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H. KEITH HENSON
1794 Cardel Way
San Jose, CA 95124
(408) 978-7616
THOMAS K. DONALDSON
1410 Norman Dr.
Sunnyvale, CA 94087
(408) 732-4234
ROGER E. GREGORY
2040 Columbia St.
Palo Alto, CA 94306
(415) 493-7582
U. S. DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
H. KEITH HENSON, THOMAS K. )
DONALDSON, and ROGER E. GREGORY, )
on behalf of themselves and as )
representatives of others ) COMPLAINT FOR
similarly affected, ) DECLARATORY
) JUDGEMENT
Plaintiffs, )
)
vs. ) No.
)
)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ) ENFORCEMENT OF
RON HELLER, U. S. ATTORNEY OFFICE ) PROVISIONS OF THE
Los Angeles, MICHAEL EMICK, and ) ELECTRONIC
DOES 1 TO 100, inclusive, ) COMMUNICATION
) PRIVACY ACT.
)
Defendants. ) CLASS ACTION
)
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
1. On or about January 12, 1988 law enforcement officials
of Riverside County obtained plaintiffs' electronic
communications (electronic mail, email). From that date to
present plaintiffs have been prevented authorized access to
their electronic communications. Plaintiff Henson contacted
the FBI by phone in March 1988 and requested the FBI to
investigate this apparent violation of Federal law (Title 18,
Section 2701 et seq.) in a letter to Supervisor of Riverside
COMPLAINT 1
FBI Office Ron Heller April 5, 1988. (Attachment A). Request
was referred by the FBI without field investigation to the
U. S. Attorney's Office in Los Angeles. This office, following
the disinclination of the FBI to investigate, professed
disinterest. Plaintiff Henson was informed of "declined to
prosecute" decision of U. S. Attorney's office via telephone by
Mr. Heller. With advice from the other plaintiffs, Henson
responded to Mr. Heller (Attachment B) and also wrote Michael
Emick, Chief of Criminal Complaints, U. S. Attorney's Office,
Los Angeles, California on April 25. (Attachment C).
In a subsequent telephone call, Mr. Emick's assistant Mr.
Medrano promised a letter would be sent to Plaintiff Henson
supporting claim by U.S. Attorney's office that provisions of
the Electronic Communication Privacy Act were not violated, or
providing other reason(s) for declining prosecution. In spite
of attempts through Representative Norman M. Mineta and Senator
Pete Wilson (Attachments D, E, & F), and follow-up phone calls,
no substantive response to plaintiff's complaint re the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 has been received
to the date of filing, from an FBI or Justice Department
representative (Attachments G, H, & I).
JURISDICTION
2. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant
to U.S.C. 28, Sections 2201, 1331, and 1346.
PARTIES
3. Plaintiffs H. KEITH HENSON, THOMAS K. DONALDSON and
ROGER E. GREGORY are citizens of the United States, residents
of Santa Clara County, and were current users of electronic
COMPLAINT 2
mail service provided by Alcor Life Extension Foundation on
January 12, 1988.
4. Named defendants are agencies and employees of the
Government of the United States.
CLASS ACTIONS ALLEGATIONS
5. Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action
pursuant to Rule 23 (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure on behalf of themselves and the other users of
electronic mail who had their correspondence stored in this
computer. There are between 50 and 100 people in this class.
Some of them are not California residents, and at least one of
them is a citizen of another country. All are entitled to
protection under the provisions of the Electronic Communication
Privacy Act. A comprehensive list of the members of this class
cannot be obtained until the computer in which the list resides
has been returned.
An additional class is all users of electronic mail
in the United States who are entitled to privacy and Fourth
Amendment protection via the enforcement of the provisions of
this Act. This last class is so numerous as to make the
joinder of all members of the class completely impracticable.
However, due to the unique nature of the class, notification
of, and email replies from, a substantial fraction of this
class could be accomplished economically by posting notice
on the computer networks. Eleven thousand people are reported
to read the Usenet news group "misc.legal." Plaintiffs will
offer the widespread members of this class an opportunity to
join the action if instructed to do so by the Court.
COMPLAINT 3
FACTS
6. On or about January 12, 1988 certain law enforcement
agents (coroner's deputies) obtained and executed a warrant to
remove computers and related equipment from Alcor Life
Extension Foundation at 12327 Doherty St., Riverside, CA 92503.
(Attachment J)
7. One of these computers and a small number of
removable disks contained plaintiffs' electronic communications
as they are defined in the Electronic Communication Privacy
Act.
8. Law enforcement agencies in Riverside have prevented
authorized access to plaintiffs' electronic mail. An unknown
number of law enforcement personnel from the Coroner's Office,
the District Attorney's Office, and the Riverside City Police
have obtained plaintiffs' electronic communications in
electronic storage, and have prevented authorized access to
these communications, without Court orders or warrants which
would exempt them from the punitive provisions of Title 18,
Section 2701(b).
9. The warrant used to remove the computer and prevent
authorized access to Plaintiff's electronic mail did not meet
the provisions of Title 18, Section 2703. In particular, no
warrants were issued which provide for the disclosure or
sequestering of plaintiffs' (or any other) electronic mail.
10. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Justice
Department have refused to either investigate or provide an
explanation for why the provisions of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act do not apply. Oral communications
COMPLAINT 4
with these agencies have produced the verbal argument that a
search warrant issued against a computer used for electronic
mail is equivalent to a search warrant issued against a post
office, where all mail within the walls of a post office could
be opened and read. Plaintiffs' counter arguments that such a
warrant would be similar to a "writ of assistance," and that
the Fourth Amendment requires "particularly describing" were
dismissed as frivolous.
11. Repeated efforts to resolve these issues through
administrative channels have failed. This matter has been
brought to the attention of this Court only after numerous
attempts have been made to obtain a substantive reply as to why
clear provisions of the law were deemed not applicable by the
FBI and Justice Department.
DISCUSSION
12. A substantial part of the reason Congress enacted
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 was to
balance Fourth Amendment protection for users of electronic
mail with the needs of law enforcement agents to access this
rapidly growing new form of communications. The Justice
Department testified at length to avoid the cumbersome
provisions of Court orders needed for telephone taps. Congress
went along with the Justice Department and made the seizing of
electronic mail by law enforcement agents similar in procedure
to that required for seizing first class mail, that is,
dependent on a Rule 41 search warrant, or similar State
warrant. (See quotes of James Knapp, then Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, in Attachment C.)
COMPLAINT 5
Testimony before the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice makes it clear
that Congress was concerned about law enforcement agencies
abusing the Fourth Amendment rights of people who use
electronic mail. This is evidenced by testimony about the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act by Senator Leahy before
the House Subcommittee on September 26, 1985:
"There is no adequate legal protection against the
unauthorized access of electronic communications system
computers to obtain or alter the communications contained in
those computers.
. . . .
"Our bill . . . will help protect private communications
from interception by an eavesdropper, whether the eavesdropper
is a corporate spy, a police officer without probable cause, or
just a plain snoop."
The House and Senate Subcommittees wrote into the law only
a few exceptions from punishing someone who:
". . . intentionally accesses without authorization a
facility through which electronic communication service is
provided; or intentionally exceeds an authorization to access
that facility; and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents
authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while
it is in electronic storage . . . ."
In the case at hand, plaintiffs argue that the coroner's
deputies either had no authorization, or exceeded what they
had. It is certain that they obtained the email of a number of
people, including plaintiffs, uncertain as to their altering
COMPLAINT 6
it, and certain that authorized access to plaintiffs' email has
been prevented for the past 11 months.
Exceptions are provided by the Act in Section 2703 for law
enforcement agencies to access electronic communications in
situations where they obtain a warrant. To quote the relevant
section:
"Requirements for governmental access
(a) Contents of electronic communications in electronic
storage--A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a
provider of electronic communications services of the contents
of an electronic communication that is in electronic storage
for one hundred eighty days or less, only pursuant to a
warrant issued under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or
equivalent State warrant" (emphasis added).
The requirements for such a warrant were spelled out by
James Knapp in his testimony: "The affidavit and judicial
authorization should sufficiently specify the people
involved, . . ." (emphasis added).
The requirement to name "the people involved" places no
burden on the law enforcement agency seeking a warrant. In
situations (such as this one) where the names of the people
with stored electronic communications are not known to the law
enforcement agency prior to executing the search warrant and
examining the computer files, John Does 1-1000 could be named
and an amended warrant filed after the names were extracted
from the computer.
The plaintiffs are not aware of any warrants, even John
Doe warrants, which have been issued against their electronic
COMPLAINT 7
communications; it seems clear that our private electronic
communications were seized and the provider of electronic
communication services (Alcor) was forced to disclose the
contents of private email without a warrant.
Law enforcement agencies, in particular the FBI, have
orally supported two lines of reasoning for legally seizing and
denying access to our electronic communications without a
warrant.
1) The law enforcement agents who seized the computer on
which our electronic communications were stored did not know
that there was contained email--despite the fact that the
agents had to unhook the computer from the phone lines.
2) A warrant against the provider of the electronic
communication service to seize the computer on which our email
was stored is sufficient to seize and examine any electronic
communications stored within that computer.
If this were the case, Congress would have provided an
exemption for seizing the computers on which electronic mail is
stored. Since they did not, such an exemption will have to be
provided by the Courts, or found to be an error in the FBI's
interpretation of the law.
It is easy to understand the reluctance of one law
enforcement agency to investigate another, especially in the
small-town, close working conditions of Riverside. But if the
FBI will not protect the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens
from over-zealous local officials who violate the privacy of
electronic communications, who will?
COMPLAINT 8
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs and the classes they seek to
represent in this action respectfully pray that this Court
enter judgment against defendants:
a) That the FBI be ordered by this Court to investigate
fully the circumstances herein described involving electronic
mail sequestered by law enforcement agents in Riverside County;
b) That the U. S. Attorney's office be ordered to either
file charges based on the results of the FBI determination of
the facts involved, or forthwith provide legal argument
acceptable to this Court as to the non-applicability of Title
18, Section 2701 et seq. to this case;
c) Plaintiffs' expenses;
d) Other relief such as the Court may deem appropriate.
Dated: December 9, 1988 H. KEITH HENSON
THOMAS K. DONALDSON
ROGER E. GREGORY
COMPLAINT 9
(Attachments to Henson, Donaldson, and Gregory lawsuit)
H. Keith Henson
1794 Cardel Way
San Jose, CA 95124
408-978-7616
April 5, 1988
Ron Heller, Supervisor
Federal Bureau of Investigation
P.O. Box 2317
Riverside, CA 92516
Dear Mr. Heller:
Please excuse the delay in getting this material to you per our telephone
conversation of last month. My background is in engineering, and, though I
have had experience in space law and international human rights, it took
some time for me to acquire sufficient understanding of the law in this
area to make a clear statement.
I believe a serious Federal crime has been committed against me and
several others by certain members of the Riverside County Coroner's
Office. The statute involved is Title 18, Section 2701, otherwise
referenced as Chapter 121, "Stored Wire and Electronic Communications
and Transactional Records Access." (1986) The criminal act was the
removing of a computer (specifically a Toshiba T300 with a green screen
monitor, a Xebec 10 Mbyte hard disk and a modem) used for electronic mail
from the Alcor Life Extension Foundation at 12327 Doherty St., in
Riverside on January 12 of this year, subsequently preventing authorized
access, and (probably) accessing stored electronic mail files on that
computer, all without a warrant. I have apprised various members of the
coroner's office of the use and content of this particular computer and of
the Federal law involved. They seem to have no concern about the legality
of their activities.
Subsection (a) of 2701, except as provided in subsection (c), details the
offence: intentionally accessing an electronic mail facility without
authorization, or intentionally exceeding an authorization to access that
facility and thereby obtaining or preventing authorized access to a wire or
electronic communication.
Subsection (c) provides three exceptions for authorized access. Points 1
and 2 under that sub-subsection do not apply, as the coroner's office
neither provides electronic communication service, nor are they the
intended recipient of the electronic mail in question. Point 3 list three
statutes under which law enforcement officials can obtain authorization
to access stored electronic mail. Of these, section 2518 is the standard
Ron Heller Page 2
April 5, 1988
wire tap regulations. As far as I know, the coroner's office has not
obtained a court order which would allow wire tapping or access to my
electronic mail.
Section 2704 provides for forcing service providers to make backups of
electronic mail, (with a warrant) and does not seem applicable either.
Section 2703 provides for only one way for law enforcement agencies to
access electronic mail stored less than 180 days: a warrant issued under
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or an equivalent State warrant. I
do not believe that warrants of any kind have been issued which would
permit the coroner or his deputies access to my electronic mail on the
Alcor computer system. If warrants to this effect have been issued, I have
not been informed of them.
While the coroner's office has been engaged in an investigation, this is no
excuse for a law enforcement agency to break laws by failing to obtain a
valid warrant. My reading of the law, and the legislative history behind it,
leads me to believe that this particular episode of Fourth Amendment
abuse is exactly what Congress had in mind to prevent when it passed
Chapter 121.
The loss of this computer and our other computers has cause Alcor a great
deal of difficulty. (This may have been the primary reason they were
taken.) Alcor and its members need the computer in question to be
returned to us and put back in service if this is possible. I would like the
computer and related equipment returned to Alcor rather than the FBI
holding it as evidence. Alcor could make printed copies of the directories
and "userlist" to be preserved as evidence.
Please let me know if I have made errors in either my reasoning or the
events I have described. I will be happy to provide your office with
background on any aspects of this matter about which I have knowledge.
Sincerely,
H. Keith Henson
cc C. Ashworth
PS I hear the investigation has been turned over to the Riverside Police
Department. You might warn them so *they* don't run afoul of Federal
Law.
Enc. Title 18 USC Sections 2701-2710
ATTACHMENT A
--------------------------------------
H. Keith Henson
1794 Cardel Way
San Jose, CA 95124
408-978-7616
April 22, 1988
Ron Heller
Federal Bureau of Investigation
P.O. Box 2317
Riverside, CA 92516
Dear Mr. Heller:
I was astounded at the refusal of the FBI to even make minimal
inquiry into a citizen`s complaint of a clear violation of a
Federal law. Your advice that I take my complaints to Riverside
County is hard to fathom; to the best of my knowledge, the county
has no laws regarding intercepting electronic mail.
Your argument that having an unrelated warrant to take a computer
permits interception of the electronic mail of all people who
were using that computer would (I think) generate great concern
among the staff and members of the House Committee on the Judi-
ciary which held extensive hearing on this law only two years
ago.
Your reluctance to investigate another law enforcement agency is
understandable, but if the federal government won`t protect citi-
zens from local officials who break Federal laws and violate our
Fourth Amendment rights, who will?
Sincerely,
H. Keith Henson
HKH:al
cc: John R. Bolton, Asst. Attorney General
Rep. George Brown
Michael Emick, U. S. Attorney
Rep. Hamilton Fish, Jr.
Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier
James Knapp, Asst. Attorney General
Rep. N. Mineta
Rep. Carlos J. Moorhead
Sen. Pete Wilson
ATTACHMENT B
----------------------------------
(KH Letterhead)
April 25, 1988
Michael Emick
Chief of Criminal Complaints
U.S. Attorney's Office
312 N. Spring St.
Los Angeles, CA 90012
Dear Mr. Emick:
This letter is to complain about the refusal of the FBI office in
Riverside to investigate a clear violation of Federal law.
Mr. Heller did not pass on the enclosed letter to Alka Sagar of
your office, and she had no recollection Monday of his verbal
arguments for the FBI's inaction.
I looked into the legislative history of the particular House
Bill which eventually became law and found that James Knapp (who
was then Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,
and has since moved to a higher position in the Justice Depart-
ment) had a number of things to say about the impending legisla-
tion. He was particularly interested in forstalling the need for
court orders to obtain access to stored electronic communica-
tions. I quote from his written testimony of March 5, 1986
before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice:
"The authorization to intercept the communications should be
accomplished by a statute mandating a judicial authorization
based on probable cause akin to that which can now be secured
with a Fourth Amendment search warrant pursuant to Rule 41 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. This procedure is based on
the premise that the interception of electronic mail generally
should be accorded no more protection than that accorded to
regular mail. At the present time regular mail can be seized
with a Rule 41 search warrant. . . .
"The search warrant . . . should be based on a sworn affidavit
establishing probable cause to believe that a crime has been, is
being or is about to be committed. The affidavit and judicial
authorization should sufficiently specify the people involved,
the facility in question, the specific offenses involved, and the
type of information sought to be intercepted. . . ."
Congress went along with the Justice Department in requiring
search warrants rather than the more cumbersome court orders,
with the understanding that they would watch for abuse.
Michael Emick -2- April 25, 1988
Now in the case at hand, there was a search warrant, but it was
clearly inadaquate to seize electronic mail since it was directed
to the computer rather than its contents and the people who put
the contents into it.
The correct analogy according to Mr. Knapp's testimony would be a
search warrant obtained against a private postal service in which
all mail in private boxes was confiscated, opened, and read.
The search warrant under which the computer was taken was based
on incredible half-truth distortions, and simply irrelevent
information. For example, the prime item presented under oath to
the judge who issued the warrant was verbal testimony about a
copy of a receipt for equipment sold to UCLA, shipped to a
Florida address, and authorized by an Alcor officer who works at
UCLA. In the first place, the coroner's office has no business
investigating theft. If they found something suspicious in the
course of other investigation, they should have turned it over to
the police. In the second place, *taped to the front of that
invoice was a canceled check on the officer's account for the
full amount on the invoice.* If this isn't perjury, it skates
within a hair of it.
This may seem to be an unpopular cause to the FBI, but this is
the first time (to my knowledge) that a law enforcement agency
has violated the provisions of this law. As a result, there is a
great deal of interest by a number of people in the electronic
mail industry. If local law enforcement officials demonstrate
that they can get away with ignoring this law, there may be
considerable pressure on Congress to require more stringent
provisions for law enforcement agencies to obtain access to
electronic communications.
If you have any questions, please give me a call.
Sincerely,
H. Keith Henson
HKH:al
cc: Christopher Ashworth, Esq.
ATTACHMENT C
------------------------------
(KH Lettterhead)
April 25, 1988
Representative Norman Mineta
13th District
1245 S. Winchester Blvd., Suite 310
San Jose, Ca 95128
Attention: Dorene Giacopini
Dear Representative Mineta:
I am writing to ask you to intercede with the FBI on behalf of
myself and two other San Jose constituents, Thomas K. Donaldson
and Roger Gregory. We believe a Federal Law, Section 2701, et
seq. of Title 18, was broken by local law enforcement officials in
Southern California. We would like you to make a request of the
FBI that they determine if this is true, and if it is, ask the
U.S. Attorney to file charges.
All of us used (and paid for through membership fees) an elec-
tronic mail facility owned by the Alcor Life Extension Founda-
tion. On January 12 of this year, the computer containing our
confidential personal communications was seized by the coroner`s
office in Riverside under a warrant issued against Alcor and
obtained on the basis of gross distortions. Regardless of the
validity of this warrant, <2703 requires a warrant naming the
individual whose mail is to be seized, and stating probable cause
as to the need to invade the individual`s privacy. No warrants
have been issued which would permit these officials to access or
deny us access to our electronic mail.
The FBI is understandably reluctant to investigate a fellow law
enforcement agency. In my first telephone conversation with Ron
Heller he strongly discouraged me from complaining. While it may
have been inadvertent, his office lost my first letter (sent by
Express Mail), did not pass on the enclosed letter to the U.S.
Attorney`s office, and suggested (when he called after 5PM last
Friday) that my only recourse is to the same local officials who
have violated the law.
The cited section of law, the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act of 1986, and the cases which develop from it are of great
interest in Silicon Valley, where the local volume of electronic
mail may be approaching that of First Class mail. There is a
considerable interest expressed by several computer publications
in the case. I can direct the reporters who are calling me to
your office if you wish.
Sincerely,
H. Keith Henson
HKH:al
ATTACHMENT D
---------------------------------
(KH letterhead)
April 25, 1988
Senator Pet Wilson
2040 Ferry Building
San Francisco, CA 94111
Attention: Lisa Nauman
Dear Senator Wilson:
(body same as Attachment D)
ATTACHMENT E
---------------------------------
(KH Letterhead)
July 31, 1988
Representative Norman Mineta
13th District
1245 S. Winchester Blvd., Suite 310
San Jose, Ca 95128
Dear Representative Mineta:
Thank you for pursuing an inquiry for me into the FBI's disinter-
est in an apparent violation of the Electronic Communication Pri-
vacy Act, and for forwarding a copy of Mr. Floyd Clark's letter.
In that letter of June 3, the FBI excused their unwillingness to
investigate because the US Attorney declined prosecution. Alka
Sagar, the US Attorney in Los Angeles who Mr. Heller told me had
made the decision to decline prosecution, based her decision
entirely on a short telephone conversation with FBI represen-
tative Mr. Heller. When I contacted her on the Monday after Mr.
Heller told me that no investigation was going to be made, she
told me that my letter to the FBI had not been forwarded. She
could not remember either the subject or the reason for declining
prosecution. If I could speculate on the conversation, Mr. Heller
may have told her he had a case he did not want to work on, and
her response may have been something like "Well, if you don't
want to work on it, the U.S. Attorney isn't interested." This is
hardly an independent evaluation of the merits of my complaint.
I then wrote to Michael Emick, Ms. Sagar's boss. He is Chief of
Criminal Complaints for the U.S. Attorney's Office in Los
Angeles. One of Mr. Emick's assistants called a week or two
later and told me that virtually no cases except those involving
large amounts of cocaine are being accepted for prosecution,
regardless of the merits. I have received no written response to
my letter of April 25 to date (copy enclosed).
There may be a need for remedial legislation on electronic pri-
vacy. Mr. Heller, a San Jose FBI agent, and two representatives
of the District Attorney's office in Riverside all believe that
the requirements for obtaining warrants against individuals found
in 1986 law can be safely ignored if a warrant can be obtained
against the computer on which the electronic mail is stored.
They use the analogy that if they obtained a warrant against a
Post Office, they could open and read any mail they found within
the walls of the Post Office. I doubt this was the intent of
Representative Norman Mineta -2- July 31, 1988
Congress, but if it was, the fact would be of great interest in
this area.
In his closing sentence, Mr. Clark recommends that I contact an
attorney to see what civil remedies are available to me. I have
already contacted several. I find that while there are pro-
visions (Section 2707) for civil actions at law, they are use-
less. If a jury found that my privacy rights had indeed been
violated, I could be awarded $1,000. The attorneys I have
contacted tell me that the case could be made, and likely won,
but the cost to do so would start at $100,000 and range upwards
of $500,000.
If this were an isolated incident, I would feel better about
ignoring the decay of civil rights in this area. But recently
Riverside county officials used a search warrant to confiscate
television news tapes in violation of federal and state laws pro-
tecting freedom of the press. Limits on law enforcement activi-
ties are as important as limits on criminals. Although it is a
lot of trouble for a citizen to oppose high handed law enforce-
ment agents, it has to be done to prevent the loss of our rights.
I would appreciate your inquiring of the Justice Department what
reasoning they used to decline enforcing the law Congress made
regarding electronic communications. Perhaps they would respond
to a letter from you in less than three months. I know you are
sensitive to shortcuts in due process, and I could use your ad-
vice on what, if anything, I should do.
Sincerely,
H. Keith Henson
HKH:al
ATTACHMENT F
-----------------------------------
U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Wahsington, DC 20535
June 27, 1988
Honorable Pete Wilson
United States Senator
2040 Ferry Building
San Francisco, California 94111
Dear Senator Wilson:
Your May 18th inquiry of the Department of Justice on behalf
of Mr. H. Keith Henson has been referred to FBI Headquarters.
Mr. Henson's concerns have been reviewed both here and by
our Los Angeles Office. The facts have been presented to the
United States Attorney's Office and prosecution was declined.
Mr. Henson has been advised of the declination and that our
investigation is closed.
It has been suggested to Mr. Henson that he contact an
attorney of his choice to pursue possible civil remedies
available to him.
Sincerely yours,
(signed)
Floyd I. Clarke
Assistant Director
Criminal Investigative Division
ATTACHMENT G
--------------------------------
U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Legislative Affairs
Office of the Assistant Attorney General
Washington, DC 20530
04 NOV 1988 (stamped date)
Honorable Norman Y. Mineta
U.S. House of Representatives
1245 South Winchester Blvd., Suite 310
San Jose, California 95128
ATTN: Dorene M. Giacopini
Field Representative
Dear Congressman Mineta:
This is in response to your letter dated September 22, 1988,
on behalf of your constituent H. Keith Henson.
The Unites States Attorney's office for the Central District
of California considered twice whether prosecution was warranted,
taking into account the information provided by Mr. Henson.
However, there is no competent evidence upon which to base a
federal prosecution.
Since Mr. Henson's letter addresses a matter courrently
being prosecuted by the State of California, this office
recommends that you refer Mr. Henson's inquiry to the District
Attorney's office, Los Angeles, California.
Sincerely,
(signed)
Thomas M. Boyd
(for) Assistant Attorney General
ATTACHMENT H
------------------------------
(KH Letterhead)
November 9, 1988
Thomas M. Boyd
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Assistant Attorney General
Washington, DC 20530
Dear Mr. Boyd:
Representative Norman Mineta passed on your undated letter to me
responding to his letter of September 22, 1988.
It is a violation of federal law (Title 18, Section 2701 et seq.)
to seize a person's electronic mail without a warrant against the
person's mail. My electronic mail was seized without a warrant
being sought against it. Could you tell me how these simple-to-
determine facts fail to provide "competent evidence on which to
base a federal prosecution." Could you tell me what constitutes
"competent evidence" or provide a reference?
Could you clarify the last paragraph of your letter. To the best
of my knowledge there is nothing related to any letter I have
written which is "currently being prosecuted by the State of
California" by the District Attorney's office in Los Angeles. If
there is, this would be of intense concern.
Sincerely
H. Keith Henson
HKH:al
cc Representative Norman Y. Mineta
ATTACHMENT I
-----------------------------
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SEARCH WARRANT
(boilerplate, description of place to be searched)
. . . for the following property:
1. All electronic storage devices, capable of storing,
electronic data regarding the above records, including magnetic
tapes, disc (floppy or hard), and the complete hardware necessary
to retrieve electronic data including CPU (Central Processing
Unit), CRT (viewing screen, disc or tape drive(s), printer,
software and service manuals for operation of the said computer,
together with all handwritten notes or printed material
describing the operation of the computers. (See Exhibit A -
Search Warrant No. 1, property to be seized #1)
2 Human body parts identifiable as belonging to the deceased,
Dora Kent.
3 Narcotics, controlled substances and other drugs subject to
regulation by the Drug Enforcement Administration.
(more boilerplate, signiture of Judge)
ATTACHMENT J
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