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>C O M P U T E R U N D E R G R O U N D<
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>D I G E S T<
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*** Volume 1, Issue #1.03 (April 8, 1990) **
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****************************************************************************
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MODERATORS: Jim Thomas / Gordon Meyer
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REPLY TO: TK0JUT2@NIU.bitnet
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COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
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information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of
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diverse views.
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--------------------------------------------------------------------
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DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent the
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views of the moderators. Contributors assume all responsibility
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for assuring that articles submitted do not violate copyright
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protections.
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In This Issue:
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File 1: News and Notes (moderators)
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File 2: The Future of Hacking (Christopher Seline)
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File 3: Hacking into Nasa (Ellis Dea)
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File 4: The FBI sets up Earth First!? (Anonymous contributor)
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File 5: An Alternative view of Piracy (Jim Thomas/Gordon Meyer)
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File 6: Hackers in the News: LoD, Australian Hackers
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--------------------------------------------------------------------
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***************************************************************
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*** Computer Underground Digest Issue #1.03 / File 1 of 6 ***
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***************************************************************
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We still do not have an FTP site for archives, although we have
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several volunteers if we cannot ultimately set one up here.
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When we have one, we will permantely post it in the header.
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If you have not received back issues of CuD but have requested to
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be placed on the mailing list, re-send your request, and manually
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include your address in your signature. The biggest problems seem to
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be those addresses for which we must rely on the headers. BITNET is
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preferred.
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We are especially looking to build the archives with research
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papers, such as those presented at conferences, or published
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articles for which authors retain copyright. AGAIN WE CAUTION--
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PLEASE BE SURE THERE ARE NO COPYRIGHT VIOLATIONS, or we cannot
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post the articles. Even if an author writes and contributes a piece,
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if it has been published in an academic journal, the journal
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normally retains the copyright. However, because most papers are
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first presented at a conference, and because the final product
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usually contains substantial revisions, conference papers, or
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book chapters on which the author retains copyright, are
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acceptable. Same goes for newspaper articles or transcripts of
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radio or tv broadcasts. So, send those articles, but if in doubt,
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err on the side of caution! We will not knowingly distribute
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anything that violates this or any other laws.
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We are starting to put together a bibliography listing books and research
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articles on the computer underground. If you come across any journals,
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books, or feature-length articles (not simply news blurbs), please pass
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along the *complete* reference and preferably a summary (or, better, a
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review/critique) we can publish.
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NOTE: WE WILL BE AT A CONFERENCE FROM WEDS, APRIL 11 THRU SUNDAY APRIL 15,
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AND WILL NOT BE ANSWERING ANY MAIL UNTIL MONDAY, APRIL 16. Issue #1.04 will
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be lengthy--about 2,100 lines. It will go out Monday, April 16, and will be
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broken down into four (4) individual files of about 500 lines each.
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=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
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+ END THIS FILE +
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+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+===+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=
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***************************************************************
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*** Computer Underground Digest Issue #1.03 / File 2 of 6 ***
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***************************************************************
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From: "CHRISTOPHER J.D. SELINE - CJS@CWRU.CWRU.EDU"
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Subject: Hacking in the 90's-the move from active invasions to
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passive listening
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To: tk0jut2
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I've been thinking about the future of hacking lately. Where is it going to
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go. What will it be like in a few years.
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Without taking a poll, I think hacking is going to move toward obtaining
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information through more passive eavesdropping rather than active invasion of
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systems. Of course, the active invasion could be preceded by a long passive
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invasion used to obtain passwords and operating procedures.
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Basicly, my argument is this: hackers who invade systems are being detected;
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once detected they are often tracked down through the electroinc network
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(phone, internet, whatever) and apprehended. Hackers will try to avoid
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detection by using "passive" systems to obtain information.
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These passive systems will be either simple line tapping and network
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eavesdropping, or the interception of compromising emanations (ELINT/CE).
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ELINT/CE circuit schematics are available through the underground and for less
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than $200 a hacker can produce a "box" that will "see" what someone is typing
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on their terminal from several hundred meters away. ELINT/CE doesn't require
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the physical invasion of an office to place a tap. It is completely
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undetectable and relatively unknown. Because it is unknown there are _no_
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countermeasures in place (except for government activeities with national
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security information, many FBI terminals, and many DEA terminals).
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Since it is passive, undetectable, and there are no routinely used
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countermeasures ELINT/CE represents an extremely safe way to obtain lots of
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information.
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For the more adventurous there is always phone line tapping and serial line
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tapping. The only drawback here is that the connection to someone's phone line
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does requires (often) a bit of trespass, which makes it more likely the hacker
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will be caught.
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And, of course, there is network tapping. With an ethernet is this very very
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easy (just put your ethernet board in promiscuous mode). This often requires
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legitimate access to the network, but once a hacker has this physical access
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there is little information he can not capture. Since most networks don't
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monitor for "new" ethernet boards attached to the cable, an unauthorised
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connection can be made with an ethernet net tap.
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These are all "old" techniques. The intelligence agencies have been using them
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for a long long time. All of these techniques all the gathering of a great
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deal of information without the associated risk of directly invading
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someone's computer. I think that they will be "the hacking of the 90's" as
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more and more hackers are apprehended using the old methods.
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Christopher Seline
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cjs@cwru.cwru.edu
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=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
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+ END THIS FILE +
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+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+===+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=
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***************************************************************
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*** Computer Underground Digest Issue #1.03 / File 3 of 6 ***
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***************************************************************
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(Contributed by Ellis Dea)
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The March 19, 1990 issue of The Scientist contains an article
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titled "NASA Network Faulted for Security Gaps" (2, 12). An interesting
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heading of the page twelve continuation of the article is "NASA Says Best
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Defense Against Hackers is Prosecution" (12). The Scientist, as usual,
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maintains its objectivity through the novel approach of supporting BOTH
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sides of the issue. Although I find it difficult to raise ambivalence and
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equivocation to the level of objectivity, the publication should at least
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be commended for at least mentioning the faulty security, especially as
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almost everybody reading this knows full well that the system password for
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NASA's computer system was for a long time 3210 (cleaver? who would ever
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think of trying that?).
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SPAN (Space Physics Analysis Network) is an unclassified network on
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which research scientists share information that is vital to their work.
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Much of the information could be of general interest, but much of it would
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be far over the head of the average "hacker." SPAN investigates every
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violation of security, it says, but one wonders why. None of the alleged
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incidents have resulted in any loss of data, thus proving that those who
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did gain access illegally had no malice in mind. If they had resulted in
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loss of data, however, I would strongly question why that information was
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not backed up. Better yet, why is the information restricted at all? Why
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not simply make this information available to the general public, perhaps
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on a duplicate machine?
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What is happening here is a conflict between the General Accounting
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Office (GAO) and the people who are trying to maintain the computer system.
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The GAO is pointing out, quite correctly, that they are doing their jobs.
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NASA is countering that it is much better to prosecute than to prevent (not
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quite in those words, but that is the point that emerges). The truth of
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the matter is that those who are supposed to preventing unauthorized access
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to the SPAN network are incompetent. The best way to cover up incompetence
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is to hide behind some sort of moral or legal shield.
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Actually, what the GAO says in its report makes perfect sense which
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may be one reason why NASA is resisting it and posturing instead: "Suppose
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a SPAN user at university X taps into the system and is connected with the
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Johnson Space Center. And suppose he figures out how to bypass the files
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he is pointed to and taps into another database. Could he cause
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significant damage to that system is he tried to change it? And what's the
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information worth? That's what we think NASA should be trying to find
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out." Suppose the system is such that he could NOT cause significant
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damage? Why worry about it then? Suppose the information is worthless?
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Why bother? Why not try to find out? Because this "hacker" could cause
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significant damage and NASA knows it. Furthermore, NASA is incapable, at
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the present time, of preventing it. If NASA had enough brains, it would
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hire some of these "hackers" as consultants and fix their systems rather
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than expecting our penal system to do it for them.
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At the present time, it seems that NASA is relying on the threat
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of prosecution to prevent unauthorized access to SPAN. One of NASA's
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arguments is that to increase security would make access more difficult.
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Since their database is designed primarily for scientists, especially
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astrophysicists, one can not expect them to make the system too complicated
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and thus above the heads of their users, but one can expect at least of
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modicum of expertise in these areas from them. Certainly, the threat of
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prosecution seems absurd.
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We can realize its absurdity by making a simple analogy to everyday
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life. Of course, it may be considered a bit unfair by NASA for us to
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expect them to take reality into consideration, but a bit of common sense
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can not always be out of place. The situation seems to me analogous to
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saying that we will no longer lock the doors to our homes or automobiles
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when we leave them --we will henceforth rely on law enforcement to protect
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our belongings. From now on, we will impose draconian penalties on anyone
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who steals anything from us without our permission. We will cut their
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fingers or hands off, castrate them, etc. Even under these conditions,
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even with a tremendous influx of money for enforcement of these penalties,
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I am sure that we would continue to lock our doors and I am somewhat
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certain that even those speaking for NASA in this case would continue to
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lock their doors.
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If I could humbly offer a bit of advice to NASA: lock your doors.
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Furthermore, if you find that a hacker has opened your door, why not seek
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his advice on how to lock it better? Why not even sponsor some sort of
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contest? See who does the best job of getting around your security (for
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they will anyway) and reward that person. Or perhaps punish him by putting
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HIM in charge of your computer security. He could certainly do a damn
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better job of it than you are doing now and you could go back to your
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research.
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***************************************************************
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*** Computer Underground Digest Issue #1.03 / File 4 of 6 ***
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***************************************************************
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Your reference to the FBI tactics in the arrest of Earth First participants
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as questionable, illegal, immoral, unethical, and generally wrong, led me
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to look up the original article. It appeared in THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE (and
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presumably other sources) on March 2, 1990, pp. 1, 12, titled "FBI tactics
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questioned in probe of activeists," by Terry Atlas, date-lined Phoenix. The
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article describes what appears to be entrapment, and suggests that the FBI
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set up the leaders intentionally:
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"PHOENIX--Mike Tait was a quiet, troubled cowboy, a Vietnam War
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veteran in his early 40s who wore an Arizona Feeds cap that
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covered his bald spot.
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As it turned out, he was hiding a lot more than that.
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To his best friend, Margaret "Peg" Millett, a part-time counselor
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at a Planned Parenthood clinic in Prescott, Ariz., tait was a
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good-hearted redneck who liked to dance and was trying to get in
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touch with his feelings.
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Along with Millett and some of her friends, he took an interest
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in "monkey-wrenching"--disruptive, often illegal, acts in the
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name of Mother Nature--popularized by the radical environmental
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group Earth First!.
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One night last May, Tait drove Millett and two of her trusted
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friends into the Arizona desert outside Prescott on such a
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clandestine mission.
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Suddenly, flares exploded that lit up the desert sky and exposed
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Tait's secret. More than 40 FBI agencies--on foot, on horseback
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and in a helicopter--moved in on tait's unarmed friends as they
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allegedly used a blowtorch in an attempt to cut down a power-line
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tower.
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The ambush, and the arrest the next morning of Earth First!
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founder David Foreman 200 miles away in Tucson, climaxed an
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18-month federal undercover investigation into what the
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government charges was a dangerous group of eco-terrorists whose
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nighttime raid was a practice run for more serious attacks on
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power lines at nuclear plants in Arizona, California and
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Colorado.
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The investigation was begun with high-level approval from
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Washington during the Reagan administration. It included putting
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FBI agent Michael Fain undercover as Mike Tait, backed up by
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wiretaps, hidden microphones and body wires used to secretly
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record more than 1,400 %page break, con't on page 12% hours of
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conversations among environmental activeists."
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The article goes on to question whether such resources were
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simply retaliation for Foreman's outspoken advocacy of an
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anti-nuclear position. The issue raised in the article is that
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the FBI was out to get Fain. The article continues (p. 12):
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"And new evidence--an apparently careless remark by agent Fain
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that was inadvertently recorded--lends some support to Foreman's
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charge that he was the big catch the government wanted.
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On one tape that the government recently provided to defense
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attorneys, what is apparently Fain's voice is heard telling two
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other FBI agents that Foreman wasn't an actual perpetrator. This
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is the guy we need to pop to send a message."
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"That's all we're really doing," he goes on, "and if we don't
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nail this guy and we get only Davis, we're not sending any
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message."
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They laughed that the supposedly fearsome band of environmental
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radicals was holding a yard sale in Tucson to raise enough money
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to keep going, and Fain remarks, "They're low budget, and I don't
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really look for them to be doing a lot of hurting of people."
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Then suddenly realizing that the tape recorder is on, Fain says,
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"We don't need that on the tape. Hoo boy," and he shuts it of.
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Gerry Spence is defending Earth First!, and, according to the
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article, the trial has been postponed from the original April
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date.
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I find the implications of this scary. I don't support bombings
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and destruction of property, but I like a police state even less.
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I don't know what counts as a set in law, but common sense tells me
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that something's not right here. It seems like the FBI is
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manipulating people and events to assure a particular kind of
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outcome. What did this entire operation cost? How much will
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tax payers have to pay for the prosecution of what could result in
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a fiasco? Who else are the feds manipulating and for what purpose?
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Who does the approving? Where does legitimate law enforcement
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strategy end and gestapo tactics begin? I don't have any answers.
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Does anybody else?
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=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
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+ END THIS FILE +
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+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+===+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=
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***************************************************************
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*** Computer Underground Digest Issue #1.03 / File 5 of 6 ***
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***************************************************************
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Gordon and I wrote the following for Northern Illinois University's THE
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COMPUTING NEWS. It was not published for two reasons. First, despite the
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fact that our comments are drawn from an on-going research project, it was
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considered "opinionated." We were in a catch-22 situation: We were required
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to work within severe space constraints, and could present neither data nor
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other research citations, yet, we were also advised not to make the article
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"too scholarly" for a general audience. Second, and apparently most
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important, we were told that if the article were published, it would appear
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to violate the NIU policy, so was inappropriate. Only through the most
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adept feat of intellectual aerobics could such an interpretation be made,
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because we were then, and our article is quite explicit that, in no way
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opposing the policy, but only the rhetoric in which it was presented. Our
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goal was to debate the rhetoric, not the policy. Such a rationale strikes us
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as the CHILLING EFFECT that has occured because of recent hysteria
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surrounding alleged computer abuses, and we find it quite ironic that a
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University, normally the cornerstone of debate, seems to be stifling debate
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on this issue. So, we present it here instead.
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We have seen an earlier version of this article floating around on bulletin
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boards, but this is the final, "official," version.
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Jim Thomas / Gordon Meyer
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******************************************************************
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SOFTWARE PIRACY: AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW
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Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer
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(5 March, 1990)
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-------------------------------------------------------------------
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Jim Thomas is an associate professor in Sociology. Gordon Meyer
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received his M.A. in Sociology in 1989. They are currently
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researching the computer underground from which the data for this
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note are drawn.
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-------------------------------------------------------------------
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The university policy against computer software piracy has
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been widely publicized, including in a recent issue of Computing
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News (December, 1989). There is no question that the university
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must protect itself against actions of the NIU community for
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which it could be held legally accountable. However, based on
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our current research of the "computer underground" and the active-
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ities of "phreaks, hackers, and pirates," we find no evidence to
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support the many value judgments offered in the rationale circu-
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lated by the university. These normative judgments contribute to
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law enforcement tendencies to expand the definitions of illegali-
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ty and, as one recent government publication has done, to place
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piracy in the same category of crimes as "computer theft" and
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"theft of trade secrets." Our intent here is neither to justify
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software piracy nor to challenge University policy. However, be-
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cause the area of copyright and "computer abuse" law is so new,
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and because these laws tend to rely in media and other depictions
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of "computer underground" activeity as criminally sanctionable, we
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challenge conceptions of underground activeity that seem unsub-
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stantiated by evidence.
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The university's normative justification of the University
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policy can be summarized in three broad principles:
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1. Software piracy shows disrespect for the intellectual work
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and property of others and subverts the mission of higher
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education.
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2. Software piracy deprives authors of a "fair return" for
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their work.
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3. Software piracy is unethical.
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These assertions help justify criminalization and corresponding
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sanctions. However, The data from our research do not support
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these judgments for several reasons. First, software pirates
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make a clear distinction between "pirates," persons who collect
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and share software for as hobbyists akin to stamp collectors, and
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"bootleggers." Bootleggers are persons who distribute software
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for material gain. Pirates may copy and install programs, but
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generally their goal is to collect, and they derive satisfaction
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from running programs for which they have no need and that they
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will rarely, if ever, use.
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Second, software pirates--despite the claims of the SPA
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(Software Publishsers Association)--report spending considerably
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more money purchasing software than the average user. Many of
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these purchases are for trading, and there is a strong ethos in
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the pirate world that if one uses a program, one purchases it.
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Reasons for purchasing include documentation, acquiring informa-
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tion about and discounts on updates, and on-line technical sup-
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port. It is quite common for pirates to purchase identical pro-
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grams to those they have already obtained.
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Third, the "no return" policy of most software merchandisers
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makes it difficult for potential buyers to assess the ability of
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a program to meet their needs or work adequately on their system.
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Piracy creates an informed public by assuring that programs are
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available for pre-testing, by providing a pool of reasonably lit-
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erate users to publicly discuss the merits of competing products,
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and to even offer technical assistance to those who have pur-
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chased a program. In this sense, the "unauthorized" copying of
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software can be seen as contributing to the university mission of
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expanding knowledge, of preventing exploitation of consumers, and
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above all, to the expansion of computer literacy contributing to
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the free flow of information.
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Fourth, pirates spend a considerable sum on their hobby.
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Among the most active topics of discussion among pirates are
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those of the need to endlessly upgrade, the endless purchase of
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diskettes on which to store programs, and--with the popularity of
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9600 baud modems--the advantages of investing between $600-900
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for expanding telecommunications hardware. Because most pirates
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exchange software across telephone lines, piracy has benefitted
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telephone companies because of the growth of Bulletin Board Sys-
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tems (BBSs). Our data indicate that an average monthly phone bill
|
|
of $200 or more is common, and active pirates easily double that
|
|
cost.
|
|
|
|
Fifth, there is simply no evidence to corroborate the claim
|
|
that piracy deprives authors of revenue. Our data suggest that
|
|
pirates annually purchase no less than three times the 1.5 pro-
|
|
grams the SPA estimates for the "average" user, purchases direct-
|
|
ly related to the hobby rather than a need. Further, few students
|
|
or faculty could afford the price of Dbase 4 and other large pro-
|
|
grams, and few people could afford to spend several thousand dol-
|
|
lars a year on computer games. Traded programs would simply re-
|
|
main unpurchased. Because piracy creates an interest in software,
|
|
expands consumer literacy, and contributes to a "user culture"
|
|
that benefits the industry as a whole, we suggest that without
|
|
such a culture there would be less interest in software and, con-
|
|
sequently, less revenue for authors.
|
|
|
|
Sixth, the claim that piracy is unethical is usually a glib
|
|
one made without a strong rationale. Although we make no metaphy-
|
|
sical claims here, we do suggest that the appeal to ethic in at-
|
|
tempts to criminalize piracy is far too serious to be so glibly
|
|
asserted, and the underlying issues require far more research and
|
|
debate. Even in the debates over VCR reproduction and photocopy-
|
|
ing books or journal articles, the appeal to ethics was never ad-
|
|
duced as stridently and self-righteously as in discussions of
|
|
software piracy.
|
|
|
|
The rapid growth of computer and telecommunications technol-
|
|
ogy brings with it new ethical, legal, and practical questions of
|
|
the nature of "private property," free and open access to infor-
|
|
mation and resources, and definitions of "authorship." Few among
|
|
us condone any form of predatory behavior. However, we find
|
|
equally disturbing the tendency to assumptively assert claims and
|
|
definitions that rightly should be brought into a public forum
|
|
for debate rather. The University has the obligation to protect
|
|
the law, but it also has an equal obligation to do so responsibly
|
|
without contributing to the current hysteria surrounding alleged
|
|
"computer crime."
|
|
|
|
=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
|
|
+ END THIS FILE +
|
|
+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+===+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=
|
|
|
|
|
|
***************************************************************
|
|
*** Computer Underground Digest Issue #1.03 / File 6 of 6 ***
|
|
***************************************************************
|
|
|
|
Date: Sat, 7 Apr 90 00:22:43 PDT
|
|
From: brooney@sirius.UVic.CA(Benjamin Rooney)
|
|
To: TK0JUT2
|
|
Subject: News Articles
|
|
|
|
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
MISSOURI STUDENT PLEADS INNOCENT IN 911 SYSTEM INTRUSION CASE
|
|
|
|
Craig Neidorf, a 19-year-old University of Missouri student, has pleaded not
|
|
guilty to federal allegations that he invaded the 911 emergency phone network
|
|
for 9 states.
|
|
|
|
As reported earlier, he was indicted this month along with Robert J. Riggs,
|
|
20, of Decatur, Ga. Both are charged with interstate transportation of stolen
|
|
property, wire fraud, and violations of the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse
|
|
Act of 1986.
|
|
|
|
Prosecutors contend the two used computers to enter the 911 system of
|
|
Atlanta's Bell South, then copied the program that controls and maintains the
|
|
system. The stolen material later allegedly was published on a computer
|
|
bulletin board system operating in the Chicago suburb of Lockport.
|
|
Authorities contend Neidorf edited the data for an electronic publication
|
|
known as "Phrack."
|
|
|
|
According to Associated Press writer Sarah Nordgren, in a recent hearing on
|
|
the case Assistant U.S. Attorney William Cook was granted a motion to prevent
|
|
the 911 program from becoming part of the public record during the trial.
|
|
U.S. District Judge Nicholas Bua set April 16 for a trial.
|
|
|
|
The 911 system in question controls emergency calls to police, fire,
|
|
ambulance and emergency services in cities in Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia,
|
|
Tennessee, Kentucky, Louisiana, North Carolina, South Carolina and Florida.
|
|
|
|
Article from "A Networker's Journal" by Charles Bowen
|
|
INFO-MAT MAGAZINE Vol.6 Num. 2
|
|
|
|
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
|
|
The following is a press release from the Australian Federal Police
|
|
concerning the Australian hacker "Dave" mentioned recently in the
|
|
New York Times and two other hackers. Credit where it is due -- this
|
|
information came to me from Paul Pavlinovich in Australia where it was
|
|
originally posted on a Melbourne University newsgroup.
|
|
|
|
Ben Rooney
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
"MEDIA RELEASE"
|
|
|
|
Monday 2 April, 1990
|
|
|
|
COMPUTERS SEIZED - THREE ARRESTED
|
|
|
|
Australian Federal Police detectives have executed four search
|
|
warrants on three private residences and a business address
|
|
following a six month investigation into computer hacking.
|
|
|
|
Three men, an 18 year old student of North Caulfield, a 20 year
|
|
old student of Greensborough and a 21 year old Computer
|
|
Programmer of Frankston have been arrested and are being
|
|
interviewed by Federal Police.
|
|
|
|
Federal Police computer crime investigators say their inquiries
|
|
have centred on three hackers who have used the code names
|
|
'Phoenix', 'Electron' and 'Nom'.
|
|
|
|
The hackers are alleged to have been gaining illegal access, or
|
|
breaking into computer systems in the United States and Australia.
|
|
It is alleged that whilst the hackers were accessing restricted
|
|
files and information, they also caused damage to those systems.
|
|
|
|
Australian Federal Police allege the hackers used Telecom and
|
|
Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (OTC) facilities for
|
|
their illegal activeities, via modems at their home addresses.
|
|
Through the telephone system they would then use their personal
|
|
computers (PC) to communicate with the other computer systems in
|
|
the northern hemisphere and across Australia.
|
|
|
|
The activeities of one computer hacker was brought to the
|
|
attention of the United States Secret Service in 1988 at which
|
|
time investigations by the Service showed the Citibank system had
|
|
been illegally entered by an Australian-based hacker known as
|
|
Phoenix.
|
|
|
|
Further reports of extensive illegal entry to US computers
|
|
followed throughout 1989.
|
|
|
|
Federal Police were able to launch their investigation following
|
|
the introduction in July last year of new Legislation under Part
|
|
6A of the Commonwealth Crimes Act covering offences relating to
|
|
the illegal use of computers.
|
|
|
|
They allege one of the hackers under investigation was identified
|
|
in recent media stories as 'David' or 'Dave'.
|
|
|
|
He was quoted in the media as having claimed success in his
|
|
attempts to 'hack' into computers in the United States and stated
|
|
he was not concerned about being caught, because "he knew that
|
|
in Australia the laws could punish him with no more than a small
|
|
fine for trespass."
|
|
|
|
Under the new legislation, Section 76E of the Crimes Act provides
|
|
for a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment for;
|
|
|
|
"Damaging data in Commonwealth and other
|
|
computers by means of a Commonwealth facility."
|
|
|
|
There is no provision for a fine.
|
|
|
|
The AFP officer heading the investigation Detective
|
|
Superintendent Ken Hunt said, it was not unusual for the
|
|
Australian hackers to spend up to 16 hours a day on their PC's
|
|
and other computers.
|
|
|
|
He said, much of that time would be spent on international
|
|
telephone lines, with the hackers, through their computer
|
|
keyboards, directing the cost of their calls to be met by the
|
|
companies whose computer systems they had illegally accessed.
|
|
|
|
Federal Police were required to enter the premises of the
|
|
suspects early this morning and quickly disable their computers
|
|
to prevent the destruction of programme software.
|
|
|
|
During the execution of the search warrants a considerable
|
|
amount of computer software, print outs and other documentation
|
|
was seized.
|
|
|
|
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|
|
+ END THIS FILE +
|
|
+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+===+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=
|
|
! |