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>C O M P U T E R U N D E R G R O U N D<
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>D I G E S T<
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*** Volume 2, Issue #2.01 (Aug 31, 1990) **
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****************************************************************************
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MODERATORS: Jim Thomas / Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.bitnet)
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ARCHIVISTS: Bob Krause / Alex Smith
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USENET readers can currently receive CuD as alt.society.cu-digest.
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COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
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information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of
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diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted as long as the source is
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cited. It is assumed that non-personal mail to the moderators may be
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reprinted, unless otherwise specified. Readers are encouraged to submit
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reasoned articles relating to the Computer Underground.
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++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent the
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views of the moderators. Contributors assume all responsibility
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for assuring that articles submitted do not violate copyright
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protections.
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++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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CONTENTS:
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File 1: Moderators' Corner
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File 2: Proposed changees in Computer Abuse Act (S.2476)
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File 3: CPSR Seeks FBI data on Bulletin Board Monitoring
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File 4: Computers, Social Responsibility, and Political Action
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File 5: Another experience with the SS
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File 6: CU in the News
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++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
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********************************************************************
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*** CuD #2.01, File 1 of 6: Moderator's corner ***
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********************************************************************
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Date: August 31, 1990
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From: Moderators
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Subject: Moderators' Corner
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++++++++++
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In this file:
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1) ERRATA (National Computer Security Conference)
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2) LAW ENFORCEMENT POLICY OF "FORFEITURE DEALS"
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++++++++++++++++++
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Errata: National Computer Security Conference
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++++++++++++++++++
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In CuD 2.00, a typo occured indicating that "Dorothy Denning will present
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my paper on computer hackers." This *should have read* that Dorothy Denning
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will present *her* paper on computer hackers. We regret the error, even
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though it could have padded our vitas.
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++++++++++++++++++++
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Law Enforcement Forfeiture "Deals"
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++++++++++++++++++++
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The recent crackdowns by law enforcement on computer hackers raise serious
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questions about Constitutional protections in investigations. One of the
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most troublesome practices is that of confiscating all computer and in some
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cases non-computer equipment, including printers, telephone answering
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machines, cassette tapes, books, personal papers, and other articles
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totally unrelated to the alleged offense. Some of the victims of
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confiscations have neither been indicted nor are under suspicion for
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wrong-doing. Others alleged to have infringed on the law have lost material
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unrelated to the offense of which they are suspected.
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A troublesome practice seems to be emerging from the confiscations. The
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victims are offered a "deal" in which they must choose between having
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their equipment forfeited in exchange either for a guilty plea or the
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dropping of charges and suffering only a material loss, or fighting the
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charges and, even if innocent, running the risk of lengthy delays in the
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return of the equipment. For those whose livelihood is invested in the lost
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articles, this is not a pleasant choice. The costs of fighting charges,
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especially if one is innocent (and we still have a judicial system
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supposedly based on presumptive innocence), can far exceed the value of the
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equipment. Even if all charges are dropped in exchange for forfeiture, the
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result is punishment without trial. Law enforcement officials may argue
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that the choice is voluntary, but such a choice is coercive, and a coercive
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choice is not a voluntary choice.
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The irony of this new version of "Let's Make a Deal" is that those
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entrusted to protect the Constitution seem to be hell-bent on subverting
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it. The Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments guarantee protection of
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property against unreasonable seizure, and due process protections,
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including a trial. It seems that the "forfeiture deals" are justice at its
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worst, and the due process model of justice embodied by Constitution
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principles has broken down. Agents seem to be trying cases in the media
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with hyperbole, disinformation, and distortion, and are abusing their power
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and status to punish by forfeiture what they cannot punish in court. It's
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a no-win situation for victims, but even worse, it erodes respect for law
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and law enforcement by creating a new form of social control by police that
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has historically been the domain of the courts. To my mind, the forfeiture
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practice is an abuse of law and perhaps even borders on lawlessness.
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Jim Thomas
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********************************************************************
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>> END OF THIS FILE <<
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***************************************************************************
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------------------------------
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Date: August 15, 1990
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From: Moderators
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Subject: Proposed changees in Computer Abuse Act (S.2476)
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********************************************************************
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*** CuD #2.01: File 2 of 6: Computer Abuse Act Amendment ***
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********************************************************************
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+++++++++++++++++++++++++
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Proposed amendments in the computer abuse act, reported previously in CuD,
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do not seem to go far enough in removing the ambiguity from the language of
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the Act that currently gives broad powers to federal agents to target those
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they perceive as "dangerous" who in fact may not be. Following is the text
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of the revision. We invite responses (moderators).
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++++++++++++++++++++++++
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*******************************************************************
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The following is the text of S.2476, a bill proposed to amend
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Title 18. For more information, contact:
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Committee on the Judiciary
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United States Senate
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Washington, DC 20510-6275
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A summary of the changes follows the text of the bill.
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*******************************************************************
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101st CONGRESS
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2D Session S.2476
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To amend title 18 of the United States Code to clarify and expand legal
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prohibitions against computer abuse
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------------------------------------
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IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
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April 19 (legislative day, April 18), 1990
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Mr. Leahy (for himself, Mr. Humphrey, and Mr. Kohl) introduced the
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following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee
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on the Judiciary
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------------------------------------
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A BILL
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To amend title 18 of the United States Code to clarify and
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expand legal prohibitions against computer abuse.
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1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
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2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
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3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
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4 This Act may be cited as the "Computer Abuse Amend-
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5 mends Act of 1990".
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6 SEC.2. FINDINGS.
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7 The Congress finds that--
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8 (1) the maintenance of the security and integrity
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9 computer systems has become increasingly critical to
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10 national security, interstate and foreign commerce,
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- 2 -
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1 communications, education, science, and technology in
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2 the United States;
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3 (2) the deliberate abuse of computers and comput-
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4 er systems to cause damage, disruption, and interfer-
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5 ence with the efficient functioning of computer systems
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6 has created significant problems for both government
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7 and nongovernment computer systems, and such abuse
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8 creates real and potential problems for national securi-
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9 ty, commerce, business, science, and education, and
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10 imposes significant burdens on interstate and foreign
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11 commerce;
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12 (3) in light of rapid developments in computer
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13 technology, it is necessary to revise and clarify existing
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14 Federal laws governing computer security and abuse to
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15 assure that novel forms of serious computer abuse are
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16 clearly prohibited; and
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17 (4) it is the intent of this Act to exercise the full
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18 scope of the powers of Congress under the Commerce
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19 Clause of the United States Constitution to regulate
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20 forms of computer abuse which arise in connection
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21 with, and have a significant effect upon, interstate or
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22 foreign commerce.
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- 3 -
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1 SEC.3. AMENDMENTS TO THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE
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2 ACT.
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3 (a) PROHIBITION.--Section 1030)(a)(5) of title 18,
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4 United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
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5 "(5)(A) through means of or in a manner affecting
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6 a computer used in interstate commerce or communica-
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7 tions, knowingly causes the transmission of a program,
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8 information, code, or command to a computer or
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9 a computer system if the person causing the transmission
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10 intends that such program, information, code or
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11 command will damage, disrupt, alter, destroy, or mis-
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12 appropriate the functioning, use, programs, systems,
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13 databases, or other information of or contained in the
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14 affected computer or computer system and the trans-
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15 mission of the harmful component of the program,
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16 information, code, or command--
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17 "(i) occured without the knowledge and au-
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18 thorization of the persons or entities who own or
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19 are responsible for the computer system receiving
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20 the program, information, code, or command; and
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21 "(ii)(I) causes loss or damage to one or more
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22 other persons of a value aggregating $1,000 or
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23 more during any one-year period; or
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24 "(II) modifies or impairs, or potentially modi-
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25 fies or impairs, the medical examination, medical
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- 4 -
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1 diagnosis, medical treatment, or medical care of
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2 one or more individuals; or
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3 "(B) through means of or in a manner affecting a
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4 computer used in interstate commerce or communica-
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5 tions, knowingly causes the transmission of a program,
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6 information, code or command to a computer or com-
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7 puter system if the person caused the transmission with
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8 reckless disregard for whether the transmission will
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9 damage, disrupt, alter, destroy or misappropriate the
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10 functioning, use programs, systems, databases, or other
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11 information of or contained in the affected computer or
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12 computer system and the transmission of the harmful
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13 component of the program, information, code, or com-
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14 mand--
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15 "(i) occured without the knowledge and au-
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16 thorization of the persons or entities who own or
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17 are responsible for the computer system receiving
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18 the program, information, code, or command; and
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19 "(ii)(I) causes loss or damage to one or more
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20 other persons of a value aggregating $1,000 or
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21 more during any one-year period; or
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22 "(II) modifies or impairs, or potentially modi-
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23 fies or impairs, the medical examination, medical
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24 diagnosis, medical treatment, or medical care of
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25 one or more individuals; or".
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- 5 -
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1 (b) PENALTY.--Section 1030(c) of title 18, United
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2States Code is amended--
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3 (1) by striking "and" after the semicolon at the
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4 end of paragraph (2)(B);
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5 (2) in paragraph (3)(A) by inserting "(A)" after
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6 "(a)(5)"; and
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7 (3) in paragraph (3)(B) by striking the period at
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8 the end thereof and inserting "; and"; and
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9 (4) inserting at the end thereof the following:
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10 "(4) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not
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11 more than 1 year, or both, in the case of an offense
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12 under subsection (a)(5)(B).".
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13 (c) DEFINITION.--Section 1030(e) of title 18, United
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14States Code, is amended--
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15 (1) in paragraph (6), by striking "and" after the
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16 semicolon;
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17 (2) in paragraph (7), by striking the period and in-
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18 serting "; and";
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19 (3) by adding after paragraph (7) the following
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20 new paragraph:
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21 "(8) the term 'access' means--
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22 "(A) to gain access to the stored or displayed
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23 information or to the functions of a computer or
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24 computer system in such a way that infor-
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- 6 -
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1 mation can be seen or otherwise deciphered or
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2 such functions can be performed; or
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3 "(B) to transmit, or cause the transmission
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4 of, a program, information, code, or command to a
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5 computer or computer system under circumstances
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6 where the person causing the transmission in-
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7 tends, or reasonably expects, that such program,
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8 information, or command will significantly
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9 damage, disrupt, alter, destroy, or misappropriate
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10 the functioning, use, programs, systems, data-
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11 bases, or other information of or contained in that
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12 computer or computer systems, whether or not
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13 the persons causing th transmission gains access
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14 in the manner described in subparagraph (A).".
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15 (d) CIVIL ACTION.--Section 1 3 of title 18, United
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16 States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the
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17 following new subsection:
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18 "(g) Any person who suffers damage or loss by reason
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19 of a violation of this section may maintain a civil action against
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20 the violator to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive
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21 relief or other equitable relief.".
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<<END>>
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********************************************************************
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SUMMARY OF LEAHY/HUMPHREY COMPUTER ABUSE AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1990
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(Provided by Senator Leahy's office)
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********************************************************************
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NEW CRIME
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Makes it a felony intentionally to cause harm to a computer or the information
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stored in it by transmitting a computer program or code (including computer
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viruses) without the knowledge and authorization of the person responsible for
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the computer attacked.
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Makes it a misdemeanor recklessly to cause harm to a computer or the
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information stored in it by transmitting a computer program or code (including
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computer viruses) without the knowledge and authorization of the person
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responsible for the computer attacked.
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JURISDICTION
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Covers harm to any computer or program that involves $1,000 worth of damage or
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tampering with medical records.
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PENALTY
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Find and/or imprisonment for up to five years for the felony. Fine and/or
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imprisonment for up to one yer for the misdemeanor.
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CIVIL CAUSE OF ACTION
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Creates a new, civil cause of action for those harmed by a violation of the
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Act for compensatory or injunctive relief.
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DEFINITION OF "ACCESS"
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Defines "access" -- a term used throughout the Computer Fraud and Abuse Ace --
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to cover the remote transmission of a program to affect a computer or the
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information stored in it.
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********************************************************************
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>> END OF THIS FILE <<
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***************************************************************************
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------------------------------
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Date: July 24, 1990
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From: Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
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Subject: CPSR Seeks FBI data on Bulletin Board Monitoring
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********************************************************************
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*** CuD #2.01: File 3 of 6: CPSR Seeks FBI BBS monitoring data ***
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********************************************************************
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+++++++++++++
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The following notice from CPSR is reprinted with permission.
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+++++++++++++
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LAWSUIT SEEKS FBI RECORDS ON COMPUTER MONITORING
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Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility filed a lawsuit in
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Federal District Court today to obtain information from the FBI about the
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monitoring of computer bulletin boards.
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Marc Rotenberg, director of the CPSR Washington Office, said that the
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disclosure of the records would provide a starting point for an informed
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discussion about the proper scope of computer crime investigations. He
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said that the FBI's failure to respond to CPSR's original Freedom of
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Information Act request made the lawsuit necessary.
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A computer bulletin board is a publicly accessible computer system that is
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designed to promote the exchange of views and information. Computer
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bulletin boards are also used for confidential communications that are
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directed to one or more specific parties.
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The Freedom of Information Act provides a legal right for individuals to
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obtain records held by government agencies. Under the law, agencies are
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required to respond within ten working days. When agencies fail to respond
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within a reasonable period of time, requesters often begin legal
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proceedings to obtain the information.
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CPSR filed the original FOIA request in August, 1989. After a series of
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letters from CPSR to the FBI failed to produce a response, the FOIA request
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was considered at a Congressional hearing in February, 1990. A subsequent
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letter from the Treasury Department revealed that the Secret Service was in
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fact monitoring computer bulletin boards. The FBI's activities are still
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not known.
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The lawsuit comes at a time of growing concern over the conduct of
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computer crime investigations directed toward "computer hackers." In one
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case, charges were dropped against a newsletter publisher after claims that
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a confidential business document was disclosed turned out to be false. In
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another case a game manufacturer in Austin, Texas suffered substantial
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business losses after a Secret Service raid earlier this year, though no
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charges were ever brought against the owner or his company.
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The case is CPSR v. FBI. Civil Action No. 90-2096, U.S. District Court for
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the District of Columbia, August 28.
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For more information contact, the CPSR Washington Office, 1025 Connecticut
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Ave., NW, Suit 1015, Washington DC 20036 (202) 775-1588 or
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rotenberg@csli.stanford.edu.
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********************************************************************
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>> END OF THIS FILE <<
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***************************************************************************
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------------------------------
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Date: 19 August, 1990
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From: Bob Gleason
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Subject: Computers, Social Responsibility, and Political Action
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********************************************************************
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*** CuD #2.01: File 4 of 6: Computers, Social Responsibility ***
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********************************************************************
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++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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In a recent discussion on The Well, there have been debates about how to
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respond to law enforcement attacks on "hackers." Topics incuded how to
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educate the public, whether it is better to use the metaphor of "war" or
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"peace" in responding, and how, in general, does one mobilize a large group
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to address what are perceived to be threats to civil liberties. George
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Gleason argues for conciliation, but recognizes that the resolution lies
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in the broader problem of public apathy and wider social issues.
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+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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Twenty-five percent of Americans own personal computers. It is most
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likely that these individuals come almost entirely from the more
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privileged half of society. Most of the people who use computers do so in
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routine capacities such as clerical jobs or academic writing. Awareness
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of the political and personal empowerment possibilities of the computer,
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is limited to a small subculture, many of whose members are concentrated
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in the Bay Area and the urban Northeast.
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The fine points on which our arguments rest lie outside of the
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experience of most of the population. We are talking about specialised
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knowledge, and even though it has broad implications, it is difficult to
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understand without at least a certain familiarity with some of this
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specialised knowlede base. The position is similar to that of geneticists
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engaged in engineering microbes to alter plant behavior, and faced with
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public opposition to improbable consequences of their work.
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The other face of the debate over "elitism" rests on the contents of my
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statement, to which I next turn.
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Here we see a mainstream culture which is engaged in behavior that is
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ecologically and in other ways non-sustainable. We also see a vast scale
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of aacquiescence in a political agenda of creeping authoritarianism. We
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also see the continuation of cultural norms that support greed and
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self-centeredness to the exclusion of other values.
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A person can take an attitude of support for these cultural norms, or of
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mere acceptance of them, or of opposition to them. Those who support can
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be seen as doing so out of commitment to either an actual or potential
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benefit they may realize from their position: for instance a high-paying
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job in the military-industrial bureaucracy, or the symbolic identification
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with nationalistic themes, etc. More typical, and in fact the large
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majority by most measures, is a mood of acquiescence, plus or minus some
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grumbling. My argument is based on the position that acquiescence is
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nearly as problematic as active malice, and that acquiescence represents
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the utter abdication of personal responsibility for ethical choice.
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Now for any given individual, one or more of the following can be true:
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-He or she is being manipulated by the media or other large institutions.
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-He or she is more interested in personal gain than in public issues which
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involve consequences to others. -He or she is under sufficient pressure
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of circumstance as to have no opportunity to engage in various acts of
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personal liberation, public opposition, or even basic creativity. (For
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example, parenthood plus a full-time job).
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In the last case we can see at minimum the decision that the status quo is
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better than taking a chance on the unknown. Whether this decision is
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"right" or "wrong" isn't up to me. The question I have to raise though
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is, "How bad do things have to get before people rise up?" The extreme
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case can be seen in the black community: economic oppression, the
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destruction of an entire generation by drugs, poverty, violence, etc. One
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wonders why the signs of collective outrage have not become more evident
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in that community: the history of the political repression in the 60s
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supplies part of the answer.
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However, most people in the mainstream aren't under that kind of extreme
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pressure of circumstances. For them, acquiescence is either a matter of
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being manipulated or being selfish.
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Are we going to say that the public are brainwashed? Does this imply that
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we ourselves are relatively free of brainwashing? That would be awfully
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elitist, wouldn't it?; and as well, would create a mass "victim" role. If
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we truly believe that brainwashing by TV and so on is the cause of the
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predicament, we are left facing a force that is so powerful as to be
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unstoppable: How can our calls to freedom and lofty ideals ever begin to
|
|
compete with the pleasures of the shopping mall and consumption lifestyle?
|
|
How can our press conferences and pamphlets be heard and seen above the
|
|
din of commercial jingles and junk mail? What have we to offer that can
|
|
satisfy basic needs and desires? A meager existence in cramped housing
|
|
and on a hippie diet, made tolerable by an ethic of sustainability? There
|
|
is no substantial alternative economy anywhere in view. Our alternative
|
|
culture is either barely able to survive or supported by rare cases of
|
|
vast success whose effects even so are not able to build a truly
|
|
large-scale example which can become self-supporting.
|
|
|
|
Instead, are we going to say that the public are acting selfishly? That
|
|
would cast the majority in a moderate version of the role of "Good
|
|
Germans." Instead of an absence of insight and will, there would be an
|
|
absence of ethics and basic compassion. The result of this is even more
|
|
dire: it is not that people don't know what they want, it's that they want
|
|
more or less what they're getting, *including* the consequences of
|
|
intolerance and repression and injustice. In that case, what alternative
|
|
have we to offer? Simulations of public executions, to stem the desire
|
|
for the real thing? Simulations of other forms of evil, which serve to
|
|
disguise good done in secret? That appears rather Machiavellian. Or
|
|
instead should we fold inwardly and hide from the rising tide? A limited
|
|
escape if that.
|
|
|
|
Sixty percent of the public don't vote. Sixty five percent of people
|
|
under 35 years of age don't read newspapers or watch broadcast news
|
|
(source Newsweek poll a few weeks ago). When "don't know" is compounded
|
|
with "don't care," we are in deep shit.
|
|
|
|
Fact is, I believe that there may be some way out. As Huxley said,
|
|
"Nothing less than everything is truly sufficient." It does cause me much
|
|
despair to see that the vast majority of our resources are committed to
|
|
fighting a holding action where success is measured in the absence of
|
|
defeat. I believe that a key element in the overall solution needs to
|
|
take the form of cohesive examples of alternative economic and cultural
|
|
entities. Integral neighborhoods, intentional communities (not the same
|
|
as "hippie communes" thank you), cooperative enterprises; generating a
|
|
sustainable *and* prosperous way of living by higher ideals and deeply
|
|
considered values. Not isolated on little islands, but integrated with
|
|
the overall economic and cultural sphere while retaining distinct
|
|
identity. And of course, publicized as such, to provide accessible models
|
|
from which to proceed further. . . .
|
|
|
|
We all have our cynical moods. Contemplating the overall scale of the
|
|
predicament of what used to be called "civilization," is frightening and
|
|
can as easily give rise to despair as it does inspiration and hope for
|
|
change. I think one thing we all share here is a commitment to creating a
|
|
better world in many ways. Argument and debate are valuable ways of
|
|
clarifying views and reaching a more cohesive synthesis.
|
|
|
|
My cause of despair is that a huge amount of talent and energy and
|
|
resources are going into what is basically the equivalent of defence
|
|
expenditures. On very many fronts. Realistically I'd like to suggest a
|
|
concentration of political effort in one specific geographic area, to
|
|
create and maintain an area which is conducive toward the creation of real
|
|
alternative institutions of all kinds. From a strong and solid base like
|
|
that, we can move outward and affect other areas. There are plenty of
|
|
other ways to get at an agenda that actually moves forward instead of
|
|
fighting defensively. I think the people who talk in terms of educating
|
|
our opponents are on the right track: not us/them, but "all of us," and
|
|
solving problems together. "Nothing less than everything is truly
|
|
sufficient," isn't a cry of despair but an affirmation of the need for
|
|
everyone to play whatever part their conscience moves them toward.
|
|
|
|
Forward!
|
|
|
|
***************
|
|
|
|
|
|
********************************************************************
|
|
>> END OF THIS FILE <<
|
|
***************************************************************************
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Subject: Another experience with the SS
|
|
From: Anonymous, somewhere in Texas
|
|
Date: Tue, 28 Aug 90 21:14:19 CDT
|
|
|
|
********************************************************************
|
|
*** CuD #2.01: File 5 of 6: Another Experience with the SS ***
|
|
********************************************************************
|
|
|
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
|
%The moderators deleted the identity of the following article's author because
|
|
of legitimate concerns for his welfare. He is considered by those familiar
|
|
with his situation to be another victim of recent SS activity, and the need
|
|
to conceal his identity further illustrates the chilling effect on freedom
|
|
of speech that the SS has created--moderators.%
|
|
|
|
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
|
|
|
I just remembered a Texas tie-in to the LOD name. I found this in Mike
|
|
Cochran's book "And deliver us from evil," from Texas Monthly Press. In
|
|
the concluding essay, he wrote,
|
|
|
|
And, if there was a roll call for bizarre Texas crime, it surely
|
|
would include:
|
|
|
|
[ (accounts of mayhem removed)
|
|
|
|
-- The Legion of Doom, an up-scale group of student vigilantes who
|
|
used dead cats, car bombs, and other forms of intimidation to shape
|
|
up the riffraff at Fort Worth's Paschal High. Their misguided crusade
|
|
got them in a heap of trouble, but they all escaped jail.
|
|
|
|
Speaking of reading... I re-read CUD 1.18 today. There are parts of John R.
|
|
Simpson's response to Representative Don Edwards' FOI inquiry that, ahem, do
|
|
not compute. Like this:
|
|
|
|
"We do not keep records of the bulletin boards which we have
|
|
monitored but we can provide information concerning a particular
|
|
board if we are given the name of the board."
|
|
|
|
Well, maybe they'd go check the board out again. But, as "records of the
|
|
bulletin boards which we have monitored" may include communications program
|
|
dialing directories and call logs, as well as telephone records of outgoing
|
|
calls, I know that what Simpson has said isn't true. Let's see what's on
|
|
those disks and phone bills, Uncle Sam!
|
|
|
|
But the real corker is:
|
|
|
|
"No, the U.S. Secret Service has not created a computer bulletin
|
|
board nor a network which was offered to members of the public. We
|
|
have created an undercover bulletin board which was offered to a select
|
|
number of individuals who had demonstrated an interest in conducting
|
|
criminal activities. This was done with the guidance of the U.S.
|
|
Attorney's Office and was consistent with the Electronic Communications
|
|
Privacy Act."
|
|
|
|
When I was interviewed by the Secret Service in early 1990, SS Agent Timothy
|
|
Foley discussed the UNIX system known as "attctc", formerly called "killer."
|
|
Agent Foley discussed the status of jolnet and attctc, claiming that "I own
|
|
jolnet" and "I own attctc." He also asked me why I thought AT&T would fund
|
|
attctc. His answer to his own question was that attctc existed "for the
|
|
"for the purpose of monitoring the hacker community." When it was still
|
|
running, attctc was once referred to as "the largest mail hub in the
|
|
Southwest." Did AT&T provide Secret Service agents with access to attctc? I
|
|
had this view of attctc as a kink in the image of AT&T as an all-devouring
|
|
monopoly, and approved of it as good for the image of AT&T. But if it was a
|
|
listening post, well, I take it all back. It was >very< available to the
|
|
public.
|
|
What role did Uncle Sam and the Secret Service have in the management, funding
|
|
and operation of attctc?
|
|
|
|
|
|
********************************************************************
|
|
>> END OF THIS FILE <<
|
|
***************************************************************************
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Date: August 30, 1990
|
|
From: <Michael.Rosen@SAMBA.ACS.UNC.EDU>
|
|
Subject: CU in the News
|
|
|
|
********************************************************************
|
|
*** CuD #2.01: File 6 of 6: The CU in the News ***
|
|
********************************************************************
|
|
|
|
Source: Computerworld, Aug. 27, 1990, pg. 6, News Shorts
|
|
|
|
"NSA Denise Killing Security Center"
|
|
|
|
The National Security Agency (NSA) last week denied a published account
|
|
that said the agency is dismantling its National Computer Security Center,
|
|
a semipublic unit of the supersecret agency that was established by the
|
|
U.S. Department of Defense in 1982 to evaluate and certify the security, or
|
|
levels of trust, of computer systems. A spokeswoman for NSA said the
|
|
center is being restructured to align its activities more closely with
|
|
NSA's communications security work. The move was prompted by the blurring
|
|
of distinction between telecommunications and computer systems, she said.
|
|
Patrick Gallagher will remain director of the center, and the center will
|
|
continue to meet its commitments to industry for product evaluation and
|
|
certification, the spokeswoman said.
|
|
|
|
************************************************************
|
|
|
|
|
|
Source: Computerworld, Aug 20, 1990, p. 74:
|
|
|
|
"Bozhe Moy! Hackers and viruses already plague Soviets"
|
|
|
|
There have already been computer crimes and virus attacks in the USSR.
|
|
Over the last several years, the number of incidents has appeared to
|
|
increase along with other forms of crime.
|
|
|
|
One of the earliest cases of a computer virus in the USSR occurred in 1988
|
|
when an unidentified programmer at the Gorky Automobile Works on the Volga
|
|
River was charged with deliberately using a virus to shut down an assembly
|
|
line in a dispute over work conditions. The man was convicted under
|
|
Article 206, the so-called hooliganism law, which provides for a jail term
|
|
of up to six years for "violating public order in a coarse manner and
|
|
expressing a clear disrespect toward society."
|
|
|
|
The comments about viruses heard at a number of meetings are worth
|
|
reporting:"We are ready to meet the problem." (Moscow State University);
|
|
"Viruses come from international exchanges but some day soon come from
|
|
here." (National Academy of Economics); "The USSR recently joined Interpol.
|
|
A requirement of that organization is that member states' police
|
|
departments must ensure date security. The result has been that the police
|
|
management has now become sensitized to that issue." (National Academy of
|
|
Economics); "On the physical side [of security], we close what needs to be
|
|
closed. Some say that only a sentry will be sufficient." (A Soviet bank
|
|
security official); "How have we responded to viruses? Up until now we
|
|
suffer." (Institute for Information Problems in the Information Sciences
|
|
Department of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR).
|
|
|
|
According to various Westerners, pirated software is all over the USSR, and
|
|
the Soviets often get hit with viruses when they buy these "forbidden
|
|
fruits" via the Hong Kong or Swiss connections. A number of the 70 known
|
|
Bulgarian viruses also appear to be prevalent, along with two Soviet
|
|
strains: Victor and a variant of the Vienna virus.
|
|
|
|
According to Aryeh Goretsky at McAffee Associates, a computer security
|
|
firm, other viruses that have been confirmed by Soviet and Eastern European
|
|
antiviral programmers include the following: Yankee Doodle, Vacsina,
|
|
Microsoft88 (534), Sunday, Amstrad or Pixel, Disk Killer 170X, Stoned, Ping
|
|
Pong, Vienna, Jerusalem, Friday the 13th COM, Pakistani Brain, Disk Killer
|
|
and W-13. Programs available to combat viruses are Aidstest by Lozynky
|
|
and Anti-Kot and Anti-Kor by Kotik. Some Western antivirus programs and
|
|
some homegrown versions were also found at various Soviet sites.
|
|
|
|
It is noteworthy that viruses are increasing, even though a form of data
|
|
security exists in the Soviet Union. This security is of the most basic
|
|
type: It is largely composed of guards and locked doors restricting
|
|
access to computer rooms.
|
|
|
|
Other simple measures are used, such as limiting links between computers
|
|
and systems and access controls to files. These measures are far from
|
|
adequate,however, given the pressure to acquire and distribute
|
|
microcomputers and to establish networks.
|
|
|
|
What makes the situation worse is the lack of trained data security
|
|
personnel, data security standards and tools, data security supports and,
|
|
in some instances (but not in others), lack of knowledge of security
|
|
techniques beyond basic approaches.
|
|
|
|
Sadly, it appears certain that there will be an onslaught of computer
|
|
crimes and virus attacks in the near future. If (and when) perestroika can
|
|
lead to computer linkages of even a minimal sort, the types of crime and
|
|
abuse problems that have become part of life in the West will be found in
|
|
the USSR. A mixture of homegrown hackers, outsiders and even some business
|
|
managers will create what could be a very fearful situation for the Soviet
|
|
authorities. How they will respond to this challenge is, to a large
|
|
degree, based on what authority will be functioning in the near future.
|
|
|
|
Decisions about what information to protect and how to do it are not being
|
|
developed in the USSR today. Unfortunately, it appears that these
|
|
decisions will be put off there as they were in the U.S. for too long.
|
|
|
|
Soviet computerists, both in state enterprises and the fledgling private
|
|
sector, can learn about information security from U.S. experiences. The
|
|
main issue is to try to be like us while avoiding the many problems
|
|
(including security problems) that we developed in association with
|
|
computerization.
|
|
|
|
-Sanford Sherizen
|
|
|
|
********************************************************************
|
|
|
|
Source: Computerworld, August 20, 1990, pg. 102, Inside Lines:
|
|
|
|
When a young computer hacker broke into an unclassified computer at the
|
|
Pentagon last November, the U.S. Air Force was quick to draw a bead on him.
|
|
The Air Force's Office of Special Investigations (OSI) is the only federal
|
|
agency with a full-time staff of computer crime investigators, according
|
|
to the OSI. There are 14 Air Force computer crime cops stationed
|
|
at air bases around the world. The group was instrumental in tracking
|
|
down the Hannover hacker, profiled in _The Cuckoo's Egg_ by Clifford Stoll.
|
|
|
|
Talk with Soviet users
|
|
|
|
From Computerworld, August 20, 1990, pg. 74, no author.
|
|
|
|
Network connections to and from the USSR are few but growing all the time.
|
|
Some of the choices include a bulletin board that provides electronic mail
|
|
and teleconferencing with Soviet computer users called the San Francisco/
|
|
Moscow Teleport located at 3278 Sacramento St., San Francisco, Calif. 94115
|
|
(415) 931-8500. Another connection is through Peacenet via Jeff Sears,
|
|
(415) 923-0900.
|
|
|
|
A Russian text processing mailing list, Rustex-L, is also available.
|
|
It is administered by Dimitri Vulius, Department of Mathematics, City
|
|
University of New York Graduate Center, who can be contacted at
|
|
DLV%CUNYVMS1.BITNET@cunyvm.cuny.edu.
|
|
|
|
An excellent overview of Soviet technological growth is provided
|
|
in a book entitled _Chip in the Curtain: Computer Technology in the
|
|
Soviet Union_ by David A. Wellman, Washington, D.C., National Defense
|
|
University Press, 1989. (202) 475-0948.
|
|
|
|
From Computerworld, August 20, 1990, pg. 74, no author.
|
|
|
|
********************************************************************
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
**END OF CuD #2.01**
|
|
********************************************************************
|
|
! |