427 lines
23 KiB
Plaintext
427 lines
23 KiB
Plaintext
July 1990
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ANTICIPATORY SEARCH WARRANTS
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By
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A. Louis DiPietro, J.D.
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Special Agent and Legal Instructor, FBI Academy
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The fourth amendment to the U. S. Constitution requires that
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search warrants be based on a showing of probable cause. The
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probable cause requirement is satisfied when a law enforcement
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officer sets forth facts which indicate a fair probability that a
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crime has been committed and that evidence of that crime is
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presently located at a particular location. (1)
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Sometimes, however, law enforcement officers only have
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information that evidence will be in a particular location at
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some future time, but have no reliable information about the
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present location of that evidence. For example, an officer might
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receive reliable source information indicating that contraband
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will be delivered to a particular address the next day. If the
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officer waits until the delivery is made to obtain a warrant to
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search that location, the officer runs the risk that the evidence
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will be moved or destroyed before the warrant can be executed.
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As an alternative, the officer might conduct a warrantless search
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of the premises immediately upon delivery of the contraband and
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attempt to justify that search under the emergency exception (2) to
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the warrant requirement. The risk the officer runs by this
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course of action is that a court may find probable cause lacking
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or fail to recognize the emergency, and accordingly, suppress the
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evidence under the provisions of the exclusionary rule. (3)
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The law provides a solution to this dilemma. Rather than
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risking either loss or suppression of the evidence, the officer
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can use an anticipatory or prospective search warrant. An
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anticipatory search warrant is based on a showing of probable
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cause that at some future time (but not presently) certain
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evidence of crime will be located at a specific place. Where
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officers have probable cause to believe that evidence or
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contraband will arrive at a certain location within a reasonable
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period of time, they need not wait until delivery before
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requesting a warrant. Instead, officers may present this
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probable cause to a magistrate prior to the arrival of that
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evidence, and the magistrate can issue an anticipatory search
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warrant based on probable cause that the evidence will be found
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at the location to be searched at the time the warrant is
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executed.
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The purpose of this article is to acquaint law enforcement
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officers with the uses and requirements for anticipatory
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warrants. After reviewing the general judicial acceptance of
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anticipatory warrants, the article discusses numerous court
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decisions involving various investigative applications for
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anticipatory search warrants. The article also offers several
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recommendations for avoiding potential constitutional
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challenges to the use of anticipatory warrants.
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JUDICIAL ACCEPTANCE OF ANTICIPATORY WARRANTS
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Although the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the
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issue of anticipatory warrants, (4) numerous lower courts have
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ruled that it is constitutionally permissible to obtain such a
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warrant. Challenges to the constitutionality of prospective
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search warrants often involve claims that the fourth amendment
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probable cause requirement is not satisfied, because at the time
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of the warrant's issuance, there is no probable cause to believe
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that the items to be seized are presently at the place to be
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searched.
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However, the vast majority of State and Federal courts that
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have considered this question have concluded that anticipatory
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warrants are constitutional and consistent with the longstanding
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preference that whenever possible, police obtain judicial
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approval before searching. Judicial acceptance of the
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anticipatory warrant also encourages police to use the warrant
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process rather than taking warrantless action. Moreover, privacy
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interests are better protected by permitting law enforcement
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officers to obtain warrants in advance if they can show probable
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cause to believe that the object of the search will be located on
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the premises at the time the search takes place.
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INVESTIGATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ANTICIPATORY WARRANTS
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For purposes of this article, court decisions involving
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various investigative applications of anticipatory warrants have
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been categorized according to the degree of police control over
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the delivery of the evidence to the place to be searched as
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follows: 1) Mail deliveries; 2) controlled delivery by
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cooperating witness; and 3) delivery uncontrolled by the
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government.
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Mail Deliveries
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The anticipated mail delivery of packages containing items
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subject to seizure is the most common use for anticipatory
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warrants. (5) For example, in United States v. Goodwin, (6) and
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United States v. Dornhofer, (7) the U. S. Postal Inspection
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Service set up a child pornography reverse sting operation to
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locate and prosecute individuals who receive child pornography
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through the mail.
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Postal inspectors mailed to the defendants child pornography
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catalogs summarizing available material in graphic terms. After
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receiving orders from the defendants for this material, postal
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inspectors obtained anticipatory search warrants to search those
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locations where the material was to be delivered. In both cases,
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the postal inspectors affirmed in their search warrant
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affidavits that through their efforts, pornographic materials
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would be delivered by mail to the particular locations to be
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searched. Government agents, thereafter, observed the
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anticipated deliveries and then executed the search warrants and
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recovered the delivered pornography, as well as other sexually
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explicit material.
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In both cases the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
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Circuit upheld the constitutionality of these anticipatory
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warrants. The court concluded there was probable cause to issue
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a search warrant, even though at the time of the warrant's
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issuance the evidence had not yet been delivered to the location
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to be searched.
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Controlled Delivery by Cooperative Witness
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In United States v. Garcia, (8) two U.S. military servicemen,
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Hooks and Oliver, were caught by U. S. Customs agents in Miami
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trying to smuggle cocaine into the country from Panama. After
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being flown to New York to meet with Drug Enforcement
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Administration (DEA) agents, Hooks and Oliver agreed to cooperate
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and proceed with a controlled delivery of the cocaine. They
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telephoned the defendant and made arrangements to bring the
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cocaine to the apartment where she was then located. Before
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delivery, DEA agents applied for and received an anticipatory
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search warrant for that apartment. With the cocaine still in
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their duffel bags, Hooks and Oliver went to the apartment under
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observation of DEA agents. After being admitted and given
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permission to wait for the defendant, Hooks and Oliver sat down
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in the living room and placed the duffel bags next to them. Five
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to 10 minutes later, while Hooks and Oliver were still waiting
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and before the defendant or anyone else had taken possession of
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the duffel bags, DEA agents entered and executed the search
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warrant.
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The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the
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validity of the anticipatory search warrant and concluded as
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follows:
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``The fact that contraband is not `presently located at the
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place described in the warrant' is immaterial, so long as
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`there is probable cause to believe that it will be there
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when the search warrant is executed.' '' (9)
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In rejecting the defendant's claim that the agents acted
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prematurely when they entered and searched the apartment before
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the cocaine was transferred personally to the defendant, the
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court stated that the warrant was valid upon delivery of cocaine
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to the apartment and did not require that anyone take possession
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prior to execution of the warrant.
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Delivery Uncontrolled by the Government
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In some cases, anticipatory warrants have been used where
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officers do not have control over the delivery of evidence to the
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location to be searched. For example, in United States v.
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Goff, (10) DEA agents in Seattle developed probable cause to
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believe that Goff and Jacobson were making a 36-hour round trip
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to Miami to purchase a large quantity of cocaine. After airline
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personnel confirmed that the defendants had boarded the nonstop
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return flight to Seattle, the agents applied for an anticipatory
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warrant that was issued while the plane was in flight.
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In approving the subsequent search that occurred when the
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defendants disembarked from the plane in Seattle, the U. S. Court
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of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that there was probable
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cause to believe that the persons searched would arrive within
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the district in a reasonable time and that the warrant could not
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be executed until their arrival. The court concluded that
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issuing a warrant in anticipation of these events created no
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danger that the property seized would be other than the property
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sought in the warrant; anticipating future events did not detract
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from probable cause which must exist at the time of the
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search. (11)
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In another uncontrolled delivery case, Commonwealth v.
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Reviera, (12) an undercover officer went to a certain address,
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knocked on the door, and told the defendant who answered the
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door that he wished to buy one ounce of cocaine. The defendant
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said he was waiting for delivery, which would occur at
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approximately 10:00 p.m., and directed the undercover officer to
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return after 10:00 p.m., at which time he could purchase cocaine
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for $1,300 per ounce. Several other persons also approached the
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defendant about buying cocaine and were similarly told to return
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after 10:00 p.m. Based on these facts and additional informant
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information, an anticipatory warrant was obtained. The
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Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld the validity of this
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anticipatory warrant on the grounds there was a fair probability
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that contraband and evidence would be found at the particular
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location to be searched at the time the warrant would be
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executed.
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POTENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
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The fourth amendment mandates that all search warrants,
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including anticipatory warrants, be based on facts establishing
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probable cause and must particularly describe the place to be
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searched and the person or things to be seized. The warrant must
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be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. Anticipatory
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warrants can also be challenged on constitutional grounds if the
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search warrant affidavit lacks adequate facts indicating that the
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evidence to be seized is on a ``sure course'' to the location to
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be searched, or if there is inadequate judicial control of the
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warrant execution.
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Evidence on a ``Sure Course'' to Delivery
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Although the vast majority of Federal and State courts that
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have considered anticipatory warrants have approved their use,
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some courts have required a showing that the contraband or
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evidence to be seized is on a ``sure course'' to its destination.
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For example, in United States v. Hendricks, (13) a Customs officer
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inspected a cardboard box arriving from Brazil, which was
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addressed to Hendricks in Tucson, Arizona, but shipped in such a
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manner that Hendricks was required to pick it up personally in
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Tucson. Inside the box was a suitcase in which the inspector
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found hidden 5 to 7 pounds of cocaine. The box was sent on to
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Tucson where it was turned over to the DEA. While holding the
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box, DEA agents developed additional incriminating evidence and
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applied for a search warrant to search Hendricks' residence.
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The magistrate issuing the warrant knew that the suitcase
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was then in the DEA's possession and not at the Hendricks
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residence, and accordingly, inserted a provision in the warrant
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specifying that it was to be executed only upon the condition
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that the box is brought to the Hendricks residence. However,
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since at the time the warrant was issued, Hendricks had not
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picked up the box, there was no assurance that he would pick it
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up, or even if he did, that he would ever take the box to the
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house. Therefore, the court found there was not a sufficient
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nexus or connection between the box and the residence. The court
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held that unless the suitcase was on a sure course to the house
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(as for example in mail addressed to the house), no probable
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cause would exist to believe it would arrive there. (14)
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The ``sure course'' language of Hendricks has been cited
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with approval by several other courts. (15) To help ensure that a
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warrant will withstand subsequent attack based on lack of
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sufficient nexus between the place to be searched and the things
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to be seized, prudent investigators should attempt to develop
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facts indicating that the evidence is on a sure and irreversible
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course to its destination prior to applying for an anticipatory
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warrant.
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Ensuring Adequate Judicial Control of Warrant Execution
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The element of time may be highly relevant to the validity
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of a search warrant and its execution. The reason many courts
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require traditional search warrants to be executed ``forthwith''
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is to ensure that measure of judicial control over the search
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which the warrant procedure is intended to accomplish. Passage
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of an undue amount of time between issuance and execution raises
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the danger that the described property will no longer exist at
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the premises to be searched. The danger of loss of judicial
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control might be as great in the case of a warrant issued to take
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effect some time in the future as in the case of a stale
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warrant. (16)
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An anticipatory warrant is based on a magistrate's
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determination that sufficient probable cause exists to believe
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that at some future time (but not presently), certain evidence
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will be located at a particular place. A potential
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constitutional problem with such warrants is that the issuing
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magistrate abdicates to the officers executing the warrant an
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important judicial function, namely, the determination that
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probable cause exists to believe that the objects are currently
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in the place to be searched.
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While it is logical to assume that officers will not be
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disposed to undermine the success of their investigative efforts
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by the premature execution of an anticipatory warrant, it is
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nonetheless preferable to deal with time limitations as to
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execution explicitly in the warrant application process. (17)
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In that regard, some courts prefer the issuing magistrate to
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protect against premature execution by defining the circumstances
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and/or conditions that must be present prior to its execution. (18)
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For example, the issuing magistrate could delete the forthwith
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command found preprinted on many warrant forms and insert a
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directive that execution occur only upon the happening of a
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specific event, such as delivery of the evidence. This ensures
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judicial control because if the critical future event never
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occurs, the warrant may not be executed. (19)
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To guard against successful challenges to the validity of
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anticipatory warrants based on an alleged loss of judicial
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control in their execution, officers should place reasonable
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limiting language in their warrant affidavits specifying that
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execution will not occur in the absence of a particular
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contingency, such as: 1) A scheduled time for delivery; 2) a
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given event; 3) police surveillance confirming that the package
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has been delivered; or 4) a particular method that allows
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executing officers to know that the items are in the place to be
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searched. Such language in the affidavit may save an otherwise
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defective warrant if the magistrate merely fails to include
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that limiting language in the warrant itself.
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CONCLUSION
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The anticipatory or prospective search warrant is obtained
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in advance of the anticipated time for delivery of evidence to
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the place to be searched so police may promptly execute the
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search when delivery is made. When police are confronted with
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the need for quick action, anticipatory warrants provide a
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practical alternative to proceeding with no warrant and risking
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suppression of the evidence. If police delay applying for a
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warrant until the evidence arrives at the place to be searched,
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they increase the risk that the evidence will be lost before the
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search can be made. Officers applying for anticipatory warrants
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should ensure that their search warrant affidavits meet
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traditional fourth amendment requirements, and also reflect that
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the items are on a ``sure course'' to the place to be searched.
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Officers should also include appropriate limiting language in the
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affidavit to prevent loss of judicial control.
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FOOTNOTES
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(1) See New York v. P.J. Video, 106 S.Ct. 1610 (1986);
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Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
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(2) See Sauls, ``Emergency Searches of Premises,'' FBI Law
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Enforcement Bulletin, vol. 56, Nos. 3-4, March and April 1987.
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(3) See Fiatal, ``The Judicial Preference for the Search
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Warrant: The Good Faith Warrant Exception to the Exclusionary
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Rule,'' FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, vol. 55, No. 7, July 1986.
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(4) In Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), the Supreme
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Court indirectly acknowledged such a possibility when it
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indicated that it could be constitutionally permissible to obtain
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a warrant authorizing the seizure (through the use of electronic
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surveillance) of oral communications which will not exist until
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vocalized by the participants to that conversation at some future
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time.
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(5) 2 W.R. LaFave, Search and Seizure sec. 3.7(c) at 94 (2d
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ed. 1987).
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(6) 854 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1988).
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(7) 859 F.2d 1195 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct.
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1639 (1989).
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(8) 8882 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1989).
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(9) Id. at 702.
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(10) 681 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1982).
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(11) The court also rejected a challenge to the warrant under
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Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
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requires a Federal search warrant be issued in the district where
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the person or property sought is located. The court stated the
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rule does not require that in every circumstance, the evidence
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sought must be physically in existence within the district at the
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time the warrant issues. Although the warrant cannot be executed
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until the object of the search is in the district, the rule is
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not violated when the affidavit clearly demonstrates that the
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objects of the search will exist in the district within the time
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allowed for execution.
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(12) 563 A.2d 1252 (Pa. Super. 1989).
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(13) 743 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1006
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(1985).
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(14) Although the warrant was invalid for lack of probable
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cause, the agents' good faith reliance on it was held to be
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reasonable, and therefore, the evidence was nevertheless
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admissible.
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(15) See, e.g. United States v. Hale, 784 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir.
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1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 110; Goodwin, supra note 6;
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Dornhofer, supra note 7.
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(16) United States ex rel Beal v. Skaff, 418 F.2d 430 (7th
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Cir. 1969).
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(17) LaFave, supra note 5, at 98.
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(18) Commonwealth v. Soares, 424 N.E. 2d 221 (Mass Sup. Ct.
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1981). In Garcia, supra note 8 at 702, the Second Circuit Court
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of Appeals held:
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``When a government official presents independent evidence
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indicating that delivery of contraband will, or is likely
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to, occur, and when the magistrate conditions the warrant
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on that delivery, there is sufficient probable cause to
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uphold the warrant.''
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(19) Although desirable, the absence of contingencies is not
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necessarily fatal where premature execution is unlikely. See,
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Reviera, supra note 12.
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____________
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Law enforcement officers of other than Federal jurisdiction
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who are interested in this article should consult their legal
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adviser. Some police procedures ruled permissible under Federal
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constitutional law are of questionable legality under State law
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or are not permitted at all.
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Author's Note
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On May 1, 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court sent to Congress
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proposed amendments to Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of
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Criminal Procedure. The first amendment would permit warrants
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to search where the person or property is outside the
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jurisdiction when the warrant is issued, but within the district
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by the time the warrant is executed. A second amendment would
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permit the issuance, by Federal magistrates only, of search
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warrants for property or persons who are within the district
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when the warrant is issued, but might move outside the district
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before the warrant is executed.
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