1242 lines
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1242 lines
58 KiB
Plaintext
Date: Thu, 19 Mar 1992 15:00:07 EST
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From: "The Moderator Kenneth R. van Wyk" <krvw@CERT.SEI.CMU.EDU>
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Subject: VIRUS-L Digest V5 #70
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Comments: To: VIRUS-L@ibm1.cc.lehigh.edu
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VIRUS-L Digest Thursday, 19 Mar 1992 Volume 5 : Issue 70
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Today's Topics:
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VIRUS-L/comp.virus FAQ, 19 March 1992
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VIRUS-L is a moderated, digested mail forum for discussing computer
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virus issues; comp.virus is a non-digested Usenet counterpart.
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Discussions are not limited to any one hardware/software platform -
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diversity is welcomed. Contributions should be relevant, concise,
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polite, etc. (The complete set of posting guidelines is available by
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FTP on cert.sei.cmu.edu or upon request.) Please sign submissions
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with your real name. Send contributions to VIRUS-L@IBM1.CC.LEHIGH.EDU
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(that's equivalent to VIRUS-L at LEHIIBM1 for you BITNET folks).
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Information on accessing anti-virus, documentation, and back-issue
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archives is distributed periodically on the list. Administrative mail
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(comments, suggestions, and so forth) should be sent to me at:
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krvw@CERT.SEI.CMU.EDU.
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Ken van Wyk
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
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Date: Thu, 19 Mar 92 14:07:05 -0500
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From: Kenneth R. van Wyk <krvw@cert.sei.cmu.edu>
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Subject: VIRUS-L/comp.virus FAQ, 19 March 1992
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Frequently Asked Questions on VIRUS-L/comp.virus
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Last Updated: 19 March 1992, 2:00 PM EST
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====================
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= Preface Section: =
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====================
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This document is intended to answer the most Frequently Asked
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Questions (FAQs) about computer viruses. As you can see, there are
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many of them! If you are desperately seeking help after recently
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discovering what appears to be a virus on your computer, consider
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skimming through sections A and B to learn the essential jargon, then
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concentrate on section C.
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If you may have found a new virus, or are not quite sure if some file
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or boot sector is infected, it is important to understand the protocol
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for raising such questions, e.g. to avoid asking questions that can be
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answered in this document, and to avoid sending "live" viruses except
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to someone who is responsible (and even then in a safe form!).
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Above all, remember the time to really worry about viruses is BEFORE
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your computer gets one!
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The FAQ is a dynamic document, which changes as people's questions
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change. Contributions are gratefully accepted -- please e-mail them
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to me at krvw@cert.sei.cmu.edu. The most recent copy of this FAQ will
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always be available on the VIRUS-L/comp.virus archives, including the
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anonymous FTP on cert.sei.cmu.edu (192.88.209.5) in the file:
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pub/virus-l/FAQ.virus-l
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Ken van Wyk, moderator VIRUS-L/comp.virus
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Primary contributors (in alphabetical order):
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Mark Aitchison <phys169@csc.canterbury.ac.nz>
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Vaughan Bell <vaughan@computing-department.poly-south-west.ac.uk>
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Matt Bishop <matt.bishop@dartmouth.edu>
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Vesselin Bontchev <bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de>
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Olivier M.J. Crepin-Leblond <umeeb37@vaxa.cc.ic.ac.uk>
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David Chess <chess@watson.ibm.com>
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John-David Childs <con_jdc@lewis.umt.edu>
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Nick FitzGerald <cctr132@csc.canterbury.ac.nz>
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Claude Bersano-Hayes <hayes@urvax.urich.edu>
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John Kida <jhk@washington.ssds.COM>
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A. Padgett Peterson <padgett%tccslr.dnet@mmc.com>
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Rob Slade <rslade@sfu.ca>
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Gene Spafford <spaf@cs.purdue.edu>
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Otto Stolz <rzotto@nyx.uni-konstanz.de>
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====================
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Questions answered in this document
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Section A: Sources of Information and Anti-viral Software
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(Where can I find HELP..!)
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A1) What is VIRUS-L/comp.virus?
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A2) What is the difference between VIRUS-L and comp.virus?
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A3) How do I get onto VIRUS-L/comp.virus?
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A4) What are the guidelines for VIRUS-L?
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A5) How can I get back-issues of VIRUS-L?
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A6) What is VALERT-L?
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A7) What are the known viruses, their names, major symptoms and
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possible cures?
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A8) Where can I get the latest free/shareware anti-virus programs?
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A9) Where can I get more information on viruses, etc for my report?
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Section B: Definitions
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(What is ...?)
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B1) What are computer viruses (and why should I worry about them) ?
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B2) What is a trojan horse?
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B3) What are "stealth" viruses (and what is special about them) ?
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B4) What are "polymorphic" viruses (and what is special about them) ?
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B5) What are "armored" viruses?
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B6) What different types of PC viruses are there?
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B7) Miscellaneous Abbreviations and jargon
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Section C: Virus Detection
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(Is my computer infected? What do I do?)
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C1) What are the symptoms and indications of a virus infection?
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C2) What steps should be taken in diagnosing and identifying viruses?
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C3) What does the <insert name here> virus do?
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C4) What are "false positive" (Type I) and "false negative" (Type II)
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errors ?
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C5) Could an anti-viral program be infected?
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C6) Where can I get a virus scanner for my Unix system?
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C7) Why does an antiviral scanner reports an infection only sometimes?
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C8) Am I infected with the Stoned virus ?
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C9) I think I have detected a new virus; what do I do?
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Section D: Protection Plans
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(What should I do to prepare against viruses?)
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D1) What is the best protection policy for my computer?
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D2) Is it possible to protect a computer system with only software?
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D3) What can be done with hardware protection?
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D4) Will setting MSDOS files' attributes to READ ONLY protect them from
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viruses?
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D5) Will password protection systems protect my files from viruses?
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D6) Will the protection systems in DR-DOS work against viruses?
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D7) Will a write-protect tab on a floppy disk prevent a virus from
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infecting it?
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D8) What is the best way to remove the virus?
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D9) What other ways can I stop viruses before they enter my computer?
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Section E: Facts and Fibs about computer viruses
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(Can a virus...?)
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E1) Can "boot sector" viruses like Stoned infect non-bootable floppy disks?
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E2) Can a virus hide in a PC's battery-backed CMOS memory?
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E3) Can viruses infect data files?
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E4) Can viruses spread from one type of computer to another?
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E5) Can mainframe computers be susceptible to computer viruses?
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E6) Some people say that disinfecting viruses is a bad idea. Is that true?
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E7) Can I avoid viruses by avoiding shareware/free software/games?
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E8) Can MS-DOS Viruses run on Non-DOS machines (e.g., Mac, Amiga)?
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Section F: Miscellaneous Questions
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(I was just wondering...)
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F1) How many different types of viruses are there?
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F2) How do viruses spread so quickly?
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F3) What is the plural of "virus"? "Viruses" or "viri" or "virii" or...
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F4) When reporting a virus infection (and looking for assistance), what
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information should be included?
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F5) How often should we upgrade our anti-virus tools to minimize
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software and labor costs and maximize our protection?
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Section G: Specific Virus and Anti-viral software Questions...
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G1) I was infected by the Jerusalem virus and disinfected the infected
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files with my favorite anti-virus program. However, Wordperfect and
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some other programs still refuse to work. Why?
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G2) I was told that the Stoned virus displays the text "Your PC is now
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Stoned" at boot time. I have been infected by this virus several
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times, but have never seen the message. Why?
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================================================================
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= Section A. Sources of Information and Anti-viral Software. =
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================================================================
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A1) What is VIRUS-L/comp.virus?
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It is a discussion forum with a focus on computer virus issues. More
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specifically, VIRUS-L is an electronic mailing list and comp.virus is
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a USENET newsgroup. Both groups are moderated; all submissions are
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sent to the moderator for possible inclusion in the group. For more
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information, including a copy of the posting guidelines, see the file
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virus-l.README, available by anonymous FTP on cert.sei.cmu.edu in the
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pub/virus-l directory. (FTP is the Internet File Transfer Protocol,
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and is described in more detail in the monthly VIRUS-L/comp.virus
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archive postings - see below.)
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Note that there have been, from time to time, other USENET
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cross-postings of VIRUS-L, including the bit.listserv.virus-l. These
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groups are generally set up by individual site maintainers and are not
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as globally accessible as VIRUS-L and comp.virus.
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A2) What is the difference between VIRUS-L and comp.virus?
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As mentioned above, VIRUS-L is a mailing list and comp.virus is a
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newsgroup. In addition, VIRUS-L is distributed in digest format (with
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multiple e-mail postings in one large digest) and comp.virus is
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distributed as individual news postings. However, the content of the
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two groups is identical.
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A3) How do I get onto VIRUS-L/comp.virus?
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Send e-mail to LISTSERV@IBM1.CC.LEHIGH.EDU (or LISTSERV@LEHIIBM1 for
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you Bitnetters) stating: "SUB VIRUS-L your-name". To "subscribe" to
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comp.virus, simply use your favorite USENET news reader to read the
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group (assuming that your site receives USENET news).
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A4) What are the guidelines for VIRUS-L?
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The list of posting guidelines is available by anonymous FTP on
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cert.sei.cmu.edu. See the file pub/virus-l/virus-l.README for the
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most recent copy. In general, however, the moderator requires that
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discussions are polite and non-commercial. (Objective postings of
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product availability, product reviews, etc., is fine, but commercial
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advertising is not.) Also, requests for viruses (binary or
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disassembly) are not allowed. Technical discussions are encouraged,
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however, within reason.
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A5) How can I get back-issues of VIRUS-L?
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VIRUS-L/comp.virus includes a series of archive sites that carry all
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the back issues of VIRUS-L, as well as public anti-virus software (for
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various computers) and documents. The list of archive sites is
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updated monthly and distributed to the group; it includes a complete
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listing of the sites, what they carry, access instructions, as well as
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information on how to access FTP sites by e-mail. The anonymous FTP
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archive at cert.sei.cmu.edu carries all of the VIRUS-L back issues, as
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does the LISTSERV at LEHIIBM1 (on BITNET). See the file
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pub/virus-l/README for more information on the cert.sei.cmu.edu
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archive site.
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A6) What is VALERT-L?
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VALERT-L is a sister group to VIRUS-L, but is intended for virus
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alerts and warnings only -- NO DISCUSSIONS. There is no direct USENET
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counterpart to VALERT-L; it is a mailing list only. All VALERT-L
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postings are re-distributed to VIRUS-L/comp.virus later. This group
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is also moderated, but on a much higher priority than VIRUS-L. The
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group is monitored during business hours (East Coast, U.S.A.,
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GMT-5/GMT-4); high priority off-hour postings can be made by
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submitting to the group and then telephoning the CERT/CC hotline at +1
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412 268 7090 -- leave instructions to call Ken van Wyk.
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Subscriptions to VALERT-L are handled identically to VIRUS-L --
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contact the LISTSERV.
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A7) What are the known viruses, their names, major symptoms and
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possible cures?
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There are several major sources of information about viruses.
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Probably the biggest one is Patricia Hoffman's hypertext VSUM. It
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describes only MS-DOS viruses, but almost all of them. Unfortunately,
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it tends to be too verbose and is regarded by many in the field as
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being inaccurate, so we do not advise people to rely on it. It can be
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downloaded from most major archive sites -except- SIMTEL20.
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The second one is the Computer Virus Catalog, published by the Virus
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Test Center in Hamburg. It contains a highly technical description of
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computer viruses for several platforms: MS-DOS, Mac, Amiga, Atari ST,
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Unix. Unfortunately, the MS-DOS section is somewhat incomplete. The
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CVC is available for anonymous ftp from ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de
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(IP=134.100.4.42), directory pub/virus/texts/catalog.
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A third source of information is the monthly Virus Bulletin. It
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regularly publishes very detailed technical information about viruses.
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Unfortunately it is -very- expensive (the subscription is about $350
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per year; US subscriptions can be obtained by calling 203-431-8720).
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A fourth good source of information on MS-DOS viruses is the "Computer
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Viruses" report of the National Computer Security Association. This
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is updated regularly, and is fairly complete. Copies cost
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approximately $75, and can be ordered by calling +1 202-244-7875.
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Another source of information is the documentation of Dr. Solomon's
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Anti-Virus ToolKit. It is more complete than the CVC list, just as
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accurate (if not more), but lists only MS-DOS viruses. However, it is
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not available electronically; you must buy his anti-virus package and
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the virus information is part of the documentation.
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Yet another source of information is "Virus News International",
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published by S & S International. And, while not entirely
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virus-related, "Computers & Security" provides information on many
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aspects of computer security, including viruses.
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The best source of information available on Apple Macintosh viruses is
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the on-line documentation provided with the freeware Disinfectant
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program by John Norstad. This is available at most Mac archive sites.
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A8) Where can I get the latest free/shareware anti-virus programs?
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The VIRUS-L/comp.virus archive sites carry publicly distributable
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anti-virus software products. See a recent listing of the archive
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sites (or ask the moderator for a recent listing) for more information
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on these sites.
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If you need an MS-DOS anti-virus program urgently, chances are that
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you can find it via anonymous FTP on WSMR-SIMTEL20.ARMY.MIL
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(192.88.110.20), in the directory PD1:<MSDOS.TROJAN-PRO>. (Note that
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the SIMTEL20 archives are also mirrored at many other anonymous FTP
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sites, including oak.oakland.edu (141.210.10.117) and
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wuarchive.wustl.edu (128.252.135.4).
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Likewise, Macintosh anti-virus programs can be found on SIMTEL20 in
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the PD3:<MACINTOSH.VIRUS> directory.
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A9) Where can I get more information on viruses, etc for my report?
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There are three excellent books on computer viruses available that
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should cover most of the introductory and technical questions you
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might have:
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* "Computers Under Attack: Intruders, Worms and Viruses," edited by
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Peter J. Denning, ACM Press/Addison-Wesley, 1990. This is a book of
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collected readings that discuss computer viruses, computer worms,
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break-ins, legal and social aspects, and many other items related to
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computer security and malicious software. A very solid, readable
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collection that doesn't require a highly-technical background.
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* "Rogue Programs: Viruses, Worms and Trojan Horses," edited by
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Lance J. Hoffman, Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1990. This is a book of
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collected readings describing in detail how viruses work, where they
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come from, what they do, etc. It also has material on worms, trojan
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horse programs, and other malicious software programs. This book
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focuses more on mechanism and relatively less on social aspects than
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does the Denning book; however, there is an excellent piece by Anne
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Branscomb that covers the legal aspects.
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* "A Pathology of Computer Viruses," by David Ferbrache,
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Springer-Verlag, 1992. This is a recent, in-depth book on the
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history, operation, and effects of computer viruses. It is one of the
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most complete books on the subject, with an extensive history section,
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a section on Macintosh viruses, networks worms, and Unix viruses (if
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they were to exist).
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A somewhat dated, but still useful, high-level description of viruses,
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suitable for a complete novice without extensive computer background
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is in "Computer Viruses: Dealing with Electronic Vandalism and
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Programmed Threats," by Eugene H. Spafford, Kathleen A. Heaphy, and
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David J. Ferbrache, ADAPSO (Arlington VA), 1989. ADAPSO is a
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computer industry service organization, and not a publisher, so the
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book cannot be found in bookstores; copies can be obtained directly
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from ADAPSO @ +1 703-522-5055). There is a discount for ADAPSO
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members, educators, and law enforcement personnel. Many people have
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indicated they find this a very understandable reference; portions of
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it have been reprinted many other places, including Denning &
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Hoffman's books (above).
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======================================================
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= Section B. Definitions and General Information =
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======================================================
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B1) What are computer viruses (and why should I worry about them) ?
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The term "computer virus" tends to be used to cover many sorts of computer
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programs that hide their true (malicious) function and try to spread onto as
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many computers as possible. While the definitions of the various types of
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computer virus (and other malicious software) in this document are certainly
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useful, it can still be worth keeping something a "fuzzy" definition of
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"computer virus", since pre-conceived notions as to what a virus is, and what
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it exactly does, can lead to a false sense of security.
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These software "pranks" are very serious; they are spreading faster than they
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are being stopped, and even the least harmful of viruses can have serious
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consequences. For example, a virus that stops your computer and displays a
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message, in the context of a hospital life-support computer, could be fatal.
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Even those who created the viruses could not stop them if they wanted to; it
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requires a concerted effort from computer users to be "virus-aware", rather
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than the ignorance and ambivalence that have allowed them to grow to such a
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problem.
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B2) What is a trojan horse?
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It is a program that does something the programmer intended, but that
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the user would not approve of if he knew about it. Thus, a virus is a
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particular case of a Trojan horse, which is able to spread to other
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programs (i.e., it turns them into trojans, too).
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B3) What are "stealth" viruses (and what is special about them) ?
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Every virus makes changes to executable code; hence every virus can be
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detected by checking all executable code in a system for discrepancies
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between presumed and actual contents. A stealth virus camouflages the
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changes it has made from detection by other programs, usually by
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monitoring the system functions used by programs to read files or
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physical blocks from storage media, and forging the results of such
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system functions suitably. However, in order to practise "stealth,"
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the virus must be resident in memory. In every "stealth" virus seen
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so far, this residence is detectable, often easily.
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Example: One of the oldest MS-DOS Viruses, Brain, a boot sector
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infector, monitors physical disk-I/O and re-directs any attempt to
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read a Brain-infected boot sector to the disk area where the original
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boot sector is stored.
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Countermeasures: To gain unadulterated access to storage media, a
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"clean" system is needed so that no virus is present to interfere with
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its operation. Thus, the system should be built from a trusted,
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clean master copy before any virus-checking is attempted; this is "The
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Golden Rule of the Trade." With MS-DOS, (1) boot from original DOS
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diskettes (i.e. DOS Startup/Program diskettes from a major vendor that
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have been write-protected since their creation), (2) use only tools
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from original diskettes until virus-checking has completed.
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B4) What are polymorphic viruses (and what is special about them) ?
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In order to eradicate a virus infection, all instances of this
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particular virus in various places (program files, boot records, etc.)
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have to be found and identified. A program to accomplish this task is
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called a Virus Scanner.
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A polymorphic virus tries to escape virus scanners by producing varied
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(yet fully operational) copies of itself.
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One method to evade signature-driven virus scanners is self-encryption
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with a variable key; however these viruses (e.g. Cascade) are not
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termed "polymorphic," as their decryption code is always the same and
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thus can be used as a virus signature even by the simplest, signature-
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driven virus scanners.
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|
|
|
One method for a polymorphic virus is choosing amongst a variety of
|
|
different encryption schemes requiring different decryption routines:
|
|
only one of these routines would be plainly visible in any instance of
|
|
the virus (e.g. the Whale virus). A signature-driven virus scanner
|
|
would have to exploit several signatures (one for each possible
|
|
encryption method) to reliably identify a virus of this kind.
|
|
|
|
A more sophisticated polymorphic virus (e.g. V2P6) will vary the
|
|
sequence of instructions in its copies, by interspersing it with
|
|
"noise" instructions (e.g. a No Operation instruction, or an
|
|
instruction to load a currently unused register with an arbitrary
|
|
value), by interchanging mutually independent instructions, or even by
|
|
using various instruction sequences with identical net effects (e.g.
|
|
Subtract A from A, and Move 0 to A). A simple-minded, signature-based
|
|
virus scanner would not be able to reliably identify this sort of
|
|
virus; rather, a sophisticated "scanning engine" has to be constructed
|
|
after thorough research into the particular virus.
|
|
|
|
The advent of polymorphic viruses has rendered virus-scanning an ever
|
|
more difficult and expensive endeavor; adding more and more search
|
|
strings to simple scanners will not adequately deal with these
|
|
viruses.
|
|
|
|
|
|
B5) What are "armored" viruses?
|
|
|
|
Armored viruses use special tricks to make the tracing, disassembling
|
|
and understanding of their code more difficult. A good example is the
|
|
Whale virus.
|
|
|
|
|
|
B6) What different types of PC viruses are there?
|
|
|
|
Generally, there are two main classes of viruses: the first describes
|
|
file infectors which attach themselves to individual programs that
|
|
are easily copied/transferred between computers. These attack .COM
|
|
and .EXE programs though some will infect other classes of program
|
|
capable of execution (e.g. .DB* and .WK* files). Still others can
|
|
infect any program for which execution is requested such as .SYS,
|
|
.OVL, .PRG, & .MNU programs. Generally though, all file infector
|
|
viruses will infect either .COM or .EXE programs or both. Common
|
|
examples are Jerusalem, Sunday, Vienna, 4096, or Whale.
|
|
|
|
The second category is System Infectors: those viruses which infect
|
|
executable code found in specific locations either on a disk or in
|
|
memory. On DOS systems, for example, most of these viruses infect the
|
|
Master Boot Record on fixed disks, the DOS Boot Record on both fixed
|
|
and floppy disks, or the system files (IO.SYS or MSDOS.SYS). Examples
|
|
include Brain, Stoned, Empire, Azusa, & Michelangelo.
|
|
|
|
Finally, a few viruses are able to infect both (the Tequila
|
|
virus is one example).
|
|
|
|
|
|
B7) Miscellaneous Jargon and Abbreviations...
|
|
|
|
BSI = Boot Sector Infector: the most common PC viruses belong to this
|
|
family, which take over control when the computer attempts to boot.
|
|
|
|
DOS = Diskette Operating System: We use DOS to mean MS-DOS, PC-DOS, or
|
|
DR-DOS even though there are operating systems called DOS on unrelated
|
|
hardware.
|
|
|
|
MBR = Master Boot Record: the first sector on a PC hard disk, that
|
|
usually contains the partition table (but may simply contain a DOS
|
|
boot sector).
|
|
|
|
RAM = Random Access Memory: the place programs are loaded into to
|
|
execute; the significance for viruses is that, to be active, they must
|
|
grab some of this for themselves. However, some virus scanners may
|
|
declare a virus is active simply when it is found in RAM - even though
|
|
it might be in a disk's buffer area of RAM rather than truly being
|
|
executed.
|
|
|
|
TOM = Top Of Memory: (this is particularly significant in PC's) The
|
|
amount of RAM is recorded in the computer; viruses or other software)
|
|
may try to tell the software that follows there is less memory than
|
|
there really is, so the virus can hide there.
|
|
|
|
TSR = Terminate but Stay Resident: these are PC programs that stay in
|
|
memory while you continue to use the computer for other programs; they
|
|
include pop-up utilities, network software, and (unfortunately) some
|
|
viruses. These can often be seen using utilities such as MEM and PMAP
|
|
and INFOPLUS.
|
|
|
|
|
|
=================================
|
|
= Section C. Virus Detection =
|
|
=================================
|
|
|
|
C1) What are the symptoms and indications of a virus infection?
|
|
|
|
There are all kinds of symptoms which virus authors have written into
|
|
their programs, such as messages, music and graphical displays. These
|
|
"payloads" may include deleting files, or other destruction. Viruses
|
|
try to do a lot of spreading before they deliver their payload, but
|
|
there can be symptoms of virus infection before this, and it is
|
|
important to use this opportunity to spot and eradicate the virus
|
|
before any destruction.
|
|
|
|
The main indications are changes to file sizes and contents, changing
|
|
of interrupt vectors (on a PC), and the unaccounted use of RAM (but,
|
|
of course, viruses try to hid such effects). On a PC it can be very
|
|
worthwhile looking at the amount of RAM known to the CHKDSK program,
|
|
which should be 655360 bytes (or at least a multiple of 16384 bytes);
|
|
and boot sector infections are often easily identified to the trained
|
|
eye (or heuristic checkers such as CHECKOUT). These symptoms, along
|
|
with longer disk activity and strange behavior from the hardware, can
|
|
also be caused by genuine software, or by harmless "prank" programs,
|
|
or by hardware faults, unfortunately.
|
|
|
|
The only foolproof way to determine that a virus is present is for an
|
|
expert to analyze the assembly code contained in all programs and
|
|
system areas, but this is usually impracticable. Virus scanners go
|
|
some way towards that by looking in that code for known viruses; some
|
|
will even try to use artificial intelligence means to spot viral
|
|
activity, but this is usually only reliable for boot sectors. It is
|
|
wise to arm yourself with the latest anti-viral software, but also to
|
|
pay close attention to your system... look particularly for any change
|
|
in the memory map or configuration as soon as you start the computer.
|
|
For users of MS-DOS 5.0, the MEM program with the /C switch is very
|
|
handy for this. If you have DRDOS, use MEM with the /A switch; if you
|
|
have an earlier version use CHKDSK or the commonly-available PMAP or
|
|
MAPMEM utilities. You don't have to know what all the numbers mean,
|
|
only that they change.
|
|
|
|
|
|
C2) What steps should be taken in diagnosing and identifying viruses?
|
|
|
|
Most of the time, a virus scanner program will take care of that for
|
|
you. Running it often and on new disks will help identify problems
|
|
early! If you run into one that the scanner doesn't identify, or
|
|
doesn't properly clean up for you, first verify that the version that
|
|
you are using is the most recent, and then get in touch with one of
|
|
the reputable antivirus researchers and send a copy of the infected
|
|
file to them, after they ask you to send it. See also question C9.
|
|
|
|
|
|
C3) What does the <insert name here> virus do?
|
|
|
|
If an anti-virus program has detected a virus on your computer, don't
|
|
rush to post a question to this list asking what it does. First, it
|
|
might be a false positive alert (especially if the virus is found only
|
|
in one file), and second, some viruses are extremely common, so the
|
|
question "What does the Stoned virus do?" or "What does the Jerusalem
|
|
virus do?" is asked here repeatedly. While this list is monitored by
|
|
several anti-virus experts, they get tired of perpetually answering
|
|
the same questions over and over again. In any case, if you really
|
|
*need* to know what a particular virus does (as opposed to knowing
|
|
enough to get rid of it), you will need a longer treatise than could
|
|
reasonably be given to you.
|
|
|
|
For example, the Stoned virus replaces the disk's boot sector with its
|
|
own, relocating the original to a sector on the disk that may (or may
|
|
not) occur in an unused portion of the root directory of a DOS
|
|
diskette; when active, it sits in an area a few kilobytes below the
|
|
top of memory. All this description could apply to a number of common
|
|
viruses; but the important points of where the original boot sector
|
|
goes - and what effect that has on networking software, non-DOS
|
|
partitions, and so on are all major questions in themselves.
|
|
|
|
Therefore, it is better if you first try to answer your question
|
|
yourself. There are several sources of information about the known
|
|
computer viruses, so please consult one of them before requesting
|
|
information publicly. Chances are that your virus is rather well known
|
|
and that it is already described in detail in at least one of these
|
|
sources. (See the answers to questions A7 and A9, for instance.)
|
|
|
|
|
|
C4) What are "false positive" (Type I) and "false negative"
|
|
(Type II) errors?
|
|
|
|
Most virus scanners do not identify viruses exactly. What they do is
|
|
to use a characteristic sequence of bytes from the virus code, called
|
|
"scan string" and to scan the files for this string. While the authors
|
|
of most scanners do their best to select good scan strings, it is
|
|
possible that the same string happens to be present in a benign
|
|
program. If a non-virus program is flagged as a virus by the scanner,
|
|
this is called a "false positive" error.
|
|
|
|
On the other hand, a virus scanner searches only for known viruses.
|
|
Most probably it will miss a completely new or a heavily modified
|
|
virus. If the scanner does not detect a program, which in fact
|
|
contains a virus, this is called a "false negative" error.
|
|
|
|
Obviously the false negative errors are more dangerous than the false
|
|
positive ones. Therefore, producers of virus scanners usually attempt
|
|
to minimize both kinds of errors, but they are more concerned with the
|
|
false negative ones.
|
|
|
|
One other serious problem could occur: A "positive" that is
|
|
misdiagnosed. E.g., a scanner that detects the Empire virus in a boot
|
|
record but reports it as the Stoned. In the case of a boot sector
|
|
infector, use of a Stoned specific "cure" to recover from the Empire
|
|
could result in an unreadable disk or loss of extended partitions.
|
|
Similarly, sometimes "generic" recovery can result in unusable files.
|
|
"Second generation" products store information about "clean" programs
|
|
to allow verification of recovery processes.
|
|
|
|
|
|
C5) Could an anti-viral program itself be infected?
|
|
|
|
Yes, so it is important to obtain this software from good sources, and
|
|
to only trust results after running scanners from a "clean" system.
|
|
But there are situations where one scanner appears to be infected when
|
|
it isn't.
|
|
|
|
Most antiviral programs try very hard to identify only viral
|
|
infections, but sometimes they give false alarms. If two different
|
|
antiviral programs are both of the "scanner" type, they will contain
|
|
"signature strings" to identify viral infections. If the strings are
|
|
not "encrypted", then they will be identified as a virus by another
|
|
scanner type program. Also, if the scanner does not remove the
|
|
strings from memory after they are run, then another scanner may
|
|
detect the virus string "in memory".
|
|
|
|
Note that a recent example of this type of false alarm regards F-PROT
|
|
"detecting" viruses in two Central Point Anti-Virus (CPAV) files.
|
|
|
|
Some "change detection" type antiviral programs add a bit of code or
|
|
data to a program when "protecting" it. This might be detected by
|
|
another "change detector" as a change to a program, and therefore
|
|
suspicious.
|
|
|
|
It is good practice to use more than one antiviral program. Do be
|
|
aware, however, that antiviral programs, by their nature, may confuse
|
|
each other.
|
|
|
|
|
|
C6) Where can I get a virus scanner for my Unix system?
|
|
|
|
Basically, you shouldn't bother scanning for Unix viruses at this
|
|
point in time. Although it is possible to write Unix-based viruses,
|
|
we have yet to see any instance of a non-experimental virus in that
|
|
environment. Someone with sufficient knowledge and access to write an
|
|
effective virus would be more likely to conduct other activities than
|
|
virus-writing. Furthermore, the typical form of software sharing in
|
|
an Unix environment would not support virus spread.
|
|
|
|
This answer is not meant to imply that viruses are impossible, or that
|
|
there aren't security problems in a typical Unix environment -- there
|
|
are. However, true viruses are highly unlikely and should be found
|
|
quite readily with normal Unix file integrity procedures. For more
|
|
information on Unix security, see the book "Practical Unix Security"
|
|
by Garfinkel and Spafford, O'Reilly & Associates, 1991 (it can be
|
|
ordered via e-mail from nuts@ora.com).
|
|
|
|
However, there are special cases for which scanning Unix systems for
|
|
non-Unix viruses does make sense. For example, a Unix system which is
|
|
acting as a file server (e.g., PC-NFS) for PC systems is quite capable
|
|
of containing PC file infecting viruses that are a danger to PC clients.
|
|
Note that, in this example, the UNIX system would be scanned for PC
|
|
viruses, not UNIX viruses.
|
|
|
|
Another example is in the case of a 386/486 PC system running Unix,
|
|
since this system is still vulnerable to infection by BIOS infectors
|
|
such as Stoned and Michelangelo, which are operating system
|
|
independent. (Note that an infection on such a Unix PC system would
|
|
probably result in disabling the Unix disk partition(s) from booting.)
|
|
|
|
In addition, a file integrity checker (to detect unauthorized changes
|
|
in executable files) on Unix systems is a very good idea. (One free
|
|
program which can do this test, as well as other tests, is the COPS
|
|
package, available by anonymous FTP on cert.sei.cmu.edu.) Unauthorized
|
|
file changes on Unix systems are very common, although they usually
|
|
are not due to virus activity.
|
|
|
|
|
|
C7) Why does my anti-viral scanner report an infection only sometimes?
|
|
|
|
There are circumstances where part of a virus exists in RAM without
|
|
being active; if your scanner reports a virus in memory only sometimes
|
|
it could be due to the operating system buffering disk reads, keeping
|
|
disk contents that include a virus in memory (harmlessly) - in which
|
|
case it should also find it on disk, or after running another scanner
|
|
there may be scan strings left (again harmlessly) in memory.
|
|
|
|
|
|
C8) Is my disk infected with the Stoned virus ?
|
|
|
|
Of course the answer to this, and many similar questions, is to obtain
|
|
a good virus detector. However, the Stoned virus is one that occurs
|
|
often and you may spend a lot of time going through disks looking for
|
|
it. Also, there are several versions of this virus (and similar ones)
|
|
that may just possibly escape detection by conventional scanners.
|
|
|
|
Since it is so easy to detect "by hand", it is worth using the CHKDSK
|
|
method (mentioned in C2) to make sure it isn't in memory, then looking
|
|
at the first 11 bytes in diskettes using your favorite hex disk
|
|
editor; what you should look for is the third byte should be "90" hex
|
|
for a good diskette, and "00" for an infected diskette (anything else
|
|
may or may not imply an infection). There are even better methods of
|
|
determining the presence of such a virus, e.g. contained in the
|
|
freeware CHECKOUT program and the shareware SCANBOOT program, but this
|
|
is good enough for a quick check. The advantage of the system is that
|
|
it can be a lot faster than running some scanners over the disk, if
|
|
there are many to check. There are disadvantages - the main one being
|
|
that a few "good" diskettes, such as "immunized" ones, may show up as
|
|
having a virus - in which case you refer them to a better scan before
|
|
disinfecting them.
|
|
|
|
A more time-efficient method is to load the SCANBOOT TSR and let it
|
|
check diskettes automatically as you access them in the normal way
|
|
(e.g. when listing their files).
|
|
|
|
|
|
C9) I think I have detected a new virus; what do I do?
|
|
|
|
Whenever there is doubt over a virus, you should obtain the latest
|
|
versions of several (not just one) major virus scanner. If you use
|
|
F-PROT, which has several methods of scanning, try each method in
|
|
turn. The "heuristic" methods in one of these scan methods, and in
|
|
several other programs (CHECKOUT and SCANBOOT, for example), can
|
|
report a disk or file as being possibly infected, when it is, in fact
|
|
perfectly safe (odd, perhaps, but not infected). If no
|
|
string-matching scan finds a virus, but a heuristic program does (or
|
|
there are other reasons to suspect the file, e.g. change in size of
|
|
files) then it is possible that you have found a new virus, although
|
|
the chances are probably greater that it is an odd-but-okay disk or
|
|
file. Start by looking in recent VIRUS-L postings about "known" false
|
|
positives, then contact the author of the anti-virus software that
|
|
reports it as virus-like. Read the section explaining what to do if
|
|
you think you have found a new virus, and consider using the BOOTID or
|
|
CHECKOUT programs to calculate the "hashcode" of the diskette, in the
|
|
case of boot sector infectors.
|
|
|
|
|
|
===================================
|
|
= Section D. Protection plans =
|
|
===================================
|
|
|
|
D1) What is the best protection policy for my computer?
|
|
|
|
There is no "best" anti-virus program. In fact, there is no program
|
|
that can magically protect you against all viruses. But you can design
|
|
a whole anti-virus protection strategy and build multiple layers of
|
|
defense. There are three main kinds of anti-virus detectors, plus
|
|
several other means of protection (such as hardware write-protect
|
|
methods).
|
|
|
|
1) Monitoring programs; these look for viral activity when it happens,
|
|
such as attempts to write to another executable, reformat the disk,
|
|
etc, etc. Examples: FluShot+ (PC), and GateKeeper (Macintosh).
|
|
|
|
2) Scanners. Most look for known virus strings (byte sequences known
|
|
to occur in certain viruses, but hopefully not in good software), but
|
|
some use AI or heuristic techniques to recognize viral code. They may
|
|
also include virus removers. Examples: Dr Solomon's Anti-Virus Toolkit,
|
|
FRISK's F-Prot, McAfee's VIRUSCAN (all PC), Disinfectant (Macintosh).
|
|
|
|
3) Integrity (change-of-state) checkers. These take a "snapshot" of code,
|
|
and periodically compare code with the original and (what is supposed
|
|
to be) uninfected snapshot. Examples: V-Analyst (commercial, BRM
|
|
Technologies, Israel) and Integrity Master (shareware), both for the PC.
|
|
|
|
Plus, there are mixtures and variations on these approaches, such as
|
|
resident scanners (e.g. VShield, VIRSTOP) and heuristic search
|
|
versions (e.g. SCANBOOT). Of course, only a few examples of each type
|
|
were given. All of them can find their place in the protection
|
|
against the computer viruses, but you should appreciate the
|
|
limitations of each method, along with system-supplied security
|
|
measures that may or may not be helpful in defeating viruses. Ideally,
|
|
you would arrange a combination of methods that cover the loopholes
|
|
between them.
|
|
|
|
A typical PC installation might include a protection system on the
|
|
hard disk's MBR to protect against viruses at load time (ideally this
|
|
would be hardware or in BIOS, but software methods such as DiskSecure
|
|
and PanSoft's Immunise are pretty good). This would be followed by
|
|
resident virus detectors loaded as part of the machine's startup
|
|
(config.sys or autoexec.bat), such as FluShot+ and/or VirStop together
|
|
with ScanBoot. A scanner such as F-Prot or McAfee's scan should be
|
|
put into autoexec.bat to look for viruses as you start up, but this
|
|
may be a problem if you have a large disk to check (or don't reboot
|
|
often enough). Most importantly, new files should be scanned as they
|
|
arrive on the system. If your system has DR-DOS installed, you should
|
|
use the password command to write-protect all system executables and
|
|
utilities. If you have Stacker or SuperStore, you can get some
|
|
improved security from these compressed drives, but also a risk that
|
|
those viruses stupid enough to directly write to the disk could do
|
|
much more damage than normal; using a software write-protect system
|
|
(such as provided with Disk Manager or Norton Utilities) may help, but
|
|
the best solution (if possible) is to put all executables on a disk of
|
|
their own, protected by a hardware read-only system that sounds an
|
|
alarm if a write is attempted.
|
|
|
|
If you do use a resident BSI detector or a scan-while-you-copy
|
|
detector, it is important to trace back any infected diskette to its
|
|
source; the reason why viruses survive so well is that usually you
|
|
cannot do this, because the infection is found long after the
|
|
infecting diskette has been forgotten with most people's lax scanning
|
|
policies.
|
|
|
|
Organizations should devise and implement a careful policy, that may
|
|
include a system of vetting new software brought into the building and
|
|
free virus detectors for home machines of employees/students/etc who
|
|
take work home with them.
|
|
|
|
|
|
D2) Is it possible to protect a computer system with only software?
|
|
|
|
Not perfectly, however, software defenses can significantly reduce
|
|
your risk of being affected by viruses WHEN APPLIED APPROPRIATELY.
|
|
All virus defense systems are tools - each with their own capabilities
|
|
and limitations. Learn how your system works and be sure to work
|
|
within its limitations.
|
|
|
|
From a software standpoint, a very high level of protection/detection
|
|
can be achieved with only software, using a layered approach.
|
|
|
|
1) ROM Bios - password (access control) and selection of boot
|
|
disk. (some may consider this hardware)
|
|
|
|
2) Boot sectors - integrity management and change detection
|
|
|
|
3) OS programs - integrity management of existing programs,
|
|
scanning of unknown programs. Requirement of authentication
|
|
values for any new or transmitted software.
|
|
|
|
4) Locks that prevent writing to a fixed or floppy disk.
|
|
|
|
As each layer is added, invasion without detection becomes more
|
|
difficult. However complete protection against any possible attack
|
|
cannot be provided without dedicating the computer to pre-existing or
|
|
unique tasks. The international standardization of the world on the
|
|
IBM PC architecture is both its greatest asset and its greatest
|
|
vulnerability.
|
|
|
|
|
|
D3) What can be done with hardware protection?
|
|
|
|
Hardware protection can accomplish various things, including: write
|
|
protection for hard disk drives, memory protection, monitoring and
|
|
trapping unauthorized system calls, etc. Again, no tool is foolproof.
|
|
|
|
The popular idea of write-protection (see D6) may stop viruses
|
|
spreading to the disk that is protected, but doesn't, in itself,
|
|
prevent a virus from running.
|
|
|
|
|
|
D4) Will setting DOS file attributes to READ ONLY protect them from viruses?
|
|
|
|
No. While the Read Only attribute will protect your files from a few
|
|
viruses, most simply override it, and infect normally. So, while
|
|
setting executable files to Read Only is not a bad idea, it is
|
|
certainly not a thorough protection against viruses!
|
|
|
|
|
|
D5) Will password/access control systems protect my files from viruses?
|
|
|
|
Some will, some won't. Many file access control systems for PCs will
|
|
do a great deal to guard against existing PC viruses. A good
|
|
operating system (not wishing to start a "Unix vs MSDOS" war!)
|
|
combined with use of memory management hardware is best. But they are
|
|
not foolproof.
|
|
|
|
The important thing is that they be properly installed and
|
|
administered. (There's a recurring theme here...)
|
|
|
|
|
|
D6) Will the protection systems in DR-DOS 5 or 6 work against viruses ?
|
|
|
|
Partially. Neither the password file/directory protection available
|
|
from DRDOS version 5 onwards, nor the secure disk partitions
|
|
introduced in DRDOS 6 are intended to combat viruses, but they do to
|
|
some extent. If you have DRDOS, it is very wise to password-protect
|
|
your files (to stop accidental damage too), but don't depend on it as
|
|
the only means of defense.
|
|
|
|
The use of the password command (e.g. PASSWORD/W:MINE *.EXE *.COM)
|
|
will stop more viruses than the plain DOS attribute facility, but that
|
|
isn't saying much! The combination of the password system plus a disk
|
|
compression system may be more secure (because to bypass the password
|
|
system they must access the disk directly, but under SuperStore or
|
|
Stacker the physical disk is meaningless to the virus). There may be
|
|
some viruses which, rather than invisibly infecting files on
|
|
compressed disks in fact very visibly corrupt the disk.
|
|
|
|
The "secure disk partitions" system introduced with DRDOS 6 may be of
|
|
some help against a few viruses that look for DOS partitions on a
|
|
disk. The main use is in stopping people fiddling with (and
|
|
infecting) your hard disk while you are away.
|
|
|
|
|
|
D7) Will a write-protect tab on a floppy disk stop viruses ?
|
|
|
|
In general, yes. The write-protection on IBM PC (and compatible) and
|
|
Macintosh floppy disk drives is implemented in hardware, not software,
|
|
so viruses cannot infect a diskette with a properly-functioning
|
|
write-protection mechanism is functioning properly.
|
|
|
|
But remember:
|
|
|
|
(a) A computer may have a faulty write-protect system (this happens!)
|
|
- you can test it by trying to copy a file to the diskette.
|
|
(b) Someone may have removed the tab for a while, allowing a virus on.
|
|
(c) The files may have been infected before the disk was protected.
|
|
Even some diskettes "straight from the factory" have been known to be
|
|
infected in the production processes.
|
|
|
|
So, it is worthwhile to scan even write-protected disks for viruses.
|
|
|
|
|
|
D8) What is the best way to remove the virus so that downtime is short
|
|
and losses are low?
|
|
|
|
Do the minimum that you must to restore the system to a normal state,
|
|
starting with booting the system from a clean diskette. It is very
|
|
unlikely you need to "low level reformat" the hard disk!
|
|
|
|
If a disinfecting program will remove the virus, do that. If not, and
|
|
the virus is a program (or file) infector, remove the infected file
|
|
and reinstall the software from the original (write-protected) disks.
|
|
If the virus is a boot sector infector, you can continue using the
|
|
computer with relative safety if you boot it from a clean system
|
|
diskette, but it is wise to go through all your diskettes removing
|
|
infection, since sooner or later you may be careless and leave a
|
|
diskette in the machine when it reboots. Boot sector infectors on PC's
|
|
can be cured by a two-step approach of replacing the MBR then using
|
|
the SYS command.
|
|
|
|
|
|
=======================================================
|
|
= Section E. Facts and Fibs about computer viruses =
|
|
=======================================================
|
|
|
|
E1) Can "boot sector" viruses like Stoned infect non-bootable floppy disks?
|
|
|
|
Any diskette that has been properly formatted contains an executable
|
|
program in the boot sector. If the diskette is not "bootable," all
|
|
that boot sector does is print a message like "Non-system disk or disk
|
|
error; replace and strike any key when ready" but it's still
|
|
executable and still vulnerable to infection. If you accidentally
|
|
turn your machine on with a "non-bootable" diskette in the drive, and
|
|
see that message, it means that any boot virus that may have been on
|
|
that diskette *has* run, and has had the chance to infect your hard
|
|
drive, or whatever. So when thinking about viruses, the word
|
|
"bootable" (or "non-bootable") is really misleading. All formatted
|
|
diskettes are capable of carrying a virus.
|
|
|
|
|
|
E2) Can a virus hide in a PC's battery-backed CMOS memory?
|
|
|
|
No. The CMOS RAM in which system information is stored and backed up
|
|
by batteries is ported, not addressable. That is, in order to get
|
|
anything out, you use I/O commands. So anything stored there is not
|
|
directly sitting in memory. Nothing in a normal machine loads the
|
|
data from there and executes it, so a virus that "hid" in the CMOS RAM
|
|
would still have to infect an executable object of some kind, in order
|
|
to load and execute whatever it had written to CMOS. A malicious
|
|
virus can of course *alter* values in the CMOS as part of its payload,
|
|
but it can't spread through, or "hide" itself in, the CMOS.
|
|
|
|
|
|
E3) Can a virus infect data files?
|
|
|
|
Several viruses (Frodo, Cinderella) contain bugs, which make them
|
|
infect non-executable programs. However, in order to spread, the virus
|
|
must be executed. Therefore, the "infected" non-executable files
|
|
cannot be sources of infection.
|
|
|
|
However, note that it is not always possible to make a distinct
|
|
difference between executable and non-executable files. One man's code
|
|
is another man's data and vice versa. Several files that are not
|
|
directly executable contain code or data, which is at some time
|
|
executed or interpreted.
|
|
|
|
Some examples from the IBM PC world are .OBJ files, libraries, device
|
|
drivers, source files for any compiler or interpreter, macro files
|
|
for some packages like MS Word and Lotus 1-2-3, and many others.
|
|
Currently there are viruses that infect boot sectors, master boot
|
|
sectors, COM files, EXE files, BAT files, and device drivers, although
|
|
any of the objects mentioned above can theoretically be used as an
|
|
infection carrier. PostScript files can also be used to carry a virus,
|
|
although no currently known virus does that.
|
|
|
|
|
|
E4) Can viruses spread from one type of computer to another? (e.g.,
|
|
Amiga to PC), even if they can both read the same format disks,
|
|
like the Atari ST reading MS-DOS format disks.
|
|
|
|
The simple answer is that no currently known viruses can do that.
|
|
Although the disk formats may be the same, the different machines
|
|
interpret the code differently. For example, the Stoned virus cannot
|
|
infect an ST as the ST cannot execute the virus code in the
|
|
bootsector. The Stoned virus contains instructions for the 80x86
|
|
family of CPU's that the 680x0-family CPU (Atari ST) can't understand
|
|
or execute.
|
|
|
|
The more general answer is that such viruses are possible, but
|
|
unlikely. Such a virus would be quite a bit larger than current
|
|
viruses and might well be easier to find. Additionally, the low
|
|
incidence of cross-machine sharing of software means that any such
|
|
virus would be unlikely to spread -- it would be a poor environment
|
|
for virus growth.
|
|
|
|
|
|
E5) Can mainframe computers be susceptible to computer viruses?
|
|
|
|
Yes. Numerous experiments have shown that computer viruses spread
|
|
very quickly and effectively on mainframe systems. However, to our
|
|
knowledge, no non-research computer virus has been seen on mainframe
|
|
systems. (The Internet worm of November 1988 was not a computer virus
|
|
by most definitions, although it definitely had some virus-like
|
|
characteristics.)
|
|
|
|
Computer viruses are actually a special case of something else called
|
|
"malicious logic", and other forms of malicious logic -- notably
|
|
Trojan horses -- are far quicker, more effective, and harder to detect
|
|
than computer viruses. Hence those tend to be used to attack
|
|
mainframe systems, rather than computer viruses.
|
|
|
|
For further information on malicious programs on multi-user systems,
|
|
see Matt Bishop's paper, "An Overview of Malicious Logic in a Research
|
|
Environment". The paper is available via anonymous FTP on
|
|
Dartmouth.edu (129.170.16.4) as "pub/security/mallogic.ps".
|
|
|
|
|
|
E6) Some people say that disinfecting viruses is a bad idea. Is that true?
|
|
|
|
Disinfecting a virus is completely "safe" only if the disinfecting
|
|
process restores the non-infected state of the object completely. That
|
|
is, not only the virus must be removed from the file, but the original
|
|
length of the file must be restored exactly, as well as its time and
|
|
date of last modification, all fields in the header, etc. Sometimes,
|
|
it is necessary to to be sure that the file is placed on the same
|
|
clusters of the disk that it occupied prior to infection. If this is
|
|
not done, then a program, which uses some kind of self-checking or
|
|
copy protection may stop functioning properly, if at all.
|
|
|
|
None of the currently available disinfecting programs do all this. For
|
|
instance, because of the bugs that exist in many viruses, some of the
|
|
information of the original file is destroyed and cannot be recovered.
|
|
Other times, it is even impossible to detect that this information has
|
|
been destroyed and to warn the user. Furthermore, some viruses
|
|
corrupt information very slightly and in a random way (Nomenklatura,
|
|
Phoenix), so that it is even not possible to tell which files have
|
|
been corrupted.
|
|
|
|
Therefore, it is always better to determine the infected objects, and
|
|
to destroy them by replacing them with clean backups. You should try
|
|
to disinfect files only if they contain some valuable data that
|
|
cannot be restored from backups or compiled from their original
|
|
source.
|
|
|
|
|
|
E7) Can I avoid viruses by avoiding shareware/free software/games?
|
|
|
|
No. There are many documented instances in which commercial "shrink
|
|
wrap" software was inadvertently distributed containing viruses.
|
|
Avoiding shareware, freeware, games, etc., only isolates you from a
|
|
vast collection of software (some of it very good, some of it very
|
|
bad, most of it somewhere in between...).
|
|
|
|
The important thing is not to avoid a certain type of software, but to
|
|
be cautious of ANY AND ALL newly acquired software. Simply scanning
|
|
all new software media for known viruses would be rather effective at
|
|
preventing virus infections, especially when combined with some other
|
|
prevention/detection strategy such as integrity management of
|
|
programs.
|
|
|
|
|
|
E8) Can MS-DOS Viruses run on Non-DOS machines (e.g., Mac, Amiga)?
|
|
|
|
In general, no. However, on machines running DOS emulators (either
|
|
hardware or software based), DOS viruses - just like any DOS program -
|
|
may function. These viruses would be subject to the file access
|
|
controls of the host operating system. An example is when running a
|
|
DOS emulator such as VP/ix under a 386 UNIX environment, DOS
|
|
programs are not permitted access to files which the host UNIX system
|
|
does not allow them to. Thus, it is important to administer these
|
|
systems carefully.
|
|
|
|
|
|
=========================================
|
|
= Section F. Miscellaneous Questions =
|
|
=========================================
|
|
|
|
F1) How many different types of viruses are there?
|
|
|
|
It is not possible to give an exact number because new viruses are
|
|
being created literally every day. Furthermore, the different
|
|
anti-virus researchers use different criteria to decide whether two
|
|
viruses are different or one and the same. Some count two viruses as
|
|
two different ones if they differ by at least one bit in their
|
|
non-variable code. Others group the viruses in families and do not
|
|
count the closely related variants in one family as different viruses.
|
|
|
|
As of March 1992, there were about 1,200 different IBM PC viruses,
|
|
about 150 Amiga viruses, about 30 Macintosh viruses, several Atari ST
|
|
viruses and a few Apple II viruses.
|
|
|
|
|
|
F2) How do viruses spread so quickly?
|
|
|
|
This is a very complex issue. Most viruses don't spread very quickly.
|
|
Those that do spread widely are able to do so for a variety of
|
|
reasons. A large target population (i.e., millions of compatible
|
|
computers) helps... A large virus population helps... Vendors whose
|
|
quality assurance mechanisms rely on, for example, outdated scanners
|
|
help... Users who gratuitously insert new software into their systems
|
|
without making any attempt to test for viruses help... All of these
|
|
things are factors.
|
|
|
|
|
|
F3) What is the plural of "virus"? "Viruses" or "viri" or "virii" or...
|
|
|
|
The correct English plural of "virus" is "viruses." The Latin word is
|
|
a mass noun (like "air"), and there is no correct Latin plural.
|
|
Please use "viruses," and if people use other forms, please don't use
|
|
VIRUS-L/comp.virus to correct them.
|
|
|
|
|
|
F4) When reporting a virus infection (and looking for assistance), what
|
|
information should be included?
|
|
|
|
People frequently post messages to VIRUS-L/comp.virus requesting
|
|
assistance on a suspected virus problem. Quite often, the information
|
|
supplied is not sufficient for the various experts on the list to be
|
|
able to help out. Also note that any such assistance from members of
|
|
the list is provided on a volunteer basis; be grateful for any help
|
|
received. Try to provide the following information in your requests
|
|
for assistance:
|
|
- The name of the virus (if known);
|
|
- The name of the program that detected it;
|
|
- The version of the program that detected it;
|
|
- Any other anti-virus software that you are running and
|
|
whether it has been able to detect the virus or not, and if yes, by
|
|
what name did it call it;
|
|
- Your software and hardware configuration (computer type,
|
|
kinds of disk(ette) drives, amount of memory and configuration
|
|
(extended/expanded/conventional), TSR programs and device drivers
|
|
used, OS version, etc.)
|
|
|
|
|
|
F5) How often should we upgrade our anti-virus tools to minimize
|
|
software and labor costs and maximize our protection?
|
|
|
|
This is a difficult question to answer. Antiviral software is a kind
|
|
of insurance, and those type of calculations are difficult.
|
|
|
|
There are two things to watch out for here: the general "style" of the
|
|
software, and the signatures which scanners use to identify viruses.
|
|
Scanners should be updated more frequently than other software, and it
|
|
is probably a good idea to have a new set of signatures at least every
|
|
two to three months.
|
|
|
|
Some antiviral software looks for changes to programs or specific
|
|
types of viral "activity," and these programs generally claim to be
|
|
good for "all current and future viral programs." However, even these
|
|
programs cannot guarantee to protect against all future viruses, and
|
|
should probably be upgraded once per year.
|
|
|
|
Of course, not every anti-virus product is effective against all (or
|
|
any!) viruses, even if upgraded regularly. Thus, do *not* depend on
|
|
the fact that you have upgraded your product recently as a guarantee
|
|
that your system is free of viruses!
|
|
|
|
=====================================================================
|
|
= Section G. Specific Virus and Anti-viral software Questions... =
|
|
=====================================================================
|
|
|
|
|
|
G1) I was infected by the Jerusalem virus and disinfected the infected
|
|
files with my favorite anti-virus program. However, Wordperfect and
|
|
some other programs still refuse to work. Why?
|
|
|
|
The Jerusalem virus and Wordperfect program combination is an example
|
|
of a virus and program that cannot be completely disinfected by an
|
|
anti-virus tool. In some cases such as this one, the virus will
|
|
destroy file header information by overwriting it. The only solution
|
|
is to re-install the programs from clean (non-infected) backups or
|
|
distribution media. (See question C4.)
|
|
|
|
|
|
G2) I was told that the Stoned virus displays the text "Your PC is now
|
|
Stoned" at boot time. I have been infected by this virus several
|
|
times, but have never seen the message. Why?
|
|
|
|
The "original" Stoned message was ".Your PC is now Stoned!", where the
|
|
"." represents the "bell" character (ASCII 7 or "PC speaker beep").
|
|
The message is displayed with a probability of 1 in 8 only when a PC is
|
|
booted from an infected diskette -- when booting from an infected hard
|
|
disk Stoned never displays this message.
|
|
|
|
Recently, versions of Stoned with -no message whatsover- or only the
|
|
leading bell character have become very common. These versions of
|
|
Stoned are likely to go unnoticed by all but the most observant, even
|
|
when regularly booting from infected diskettes.
|
|
|
|
Contrary to the information in Patricia Hoffman's VSUM and derivative
|
|
works (apparently including the Central Point Anti-Virus ad's in
|
|
PC-Magazine, et al.), the Stoned virus -does NOT- display the message
|
|
"LEGALISE MARIJUANA", although such a string is quite clearly visible
|
|
in the boot sectors of diskettes infected with the "original" version
|
|
of Stoned in "standard" PC's.
|
|
|
|
====================
|
|
[End of VIRUS-L/comp.virus FAQ]
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
End of VIRUS-L Digest [Volume 5 Issue 70]
|
|
*****************************************
|