434 lines
21 KiB
Plaintext
434 lines
21 KiB
Plaintext
April 1991
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ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES PROSECUTION:
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A LAW ENFORCEMENT PARTNERSHIP
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By
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Vincent A. Matulewich
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Supervisory State Investigator
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Environmental Prosecutions Bureau
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New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice
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On a cold, rainy Sunday, a railroad police patrol
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discovered a large pile of abandoned drums along a dirt access
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road near the tracks of a major metropolitan commuter line.
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Upon closer inspection, the officers noted that many of the
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drums were leaking and that the air had a chemical odor. Soon,
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they became lightheaded, but were able to return to their patrol
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vehicle to call the local municipal police department for
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assistance.
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After arriving on the scene, the local police officers,
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seeing the condition of the other officers, called in
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reinforcements. Shortly thereafter, the local health officer,
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supported by the fire and rescue squads, arrived at the scene. A
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decision was then made to notify the county and State agencies.
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Later, the county health department's emergency response unit
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arrived, followed by the State police's emergency management
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coordinator and the State's department of environmental
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protection/hazardous materials incident team.
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By this time, several hundred people, dressed in every
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conceivable type of protective clothing, were milling around an
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impromptu command post. As a portion of the contaminated area
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near the tracks was evacuated, and the decision to shut down the
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commuter railroad was made, the television news crew arrived.
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When all was said and done, it was estimated that the cleanup
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would cost approximately $100,000.
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Reaction to this hypothetical dumping incident would depend
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on when it took place. If it occurred prior to Earth Day, April
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21, 1970, most likely nothing would have happened. The drums of
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chemicals would have been allowed to ooze into the ground and
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contaminate the water supply. If it occurred during the 1970s
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or early 1980s, someone would pay for the cleanup, and in this
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case, it would be the railroad, since they owned the property
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where the drums of chemicals were found. The railroad, after
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cleaning up the site, would probably pass along the cost to the
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public in the form of a fare increase.
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Today, however, if this incident occurred, the municipal
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police department would most likely request assistance from one
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or more law enforcement agencies to process the abandoned drum
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site as a crime scene before having the hazardous chemicals
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removed. The involved agencies would also conduct an
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investigation to determine who was responsible for the act and
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criminally prosecute the violators.
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ENFORCEMENT HISTORY
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Today, the United States produces approximately 125 billion
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pounds of hazardous waste annually. (1) Because many of the
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environmental crimes prosecuted now were considered
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environmentally acceptable acts 30 years ago, hazardous waste
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has become a dangerous legacy that can no longer be overlooked.
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(2) Toxic and hazardous waste from approximately 15,000
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municipal and 75,000 industrial landfills has contaminated
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public and private water supplies throughout the country. (3)
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And, if left undiscovered, this contaminated water can cause
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cancer, birth defects, and genetic changes, as well as a variety
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of other disorders.
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Eventually, in response to public pressure resulting from
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events such as the Love Canal, where chemical wastes produced
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and disposed of during World War II seeped into the homes of
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local residents, the Federal Government began to attack the
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problem of improper chemical disposal practices in two ways: 1)
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Preventing further chemical contamination; and 2) dealing with
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existing chemical waste.
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To prevent new hazardous waste sites from being created, in
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1976, Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and Recovery
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Act (RCRA). RCRA sought to provide "cradle-to-the-grave"
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management of newly created hazardous wastes by imposing a set
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of regulations and a manifest system not only on the generators
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of hazardous wastes but also on the transporters and disposers
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of such chemicals. Under this act, treatment, storage, or
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disposal of hazardous wastes at any other place but an
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authorized facility is illegal. Violators are subject to civil
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penalties of $25,000 per day of continued noncompliance, and
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persons convicted of violations are subject to criminal
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penalties of up to $50,000 for each day of violation and
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imprisonment for a maximum of 5 years. (4)
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To handle existing hazardous waste sites, Congress, in
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1980, passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response
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Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), commonly known as the
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"Superfund Act." This act established a $1.6 billion fund to be
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used for, among other things, the clean up of abandoned
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hazardous waste sites. (5)
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Also, during the 1980s, various States enacted criminal
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sanctions for both knowing or reckless conduct involving the
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illegal disposal or abandonment of toxic or hazardous wastes.
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Now, in addition to similar fines imposed by the RCRA, States
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could impose terms of imprisonment for up to 10 years.
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SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
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Historically, private industry has not played a leadership
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role in protecting the environment and is still reluctant to
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take environmental precautions unless it views overwhelming
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scientific evidence that demonstrates that the expenditure of
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funds is necessary. Despite this reluctance, most large
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corporations operate according to environmental regulations;
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however, there are others willing to break the law in order to
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save or make money.
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Prior to the RCRA, the cost of disposing a 55-gallon drum
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of hazardous waste cost $3 to $5. Today, disposing legally that
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same waste costs $300 to $500. For some hazardous chemicals,
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this cost could be in excess of $1,500 per drum. Larger
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corporations simply pass this added cost onto the consumer, but
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smaller, marginal companies oftentimes may need to cut corners
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to save money. As a result, it is usually marginally
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competitive, smaller companies, or facilities hired by them,
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that illegally dump hazardous waste. (6)
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LAW ENFORCEMENT'S ROLE
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In the early 1980s, only Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, New
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Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania employed specialized units to
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deal with environmental crimes on a full-time basis. In all,
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this amounted to a few dozen overworked criminal investigators
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who were charged with developing investigative methods and
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procedures where none previously existed. To make matters more
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complicated, these investigators were "forced to work with," and
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at times rely upon, non-law enforcement agencies as their
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evidence collection teams and for records of those who
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generated, transported, and/or disposed of hazardous waste. (7)
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Today, through problem awareness and investigative methods
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training, 29 States now have environmental crimes units at the
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State law enforcement level. (8) In addition, over 1,000 police
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officers and investigators have attended investigative training
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programs. (9) This remarkable improvement in such a short time
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is directly attributed to law enforcement's perceived necessity
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of such teams and to public pressure.
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The Municipal Police Department
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By nature, most municipal police departments do not have
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the resources to devote themselves exclusively to investigating
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environmental crimes. However, municipal departments
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acknowledge that the public it is charged to protect is acutely
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aware of the dangers associated with hazardous chemicals. As a
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result, many have provided their patrol officers with problem
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awareness training so that they may properly secure hazardous
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areas from the public, and if possible, preserve the crime
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scene.
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In most cases, for a municipal police department, dealing
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with hazardous chemicals means calling on agencies that have the
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capability and resources to control the situation. Chemicals
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found at any given site must be considered unknowns, and as
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such, must only be approached by trained personnel. Even so,
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municipal departments can act as invaluable resources to
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criminal investigators by providing informant information and by
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"working" the community for suspect leads.
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The County District Attorney's or Prosecutor's Office
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Due to limited resources, most county investigative
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departments also do not actively investigate environmental
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crimes. However, some counties consider hazardous waste a major
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public safety issue and actively pursue criminal violators. In
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some States, the local district attorney's or State attorney's
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office is the only agency with the statutory authority to
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prosecute criminal violations. (10) This is especially true for
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counties that have a large industry-based economy and a high
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incidence of midnight dumping.
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The State Police or State Attorney General's Office
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Most environmental crimes units that are attached to the
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State police or the State attorney general's office are usually
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better equipped logistically to deal with the mobile nature of
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environmental violators who cross municipal and county lines. (11)
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In addition, State agencies are also better able to conduct
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long-term investigations leading to successful criminal
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prosecutions. (12)
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Typically, State law enforcement agencies investigate and
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prosecute violations, such as fraud within the hazardous waste
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industry, illegal operation of hazardous waste facilities, and
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the illegal storage and disposal of hazardous wastes. In
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addition to environmental crime laws, State agencies also
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implement white-collar provisions of criminal codes and other
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violations of the law, such as theft by deception, falsifying or
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tampering with records, deceptive business practices,
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maintaining a nuisance, official misconduct, obstruction of
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justice, conspiracy, and manslaughter. (13)
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State Regulatory Agencies
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Although State regulatory agencies are not considered law
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enforcement agencies, they are an integral component to the
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successful criminal investigation of environmental crimes.
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These agencies maintain the "cradle-to-the-grave" manifest
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system required for all transactions involving the generation,
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transportation, and/or disposal of hazardous wastes. In
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addition, these agencies license and routinely inspect all
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facilities associated with the generation and disposal of
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hazardous waste. Furthermore, as a component of their emergency
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response duties, they also maintain specialized units that are
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dispatched to collect sample evidence at the scene of midnight
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dumpings or other situations where hazardous waste may affect
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the public health.
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The Federal Government
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In 1984, the U.S. Justice Department granted law
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enforcement powers to 23 agents of the U.S. Environmental
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Protection Agency (USEPA). The agents are attached to USEPA's
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National Enforcement Investigations Center (NEIC)/Office of
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Criminal Investigation in Denver, Colorado, and operate out of
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USEPA regional offices located throughout the country.
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Currently, NEIC has 55 agents.
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With the passage of the "Pollution Prosecution Act of
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1990," Congress has mandated that the number of criminal
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investigators be no fewer than 200 by October 1, 1995.
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Additionally, the USEPA has centralized the administration of
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their special agents in Washington, D.C., within the Office of
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Enforcement. Even so, this number is far too low to respond to
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emergencies or to conduct extended surveillance on suspected
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dumpers. Therefore, the USEPA is primarily directed toward
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major, long-term investigations of national significance,
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assisting local or State environmental crimes units with
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technical support, and filling the void where no coverage is
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provided at the local or State level. (14)
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The FBI has assisted the USEPA since 1981, and in 1986, 35
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Special Agents from the FBI's White-Collar Crimes Section were
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given the additional responsibility for investigating Federal
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environmental crimes. (15) Currently, the FBI is investigating
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over 300 environmental crimes cases.
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THE PARTNERSHIP
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Background
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In 1980, in response to media and public pressure regarding
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hazardous waste, the Attorneys General of the Northeastern
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United States initiated the Northeast Hazardous Waste
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Coordination Committee. Originally comprised of 11 Northeastern
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States, the committee later changed its name to the Northeast
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Hazardous Waste Coordination Project (NEHWP) and expanded its
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membership to 14 States.
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The primary purpose of the NEHWP is to: 1) Promote and
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coordinate investigations among member States; 2) provide
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technical assistance; 3) provide an information bank for all
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public record information with respect to the various components
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of the hazardous waste industry; and 4) develop the law
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enforcement partnership and provide annual training on
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environmental crimes investigations to all levels of government.
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Because of the unique relationship that must be maintained with
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the State regulatory agencies, the project's membership is
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composed both of representatives from State law enforcement and
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regulatory agencies. The project is funded by the participating
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States and the USEPA/National Enforcement Investigations Center
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(NEIC). (16)
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To meet national goals, the NEIC used the NEHWP as a model
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to establish three other regional groups--The Midwest
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Environmental Enforcement Association (previously known as the
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Midwestern Hazardous Waste Association), the Western States
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Hazardous Waste Enforcement Network and the Southern
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Environmental Enforcement Network (previously known as the
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Southern Hazardous Waste Project). Today, 46 States and the
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Province of Ontario, Canada, are members of these regional
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groups. The only States not participating in a regional group
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are Kansas, Montana, Texas, and Wyoming. The regional groups
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changed their names to reflect the USEPA's shift from simply
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hazardous waste enforcement to a multi-media approach to
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environmental enforcement dealing with surface water, ground
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water, pesticides, and air pollution. (17)
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Training
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However, in order to maintain successful environmental
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crimes programs, proper training is essential and must focus on
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two specific groups: 1) Law enforcement agencies that require
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only a subject awareness; and 2) law enforcement agencies that
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are actively involved in environmental crimes investigations.
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For the first group, training is limited to what environmental
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crimes are and which agencies actively investigate such crimes.
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Training for this group, which consists of representatives from
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municipal or county police departments and health, fire, and
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code inspectors, is usually limited to a 4- to 8-hour block of
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instruction. Such basic awareness programs, conducted by the
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regional groups or the State's environmental crimes unit, have
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enjoyed success throughout the Nation. These regional groups
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have the combined capability to train approximately 1,000
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individuals per year in various topics. (18)
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For those law enforcement and regulatory agencies involved
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actively in environmental crimes investigations, training is
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more in-depth and includes instruction in specific technical
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skills. For example, the NEHWP uses a two-step program that
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includes 1 week of classroom instruction followed by a 3-day
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practical exercise that details an environmental crimes case
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from the initial response to the execution of a search warrant.
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This practical exercise helps to expose the criminal
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investigators and regulatory inspectors to each other's duties
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and responsibilities. (19)
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In 1985, the USEPA perceived the need to develop a national
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training program regarding hazardous waste investigations. In
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conjunction with the National Center for State and Local Law
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Enforcement Training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training
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Center (FLETC) in Glynco, Georgia, the NEHWP, and other State
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agencies, the USEPA developed a 2-week program that addresses
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criminal violations with regard to the handling, transportation,
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and disposal of hazardous waste. The program was developed for
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investigative and regulatory personnel and stresses the
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multidisciplinary approach to the investigation and prosecution
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of violations. (20)
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The passage of the "Pollution Prevention Act of 1990"
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required the USEPA to create a National Enforcement Training
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Institute. The emphasis of the institute will be to conduct
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comprehensive criminal and civil environmental enforcement
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training for Federal, State, and local personnel.
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CONCLUSION
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Despite the efforts to increase awareness and to educate
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law enforcement and related personnel to the significance and
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dangers of environmental crimes, there are still municipal
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departments and county and State agencies that have not
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addressed the issue of environmental crimes. Therefore, to
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increase awareness among these groups, the FLETC and NEIC have
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brought together the heads of State agencies that have
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long-standing enforcement programs with their counterparts in
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those States that have not adequately addressed the problem.
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Even so, more specialized training programs are needed for those
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environmental crimes investigators currently working in the
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field.
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As law enforcement becomes more effective in dealing with
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environmental offenders, offenders have become more adept at
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avoiding detection. To help meet this need, the regional groups
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have developed investigative training courses that deal
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specifically with the sophisticated dumper. It is hoped that
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through training and continued vigilance, law enforcement,
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together with its partner agencies, can successfully rid the
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Nation of those individuals who blatantly disregard the
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importance of a safe, clean environment.
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FOOTNOTES
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(1) P. Miller, "Organized Crime's Involvement in the
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Waste Hauling Industry," in A Report from Chairman Maurice D.
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Hinchey to the New York State Assembly Environmental
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Conservation Committee, July 24, 1986, p. 187.
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(2) S. Wolf, "Hazardous Waste Trials and Tribulations,"
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Environmental Law, vol. 13, No. 2, Winter 1983.
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(3) Supra note 1.
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(4) M. Leepson, "Toxic Substances Control," in
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Environmental Issues: Prospects and Problems (Washington, DC:
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Editorial Research Reports, 1982), pp. 99-115.
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(5) Ibid.
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(6) A. Block and F. Scarpitti, Poisoning for Profit: The
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Mafia and Toxic Waste in America (New York: William Morrow and
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Co., 1985).
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(7) D. Rebovich, Understanding Hazardous Waste Crime, the
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Northeast Hazardous Waste Project and the New Jersey Division of
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Criminal Justice, June 1986, p. 70, and the National Association
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of Attorneys General, State Attorneys General Guide to
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Environmental Law, Washington, DC, 1990, p. 174.
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(8) Ibid.
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(9) The Northeast Hazardous Waste Project, Annual Report,
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1987.
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(10) "L.A. Sheriff Expanding Unique Hazardous Materials
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Unit," Crime Control Digest, September 1, 1986, p. 10, and
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personal communication with R. Honnicker, Assistant Prosecutor,
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Monmouth County Prosecutor's Office.
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(11) Supra note 7.
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(12) Supra note 7.
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(13) Supra note 7 and New Jersey Department of Law and
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Public Safety, "Division of Criminal Justice Annual Activities,"
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1986, p. 27.
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(14) Third Conference of State Environmental Enforcement
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Organization, National Association of Attorneys General and
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NEIC. Denver Federal Center, Denver, Colorado, January 23 and
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24, 1991.
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(15) Personal communication with Special Agent J. Molton,
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Federal Bureau of Investigation.
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(16) The Northeast Hazardous Waste Project, Five Year
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Report: 1980-1985.
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(17) C.G. Wills and C.W. Murray, Jr., "State Environmental
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Organizations," National Environmental Enforcement Journal, vol.
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4., No. 7, 1989, pp. 3-8.
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(18) Personal communication with M. Staub, Training Chair
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for the Northeast Hazardous Waste Project.
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(19) Ibid.
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(20) J. Miller, "Hazardous Waste Investigative Training
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Program Feasibility Conference Notes," Federal Law Enforcement
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Training Center, Glynco, Georgia, 1985.
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