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****************************************************************************
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>C O M P U T E R U N D E R G R O U N D<
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>D I G E S T<
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*** Volume 3, Issue #3.23 (June 27, 1991) **
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****************************************************************************
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MODERATORS: Jim Thomas / Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.bitnet)
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PHILEMEISTER: Bob Krause // VACATIONMEISTER: Bob Kusumoto
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MEISTERMEISTER: Brendan Kehoe
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+++++ +++++ +++++ +++++ +++++
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CONTENTS THIS ISSUE:
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File 1: From the Mailbag (Response to Dalton; Hacker Definitions)
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File 2: Warrants issued for Indiana and Michigan "Hackers"
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File 3: More on Thrifty-Tel
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File 4: The CU in the News (Thackeray; Cellular Fraud; Privacy)
|
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+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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CuD is available via electronic mail at no cost. Hard copies are available
|
||
through subscription or single issue requests for the costs of reproduction
|
||
and mailing.
|
||
|
||
USENET readers can currently receive CuD as alt.society.cu-digest.
|
||
Back issues of Computer Underground Digest on CompuServe can be found
|
||
in these forums:
|
||
IBMBBS, DL0 (new uploads) and DL4 (BBS Management)
|
||
LAWSIG, DL1 (Computer Law)
|
||
TELECOM, DL0 (New Uploads) and DL12 (Electronic Frontier)
|
||
Back issues are also available from:
|
||
GEnie, PC-EXEC BBS (414-789-4210), and at 1:100/345 for those on FIDOnet.
|
||
Anonymous ftp sites: (1) ftp.cs.widener.edu (192.55.239.132);
|
||
(2) cudarch@chsun1.uchicago.edu;
|
||
(3) dagon.acc.stolaf.edu (130.71.192.18).
|
||
E-mail server: archive-server@chsun1.uchicago.edu.
|
||
|
||
COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
|
||
information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of
|
||
diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted as long as the source is
|
||
cited. Some authors, however, do copyright their material, and those
|
||
authors should be contacted for reprint permission. It is assumed
|
||
that non-personal mail to the moderators may be reprinted unless
|
||
otherwise specified. Readers are encouraged to submit reasoned
|
||
articles relating to the Computer Underground. Articles are preferred
|
||
to short responses. Please avoid quoting previous posts unless
|
||
absolutely necessary.
|
||
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent
|
||
the views of the moderators. Contributors assume all
|
||
responsibility for assuring that articles submitted do not
|
||
violate copyright protections.
|
||
|
||
********************************************************************
|
||
>> END OF THIS FILE <<
|
||
***************************************************************************
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|
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------------------------------
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From: Various
|
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Subject: From the Mailbag (Response to Dalton; Hacker Definitions)
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Date: June 27, 1991
|
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********************************************************************
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*** CuD #3.23: File 1 of 4: From the Mailbag ***
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********************************************************************
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From: "Chas. Dye -- Solarsys Mechanic" <chas@SOLUTION.COM>
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Subject: Anonymous uucp from solarsys in Bay Area
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Date: Mon, 24 Jun 91 19:13:32 PDT
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solarsys, the site available for anonymous uucp downloads in the Bay
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Area, has had connectivity problems which have since been remedied. If you
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would like a listing of the available archives, you can grap the file
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/usr/uucppublic/ls-lR.Z
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You need to have a line in you Systems (or L.Sys) file which looks like this:
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solarsys ANY ACU <speed> <number> ""-%n-gin: archinfo sword: knockknock
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where
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<speed> is a standard modem speed between 300 and 19200
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(We have a Telebit T2500 modem)
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and
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<number> is whatever portion of "1 415 339 6540" you need from
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your site
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Feel free to contribute files by writing them to the directory
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/usr/uucppublic/newfiles
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and letting me know (via mail to chas@solution.com) that you have sent
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something.
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We apologize for any inconvenience you may have experienced by with
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earlier attempts to dial in.
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|
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++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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From: argonaut@PNET91.CTS.COM(C. Peter Constantinidis)
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Subject: Dalton Spence's Imaginary Canadian BBS Crackdown
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Date: Sun, 23 Jun 91 14:20:14 EDT
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> However, I will not become TOO complacent, since the government of
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> Canada has a history of following the lead of the United States, even
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> when it would serve us better NOT to. I am worried that the recent
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> virus infestations of government computers, as described in the
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> attached article from "Toronto Computes!" magazine (June 3, Vol. 7,
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> #5, p. 3), may act as a catalyst for a crackdown on Canadian bulletin
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> boards. Which would be a shame, since I am just getting the hang of
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> using them.
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Give me a break Dalton. I would be very interested in understanding
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how exactly you put two and two together to result in four. Because I
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cannot seem to understand how it could possibly happen. So basically
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you're saying, that if the government uses lousy computers with lousy
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security and some 14 year old writes a virus program that says, for
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example, "legalize marijuana" the government is going to take revenge
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by taking away the computers of every single Canadian in the country?
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Come on.. Unless the government goes dictatorship (doubtful) the
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people would go ballistic and vote the government out of existence in
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a hurry.
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I would imagine those people who would like to ban BBSes are the same
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people who are unable to program a VCR's clock because they are simply
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too technologically stupid. There is an expression you might be
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familiar with, "those who cannot do, teach".
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But back to the topic, whipping out our handy copy of the Canadian
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Charter of Rights and Freedoms we see in section 2b that ALL forms of
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communication, electronic and otherwise are PROTECTED. The government
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could not ban BBSes or crack down on them unless it could prove that
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it would benefit the people to do so and obviously they can't. Because
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of the protection in section 2b they cannot regulate bbses because
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then it would be controlling people's ability to read,write and
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communicate with other people.
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Canada has better protections in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms
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than the Americans do in their Constitution. The Canadian Charter was
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written in 1982 which makes it more up to date and contemporary. So
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you needn't worry that tomorrow morning you'll be woken up by big
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thugs shining a bright light into your eyes, having them drag you
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outside and shoot you just because of some scare mongers (which you
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tried to do) or out of date laws in OTHER countries.
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Dalton, last time I looked, Canada was still a sovereign country. And
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the government has more important things to worry about than computers
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bbses. So just take it easy and don't worry. Of course one knows one
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shouldn't send email to the government over and over saying "fuck you!
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i'm a BBS user! what are you gonna do about that?! hahahahahah"
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Jesus...
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|
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Hope this has helped in clearing up any confusion.
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|
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++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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From: "76012,300 Brad Hicks" <76012.300@COMPUSERVE.COM>
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Subject: Phreaks/Crackers/Hackers and Assundry Others
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Date: 20 Jun 91 10:59:54 EDT
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Attn: Computer Underground Digest
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REGARDING Re: Please Explain the Terms 'Hacker' and
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"Phreaker'
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In TELECOM Digest vol 11, #471, jdl@pro-nbs.cts.com (Jennifer
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Lafferty) asked:
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> I'm kind of lost here. Exactly what is "phreaking" and "hacking"
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> as you are using the terms.
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This should make a LONG thread. Everybody has their own definitions.
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Pat Townson, the TELECOM moderator, chimed in with his own. If I may
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paraphrase in the interest of brevity, Pat sez that a phreaker is
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someone who likes to rip of the Phone Cops; a hacker, a bright
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computer programmer; and a cracker, someone who rips off computer
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users.
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If true, this leaves a gaping hole in the language: what do we call a
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bright phone system expert who isn't a bright computer programmer?
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That aside, let me chip in my own definitions, which hopefully will
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shed as much light as they will heat (grin):
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HACKER: (n) Derived from "to hack," a verb used at MIT for dozens of
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years now to mean "to throw something together quickly" with an
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alternate, but related meaning, "to prank." (In MIT usage, a great
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prank is still called a hack, whether or not it has anything to do
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with computers.) Computer hackers are people who live for their
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hobby/profession. What separates a truly brilliant hacker from a
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truly brilliant programmer is that the hacker is only interested in
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results; s/he will achieve the impossible in record time but with code
|
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that cannot be maintained and no documentation.
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As one of Nancy Lebovitz's buttons says, "Real programmers don't
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document. If it was hard to write, it SHOULD be hard to understand."
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Or as we used to say at Taylor U., a hacker is someone who will sit at
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a computer terminal for two solid days, drinking gallons of
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caffeinated beverages and eating nothing but junk food out of vending
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machines, for no other reward than to hear another hacker say, "How
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did you get it to do THAT?"
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PHREAK: (n) Derived from the word "phone" and the Sixties usage,
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"freak," meaning someone who is very attached to, interested in,
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and/or experienced with something (e.g., "acid freak"). A "phone
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freak," or "phreak," is to the world-wide telephone system what a
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hacker is to computers: bright, not terribly disciplined, fanatically
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interested in all of the technical details, and (in many cases) prone
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to harmless but technically illegal pranks.
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CRACKER: (n) A hacker who specializes in entering systems against the
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owner and/or administrator's wishes. Used to be fairly common
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practice among hackers, but then, computing used to be WAY outside the
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price range of almost anybody and computers used to have lots of empty
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CPU cycles in the evenings. (There also used to be a lot fewer
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hackers; what is harmless when four or five people do it may become a
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social problem when four or five thousand do it.) Now hackers who
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don't illegally enter systems insist on a distinction between
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"hackers" and "crackers;" most so-called crackers do not, and just
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call themselves hackers.
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CRASHER: (n) Insult used by computer bulletin board system operators
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(sysops) to describe a cracker who enters for the malicious purpose of
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destroying the system or its contents. Used to be unheard of, but
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when I was last sysoping, was incredibly common. Crashers (who insist
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on calling themselves hackers) insist that this is because sysops are
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more obnoxious about asking for money and insisting on collecting
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legal names and addresses.
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CYBERPUNK: (n) A cyberpunk is to hackers/phreaks/crackers/crashers
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what a terrorist is to a serial killer; someone who insists that their
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crimes are in the public interest and for the common good, a
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computerized "freedom fighter" if you will.
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********************************************************************
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>> END OF THIS FILE <<
|
||
***************************************************************************
|
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------------------------------
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From: Moderators
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Subject: Warrants issued for Indiana and Michigan "Hackers"
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Date: 18 June, 1991
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********************************************************************
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*** CuD #3.23: File 1 of 4: Indiana/Michigan Hackers Busted ***
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||
********************************************************************
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%Moderators note: The following is the news release distributed
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||
by the Indianapolis Police Department.%
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NEWS RELEASE May 31, 1991
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_Search Warrants Served in Computer "Hacking" Scheme_
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INDIANAPOLIS -- The Indianapolis Police Department, the Federal Bureau
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of Investigation, and the United States Secret Service served search
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warrants at five Indianapolis locations on Wednesday, May 29, 1991,
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for computer-related equipment. The warrants were served by five teams
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of law enforcement officials forming a group known as the Special
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Computerized Attack Team (SCAT).
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SCAT is a cooperative effort between the Indianapolis Police
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Department the FBI, the Secret Service and other federal, state and
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local law enforcement agencies aimed at tracking computer "hackers"
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who illicitly enter the computer systems of companies in an attempt to
|
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gain sensitive information, money, or company secrets.
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|
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The White Collar Crime Unit of IPD obtained information from the FBI
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and Secret Service concerning illegal computer access to the PBX
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system of an Indianapolis company. Armed with search warrants, SCAT
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members confiscated computer equipment from fie Indianapolis residences
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which linked several juveniles to the crime. The Indianapolis company
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has experienced losses which approach $300,000. A search warrant was
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served simultaneously by FBI agents, the Secret Service and Michigan
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State Police in West Bloomfield, Michigan, in this same case.
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Information gained from the search warrants has led police to continue
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the investigation in other cities as well.
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Suspects in the case are all juveniles and the investigation is
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continuing to determine if the evidence collected will support
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arrests. The SCAT unit is currently investigating other
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computer-related crimes and hopes to send a strong message to computer
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"hakers" that their illegal actions are being monitored closely bylaw
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enforcement officials.
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|
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For further information, please contact Special Agent in Charge Roy
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Yonkus, U.S. Secret Service (Indiana) at 317/ 639-3301; or John M.
|
||
Britt, Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge, U.S. Secret Service
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(Detroit Office) at 313/ 226-6400.
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|
||
********************************************************************
|
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>> END OF THIS FILE <<
|
||
***************************************************************************
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
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|
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From: John Higdon and Dennis Rears
|
||
Subject: More on Thrifty-Tel
|
||
Date: June 25, 1991
|
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|
||
********************************************************************
|
||
*** CuD #3.23: File 1 of 4: More on Thrifty-Tel ***
|
||
********************************************************************
|
||
|
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%Moderators' note: The following is reprinted from Telecom Digest%
|
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|
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Date: Sat, 15 Jun 91 02:24 PDT
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From: John Higdon <john@zygot.ati.com>
|
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|
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Mark Seecof <marks@capnet.latimes.com> quotes the %LA Times%:
|
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|
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> %%Little Phone Company on a Hacker Attack''
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> By Susan Christian, Times Staff Writer.
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|
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On June 13, the %San Jose Mercury% ran a story about Ms. Bigley's
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courageous efforts. The writer, Alex Barnum, did a little more
|
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investigating and presented a little more balanced picture than Ms.
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Christian. Excerpts below:
|
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|
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Firm's Big Phone Fees Hang up Hackers
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by Alex Barnum, Mercury Staff Writer
|
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|
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"A year ago, Thrifty Tel Inc. won approval from the state Public
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Utilities Commission ot charge unauthorized users of its long-distance
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lines a 'special' rate: a $3,000 'set-up' charge, a $3,000 daily line
|
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fee, $200 an hour for labor and the costs of investigating and
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prosecuting the offender.
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|
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"Since then, the Garden Grove company has netted $500,000 and caught
|
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72 hackers, ranging from an 11-year-old girl to a grandma-grandpa team
|
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of professional phone hackers."
|
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|
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[Doesn't sound as if Thrifty Tel came off too badly on that one, does
|
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it? That's $500,000 NET profit on hackers. JH]
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|
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"But while many have applauded Thrifty Tel's ingenuity, others have
|
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criticized the company for taking the law into its own hands. Some Los
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Angeles law enforcement officials, in fact, say the approach borders
|
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on extortion ...
|
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|
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"Others charge that Thrifty Tel is deliberately baiting its long-distance
|
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system with lax security to catch hackers and bring in new revenue.
|
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Thrifty Tel is 'a vigilante,' says John Higdon, a San Jose phone
|
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network expert." [blush]....
|
||
|
||
"Even a single call can cost a hacker more than $6,000. And Thrifty
|
||
Tel charges an extra $3,000 for every access code the hacker uses.
|
||
Since about half of Thrifty Tel's hacker 'customers' are minors, their
|
||
parents usually wind up footing the bill.
|
||
|
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"Moreover, as a condition of the settlement, Thrifty Tel requires
|
||
hackers to hand over their computers which mirrors a provision in the
|
||
criminal code. Bigley usually turns the computer over to authorities,
|
||
although she says she kept one once. [She kept more than that
|
||
according to her own conversation with me. JH]
|
||
|
||
"While praising Bigley's basic strategy, law enforcement officials say
|
||
she has taken it a step too far. 'She can threaten a civil suit, but
|
||
not criminal charges,' says one official. 'You don't use a criminal
|
||
code to enforce a civil settlement.'"...
|
||
|
||
"Other critics charge that Thrifty Tel is deliberately baiting hackers
|
||
with antiquated switching technology and short access codes that are
|
||
easier to hack than the more modern, secure technology and 14-digit
|
||
access codes of the major long-distance carriers."
|
||
|
||
Mr. Barnum has all the quotes from Ms. Bigley that the %LA Times%
|
||
article had, which essentially contain the circular argument that it
|
||
costs money to upgrade to FGD and why should Thrifty have to spend
|
||
that money on account of "thugs and criminals" while whining about all
|
||
the losses suffered at the hands of the hackers. Thrifty's technique
|
||
looks more like a profit center than hacker "prevention".
|
||
****************************************************************
|
||
|
||
%Moderators' note: The following is reprinted from TELECOM Digest, #476%.
|
||
|
||
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 91 11:07:35 EDT
|
||
From: "Dennis G. Rears (FSAC)" <drears@pica.army.mil>
|
||
Subject: Re: Speaking in Defense of ThriftyTel (was Fighting Hackers)
|
||
|
||
|
||
Kurt Guntheroth <kurt@tc.fluke.com> writes:
|
||
|
||
> John Higdon says:
|
||
|
||
>> Mr. Barnum has all the quotes from Ms. Bigley that the %LA Times%
|
||
>> article had, which essentially contain the circular argument that it
|
||
>> costs money to upgrade to FGD and why should Thrifty have to spend
|
||
>> that money on account of "thugs and criminals" while whining about all
|
||
>> the losses suffered at the hands of the hackers. Thrifty's technique
|
||
>> looks more like a profit center than hacker "prevention".
|
||
|
||
> Let's suppose ThriftyTel is deliberately baiting hackers (though using
|
||
> older equipment because it is cheap sounds more reasonable to me).
|
||
> How can this be considered more reprehensible than stealing network
|
||
> services in the first place? I find it quite just that a company
|
||
> should hang hackers with their own rope. If ThriftyTel was posting
|
||
> the access codes on pirate BBS's, this might be going a bit too far on
|
||
> the entrapment side, but there is no evidence this is happening.
|
||
|
||
Have you ever heard of an attractive nuisance? Granted it may be
|
||
stretching a point, but hey we are talking about California? :-) It
|
||
could be argued that ThriftyTel has created an attractive nuisance by
|
||
not securing their systems in accordance with industry standards; just
|
||
like the homeowner who does not build a secure enough fence to keep
|
||
the little cretins out of his/her pool.
|
||
|
||
> And whoever asked whether ThriftyTel was inducing minors to enter into
|
||
> an unenforceable contract, or an ex-post-facto contract, this may be
|
||
> true. The hackers do have the option of refusing the contract and
|
||
> letting ThriftyTel make good on its threat to initiate criminal
|
||
> proceedings if it can. Probably most hackers, caught crouched over
|
||
> the body with the smoking gun in their hand, and with the knowledge of
|
||
> their guilt in mind, are reluctant to test their luck in court.
|
||
|
||
Contract, hell it is extortion. As any first year law student could
|
||
tell you the following must exist to be a contract:
|
||
|
||
o legality of object # OK
|
||
o mutual consideration # OK
|
||
o contractual capacity # OK; minors create
|
||
# a voidable contract
|
||
o manifestion of consent
|
||
(offer/acceptance) # NO
|
||
o meeting of the minds
|
||
|
||
The hacker is not aware of the offer (tariff), there is no manifestion
|
||
of consent, and there is not meeting of the minds.
|
||
|
||
Another point, California has the Uniform Commercial Code, thus the
|
||
statue of frauds would apply. This means the contract (including
|
||
acceptance) must be in writing for amount of over $500.00.
|
||
|
||
One last point if they are saying a contract was formed, it becomes a
|
||
civil matter only not a criminal. Either it is a contract in all
|
||
cases or a contract in no cases. If they decide it is a contract they
|
||
have to sue for breach of contract; they can't have criminal charges
|
||
too. They must be consistent.
|
||
|
||
BTW, I don't approve of what the hackers/phreakers are doing either,
|
||
but ThriftyTel response is just as abusive of the laws as
|
||
hackers/phreakers. We are still innocent until proven guilty, and
|
||
there is no way I can tolerate any company or government "official"
|
||
altering this.
|
||
|
||
dennis
|
||
|
||
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
||
Subject: Re: Speaking in Defense of ThriftyTel (was Fighting Hackers)
|
||
Date: 21 Jun 91 12:32:56 PDT (Fri)
|
||
From: John Higdon <john@mojave.ati.com>
|
||
|
||
Kurt Guntheroth <kurt@tc.fluke.com> writes:
|
||
|
||
> Record me as a supporter of ThriftyTel.
|
||
|
||
You are overlooking a major flaw in Thrifty Tel's scam. In the United
|
||
States, the system of jurisprudence requires the plaintiff in a civil
|
||
case to 1.) prove damages and 2.) show mitigation of damages. Thrifty
|
||
Tel does neither.
|
||
|
||
In a five-day period, Thrifty Tel whisked a "Hacker Tariff" through
|
||
the CPUC without comment, showing, documentation, or any justification
|
||
WHATSOEVER. This tariff, which provides for "charges" that are around
|
||
three hundred times the company's going rate for services, is then
|
||
used in civil suits to claim damages. Thrifty Tel sits back in court,
|
||
presents the logs showing the intruder's usage and then holds up this
|
||
bogus tariff. In other words, TT has at no time ever proved its claim
|
||
for the extortion it pulls on the "criminals and thugs" that it so
|
||
actively crusades against.
|
||
|
||
Concerning point two, let me give you an analogy. Let us suppose that
|
||
I have decided to go into the banking business, but find that the cost
|
||
of constructing a vault is prohibitively expensive. So I leave all the
|
||
cash sitting around in the tellers' drawers. Word gets around that my
|
||
bank is an easy mark, and consequently I find that frequently the cash
|
||
has been cleaned out by thieves the night before. To combat this, I
|
||
install a very sophisticated intrusion detection system with cameras
|
||
and the like. I am now able to identify the thieves and I manage to
|
||
get a law passed that allows my bank to claim damages against the
|
||
burglars at about three hundred times the value of the cash stolen.
|
||
|
||
Obviously, a bank vault would solve the lion's share of my problem,
|
||
but why should I have to pay for a vault when it is "criminals and
|
||
thugs" that are at the root of my "losses"? This is precisely the
|
||
argument that TT uses when it is suggested that it upgrade its
|
||
equipment and use FGD instead of FGB.
|
||
|
||
Of course, FGD would not allow it to skim intraLATA traffic from
|
||
Pac*Bell as it now does, but that is a different matter altogether.
|
||
Believe me when I tell you that Thrifty Tel has no moral high ground
|
||
to stand on.
|
||
|
||
John Higdon <john@zygot.ati.com> (hiding out in the desert)
|
||
|
||
********************************************************************
|
||
>> END OF THIS FILE <<
|
||
***************************************************************************
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
From: Various
|
||
Subject: The CU in the News (Thackeray; Cellular Fraud; Privacy)
|
||
Date: 27 June, 1991
|
||
|
||
********************************************************************
|
||
*** CuD #3.23: File 1 of 4: CU in the News / Thackeray;Privacy ***
|
||
********************************************************************
|
||
|
||
From: Barbara E. McMullen & John F. McMullen (Reprinted from Newsbytes)
|
||
Subject: Gail Thackeray & Neal Norman Form Security Firm
|
||
Date: June 21, 1991
|
||
|
||
NORMAN & THACKERAY FORM SECURITY FIRM 06/21/91
|
||
|
||
DALLAS, TEXAS U.S.A., 1991 JUNE 21 (NB) -- Neal Norman, a veteran of
|
||
34 years with AT&T, has announced the formation of GateKeeper
|
||
Telecommunications Systems, Inc. The new firm will introduce a
|
||
product which it says "provides an airtight defenses against
|
||
unauthorized computer access."
|
||
|
||
Norman told Newsbytes "we think we have a product that will
|
||
revolutionize telecommunications by stopping unauthorized access to
|
||
computer systems." Norman said that the system, which is scheduled to
|
||
become available in the early fall, will provide protection for
|
||
terminals, mainframes, and PBXs.
|
||
|
||
Norman also told Newsbytes that Gail Thackeray, ex-Arizona assistant
|
||
attorney general known for her activities in the investigation of
|
||
computer crime, will be a vice president of the new firm. "I am
|
||
extremely happy to have someone of Gail's ability and presence
|
||
involved in this endeavor right from the beginning. Additionally,"
|
||
Norman said, "we have enlisted some of the industry's most well known
|
||
persons to serve on a board of advisors to our new company. These
|
||
respected individuals will provide guidance for us as we bring our
|
||
system to market. Among those who have agreed to serve in this group
|
||
are Donn Parker of SRI; Bill Murray, formerly of IBM; and Bob Snyder,
|
||
Chief Computer Crime Investigator for the Columbus, Ohio, police.
|
||
|
||
Synder told Newsbytes "I am excited about working with such bright
|
||
people on something of real importance and I hope to contribute to an
|
||
improvement in computer security."
|
||
|
||
(Barbara E. McMullen & John F. McMullen/19910621)
|
||
|
||
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
||
From: Anonymous
|
||
Subject: Cellular Phone Fraud
|
||
Date: Thu, 27 Jun 91 13:35:41 CDT
|
||
|
||
From: The Wall Street Journal, June 6, 1991. Pp. A-1, A-7.
|
||
By John J. Keller
|
||
|
||
DIALING FOR FREE
|
||
****
|
||
Thanks to Hackers, Cellular Phone Firms Now Face Crime Wave
|
||
***
|
||
An Altered Computer Chip is Permitting Easy Access to Networks Nationwide
|
||
***
|
||
Mr. Sutton's Crucial Error
|
||
***
|
||
|
||
Robert Dewayne Sutton wants to help stop the tide of fraud sweeping the
|
||
cellular telephone industry. The 35-year old clearly knows plenty about
|
||
fraud. After all, he helped spark the crime wave in the first place.
|
||
|
||
Mr. Sutton is a computer hacker, a technical whiz who used an
|
||
acquaintance's home-grown computer chip to tap into the local cellular
|
||
phone network and dial for free. Mr. Sutton went into business selling the
|
||
chips, authorities say, and soon fraudulent cellular phone calls were
|
||
soaring nationwide.
|
||
|
||
In February, 1989, police finally nabbed Mr. Sutton in his pick-up truck at
|
||
a small Van Nuys, Calif., gas station. He was about to sell five more of
|
||
the custom chips to a middleman. But by then it was too late. The wave of
|
||
fraud Mr. Sutton helped launch was rolling on without him.
|
||
|
||
((stuff deleted explaining that industry currently loosing about $200
|
||
million a year, "more than 4% of annual U.S. revenue" to cellular phone
|
||
fraud, and could rise to %600 million annually. Celluar system first
|
||
cracked in 1987, by Kenneth Steven Bailey an acquaintance of Sutton from
|
||
Laguna Niguel, Calif. Bailey used his PC to rewrite the software in the
|
||
phone's memory chi to change the electronic serial number. By replacing the
|
||
company chip with his own, Bailey could gain free access to the phone
|
||
system.))
|
||
|
||
((More stuff deleted, explaining how drug dealers use the phones, and small
|
||
businesses sprung up selling free calls to anyplace in the world for a few
|
||
dollars. Sutton denied selling the chips, but apparently sold his program
|
||
for a few hundred dollars, and anybody with a copy could duplicate it. This
|
||
is, according to the story, an international problem.))
|
||
|
||
When the dust settled in U.S. District Court in Los Angeles this April, Mr.
|
||
Sutton pleaded guilty to production of counterfeit access devices and, after
|
||
agreeing to cooperate with investigators, was sentenced to three years'
|
||
probation and a $2,500 fine.
|
||
|
||
((stuff deleted))
|
||
|
||
But in adversity there is opportunity, or so believes Mr. Sutton. He says
|
||
he's got a marketable expertise--his knowledge of weaknesses in cellular
|
||
phone security systems--and he wants to help phone companies crack down on
|
||
phone fraud. He'll do that, of course, for a fee.
|
||
|
||
** end article**
|
||
|
||
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
||
From: <Silicon Surfer@unixville.edu>
|
||
Subject: How Did They Get My Name?
|
||
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 91 19:09 EDT
|
||
|
||
How Did They Get My Name?
|
||
By John Schwartz
|
||
Newsweek: June 3, 1991
|
||
|
||
When Pam Douglas dropped by Michelle Materres's apartment, Michelle
|
||
was on the phone--but Pam knew that already. She and her son, Brian,
|
||
had been playing with his new walkie-talkie and noticed the toy was
|
||
picking up Michelle's cordless-phone conversation next door. They had
|
||
come over to warn her that her conversation was anything but private.
|
||
Materres was stunned. It was as if her neighbors could peek through a
|
||
window into her bedroom-except that Michelle hadn't known that this
|
||
window was there. "It's like Nineteen Eighty-four ;" she says.
|
||
|
||
Well, not quite. In Orwell's oppressive world, Big Brother-the police
|
||
state-was watching. "We don't have to worry about Big Brother
|
||
anymore," says Evan Hendricks, publisher of the Washington-based
|
||
Privacy Times. "We have to worry about little brother." Until
|
||
recently, most privacy fears focused on the direct mail industry; now
|
||
people are finding plenty of other snoops. Today's little brothers
|
||
are our neighbors, bosses and merchants, and technology and modern
|
||
marketing techniques have given each a window into our lives.
|
||
|
||
Suddenly privacy is a very public issue. A 1990 Harris poll, conducted
|
||
for consumer-data giant Equifax, showed that 79 percent of respondents
|
||
were concerned with threats to their personal privacy-up from 47
|
||
percent in 1977. Privacy scare stories are becoming a staple of local
|
||
TV news; New York City's ABC affiliate showed journalist Jeffrey
|
||
Rothfeder poking into Vice President Dan Quayle's on-line credit
|
||
records-a trick he had performed a year before for a story he wrote
|
||
for Business Week. Now Congress is scrambling to bring some order to
|
||
the hodgepodge of privacy and technology laws, and the U.S. Office of
|
||
Consumer Affairs has targeted privacy as one of its prime concerns.
|
||
Advocacy groups like the Consumer Federation of America and the
|
||
American Civil Liberties Union are turning to privacy as one of the
|
||
hot-button issues for the '90s . "There's a tremendous groundswell of
|
||
support out there," says Janlori Goldman, who heads the ACLU Privacy
|
||
Project.
|
||
|
||
Snooping boss: Concern is on the rise because, like Materres,
|
||
consumers are finding that their lives are an open book. Workers who
|
||
use networked computers can be monitored by their bosses, who in some
|
||
cases can read electronic mail and could conceivably keep track of
|
||
every keystroke to check productivity. Alana Shoars, a former e-mail
|
||
administrator at Epson America, says she was fired after trying to
|
||
make her boss stop reading co-workers' e-mail. The company says
|
||
Shoars got the ax for in subordination; Shoars counters that the
|
||
evidence used against her was in her own e-mail--and was
|
||
misinterpreted. Other new technologies also pose threats: cordless and
|
||
cellular phones are fair game for anyone with the right receiver, be
|
||
it a $1,000 scanner or a baby monitor. Modern digital-telephone
|
||
networks allow tapping without ever placing a physical bug; talented
|
||
"phone phreaks" can monitor calls through phone companies or corporate
|
||
switchboards.
|
||
|
||
Such invasions may sound spooky, but privacy activists warn that the
|
||
bigger threat comes from business. Information given freely by
|
||
consumers to get credit or insurance is commonly sold for other uses
|
||
without the individual's knowledge or consent; the result is a flood
|
||
of junk mail and more. Banks study personal financial data to target
|
||
potential credit-card customers. Data sellers market lists of people
|
||
who have filed Worker Compensation claims or medical-malpractice
|
||
suits; such databases can be used to blackball prospective employees
|
||
or patients. Citicorp and other data merchants are even pilot testing
|
||
systems in supermarkets that will record your every purchase; folks
|
||
who buy Mennen's Speed Stick could get pitches and discount coupons to
|
||
buy Secret instead. "Everything we do, every transaction we engage in
|
||
goes into somebody's computer, " says Gary Culnan, a Georgetown
|
||
University associate professor of business administration.
|
||
|
||
How much others know about you can be unsettling. Architect David
|
||
Harrison got an evening call from a local cemetery offering him a deal
|
||
on a plot. The sales rep mentioned Harrison's profession, family size
|
||
and how long he had lived in Chappaqua, N.Y. Harrison gets several
|
||
sales calls a week, but rarely with so much detail: "This one was a
|
||
little bizarre."
|
||
|
||
High tech is not the only culprit. As databases grow in the '80s, the
|
||
controls were melting away, says Hendricks. "Reagan came in and said,
|
||
'We're going to get government off the backs of the American people.'
|
||
What he really meant was, 'We're going to get government regulators
|
||
off the i backs of business.' That sent signals to the private sector
|
||
that 'you can use people's personal information any way you want'"'
|
||
The advent of powerful PCs means that the field is primed for another
|
||
boom. Today companies can buy the results of the entire 1990 census
|
||
linked to a street-by-street map of the United States on several
|
||
CD-ROM disks.
|
||
|
||
Defenders of the direct-marketing industry point out that in most
|
||
cases companies are simply, trying to reach consumers efficiently-and
|
||
that well targeted mail is not "junk" to the recipient. Says Equifax
|
||
spokesman John Ford: "People like the kinds of mail they want to
|
||
receive." Targeting is now crucial, says Columbia University professor
|
||
Alan Westin: "If you can't recognize the people who are your better
|
||
prospects, you can't stay in business." Ronald Plesser, a lawyer who
|
||
represents the Direct Marketing Association, says activists could end
|
||
up hurting groups they support: "It's not just marketers. It's
|
||
nonprofit communication, it's political parties. It's environmental
|
||
groups. "
|
||
|
||
E-mail protest: Consumers are beginning to fight back. The watershed
|
||
event was a fight over a marketing aid with data on 80 million
|
||
households, Lotus MarketPlace: Households, proposed by the Cambridge,
|
||
Mass.- based Lotus Development Corp. Such information had been readily
|
||
available to large corporations for years, but MarketPlace would have
|
||
let anyone with the right PC tap in. Lotus received some 30,000
|
||
requests to be taken off the households list. Saying the product was
|
||
misunderstood, Lotus killed MarketPlace earlier this year. New York
|
||
Telephone got nearly 800,000 "opt out" requests when it wanted to
|
||
peddle its customer list; the plan was shelved.
|
||
|
||
With the MarketPlace revolt, a growing right-to-privacy underground
|
||
surfaced for the first time. Privacy has become one of the most
|
||
passionately argued issues on computer networks like the massive
|
||
Internet, which links thousands of academic, business nd military
|
||
computers. Protests against MarketPlace were broadcast on the Internet
|
||
and the WELL (an on-line service that has become a favorite electronic
|
||
hangout for privacy advocates and techie journalists), and many
|
||
anti-MarketPlace letters to Lotus were relayed by e-mail.
|
||
|
||
Consumers are also taking new steps to safeguard their own privacy
|
||
often by contacting the Direct Marketing Association, which can remove
|
||
names from many mailing lists. But compliance is voluntary, and relief
|
||
is slow. In one chilling case, an unknown enemy began flooding
|
||
business manager Michael Shapiro's Sherman Oaks, Calif., home with
|
||
hundreds of pieces of hate junk mail. Suddenly Shapiro, who is
|
||
Jewish, was receiving mail addressed to "Auschwitz Gene Research" and
|
||
"Belsen Fumigation Labs." Shapiro appealed to the DMA and the mailing
|
||
companies directly but got no responses to most of his calls and
|
||
letters. "They ignore you, throw your letter away and sell your name
|
||
to another generation of people with computers," he complains. Finally
|
||
one marketing executive publicized Shapiro's plight within the DM
|
||
industry. Eight months after the onslaught began, the letters have
|
||
slowed-though some companies still have not removed him from their
|
||
lists.
|
||
|
||
How else can privacy be protected? It doesn't have to mean living like
|
||
a hermit and only paying cash, but it does mean not saying anything
|
||
over cellular and cordless phones that you wouldn't want others to
|
||
overhear. Culnan of Georgetown uses her American Express card
|
||
exclusively, because while the company collects voluminous data on its
|
||
cardholders, it shares relatively little of it with other companies.
|
||
|
||
Some privacy activists look hopefully, across the Atlantic Ocean. The
|
||
European Community is pushing tough new data rules to take effect
|
||
after 1992. The Privacy Directive relies on consumer consent;
|
||
companies would have to notify consumers each time they intend to pass
|
||
along personal information. The direct-marketing industry claims the
|
||
regulations would be prohibitively expensive. The rules may be
|
||
softened but could still put pressure on U.S. marketers who do
|
||
business abroad.
|
||
|
||
U.S. firms might find another incentive to change. Companies don't
|
||
want to alienate privacy-minded customers. "We're in the relationship
|
||
business," says James Tobin, vice president for consumer affairs at
|
||
American Express. "We don't want to do anything to jeopardize that
|
||
relationship." Citicorp's supermarket plan makes privacy advocates
|
||
nervous; but Citicorp rewards customers for giving up their privacy
|
||
with incentives like discount coupons, and it reports that no
|
||
consumers have complained. Eventually, strong privacy-protection
|
||
policies could make companies more attractive to consumers, says
|
||
Columbia's Westin-and may even provide a competitive edge. Then
|
||
consumers might get some of their privacy back-not necessarily because
|
||
it's the law, or even because it's right, but because it's good
|
||
business.
|
||
|
||
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
||
From: <Silicon Surfer@unixville.edu>
|
||
Subject: Would New Laws Fix the Privacy Mess?
|
||
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 91 19:09 EDT
|
||
|
||
Would New Laws Fix the Privacy Mess?
|
||
By Annetta Miller and John Schwartz with Michael Rogers
|
||
Newsweek: June 3, 1991
|
||
|
||
Congress is scrambling to catch up with its constituents in the battle
|
||
over privacy. It has a daunting task ahead: to make sense of the
|
||
jumble of laws that have been passed-or are currently under
|
||
consideration-to regulate privacy. Why, for example, is it legal to
|
||
listen in on someone's cordless phone conversation but illegal to
|
||
listen to a cellular call? Why are video-rental records protected but
|
||
records of health-insurance claims largely unprotected? (That one has
|
||
to do with an impertinent reporter revealing the video-renting habits
|
||
of Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork.)
|
||
|
||
The present foundations of privacy law have their roots in the U.S.
|
||
Constitution. Although the word "privacy" does not appear in the
|
||
document, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to grant
|
||
individuals a right of privacy based on the First, Fourth, Fifth,
|
||
Ninth and Fourteenth amendments. Since the mid-1960s, Congress has
|
||
enacted no fewer than 10 privacy laws-including the landmark 1974
|
||
Privacy Act. And yet a national right to privacy is far from firmly
|
||
established. On its face, for example, the Fair Credit Reporting Act
|
||
limits access to credit reports. But it also grants an exception to
|
||
anyone with a "legitimate business need." The Right to Financial
|
||
Privacy Act of 1978 severely restricts the federal government's
|
||
ability to snoop through bank-account records; but it exempts state
|
||
agencies, including law-enforcement agencies, and private employers.
|
||
"It's easy to preach about the glories of privacy," says Jim Warren,
|
||
who organized a recent "Computers, Freedom & Privacy" conference. But
|
||
it's hard to implement policies without messing things up."
|
||
|
||
That hasn't stopped people from trying. James Rule, a State University
|
||
of New York sociology professor, says that new legislation is
|
||
warranted "on the grounds that enough is enough . . . [Privacy
|
||
infringement] produces a world that almost nobody likes the look of."
|
||
|
||
Data board: The newest efforts to regulate privacy range from simple
|
||
fixes to a full-fledged constitutional amendment. Last week a Senate
|
||
task force recommended extending privacy laws to cover cordless
|
||
tele-phones. One bill, proposed by Rep. Robert Wise of West Virginia,
|
||
would create a federal "data-protection board" to oversee business and
|
||
gov-ernmental use of electronic information. Another, being prepared
|
||
by Sen. Patrick Leahy of Vermont, would apply the Freedom of
|
||
Informa-tion Act to electronic files as well as to paper. Rep. Andy
|
||
Jacobs of Indiana has held hearings on the misuse of social-security
|
||
numbers to link computerized information. And several bills have been
|
||
introduced to stop credit reporters from selling personal data to junk
|
||
mailers.
|
||
|
||
Possibly the most sweeping proposal for change comes from Harvard
|
||
University law professor Laurence Tribe. In March, Tribe proposed a
|
||
constitutional amendment that would, among other things protect
|
||
individuals from having their private data collected and shared
|
||
without approval. "Constitutional principles should not vary with
|
||
accidents of technology," Tribe said at the "Computers, Freedom &
|
||
Privacy" conference earlier this spring. He said an amendment is
|
||
needed because the letter of the Constitution can seem, at the very
|
||
least, "impossible to take seriously in the world as reconstituted by
|
||
the microchip."
|
||
|
||
But some experts argue that well-meaning reform could do more harm
|
||
than good. Requiring marketers to get permission every time they want
|
||
to add a name to a mailing list would make almost any kind of mass
|
||
mailing hopelessly expensive. "It's nice to talk about affirmative
|
||
consent, but it really will kill the industry," warns Ronald Plesser,
|
||
who represents the Direct Marketing Association. "And then people who
|
||
live out in the country won't have access to the L.L. Bean catalog and
|
||
the services they like." In this technological age, how much privacy
|
||
Americans enjoy will depend partly on how high a price they are
|
||
willing to pay to keep it.
|
||
|
||
********************************************************************
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
**END OF CuD #3.23**
|
||
********************************************************************
|
||
|
||
|