306 lines
15 KiB
Plaintext
306 lines
15 KiB
Plaintext
June 1991
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ROP-ing IN FENCES
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By
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James Rainum
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Officer
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Repeat Offender Project
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Metropolitan Police Department
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Washington, D.C.,
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Nancy Brown
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Investigator
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Repeat Offender Projcet
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Metropolitan Police Department
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Washington, D.C.
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and
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Raymond Smith, Jr.
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Special Agent
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FBI's Washington Metropolitan Field Office
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To Dickens Oliver, he was Fagan, the "...villainous-looking
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and repulsive..." trainer of young pickpockets. (1) In
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Sinclair's "The Jungle," he was Rosensteg, "...the pawnbroker,
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who would buy anything...for one third of its value and
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guarantee to keep it hidden for a year." (2) All of us are
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familiar with the sleazy characters in the alley wearing
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trenchcoats lined with jewelry and a dozen watches on their
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arms. The fence is not only a part of our fiction and our
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folklore but also our everyday lives as well.
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There are considerable difficulties inherent in building
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and prosecuting cases involving fences. For the most part,
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departments don't have programs specifically directed at fencing
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operations. However, this article explains how fencing markets
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and operations run, how to build cases against these offenders,
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and how to prosecute offenders successfully. By using the
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Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department's and the FBI's
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ROPTIDE Program as an example, this article explains the steps
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that law enforcement agencies can take to curtail, or end,
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fencing operations in their respective jurisdictions.
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BUYING AND SELLING STOLEN GOODS
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Because very few items are stolen by a professional thief
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for personal use, it is the fence who determines who will receive
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stolen goods. The thief may steal to support a gambling or drug
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habit, pay off substantial debts, or for many other reasons. In
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each case, unless the thief can directly use the stolen product,
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it must be converted to cash. There must be a market for the
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stolen product, and this need is satisfied by the activities of
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the fence.
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THE MARKETPLACE
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The market for stolen products is everywhere and so are the
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customers. The underground economy of stolen property is so
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substantial that "Forbes Magazine" recently published an article
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on the fencing business. It describes fencing as a business
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where "...inventory turnover is slow, but markups run 900%.
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Your suppliers will expect cash, but their prices are dirt
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cheap. There are legal risks, but they are minimal." (3)
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One of the most common ways to convert property to cash is
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for the thief to act as the fence, selling the merchandise to
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customers on the street. As with any business, success depends
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on customers knowing where the goods will be sold. Shoplifters
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and petty thieves hawking their merchandise from plastic bags
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are a common sight, as are car trunks loaded with electronic
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equipment, clothing, tools, and other items. These thieves
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often receive 50% or more of the retail value of the
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merchandise.
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FENCING BUSINESSES
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A true "fence" is usually considered to be an established
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businessperson--one who knowingly purchases stolen property and
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redistributes it in any fashion for profit. In fact, most
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fences operate legitimate businesses in conjunction with their
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illegitimate fencing activities. In many cases, the business
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may have started out as a legitimate operation, but evolved into
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a fencing activity for the most obvious reason--increased
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profits.
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Almost any type of business can become involved in fencing
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activities. Retail stores can resell items shoplifted from
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stores that carry the same items. Construction businesses can
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use lumber and equipment stolen from other job sites. Appliance
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stores and contractors can purchase new appliances stolen from
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homes under construction. Junk and scrap yards, pawnbrokers,
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and secondhand and antique stores are the most common sources
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for fencing enterprises. Though police departments attempt to
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regulate these activities, they are often difficult to control
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or investigate.
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LAW ENFORCEMENT AND FENCING OPERATIONS
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For law enforcement agencies, building a fencing case can
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be problematic. All jurisdictions have laws dealing with the
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receipt of stolen property. For the most part, each contains
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elements which show that the police department must prove that
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the property was stolen. However, this is often difficult to
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prove without an admission that the receiver knew the property
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was stolen. Retail stores seldom maintain updated and accurate
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inventory records. Citizens, for the most part, do not record
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the serial numbers of their property, and lumber, tools, and
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other construction supplies seldom have identifying marks.
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Even if undercover police officers posing as burglars sell
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merchandise to a fence, which they represent as stolen, the
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violation only constitutes the misdemeanor of attempting to
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receive stolen property because the item sold was not actually
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stolen. Additionally, because they are business people, most
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fences are very personable and many are even established in the
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community. As a result, few in law enforcement and the
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community are willing to expend the effort and money necessary
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to charge this type of criminal with a misdemeanor.
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STING OPERATIONS
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Most departments attack thieves through storefront sting
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operations. Copying known fencing operations, officers set up a
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business and begin buying stolen property themselves. As a
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result, thieves can be identified, stolen property is recovered,
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and multiple arrests can be made. However, disadvantages of
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using this technique include extremely large outlays of money,
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personnel, and time, which most departments either are unwilling
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or unable to make.
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THE STOLEN PROPERTY STATUTE
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Using an innovative approach to the fencing problem, the
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District of Columbia approved the Trafficking in Stolen Property
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statute included in the Theft and White Collar Crimes Act of
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1982. (4) This law took the Receiving Stolen Property statute
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one step further and directly addressed those who purchased
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stolen property with the intent to redistribute for profit.
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The law simply states that anyone who sells or disposes of
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stolen property in any form for profit on two or more occasions,
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or anyone who receives stolen property on two or more occasions
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with intent to redistribute for profit, is guilty of a felony,
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punishable by a $10,000 fine or 10 years' imprisonment or both.
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What makes this law unique is that the property does not have to
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be stolen. As long as the person possessing or receiving the
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property has reason to believe that property is stolen, it is as
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good as stolen in the eyes of the court.
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"ROP" PROGRAM
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Washington, D.C., clearly needed a specific police program
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to enforce these new laws that had the potential to clamp down
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on fences. The same year that the trafficking statute came into
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being, the Metropolitan Police Department formed its Repeat
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Offender Project. Better known as ROP (pronounced rope), the
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project began as a proactive policing experiment. Basing its
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concept on the idea that a minority of criminals committed the
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majority of crimes, ROP targeted individuals who were believed
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to be committing five or more Part I offenses (5) per week.
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Officers handpicked for the experiment were told they could
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use any legal, moral, and ethical means necessary to put the
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target suspects behind bars. The project's success was
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outstanding, and ROP was made a permanent unit within the police
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department. Shortly thereafter, administrators decided that ROP
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could also be used to deal with the fencing problem that faced
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the city.
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ROP and the new trafficking law were practically made for
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each other. Though the new law made cases against fences easier
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than ever, the work necessary to build a good case demanded more
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than the street officer or average detective was able to give.
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Surveillance and undercover work were necessary, along with a
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supply of desirable bait property that the undercover officer
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could sell to the fence. Because of the operational creativity
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afforded to ROP, these problems were overcome, and during the
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winter of 1983, the law was first used to build cases against
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prominent fences in the metropolitan area.
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TWO CASE STUDIES
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Intelligence determined that the owner of a grocery store
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located in the southeast section of Washington, D.C., was buying
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stolen food stamps and other merchandise. ROP began a joint
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investigation with the U.S. Department of Agriculture and sent
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an undercover officer into the store on three occasions to sell
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the owner bait property consisting of food stamps and electronic
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items. The food stamps, supplied by the Department of
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Agriculture, and electronic items donated by an area retail
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store were clearly represented as stolen by the undercover
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officer. After the owner exchanged cash for stolen property,
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search warrants were obtained and served on the store and at the
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store owner's home address in Maryland. Stolen property was
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recovered from both locations, and the store owner was convicted
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in D.C. Superior Court of Trafficking in Stolen Property.
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With this experience under its belt, ROP tackled several
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other fencing operations. However, two problems quickly became
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evident. First, because of the nature of fencing (along with
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the size of the District of Columbia), the investigations
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usually extended outside the jurisdiction of ROP. Second, the
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supply of bait property was usually donated by local retail
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stores, and some of the merchandise, such as jewelry, simply
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could not cover the need. In searching for a solution to these
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problems, ROP turned to the Washington Metropolitan Field Office
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of the FBI. The cooperative efforts of these two law
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enforcement agencies proved to be effective as cases were made
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and criminals were prosecuted successfully.
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The working relationship developed fully between the two
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agencies when they solved an important case in February 1987.
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ROP had uncovered a fencing operation working out of a
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Washington, D.C., restaurant. The restaurant was run by two
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brothers who were prominent figures in the local community.
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They were buying large amounts of stolen property, specifically
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items dealing with horses, and transporting them to one of the
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brother's horse farm in Virginia. There the items were being
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sold from a tack shop on the farm.
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Using both FBI and ROP informants, an undercover officer
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began selling "stolen" property to the brothers after being
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introduced to them by another thief. When ROP's supply of bait
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property quickly ran out, the FBI supplied over $10,000 worth of
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items to be sold. Once the case was developed, ROP and the FBI
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were co-affiants on the search warrants, which were executed in
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both Virginia and D.C. Items valued at approximately $2 million
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were seized, representing property stolen in burglaries in
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Virginia, Maryland, and D.C.
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ROPTIDE
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Based on this and other successes, the Washington Field
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Office of the FBI and ROP formed a property crimes task force
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known as ROPTIDE in May 1987. ROPTIDE began with one FBI
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Special Agent and the ROP Squad, which consisted of one sergeant
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and six officers. It has since grown to six Agents, two
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sergeants, and nine officers. In addition, detectives from
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other surrounding departments assist with investigations that
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involve their jurisdictions and continually provide intelligence
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to help the task force select new targets.
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ROPTIDE has three target thief categories that are
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consistently investigated. The first is that of new home
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construction site burglars and their fences. During 1988,
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construction companies in the Washington, D.C., area lost in
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excess of $6 million of materials and equipment. The second is
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that of home and office burglars and their fences. The third is
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that of professional and repetitive auto thieves and their
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outlets (chop shops, etc.).
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When a target is identified, it is handled as a separate
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case. One FBI Agent and one ROP officer are designated as the
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case investigators. Together, they decide how to address the
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investigation and develop an investigative plan to include the
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use of different strategies, such as bait property, an
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undercover operation, consensual monitoring, closed-circuit
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television coverage, and informants. The Agent then makes a
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request for funds from FBI Headquarters, and upon receipt of the
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case funds, the undercover investigation begins.
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In the interim, the investigators conduct additional
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background work, including surveillance, use of informants,
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analysis of telephone records, and other investigative
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techniques. This work is performed by ROPTIDE as a whole, not
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just by the lead investigators. Funding for the operation is
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provided by the FBI. These cooperative efforts proved to be
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successful in curtailing fencing activities. As of April, 1991,
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ROPTIDE has led to 276 arrests, 201 indictments, 224
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convictions, and the recovery of approximately $8 million in
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stolen property.
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CONCLUSION
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By drawing on the talents and resources of the two
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agencies, ROPTIDE has allowed the investigators to overcome
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obstacles that would have seriously crippled past fencing
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investigations. And, cases have been tackled that would have
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overwhelmed any department or agency working on its own.
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ROPTIDE has recently been praised as being a very cost effective
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operation having a real impact on the crime problem in the
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Washington, D.C., metropolitan area.
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Fencing operations contribute greatly to the level of crime
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and economic fraud wherever they occur. Cooperative law
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enforcement efforts and a directed program against fences can
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prove to be successful deterrents to this crime.
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FOOTNOTES
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(1) Charles Dickens, Oliver Twist (New York: The New
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American Library, Inc., 1980).
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(2) Upton Sinclair, The Jungle (New York: The New
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American Library, Inc., 1960).
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(3) Steve Weiner and John Harris, "Hot Retailing," Forbes
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Magazine, August 7, 1989, vol. 144, No. 3.
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(4) Washington, D.C. Law 4-164, secs. 22-3831 and 3832.
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(5) A Part I offense, as described by the FBI, includes
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rape, robbery, homicide, burglary, arson, assault, and theft.
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