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>C O M P U T E R U N D E R G R O U N D<
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>D I G E S T<
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*** Volume 3, Issue #3.06 (February 23, 1991) **
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****************************************************************************
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MODERATORS: Jim Thomas / Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.bitnet)
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ARCHIVISTS: Bob Krause / Alex Smith / Bob Kusumoto
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ROUTER AWAITER: Brendan Kehoe
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USENET readers can currently receive CuD as alt.society.cu-digest. Back
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issues are also available on Compuserve (in: DL0 of the IBMBBS sig),
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PC-EXEC BBS (414-789-4210), and at 1:100/345 for those on FIDOnet.
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Anonymous ftp sites: (1) ftp.cs.widener.edu (temporarily down); (2)
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cudarch@chsun1.uchicago.edu E-mail server: archive-server@chsun1.uchicago.edu.
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COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
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information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of
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diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted as long as the source is
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cited. Some authors, however, do copyright their material, and those
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||
authors should be contacted for reprint permission. It is assumed that
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||
non-personal mail to the moderators may be reprinted unless otherwise
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||
specified. Readers are encouraged to submit reasoned articles relating to
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the Computer Underground. Articles are preferred to short responses.
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||
Please avoid quoting previous posts unless absolutely necessary.
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||
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent the
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||
views of the moderators. Contributors assume all responsibility
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for assuring that articles submitted do not violate copyright
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protections.
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++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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CONTENTS THIS ISSUE:
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Subject: Moderators' Corner
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Subject: From the Mailbag
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Subject: message for help about archive server
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Subject: Felony Charges Dropped against Phiber Optik
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Subject: The FBI Comes Rapping, Rapping at Your BBS
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Subject: Some Thoughts on Government Actions
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++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
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********************************************************************
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*** CuD #3.06, File 1 of 6: Moderator's corner ***
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********************************************************************
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From: Moderators
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Subject: Moderators' Corner
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Date: February 23, 1991
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A few comments in list format:
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1) The Len Rose case is still pending. It is currently on a day-by-day
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status as discussions occur. More on this later.
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2) The concern about privacy and First Amendment issues in cyberspace
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continues. We are re-printing Brock Meeks' original "FBI" article (see file
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5 below) because it has aroused renewed interest. Brock also wrote a recent
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story on the FBI running "sting"-type operations which we encourage all to
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read. The concern impels us to do a special issue on it all within the next
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few weeks.
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3) For the next month or so, CuD will be coming out about bi-weekly because
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of time constraints. Gordon has been transferred to Pennsylvania, but will
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be commuting between the east and west coasts every two weeks as part of
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his employment. Jim's publishers have lost all sense of humor and are
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demanding the two promised books, long past deadline.
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********************************************************************
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>> END OF THIS FILE <<
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***************************************************************************
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------------------------------
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From: Moderators
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Subject: From the Mailbag
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Date: 23 February, 1991
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********************************************************************
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*** CuD #3.06: File 2 of 6: From the Mailbag ***
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********************************************************************
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From: louisg <louisg@VPNET.CHI.IL.US>
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Subject: posttocomp.org.eff.talk
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Date: Thu, 21 Feb 91 1:48:12 CST
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Has anyone seen the announcement for the Ides of March computer conference?
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The reason it caught my attention is that one of the speakers is Gail
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Thackery.
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My question is: why?
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Why is Gail speaking at a computer conference? What does she know about
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computers?
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She probably does know a lot about prosecution, I don't doubt her ability
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as a lawyer, but what does she know about computer crime specifically?
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Ok. We all know what she was involved in, but that just proves my point
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further. Those aren't exactly what you would call "clean" busts. And with
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Sundevil, there weren't even that many (any?) busts made.
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It doesn't say much for her ability to prosecute computer crime.
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What exactly is she going to speak about? I can't figure that out. Maybe
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she's going to explain what KERMIT is or something. Though, she should
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explain that to law enforcement officials.
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See, that's where I have this problem. Here we have an individual speaking
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at an industry conference, and this individual is not in the industry. She
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does not affect the industry except in destructive ways (if you want a list
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on how it's been destructive, E-mail me. It's too long for here).
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And with her being on the Well and all, and now there's a rumor of her
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getting some type of "honor" with Barlow at the Comps, Sec, and Priv
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conference, I'm beginning to wonder how one becomes an authority on
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computers.
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Why not honor some beat cops who find some stolen PC's? They have about as
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much to do with computer crime and how it relates to the industry as Gail.
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This is ridiculous. Does anyone else see politics or something coming into
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play here or is it just me?
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If what law enforcement says is true, that most computer crime goes
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unreported since companies don't want to publicly admit that they have
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security problems, then aren't the companies bigger authorities on computer
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crime than lawyers and cops and feds and what have you?
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What can Gail tell an employee of AT&T or IBM or DEC or Maxis or Sierra or
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whoever that they don't already know, and probably know better? She can't
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tell them how systems are broken into. She can't tell them about a "ring"
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of hackers/phreaks since there is no such animal. She probably can't even
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tell them what a macro is.
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Just what we need. The few decent people in the industry jumping in bed
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with fascists. Ha! I'm conservative and a capitalist and all that, but I
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still wouldn't throw what few morals I have out the door for an extra buck
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or my name in lights or anything.
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See, I agree with companies when they say that they don't want some punks
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breaking into their computers. I can even agree with arresting people who
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do. What I can't agree with is persecuting people (ala Len Rose) or
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widespread terror tactics (ala Sundevil). If I were a hacker I'd rather
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have AT&T's internal security knocking at my door rather than Gail & Co.
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seeing what they've done to people.
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The only reason I can see for Gail to be there is to bury the hatchet.
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Well, when you bury the hatchet with people who are experts at wielding
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one, you can bet it'll end up in your back in the end.
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Flames gratefully accepted.
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Louis Giliberto
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louisg@vpnet.chi.il.us
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++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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From: pmccurdy@CUP.PORTAL.COM
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Subject: CompuSec in the news
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Date: Fri, 15 Feb 91 16:29:52 PST
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Here in Northern California we have a free computer magazine called
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Microtimes. It is in a 10 1/2 x 13" format computer mag that has picked up
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quite a bit of popularity over the last couple of years. It used to be
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just a place to read advertisements, but these days it has occasional
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interesting articles, too.
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The latest issue has a cover suite on computer security. From the table of
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contents:
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*Computer Crime: Beyond The Headlines
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An Interview With Dorothy Denning*
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by John Perry Barlow
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Computer security expert Denning and self-proclaimed
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cognitive dissident Barlow discuss system break-ins,
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hacker culture, recent court cases, and long-term
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issues.
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*Why Defend Hackers?*
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by Mitch Kapor
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Lotus founder and Electronic Frontier Foundation
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chairman Kapor explains what the fledgling EFF
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organization is up to, and why.
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*Realizable Fantasies*
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by Jim Warren
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Computers, freedom, and privacy - new technology poses
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new problems and questions.
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*Cliff Stoll's Practical Security Tips*
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by Mary Eisenhart
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*Security In the Single-PC Office*
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by Paul Hoffman
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*Risk Assessment For Your Computer System*
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by Mikael Blaisdell
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How to determine your security needs and solve them in a
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cost-effective manner.
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*Bulletin Boards and the Virus Plague*
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by Jack Rickard
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*Computer Security: Information Without Hysteria*
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by B. McMullen and John McMullen
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[A review of two new books; *Computers Under Attack*, Peter
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J. Denning (ACM), and *Computers At Risk*, National Academy
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Press. Both sound worth reading.]
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++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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From: decwrl!fernwood!well!jwarren@LLL-WINKEN.LLNL.GOV(Jim Warren)
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Subject: CompFreePriv Conf Reg Scholarships
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Date: Thu, 21 Feb 91 21:39:22 pst
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TEN FULL REGISTRATION SCHOLARSHIPS FOR COMPUTERS, FREEDOM & PRIVACY CONF
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John Gilmore of Cygnus Support has offered (and prepaid) ten full
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Registration Scholarships for college and university students wishing to
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attend the four-day First Conference on Computers, Freedom & Privacy, March
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25-28, 1991, at the SFO Marriott near the San Francisco International
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Airport in Burlingame, California.
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Students wishing to apply for one of these full-paid registrations
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should send a *one*-page-only request, to arrive no later than March 10th.
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They should concisely provide the following information in that one page:
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1. Personal information (name, address, phones, possible fax#, etc.)
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2. Current college or university, major, areas of special interest,
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grad/undergrad status and expected graduation date. We are especially
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seeking students majoring in law, law enforcement, political science,
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journalism, business, information science and related disciplines.
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3. A specific statement that they are certain they can arrange all needed
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travel and accomodations for the four-day event.
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4. A specific statement that they will attend the full four days of the
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event from Monday, 9am, to Thursday, 5:30pm, including the Tuesday and
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Wednesday dinner sessions (also prepaid).
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5. A paragraph stating why they are interested in attending the event.
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6. A paragraph stating what they might, or hope to, do with information
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and insights gleaned from this Conference.
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The one-page letter or fax should arrive no later than March 10th, sent to:
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John Gilmore Liberty Scholarships (fax is fine)
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CFP Conference, 345 Swett Road, Woodside CA 94062; fax/415-851-2814 The ten
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recipients will be notified no later than March 15th, but may be notified
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much earlier. (Due to the very tight time constraints, we reserve the
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right to grant awards to especially deserving applicants before the March
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10th deadline.)
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P.S. -- MAKE HOTEL RESERVATIONS *SOON*!
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If you are planning on attending the CFP Conference, but have not yet made
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your reservations at the Marriott (800-228-9290 #3), you should do so ASAP,
|
||
if you wish to be assured the special $99 Conference discount rate. As we
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||
approach the March 25th Conference opening, the Marriott is permitted to
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release unbooked rooms -- which means they either won't be available, or
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may require much higher rates (rack rates are $140).
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Use it or loose it! :-)
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--Jim Warren, CFP Conference Chair
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++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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From: The Friendly Folk at NIA (Network Information Access)
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Subject: What is NIA? From: samp@NUCHAT.SCCSI.COM(Sam Parikh) Date: Fri, 1
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Date: Feb 91 15:48 CST
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Network Information Access is a text magazine, that relates to the
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||
underground telecom industry. Articles range from Unix, Vax, and such
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systems. Covering everything from computer crime down to the latest
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||
computer bug that is floating around.
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||
|
||
If you have ever read Phrack, LOD, PHUN, and magazines of that type of
|
||
nature, we are somewhat like that. But more/less reframed then those.
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||
|
||
Currently we have 69 issues out, around the middle/end of each month we
|
||
will mail off the next current issue. All BACK ISSUES can be found at the
|
||
CUD (Computer Underground Digest) archive site, please refer to CUD for
|
||
more information or subscribe to their echo at comp.alt.society.cu-digest.
|
||
|
||
There is no actual "deadline" for articles, reports or papers to be
|
||
submitted, so if you HAVE anything, or are WORKING on something, please
|
||
think of us first. If you have anything to send to NIA, send the completed
|
||
work, as YOU WANT it to appear in our newsletter and after reviewing your
|
||
article, checking to see if we can include it in our NEXT mailing it will
|
||
go out when our next issue is released. All articles are to be sent to
|
||
elisem@nuchat.sccsi.com.
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||
|
||
All addresses sent to NIA to be added to our mailing list is kept in the
|
||
stricket confidence, we do NOT give out our list, So YOUR ADDRESS is kept
|
||
confidential and private, and so as not to have your address flooded w/
|
||
hundreds of "Please subscribe to MY newsletter" type mailings.
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||
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If an address bounces back as "UNKNOWN" or to such, we will delete that
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||
address off of our list, so if you change your address, make sure you
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||
notify us of the change or you will loose the next issue.
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If your mailer can NOT handle files in range of 200k send a note of that to
|
||
us, so that we can make the appropriate changes and get you the latest
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copy.
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I hope that this explains to you what NIA is and hopefully you'll continue
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to read us, pass us around, and heck, recommend us to a friend.
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Creators: Judge Dredd and Guardian Of Time
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elisem@nuchat.sccsi.com
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********************************************************************
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>> END OF THIS FILE <<
|
||
***************************************************************************
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
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||
From: kusumoto@CHSUN1.UCHICAGO.EDU(Bob Kusumoto)
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Subject: message for help about archive server
|
||
Date: Wed, 20 Feb 91 19:12:07 CST
|
||
|
||
********************************************************************
|
||
*** CuD #3.06: File 3 of 6: CuD Archive Server ***
|
||
********************************************************************
|
||
|
||
Some people seem to be having problems using the email archive server based
|
||
here. Here are some helpful hints:
|
||
|
||
a) place all commands to the archive server in the BODY of the message. The
|
||
server will ignore commands on the subject line.
|
||
|
||
b) do not use any slashes ('/') in any command. The server does not know
|
||
how to handle commands with slashes in the command.
|
||
|
||
c) use the "path" command. Although we do have a fairly smart mailer, it's
|
||
not foolproof. This is especially true for sites that are not directly
|
||
on the Internet. UUCP sites should locate a node on the Internet (like
|
||
uunet) and use it as a base. Bitnet sites should add the suffix .bitnet
|
||
to the end of their hostname. For example:
|
||
|
||
path uunet.uu.net!nexthost!myhost!me
|
||
path me@bithost.bitnet
|
||
|
||
This should eliminate problems getting to you.
|
||
|
||
d) If you're asking for many files, it helps to break up the send command
|
||
into multiple files. This is especially true for large files. For example:
|
||
|
||
send cud cud1.01
|
||
send cud cud1.02
|
||
send cud cud1.03
|
||
is better than
|
||
send cud cud1.01 cud1.02 cud1.03
|
||
|
||
e) Some helpful commands that the server knows:
|
||
|
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index
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||
index cud
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||
send cud cud-arch
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||
send cud chsun1.email.files
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||
|
||
Also, try and keep the files you request per send command to under 45000
|
||
bytes. Anything much larger than that will not be sent. If you want
|
||
very large files, send a special request to
|
||
archive-management@chsun1.uchicago.edu and special arrangements will be
|
||
made.
|
||
|
||
f) This is not the address for requesting futures issues of CuD to be mailed
|
||
to you. You should send those requests to: TK0JUT2@NIU.bitnet
|
||
and place the address for being placed on the mailing list.
|
||
|
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Thanks,
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||
Bob Kusumoto
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chsun1 archive management
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||
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||
********************************************************************
|
||
>> END OF THIS FILE <<
|
||
***************************************************************************
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
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|
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From: NEWSBYTES (reprint) by John F. McMullen
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Subject: Felony Charges Dropped against Phiber Optik
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Date: February 20, 1991
|
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********************************************************************
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||
*** CuD #3.06: File 4 of 6: No Felony Charges against Phiber O. ***
|
||
********************************************************************
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|
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FELONY CHARGES DROPPED AGAINST "HACKER" 2/20/91
|
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|
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NEW YORK, NEW YORK, U.S.A., 1991 FEB 20(NB) -- The felony charges of
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computer tampering and computer trespass have been dropped against Mark
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Abene, known throughout the "hacker world" as "Phiber Optic". Abene pleaded
|
||
guilty to a misdemeanor charge of unauthorized use of a computer and will
|
||
be sentenced on April 4th on that count.
|
||
|
||
The arrest of Abene by New York State Police on February 5th followed over
|
||
a year of uncertainty for Abene who had computer equipment and notes seized
|
||
during the execution of a search warrant on January 24th, 1990. At the time
|
||
of the arrest, it was alleged that Abene had electronically invaded a New
|
||
York Telephone Company computer and activated an unused telephone number.
|
||
He then supposedly arranged call forwarding to a "900" number to provide
|
||
free access to an otherwise chargeable service. These allegations led to
|
||
Abene being charged with the two felonies and a misdemeanor for theft of
|
||
services.
|
||
|
||
The dropping of the felony charges on February 19th in New York state court
|
||
was accompanied by a changing of the theft of services charge to one
|
||
alleging unauthorized use of a computer and it was the new charge to which
|
||
Abene pleaded guilty. Abene's attorney, Carol Grumbach of the firm of
|
||
Levinson & Kaplan told Newsbytes that she expects the April 4th sentencing
|
||
to result in Abene being granted youthful offender status and court records
|
||
sealed as a result. She also expects the remaining charge to be
|
||
conditionally discharged based on Abene's performance of community service
|
||
activities.
|
||
|
||
Abene, commenting on the resolution of the case, told Newsbytes "I'm very
|
||
glad that this is over. At least now, I know where I stand and that's much
|
||
better than it's been for the last year." Abene also said that the computer
|
||
equipment seized is still in the custody of the authorities and that it is,
|
||
as yet, unclear when it is to be returned.
|
||
|
||
On the same day in 1990 that the Abene's equipment was seized, search
|
||
warrants were also executed by New York State Police and United States
|
||
Secret Service agents on three other New York residents known by the hacker
|
||
names "Acid Phreak", "Scorpion" and "Flash". Newsbytes was told by informed
|
||
sources that Acid Phreak and Scorpion have been notified by the United
|
||
States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York that they are to be
|
||
charged under federal statutes for computer-related crimes. Newsbytes was
|
||
also told at the time of the Abene arrest that it was decided to charge him
|
||
under state law because his age at the time of the alleged incident would
|
||
have resulted in his classification as a minor under federal law. He was
|
||
charged as an adult under New York law.
|
||
|
||
Flash was arrested on February 13th by New York State Police and U.S.
|
||
Secret Service agents. was identified as Albert Kong, 23 and charged with
|
||
felony counts of computer trespass and 2nd degree grand larceny. At the
|
||
time of the arrest, New York State Police Senior Investigator Donald
|
||
Delaney told Newsbytes that there was no apparent connection between the
|
||
Kong case and the other cases.
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||
|
||
(Barbara E. McMullen & John F. McMullen
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||
|
||
********************************************************************
|
||
>> END OF THIS FILE <<
|
||
***************************************************************************
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
From: Brock Meeks (Reprinted with permission)
|
||
Subject: The FBI Comes Rapping, Rapping at Your BBS
|
||
Date: February 21, 1991
|
||
|
||
********************************************************************
|
||
*** CuD #3.06: File 5 of 6: The FBI Comes Rapping..... ***
|
||
********************************************************************
|
||
|
||
COPYRIGHT (C) 1991 BROCK N. MEEKS
|
||
|
||
INDIVIDUALS MAY COPY THIS ARTICLE TO DISK FOR PERSONAL USE.
|
||
TRANSMISSION OF ANY KIND IS PROHIBITED WITHOUT CONSENT OF AUTHOR
|
||
|
||
The FBI Comes Rapping, Rapping At Your BBS
|
||
by Brock N. Meeks
|
||
|
||
(first published in MICROTIMES #44, June 1988)
|
||
|
||
If that new user on your local bulletin board system (BBS) seems to be
|
||
asking a few too many personal questions, you might want to reconsider
|
||
answering, unless of course, you don't mind your answers being stored in a
|
||
database maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
|
||
|
||
That new user just might be a member of a special FBI task force scouring
|
||
the nation's electronic landscape. Or so contends Glen L. Roberts,
|
||
director of _The FBI Project_ which publishes _The FBI and Your BBS_ and a
|
||
privacy/surveillance newsletter called _Full Disclosure_.
|
||
|
||
"Now wait a minute," you say, "That smacks of radical LaRouche-type
|
||
paranoid rhetoric!" OK, so I was a bit leery, too. After all the FBI is
|
||
such an easy target. Then I started rummaging through an old, coffee
|
||
cup-ringed file labeled only "FBI/Computer Squad." In there I found
|
||
several old clippings and other documentation that started to back up
|
||
Roberts' statements.
|
||
|
||
If You Dig, You Hit Dirt =========================
|
||
|
||
In 1984 a short series of discreet advertisements. placed by the FBI,
|
||
appeared in a few computer trade publications and in _The Wall Street
|
||
Journal_. The message was simple, and went something like: "We're looking
|
||
for computer literate persons to join the Bureau." There was no mention of
|
||
any special task force; however, it was clear that the Bureau wanted to
|
||
upgrade their high-tech prowess.
|
||
|
||
Although the FBI won't confirm the existance of a computerized "hit squad,"
|
||
a public relations officer from the Bureau did confirm that they "have made
|
||
an extraordinary effort to recruit more technically oriented personnel"
|
||
since 1984.
|
||
|
||
If you dig hard enough, you'll find substantial evidence that the FBI is
|
||
most definitely working overtime in its efforts to monitor the electronic
|
||
community. "They are desperately wary of the way information flows so
|
||
freely in this medium," says Roberts.
|
||
|
||
There was a number scrawled on the inside flap of that dog-earred folder.
|
||
It was annotated "Former agent; possible source." I called the number; I
|
||
got a story.
|
||
|
||
"I was recruited in 1983 by the FBI for my computer skills," the former
|
||
agent told me. Because he stills does some consulting for the Bureau, he
|
||
asked not to be identified, but he laid out a very specific plan by the FBI
|
||
to increase their knowledge of the electronic communications world. He
|
||
confided, "If the Bureau is monitoring BBSs, it's a small group." Much
|
||
more likely, he offered, the FBI is drawing on the expertise of a small
|
||
band of high-tech freelance snoops to augment their staff, until their
|
||
skills are honed.
|
||
|
||
One member of this freelance team is the well-known John Maxfield. He's
|
||
appeared in everything from the _Washington Post_ to the Today Show to
|
||
_MicroTimes_, bragging about his undercover infiltration of "criminal BBSs"
|
||
on behalf of the FBI. (When I asked a 17-year-old hacker from Texas why no
|
||
one's taken out Maxfield, via computer, the kid told me: "He's too visible;
|
||
he's guarded pretty well as far as his computer records go; we've tried.")
|
||
|
||
Tradition =========
|
||
|
||
Certainly the FBI has a tradition of "investigating" groups of people it
|
||
deems "unsavory" or threatening. Recent published reports told of how the
|
||
FBI has gathered files on several pro- Sandanista groups here in the U.S.
|
||
This type of information gathering process seems to be standard operating
|
||
procedure for them.
|
||
|
||
The _New York Times_ broke a story last year on its front page that
|
||
detailed how FBI agents were visiting New York city libraries and asking
|
||
the librarians to monitor certain people and keep a record of the books
|
||
they checked out; the list would be given to the agent at a later date.
|
||
NYC librarians flatly declined the FBI offer. Perhaps the most startling
|
||
aspect of the story was the "it doesn't hurt to ask" attitude that flowed
|
||
from the FBI when they were confronted and asked for an explanation.
|
||
|
||
In Roberts' _The FBI and Your BBS_, the a brief history of the FBI's
|
||
willingness to gather all known information on a target group is outlined.
|
||
|
||
Pulling from the Final Report of the Select (Senate) Committee to Study
|
||
Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities, Book IV,
|
||
Supplemenatry Reports on Intelligence Activities, Roberts includes this
|
||
excerpt:
|
||
|
||
"Detectives were sent to local radical publishing houses to take their
|
||
books. In addition, they were to find every private collection or library
|
||
in the possession of any radical, and to make the arrangements for
|
||
obtaining them in their entirety. Thus, when the GID (General Intelligence
|
||
Division) discovered an obscure Italian born philosopher who had a unique
|
||
collection of books on the theory of anarchism, his lodgings were raided by
|
||
the Bureau and his valuable collection become one more involuntary
|
||
contribution to the huge and ever-growing library of the GID. [pages
|
||
87-88]."
|
||
|
||
Change "any radical" to "any BBS" and "book" to "disk" and quite suddenly
|
||
the electronic landscape turns into a winter still-life.
|
||
|
||
Data Collection ================
|
||
|
||
Roberts, quoting from his report, says, "Unlike other communications media,
|
||
information on a BBS does not get read by anyone before its instantaneous
|
||
publication. Therefore, the FBI has much less of a possibility of
|
||
intimidateing the owner of a BBS into _not_ publishing certain information.
|
||
The FBI also acts as if BBSs have a monopoly on the distribution of
|
||
so-called 'illegal information.' The FBI often uses this 'danger' as
|
||
justification to monitor the activities on these systems. In reality,
|
||
however, BBSs transfer much less 'illegal information' than the phone
|
||
system."
|
||
|
||
Roberts statements are worth noting in light of the government's increased
|
||
interest in the marriage of criminal activity and electronic
|
||
communications.
|
||
|
||
A 455-page report issued by the President's Commission on Organized Crime,
|
||
dealing with drug abuse and traffiking cites that fact that crime has moved
|
||
into the high-tech arena. The report states "To the extent that law
|
||
enforcement agencies' capabilities and equipment are inferior to those of
|
||
drug traffickers, immediate steps should be taken to rectify the
|
||
situation." The report then recommends that _data-gathering_ efforts of
|
||
several agencies (including the FBI) should be tied together in one
|
||
"all-source intelligence and operations center."
|
||
|
||
The spirit of that document is being embraced by the long-distance phone
|
||
companies. Tired of the multi-million dollar losses due to stolen or
|
||
illegally acquired access codes, these companies are circling the wagons in
|
||
a spirit of high-tech cooperative surveillance never before experienced in
|
||
the commercial world.
|
||
|
||
Quoting from a _Washington Post_ article, here's what Robert Fox, US
|
||
Sprint's director of security, says: "To shut down theft, the companies use
|
||
each other's security services and the help of local law enforcement
|
||
officials, the Secret Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
|
||
Your major toll carriers may be competitors, but in this one instance we
|
||
share information and resourses. We do everything from technical to
|
||
on-street surveillance."
|
||
|
||
Evidence that the FBI is actively monitoring BBSs also came to light in the
|
||
case of a Denver talk show host that was assassinated by a neo-Nazi group,
|
||
white supremacy group.
|
||
|
||
When it was discovered that Robert Miles, one of the defendants, was a
|
||
"computer wizard" the FBI began tracking his communications with other
|
||
neo-nazi groups; the FBI found out, and mapped, an intricate network of
|
||
BBSs, by placing a bug in his home. Where was bug placed? Inside Miles'
|
||
modem. Why there? Simple. Any calls he made with his modem would be to
|
||
other online sources; in this way, the FBI reasoned, they could chart the
|
||
(nationwide) network of neo-nazi BBSs, thus following their standing
|
||
tradition of "keeping tabs" on organizations, much like they did in the
|
||
'60s when they had agents infiltrate several radical organizations.
|
||
|
||
Any Problem Here? =================
|
||
|
||
There are no laws prohibiting the FBI (or other agencies) from monitoring
|
||
the public message traffic on a BBS; the Electronic Communications Privacy
|
||
Act of 1986 protects private messages and privately stored files only. But
|
||
what about an FBI agent monitoring a BBS solely for the purpose of
|
||
gathering information on the board's users? Any problem here?
|
||
|
||
The former FBI agent I spoke with raised the concern that such casual
|
||
monitoring might be a violation of the 1968 Wiretap Act. "In order for a
|
||
wire tap, you have to get a court order. Now if an FBI agent is monitoring
|
||
a BBS to gather information, that becomes an interesting question, because
|
||
there are very specific federal rules 'At what point does monitoring turn
|
||
into a wiretap-like act?'"
|
||
|
||
Good point. And the upshot is: there are no rules.
|
||
|
||
Unless that agent is asking for private message traffic, he can, without
|
||
impunity, monitor, store, and otherwise manipulate your public messages as
|
||
he sees fit.
|
||
|
||
Roberts points out that a BBS with public access is fair game for any kind
|
||
of governmental snooping. But there is a way to make such casual snooping
|
||
by a federal agent a crime.
|
||
|
||
"If you want your BBS readily accessible to the public but want to protect
|
||
against unwarranted monitoring, you have to provide a warning to
|
||
prospective users," says Roberts. "It should read: 'This BBS is a private
|
||
system. Only private citizens who are not involved in government or law
|
||
enforcement activities are authorized to use it. The users are not
|
||
authorized to divulge any information gained from this system to any
|
||
government or law enforcement agency or employee.'"
|
||
|
||
This does two things. It makes the board "private" in that the sysop
|
||
decides who gets access and who does not. This isn't so unusual; most BBSs
|
||
now have some sort of validation anyway. Second, it makes any kind of
|
||
monitoring by the FBI (or other agencies, such as the Secret Service) a
|
||
criminal offense, and forces them to use the established guidelines of
|
||
gaining information via a court ordered search warrant. The warning also
|
||
protects you in another way: it stops "freelancers" from doing the Bureau's
|
||
work.
|
||
|
||
Get Real =========
|
||
|
||
How real is the possibility of the FBI monitoring your BBS? _Slim_.
|
||
Unless of course you happen to run a board dedicated to say, the Sanctity
|
||
Movement, or one that supports the Sandanistas or . . . any topic perceived
|
||
to be of a questionable nature by the FBI.
|
||
|
||
The stories provided here bear out, if nothing else, an increased interest
|
||
by the FBI in electronic messaging. How extensive is the FBI's actual fact
|
||
gathering by monitoring BBSs? No one knows really knows. However, given
|
||
the history of Bureau, and the hard facts that crime in the information age
|
||
makes full use of all the technology it can get its hands on, it's a small
|
||
leap to believe that at least specific monitoring, of certain target
|
||
groups, is taking place. (Given the manpower shortage of the Bureau, and
|
||
its overwhelming case load, I would find it hard to argue for large-scale
|
||
indiscriminate monitoring.)
|
||
|
||
Where does that leave you and me in all this? Back to square one, watching
|
||
carefully what we say online. If you're a member of a "controversial" BBS,
|
||
you might pass the concerns of Roberts on to your sysop. If you are a
|
||
sysop, you might want to consider adding a bit of protection to the board .
|
||
. . for the rest of us.
|
||
|
||
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++Brock
|
||
Meeks is a San Diego-based columnist. His favorite radical BBS is . . .
|
||
well . . . private.
|
||
|
||
********************************************************************
|
||
>> END OF THIS FILE <<
|
||
***************************************************************************
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
From: pmccurdy@CUP.PORTAL.COM
|
||
Subject: Some Thoughts on Government Actions
|
||
Date: Fri, 22 Feb 91 07:36:12 PST
|
||
|
||
********************************************************************
|
||
*** CuD #3.06: File 6 of 6: Some Thoughts on Gov't Actions ***
|
||
********************************************************************
|
||
|
||
In CuD 2.15, the moderators ask "What is the relationship between law
|
||
enforcement and the media?" Later, they state "One of our goals is to
|
||
expand their literacy." I have combined (and slightly modified) these two
|
||
ideas and arrived at the central theme of this article.
|
||
|
||
THE NATURE OF THE BEAST
|
||
|
||
We of the CU tend to see our cyberworld as an extension of the real world.
|
||
Even the terminology in use among computer folks supports this. By merely
|
||
sitting at your system and striking keys or manipulating your rodent, you
|
||
can "enter" another system, "take" or "move" files and programs.
|
||
|
||
Beyond the way we picture these things and the terminology we use, the
|
||
courts have enacted laws (at all levels of government) that give a legal
|
||
basis to the idea that the whole of a computer file is more than merely the
|
||
sum of its individual electronic bits.
|
||
|
||
Let's look at this idea from another angle. No one will dispute that an
|
||
author should be able to copyright a book or that an inventor should be
|
||
able to patent a widget. But what is a program (or text file) other than a
|
||
new means of representing the author's printed word or the work of a clever
|
||
inventor? So, aside from a few subtle issues (thoughtfully discoursed by
|
||
the likes of Dark Adept, Offer Inbar, David Daniels, et al), we all agree
|
||
on the need for laws that protect electronic property and privacy just as
|
||
we have laws that protect personal property and privacy.
|
||
|
||
THE ABUSES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (LEAs)
|
||
|
||
As a self-styled libertarian, it makes me sick to read about the continued
|
||
abuses perpetrated by overzealous LEAs upon the members of the computing
|
||
community. I am an optimist at heart and I find it hard to believe that
|
||
the people who work in these LEAs are as vindictive, or at least as
|
||
ignorant, as they at first glance appear. As ever more reports of their
|
||
abuses mount, however, I find it hard to maintain a positive attitude. No
|
||
reader of this journal needs to be reminded of all the LEA abuses of the
|
||
last few years. Two acts, however, stand out in my mind as worth
|
||
recounting.
|
||
|
||
The first involves the seizure of, among many other things of questionable
|
||
use to an investigation, a laser printer at Steve Jackson Games. The
|
||
reason given buy the US Secret Service (SS) for its confiscation was that
|
||
it had RAM. One of two things must be true here. Either the agents
|
||
serving the warrant were so ignorant of computer technology that they
|
||
believed that printer RAM could be used in illegal activities (in which
|
||
case they shouldn't have been working on this type of case), or the seizure
|
||
of the printer was committed as a punitive act against the EMPLOYER of a
|
||
SUSPECTED perpetrator of a criminal act. If the latter is the case, and I
|
||
believe it is, then it is an utterly reprehensible (and possibly illegal)
|
||
act.
|
||
|
||
The second act that stands out in my mind is the use by the SS of a paid,
|
||
volunteer informant in the E911 case. The details about the exact nature
|
||
of how the SS used this informant are not yet clear. From what is
|
||
currently known, however (see CuD 3.02), it appears that the SS's use of
|
||
this miscreant borders very closely on entrapment. I won't even get myself
|
||
started commenting on the kind of detestable SLIME that would *volunteer*
|
||
to due this kind of work.
|
||
|
||
AN EXAMINATION OF WHAT MOTIVATES LEA'S
|
||
|
||
To say that LEAs have been overzealous in their investigations of computer
|
||
crime is a gross understatement. It won't do us any good merely to point
|
||
fingers at the first "bad guy" we see; identifying the culprit won't solve
|
||
the problem. We need to look beyond the immediate problem; we need to look
|
||
at the underlying causes of the problem if we are to discover what we can
|
||
do to improve the situation.
|
||
|
||
LEAs are run by Directors who sit in Washington fighting for funds with
|
||
which to run their organizations. Inasmuch, they are heavily influenced by
|
||
politicians on Capitol Hill who are, in turn, primarily influenced by
|
||
public opinion. Now, on the subject of computer crime (among many others),
|
||
the public is predominantly influenced by the media. Therein lies the
|
||
problem.
|
||
|
||
The media have seldom shied away from writing about a subject, even when
|
||
the facts are slim or when their understanding of an issue is nil. This
|
||
becomes painfully apparent when you read articles about computer crime,
|
||
viruses, hackers, etc.
|
||
|
||
Until last year, I worked in security, concentrating on computer security.
|
||
I considered it a professional responsibility to read every article I could
|
||
find on topics relating to computer security. With few exceptions, these
|
||
articles merely rehashed material from previous articles, perpetuated
|
||
misconceptions, and consistently fed the public hysteria that computer
|
||
hackers were hell-bent on destroying Western Civilization.
|
||
|
||
I am reminded of a line from the movie Ghostbusters. After informing the
|
||
group that it would be "bad" to cross the beams on their nuclear
|
||
accelerators, Egon is asked to define "bad." "Imagine every molecule in
|
||
your body exploding at the speed of light" he explains, "and all life as we
|
||
know it ceasing to exist." It is in just such a manner that the media
|
||
portrays the issue of computer crime.
|
||
|
||
So that is the scenario: A uninformed media has whipped an ignorant public
|
||
into a frenzy. The public puts pressure on politicians (who are
|
||
genetically incapable of accepting responsibility) who, in turn, pressure
|
||
LEAs for results. LEAs, no more computer literate than the media or
|
||
public, react by seeking immediate results. Civil rights are trodden upon.
|
||
|
||
THE CRUX OF THE MATTER
|
||
|
||
The underlying theme in the scenario that I have described is ignorance or
|
||
a lack of even a minimal amount of computer literacy. The media, the
|
||
public, and the LEAs are all ignorant of the technologies, as well as the
|
||
associated social issues, relevant to this matter. These social issues in
|
||
particular can only be truly appreciated and understood by those with a
|
||
level of computer literacy that is plainly absent in most of the parties to
|
||
this problem.
|
||
|
||
I have now stretched the blame for this problem from the LEAs, to
|
||
politicians, and on to the media and public. But the responsibility for
|
||
the problem does not entirely end there. A good argument can be made that
|
||
we in the computing community, too, must take a measure of responsibility.
|
||
For too long we have been content to live in our own little piece of
|
||
cyberspace, enjoying the blinding pace of advances in computing
|
||
technologies, and ignoring the problems and issues that accompanied these
|
||
technologies. We can no longer sit on the sidelines and watch. These
|
||
issues are real, they affect us all, and we must all work to solve them.
|
||
|
||
WHAT WE CAN DO
|
||
|
||
So what can we, as individuals, do to help solve this problem? If you
|
||
accept the premise that a lack of computer literacy (including the related
|
||
social issues) is the underlying problem, then the answer is clear. It is
|
||
incumbent upon us to educate the uneducated. In summing up his article in
|
||
CUD 2.15, Dark Adept enjoined us to help out the EFF, fight for our rights
|
||
using only legal means, not to hack security but to build public access
|
||
systems, and to expose the truth every chance we get. I couldn't agree
|
||
with him more.
|
||
|
||
In his excellent book "The Cuckoo's Egg", Cliff Stoll makes the point that
|
||
the mere *impression* of computer crime endangers the thin veil of trust
|
||
upon which most networks are built. We cannot be content with merely
|
||
maintaining current networks, we need to encourage creation of more and
|
||
larger networks. We must lead exemplary electronic lives; we cannot
|
||
tolerate criminal activity or any other activity that puts at risk our
|
||
access to information networks.
|
||
|
||
Beyond this, however, we must strive to educate all others involved with
|
||
this issue: the media, the public, and the government. "But that's
|
||
everyone!", you say? That's right. We have to do our best to raise
|
||
everyone's level of computer literacy to the point where the average Joe
|
||
(or Jane) on the street would experience the same level of disgust as the
|
||
rest of us at acts such as the seizure of a laser printer.
|
||
|
||
IN SUMMARY
|
||
|
||
So there it is. We must continue to discuss these issues (hats off to
|
||
CUD), keep our electronic delvings legal, and educate the world. The first
|
||
two are easy. Educating the world will be the real challenge. To once
|
||
again quote Dark Adept, "The only way to conclusively affect the existence
|
||
of the underground is to affect society."
|
||
|
||
********************************************************************
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
**END OF CuD #3.06**
|
||
********************************************************************
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|