330 lines
17 KiB
Plaintext
330 lines
17 KiB
Plaintext
December 1990
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DIASTER OPERATIONS: NOT BUSINESS AS USUAL
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By
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Michael Guerin
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Assistant Chief, Law Enforcement Division
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Governor's Office of Emergency Services
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Ontario, California
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At 5:03 p.m. on October 17, 1989, law enforcement personnel
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throughout Northern California's Bay Area were taking crime
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reports, investigating traffic accidents, issuing citations,
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patrolling the streets, and suppressing criminal activity. By
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5:05 p.m., all the rules had changed. A major earthquake shook
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the area, causing death, destruction, and chaos.
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All too often, when disasters occur, law enforcement
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officials simply comment, "It's business as usual, just more of
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it." Unfortunately, experience has shown that this is not the
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case. In fact, given any disaster situation, law enforcement
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agencies must alter their priorities, operations, and schedules
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to meet emergency demands.
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This article reviews several issues related to the manner
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in which law enforcement agencies operate after a disaster
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occurs. It considers what police have learned from past
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disasters so that they can prepare better for these crisis
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situations and provide a complete emergency response. Then, the
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article covers critical law enforcement priorities after a
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disaster occurs. These include maintaining police operations,
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informing the public, dispatching personnel and equipment, and
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light rescue and evacuation operations. Finally, it provides
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information on how managers can establish disaster operations
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plans for their agencies, regardless of size.
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LESSONS LEARNED
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In order to best allocate law enforcement resources, a
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review of police experiences during past disasters provides key
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information on which to base future emergency responses.
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Analysis of information obtained during post-disaster interviews
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clears up some misconceptions police administrators may have
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regarding disaster operations.
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First, patterns of criminal activity do not change
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dramatically when disaster strikes. Despite media reports to
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the contrary, looting is not prevalent in the hours following a
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disaster. For example, after the October California earthquake,
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only 2 law enforcement agencies out of over 100 noted any
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quake-related thefts during the emergency period. These were
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isolated, not widespread, cases. However, looting is possible
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in areas where social unrest and poor economic conditions
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already exist. For example, much of the media coverage of
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looting after Hurricane Hugo devastated parts of the eastern
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seaboard showed footage from the U.S. Virgin Islands; yet,
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incidents of looting in the Carolinas were rare.
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Second, there is a myth that the public is uncooperative
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and subject to panic after a disaster. However, past experience
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shows that just the opposite is true. In fact, law enforcement
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agencies have difficulties in handling the over-abundance of
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volunteers. Citizens are highly motivated to cooperate or offer
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assistance after a disaster, and agencies should plan ways to
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best use this enormous pool of volunteer energy, consistent with
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public safety concerns. Experience also shows that panic only
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occurs when there is a lack of consistent, visible leadership.
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Where local officials work as a team, set priorities, and keep
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the public informed, the public reacts accordingly.
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Another misconception involves police invulnerability.
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Since they often face difficult circumstances under
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fast-changing conditions, law enforcement personnel believe they
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can instantly adapt their daily operations to disaster
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conditions. Therefore, they give little thought to disaster
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training and planning. Administrators tend to overlook the
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safety of their own facilities and the readiness of their
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equipment, as well as a lack of policy and proper training for
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disaster situations.
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Finally, experience has shown that law enforcement agencies
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need to better integrate their operations during emergencies.
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Clearly, however, there are more tasks to be performed during an
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emergency than just maintaining order and providing security.
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DISASTER AFTERMATH
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Identifying law enforcement priorities after a disaster
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occurs is critical. Maintaining police services, assessing
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overall damage, assisting in light rescue operations, and
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coordinating security are realistic objectives. These can be
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handled with a high degree of efficiency and effectiveness if
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proper planning and training takes place before the emergency
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occurs. Then, if a disaster does occur, agency personnel will
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be prepared to provide a complete emergency response.
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Maintaining Police Operations
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After any disaster occurs, law enforcement agencies must
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initiate steps to ensure that police operations can be
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maintained. Clearly, agencies may need to consider facility
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evacuation plans, as well as alternative arrangements for
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carrying on critical functions, given a building evacuation.
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For example, in one major suburban police department, the entire
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Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and the communications center
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had to be evacuated for an entire shift in order to assess the
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damage and structural integrity of the building. There were no
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alternative 911 routing plans, no duplicate personnel callout
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rosters, and no alternate dispatching site. This serves to
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reenforce the concept that immediately after a disaster occurs,
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agencies must assess their capabilities and advise personnel
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accordingly. It is a good idea at this time to start an agency
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log to include notes on the effects of the disaster on police
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facilities, operations, and assignments.
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At this point, communications personnel become the lifeline
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for police operations. They should broadcast that a disaster
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has occurred and advise all units to avoid transmitting until a
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roll call can be taken. Units must know to stay off the radio
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until their identifiers are called. Dispatchers should then
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call each unit, in turn, to record all essential information.
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Only then do they report their location and status (injury,
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vehicle damage, access problems) and give a brief account of the
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extent of damage in their areas. This allows on-duty
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supervisors and managers to know the status of their resources,
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and it begins the critical process of damage assessment.
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Damage Assessment
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Only through a thorough assessment of the damage incurred
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and current police capabilities can managers best assign their
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resources. Agencies may choose to instruct units to respond
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only to emergency assignments, avoiding activities that may take
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them out of service for extended periods of time and prevent
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them from responding to more critical dispatches.
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Law enforcement personnel may need to practice a skill
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similar to triage, which is an emergency medical system of
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assigning priorities to treatment of battlefield casualties on
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the basis of urgency and chance of survival. During disaster
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situations, officers face a variety of problems in a short period
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of time. They must make rapid decisions as to which are true
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life-safety emergencies, important to the concept of "the
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greatest good for the greatest number" of citizens. Officers
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and administrators alike require a clear understanding of the
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"big picture" of damage and priorities.
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During damage assessment, patrol units check their assigned
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districts and report the extent of damage to the communications
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center. Some agencies assign each beat a list of pre-selected
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key sites that should be checked immediately after a disaster
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occurs, e.g., hospitals, schools, electrical substations, to name
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a few. If an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is established,
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these reports should be routed there for collation with reports
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from other departments and agencies.
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Informing the Public
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Keeping citizens informed is not just a convenience, but a
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necessity. Often, when citizens are unaware of a situation,
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they contact the police department to determine what has
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happened. To accommodate such calls, police departments can
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respond in one of two ways. First, agencies can designate a
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public information officer who works closely with the local news
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media to disseminate accurate information on the extent of the
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damage and the action citizens should take. Or, consideration
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might be given to a recorded information tape. This diverts
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callers from emergency telephone lines to a source of recorded
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information that gives the status of the situation and what
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actions are appropriate.
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Dispatching Personnel and Equipment
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Following any disaster, personnel mobilization occurs as
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necessary. This involves either a general re-call of all
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off-duty personnel or only those in selected assignments. With
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a general re-call policy, all off-duty employees report for duty
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when they become aware of a potential disaster situation or one
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that has already occurred. Many departments institute this
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policy since it is easier to send excess staff home than to try
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to call them to report for duty. Another option is to have an
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organized system whereby adjacent local police departments or
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the State police force provide personnel and equipment to assist
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those in the stricken area. Above all, it is critical that a
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rapid coordinated response follows an emergency.
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Equipment mobilization must also accompany an increase in
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on-duty personnel. This includes vehicles for added staff,
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redistribution of communications equipment, and issuance of
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emergency supplies, such as batteries and flares. Sleeping
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accommodations and other special arrangements, such as meals and
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showers, may also be necessary with extended shift assignments.
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Light Rescue and Evacuation
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After the October 1989, California earthquake, many Bay Area
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police agencies started to carry specialized equipment in their
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vehicles. Pry bars for lifting debris, wrenches for turning off
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natural gas meters, and better-equipped first aid kits are now
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standard items in patrol vehicles. Clearly, law enforcement
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personnel do not need to be trained in large-scale rescue
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efforts, but they should know how to perform light rescue
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operations and the capabilities of local fire agencies, search
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and rescue teams, and available military units.
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Law enforcement personnel may also be responsible for
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coordinating evacuations. A review of actual cases indicates
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that when there have been difficulties handling evacuations, the
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problems can be traced to several deficiencies in emergency
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assistance plans. These include failing to adequately warn
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citizens of the dangers and the reason for evacuation,
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difficulties in communicating information in other languages,
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failing to recommend proper routing for evacuations, and failure
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to prepare a site to house and feed those evacuated. In some
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areas, evacuees may even need transportation, and prior
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arrangements should be made with the local school or transit
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systems, as necessary.
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Security
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Alternatives exist so that security in the stricken area can
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be maintained with minimal personnel commitments. In areas
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suffering from weather or earthquake damage, erecting chain-link
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fencing around the perimeters of the damaged areas is an option.
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In some communities, contract private security companies monitor
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access to areas after the initial danger is over. Some
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jurisdictions enact special laws or ordinances as part of a
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declaration of a local emergency, including curfew restrictions,
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travel and access prohibitions, or special business regulations.
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Special Law Enforcement Operations
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Sometimes, local law enforcement officers have medical
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examiner/coroner responsibilities. Reviews conducted of past
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emergency situations indicate a need for such an operation to
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augment local capabilities in this specialized activity.
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Agreements with funeral homes, military units, or State health
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organizations are usually necessary.
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In many instances after the initial disaster, law
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enforcement personnel assist with official visitors, such as
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State legislators, ranking Federal Government officials, and
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perhaps even the President of the United States, who come to
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survey the stricken areas. Such visits require coordination
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with local law enforcement so that access, transportation,
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re-routing, and security arrangements can be integrated. These
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activities may require additional staffing. Therefore, mutual
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aid assistance agreements with other agencies might be necessary
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to provide adequate security or to handle the necessary
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arrangements for dignitary visits.
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Another concern during the extended disaster period is the
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potential for fraud. Accounts of bogus contractors approaching
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disaster victims to inspect homes and businesses are not
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uncommon. In many cases, phony repairmen take advance payments
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for work never performed. Law enforcement can stop such fraud
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by disseminating warnings through local shelters and public
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service announcements, as well as by thoroughly investigating
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fraud cases brought to their attention.
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As personnel begin to return to more routine operations,
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consideration should be given to a critical incident stress
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debriefing program. Either individual or group sessions with
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specially trained professionals can help law enforcement
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personnel cope with the death and destruction that they
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witnessed. Although some officers initially resist participating
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in such discussions, most eventually derive great benefit from
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the opportunity.
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PLANNING
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Given an understanding of the issues related to disaster
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response, how does an agency adequately plan for such
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operations? First, it is important that the law enforcement
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disaster plan be consistent with, or complement, existing city,
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county, and State disaster planning documents in force. The
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best approach involves assessing various disaster scenarios that
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could lead to special law enforcement operations. Next,
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agencies should conduct a capability assessment to determine the
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facilities, personnel, equipment, and training available to
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handle the hazards identified.
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Many agencies find that action checklists provide the best
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format to use for disaster plans. Such checklists allow
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personnel with little training to begin functioning effectively
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under emergency conditions, even if it is their "first look"
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at the plan.
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Another accepted means of command and control during the
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emergency period is an incident command system. This system,
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which was originally developed for fire services, includes such
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components as a consistent organization chart, common
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terminology, effective span of control, and efficient operations
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planning formats.
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However, even before a disaster occurs, agencies should
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consider common upgrades to facilities and equipment, such as
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emergency generator capabilities and stocking adequate reserves
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of radio and car batteries, road flares, portable stop signs, and
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flashlights and batteries. Consideration should also be given to
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keeping vehicle gas tanks filled, stocking spare tires, and
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making provisions for hand cranking gasoline in the event of a
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power failure.
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COST RECOVERY
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When and if a disaster affects a law enforcement agency,
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documentation becomes critical. The State and Federal
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Government repay most of the costs incurred in response to an
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emergency if adequate documentation exists to support such a
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claim. Therefore, agencies should keep detailed records to
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include personnel shifts, assignments, and hours. Logs for
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vehicle use and repairs and copies of receipts for any emergency
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purchases or equipment procurement will also be necessary. Logs
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prepared since the beginning of an emergency situation prove
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their value in the end.
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CONCLUSION
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When a disaster occurs, law enforcement operations do, in
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fact, change. Effective law enforcement administrators begin
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well ahead of the emergency to prepare their agencies to face
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demands. Assessment and planning are the best defenses against
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problems related to disaster response. It is in the public's
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best interest to make these preparations a constant priority.
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They should be accepted as part of the overall public safety
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challenge that each administrator must face.
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