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>C O M P U T E R U N D E R G R O U N D<
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>D I G E S T<
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*** Volume 1, Issue #1.17 (June 21, 1990) **
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** SPECIAL ISSUE: JUDGE BUA'S OPINION ON MOTION TO DISMISS **
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****************************************************************************
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MODERATORS: Jim Thomas / Gordon Meyer
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REPLY TO: TK0JUT2@NIU.bitnet
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COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
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information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of
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diverse views.
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--------------------------------------------------------------------
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DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent the
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views of the moderators. Contributors assume all responsibility
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for assuring that articles submitted do not violate copyright
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protections.
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--------------------------------------------------------------------
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File 1: Moderators' Comments
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File 2: From the Mailbag (6 items)
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File 3: Info World article and response (Mike Godwin)
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File 4: LoD and the Secret Service (Mike Godwin)
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File 5: California Law Targets Info Possession as Felonious??
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File 6: Hackers in the News (reprint by Adam Gaffin)
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--------------------------------------------------------------------
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***************************************************************
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*** Computer Underground Digest Issue #1.17 / File 1 of 6 ***
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***************************************************************
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----------
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FTP
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----------
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The FTP site seems to be working well. The directories are not obvious, but
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if you send us a note, we can provide the directory chart and info on how
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to access files if you're having problems.
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-------------
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PHRACK 31
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-------------
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We have received several questions about PHRACK 31 from people wondering
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what the connection is between the resurrected issue and previous issues.
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The lastest issue **IS IN NO WAY RELATED TO THE PREVIOUS!** The former
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editors had no connection with the current editors and they are not in any
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way associated with it. Some feel that the new editors should have changed
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the name or taken a stronger editorial position, and feel the content is
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not what would have appeared in previous issues. However, others have
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argued that they find the issues informative and feel it is important to
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continue the tradition as a way of maintaining a sense of community among
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the CU. We invite responses on both side.
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-------------
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MAILING LIST
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-------------
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If you have sent us mail but have not received a reply, it means that we
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cannot get through to your address and the "reply" command doesn't respond
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to the "From:" line. Just send us another note with several addresses that
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we can experiment with, and we'll try again.
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-------------
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STUFF TO READ
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-------------
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John Perry Barlow has written the best summary and analysis of recent
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events that we have read. It's titled "Crime and Puzzlement," and we
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encourage everybody to read it. We also recommend Dorothy Denning's work as
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well. She has not yet given us permission to circulate it, but if you're
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interested, we will send your requests directly to her.
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-------------
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ERRATTA
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-------------
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LEN ROSE: In CuD 1.14, a contributor identified Len Rose as being from New
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Jersey. The case is in fact in Baltimore.
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TAP: A reader reminded us that the current TAP, available for the price of
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a stamp, is not a direct offspring of the original.
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PHRACK: A typo listed Phrack as originating in 1986. It first appeared in
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November 1985.
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=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
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+ END THIS FILE +
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+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+===+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=
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***************************************************************
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*** CuD, Issue #1.17 / File 2 of 6 / From the Mailbag ***
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***************************************************************
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----------------
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The following was forwarded from Telecom Digest
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----------------
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Date: Wed, 13 Jun 90 11:03:34 CDT
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From: Doug Barnes <ibmchs!auschs!chaos.austin.ibm.com!dbarnes@cs.utexas.edu>
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Message-Id: <9006131603.AA00208@chaos.austin.ibm.com>
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To: @auschs.uucp:ibmchs!cs.utexas.edu!eecs.nwu.edu!telecom
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Although I have not been directly affected by this operation, it has loomed
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very large in my life. I'm an Austin, TX resident, I know many of the
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principals who *have* been directly affected, and I've experienced
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first-hand some of the chilling effects that the operation has had on
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freedom of expression and freedom of association among the usenet and bbs
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communities here in Austin.
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First of all, some simple math will tell you that if evidence was seized in
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26 places, only a handfull of the seizures have been publicized. In two
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cases of people I know personally, there was no direct participation with
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the LoD, equipment was seized, and the equipment owners sufficiently
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terrified by the prospect of further victimization that they have avoided
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publicity. Let's face it; even if over $30,000 of equipment has been seized
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from someone, that's peanuts compared to court costs and possible
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career-damaging publicity from being connected to this mess.
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The next layer of damage is to operators of systems even less involved, but
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who want to avoid having their house broken into, their equipment seized,
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and their reputation besmirched. (If the SS has come to call, then surely
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you're guilty of *something*, right?) The solution? Restrict or eliminate
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public access to your system. And give me a break, Mr. Townson; if a system
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has any reasonable volume and the administrator has any sort of a life,
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then that administrator is not going to be reading people's personal mail.
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It's semi-reasonable to expect some monitoring of public areas, but not on
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a prior review basis...
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Then there's the hard-to-quantify suspicion that brews; if being associated
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with "crackers" can lead to that early morning knock, (even if that
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association has nothing to do with cracking, say, an employer-employee
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relationship), then how does that square with freedom of association? Does
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the operator of a usenet feed have to run an extensive security check on
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anyone who calls for news? How about the operator of a computer store who
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hires a salesman? Do any of these people deserve to have their computers,
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their disks, their manuals, their modems seized because they have "been
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associated with" a "known" cracker?
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Although the crackdown has not been as bad as it could have been, allowing
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the SS to get away with it would set a most unfortunate precedent.
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Douglas Barnes
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===========================================================================
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Date: Thu, 14 Jun 90 17:08 EDT
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From: Stephen Tihor <TIHOR@NYUACF>
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Subject: Outreach..advice sought
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To: tk0jut2
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My university already has one summer program for bright high school
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students but I am looking to see what we can and should do to provide a
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legitimate opertunity for youngsters who might become crackers to learn and
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to help socialize their urges to explore and expand their world view
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without attracting electronic vandals.
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Although the computer center is receptive to student initiated projects and
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requests for talks or training on any subject few students take advantage
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of our offers. Some of our efforts (such as universal email only accounts
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on request) have been thwarted by the central administration concerns about
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the potentially hugh costs of the project. We have been proceding more
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slowly to demonstrate that most members of the university community don't
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care yet.
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I am interested in ideas with low $ and personel costs and which will avoid
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triggering more vandalism or even unguided explorations. Innocent mistakes
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made by users "sharing resources" have been almost as much trouble as the
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vandals so we can not simply take the Stallman approach and remove all
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passwords from the university.
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===========================================================================
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Date: Thu, 14 Jun 90 11:54:57 EDT
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From: mis@seiden.com(Mark Seiden)
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re CuD 1.14:
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<5. What happens, as occasionally does, if an attorney asks the moderators
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<of CuD for a copy of Phrack #22 or the E911 file? If we send it, have we
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<committed a crime? If the recipient accepts it has a second crime occured?
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presumably there a precise legal definition of "traffic"?
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<It seems that federal agents are not particularly interested in clarifying
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<these issues. It leaves the status of distribution of information in limbo
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<and turns the "chilling effect" into a sub-zero ice storm. Perhaps this is
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<what they want. It strikes us as quite irresponsible.
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Exactly how have they been asked to clarify these issues?
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Are you still able/willing to make the entire archives available to, say,
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counsel needing access for trial preparation? how about to someone who
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will be testifying before Congress (who are holding hearings in mid-July on
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this subject)?
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Does the chilling effect extend so far that defendants will find themselves
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denied access to resources they need to prepare a proper defense (while the
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government remains resourceful as always) and debate over public policy is
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stifled because relevant information cannot be revealed?
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A separate query: does anyone have in postable form the texts of the
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Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the Wire Fraud sections of USC so maybe us
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ordinary asses can figure out how this game of "pin the tail on the donkey"
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can be played?
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mis@seiden.com
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===========================================================================
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Date: Sat, 16 Jun 90 15:59:16 -0500
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From: BKEHOE@widener
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Subject: On the counts held against Riggs & Neidorf
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To: tk0jut2,
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In reading the official transcript %of Craig Neidorf's indictment--eds.%, I
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found myself realizing a few things:
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1) The way the counts read on the transmission of the E911 file along with
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the Phrack files, it opens up an interesting hole--if they are being
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charged with the fact that it was illegal to transmit such a file, then
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what of the people (from Rich Andrews at Jolnet to the Postmaster at
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Missouri) that were, albeit indirectly, also transmitting that file? Should
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they too be charged with having committed a crime? If not, then how can
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Riggs & Neidorf be charged, if it's not a crime? Murky water.
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2) Counts 3 and 4 were about as vague as anything I've read. From my
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interpretation, the counts are charging them with conspiring to perform the
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E911 "theft" via email. Does that then mean that if I were to write to
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someone with a scheme to break into a system somewhere, that I could be
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held accountable for my plans? Is the discussion of performing an illegal
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act of and in itself illegal?
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4) Finally, I must wonder how many more charges may be pulled up between
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now and the time of the trial, if that gem about transmitting Phrack 22 was
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so suddenly included. Will every Phrack be dug through for any "possibly"
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illegal information?
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Something's rubbed me wrong ever since Operation SunDevil first started
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moving its gears. The trade of information is turning out to be the
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mainstay of our society; the amazing boom of fax machines and CD-ROM
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storage of volumes of information attribute to that fact. So now all of a
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sudden we are hit with the dilemma of deciding what information should and
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shouldn't be made available to the "general public", and who should
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disseminate that information. If I were to write up a file based on the
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information in Dave Curry's Unix Security paper, using language that
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"incites devious activity" (a.k.a. encourages people to go searching for
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holes in every available Unix system they can find), can I be held
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accountable for providing that information? How much of it is based on the
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ethical & legal value of the situation, and how much of it is the result of
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the "witch hunt" mentality?
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One more thing...I know that it's like beating a dead horse, and that it's
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become a well-founded part of the American vernacular, but I still don't
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like to see the term 'hacker' defined so concretely as was in this
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indictment. Sure, the definition's been encouraged over the past decade or
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so; I think it still puts a bad light on anyone that finds a fascination
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with computers & the world focused around them.
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Well, that's enough for now...I'm interested in hearing other peoples'
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opinions on all of this. I'm sure I'm not the only one out here who gets
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mildly PO'd each time I hear about a new result of Operation Sun Devil (and
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the associated fever).
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--Brendan Kehoe (bkehoe@widener.bitnet) -- Sun Systems Manager c 40
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===========================================================================
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Date: Sun, 17 Jun 90 20:46:27 -0400
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From: adamg@world.std.com(Adam M Gaffin)
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To: tk0jut2%niu.BITNET@cunyvm.cuny.edu
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Subject: forum invitation
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Commenting on Operation Sun Devil and Mitch Kapor's efforts, Sanford
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Sherizen, a computer-security consultant in Natick, Mass, told the
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Middlesex News (Framingham, Mass) that he is worried both by the potential
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for excessive government zeal in going after computer criminals and by the
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attitude that hackers have a right to go wherever their keyboards can gain
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them entry.
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%%I would hope this would not turn into an argument over whether
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hackers are good or bad, but rather I would hope (Kapor) and a lot of other
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leaders in the computer-communications industry start looking at what is
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privacy, what is an appropriate guarantee of free speech, but also the
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right to be left alone, the right not to have their data under siege,'' he
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said. %%We don't have a good sense of what our %bill of privacy rights'
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are.''
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Sherizen is trying to organize a forum on electronic free speech and
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privacy issues with a university in the Boston area. He would like to hear
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from anybody interested in participating, including members of the CU, and
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can be reached by phone at (508) 653-7101 or on MCI Mail at SSherizen.
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===========================================================================
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To: decuac!comp-dcom-telecom@eecs.nwu.edu
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From: Pat Bahn <pat@grebyn.com>
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Subject: the Jolnet/Sun Devil story
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Date: 21 Jun 90 15:04:13 GMT
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I have a reporter friend who wants to do a story on the Jolnet/Sun Devil
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situation. Is there anyone out there who has first hand experience. She
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doesn't need friend of a friend rumours but hard physical contact. Guns in
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faces of 12 year olds makes great copy.
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thanks
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=============================================================================
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Pat @ grebyn.com | If the human mind was simple enough to understand,
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301-948-8142 | We'd be too simple to understand it. -Emerson Pugh
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=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
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+ END THIS FILE +
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+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+===+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=
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***************************************************************
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*** CuD, Issue #1.17 / File 3 of 6 / Info World - LoD ***
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***************************************************************
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Newsgroups: news.admin,alt.bbs
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Subject: Re: Legion of Doom/Secret Service
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Reply-To: mnemonic@vondrake.cc.utexas.edu.UUCP (Mike Godwin)
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Organization: The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas
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In article <564@techbook.com> jamesd@techbook.com (James Deibele) writes:
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>Interesting paragraph in this week's InfoWorld. In "Notes from the Field,"
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>Robert X. Cringely's column, he writes:
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>
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>"Back in February, when AT&T long distance service went down for most of a day,
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>the company blamed it on a software bug, but it was really a worm --- sabotage
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>by hackers loosely associated as the Legion of Doom. Members also lifted UNIX
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>System V.3 source code from Bell Labs and 911 maintenance code from Bellsouth.
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>But it was disruption of telephone service that got the Secret Service
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>involved. Many Unix nodes on the anarchic Usenet crabgrass network were seized
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>by zealous agents tracking down mailing lists."
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I doubt Cringely is correct about the connection between the AT&T crash and
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the Legion of Doom prosecutions:
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1) The indictments don't mention any connection or criminal liability
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relating to the AT&T crash.
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2) The indictments DO list only counts of wire fraud and interstate
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transportation of stolen property. (The major "theft" was of an E911
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"help" file; the major "fraud" seems to have been that the hackers
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used pseudonyms--e.g., "Knight Lightning"--and that they concealed
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the evidence of their logons on remote systems.)
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3) None of the so-called "stolen property" (there are legal reasons to
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question the feds' expansive definition of stolen property here) seems
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to have been source code.
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4) The Secret Service has been apparently been involved in the LoD
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investigation since long before the AT&T crash.
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Since the feds are constitutionally required to inform Neidorff and
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Riggs (the LoD defendants) of the charges against them, the indictment
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is pretty much of a map of the way the case is going to go--the
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prosecutors can't surprise the defendants later by saying, "Oh, yes,
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we're REALLY prosecuting you for the AT&T crash.) If they had any
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reason to believe that the LoD was involved in such a highly publicized
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failure of an LD system, it is practically a sure thing that it would
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have been mentioned in the indictment. Not to mention the press
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releases that accompanied the issuing of the indictments.
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There do seem to be a few genuine facts in Cringely's paragraph; e.g.,
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that Usenet is anarchic.
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--Mike
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-------------------------------------
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MODERATOR'S RESPONSE: We attempted to contact Mr. Cringely, a
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pseudonym, at Infoworld (415-328-4602). Mr. Cringely was not in,
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but he did return our call later (but we were not in). We will
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try to contact him again and print his response. One source who
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has contacted him indicated that Infoworld has received many calls
|
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objecting to the article. Our own information is that Mr.
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Cringely stands by his sources, but that Infoworld may do a
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follow-up NEWS story. The unidentified person with whom we spoke
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said that the purpose of the rumors column was to allow "insiders"
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to speak without fear of reprisal. But, as Mike Godwin indicates
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above, there are so many demonstrable factual errors in the
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story that one wonders whether the editors condone what appears
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to be fabrication, especially when cynical prosecutors seem willing
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to grasp any innuendo in order to discredit the CU.
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=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
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+ END THIS FILE +
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+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+===+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=
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***************************************************************
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*** CuD, Issue #1.17 / File 4 of 6 / LoD and SS ***
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***************************************************************
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To: TK0JUT2%NIU.BITNET@cunyvm.cuny.edu
|
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From: mnemonic@walt.cc.utexas.edu (Mike Godwin)
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Subject: Re: Legion of Doom/Secret Service
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Date: 22 Jun 90 04:39:54 GMT
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References: <1990Jun21.075439.23016@hayes.fai.alaska.edu> <14050@nsc.nsc.com>
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In article <14050@nsc.nsc.com> ken@nsc.nsc.com (Kenneth Trant) writes:
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> In reading all the postings regarding the Secret Service, LoD, & the
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>C/Hackers I find (maybe in my own mind :-) ) that everyone is jumping to
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>the defense of the defendants, who it appears have admitted to entering
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>systems without the permission of the Sysadm's. People seem to always side
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>against the gov't in favor of the individuals in these types of cases,
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>unless of course it was they who were the victims. I for one believe that
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>if they illegally entered another computer, whether to just poke around or
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>to gather information or material, they deserve to lose all their equipment
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>and serve some jail time. If they have some much time on their hands to
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>crack systems let them do community service. Someone mentioned that they
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>had a hard time believing the estimated amount of the "stolen property",
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>who cares?. They broke in, they stole, they should lose their equipment and
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>go to jail.
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Kenneth, it seems to me that the points you raise here are based on the
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assumption that we're all REFLEXIVELY anti-government. I for one am not.
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But if you study how the law is being used in cases like these, you cannot
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help but worry about the implications such use has for the expansion of
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government power.
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First, consider the issue of whether the property was really "stolen." The
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law defines property interests and stolen property in several ways. These
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definitions include: 1) whether the rightful owner was deprived of its use
|
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(not true in this case), 2) whether (in the case of information), the thief
|
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*used* the information himself rather than merely *possessing* it (not true
|
|
in this case), and 3) whether the thief had some kind of fiduciary duty to
|
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the rightful owner (not true in this case). The broad definition of
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property used by the federal prosecutors here could just as easily be
|
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applied to a whistleblower who photocopies government documents and takes
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them to the press.
|
|
|
|
Second, consider the degree of punishment. Neidorf and Riggs currently must
|
|
defend themselves against an 11-count indictment. Eight of the counts are
|
|
for wire fraud, which carries a maximum penalty of $1000 and five years'
|
|
prison time *per count*. The other three are for interstate transportation
|
|
of stolen property, with a maximum of $10,000 in fines and 10 years in
|
|
prison *per count*.
|
|
|
|
Third, consider the breadth of definition in the feds' use of the term
|
|
"fraud" in the wire-fraud counts: Apparently, the "fraud" in the Legion of
|
|
Doom prosecutions was nothing more than 1) the defendants' use of handles
|
|
(common-place in the BBS world, as you should know), and 2) their alleged
|
|
erasure of evidence that they had ever entered the computers in question.
|
|
This is a *very broad* application of the crime of wire fraud.
|
|
|
|
Fourth, consider that the original indictment tacked on an 18 USC 1030
|
|
charge, which gave the Secret Service jurisdiction along with the FBI. Even
|
|
though the charge was dropped in the amended indictment (that particular
|
|
statute requires a federally owned computer or a "Federal interest
|
|
computer" for jurisdictional purposes), its initial presence justified
|
|
expanded involvement of the Secret Service in domestic law enforcement.
|
|
|
|
Me, I have no objection to criminalizing unauthorized access to other
|
|
people's computers. But I object to prosecution of this scale against
|
|
defendants of this sort, for much the same reason I oppose prosecuting
|
|
joyriders for grand theft auto.
|
|
|
|
--Mike
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|
|
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|
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Mike Godwin, UT Law School |"No interest is good unless it must vest,
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+ END THIS FILE +
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+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+===+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=
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***************************************************************
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*** CuD, Issue #1.17 / File 5 of 6 / California Law ***
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***************************************************************
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|
|
|
It appears that under California's recent amendments to Sections 502 and
|
|
502.7 of the Penal Code, discussion of certain types of knowledge can be
|
|
felonious. Although we do not have the final statute (could somebody send
|
|
us a copy to TK0JUT2@NIU?), the final "mock ups" are ominous. Most of the
|
|
amended legislation is legitimately aimed at such crimes as theft,
|
|
malicious data damage, and other acts to which we all object. However,
|
|
tucked within the proposed statute is language that seems sufficiently
|
|
vague and ambiguous to warrant concern. A few passages in particular caught
|
|
our eye. Upper case indicates emphasis that we have added.
|
|
|
|
Sec. 6, 502.7 (a) specifies:
|
|
|
|
"Any person who, knowingly, willfully, and with intent to defraud a
|
|
person providing telephone or telegraph service, avoids or attempts to
|
|
avoid, OR AIDS ABETS OR CAUSES ANOTHER TO AVOID the lawful charge, in
|
|
whole or in part, for telephone or telegraph service by any of the
|
|
following means is guilty of a misdemeanor or a felony, as provided in
|
|
subdivision (f):"
|
|
|
|
Most of the provisions seem reasonable. One, however, strikes us as
|
|
potentially dangerous. 502.7 (a)(5)(b) states:
|
|
|
|
"Any person who MAKES, POSSESSES, SELLS, GIVES, OR OTHERWISE TRANSFERS
|
|
TO ANOTHER, OR OFFERS OR ADVERTISES ANY INSTRUMENT, APPARATUS, OR
|
|
DEVICE WITH INTENT TO USE IT or with knowledge or reason to believe it
|
|
is intended to be used to avoid any lawful telephone or telegraph toll
|
|
charge or to conceal the existence or place of origin of destination
|
|
of any telephone or telegraph message; or (2) sells, gives, or
|
|
otherwise transfers to another, or advertises plans or instruments for
|
|
making or assemblying an instrument, apparatus, or device described in
|
|
paragraph (1) of this subdivision with knowledge or reason to believe
|
|
that they may be used to make or assemble the instrument, apparatus, or
|
|
device is guilty of a a misdemeanor or a felony, as provided in
|
|
subdivision (1)."
|
|
|
|
Subdivision (b) of this section indicates that the law applies when a
|
|
telephone or telegraph communication either originates or terminates, or
|
|
both originates and terminates, in California. It is not clear whether the
|
|
law is limited only to communications that "intend to defraud," or extends
|
|
also to information passed over the lines as well. Given the current
|
|
liberal extension and use of RICO and anti-drug laws, there is no reason to
|
|
expect that law enforcement agents will adopt a narrow interpretation. We
|
|
have already seen the creative use of "fraud" and "theft" (as well as
|
|
"conspiracy") employed in the prosecution of Craig Neidorf in Chicago.
|
|
|
|
Just as chilling is subdivisions (g) and (h) of this passage. The language
|
|
in (g) specifics:
|
|
|
|
Any instrument, apparatus, device, plans, instructions, or written
|
|
publication described in subdivision (b) or (c) may be seized under
|
|
warrant or incident to a lawful arrest, and, upon the conviction of a
|
|
person for a violation of subdivision (a), (b), or (c), the
|
|
instrument, apparatus, device, plans, instructions, or written
|
|
publication may be destroyed as contraband by the sheriff of the
|
|
county in which the person was convicted or turned over to the person
|
|
providing telephone or telegraph service in the territory in which it
|
|
was seized.
|
|
|
|
Section (h) provides that:
|
|
|
|
Any computer, computer system, computer network, or any software or
|
|
data, owned by the defendant, which is used during the commission of
|
|
any public offense described in this section any computer, owned by
|
|
the defendant, which is used as a repository for the storage of
|
|
software or data illegally obtained in violation of this section shall
|
|
be subject to forfeiture.
|
|
|
|
Perhaps we misread the language of all this, but if so, it seems that
|
|
control agents also have considerable latitude to "misread." But, it seems
|
|
to say that the MERE POSSESSION of information of, for example, how to make
|
|
a box, or of an auto-dialer, or of information on altering a telephone
|
|
constitutes a crime, whether it is ultimately used or not. The language
|
|
seems quite explicit that communicating information about ANY of these
|
|
articles is a crime.
|
|
|
|
What does this mean? It seems to mean that if you possess any copy of
|
|
PHRACK that describes boxing with diagrammed instructions on how to make
|
|
one, you are potentially at risk for both prosecution and forfeiture of
|
|
equipment. A counter argument, one that enforcement agents give, is that we
|
|
should trust the "good faith" of controllers. We have seen, however, that
|
|
"trust your friendly computer cop" is an oxymoron.
|
|
|
|
Would persons in Illinois who have uploaded a textfile on boxing to
|
|
California be guilty under this law? It so-appears. Does California have an
|
|
extradition agreement with Illinois? Should researchers, journalists, and
|
|
just plain folk start to worry? Looks like you'd better if you possess
|
|
profane information.
|
|
|
|
Perhaps we are unduly concerned, but it seems that the language of this, if
|
|
this is what actually appears in the final statute, provides a means to
|
|
RESTRICT THE FLOW OF INFORMATION, whether used in a crime or not. And this
|
|
is what all the fuss is about! It is not about hacking, phreaking, carding,
|
|
or illegal behavior. It is about the free flow of information that seems to
|
|
be threatened with prosecution, and lots of it. It is about confiscation,
|
|
forfeiture, or...fill in your own favorite term...the rip-off of equipment
|
|
of legitimate, law-abiding folk merely for possessing (or worse?)
|
|
disseminating knowledge. As the California statue reads, even to publish
|
|
information that could help others learn how to break into a computer is a
|
|
potential felony. This means a restriction on research, literature, or any
|
|
other legitimate forum in which presentation of such information is
|
|
critical. On feature that made Stoll's work so captivating was the detail
|
|
he provided on the cat and mouse game between himself and Marcus Hess.
|
|
Should such detail be prohibited under the guise of "protecting the
|
|
commonweal?"
|
|
|
|
Our point here is that, until recently, there was no organized constituency
|
|
to oppose the excesses of otherwise well-meaning laws. It is one thing to
|
|
protect the public. It is quite another to cynically manipulate law in ways
|
|
that restrict freedom of information. The California law seems akin to
|
|
formatting the hard drive in order to delete a troublesome file. It fails
|
|
to distinguish between the nature of computer crimes, and ultimately
|
|
penalizes those of us who depend on the free flow of information that we,
|
|
perhaps naively, feel is essential to a democracy.
|
|
|
|
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|
|
+ END THIS FILE +
|
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|
|
***************************************************************
|
|
*** CuD, Issue #1.17 / File 6 of 6 / Hackers in the News ***
|
|
***************************************************************
|
|
|
|
Date: Sun, 17 Jun 90 20:42:39 -0400
|
|
From: adamg@world.std.com(Adam M Gaffin)
|
|
To: tk0jut2%niu.BITNET@cunyvm.cuny.edu
|
|
Subject: newspaper article
|
|
|
|
|
|
The following is from the Middlesex News, Framingham, Mass, 6/17.
|
|
|
|
|
|
By Adam Gaffin NEWS STAFF WRITER
|
|
|
|
Scarecrow and Ferret say they're lying low right now - this
|
|
time the feds seem to be really serious about cracking down on
|
|
computer hackers.
|
|
|
|
Not that that's what they consider themselves. But the two
|
|
Framingham-area residents are part of the computer
|
|
corporate codes to make free phone calls across the country and to
|
|
Europe as he tries to collect pirated copies of computer games from
|
|
underground computer bulletin-board systems.
|
|
|
|
Ferret ran one of these "elite" systems, open only to other
|
|
members of this demi-world, until his computer's hard drive began
|
|
malfunctioning a few weeks ago.
|
|
|
|
But the pair are cutting back their hacking. On May 7 and 8,
|
|
150 federal agents served search warrants in 15 locations across the
|
|
country in connection with a two-year probe into computer hacking.
|
|
Four months earlier several people were arrested in a related probe
|
|
into the electronic theft of a document describing the
|
|
administration of a 911 system in the South.
|
|
|
|
"I've been very low-key since this whole thing started,"
|
|
Scarecrow says, "I've gone seven weeks without using a
|
|
(credit-card) code."
|
|
|
|
"This time it has a different ring to it," Ferret said.
|
|
"This one for
|
|
me personally, it looks like maybe it's for real. It may be the end
|
|
of an era."
|
|
|
|
Both agreed to an interview on the condition that they be
|
|
identified only by the nicknames they use in the computer
|
|
underworld.
|
|
|
|
It's a world that is hard to enter until you pick up enough
|
|
skills to prove to insiders that you can hack with the best of them.
|
|
|
|
Scarecrow recalled getting a call once from a local teen who
|
|
needed some computer help. Scarecrow said he'd help, but on one
|
|
condition: that the teen crack into a computer network at a large
|
|
university in Boston and create an "account" that would give
|
|
Scarecrow access.
|
|
|
|
"And he did," Scarecrow said. Once accepted into the
|
|
computer underworld, everybody tries to help each other out and
|
|
often become fast friends - even if they do not know each
|
|
other's real names and communicate only by computer or
|
|
long-distance phone call - the two said. "I don't believe in
|
|
the high prices of software," Scarecrow says, explaining his
|
|
mania for collecting games for Commodore computers.
|
|
|
|
"Personally, I think it's insane to pay $40 for one game."
|
|
Yet he admits he has played few of the several thousand games
|
|
he has collected over the past couple of years. "It's more
|
|
like a game, just to see how many you can get." He says he has
|
|
a reputation as one of the fastest collectors in the country -
|
|
he can get any game within three days after it's been cracked.
|
|
And in the underground, reputation is everything, the two say.
|
|
It's how you gain access to the "elite" bulletin-board
|
|
systems, which now often require three personal references.
|
|
It's how you get others to do things you either cannot yourself
|
|
or just don't want to.
|
|
|
|
"I can get anything I need, and I have
|
|
the means to get it," Scarecrow said. "You do it because you
|
|
can," he said. "If I can get away with it and do it, why
|
|
not?" Scarecrow says nobody gets hurt and the phone companies
|
|
or big businesses pick up the tab for his phone calls, which
|
|
are often long conference calls with people across the country
|
|
and the Atlantic, usually at night. "They can afford it," he
|
|
said. "I don't consider what we do breaking the law," he
|
|
said. "We sort of push it to the limit. How can you sit there
|
|
and tell me I'm breaking the law when I see what they did on
|
|
May 7 and 8? How can the government say I'm breaking the law?
|
|
They threw the First Amendment out the window."
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Software
|
|
Publishers Association, which represents companies that sell
|
|
programs, and the Secret Service see it differently. "All the
|
|
publishers have to sell is an idea, a creation," says Peter
|
|
Beruq, the association's litigation manager. "A lot of time,
|
|
energy and effort goes into developing software products.
|
|
|
|
Publishers and their authors should be compensated for that
|
|
work; it doesn't matter if it's a $40 game or $200 spreadsheet.
|
|
What's the incentive for someone to create a new software
|
|
product if they know it's going to be pirated?"
|
|
|
|
"The losses
|
|
to the American public in this case are expected to be
|
|
significant," Gary Jenkins, the service's assistant director,
|
|
said in announcing the May warrants. "The Secret Service takes
|
|
computer crime very seriously, and we will continue to
|
|
investigate aggressively those crimes which threaten to disrupt
|
|
our nation's business and government services. "Our
|
|
experience shows that many computer hacker suspects are no
|
|
longer misguided teen-agers mischievously playing games with
|
|
their computers in their bedrooms," he said. "Some are now
|
|
high-tech computer operators using computers to engage in
|
|
unlawful conduct."
|
|
|
|
"No one's out for destruction," Scarecrow
|
|
said. "We keep ourselves in check more than the government
|
|
ever could. ... There's a strict etiquette and you have to
|
|
answer for your actions. Your reputation is all you have."
|
|
Hackers often design elaborate "demos" - programs with fancy
|
|
graphics and sophisticated sound effects - to spread the word
|
|
about hackers gone bad, they said. "Word on anyone can get
|
|
out within 24 hours," he said. They add there is no shortage
|
|
of new people coming into the field. "It's nice to see new
|
|
people coming in, new people taking over, but there's so much
|
|
to teach," Scarecrow said. "We're old men," Ferret, 22,
|
|
said. Scarecrow is 26.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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+ END THIS FILE +
|
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|
! |