12412 lines
542 KiB
Plaintext
12412 lines
542 KiB
Plaintext
From kls Fri Nov 13 22:47:31 1992
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Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
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Path: news
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From: Karl Swartz <kls@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Subject: Welcome to sci.aeronautics.airliners!
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Message-ID: <airliners.1992.1@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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X-Original-Message-Id: <m0mqHFq-0000UEC@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Date: Fri, 13 Nov 92 22:45:11 PST
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Welcome to sci.aeronautics.airliners! This is a moderated newsgroup
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for the discussion of airliners. More precisely, the charter, taken
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from the CFV, is as follows:
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A moderated discussion group on airliner technology: the design,
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construction, performance, human factors, operation, and histories
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of transport-category airplanes.
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MODERATION POLICY
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---------- ------
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The moderation policy will in general be to post most articles as they
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are submitted, rejecting articles only if they are redundant or mostly
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content-free (a flood of random conjecture after a crash, for example)
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or inappropriate to the charter of the group. I expect to process new
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submissions at least once per day, except occasional weekends and major
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holidays. If I anticipate longer delays I'll send a note to the group
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and, when appropriate, arrange a backup moderator.
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SUBMISSIONS
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-----------
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Submissions for the newsgroup should be sent to
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airliners@chicago.com
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If your newsreader properly supports posting to moderated newsgroups
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(and your mailpaths file is correctly configured) you may prefer to
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post articles -- this should have the same effect as sending mail to
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the above address, with the added benefit of preserving some of the
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reference information for those using threaded newsreaders.
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Administrative questions pertaining to the group should be sent to
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airliners-admin@chicago.com
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ARCHIVES
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--------
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Several archives will be maintained and made available for anonymous
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ftp. Further details will be posted within the next few weeks.
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MAILING LIST
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------- ----
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A mailing list form of the group is also being considered for people
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lacking access to Usenet. As with the archives, details will be
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posted when they are available.
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CREDITS
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-------
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Many thanks are due to Robert Dorsett, who organized and ran the vote
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and without whose perseverence this group would probably still be a
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topic for idle dinner e-mail. Thanks, too, to the 168 people who
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voted fror the group. (I'll refrain from any Bronx cheer to the 26
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naysayers -- at least they voted!)
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And thanks in advance to all of you eager contributors -- I'm eagerly
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awaiting the first article!
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--
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Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com
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1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls
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QUAYLE IS A BOZOE |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA
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"I never vote for anyone. I always vote against." (W. C. Fields)
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From kls Tue Nov 17 03:10:31 1992
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Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
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Path: news
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From: bowen@comlab.oxford.ac.uk (Jonathan Bowen)
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Subject: TV programme on 777
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Message-ID: <airliners.1992.2@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Reply-To: Jonathan.Bowen@prg.oxford.ac.uk (Jonathan Bowen)
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Organization: Programming Research Group, Oxford University, UK
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X-Original-Message-Id: <1992Nov16.121654.13087@topaz.comlab.ox.ac.uk>
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Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Date: Mon, 16 Nov 1992 12:16:54 GMT
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Last night (Sunday 15 Nov), Channel 4 broadcast a TV programme on the
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production of the new Boeing 777 airplane in the Equinox series in the
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UK. Unfortunately I only saw the last 5 minutes of the programme. Would
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anyone who saw the whole programme like to provide a summary in this
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forum? In particular, I would be interested to hear if any mention was
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made of the fly-by-wire and safety aspects of the plane.
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--
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Jonathan Bowen, <Jonathan.Bowen@comlab.ox.ac.uk>
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Oxford University Computing Laboratory.
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From kls Wed Nov 18 00:26:01 1992
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Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
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Path: news
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From: cid@athena.mit.edu (Derek H Cedillo)
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Subject: 747 engine mounts
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Message-ID: <airliners.1992.3@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Organization: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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X-Original-Message-Id: <1992Nov16.042657.19926@athena.mit.edu>
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Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Date: Mon, 16 Nov 1992 04:26:57 GMT
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I would like to merely offer up a first topic for discussion.
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Boeing and the FAA have conducted fuse pin inspections on
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the 747 fleet. A few of these inspections found cracked
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pins, and quite a few found a large amount of corrosion.
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Inspections have been expanded to include the engine mount
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pylons. What Im looking for is some specs on the shear yeilding of these
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pins and and the stuctural integrity of the pylons.
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Thanks a bunch,
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Derek
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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"There Are Two Great Tragedies In Life,
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One Is Not To Get Your Heart's Desire.
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The Other Is To Get It.
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-Bernard Shaw
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--[20968]--
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From kls Wed Nov 18 00:26:05 1992
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Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
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Path: news
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From: jerry@telecom.ksu.edu (Jerry Anderson)
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Subject: Boeing 747-300
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Message-ID: <airliners.1992.4@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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X-Original-Message-Id: <9211171641.AA06619@pawnee.telecom.ksu.edu>
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Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Date: Tue, 17 Nov 92 10:41:51 CST
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Is the Boeing 747-300 the largest commercial passenger aircraft
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in the world? Is the -300 the latest version, or are there
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newer, possibly larger stretched versions of the 747?
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I've heard Boeing, McDonnell-Douglas and Airbus all have plans
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in the works for Really Big Planes in the 600-700 passenger,
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7500-8000 mile range. Does anyone know if these planes are
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really going to get built, or is this the usual "if we can
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pre-sell a couple of hundred, maybe we'll really build it?"
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Does anyone have model numbers, specs (passengers, range), or
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projected delivery dates? These numbers come from memory, and
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I have no faith in them at all:
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Company Model Delivery
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------- ------ --------
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McDonnell-Douglas MD-11 1993
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Airbus AE-400 1994
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Boeing 777 1995-6
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--
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jerry@telecom.ksu.edu Jerry Anderson
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Kansas State University
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vox: (913) 532-6936 Telecommunications
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fax: (913) 532-7114 Manhattan KS 66506
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From kls Wed Nov 18 01:42:59 1992
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Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
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Path: news
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From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz)
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Subject: Re: Boeing 747-300
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References: <airliners.1992.4@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Message-ID: <airliners.1992.5@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Organization: Chicago Software Works
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X-Original-Message-ID: <1992Nov18.094020.12550@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 09:40:20 GMT
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In article <airliners.1992.4@ohare.Chicago.COM> jerry@telecom.ksu.edu (Jerry Anderson) writes:
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>Is the Boeing 747-300 the largest commercial passenger aircraft
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>in the world? Is the -300 the latest version, or are there
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>newer, possibly larger stretched versions of the 747?
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The 747-300 is simply a -200 with an Extended Upper Deck, which allows
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greater seating. The only 747 model currently being produced is the
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747-400, which shares the same fuselage dimensions as the -300 version
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and visually is quite similar, the most noticeable difference being
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winglets at the wingtips and subtle engine differences. Internally,
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the -400 is a *very* different aircraft, including a two-person cockpit
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and new, more powerful, and more fuel efficient engines. MGTOW is up
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to at least 870,000 from 833,000 for the -200/-300 models and range is
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substantially increased as well.
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Unless the Russians have something which I've missed, the 747-400 is
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easily the largest commercial passenger aircraft in terms of number of
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seats and payload. Its range is also the greatest of anything now in
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service, though the Airbus A340 will exceed it once it enters service
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next year.
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>I've heard Boeing, McDonnell-Douglas and Airbus all have plans
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>in the works for Really Big Planes in the 600-700 passenger,
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>7500-8000 mile range. Does anyone know if these planes are
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>really going to get built, or is this the usual "if we can
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>pre-sell a couple of hundred, maybe we'll really build it?"
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No manufacturer (well, except for Airbus) would build a new aircraft
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just for grins. If they have tangible demand in the form of orders
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they'll build it, if not, they won't. Given the current state of the
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airline industry major new orders aren't likely in the near future.
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> McDonnell-Douglas MD-11 1993
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> Airbus AE-400 1994
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> Boeing 777 1995-6
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All three of these are much smaller than what you're thinking of.
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Here are the important parameters for these three plus the 747-400
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for comparison. Seating is for a "typical" three-class cabin and
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service is the date of first service; MGTOW is in US pounds.
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Mfr. Type MGTOW seating service
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Boeing 747-400 870,000 430 1989
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MacDAC MD-11 618,000 250 1991
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Airbus A-340 559,000 230 1993
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Boeing 777 515,000 ~220 1995
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In the 600+ passenger market, Boeing has talked about both further
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stretches of the 747 and an entirely new aircraft, sometimes using
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the N650 moniker. McDonnell-Douglas has most recently talked about
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the MD-12 -- once yet another stretch of the MD-11 -- as a new and
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much larger aircraft, also in the 600+ passenger category. Airbus
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has said that if there is demand and/or if Boeing builds such an
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aircraft, Airbus will build one too. The name A600 or maybe A2000
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seems vaguely familiar though I can't locate any references.
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--
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Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com
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1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls
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QUAYLE IS A BOZOE |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA
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"I never vote for anyone. I always vote against." (W. C. Fields)
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From kls Wed Nov 18 10:21:47 1992
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Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
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Path: news
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From: sdl@linus.mitre.org
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Subject: hydraulic problems with DC-10's??
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Message-ID: <airliners.1992.6@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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X-Original-Message-Id: <9211181502.AA03545@rigel.mitre.org>
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Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Date: Wed, 18 Nov 92 10:02:08 -0500
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Great new newsgroup!
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Perhaps now I can get a more definitive answer to the following:
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Some of my pilot friends have accused the DC-10 as having a
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particularly bad history of hydraulic problems (which have contributed
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to a few crashes). But do the statistics really support the notion
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that the DC-10 really has a significantly worse safety record than
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other wide-body jets, or is this just a myth? Also, have all these
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hydraulic problems been corrected, or does the DC-10 still suffer from
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hydraulic problems even today?
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From kls Wed Nov 18 22:58:13 1992
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Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
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Path: news
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From: lomasm@t9.cs.man.ac.uk (Martin Lomas)
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Subject: Re: TV programme on 777
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References: <airliners.1992.2@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Message-ID: <airliners.1992.7@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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X-Original-Message-Id: <lomasm.722115579@p4.cs.man.ac.uk>
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Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Date: 18 Nov 92 19:39:39 GMT
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In <airliners.1992.2@ohare.Chicago.COM> bowen@comlab.oxford.ac.uk (Jonathan Bowen) writes:
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>Last night (Sunday 15 Nov), Channel 4 broadcast a TV programme on the
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>production of the new Boeing 777 airplane in the Equinox series in the
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>UK. Unfortunately I only saw the last 5 minutes of the programme. Would
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>anyone who saw the whole programme like to provide a summary in this
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>forum? In particular, I would be interested to hear if any mention was
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>made of the fly-by-wire and safety aspects of the plane.
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>--
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>Jonathan Bowen, <Jonathan.Bowen@comlab.ox.ac.uk>
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>Oxford University Computing Laboratory.
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OK, here goes (and without the aid of a video recorder! :-):
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New Boeing 777 and its design. The program concentrated on the
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general aspects of how the whole thing is put together - ie:
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need, management, tools used, some financial. Hard technical
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details were scant.
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Boeing need a plane that is bigger than their 757 and 767 yet smaller
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than the 747. With latest design, the 777 will be smaller than the
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747 yet carry nearly the same number of passengers. Pressure from
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customers and competition from Airbus and McDonnald Douglas. Large
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order from American Airlines and others prompted the design start.
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Production aircraft by 1995(?).
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Large mainframe cluster (IBM!) being used for all drawings (CAD) work
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with stress analysis to let engineers reduce component weight ('safely')
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where possible. A full size mockup to test whether all components will
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fit together will not be needed (as made for previous planes) due to
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computer design checks. (Component clashes checked and highlighted.)
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International manufacturing: Electronics from UK, rudder from Australia,
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various (large) sections from Europe, and all assembled at Boeing's now
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being built plant in America.
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Some design decisions shown: Use of Aluminium-Lithium alloy -- strong
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and light but cracks when drilled. However, the cracks don't propagate
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and so are safe. Reluctantly rejected due to engineers' fears of cracks
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and possible confusion over what parts must be crack free and where
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cracks are 'ok'.
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Safety: Issue of doors mentioned -- trade many doors against plane
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too heavy, so compromise. Doors must open even with quarter inch
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ice sealing them shut. Good demonstration showing their intended
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design works. (Big freezer, idiot in there sprays on water, big party
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next day to see the door break open.)
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Cost compromises: None made where the plane's flyability is concerned,
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possible compromises for such as crash survivabilty and other cases.
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Concentrate efforts to AVOID crashes. Anyway, bad for business
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if your plane falls out of the sky!
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Fly by wire briefly explained. Safety issues NOT covered. Only advantages
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of better fuel economy and smoother flight mentioned. Implied weight
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savings due to easier mechanics. Intended fly-by-wire system currently
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being tested on a 757 with dual control systems (mechanical and the FBW).
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Hundreds of real flights being performed. Some mention given to making
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the controls similar to existing planes so the pilots can be easily trained
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for the plane. Control ergonomics reviewed by test pilots to great detail
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(focus in on 'that knob doesn't click nicely when switching between
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settings -- make it click better...').
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Two engines only on the plane -- one adequate for flight across the
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Atlantic. Engine reliabilty relied upon. Customer engineers allowed
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to review the new engines for servicing and to make mods.
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Customers allowed into (some) of the Boeing meetings to discuss the
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777's design and to suggest mods. 'Open management' strategy.
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Main thrust of the program was the huge cost and complexity of the
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task of producing a new aircraft to tight schedules. Management
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style/issues covered much more than the technical issues.
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Good documentary very much in the 'Skyscraper' style that this film
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company first produced.
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Any other critics out there?
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Martin.
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From kls Wed Nov 18 22:58:17 1992
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Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
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Path: news
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From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz)
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Subject: Re: hydraulic problems with DC-10's??
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References: <airliners.1992.6@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Message-ID: <airliners.1992.8@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Organization: Chicago Software Works
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X-Original-Message-ID: <1992Nov18.205005.13733@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 20:50:05 GMT
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In article <airliners.1992.6@ohare.Chicago.COM> sdl@linus.mitre.org writes:
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>Some of my pilot friends have accused the DC-10 as having a
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>particularly bad history of hydraulic problems (which have
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>contributed to a few crashes).
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Two, at least. AA 191 at Chicago/O'Hare on May 25, 1979, and UA 232
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at Sioux City, Iowa on July 19, 1989. The Turkish Airlines crash near
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Paris on March 3, 1974 helped set up UA 232 though I'm never seen any
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reference to the hydraulics as being contributory to that crash.
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>But do the statistics really support the notion that the DC-10 really
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>has a significantly worse safety record than other wide-body jets, or
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>is this just a myth?
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After the A320 crash at Strasbourg early this year I saw something
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that said the A320 had overtaken the DC-10 as having the worst safety
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record of any large jetliner and that both were an order of magnitude
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worse than the third-place contender. I really wish I could find the
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reference, but alas, I can't. I don't recall the metrics used, and
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one could certainly debate the statistical validity given the small
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samples involved.
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Another view is to look at the number of airworthiness directives (AD)
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issued by the FAA in the US for the DC-10 versus its contemporaries.
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As of January 1, 1982, the DC-10 had 148, far ahead of Boeing's 747
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with 57 and Lockheed's L-1011 with 51. The FAA clearly found a lot
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more to worry about in the DC-10.
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Probably the best general interest discussion of the DC-10 and all its
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problems is in The Sporty Game, by John Newhouse (Alfred A. Knopf, New
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York, 1982). Chapter 5 in particular goes into great detail, though
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it of course predates the Sioux City crash.
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>Also, have all these hydraulic problems been corrected, or does the
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>DC-10 still suffer from hydraulic problems even today?
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The DC-10 (and the MD-11) haven't "suffered" from them recently,
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though the problems still exist. Fundamentally, the DC-10's hydraulic
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system shortcomings as compared to the 747 and L-1011 are that there
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are only three, instead of four, giving less redundancy, and they tend
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to be routed together so that something which affect one probably will
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affect all three. Boeing and Lockheed (and I believe Airbus) used
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three hydraulic systems in any one area of the plane, providing the
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mandated redundancy, but used four overall so that a problem which
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caused the failure of all three systems in one part of the aircraft
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would still leave control in other areas via the intact fourth system.
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They also chose to route the three systems independently, again to
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minimize the possibility of complete failure.
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As mentioned, I don't believe the Paris crash involved the hydraulics,
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but it did lead McDonnell-Douglas to relocate the control cables and
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hydraulics from under the cabin floor, where the cables had been
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severed by a collapsing floor, to the top of the cabin. This simply
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left them vulnerable to a different failure mode -- demonstrated 15
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years later when the fan on UA 232's #2 engine disintigrated and sent
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shrapnel through the top of the aft fuselage, including all three of
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those hydraulic lines. Clearly a more reasonable solution would have
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been to move only *some* of the lines after the Paris crash, but this
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was not done and has not been done since, though some check valves
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were added to minimize the impact.
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The vulnerable location of the hydraulics at the leading edge of the
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wing, instead of a mid-wing and/or trailing edge location as used by
|
|
other manufacturers, precipitated the Chicago crash, and the lack of
|
|
any mechanical locking mechanism to prevent uncommanded flap retrac-
|
|
tion also played a significant part. (The largest blame was placed
|
|
on American Airlines for improper maintenance practices, though the
|
|
airframe certainly received its share of blame.) While I believe the
|
|
locking mechanism was later added, nothing was done about the routing
|
|
of the hydraulics. Indeed, American requested a modification kit to
|
|
move the hydraulics and was willing to pay for it, but McDonnell-
|
|
Douglas refused.
|
|
|
|
I'll leave you to draw your own conclusions, but I certainly do not
|
|
feel comfortable flying on the DC-10, even though I've flown on them
|
|
many times. I fly SFO-ORD somewhat often and do my best to catch one
|
|
of the 747 flights United offers or a 757.
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com
|
|
1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls
|
|
|Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA
|
|
Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Nov 18 22:58:17 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: Helen Trillian Rose <hrose@eff.org>
|
|
Subject: Re: Boeing 747-300
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.4@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
<airliners.1992.5@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.9@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Original-Message-Id: <199211182226.AA03203@rocza.eff.org>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 17:26:36 -0500
|
|
|
|
Karl> == Karl Swartz <kls@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
|
|
[....]
|
|
|
|
Karl> Mfr. Type MGTOW seating service
|
|
Karl> Boeing 747-400 870,000 430 1989
|
|
Karl> MacDAC MD-11 618,000 250 1991
|
|
Karl> Airbus A-340 559,000 230 1993
|
|
Karl> Boeing 777 515,000 ~220 1995
|
|
|
|
I hadn't thought the B777 was going to be in between the 757 (~200) and
|
|
767 (~250) passengers. I thought it was going to fill the niche between
|
|
the 767 and the 747 -- about the size of the old 747SP in number of
|
|
seats. The 777 is a widebody as wide as the 747's (3-4-3 seating in
|
|
economy) and was meant to fill the market left wide open by the L-1011
|
|
and DC-10 trijets (one big reason why it has optional folding wingtips:
|
|
to fit into a DC-10 gate).
|
|
|
|
Karl> In the 600+ passenger market, Boeing has talked about both
|
|
Karl> further stretches of the 747 and an entirely new aircraft,
|
|
Karl> sometimes using the N650 moniker. McDonnell-Douglas has most
|
|
Karl> recently talked about the MD-12 -- once yet another stretch of
|
|
Karl> the MD-11 -- as a new and much larger aircraft, also in the 600+
|
|
Karl> passenger category.
|
|
|
|
McDonnell Douglas has put a hold on the MD-12 for lack of financing
|
|
(lets face it, would *you* get into bed with a company that produced the
|
|
DC-10?).
|
|
|
|
Karl> Airbus has said that if there is demand and/or if Boeing builds
|
|
Karl> such an aircraft, Airbus will build one too. The name A600 or
|
|
Karl> maybe A2000 seems vaguely familiar though I can't locate any
|
|
Karl> references.
|
|
|
|
Only Airbus would create a plane just to compete with Boeing. Just
|
|
imagine, Europe, your tax money is going to support the egos of a bunch
|
|
of political types. And inciting fear in any airliner fan. What a
|
|
worthwhile task.
|
|
|
|
--Helen
|
|
--
|
|
Helen Trillian Rose <hrose@eff.org, hrose@kei.com>
|
|
Electronic Frontier Foundation email eff@eff.org for EFF Info
|
|
Kapor Enterprises, Inc. Flames to:
|
|
Systems and Networks Administration women-not-to-be-messed-with@eff.org
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Nov 18 23:21:58 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz)
|
|
Subject: Re: Boeing 747-300
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.4@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.5@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.9@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.10@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Chicago Software Works
|
|
X-Original-Message-ID: <1992Nov19.072012.14608@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 07:20:12 GMT
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.9@ohare.Chicago.COM> Helen Trillian Rose <hrose@eff.org> writes:
|
|
Karl> == Karl Swartz <kls@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
|
|
Karl> Mfr. Type MGTOW seating service
|
|
Karl> Boeing 747-400 870,000 430 1989
|
|
Karl> MacDAC MD-11 618,000 250 1991
|
|
Karl> Airbus A-340 559,000 230 1993
|
|
Karl> Boeing 777 515,000 ~220 1995
|
|
|
|
>I hadn't thought the B777 was going to be in between the 757 (~200) and
|
|
>767 (~250) passengers. I thought it was going to fill the niche between
|
|
>the 767 and the 747 -- about the size of the old 747SP in number of
|
|
>seats.
|
|
|
|
Sorry, that was a typo. The correct number should be 290. Note,
|
|
though, that I said a *three* class configuration, since the topic
|
|
was long-range aircraft. A 757 is in the 185 to 195 range with only
|
|
two classes; 250 is the right ballpark for a two class 767-300. The
|
|
smaller 767-200 is just over 200 with two classes, not much bigger than
|
|
the 757. With three classes, a 767-200 is aroung 165 to 170 while the
|
|
767-300 is about 210 to 220.
|
|
|
|
In the case of the 777, the only numbers I have handy are for United's
|
|
two class configuration, which has 38+325 for a total of 363 seats. I
|
|
tried to extrapolate from that number and the ratio of seats on United's
|
|
two and three class 767-200s.
|
|
|
|
>The 777 ... was meant to fill the market left wide open by the L-1011
|
|
>and DC-10 trijets (one big reason why it has optional folding wingtips:
|
|
>to fit into a DC-10 gate).
|
|
|
|
True, though it ended up significantly larger than either. (Using the
|
|
United configs again, 363 seats vs. 298 on a DC-10-30 with a below-deck
|
|
galley.)
|
|
|
|
As for the foldings wingtips, nobody has yet ordered them. I wonder
|
|
just what they intend to do with all those not-quite-big-enough gates?!
|
|
|
|
>McDonnell Douglas has put a hold on the MD-12 for lack of financing
|
|
>(lets face it, would *you* get into bed with a company that produced the
|
|
>DC-10?).
|
|
|
|
I doubt the DC-10 has much to do with it, since the MD-11 has been
|
|
selling well enough. They simply found themselves in a Catch-22: they
|
|
couldn't raise the cash without any firm orders and couldn't get any
|
|
firm orders without a reasonable expectation of the financing falling
|
|
into place. Their poor financial condition of course means they can't
|
|
finance it themselves as Boeing could, which greatly complicates the
|
|
whole matter.
|
|
|
|
Actually, even if they had the financing they probably couldn't get
|
|
the orders given the current economic situation, and this is exactly
|
|
what they've said in their announcement of delaying the MD-12.
|
|
|
|
>Only Airbus would create a plane just to compete with Boeing.
|
|
|
|
Hmmm ... seems to me McDonnell-Douglas with the DC-10 and Lockheed
|
|
with the L-1011 were pretty bullheaded about going ahead simply to
|
|
compete with each other, knowing full well that with the orders split
|
|
neither one could really succeed! 8-)
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com
|
|
1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls
|
|
|Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA
|
|
Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Nov 19 03:44:49 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard)
|
|
Subject: Re: Boeing 747-300
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.4@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.11@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Boeing
|
|
X-Original-Message-Id: <9211190615.AA02738@bcstec.ca.boeing.com>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 92 22:15:02 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.4@ohare.Chicago.COM> jerry@telecom.ksu.edu (Jerry And
|
|
erson) writes:
|
|
>Is the Boeing 747-300 the largest commercial passenger aircraft
|
|
>in the world? Is the -300 the latest version, or are there
|
|
>newer, possibly larger stretched versions of the 747?
|
|
|
|
No, actually, I believe the 747-400 is currently the largest production
|
|
passenger aircraft in the world. Wingspan of 211' and max takeoff weight
|
|
of 870,000lb, I believe. Not that I do Everett products... :-)
|
|
|
|
>I've heard Boeing, McDonnell-Douglas and Airbus all have plans
|
|
>in the works for Really Big Planes in the 600-700 passenger,
|
|
>7500-8000 mile range. Does anyone know if these planes are
|
|
>really going to get built, or is this the usual "if we can
|
|
>pre-sell a couple of hundred, maybe we'll really build it?"
|
|
>Does anyone have model numbers, specs (passengers, range), or
|
|
>projected delivery dates?
|
|
|
|
The Boeing and the Airbus offerings in this market seem to both hover
|
|
around 600 seats and 7,000 mile range. Takeoff weights in the million
|
|
pound plus range. The anticipated market, as described by John Hayhurst,
|
|
Director of New Large Airplane Division, is only a couple hundred airplanes
|
|
TOTAL. From my knothole, it looks like a prestige fight. But there are a
|
|
lot of interesting questions that must be answered before anyone will build
|
|
one of these monsters.
|
|
|
|
> These numbers come from memory, and
|
|
>I have no faith in them at all:
|
|
|
|
Rightly so. :-)
|
|
|
|
> Company Model Delivery
|
|
> ------- ------ --------
|
|
> McDonnell-Douglas MD-11 1993
|
|
|
|
I think you'll find that the MD-11 has been delivering since 1990. Very
|
|
nice airplane overall. My writer flew on one to Europe, he liked it
|
|
better than the 767. :-) It is probably the MD-12 that you have in mind.
|
|
It is on hold until somebody comes up with $2Begabucks to finance the
|
|
development.
|
|
|
|
> Airbus AE-400 1994
|
|
|
|
You may be thinking of the A-340, which should certainly be delivering by
|
|
then. I think it is the A-350 that is the number being kicked about for
|
|
their UHCA (Ultra High Capacity Aircraft).
|
|
|
|
> Boeing 777 1995-6
|
|
|
|
Pretty close. March '95 sticks in my mind for some reason, but I'm not
|
|
that familiar with the 777's schedule. My wife probably knows... :-)
|
|
|
|
Terry
|
|
drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Nov 19 21:46:59 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: Pete Mellor <pm@cs.city.ac.uk>
|
|
Subject: Re: TV programme on 777
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.12@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Original-Message-Id: <3891.9211191222@csrsun8.cs.city.ac.uk>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 92 12:22:53 GMT
|
|
|
|
Jonathan,
|
|
|
|
> Would anyone who saw the whole programme like to provide a
|
|
> brief summary in this forum?
|
|
|
|
(A slightly more temperate response to your question! :-)
|
|
|
|
The programme concentrated mainly on the design of the airframe, and the use
|
|
of CAD systems to do this. It described how the structural calculations and
|
|
spatial arrangement of components could be handled using 3-D movable graphics.
|
|
The design system was intended to be "paperless", with electronic transfer of
|
|
designs between engineers' workstations, instead of blue-prints being dropped
|
|
in in-trays.
|
|
|
|
Examples of the sort of problems they were shown tackling were "What weight
|
|
of metal can we drill out of this structure and still leave it strong enough
|
|
to bear the stress?", and "When the kitchen door opens, does it hit the knees
|
|
of the first-cklass passengers?".
|
|
|
|
There was quite a bit of time devoted to the design of the doors, with a
|
|
management requirement to have them all identical to cut production costs,
|
|
and the design problems this entailed. The poor old designer took three months
|
|
to solve this one first time round, under pressure from what the manager
|
|
described as a "management ploy". ("Well, if *you* can't do it, which
|
|
consultant do you suggest we bring in to solve it for you?") On the second
|
|
version of the design, the problem of door uniformity was solved in a few
|
|
weeks, and by the third iteration it was down to a few days.
|
|
|
|
It definitely did have the feel of a "Boeing commercial" about it, with lots
|
|
of "gee-whizz" shots of designers manipulating computer graphics, and
|
|
anecdotes of the "Yes, of course we had problems, but just look how we learned
|
|
to overcome them!" variety. (See the door problem above.)
|
|
|
|
It was an interesting programme, but I was disappointed to find only one
|
|
passing reference to the flight control systems, having originally watched
|
|
it in the hope of learning about Boeing's approach to fly-by-computer.
|
|
|
|
Pete
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Nov 19 21:47:01 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: hoyme@src.honeywell.com (Ken Hoyme)
|
|
Subject: Re: Boeing 747-300
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.4@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
<airliners.1992.5@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.13@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Honeywell Systems & Research Center, Mpls. MN, USA.
|
|
X-Original-Message-Id: <HOYME.92Nov19093539@schrodinger.src.honeywell.com>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 15:35:39 GMT
|
|
|
|
(I posted this yesterday, but our mailer had problems with finding where
|
|
to send for this moderated newsgroup. I have been told this has been
|
|
fixed. I see that other follow-ups have occured as well, but there is
|
|
some information in here that wasn't covered. Rather than editing this,
|
|
I am sending it on as originally written.)
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.5@ohare.Chicago.COM> kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) writes:
|
|
|
|
> In article <airliners.1992.4@ohare.Chicago.COM> jerry@telecom.ksu.edu (Jerry Anderson) writes:
|
|
|
|
> Unless the Russians have something which I've missed, the 747-400 is
|
|
> easily the largest commercial passenger aircraft in terms of number of
|
|
> seats and payload. Its range is also the greatest of anything now in
|
|
> service, though the Airbus A340 will exceed it once it enters service
|
|
> next year.
|
|
|
|
According to the "Commercial Airliners of the World" section of the
|
|
21-27 October 1992 issue of Flight International, the largest Russian
|
|
transport is the Ilyushin II-86 Camber with a maximum seating of 350. I
|
|
noticed that the max. seating estimates for the other airplanes were for
|
|
sardine configurations, so I have to assume that this is not a 3-class
|
|
estimate. (Ex: 747-400 with max seating of 660?? That's cramped!)
|
|
|
|
>> McDonnell-Douglas MD-11 1993
|
|
>> Airbus AE-400 1994
|
|
>> Boeing 777 1995-6
|
|
|
|
> All three of these are much smaller than what you're thinking of.
|
|
> Here are the important parameters for these three plus the 747-400
|
|
> for comparison. Seating is for a "typical" three-class cabin and
|
|
> service is the date of first service; MGTOW is in US pounds.
|
|
|
|
> Mfr. Type MGTOW seating service
|
|
> Boeing 747-400 870,000 430 1989
|
|
> MacDAC MD-11 618,000 250 1991
|
|
> Airbus A-340 559,000 230 1993
|
|
> Boeing 777 515,000 ~220 1995
|
|
|
|
My data for the 777-200 is 3-class seating of 320, with a stretch
|
|
version planned with 3-class seating in the 360-390 range. United
|
|
ordered the 320 seat version according to AvWeek Oct. 22, 1990.
|
|
|
|
According to AvWeek Nov. 4, 1991, the A-340-300 will have a 3-class
|
|
seating configuration of 295, and the A340-200 will be shorter with 262
|
|
seats.
|
|
|
|
> In the 600+ passenger market, Boeing has talked about both further
|
|
> stretches of the 747 and an entirely new aircraft, sometimes using
|
|
> the N650 moniker. McDonnell-Douglas has most recently talked about
|
|
> the MD-12 -- once yet another stretch of the MD-11 -- as a new and
|
|
> much larger aircraft, also in the 600+ passenger category. Airbus
|
|
> has said that if there is demand and/or if Boeing builds such an
|
|
> aircraft, Airbus will build one too. The name A600 or maybe A2000
|
|
> seems vaguely familiar though I can't locate any references.
|
|
|
|
Boeing is considering three configurations for their "New Large Airplane
|
|
(NLA)" A 747 stretch, a double deck 747 and a totally new double decker.
|
|
3 class seats range from 484-612. See AvWeek Jan 6, 1992 for a
|
|
description of these options.
|
|
|
|
An Oct. 28, 1991 AvWeek article covers Airbus's studies on large
|
|
airplane configurations. That article confusingly talks about the
|
|
ASX-700, but shows an artists concept with an A2000 on the tail. 600
|
|
3-class seats in a double deck configuration.
|
|
|
|
I have also heard that Boeing will build theirs if Airbus launches. I
|
|
suspect both are eying the market and hoping to delay the investment as
|
|
long as possible, given the current economic climate. If one decides
|
|
the go-ahead, the other will have to launch defensively to prevent the
|
|
other from capturing the market. I hope this won't be another fiasco
|
|
like the DC-10/L-1011 developments, where each captured enough of the
|
|
market to keep the other from making any money. Lockheed got out of the
|
|
business, and some have questioned whether MDAC has ever really
|
|
recovered from that.
|
|
|
|
Ken
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
Ken Hoyme Honeywell Systems and Research Center
|
|
(612)951-7354 3660 Technology Dr., Minneapolis, MN 55418
|
|
Internet: hoyme@src.honeywell.com
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Nov 19 21:47:01 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: bentson@CS.ColoState.EDU (Randolph Bentson)
|
|
Subject: Re: TV programme on 777
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.2@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.7@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.14@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Colorado State University, Computer Science Department
|
|
X-Original-Message-ID: <Nov19.163031.47683@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 16:30:31 GMT
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.7@ohare.Chicago.COM> lomasm@t9.cs.man.ac.uk
|
|
(Martin Lomas) writes:
|
|
>...
|
|
>Fly by wire briefly explained.
|
|
>...
|
|
>Any other critics out there?
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
>Martin.
|
|
>
|
|
|
|
-NOT FROM THE SHOW-
|
|
|
|
Boeing is _very_ reluctant to use fly-by-wire. Management
|
|
trusts computer solutions no more than members of this forum. I
|
|
got the impression that this system has a pilot override as part
|
|
of it's basic design. (A sort of "do what I say, not what you
|
|
think I want" mode.)
|
|
|
|
One interesting feature is the networking of non-flight related
|
|
computers. Planes will have an internet that will also link
|
|
link to ground stations, satellites, and other planes. They
|
|
will have the ability to do significant book-work while in the
|
|
air. Flight crews will be able to order maintenance and
|
|
consumables, weather and traffic information can be exchanged,
|
|
etc. It's likely there will be a network for passangers-- a big
|
|
step forward from airphone.
|
|
|
|
Boeing recently moved a great number of folks (on the order of
|
|
5000) that were scattered south of Seattle to a new facility in
|
|
Everett, Washington (about 50 miles north). They did it on the
|
|
week-end so as not to disrupt anybody's work. They figure this
|
|
will enhance communication among folks working.
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Randolph Bentson Colorado State University
|
|
bentson@CS.ColoState.Edu Computer Science Department
|
|
303/491-5792 Ft. Collins, CO 80523
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Nov 19 22:46:21 1992
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Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
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Path: news
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From: Christopher Davis <ckd@eff.org>
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Subject: Re: hydraulic problems with DC-10's??
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Message-ID: <airliners.1992.15@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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X-Original-Message-Id: <199211200503.AA03970@loiosh.eff.org>
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Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 00:03:12 -0500
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Karl> == Karl Swartz <kls@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Karl> Probably the best general interest discussion of the DC-10 and
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Karl> all its problems is in The Sporty Game, by John Newhouse (Alfred
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Karl> A. Knopf, New York, 1982). Chapter 5 in particular goes into
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Karl> great detail, though it of course predates the Sioux City crash.
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Other good books on the subject include Moira Johnston's _The Last Nine
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Minutes_ (which, being 1976, only discusses the Turkish Airlines
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Ermenonville crash and the Windsor "incident" which foreshadowed it) and
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John Nance's _Blind Trust_ (1986, also predating Sioux City). (The
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latter discusses many other air safety issues and incidents, including
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the Air Florida crash in Washington, DC in 1982.)
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_The Sporty Game_ tends to show its age in other areas as well; the dire
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predictions of market failure for the 747, 757, and 767 have not quite
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been borne out by intervening events :)
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From kls Fri Nov 20 02:04:38 1992
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Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
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Path: news
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From: Chijioke.Anyanwu@brunel.ac.uk (Chijioke D Anyanwu)
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Subject: Re: TV programme on 777
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References: <airliners.1992.2@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.7@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Message-ID: <airliners.1992.16@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Organization: Brunel University, West London, UK
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X-Original-Message-Id: <2666.9211200818@gassendi.brunel.ac.uk>
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X-Original-Message-ID: <By09px.21J@brunel.ac.uk>
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Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 08:17:55 GMT
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In article <airliners.1992.7@ohare.Chicago.COM>, lomasm@t9.cs.man.ac.uk (Martin Lomas) gives an excellent summary of last Sunday's Equinox on the 777 - I
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definitely couldn't have done better.
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He says
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>Customers allowed into (some) of the Boeing meetings to discuss the
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>777's design and to suggest mods. 'Open management' strategy.
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Specifically Lord King: BA will be a launch customer as will Emirates which is
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already advertising the fact.
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One thing which he omitted and which I found quite interesting was
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the amount of attention paid to the design of the toilet. Apparently,
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banging toilet seats tend to cause some passengers some amount of distress
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(thoughts of bombs going off?) and so a virtually noiseless toilet seat and
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cover were designed.
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Although as Martin pointed out FBW safety issues were not covered
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(something which I had rather expected in view of all the controversy
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surrounding the A320), the programme really was a fascinating insight
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into modern aircraft design and development.
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Chijioke.
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From kls Sat Nov 21 03:55:53 1992
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Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
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Path: news
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From: Mohamed Ishaq <mishaq@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
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Subject: Info on the El-Al Plane crash
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Message-ID: <airliners.1992.17@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Reply-To: Mohamed Ishaq <mishaq@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
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X-Original-Message-Id: <Pine.2.4.9211201205.A6611@louie.cc.utexas.edu>
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Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 12:50:48 -0600 (CST)
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I am looking for information on the El-Al 747-200 plane crash in the
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Netherlands on Oct 4, 1992. I am planning on writing a report on the
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application of non-destructive testing to engine mount fuse pins and am
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analyzing the Boeing SB related to this crash and the China Airlines one
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earlier this year.
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I found your address on the user-net : sci.aeronautics.airliners. Once I
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complete my report I will be more than happy to post it the network.
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Thanks
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Mohamed Ishaq - mishaq@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu
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P.O. Box 8171
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Austin, TX 78713-8171
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Tel: 512-472-9290
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P.S. I kind of need this info ASAP
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From kls Sat Nov 21 03:55:56 1992
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Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
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Path: news
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From: Robert Dorsett <rdd@cactus.org>
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Subject: Re: TV programme on 777
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Message-ID: <airliners.1992.18@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Reply-To: rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu
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X-Original-Message-Id: <CMM.0.90.2.722295999.rdd@cactus.org>
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Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Date: Fri, 20 Nov 92 15:46:39 CST
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In article <airliners.1992.14@ohare.Chicago.COM> bentson@CS.ColoState.EDU (Randolph Bentson) writes:
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>Boeing is _very_ reluctant to use fly-by-wire. Management
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>trusts computer solutions no more than members of this forum. I
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>got the impression that this system has a pilot override as part
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>of it's basic design. (A sort of "do what I say, not what you
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>think I want" mode.)
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As I understand it, the FBW system is the only way the pilots can signal
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the actuators. Boeing is simply providing a "conventional" control law and
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interface, with "protections" that can be over-ridden by the pilot, if
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necessary. Redundancy/backup is at the hardware level, not in alternate
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select modes.
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So, rather than a simple joystick, Boeing's "simulating" a conventional
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interface, with feedback, in the cockpit cab: each control column inter-
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connected with the other, each providing tactile feedback. The FBW is there,
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one way or the other.
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On the other hand, I do think it's a positive step that Boeing's not "re-
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writing" the book by offering *artificial* control laws, as Airbus is doing.
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Thus, to override the protections, the pilots just need to push or pull
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*harder,* or click an overrride button: they don't have to deal with or
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anticipate the effects of *four* distinct control law modes, and the many
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permutations within each mode, depending upon system status, as is the case
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with the A3[2-4]0.
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---
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Robert Dorsett
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rdd@cactus.org
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...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd
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From kls Sat Nov 21 03:55:57 1992
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Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
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Path: news
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From: sfg2483@uxa.cso.uiuc.edu (sfg2483 )
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Subject: Manufacturer responsibility?
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Message-ID: <airliners.1992.19@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Organization: University of Illinois at Urbana
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X-Original-Message-Id: <By1tLC.7Av@news.cso.uiuc.edu>
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Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Date: Sat, 21 Nov 1992 04:24:47 GMT
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Does anyone know if a manufacturer (e.g., Boeing) is responsible financially
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for the results of an airplane crash if the crash is proven to be caused by
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a faulty part it made? (E.g., a bad design of pins in the 747).
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sfg2483@uxa.cso.uiuc.edu
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From kls Sat Nov 21 03:55:59 1992
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Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
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Path: news
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From: rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu (Robert Dorsett)
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Subject: The DC-10 Case
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Message-ID: <airliners.1992.20@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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X-Original-Message-Id: <9211210611.AA25114@rascal.ics.utexas.edu>
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Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Date: Sat, 21 Nov 92 00:11:55 CST
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Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics,rec.travel.air
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From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett)
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Subject: The DC-10 Case (non-review)
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Date: Fri, 9 Oct 1992 06:16:16 GMT
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Ran across this. It looks like a nice little anthology, covering many aspects
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of the DC-10. Probably worth it for the NTSB reports alone ($20 each from
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NTIS). I haven't read the more "thematic" articles, though, and no
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endorsement is meant or implied.
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--------------------
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Title: The DC-10 Case
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Subtitle: A study in applied ethics, technology, and society.
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Editors: John H. Fielder and Douglas Birsch
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Publisher: State University of New York Press
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Date: 1992
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Pages: 346
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ISBN: 0-7914-1087-0 (hardcover)
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0-7914-1088-9 (paper)
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Illustrated.
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CONTENTS:
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Preface
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Introduction
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Ethical Analysis of Case Studies/John H. Fielder
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HISTORY AND EARLY WARNINGS
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1. Regulatory and Institutional Framework
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2. High Risks, Sinking Fortunes/John Newhouse
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3. Floors, Doors, Latches and Locks/John Fielder
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4. The 1970 Ground Testing Incident/Paul Eddy, Elaine Potter,
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Bruce Page
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5. National Transportation Safety Board Report on the Windsor
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Incident
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6. The Applegate Memorandum/Paul Eddy, Elaine Potter, Bruce Page
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7. Fat, Dumb and Happy: The Failure of the FAA/Paul Eddy, Elaine
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Potter, Bruce Page
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8. Compliance with Service Bulletin SB 52-37
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9. Conclusions of the US Senate Oversight Hearings and Investigation
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of the DC-10 Aircraft
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THE 1974 PARIS CRASH
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10. French Government Report on the 1974 Paris Crash
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11. Engineers Who Kill: Professional Ethics and the Paramountcy of
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Public Safety/Kenneth Kipnis
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12. Whistleblowing, Ethical Obligation, and the DC-10/Douglas Birsch
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13. What is Hamlet to McDonnel Douglas or McDonnell Douglas to Hamlet?:
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DC-10/Peter French
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Commentary/Homer Stewell
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14. Statement of John C. Brizendine, President, Douglas Aircraft Company,
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McDonnell Douglas Corporation
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THE 1979 CHICAGO CRASH
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15. National Transportation Safety Board Report on the 1979 Chicago Crash
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16. The DC-10: A Special Report/McDonnell Douglas
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17. Two Models of Professional Responsibility/Martin Curd and Larry May
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THE 1989 SIOUX CITY CRASH
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18. National Transportation Safety Board Report on the 1989 Sioux City
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Crash
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19. The 1989 Sioux City Crash/John Fielder
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20. Statement of Ralph Nader
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21. Aviation Safety: Management Improvement Needed in FAA's Airworthiness
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Directive Program
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22. The FAA, the Carriers, and Safety/Charles Perrow
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23. International Airline Passengers Association Critique of the DC-10
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24. Moral Responsibility for Engineers/Kenneth D. Alpern
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Commentary/Andrew Oldenquist
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Commentary/Samuel C. Florman
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Select Bibliography
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IEEE Code of Ethics
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Index
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Back Cover:
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"Designed as a textbook for courses in ethics, this book privdes the material
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needed to understand the accidents in which more than 700 people were killed--
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accidents that many believe were the result of unethical actions and inactions
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by individuals, organizations, and government agencies. An introduction to
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ethical analysis and discussions of the ethical responsibilities involved are
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also provided. The case study offers material for a sustained inquiry into
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every level of ethical responsiblity reflecting the rich complexity of actual
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events.
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"_The DC-10 Case_ presents these issues through a collection of original and
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published articles, excerpts from official accident reports, congressional
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hearings, and other writings on the DC-10. The authors allow the readers to
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examine the ethical issues of airline safety as they actually occur, taking
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account of the circumstances in which they arise.
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"John H. Fielder is is Professor and Douglas Birsch is Assistant Professor of
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Philosophy at Villanova University."
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---
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Robert Dorsett
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rdd@cactus.org
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...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd
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From kls Sun Nov 22 14:47:54 1992
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Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
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Path: news
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From: Pete Mellor <pm@cs.city.ac.uk>
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Subject: Re: Airline Software-safety database (RISKS-14.08)
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Message-ID: <airliners.1992.21@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
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Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
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X-Original-Message-Id: <4664.9211221721@csrsun8.cs.city.ac.uk>
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Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Date: Sun, 22 Nov 92 17:21:22 GMT
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Dave "Van Damme" Ratner <ratner@ficus.CS.UCLA.EDU> writes in RISKS-14.08:
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> I am posting this for Robert Ratner, Ratner Associates Inc, which does
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> international consulting in air-traffic control and aviation safety issues.
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> He is looking for a public-accessible data base on software-related incidents
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> in this area. Email correspondence can be sent to me at ratner@cs.ucla.edu.
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> Thanks. Dave "Van Damme" Ratner ratner@cs.ucla.edu
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In my experience, all major manufacturers of software keep databases of
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incidents reported by users of their software and the faults ("bugs") which
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give rise to those incidents. I know for a fact that IBM, ICL, DEC, Unisys
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(or whatever it is now), and Sun all do this.
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Such a database is essential to their efforts to improve the quality of their
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software by identifying and fixing bugs, and to reduce their maintenance
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workload by informing customers about known problems so that repeated reports
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are suppressed.
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The interesting phrase is "public-accessible". If you are a customer of a large
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manufacturer of system or application software, you will almost certainly have
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access to the *relevant* parts of the database (those which concern the
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products you have bought). This will be provided either on-line, or as printed
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or micro-fiche extracts, updated on a regular basis.
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The other interesting phrase is "in this area" (i.e., of air-traffic control
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and aviation safety).
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The users of safety critical on-board avionics software are the companies that
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buy the aircraft. They are provided with regular information about all sorts
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of design glitches in the aircraft they have bought, including those in the
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software. Such information is provided in the form of "OEBs" (Operating
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Engineering Bulletins), which are distributed to the flight crews.
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Information about software faults in safety-critical avionics systems *must*,
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therefore, be kept on a database somewhere. These databases are public in the
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sense that any pilot on that type of aircraft would have access, but Joe
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Public (as far as I know) does not.
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Incidents in flight must (or should) be reported via offical channels by the
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crews. These reports drive the manufacturers' quality improvement programmes.
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After the fault which caused an incident has been diagnosed, it may result in
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an OEB or similar, and in a modification.
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Databases of such incident reports are not generally widely accessible.
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Published reports sometimes appear, however. In addition, there are channels
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for anonymous reporting of incidents. In the UK, "CHIRP" is such a forum. In
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the US, I believe the FAA used to run such a scheme, but it was compromised
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when the guarantee of anonymity was removed.
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For further information I suggest you contact ALPA.
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Given the increasing use of safety-critical software, a central database for
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each major application area would be highly desirable, to say the least.
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Obviously, sensitive issues of commercial confidentiality are involved. In
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particular, it may be difficult to obtain corresponding figures for the
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operating time so as to be able to estimate reliability, and it may be
|
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difficult to correlate incidents with faults, and so determine which incidents
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are due to software.
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I stand to be corrected if anyone *does* know of an official channel for
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public access to flight incident and system fault reports.
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Regarding ATC incidents, again I am certain that these are recorded, but access
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is not likely to be easy.
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Peter Mellor, Centre for Software Reliability, City University, Northampton
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Sq., London EC1V 0HB, Tel: +44(0)71-477-8422, JANET: p.mellor@city.ac.uk
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-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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From kls Mon Nov 23 04:38:46 1992
|
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Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: Dave Williamson <ditka!violin!dmw%piccolo>
|
|
Subject: Re: hydraulic problems with DC-10's??
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.22@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Reply-To: <199211200503.AA03970@loiosh.eff.org>
|
|
Organization: AT&T BL0512310
|
|
X-Original-Message-Id: <9211222144.AA09019@conch>
|
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Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: Sun, 22 Nov 92 16:44:33 EST
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|
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sdl@linus.mitre.org writes
|
|
> Perhaps now I can get a more definitive answer to the following:
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> Some of my pilot friends have accused the DC-10 as having a
|
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> particularly bad history of hydraulic problems (which have contributed
|
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> to a few crashes). But do the statistics really support the notion
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> ...
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I don't have anything statistical (others have covered that quite
|
|
admirably) but I had a similar experience.
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|
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Being a pilot myself (just small stuff), I tend to meet a lot of
|
|
airline pilots. A former instructor of mine introduced me to a
|
|
friend of his who was currently flying for a major airline. This guy
|
|
referred to the DC-10 as the "Death-Cruiser 10" and said he wouldn't
|
|
fly in it under any circumstances, especially not as a pilot.
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My personal opinion is that flying is still safer than other forms of
|
|
transportation, DC-10 accidents notwithstanding. While I prefer
|
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flying in a B7[456]7 (when I can't fly myself), I have no problem
|
|
getting into a DC-10 if that is what is at the gate.
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|
|
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
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>| David M. Williamson, d.m.williamson@att.com
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>| Commercial, ASEL, IA
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--> --> --> | --- ====== --- --- --- --- --- ---
|
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>| Proud part owner of Archer N7185F
|
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>|
|
|
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
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|
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From kls Tue Nov 24 00:34:06 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: weiss@mott.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss)
|
|
Subject: Re: Boeing 747-300
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.4@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.23@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: SEASnet, University of California, Los Angeles
|
|
X-Original-Message-Id: <8731@lee.SEAS.UCLA.EDU>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 24 Nov 92 02:47:07 GMT
|
|
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.4@ohare.Chicago.COM> jerry@telecom.ksu.edu (Jerry Anderson) writes:
|
|
>Is the Boeing 747-300 the largest commercial passenger aircraft
|
|
>in the world? Is the -300 the latest version, or are there
|
|
>newer, possibly larger stretched versions of the 747?
|
|
|
|
Well, Boeing no longer makes the -300; I personally saw the last -300 being
|
|
built in mid-September of 1991. The -300 has been replaced by the -400, which
|
|
has few fuselage changes. The upper deck is the same size. Basically, the
|
|
only "major" change is the addition of upper-surface winglets.
|
|
|
|
In my aero classes, we were taught that winglets are supposed to reduce the
|
|
trailing vortices and downwash from the wings. However, according to my
|
|
cousin, who used to work for Lockheed's Skunk Works, the winglets have a cost
|
|
in drag that is roughly equivalent to the gain, and therefore is more a
|
|
marketing ploy than anything else. Go figure.
|
|
|
|
>I've heard Boeing, McDonnell-Douglas and Airbus all have plans
|
|
>in the works for Really Big Planes in the 600-700 passenger,
|
|
>7500-8000 mile range. Does anyone know if these planes are
|
|
>really going to get built, or is this the usual "if we can
|
|
>pre-sell a couple of hundred, maybe we'll really build it?"
|
|
|
|
Airbus is truly working on the plane, and hopes to knock Boeing out of the
|
|
747 sales. However, Boeing has a history of being the best aircraft in the
|
|
world in terms of maintenance; Airbus apparently makes planes that are almost
|
|
as difficult to repair and inspect as McDonnell-Douglas.
|
|
|
|
McDonnell-Douglas has basically dropped out of that race, to my knowledge,
|
|
apparently because they require such a large amount of capital.
|
|
|
|
>Does anyone have model numbers, specs (passengers, range), or
|
|
>projected delivery dates? These numbers come from memory, and
|
|
>I have no faith in them at all:
|
|
> Company Model Delivery
|
|
> ------- ------ --------
|
|
> McDonnell-Douglas MD-11 1993
|
|
|
|
Try 1992. The MD-11 was certified in October of 1991. I saw about a dozen of
|
|
them at DFW this summer. They are pretty much a DC-10 with upper and lower
|
|
winglets.
|
|
|
|
> Airbus AE-400 1994
|
|
|
|
Sounds about right. Well, they were talking about '93, but that likely means
|
|
1994. Supposedly, it will compete directly with the 747.
|
|
|
|
> Boeing 777 1995-6
|
|
|
|
I would guess sooner, simply based upon the information I have heard. I could
|
|
very well be wrong, though.
|
|
--
|
|
\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | /
|
|
- Michael weiss@seas.ucla.edu | School of Engineering & Applied Science -
|
|
- Weiss izzydp5@oac.ucla.edu | University of California, Los Angeles -
|
|
/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | \
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Nov 24 03:54:40 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: gjacobs@qualcomm.com (Gary Jacobs)
|
|
Subject: Emergency Oxygen Masks
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.24@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Summary: How often is testing done and what is failure rate?
|
|
Organization: Qualcomm, Inc., San Diego, CA
|
|
X-Original-Message-Id: <gjacobs.722591030@qualcom>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 1992 07:43:50 GMT
|
|
|
|
Having just been involved in a flight where the oxygen masks
|
|
were dropped, I'm curious what the test criteria are and how
|
|
often is it done? I'd also like to know what the failure rate
|
|
is?
|
|
|
|
On my flight, America West on a Boeing 737, an oil seal supposedly
|
|
failed on the APU for the air conditioning system. This sent
|
|
oily smoke in the cabin. I assume the cockpit crew decided that
|
|
breathing that air wasn't good for the passengers and dropped, or
|
|
should I say tried to drop, the emergency oxygen masks. I'd say
|
|
that 1/4 of the overhead doors did not open until they were pried
|
|
open by a passenger and then a lot of the masks did not seem to
|
|
supply oxygen even after following the "pull hard to start the
|
|
flow of oxygen" instructions. I looked at my mask which didn't
|
|
work and could not tell what the "pull hard" did to start the
|
|
oxygen.
|
|
|
|
Gary Jacobs
|
|
gjacobs@qualcomm.com
|
|
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Nov 24 03:54:42 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz)
|
|
Subject: Re: Boeing 747-300
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.4@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.11@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.25@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Chicago Software Works
|
|
X-Original-Message-ID: <1992Nov24.110151.26562@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 1992 11:01:51 GMT
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.11@ohare.Chicago.COM> drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard) writes:
|
|
>In article <airliners.1992.4@ohare.Chicago.COM> jerry@telecom.ksu.edu (Jerry And
|
|
|
|
>>I've heard Boeing, McDonnell-Douglas and Airbus all have plans
|
|
>>in the works for Really Big Planes in the 600-700 passenger,
|
|
>>7500-8000 mile range.
|
|
|
|
>The Boeing and the Airbus offerings in this market seem to both hover
|
|
>around 600 seats and 7,000 mile range. Takeoff weights in the million
|
|
>pound plus range. The anticipated market, as described by John Hayhurst,
|
|
>Director of New Large Airplane Division, is only a couple hundred airplanes
|
|
>TOTAL. From my knothole, it looks like a prestige fight.
|
|
|
|
That's an *awful* lot of cash to dump down a hole simply for bragging
|
|
rights. I suppose that's part of "being sporty" but there's also a
|
|
real market there -- the Pacific Rim, which is where nearly all the
|
|
growth is in the airline industry and which requires those kind of
|
|
range figures. The load potential is there too, if not now then well
|
|
well within the next 10 to 20 years.
|
|
|
|
One aircraft that could punch a major hole in this market would be the
|
|
next generation supersonic transport. (HSCT? I can't pick the right
|
|
acronym out of my bowl of alphabet soup today ...) *If* built, and at
|
|
least for now that is a very big if, this too would be aimed directly
|
|
at the Pacific Rim market. The studies I've seen for this bird seem
|
|
to be aiming at the mainstream market and not just a very tiny high-
|
|
priced market like the Concorde.
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com
|
|
1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls
|
|
|Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA
|
|
Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Nov 24 03:54:43 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz)
|
|
Subject: Re: Boeing 747-300
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.4@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.23@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.26@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Chicago Software Works
|
|
X-Original-Message-ID: <1992Nov24.113158.26665@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 1992 11:31:58 GMT
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.23@ohare.Chicago.COM> weiss@mott.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss) writes:
|
|
>Well, Boeing no longer makes the -300; I personally saw the last -300 being
|
|
>built in mid-September of 1991. The -300 has been replaced by the -400 ...
|
|
|
|
[ Moderator's note: When I started reading this I thought "oh no, yet
|
|
another answer to the same question ... time to play moderator and
|
|
turn on the squelch." But there were some interesting points
|
|
further down. If you think we're beating a dead horse or would
|
|
somehow like to see the thread split, please send suggestions to me
|
|
at airliners-admin@chicago.com. ]
|
|
|
|
>In my aero classes, we were taught that winglets are supposed to reduce the
|
|
>trailing vortices and downwash from the wings. However, according to my
|
|
>cousin, who used to work for Lockheed's Skunk Works, the winglets have a cost
|
|
>in drag that is roughly equivalent to the gain, and therefore is more a
|
|
>marketing ploy than anything else.
|
|
|
|
I've seen this comment before, either on sci.aeronautics or perhaps on
|
|
rec.aviation. Would anyone care to provide a more scientific discourse
|
|
on the subject for the benefit of the rest of us?
|
|
|
|
>Airbus is truly working on the plane, and hopes to knock Boeing out of the
|
|
>747 sales. However, Boeing has a history of being the best aircraft in the
|
|
>world in terms of maintenance; Airbus apparently makes planes that are almost
|
|
>as difficult to repair and inspect as McDonnell-Douglas.
|
|
|
|
I've heard some comments about Airbus maintenance being exorbitantly
|
|
expensive. In particular, one comment I heard was that they are very
|
|
unforgiving about substitution of equivalent parts and gold-plate the
|
|
prices of Genuine Airbus Parts.
|
|
|
|
I have not previously encountered negative comments regarding
|
|
McDonnell-Douglas products in this context, however, and in fact have
|
|
heard that the DC-10 is rather well-liked because it's somewhat like
|
|
a big Chevy V-8 -- solid, and easy to fix when it breaks. (Problems
|
|
with the design of the hydraulics notwithstanding.)
|
|
|
|
Seems to me that Lockheed, the L-1011 in particular but perhaps the
|
|
Electra in its time as well, tended toward somewhat more finicky
|
|
products that compensated by giving better performance.
|
|
|
|
Again, any more concrete comments on the subject would be welcomed.
|
|
|
|
>McDonnell-Douglas has basically dropped out of that race, to my knowledge,
|
|
>apparently because they require such a large amount of capital.
|
|
|
|
With regard to the MD-12, MacDAC seems to remain in the race nearly as
|
|
much as Boeing and Airbus, though their ability to carry through with
|
|
an actual aircraft is certainly less certain given their finances. In
|
|
any case all three are paper planes until the airlines get themselves
|
|
into better financial shape.
|
|
|
|
> Airbus AE-400 1994
|
|
>
|
|
>Sounds about right. Well, they were talking about '93, but that
|
|
>likely means 1994. Supposedly, it will compete directly with the 747.
|
|
|
|
That would be the A-340, which is well along in its test program and
|
|
looks likely to make its scheduled first delivery (to Lufthansa) in
|
|
the first quarter of 1993. It competes with the 747 in the sense
|
|
that it is a long-range aircraft, in fact exceeding the range of the
|
|
747-400 by a little bit, but it's somewhat smaller, on the order of
|
|
two-thirds the size. In that sense it competes more closely with the
|
|
MD-12.
|
|
|
|
>> Boeing 777 1995-6
|
|
>
|
|
>I would guess sooner, simply based upon the information I have
|
|
>heard. I could very well be wrong, though.
|
|
|
|
It is indeed due the first half of 1995. This seemed an inordinately
|
|
long gestation, but at launch time Boeing still had its hands full
|
|
with the 747-400, and was also painfully aware of the delays in the
|
|
747-400 program due to an over-ambitious schedule. They simply did
|
|
not have the resources to commit to an earlier delivery.
|
|
|
|
The extra time has not at all been leisurely, however. Boeing is
|
|
using many new design techniques with the 777, for example doing all
|
|
the mockups in computers. (Actually a mockup *was* built of the nose
|
|
section, but more as a check on the computer models rather than of
|
|
the fit of the parts.) There is also an aggressive commitment to
|
|
delivering an aircraft that's ready for service from day one, without
|
|
a substantial period of teething problems in operation. This is an
|
|
area of some controversy in that they are striving for ETOPS rating
|
|
at initial delivery.
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com
|
|
1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls
|
|
|Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA
|
|
Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Nov 24 03:54:43 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz)
|
|
Subject: The Sporty Game -- Boeing 757
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.15@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.27@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Chicago Software Works
|
|
X-Original-Message-ID: <1992Nov24.115042.26779@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 1992 11:50:42 GMT
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.15@ohare.Chicago.COM> Christopher Davis <ckd@eff.org> writes:
|
|
>Karl> == Karl Swartz <kls@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
|
|
> Karl> Probably the best general interest discussion of the DC-10 and
|
|
> Karl> all its problems is in The Sporty Game, by John Newhouse (Alfred
|
|
> Karl> A. Knopf, New York, 1982).
|
|
|
|
>_The Sporty Game_ tends to show its age in other areas as well; the dire
|
|
>predictions of market failure for the 747, 757, and 767 have not quite
|
|
>been borne out by intervening events :)
|
|
|
|
The 757 was doing rather weakly for quite a while, however. The huge
|
|
orders in the past few years from American, United, and United Parcel
|
|
have contributed mightily to the 757's success.
|
|
|
|
I recently re-read this book and one thing I found fascinating was the
|
|
discussion of the 757 and how it was the wrong aircraft -- it should
|
|
have had about 30 fewer seats, which is what everyone wanted. Everone
|
|
except British Airways, that is, and Boeing wanted desperately to sell
|
|
to BA in the hopes of keeping the UK out of Airbus. They won the
|
|
battle, as it were, but lost the war. In more ways than one, since
|
|
not only did the UK link up with Airbus (despite BA's purchase of the
|
|
757) but Boeing was left without a well-positioned replacement for the
|
|
727 ... and Airbus *did* develop one, in the form of the A-320.
|
|
|
|
All of this was particularly interesting as I was reading it right as
|
|
United announced their A-320 order, rejecting Boeing's offerings as
|
|
either too big (the 757) or inadequate on a variety of counts (the
|
|
737-400) for the intended job of replacing the 727-200. Fascinating
|
|
to see how decisions made 15 years ago are still so clearly relected
|
|
in today's market.
|
|
|
|
I'm *still* surprised that Boeing hasn't made much noise (maybe none)
|
|
about plugging this obvious hole by offering a 757-100 or whatever --
|
|
a shortened 757 like the original proposal and a real replacement for
|
|
the 727-200. Even with United it never seemed to come up, instead all
|
|
the discussion focussing on a massively stretched and pulled and re-
|
|
designed 737-600. True, a 757 is more expensive (~ $45 million versus
|
|
$30 - 35 million) but the changes embodied in the 737-600 would surely
|
|
have added tremendously to the price.
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com
|
|
1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls
|
|
|Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA
|
|
Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Nov 24 16:00:40 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett)
|
|
Subject: Seeking pointers on switch design.
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.28@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Original-Message-Id: <9211241115.AA16994@cactus.org>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 92 05:15:42 CST
|
|
|
|
I'm looking for pointers to articles on the human-factors ramifications of
|
|
switch design. I've noticed an interesting difference between Airbus and
|
|
Boeing switch philosophy.
|
|
|
|
Boeing seems to build the "on" state into the switch. It might be a white
|
|
bar, indicating a closed circuit or open valve on a placarded systems
|
|
a subdued "on" function description, with an "engage" bar, etc. But the
|
|
philosophy seems to be: "default" state == off (dark indicator), pilot action
|
|
to turn it on (white indicator), operational state = on (white indicator)
|
|
until pilot turns it off again or an abnormal state occurs (colored indicator,
|
|
annunciator). This doesn't violate the "dark cockpit" philosophy, since only
|
|
one color (white) is used for selects, and abnormal states are clearly
|
|
detectable.
|
|
|
|
Airbus (in the A320, and presumably the A340 and A330), on the other hand,
|
|
seems to use smart-logic to default to an "on" state which is completely
|
|
dark. The switches, when pressed, then show an *abnormal* state, like turning
|
|
a fuel pump off. Nearly all of the switches also have a "failure" state-flag,
|
|
showing an amber or red fault message. There are also systems with "mixed"
|
|
switch formats. For instance, since a fuel pump state is normally on, a
|
|
switch, when pressed, turns it off and indicates an off state. But crossfeed
|
|
valve switches, when pressed, show an "ON," followed by "OPEN," state, which
|
|
seems more "positive." So the Airbus philosophy seems to be: initialize
|
|
switch states at boot time (on, no indicator), pilot action to turn it off
|
|
(illuminated, abnormal state), operational state = dark until pilot triggers
|
|
a disconnect.
|
|
|
|
Seems to me that Boeing's the correct approach: a thou-shalt-not, drilled
|
|
into me at an early point, was never to use double-negatives to prompt user
|
|
actions ("Do you not want to save the file? Y/N") . An action should ideally
|
|
be expressed in *positive* terms. And the interface should be consistent
|
|
across all systems and within systems.
|
|
|
|
On the other hand, Airbus' design can be rationalized in that if the computers
|
|
do *all* routine management, as they do, then bringing the pilots in the loop
|
|
at initial start-up is an invitation for error: in this model, pilot involve-
|
|
ment is an *abnormal* event, and signs of that involvement should be
|
|
highlighted. This raises interesting implications of the pilots being out of
|
|
the loop TOO long, perhaps never dealing with a system or mentally "reviewing"
|
|
that system for several flights, as would be the case with more "hands-on"
|
|
initialization and management. This could be the reason behind Airbus's
|
|
pre-flight "walk-through," in which each switch illuminates in sequence,
|
|
requiring the pilot to depress it to extinguish the light.
|
|
|
|
Comments? References?
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
Robert Dorsett
|
|
rdd@cactus.org
|
|
...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Nov 24 16:00:41 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett)
|
|
Subject: Re: Boeing 747-300 (PLEASE let this be the end of it! :-))
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.4@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.29@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx
|
|
X-Original-Message-Id: <9211241245.AA19191@cactus.org>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 92 06:45:43 CST
|
|
|
|
Michael Weiss wrote:
|
|
|
|
>Airbus is truly working on the plane, and hopes to knock Boeing out of the
|
|
>747 sales.
|
|
|
|
Airbus is not working on the plane. It has no launch customers, and has
|
|
not committed resources to it. It is in a very preliminary concept stage,
|
|
which is being heavily hyped, as part of the marketing effort. It's a major
|
|
step: the failure OR success of the airplane can easily damage the consortium,
|
|
if they figure the market wrong.
|
|
|
|
|
|
>However, Boeing has a history of being the best aircraft in the
|
|
>world in terms of maintenance; Airbus apparently makes planes that are almost
|
|
>as difficult to repair and inspect as McDonnell-Douglas.
|
|
|
|
I've heard that Airbus maintenance is highly modular, highly automated,
|
|
and very structured, with no more problems than what one might expect when
|
|
client airlines switch from one vendor's accounting/maintenance practices to
|
|
another. This takes time, it takes a lot of training, and it is a standard-
|
|
ization nightmare: but there's little to suggest one manufacturer's program
|
|
is better than the other's, on its own merits.
|
|
|
|
|
|
>> McDonnell-Douglas MD-11 1993
|
|
>
|
|
>Try 1992. The MD-11 was certified in October of 1991.
|
|
|
|
By the end of 1991, MDC had made in excess of 30 deliveries of the MD-11.
|
|
First deliveries tend to follow certification VERY quickly.
|
|
|
|
|
|
>> Airbus AE-400 1994
|
|
>
|
|
>Sounds about right. Well, they were talking about '93, but that likely means
|
|
>1994. Supposedly, it will compete directly with the 747.
|
|
|
|
The A340 should receive certification next month, with deliveries in
|
|
January 1993. The A330 was rolled out last month, and should be certified
|
|
by mid-1993. These are the only two new active programs Airbus is working
|
|
on, apart from the A320 derivatives.
|
|
|
|
|
|
>> Boeing 777 1995-6
|
|
|
|
First flight by June 1, 1994, deliveries in 1995, based on the July 1, 1992
|
|
Flight International.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
Robert Dorsett
|
|
rdd@cactus.org
|
|
...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Nov 24 16:00:41 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
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Path: news
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From: weiss@curtiss.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss)
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Subject: Re: hydraulic problems with DC-10's??
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References: <airliners.1992.6@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.8@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Message-ID: <airliners.1992.30@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Organization: SEASnet, University of California, Los Angeles
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X-Original-Message-Id: <8733@lee.SEAS.UCLA.EDU>
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Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Date: 24 Nov 92 17:40:41 GMT
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In article <airliners.1992.8@ohare.Chicago.COM> kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) writes:
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>In article <airliners.1992.6@ohare.Chicago.COM> sdl@linus.mitre.org writes:
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>>Some of my pilot friends have accused the DC-10 as having a
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>>particularly bad history of hydraulic problems (which have
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>>contributed to a few crashes).
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>Two, at least. AA 191 at Chicago/O'Hare on May 25, 1979, and UA 232
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>at Sioux City, Iowa on July 19, 1989.
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I have a hard time believing that an intact hydraulic system would have
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prevented AA191 from crashing. Let's face it, a wing-mounted engine falling
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off produces such a rediculous unbalance that even full aileron wouldn't be
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able to counter it.
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--
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\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | /
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- Michael weiss@seas.ucla.edu | School of Engineering & Applied Science -
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- Weiss izzydp5@oac.ucla.edu | University of California, Los Angeles -
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/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | \
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From kls Tue Nov 24 16:46:33 1992
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Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
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Path: news
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From: Stephen L Nicoud <stephen@boeing.com>
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Subject: Boeing reduces production rate of 757 & 767
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Message-ID: <airliners.1992.31@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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X-Original-Message-Id: <9211242332.AA01284@moclips.boeing.com>
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Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Date: Tue, 24 Nov 92 15:32:37 PST
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757, 767 PRODUCTION RATE REDUCTIONS ANNOUNCED
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Boeing Commercial Airplane Group is announcing today reductions in 757 and 767
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production rates in 1993.
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The monthly rate of 757s, which is currently at 8.5 airplanes per month, will
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go to seven in June 1993, and will be reduced further to five per month in
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November. The reduction to seven a month had originally been planned to take
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effect in September.
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Also in November, the 767 rate will be decreased from the current five per
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month to four.
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Early indications are that the 757 and 767 reductions could result in about
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2,000 fewer jobs in the Puget Sound area and approximately 500 fewer jobs at
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the Commercial Airplane Group's Wichita Division.
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"Our customers' delivery needs are changing as a result of the difficult time
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many of them are currently having. We are adjusting our rates to meet their
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needs," said Dean Thornton, president of the Commercial Airplane Group.
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"We remain optimistic about the long-term. This decision takes into account
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the cumulative recent requests of a number of our customers for changes in
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their delivery streams," Thornton added.
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From kls Tue Nov 24 16:46:36 1992
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Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
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Path: news
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From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz)
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Subject: Re: hydraulic problems with DC-10's??
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References: <airliners.1992.6@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.8@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.30@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Message-ID: <airliners.1992.32@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Organization: Chicago Software Works
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X-Original-Message-ID: <1992Nov25.004006.28130@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Date: Wed, 25 Nov 1992 00:40:06 GMT
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In article <airliners.1992.30@ohare.Chicago.COM> weiss@curtiss.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss) writes:
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>I have a hard time believing that an intact hydraulic system would have
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>prevented AA191 from crashing. Let's face it, a wing-mounted engine falling
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>off produces such a rediculous unbalance that even full aileron wouldn't be
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>able to counter it.
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I don't see that ailerons have much to do with it -- the biggest
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effect would be a substantial yaw, which would require rudder input.
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In any case, start believing. A United 747 (N4713U, now N4724U)
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operating a HNL-SYD flight on Feb. 23, 1989 lost both engines on the
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right side due to debris ingestion after a cargo hatch failed. They
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dumped fuel and limped back to Honolulu, well over an hour's flying
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time.
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Having lots of altitude and airspeed to work with is certainly quite
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helpful, but isn't a requirement. A few years ago a Piedmont 737-200
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lost #2 immediately after takeoff from O'Hare. The pilots promptly
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declared an emergency, turned around, and landed several minutes later
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on another runway. They didn't even realize that the engine had
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litterally fallen off until the got off he plane and looked.
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Getting back to AA 191, what really killed AA 191 was a stall of the
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left wing after the uncommanded retraction of the flaps on that side.
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Even this was recoverable had the pilots known that their stall speed
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was suddenly higher -- alas, McDonnell-Douglas didn't bother with any
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redundancy for the flap retraction warning and that happened to be
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powered by the engine that fell off. In simulator tests after the
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crash, every pilot crashed when confronted with the same scenario.
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When given this indicator, and thus some indication of what was going
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on, every pilot managed to maintain control of the aircraft.
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An engine separation, while certainly not a normal event, should not
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be a fatal event, and indeed the certification process requires some
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consideration of an engine separation.
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--
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Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com
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1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls
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|Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA
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Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com
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From kls Wed Nov 25 03:16:35 1992
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Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
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Path: news
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From: bentson@CS.ColoState.EDU (Randolph Bentson)
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Subject: Re: hydraulic problems with DC-10's??
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References: <airliners.1992.6@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.8@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.30@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Message-ID: <airliners.1992.33@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Organization: Colorado State University, Computer Science Department
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X-Original-Message-ID: <Nov25.045400.75150@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU>
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Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Date: Wed, 25 Nov 1992 04:54:00 GMT
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In article <airliners.1992.30@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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weiss@curtiss.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss) writes:
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>
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>I have a hard time believing that an intact hydraulic system would have
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>prevented AA191 from crashing. Let's face it, a wing-mounted engine falling
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>off produces such a rediculous unbalance that even full aileron wouldn't be
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>able to counter it.
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The problem was that when the hydraulics failed, leading edge
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slat retracted on one side and that wing stalled. No indication
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was given in the cockpit so the flight crew didn't use the
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appropriate recovery mechanism.
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Ref: "The DC-10 Case", John H. Feilder & Douglas Birsch, eds.
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--
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Randolph Bentson Colorado State University
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bentson@CS.ColoState.Edu Computer Science Department
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303/491-5792 Ft. Collins, CO 80523
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From kls Wed Nov 25 03:16:39 1992
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Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
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Path: news
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From: kawai@Csli.Stanford.EDU (goh kawai - n6uok)
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Subject: Re: Emergency Oxygen Masks
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References: <airliners.1992.24@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Message-ID: <airliners.1992.34@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Organization: speech research program, sri international
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X-Original-Message-Id: <1992Nov25.004045.6594@Csli.Stanford.EDU>
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Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Date: Wed, 25 Nov 1992 00:40:45 GMT
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Gary Jacobs (gjacobs@qualcomm.com) comments:
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| I'm curious what the test criteria [of oxygen masks] are and how often
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| is it done? I'd also like to know what the failure rate is?
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I was on a flight the other day (B-747) when an oxygen mask dropped by
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accident in the business class cabin. I was horrified to see that the
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plastic tubing that connects the mask to the oxygen supply was
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brownish-colored due to age. I have an aquarium at home, and I know how
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long it takes for air-tubing to turn brown. While it is quite conceivable
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that they use a higher grade of tubing in aircraft, that is not awfully
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reassuring, because low-grade or high-grade, old tubing is old tubing. I
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shudder to think what condition the rest of the system is in.
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-goh-
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----------------- Speech Research Program, SRI, Menlo Park, CA 94025-3493 USA
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--- Goh Kawai --- work:(415)859-2231 fax:(415)859-5984 home:(415)323-7214
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----------------- internet: kawai@speech.sri.com radio: n6uok and jk1zyp
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From kls Wed Nov 25 03:16:42 1992
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Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
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Path: news
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From: rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu (Robert Dorsett)
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Subject: NTSB DC-10 excerpts
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Message-ID: <airliners.1992.35@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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X-Original-Message-Id: <9211250826.AA14686@rascal.ics.utexas.edu>
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Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Date: Wed, 25 Nov 92 02:26:16 CST
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It's been about two years since I last posted this, so...
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--------------------
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Excerpts from the NTSB accident report on the Chicago O'Hare crash:
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Synopsis:
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About 1504 CDT, May 25, 1979, American Airlines Flight 191, a McDonnell-Douglas
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DC-10-10 aircraft, crashed into an open field just short of a trailer park about
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4600' northwest of the departure end of runway 32R at Chicago-O'Hare Internat-
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ional Airport, Illinois.
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Flight 191 was taking off from Runway 32R. The weather was clear and the vis-
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ibility was 15 miles. During the takeoff rotation, the left engine and pylon
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assembly and about 3 ft of the leading edge of the left wing separated from
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the aircraft and fell to the runway. Flight 191 continued to climb to about
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325' above the ground and then began to roll to the left. The aircraft con-
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tinued to roll to the left until the wings were past the vertical position,
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and during the roll, the aircraft's nose pitched down below the horizon.
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Flight 191 crashed into the open field and the wreckage scattered into an
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adjacent trailer park. The aircraft was destroyed in the crash and subsequent
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fire. Two hundred and seventy-one persons on board Flight 191 were killed;
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two persons on the ground were killed, and two others were injured. An old
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aircraft hangar, several automobiles, and a mobile home were destroyed.
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The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause
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of this accident was the asymmetrical stall and the ensuing roll of the air-
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craft because of the uncommanded retraction of the left wing outboard leading
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edge slats and the loss of stall warning and slat disagreement indication sys-
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tems resulting from maintenance-induced damage leading to the separation of the
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No. 1 engine and pylon assembly at a critical point during takeoff. The sep-
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aration resulted from damage by improper maintenance procedures which led to
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failure of the pylon structure.
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Contributing to the cause of the accident were the vulnerability of the design
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of the pylon attach points to maintenance damage; the vulnerability of the
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design of the leading edge slat system to the damage which produced asymmetry;
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deficiencies in Federal Aviation Administration surveillance and reporting sys-
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tems which failed to detect and prevent the use of improper maintenance proced-
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ures; deficiencies in the practices and communications among the operators,
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the manufacturer, and the FAA which failed to determine and disseminate the
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particulars during previous maintenance damage incidents; and the intolerance
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of prescribed operational procedures to this unique emergency.
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Findings (p. 67)
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1. The engine and pylon assembly separated either at or immediately after
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takeoff. The flightcrew was committed to continue the takeoff.
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2. The aft end of the pylon assembly began to separate in the forward flange
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of the aft bulkhead.
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3. The structural separation of the pylon was caused by a complete failure of
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the forward flange of the aft bulkhead after its residual strength had been
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critically reduced by the fracture and subsequent service life.
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4. The overload fracture and fatigue cracking on the pylon aft bulkhead's
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upper flange were the only preexisting damage on the bulkhead. The length of
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the overload fracture and fatigue cracking was about 13 inches. The fracture
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was caused by an upward movement of the aft end of the pylon which brought the
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upper flange and its fasteners into contact with the wing clevis.
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5. The pylon to wing attach hardware was properly installed at all attachment
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points.
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6. All electrical power to the No. 1 AC generator bus and No. 1 DC bus was
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lost after the pylon separated. The captain's flight director instrument, the
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stall warning system, and the slat disagreement warning light systems were
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rendered inoperative. Power to these buses was never restored.
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7. The No. 1 hydraulic system was lost when the pylon separated. Hydraulic
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systems No. 2 and No. 3 operated at their full capability throughout the flight.
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Except for spoiler panels No. 2 and No. 4 on each wing, all flight controls
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were operating.
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8. The hydraulic lines and followup cables of the drive actuator for the left
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wing's outboard leading edge slat were severed by the separation of the pylon
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and the left wing's outboard slats retracted during climbout. The retraction
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of the slats caused an asymmetric stall and subsequent loss of control of the
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aircraft.
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9. The flightcrew could not see the wings and engines from the cockpit.
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Because of the loss of the slat disagreement light and the stall warning system,
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the flightcrew would not have received an electronic warning of either the slat
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asymmetry or the stall. The loss of the warning systems created a situation
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which afforded the flightcrew an inadequate opportunity to recognize and
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prevent the ensuing stall of the aircraft.
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10. The flightcrew flew the aircraft in accordance with the prescribed emer-
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gency procedure, which called for the climbout to be flown at V2 speed. V2
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was 6 KIAS below the stall speed for the left wing. The deceleration to V2
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speed caused the aircraft to stall. The start of the left roll was the only
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warning the pilot had of the onset of the stall.
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11. The pylon was damaged during maintenance performed on the accident aircraft
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at American Airline's Maintenance Facility at Tulsa, Oklahoma, on March 29 and
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30, 1979.
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12. The design of the aft bulkhead made the flange vulnerable to damage when
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the pylon was being separated or attached.
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13. American Airlines engineering personnel developed an ECO to remove and
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reinstall the pylon and engine as a single unit. The ECO directed that the
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combined engine and pylon assembly be supported, lowered, and raised by a
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forklift. American Airlines engineering personnel did not perform an adequate
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evaluation of either the capability of the forklift to provide the required
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precision for the task, or the degree of difficulty involved in placing the
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lift properly, or the consequences of placing the lift improperly. The CO
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did not emphasize the precision required to place the forklift properly.
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14. The FAA does not approve the carriers' maintenance procedures, and a
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carrier has the right to change its maintenance procedures without FAA approval.
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15. American Airlines personnel removed the aft bulkhead's bolt and bushing
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before removing the forward bulkhead attach fittings. This permitted the
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forward bulkhead to act as a pivot. Any advertent or inadvertent loss of
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forklift support to the engine and pylon assembly would produce an upward
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movement at the aft bulkhead's upper flange and bring it into contact with
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the wing clevis.
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16. American Airlines maintenance personnel did not report formally to their
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maintenance engineering staff either their deviation from the removal sequence
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contained in the ECO or the difficulties they had encountered in accomplishing
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the ECO's procedures.
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17. American Airline's engineering personnel did not perform a thorough
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evaluation of all aspects of the maintenance procedures before they formulated
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the ECO. The engineering and supervisory personnel did not monitor the
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performance of the ECO to ensure either that it was being accomplished properly
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or if their maintenance personnel were encountering unforeseen difficulties in
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performing the assigned tasks.
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18. The nine situations in which damage was sustained and cracks were found on
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the upper flange were limited to those operations wherein the engine and pylon
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assembly was supported by a forklift.
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19. On December 19, 1978, and Feb. 22, 1979, Continental Airlines maintenance
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personnel damaged aft bulkhead upper flanges in a manner similar to the damage
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noted on the accident aircraft. The carrier classified the cause of the damage
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as maintenance error. Neither the air carrier nor the manufacturer interpreted
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the regulation to require that it further investigate or reprot the damages to
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the FAA.
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20. The original certification's fatigue-damage assessment was in conformance
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with the existing requirements.
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21. The design of the stall warning system lacked sufficient redundancy; there
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was only one stickshaker motor; and further, the design of the system did not
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provide for crossover information to the left and right stall warning computers
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from the applicable leading edge slat sensors on the opposite side of the
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aircraft.
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22. The design of the leading edge slat system did not include positive
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mechanical locking devices to prevent movement of the slats by external loads
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following a failure of the primary controls. Certification was based upon
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acceptable flight characteristics with an asymmetrical leading edge slat
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condition.
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23. At the time of DC-10 certification, the structural separation of an engine
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pylon was not considered. Thus, multiple failures of other systems resulting
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from this single event was not considered.
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Additional excerpts:
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[design requirements for slats]
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"The motion on the flaps on opposite sides of the plane of symmetry
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must be synchronized unless the aircraft has safe characteristics with
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the flaps retracted on one side and extended on the other."
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Since the left and right inboard slats are controlled by a single valve and
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actuated by a common drum and the left and right outboard slats receive their
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command from mechanically linked control valves which are "slaved" to the
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inboard slats by the followup cable, the synchronization requirement was
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satisfied. However, since the cable drum actuating mechanisms of the left and
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right outboard slats were independent of each other, the possibility existed
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that one outboard slat might fail to respond to a commanded movement.
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Therefore, the safe flight characteristics of the aircraft with asymmetrical
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outboard slats were demonstrated by test flight. These flight characteristics
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were investigated within an airspeed range bounded by the limiting airspeed for
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the takeoff slat positions--260 kts--and the stall warning speed; the flight
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test did not investigate these characteristics under takeoff conditions.
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In addition, a slat disagree warning light system was installed which, when
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illuminated, indicated that the slat handle and slat position disagree, or
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the slats are in transit, or the slats have been extended automatically.
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The program engineer stated that the commanded slat position is held by trapped
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fluid in the actuating cylinder, and that no consideration was given to an
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alternate locking mechanism. The slats' hydraulic lines and followup cables
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were routed as close as possible to primary structure for protection; however,
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routing them behind the wing's front spar was not considered because of
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interference with other systems.
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"The branch chief of the Reliability and Safety Engineering Organization of the
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Douglas Aircraft Company described the failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA)
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and fault analysis. The witness indicated that the FMEA was a basic working
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document in which rational failure modes were postulated and analyzed; vendors
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and subcontractors were requested to perform similar analyses on equipment they
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supplied to McDonnell-Douglas. Previous design and service experience was
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incorporated in the initial DC-10-10's FMEA's, and analyses were modified as
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the design progressed. The FMEA's were synthesized to make fault analyses,
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which were system-oriented summary documents submitted to the FAA to satisfy 14
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CFR 25.1309. The FAA could have requested and could have reviewed the FMEA's.
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The basic regulations under which the slats were certified did not require
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accountability for multiple failures. The slat fault analysis submitted to the
|
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FAA listed 11 faults or failures, all of which were correctable by the
|
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flightcrew. However, one multiple failure--erroneous motion transmitted to
|
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the right-hand outboard slats and an engine failure on the appropriate side--
|
|
was considered by McDonnell-Douglas in its FMEA. The FMEA noted that the
|
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"failure increases the amount of yaw but would be critical only under the most
|
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adverse flight or takeoff conditions. The probability of both failures
|
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occurring is less than 1 x 10e-10 [a popular number with airframe
|
|
manufacturers!]."
|
|
|
|
[...]
|
|
|
|
"The December 1, 1978 revision of 14 CFR 25.571 retitled the regulation
|
|
"Damage-Tolerance and Fatigue Evaluation of Structure." The fail-safe
|
|
evaluation must now include damage modes due to fatigue, corrosion, and
|
|
accidental damage. According to the manufacturer, the consideration for
|
|
accidental damage was limited to damage which can be inflicted during routine
|
|
maintenance and aircraft servicing."
|
|
|
|
[...]
|
|
|
|
"Because of the designed redundancy in the aircraft's hydraulic and electrical
|
|
systems, the losses of those systems powered by the No. 1 engine should not have
|
|
affected the crew's ability to control the aircraft. However, as the pylon
|
|
separated from the aircraft, the forward bulkhead contacted and severed
|
|
four other hydraulic lines and two cables which were routed through the wing
|
|
leading edge forward of the bulkhead. These hydraulic lines were the operating
|
|
lines from the leading edge slat control valve, which was located inboard of
|
|
the pylon, and the actuating cylinders, which extend and retract the outboard
|
|
leading edge slats. Two of the lines were connected to the No. 1 hydraulic
|
|
system and two were connected to the No. 3 system, thus providing the
|
|
redundancy to cope with a single hydraulic system failure. The cables which
|
|
were severed provided feedback of the leading edge slat position so that the
|
|
control valve would be nulled when slat position agreed with position commanded
|
|
by the cockpit control.
|
|
|
|
The severing of the hydraulic lines in the leading edge of the left wing could
|
|
have resulted in the eventual loss of No. 3 hydraulic system because of fluid
|
|
depletion. However, even at the most rapid rate of leakage possible, the system
|
|
would have operated throughout the flight. The extended No. 3 spoiler panel on
|
|
the right wing, which was operated by the No. 3 hydraulic system, confirmed that
|
|
this hydraulic system was operating. Since two of the three hydraulic systems
|
|
were operative, the Safety Board concludes that, except for the No. 2 and No. 4
|
|
spoiler panels on both wings which were powered by the No. 1 hydraulic systems,
|
|
all flight controls were operating. Therefore, except for the significant
|
|
effect that the severing of the No. 3 hydraulic system's lines had on the left
|
|
leading edge slat system, the fluid leak did not play a role in the accident.
|
|
|
|
During takeoff, as with any normal takeoff, the leading edge slats were
|
|
extended to provide increased aerodynamic lift on the wings . When the slats
|
|
are extended and the control valve is nulled, hydraulic fluid is trapped in the
|
|
actuating cylinder and operating lines. The incompressiblity of this fluid
|
|
reacts against any external air loads and holds the slats extended. This is
|
|
the only lock provided by the design. Thus, when the lines were severed and
|
|
the trapped hydraulic fluid was lost, air loads forced the left outboard slats
|
|
to retract. While other failures were not critical, the uncommanded movement
|
|
of these leading edge slats had a profound effect on the aerodynamic performance
|
|
and controllability of the aircraft. With the left outboard slats retracted
|
|
and all others extended, the lift of the left wing was reduced and the airspeed
|
|
at which that wing would stall was increased. The simulator tests showed that
|
|
even with the loss of the No. 2 and No. 4 spoilers, sufficient lateral control
|
|
was available from the ailerons and other spoilers to offset the asymmetric
|
|
lift caused by left slat retraction at airspeeds above that at which the wing
|
|
would stall. However, the stall speed for the left wing increased to 159 KIAS.
|
|
|
|
[...]
|
|
|
|
The Safety Board is also concerned that the designs of the flight control,
|
|
hydraulic, and electrical systems in the DC-10 aircraft were such that all
|
|
were affected by the pylon separation to the extent that the crew was unable to
|
|
ascertain the measures needed to maintain control of the aircraft.
|
|
|
|
The airworthiness regulations in effect when the DC-10 was certificated were
|
|
augmented by a Special Condition, the provisions of which had to be met before
|
|
the aircraft's fully powered control system would be certificated.
|
|
The Special Condition required that the aircraft be capable of continued
|
|
flight and of being landed safely after failure of the flight control system,
|
|
including lift devices. These capabilities must be demonstrated by analysis
|
|
or test, or both. However, the Special Condition, as it applied to the slat
|
|
control system, was consistent with the basic airworthiness regulations in
|
|
effect at the time. The basic airworthiness regulations specified requirements
|
|
for wing flap asymmetry only and did not include specific consideration of
|
|
other lift devices. Because the leading edge slat design did not contain any
|
|
novel or unusual features, it was certificated under the basic regulation. The
|
|
flap control requirements for symmetry and synchronization were applied to and
|
|
satisfied by the slat system design. Since a malfunction of the slat actuating
|
|
system could disrupt the operation of an outboard slat segment, a fault analysis
|
|
was conducted to explore the probability and effects of both an uncommanded
|
|
movement of the outboard slats and the failure of the outboard slats to respond
|
|
to a commanded movement. The fault analysis concluded that the aircraft could
|
|
be flown safely with this asymmetry.
|
|
|
|
Other aircraft designs include positive mechanical locking devices to prevent
|
|
movement of slats by external loads following a primary failure. The DC-10
|
|
design did not include such a feature nor was it deemed necessary, since
|
|
compliance with the regulations was based upon analysis of those failure modes
|
|
which could result in asymmetrical positioning of the leading edge devices and
|
|
a demonstration that sufficient lateral control was available to compensate for
|
|
the asymmetrical conditions throughout the aircraft's flight envelope. The
|
|
flight tests conducted to evaluate the controllability of the aircraft were
|
|
limited to a minimum airspeed compatible with stall-warning activation
|
|
predicated upon the slat-retracted configuration.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Nov 25 03:16:43 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz)
|
|
Subject: MD-11 milestone dates
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.4@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.29@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.36@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Chicago Software Works
|
|
X-Original-Message-ID: <1992Nov25.102758.29314@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: Wed, 25 Nov 1992 10:27:58 GMT
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.29@ohare.Chicago.COM> rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) writes:
|
|
>Michael Weiss wrote:
|
|
>>> McDonnell-Douglas MD-11 1993
|
|
|
|
>>Try 1992. The MD-11 was certified in October of 1991.
|
|
|
|
>By the end of 1991, MDC had made in excess of 30 deliveries of the MD-11.
|
|
>First deliveries tend to follow certification VERY quickly.
|
|
|
|
Having received several other submissions mentioning earlier service
|
|
dates I decided to look up the real dates for the MD-11 and hopefully
|
|
nail the lid on the debate once and for all.
|
|
|
|
date LN reg'n note
|
|
---- -- ----- ----
|
|
Jan 10 1990 447 N11MD first flight
|
|
Nov 9 1990 - - type certificate issued (GE CF6-80C2 engines)
|
|
Nov 29 1990 455 OH-LGA first delivery (PR event, to Finnair)
|
|
Dec 7 1990 455 OH-LGA actual title transfer (at Las Vegas)
|
|
Dec 18 1990 - - type certificate issued (P&W PW4460 engines)
|
|
Dec 20 1990 455 OH-LGA first revenue service (Finnair, Helsinki-
|
|
Tenerife charter)
|
|
Dec 21 1990 453 N891DL delivery of Delta's first two MD-11s, leased
|
|
454 N892DL from Mitsui (GE engines; Delta's own are PW)
|
|
Jan 24 1991 456 HL7371 first delivery of PW4460 version (to Korean)
|
|
Feb 5 1991 454 N892DL first scheduled service (DL 4049 ATL-DFW-MCO)
|
|
Feb 6 1991 453 N891DL first scheduled int'l (LAX-NRT; arrived LAX
|
|
previous day operating DL 4039 ATL-DFW-LAX)
|
|
Jun 27 1991 447 N601FE delivery of first MD-11 (to Federal Express,
|
|
after refitting by Aerotest in Mojave, CA)
|
|
|
|
Roughly 35 MD-11s had been delivered by the end of 1991; McDonnell-
|
|
Douglas got off to a rather slow start because nearly every one of the
|
|
early aircraft were different, including passenger, freight, and combi
|
|
versions, some with GE engines and others with Pratt and Whitney. The
|
|
Rolls-Royce version was cancelled after the demise of Air Europe.
|
|
|
|
BTW, note that line number 447 is the first MD-11. 446 was the last
|
|
of the last of the DC-10 line, a KC-10 if I'm not mistaken.
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com
|
|
1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls
|
|
|Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA
|
|
Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Nov 25 03:16:44 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: Karl Swartz <kls@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Subject: Thanksgiving
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.37@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Original-Message-Id: <m0muKha-0000cHC@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: Wed, 25 Nov 92 3:14:35 PST
|
|
|
|
Tomorrow (er, it's late, better make that today) is the day before
|
|
Thanksgiving in the United States, traditionally the busiest air
|
|
travel day of the year. My home-town airport (perhaps you've heard
|
|
of it -- Chicago's O'Hare International, namesake of the machine I'm
|
|
posting this on) usually sets a new passenger volume record every year
|
|
on this day, though this year may be an exception as the half-price
|
|
fare war led to several record-shattering days this past summer.
|
|
|
|
(For those of you who may be unfamiliar with this custom, it entails
|
|
family and friends gathering together on the Thursday before the last
|
|
Friday in November to consume a turkey and stuffing, yams, cranberry
|
|
sauce, pumpkin pie, and all sorts of other goodies, followed by three
|
|
days to sit back, watch football, and digest all that food!)
|
|
|
|
In any case, I'll be doing my part to support the travel industry
|
|
this holiday, though not at O'Hare and not by air. This means I'll
|
|
be away from the keyboard until Monday, and airliners posts likely
|
|
won't go out until then. (I may check in once or twice before then
|
|
but no promises.)
|
|
|
|
To those of you in the US or celebrating this US holiday, may this
|
|
be a happy and *safe* holiday for you. To the rest, well, you'll be
|
|
saved the inevitable weeks of leftover turkey sandwiches. ;-)
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com
|
|
1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls
|
|
|Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA
|
|
Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Nov 25 11:07:26 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett)
|
|
Subject: Re: hydraulic problems with DC-10's??
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.6@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.8@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.30@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.32@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.38@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx
|
|
X-Original-Message-Id: <9211251258.AA19229@cactus.org>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: Wed, 25 Nov 92 06:58:52 CST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.32@ohare.Chicago.COM> kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) writes:
|
|
>In article <airliners.1992.30@ohare.Chicago.COM> weiss@curtiss.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss) writes:
|
|
>>I have a hard time believing that an intact hydraulic system would have
|
|
>>prevented AA191 from crashing. Let's face it, a wing-mounted engine falling
|
|
>>off produces such a rediculous unbalance that even full aileron wouldn't be
|
|
>>able to counter it.
|
|
>
|
|
>I don't see that ailerons have much to do with it -- the biggest
|
|
>effect would be a substantial yaw, which would require rudder input.
|
|
|
|
In the NTSB report on the DC-10 crash, a considerable amount of both yaw
|
|
and rudder were necessary to regain level flight, in the simulator tests--
|
|
80% right rudder and 70% right-wing-down aileron; roll angles didn't
|
|
exceed 30 degrees before recovery.
|
|
|
|
Normally, given asymmetric thrust, you bank into the good engine(s): rudder's
|
|
normally used to augment the ailerons as necessary to control sideslip.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
>Having lots of altitude and airspeed to work with is certainly quite
|
|
>helpful, but isn't a requirement. A few years ago a Piedmont 737-200
|
|
>lost #2 immediately after takeoff from O'Hare. The pilots promptly
|
|
>declared an emergency, turned around, and landed several minutes later
|
|
>on another runway. They didn't even realize that the engine had
|
|
>litterally fallen off until the got off he plane and looked.
|
|
|
|
There are actually two issues at work, here: one is the *power* lost by
|
|
the engine. To maintain level flight, the power required for flight must
|
|
equal the power available. If the power available is less, one will start
|
|
to descend; if it's a lot less, one will descend faster. The real issue is
|
|
just power: it has little to do with where the failure was: losing two
|
|
of three engines on a 727 at MTOW means you'll go down, too.
|
|
|
|
The second issue is the moment produced by the combination of the "dead"
|
|
engine (with its drag) and the "good" engines. This is generally a minimal
|
|
issue, assuming the airspeed is there, and the pilot applies correct
|
|
technique. Most transport aircraft can fly with all engines out on one side,
|
|
although I do not know if this is an explicit regulatory requirement. As
|
|
long as the inherent longitudinal stability of the airplane (contributed
|
|
by the vertical stabilizer, rudder, wings, and fuselage) is sufficient to
|
|
overcome the yawing moment, the airplane can be controlled. So *correcting*
|
|
for a lost engine is a near-instantaneous correction, applied by the pilot,
|
|
needing no altitude reserve.
|
|
|
|
|
|
During the El Al discussion on sci.aero, rec.av, and rec.travel.air, there
|
|
seemed to be considerable confusion between the role each factor took.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
Robert Dorsett
|
|
rdd@cactus.org
|
|
...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd
|
|
|
|
From kls Sun Nov 29 14:35:26 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: Bob Coggeshall <coggs@Hongkong.Cogwheel.COM>
|
|
Subject: 757 highest thrust to weight ratio ?
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.39@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Original-Message-Id: <199211281348.AA07134@drewll.cogwheel.com>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: Sat, 28 Nov 1992 21:48:00 +0800
|
|
|
|
I've heard that the 757 has a very high thrust to weight ratio. Just
|
|
how high is it ? Is it the highest of any commercial jetliner ?
|
|
|
|
I've also heard that there is a boeing-internal video of it
|
|
during tests doing an [almost?] straight vertical climb.
|
|
|
|
What are the facts here ?
|
|
|
|
Thanks.
|
|
|
|
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
|
Bob Coggeshall, President
|
|
Cogwheel Incorporated - Producers of Low-cost dial-up IP Routers
|
|
coggs@hongkong.Cogwheel.COM
|
|
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
From kls Sun Nov 29 14:35:27 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: weiss@wright.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss)
|
|
Subject: Re: pair (sorry, couldn't resist the pun)
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.4@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.23@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.26@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.40@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: SEASnet, University of California, Los Angeles
|
|
X-Original-Message-Id: <8761@lee.SEAS.UCLA.EDU>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 29 Nov 92 08:04:20 GMT
|
|
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.26@ohare.Chicago.COM> kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) writes:
|
|
>In article <airliners.1992.23@ohare.Chicago.COM> weiss@mott.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss) writes:
|
|
>>However, Boeing has a history of being the best aircraft in the
|
|
>>world in terms of maintenance; Airbus apparently makes planes that are almost
|
|
>>as difficult to repair and inspect as McDonnell-Douglas.
|
|
>I have not previously encountered negative comments regarding
|
|
>McDonnell-Douglas products in this context, however, and in fact have
|
|
>heard that the DC-10 is rather well-liked because it's somewhat like
|
|
>a big Chevy V-8 -- solid, and easy to fix when it breaks. (Problems
|
|
>with the design of the hydraulics notwithstanding.)
|
|
|
|
All of my repair information comes from my girlfriend's brother, who works as
|
|
a maintenance guy for SkyWest (a commuter airline that operates also as the
|
|
Delta Connection in Los Angeles, Palm Springs, Phoenix, and Las Vegas
|
|
primarily). He said that DC-10s are notorious for repairs being all-day
|
|
operations, whereas Boeing's 737-300 and -400, 747-300 and -400, 757, and 767
|
|
have self-diagnostic systems that go so far as to direct the location of the
|
|
repair instructions down to the page, turning the repairs into a half-day
|
|
operation instead. Note that I cannot verify this information, but I see no
|
|
reason to dispute it.
|
|
|
|
>Seems to me that Lockheed, the L-1011 in particular but perhaps the
|
|
>Electra in its time as well, tended toward somewhat more finicky
|
|
>products that compensated by giving better performance.
|
|
|
|
Now there's one I should ask my cousin. He was a test pilot for the L-1011
|
|
when he was first hired by Lockheed.
|
|
|
|
>With regard to the MD-12, MacDAC seems to remain in the race nearly as
|
|
>much as Boeing and Airbus, though their ability to carry through with
|
|
>an actual aircraft is certainly less certain given their finances. In
|
|
>any case all three are paper planes until the airlines get themselves
|
|
>into better financial shape.
|
|
|
|
My understanding is that the capital exists within Boeing, and can certainly
|
|
be "created" within Airbus, but MacDAC has been losing faith quickly from its
|
|
investors. At least, that's what the LA Times seems to indicate. Rumor had it
|
|
that if the MD-11 did not get cert back in October '91, MacDAC was going to
|
|
have to file for bankruptcy. Again, this was LA Times info.
|
|
--
|
|
\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | /
|
|
- Michael weiss@seas.ucla.edu | School of Engineering & Applied Science -
|
|
- Weiss izzydp5@oac.ucla.edu | University of California, Los Angeles -
|
|
/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | \
|
|
|
|
From kls Sun Nov 29 14:35:28 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: michael@is3000.bmr.gov.au (System Support)
|
|
Subject: Boeing Book
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.41@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Australian Geological Survey Organization
|
|
X-Original-Message-Id: <9211291359.AA08442@is3000.UUCP>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: Sun, 29 Nov 92 13:59:40 AUS
|
|
|
|
Maybe someone can help me. I'm trying to get hold of a new book about
|
|
Boeing entitled something like "The Boeing Story". Does anyone have
|
|
any ideas about such a book, author? Any help would be much
|
|
appreciated. Does Boeing (Seattle) have an email address?
|
|
|
|
Thanking You in appreciation,
|
|
Michael
|
|
|
|
michael@is3000.bmr.gov.au
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
|
|
From kls Sun Nov 29 14:35:28 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: fxm4993@hertz.njit.edu (Farhan Muhammad)
|
|
Subject: Request for the informations on Concorde.
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.42@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: New Jersey Institute of Technology, Newark, N.J.
|
|
X-Original-Message-ID: <1992Nov29.192511.29500@njitgw.njit.edu>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: Sun, 29 Nov 1992 19:25:11 GMT
|
|
|
|
|
|
Hello Everybody.
|
|
Recently, i have come to know from an article that the
|
|
Concorde doesn't have the flaps. Can anyone brief me
|
|
on how the plane flies, specially land without the help
|
|
of flaps.
|
|
|
|
P.S. can anyone inform me on the take-of and landing procedures
|
|
of Concorde.
|
|
|
|
My thanks are offered.
|
|
|
|
Fahan Muhammad
|
|
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Univ.
|
|
|
|
muhammaf@erau.db.erau.edu
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 1 00:13:23 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
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From: gregory@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Greg Wright)
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Subject: Re: The Sporty Game -- Boeing 757
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X-Submission-Date: Wed, 25 Nov 92 13:25:45 PST
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References: <airliners.1992.15@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.27@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Message-ID: <airliners.1992.43@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Organization: Boeing
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Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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X-Submission-Message-Id: <9211252125.AA23119@bcstec.ca.boeing.com>
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Date: 01 Dec 92 00:13:23 PST
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In article <airliners.1992.27@ohare.Chicago.COM> kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) writes:
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>
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>I'm *still* surprised that Boeing hasn't made much noise (maybe none)
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>about plugging this obvious hole by offering a 757-100 or whatever --
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>a shortened 757 like the original proposal and a real replacement for
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>the 727-200. Even with United it never seemed to come up, instead all
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>the discussion focussing on a massively stretched and pulled and re-
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>designed 737-600. True, a 757 is more expensive (~ $45 million versus
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>$30 - 35 million) but the changes embodied in the 737-600 would surely
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>have added tremendously to the price.
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>
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>--
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>Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com
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>1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls
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> |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA
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> Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com
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I think that you will find that every attempt at a shortened version
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of one of our planes has had limited success. Take the 747SP for example.
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Airlines tend not to like the sorted versions very much. In $/seat or $/mile
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these versions are too expensive to run. There is a real problem having
|
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too much engine or wing with them. We find it is better to stretch if
|
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anything....
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Greg
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--
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|
________Greg Wright____________ "I struggle to be brief
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| gregory@bcstec.ca.boeing.com | and become obscure."
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| gregory@halcyon.com |
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|____uunet!bcstec!gregory_______| NOT A BOEING SPOKESPERSON.
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From kls Tue Dec 1 00:13:24 1992
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Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners,rec.travel.air
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Path: news
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From: cid@athena.mit.edu (Derek H Cedillo)
|
|
Subject: A320 loses wheels and skids 200 feet
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Mon, 30 Nov 1992 03:58:24 GMT
|
|
References: <ca-airbusU2NS6pp@clarinet.com> <airbusU2NS920pe@clarinet.com>
|
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Message-ID: <airliners.1992.44@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
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Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Organization: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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X-Submission-Message-Id: <1992Nov30.035824.22954@athena.mit.edu>
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Date: 01 Dec 92 00:13:24 PST
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A Mexicana A320 Lost its nose gear on takeoff at LAX
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(flt #901 @3:25PM)
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The aircraft was fairly new, what I was wondering,
|
|
was what it takes exactly to lose a gear, especially
|
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on take off. Landing, you have a lot more stress and what not.
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My main concern is that with it being a relatively new
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aircraft, long term stress and maintainence problems
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shouldnt be much of a factor, thus implying either a tragic
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design flaw or machining flaw/one time error.
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I realize that ther rest of the A320's problems
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dont stem from things like this but mainly from control
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|
problems. Does anyone have specific info on what it would/did
|
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take to have this gear fail?
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Thanks
|
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|
|
Derek
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-------------------------------------------------------------------
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"He lived a life of going-to-do,
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and died with nothing done"
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-J. Albery
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In other words---JUST DO IT!
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|
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From kls Tue Dec 1 00:13:24 1992
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Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
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Path: news
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From: slenk@hal.EMBA.UVM.EDU (Carl A Slenk)
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|
Subject: Boeing Book
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Mon, 30 Nov 1992 19:25:43 GMT
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References: <airliners.1992.41@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
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Message-ID: <airliners.1992.45@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
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Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
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Organization: University of Vermont, EMBA Computer Facility
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
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X-Submission-Message-Id: <1992Nov30.192543.16611@uvm.edu>
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Date: 01 Dec 92 00:13:24 PST
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A new book out in January of 93 looks interesting:
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Wide-Body: the Triumph of the 747 by Clive Irving
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Pub: William Morrow &co
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|
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--
|
|
Carl A. Slenk | "A computer lets you make more mistakes faster
|
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slenk@hal.emba.uvm.ed | then any other invention with the possible
|
|
University of Vermont | exceptions of handguns and Tequilla" -
|
|
My opinions;get your own | Mitch Ratcliffe
|
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|
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From kls Tue Dec 1 00:13:25 1992
|
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Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
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Path: news
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From: raveling@Unify.com (Paul Raveling)
|
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Subject: Re: pair (sorry, couldn't resist the pun)
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Mon, 30 Nov 92 20:21:32 GMT
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References: <airliners.1992.4@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.23@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.26@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.40@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
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Message-ID: <airliners.1992.46@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
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Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
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Organization: Unify Corporation (Sacramento)
|
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Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
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X-Submission-Message-Id: <ld7b8zp@Unify.Com>
|
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Date: 01 Dec 92 00:13:25 PST
|
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|
|
In article <airliners.1992.40@ohare.Chicago.COM>, weiss@wright.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss) writes:
|
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>
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|
> In article <airliners.1992.26@ohare.Chicago.COM> kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) writes:
|
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> >In article <airliners.1992.23@ohare.Chicago.COM> weiss@mott.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss) writes:
|
|
> >>However, Boeing has a history of being the best aircraft in the
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> >>world in terms of maintenance; Airbus apparently makes planes that are almost
|
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> >>as difficult to repair and inspect as McDonnell-Douglas.
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> >I have not previously encountered negative comments regarding
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> >McDonnell-Douglas products in this context, however, and in fact have
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> >heard that the DC-10 is rather well-liked because it's somewhat like
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> >a big Chevy V-8 -- solid, and easy to fix when it breaks. (Problems
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> >with the design of the hydraulics notwithstanding.)
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My dad always said that DC-10's were much easier to maintain
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than the Boeings that he also worked on at Western Airlines.
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My impression from him was that the DC-10's greatest advantage
|
|
for maintenance was better access to components or areas needing
|
|
maintenance. To put it another way, the hell-hole count was
|
|
much lower on the DC-10. He also cited a lot of things
|
|
that were simply more durable on the DC-10. This is basically
|
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an echo of your report about being solid and easy to fix.
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|
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Background: My dad worked in Western's LAX shop until he
|
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retired about the time Western merged into Delta. The Boeings
|
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in question were 707's, 720's, 727's, and 737's. Farther back
|
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(1950's) he also worked for Boeing's Renton plant when they
|
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were first manufacturing 707's and KC-135's. He still did
|
|
occasional minor consulting jobs for Boeing until retirement,
|
|
typically to update quick-reference maintenance manuals.
|
|
He also had contacts at United's LAX shop who passed on
|
|
info about 747's & 767's.
|
|
|
|
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|
------------------
|
|
Paul Raveling
|
|
Raveling@Unify.com
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From kls Tue Dec 1 00:13:26 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: Christopher Davis <ckd@eff.org>
|
|
Subject: MD-11 milestone dates
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Mon, 30 Nov 1992 15:34:58 -0500
|
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References: <airliners.1992.36@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.47@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <199211302034.AA07008@loiosh.eff.org>
|
|
Date: 01 Dec 92 00:13:26 PST
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|
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KS> == Karl Swartz <kls@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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|
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KS> Having received several other submissions mentioning earlier service
|
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KS> dates I decided to look up the real dates for the MD-11 and hopefully
|
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KS> nail the lid on the debate once and for all.
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KS> date LN reg'n note
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KS> ---- -- ----- ----
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KS> Dec 21 1990 453 N891DL delivery of Delta's first two MD-11s, leased
|
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KS> 454 N892DL from Mitsui (GE engines; Delta's own are PW)
|
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|
|
Interesting note on these two; I was on a DL flight from CVG-BOS last
|
|
night (Thanksgiving travel :) and was looking in the seat pocket (trying
|
|
to find a DL postcard I didn't already have, actually) and noted their
|
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"supplemental" emergency information card, which covers the aisle
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lighting (red lights at exits, white elsewhere) now standard.
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The card listed all of DL's jet types, with an interesting note next to
|
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MD-11: "(except ships 891 and 892)". After looking in JP, we realized
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that these were the "odd couple" and that explained it.
|
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(Unrelated notes: 757 BOS-CVG, 727 CVG-CLE, 727 CLE-CVG, 757 CVG-BOS,
|
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and the outdoor viewing deck at CLE was closed (sigh) but at least the
|
|
glassed-in area was open...)
|
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|
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|
|
From kls Tue Dec 1 00:13:26 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: Christopher Davis <ckd@eff.org>
|
|
Subject: Re: Boeing Book
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Mon, 30 Nov 1992 15:41:12 -0500
|
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References: <airliners.1992.41@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.48@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <199211302041.AA07012@loiosh.eff.org>
|
|
Date: 01 Dec 92 00:13:26 PST
|
|
|
|
Michael> == System Support <michael@is3000.bmr.gov.au>
|
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|
|
Michael> Maybe someone can help me. I'm trying to get hold of a new
|
|
Michael> book about Boeing entitled something like "The Boeing Story".
|
|
Michael> Does anyone have any ideas about such a book, author? Any help
|
|
Michael> would be much appreciated.
|
|
|
|
This might be the Robert Serling _Legend & Legacy_, which I hope to find
|
|
the time to do a book review on, eventually. *Very* good book. (I
|
|
don't have an ISBN handy, the book's at home.)
|
|
|
|
Michael> Does Boeing (Seattle) have an email address?
|
|
|
|
Probably not an official one, if that's what you're asking. There are a
|
|
number of divisions of Boeing, and they're all under the boeing.com domain.
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 1 02:10:47 1992
|
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Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard)
|
|
Subject: Re: Seeking pointers on switch design.
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Tue, 1 Dec 1992 02:17:17 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.28@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.49@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Boeing
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
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X-Submission-Message-Id: <ByK6Cu.Muy@bcstec.ca.boeing.com>
|
|
Date: 01 Dec 92 02:10:47 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.28@ohare.Chicago.COM> rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) writes:
|
|
>I'm looking for pointers to articles on the human-factors ramifications of
|
|
>switch design. I've noticed an interesting difference between Airbus and
|
|
>Boeing switch philosophy.
|
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>
|
|
[Much interesting material deleted]
|
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>
|
|
>On the other hand, Airbus' design can be rationalized in that if the computers
|
|
>do *all* routine management, as they do, then bringing the pilots in the loop
|
|
>at initial start-up is an invitation for error: in this model, pilot involve-
|
|
>ment is an *abnormal* event, and signs of that involvement should be
|
|
>highlighted. This raises interesting implications of the pilots being out of
|
|
>the loop TOO long, perhaps never dealing with a system or mentally "reviewing"
|
|
>that system for several flights, as would be the case with more "hands-on"
|
|
>initialization and management. This could be the reason behind Airbus's
|
|
>pre-flight "walk-through," in which each switch illuminates in sequence,
|
|
>requiring the pilot to depress it to extinguish the light.
|
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>
|
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>Comments? References?
|
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|
|
I'd just like to address one small part of your message, the part dealing
|
|
with pilots being out of the loop too long. I've read not to long ago that
|
|
there is research being performed on a tweak of the flight management
|
|
systems paradigm. Instead of the FMCS just flying the programmed course,
|
|
the new thought is to have it tell the pilot the next step and have the
|
|
pilot initiate the maneuver. This keeps the flight crew mentally engaged,
|
|
one hopes. Apparently there is a history of incidents where the pilot was
|
|
too far behind the airplane.
|
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|
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I just love this industry! :-)
|
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|
|
|
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|
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--
|
|
Terry
|
|
drinkard@bcstec.boeing.com
|
|
"Anyone who thinks they can hold the company responsible for what I say has
|
|
more lawyers than sense."
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 1 02:10:49 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard)
|
|
Subject: Re: hydraulic problems with DC-10's??
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Tue, 1 Dec 1992 02:25:46 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.6@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.8@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.30@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.50@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Boeing
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <ByK6qz.8G@bcstec.ca.boeing.com>
|
|
Date: 01 Dec 92 02:10:49 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.30@ohare.Chicago.COM> weiss@curtiss.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss) writes:
|
|
>
|
|
>In article <airliners.1992.8@ohare.Chicago.COM> kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) writes:
|
|
>>In article <airliners.1992.6@ohare.Chicago.COM> sdl@linus.mitre.org writes:
|
|
>>>Some of my pilot friends have accused the DC-10 as having a
|
|
>>>particularly bad history of hydraulic problems (which have
|
|
>>>contributed to a few crashes).
|
|
>>Two, at least. AA 191 at Chicago/O'Hare on May 25, 1979, and UA 232
|
|
>>at Sioux City, Iowa on July 19, 1989.
|
|
>
|
|
>I have a hard time believing that an intact hydraulic system would have
|
|
>prevented AA191 from crashing. Let's face it, a wing-mounted engine falling
|
|
>off produces such a rediculous unbalance that even full aileron wouldn't be
|
|
>able to counter it.
|
|
|
|
Not true. An engine departing the airplane is a planned for event, in
|
|
terms of stability and control. An aileron would have no problem
|
|
countering just the imbalance of thrust (and it would actually be mostly
|
|
rudder), in fact, without the added drag of a windmilling engine, the
|
|
problem is a bit simplified. Flight AA 191 lost the slats on the left hand
|
|
wing (if memory serves) because of Douglas' failure to include mechanical
|
|
lockouts on the slat actuators. They were not required to certify the
|
|
airplane. But then, why build a 'just barely good enough' airplane? The
|
|
#1 engine departed the wing, taking the hydraulic lines that run along the
|
|
front spar with it. This cause a major loss of pressure in the slat
|
|
actuators which were then pushed back into the wing by dynamic pressure.
|
|
The assymetrical loss of the leading edge high lift devices was a major
|
|
contributing factor in this crash.
|
|
|
|
Interestingly enough, the DC-10 is often used as an illustration of how NOT
|
|
to design hydraulic systems.
|
|
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Terry
|
|
drinkard@bcstec.boeing.com
|
|
"Anyone who thinks they can hold the company responsible for what I say has
|
|
more lawyers than sense."
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 1 02:10:50 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: duchad@rpi.edu (David Benedict Ducharme)
|
|
Subject: GE aerospace
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Tue, 1 Dec 1992 07:23:35 GMT
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.51@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <rq!24=q@rpi.edu>
|
|
Date: 01 Dec 92 02:10:50 PST
|
|
|
|
I was in an argument the other day that I hope that can be cleared up here
|
|
|
|
was GE aerospace sold straightout, or was it merged with MM.
|
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|
|
|
|
sold straightout meaning that they no longer have any say in those dealing
|
|
anymore.
|
|
|
|
thanks
|
|
|
|
email is fine
|
|
duchad@rpi.edu
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 1 02:10:51 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz)
|
|
Subject: Re: Boeing Book
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Tue, 1 Dec 1992 08:45:34 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.41@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.52@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Chicago Software Works
|
|
X-Submission-Message-ID: <1992Dec1.084534.12650@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 01 Dec 92 02:10:51 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.41@ohare.Chicago.COM> michael@is3000.bmr.gov.au (System Support) writes:
|
|
>Maybe someone can help me. I'm trying to get hold of a new book about
|
|
>Boeing entitled something like "The Boeing Story". Does anyone have
|
|
>any ideas about such a book, author?
|
|
|
|
As Christopher Davis pointed out, "Legend and Legacy" sounds like the
|
|
book you're after. There was a review posted on rec.aviation recently;
|
|
I believe Robert Dorsett may have it archived on rascal.ics.utexas.edu
|
|
if you have anon ftp access.
|
|
|
|
A good source for books on airliners (though not this particular one;
|
|
the review mentioned B. Dalton's as having it) is "Just Plane Crazy"
|
|
in Miami, the retail arm of World Transport Press which publishes both
|
|
Airliners and Airliners Monthly News, and is the U.S. distributor for
|
|
the JP fleet lists.
|
|
|
|
The best way of reaching them is by phone, and thankfully (for those
|
|
of us on the west coast of the U.S.) they are open late, until 10 pm
|
|
Eastern Time. Saturdays until 6 pm and they open at 10 am. From the
|
|
48 continental states try 1-800/875-6711; elsewhere, 1-305/477-7163.
|
|
They also have a 24-hour FAX line at 1-305/599-1995.
|
|
|
|
By mail, write to
|
|
|
|
Airliners Catalog
|
|
P.O. Box 521238
|
|
Miami, FL 33152-1238
|
|
USA
|
|
|
|
If you happen to be visiting Miami, they're right next to Miami
|
|
International Airport at 1200 NW 72nd Ave. in the Perimeter Road
|
|
Building.
|
|
|
|
All that said, I have no affiliation with them other than as a
|
|
satisfied customer on several occasions.
|
|
|
|
Their latest catalog includes several new books which may be of
|
|
interest, including
|
|
|
|
Douglas DC-8: A Pictorial History
|
|
|
|
Grounded: Frank Lorenzo and the Destruction of Eastern Airlines
|
|
|
|
Too bad he's gone from the scene -- we'd have great fun
|
|
picking on him!!! :-)
|
|
|
|
Jet Airliner Production List (2nd Edition)
|
|
|
|
Mine has been on order for a week; damned Christmas mail
|
|
must have it trapped along the way!
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com
|
|
1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls
|
|
|Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA
|
|
Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 1 13:54:48 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: Christopher Davis <ckd@eff.org>
|
|
Subject: Re: Boeing Book
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Tue, 1 Dec 1992 06:17:08 -0500
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.41@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.48@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.53@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <199212011117.AA07785@loiosh.eff.org>
|
|
Date: 01 Dec 92 13:54:48 PST
|
|
|
|
ckd> == Christopher Davis <Christopher Davis <ckd@eff.org>>
|
|
Michael> == System Support <michael@is3000.bmr.gov.au>
|
|
|
|
Michael> Maybe someone can help me. I'm trying to get hold of a new
|
|
Michael> book about Boeing entitled something like "The Boeing Story".
|
|
Michael> Does anyone have any ideas about such a book, author? Any help
|
|
Michael> would be much appreciated.
|
|
|
|
ckd> This might be the Robert Serling _Legend & Legacy_, which I hope
|
|
ckd> to find the time to do a book review on, eventually. *Very* good
|
|
ckd> book. (I don't have an ISBN handy, the book's at home.)
|
|
|
|
Okay, I'm at home now...information follows in (hopefully) refer format:
|
|
|
|
%A Robert J. Serling
|
|
%T Legend & Legacy: The Story of Boeing and Its People
|
|
%P 480
|
|
%I St. Martin's Press
|
|
%C New York
|
|
%D 1992
|
|
%O ISBN 0-312-05890-X
|
|
%Y US$24.95 (hc)
|
|
|
|
There is a photo section in the center, including some interesting
|
|
"747-300" shots (a trimotor design in the same class as the
|
|
L-1011/DC-10, which obviously never saw production), the 2707 SST
|
|
mockup, the Boeing hydrofoil (one of which I once rode on between
|
|
Victoria BC and Seattle as the _Flying Princess_), and some others. It
|
|
does not include the Boeing light rail vehicle (streetcar) that Boston
|
|
and San Francisco wound up with.
|
|
|
|
(Interesting note: I have had the [probably extremely rare] experience
|
|
of having been a passenger in Boeing vehicles below ground, at ground
|
|
level, at (and slightly above) sea level on water, and of course the
|
|
traditional jet cruising altitudes. Now if I could have only managed a
|
|
trip to the Moon; both the Saturn first stage and the Lunar Rover...)
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 1 13:54:51 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: palmer@icat.larc.nasa.gov (Michael T. Palmer)
|
|
Subject: Flight Envelope Protection (was: TV prog. on 777)
|
|
X-Submission-Date: 1 Dec 92 13:19:47 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.18@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.54@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA USA
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <palmer.723215987@news.larc.nasa.gov>
|
|
Date: 01 Dec 92 13:54:51 PST
|
|
|
|
Robert Dorsett <rdd@cactus.org> writes:
|
|
|
|
>As I understand it, the FBW system is the only way the pilots can signal
|
|
>the actuators. Boeing is simply providing a "conventional" control law and
|
|
>interface, with "protections" that can be over-ridden by the pilot, if
|
|
>necessary. Redundancy/backup is at the hardware level, not in alternate
|
|
>select modes.
|
|
|
|
[etc]
|
|
|
|
>On the other hand, I do think it's a positive step that Boeing's not "re-
|
|
>writing" the book by offering *artificial* control laws, as Airbus is doing.
|
|
>Thus, to override the protections, the pilots just need to push or pull
|
|
>*harder,* or click an overrride button: they don't have to deal with or
|
|
>anticipate the effects of *four* distinct control law modes, and the many
|
|
>permutations within each mode, depending upon system status, as is the case
|
|
>with the A3[2-4]0.
|
|
|
|
|
|
This is correct, and highlights a very important distinction between the
|
|
approaches to flight envelope protection being taken by Boeing & Airbus.
|
|
The B-777 will have protections, but as you noted the crew can override
|
|
them by using excess force on the control column. So, the airplane will
|
|
make it more difficult to do something it thinks shouldn't be done, but
|
|
will always leave the final decision to the crew. In contrast, the
|
|
protection on the A320 *cannot* be overridden - you either get switched
|
|
into an alternate control mode, or your inputs are ignored.
|
|
|
|
This has some serious consequences. For example, in the China Airlines
|
|
B-747 incident 300 nm northwest of San Francisco in 1985 (NTSB/AAR-86-03),
|
|
the crew was forced to overstress (and structurally damage) the horizontal
|
|
tail surfaces to recover from a roll and near-vertical dive following an
|
|
automatic disconnect of the autopilot when it could no longer compensate
|
|
for an asymmetric thrust condition. At the time of disconnect, full
|
|
rudder was engaged to one side and the crew was unaware of this. The
|
|
crew recovered control with about 10,000 ft of altitude left (from an
|
|
original high-altitude cruise). It is very likely that if the aircraft
|
|
had prevented the crew from initiating control commands that would lead
|
|
to aircraft damage, the aircraft (and passengers) would have been lost.
|
|
|
|
Unfortunately, it appears that engine manufacturers may be heading down
|
|
the same path as Airbus with respect to their electronic engine controllers.
|
|
I can't remember which engine it was, but I remember reading that when
|
|
the controller detects a condition for which the proper action is to shut
|
|
the engine down, it will do it itself AND THE CREW CANNOT OVERRIDE THIS
|
|
ACTION. Now, this may seem like a good idea on paper, but remember the
|
|
Eastern L-1011 out of Miami in 1983 (NTSB/AAR-84-04) with the triple
|
|
engine failure because the oil seals were missing? Can you imagine the
|
|
tragic result if the engines had ALL detected this condition (in flight)
|
|
and shut themselves down? It seems to me that letting the crew decide
|
|
to sacrifice an engine to save the airframe is probably a good idea.
|
|
|
|
If nothing else, I hope I have brought up some topics that deserve
|
|
discussion among readers of this newsgroup. After all, aren't we the
|
|
ones in positions to influence our industry (all in our own way, of
|
|
course)?
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Michael T. Palmer, M/S 152, NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA 23681
|
|
Voice: 804-864-2044, FAX: 804-864-7793, Email: m.t.palmer@larc.nasa.gov
|
|
PGP 2.0 Public Key now available -- Consider it an envelope for your e-mail
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 1 13:54:52 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: palmer@icat.larc.nasa.gov (Michael T. Palmer)
|
|
Subject: Re: Airline Software-safety database (RISKS-14.08)
|
|
X-Submission-Date: 1 Dec 92 14:57:47 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.21@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.55@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA USA
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <palmer.723221867@news.larc.nasa.gov>
|
|
Date: 01 Dec 92 13:54:52 PST
|
|
|
|
|
|
Pete Mellor <pm@cs.city.ac.uk> writes:
|
|
|
|
[etc]
|
|
|
|
>Incidents in flight must (or should) be reported via offical channels by the
|
|
>crews. These reports drive the manufacturers' quality improvement programmes.
|
|
>After the fault which caused an incident has been diagnosed, it may result in
|
|
>an OEB or similar, and in a modification.
|
|
|
|
[etc]
|
|
|
|
>Databases of such incident reports are not generally widely accessible.
|
|
>Published reports sometimes appear, however. In addition, there are channels
|
|
>for anonymous reporting of incidents. In the UK, "CHIRP" is such a forum. In
|
|
>the US, I believe the FAA used to run such a scheme, but it was compromised
|
|
>when the guarantee of anonymity was removed.
|
|
|
|
>For further information I suggest you contact ALPA.
|
|
|
|
[etc]
|
|
|
|
>I stand to be corrected if anyone *does* know of an official channel for
|
|
>public access to flight incident and system fault reports.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Okay, here goes. In the USA, NASA and the FAA have teamed up to deploy
|
|
the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), which is managed by folks at
|
|
NASA Ames Research Center, Moffet Field, CA. I believe the original
|
|
poster misunderstood the intent and operation of the ASRS, so I will try
|
|
to fill in some details. Anyone from the ASRS Office at Ames is free
|
|
to jump in and correct any mistakes I make.
|
|
|
|
The ASRS collects incident and accident reports for all aviation-related
|
|
activities, including flight, air traffic control, and maintenance. The
|
|
way it works is that whenever an individual is involved in an incident,
|
|
he or she is encouraged to submit an ASRS report describing what happended,
|
|
why they think it happended, and what should be done to correct the problem
|
|
so it doesn't happen again. The fact that a report is submitted (receipts
|
|
are kept for proof) is accepted by the FAA as a sheild from legal
|
|
retribution except in cases of gross misconduct or criminal intent. There
|
|
is no anonymity, per se, in the filing of the report.
|
|
|
|
When the reports are collected and entered into the ASRS database, they
|
|
have keywords identified to allow easier searches on related topics. At
|
|
this time, they are also "de-identified." This may be what the original
|
|
poster misunderstood as a guarantee of anonymity. During de-identification,
|
|
all references that would lead a later reader of the report to be able to
|
|
identify the exact person, place, and aircraft (by N-number) involved are
|
|
removed and replaced by generic terms. This protects filers from, say,
|
|
unscrupulous company or government people that seek to harrass them later
|
|
for possibly unrelated reasons.
|
|
|
|
Now, for the good part. This database, which is HUGE, is publicly
|
|
"accessible." However, the access is controlled, and database search
|
|
requests must be submitted to and approved by the ASRS office. This
|
|
helps to prevent frivolous or duplicative use, which could rack up *very*
|
|
large costs *quickly* due to the sheer size of the database. The actual
|
|
searches are performed by Battelle, Inc. under contract to NASA Ames.
|
|
The Ames (NASA) person to call for more information about the ASRS is
|
|
Vince Mellone at (415) 969-3969 or (415) 604-6467. The database search
|
|
requests are actually sent to:
|
|
|
|
Battelle ASRS Office
|
|
625 Ellis Street, Suite 305
|
|
Mountain View, CA 94043
|
|
|
|
If you have never used the ASRS before, I suggest you give Vince a call
|
|
first to find out what information you need to provide in your search
|
|
request so the Battelle people can help you find what you're actually
|
|
looking for.
|
|
|
|
Note that the ASRS database is NOT "on-line" such that anyone could just
|
|
dial in and peruse it at their leisure. So, this may not suffice for
|
|
what the original poster had in mind. However, I would venture to guess
|
|
that any database with enough information in it to provide a reasonable
|
|
basis for design would end up being so large that access MUST be controlled
|
|
somehow. I think the ASRS is a good compromise.
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Michael T. Palmer, M/S 152, NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA 23681
|
|
Voice: 804-864-2044, FAX: 804-864-7793, Email: m.t.palmer@larc.nasa.gov
|
|
PGP 2.0 Public Key now available -- Consider it an envelope for your e-mail
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 1 13:54:52 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: palmer@icat.larc.nasa.gov (Michael T. Palmer)
|
|
Subject: Re: GE aerospace
|
|
X-Submission-Date: 1 Dec 92 15:24:29 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.51@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.56@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA USA
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <palmer.723223469@news.larc.nasa.gov>
|
|
Date: 01 Dec 92 13:54:52 PST
|
|
|
|
duchad@rpi.edu (David Benedict Ducharme) writes:
|
|
|
|
>I was in an argument the other day that I hope that can be cleared up here
|
|
>was GE aerospace sold straightout, or was it merged with MM.
|
|
|
|
>sold straightout meaning that they no longer have any say in those dealing
|
|
>anymore.
|
|
|
|
My understanding is that it was a merger, not an outright sale, based on
|
|
a letter yesterday from a friend who works for "Generous Electric Aerospace."
|
|
Additionally, I believe the FTC has not yet approved the transaction,
|
|
although I may have missed the announcement.
|
|
|
|
Anyone with first-hand knowledge is encouraged to correct me if I'm wrong.
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Michael T. Palmer, M/S 152, NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA 23681
|
|
Voice: 804-864-2044, FAX: 804-864-7793, Email: m.t.palmer@larc.nasa.gov
|
|
PGP 2.0 Public Key now available -- Consider it an envelope for your e-mail
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 1 13:54:53 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: msb@sq.sq.com (Mark Brader)
|
|
Subject: Re: Boeing Book
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Tue, 1 Dec 92 15:45:09 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.41@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.45@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.57@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: SoftQuad Inc., Toronto, Canada
|
|
X-Submission-Message-ID: <1992Dec1.154509.8633@sq.sq.com>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 01 Dec 92 13:54:53 PST
|
|
|
|
> Wide-Body: the Triumph of the 747 by Clive Irving
|
|
|
|
An excerpt from this forthcoming book appears in the current, i.e.
|
|
December-January, issue of "AIR & SPACE / Smithsonian" magazine.
|
|
--
|
|
Mark Brader, SoftQuad Inc., Toronto | "Yet Another Wonderful Novelty -- YAWN!"
|
|
utzoo!sq!msb, msb@sq.com | -- Lee R. Quin
|
|
|
|
This article is in the public domain.
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 1 13:54:54 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: Karl Swartz <kls@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Subject: A310 Aerobatics
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Tue, 1 Dec 92 13:53:48 PST
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.58@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <m0mwfXS-0000U1C@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Date: 01 Dec 92 13:54:54 PST
|
|
|
|
The latest issue of Airliners (Winter 1992) has a fascinating article
|
|
on an incident with an Airbus A310. Some tantalizing details of what
|
|
happened for the fans of leaving the pilot fully in control, but not
|
|
enough information to trace the incident any further. In the hopes
|
|
that someone might know more (PLEASE post any relavent details, and of
|
|
course dicussion is welcome too), and perhaps to turn a few folks onto
|
|
a good magazine, here's the article, from Tailpieces:
|
|
|
|
A310 Aerobatics
|
|
---- ----------
|
|
|
|
Following an autopilot-coupled go-around, the pilot attempted to
|
|
counteract the autopilot's programmed pitch-up by pushing forward on
|
|
the control column. (In most circumstances pushing on the control
|
|
column disengages the autopilot but automatic disconnect is inhibited
|
|
in go-around mode. The autopilot should be disconnected or a mode
|
|
other than go-around should be engaged through the FCU - Flight
|
|
Control Unit.)
|
|
|
|
As a result of the control inputs, the autopilot trimmed the stabil-
|
|
izer to -12 degrees (nose up) to maintain the go-around profile, but
|
|
the elevator was deflected 14 degrees (nose down). After climbing
|
|
about 600 feet (to around 2,100 feet) the autopilot captured its
|
|
preselected missed approach altitude and disconnected as the go-around
|
|
mode was no longer engaged. In the next 30 seconds, the grossly
|
|
mistrimmed A310 pitched up to 88 degrees and airspeed dropped to less
|
|
than 30 kt. (The stall warning activated then canceled itself as the
|
|
airspeed fell below usable computed values and the autothrottle system
|
|
dropped off.) At 4,300 feet, the A310 stalled, pitching down to -42
|
|
degrees while the pilot-applied control inputs showed full up
|
|
elevator. Airspeed increased to 245 kt then the aircraft bottomed out
|
|
at 1,500 feet, pulled +1.7 g, then climed rapidly.
|
|
|
|
The second pitch-up reached 70 degrees followed by a stall 50 secondds
|
|
after the first. The nose dropped to -32 degrees and airspeed rose to
|
|
290 kt and the aircraft bottomed out at 1,800 feet. On the third
|
|
pitch-up (to 74 degrees), the A310 climed to 7,000 ft then stalled
|
|
again, about 60 seconds after the second stall. This time airspeed
|
|
reached 300 kt in a -32 degree nose down attitude before the aircraft
|
|
leveled off at 3,600 feet.
|
|
|
|
The fourth pitch-up reached 9,000 feet but this time the crew's use of
|
|
thrust and elevator control (and very likely retrimming the stabilizer)
|
|
prevented a stall and the A310 leveled off at 130 kt. Speed then
|
|
increased accompanied by another milder pitch-up to 11,500 feet where
|
|
control was eventually regained.
|
|
|
|
All aircraft systems operatedd in accordance with design specifica-
|
|
tions. The reaction of ATC (the incident happened at Moscow) or the
|
|
passengers is not recorded.
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com
|
|
1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls
|
|
|Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA
|
|
Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 1 23:15:18 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard)
|
|
Subject: Re: Boeing 747-300
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Mon, 30 Nov 92 18:05:53 PST
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.4@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.11@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.25@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.59@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Boeing
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <9212010205.AA28597@bcstec.ca.boeing.com>
|
|
Date: 01 Dec 92 23:15:18 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.25@ohare.Chicago.COM> kls@ohare.chicago.com (Karl Swartz) writes:
|
|
>In article <airliners.1992.11@ohare.Chicago.COM> drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard) writes:
|
|
>>In article <airliners.1992.4@ohare.Chicago.COM> jerry@telecom.ksu.edu (Jerry And
|
|
>
|
|
>>>I've heard Boeing, McDonnell-Douglas and Airbus all have plans
|
|
>>>in the works for Really Big Planes in the 600-700 passenger,
|
|
>>>7500-8000 mile range.
|
|
>
|
|
>>The Boeing and the Airbus offerings in this market seem to both hover
|
|
>>around 600 seats and 7,000 mile range. Takeoff weights in the million
|
|
>>pound plus range. The anticipated market, as described by John Hayhurst,
|
|
>>Director of New Large Airplane Division, is only a couple hundred airplanes
|
|
>>TOTAL. From my knothole, it looks like a prestige fight.
|
|
>
|
|
>That's an *awful* lot of cash to dump down a hole simply for bragging
|
|
>rights.
|
|
|
|
It isn't just bragging rights. Prestige has a market value. There are
|
|
several airlines who are not out to make a profit. The national airlines
|
|
of some oil rich countries for example, are not expected to make buck,
|
|
rather to 'carry the flag'. Thai, as another example bought 747s some
|
|
years ago largely because of prestige. Therefore, you have some airlines
|
|
who fly the <superlative of your choice> airplane in the world to make a
|
|
political statement.
|
|
|
|
> I suppose that's part of "being sporty" but there's also a
|
|
>real market there -- the Pacific Rim, which is where nearly all the
|
|
>growth is in the airline industry and which requires those kind of
|
|
>range figures. The load potential is there too, if not now then well
|
|
>well within the next 10 to 20 years.
|
|
|
|
Most of the market you refer to can be filled with stretched 747s. This
|
|
isn't difficult, and it is no doubt being looked at quite closely.
|
|
However, there is a practical limit to the stretch 747, and the real
|
|
question is how many airplanes above that limit can you sell? If the
|
|
answer is pretty small (<100 airplanes maybe?) then it doesn't make any
|
|
sense to build the monster jet. If it is an appreciable number, then it
|
|
makes sense to bypass the 747 stretch and go with an all new large
|
|
airplane. And, as you noted, timing is a big issue. No point in building
|
|
the thing if no one needs it for two or three years after roll-out.
|
|
|
|
>One aircraft that could punch a major hole in this market would be the
|
|
>next generation supersonic transport. (HSCT? I can't pick the right
|
|
>acronym out of my bowl of alphabet soup today ...) *If* built, and at
|
|
>least for now that is a very big if, this too would be aimed directly
|
|
>at the Pacific Rim market. The studies I've seen for this bird seem
|
|
>to be aiming at the mainstream market and not just a very tiny high-
|
|
>priced market like the Concorde.
|
|
|
|
Exactly. Last word I got was ticket prices about 20% above full-price 747
|
|
coach was a target (granted that was a couple of years ago). The HSCT is
|
|
my drool-job. I doubt I'll ever get to work on it, but it really fires my
|
|
imagination. Don't look for one before 2010; we seem to be a bit short on
|
|
engine and materials technology.
|
|
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Terry
|
|
drinkard@bcstec.boeing.com
|
|
"Anyone who thinks they can hold the company responsible for what I say has
|
|
more lawyers than sense."
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 1 23:15:20 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: gary@maestro.mitre.org (Gary Bisaga)
|
|
Subject: Re: pair (sorry, couldn't resist the pun)
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Tue, 1 Dec 1992 18:01:51 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.4@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.23@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.26@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.40@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.60@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Reply-To: gary@maestro.mitre.org (Gary Bisaga)
|
|
Organization: The MITRE Corporation, McLean, Va
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <1992Dec1.180151.4587@linus.mitre.org>
|
|
Date: 01 Dec 92 23:15:20 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.40@ohare.Chicago.COM>, weiss@wright.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss) writes:
|
|
|>
|
|
|> All of my repair information comes from my girlfriend's brother, who works as
|
|
|> a maintenance guy for SkyWest (a commuter airline that operates also as the
|
|
|> Delta Connection in Los Angeles, Palm Springs, Phoenix, and Las Vegas
|
|
|> primarily). He said that DC-10s are notorious for repairs being all-day
|
|
|> operations, whereas Boeing's 737-300 and -400, 747-300 and -400, 757, and 767
|
|
|> have self-diagnostic systems that go so far as to direct the location of the
|
|
|> repair instructions down to the page, turning the repairs into a half-day
|
|
|> operation instead. Note that I cannot verify this information, but I see no
|
|
|> reason to dispute it.
|
|
Nor would I - but you're comparing apples to oranges. The other aircraft you
|
|
mention probably have much more extensive electronic maintenance aids since
|
|
most have much more extensive avionics in general. It wouldn't surprise me
|
|
if there was also more electronic diagnosis.
|
|
|
|
The MD-11, of course, is just as highly outfitted with electronics as any
|
|
of those others - and the FMC design is newer as well, if I'm not mistaken -
|
|
so a comparison with the MD-11 would almost certainly be different.
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Gary Bisaga (gbisaga@mitre.org)
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 1 23:15:21 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: ncole@nyx.cs.du.edu (Noah Cole)
|
|
Subject: Re: The Sporty Game -- Boeing 757
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Tue, 1 Dec 92 18:10:57 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.15@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.27@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.43@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.61@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Macalester College, St. Paul Minnesota USA
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <1992Dec1.181057.11073@mnemosyne.cs.du.edu>
|
|
Date: 01 Dec 92 23:15:21 PST
|
|
|
|
gregory@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Greg Wright) writes:
|
|
|
|
|
|
> I think that you will find that every attempt at a shortened version
|
|
>of one of our planes has had limited success. Take the 747SP for example.
|
|
>Airlines tend not to like the sorted versions very much. In $/seat or $/mile
|
|
>these versions are too expensive to run. There is a real problem having
|
|
>too much engine or wing with them. We find it is better to stretch if
|
|
>anything....
|
|
|
|
>Greg
|
|
|
|
How many airlines use 747SP's today? I have a poster from Popular Mechanics
|
|
that was around the arrival of the 747-400 with a drawing of a United
|
|
747SP and it said that the 747SP set a record flying from Payne Field, Washington to South Africa. Was that SAA? Who flies the 747SP Today and on what routes?
|
|
|
|
-Noah Cole
|
|
--
|
|
Noah Cole "Outside is America, NCOLE@MACALSTR.EDU
|
|
Macalester College and also the car park" ncole@nyx.cs.du.edu
|
|
St. Paul, MN 55105 - Bono, 27 December 1989 cncole@coos.dartmouth.edu
|
|
612-696-7388 Dublin aj909@cleveland.freenet.edu
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 1 23:15:22 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: cid@athena.mit.edu (Derek H Cedillo)
|
|
Subject: Re: GE aerospace
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Tue, 1 Dec 1992 23:48:26 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.51@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.62@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <1992Dec1.234826.25858@athena.mit.edu>
|
|
Date: 01 Dec 92 23:15:22 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.51@ohare.Chicago.COM> duchad@rpi.edu (David Benedict Ducharme) writes:
|
|
>I was in an argument the other day that I hope that can be cleared up here
|
|
>was GE aerospace sold straightout, or was it merged with MM.
|
|
>sold straightout meaning that they no longer have any say in those dealing
|
|
>anymore.
|
|
|
|
According to UPI reports on the dealing the whole deal is worth $3.05 Billion
|
|
In the deal GE Gets $1 billion in convertible preffered stock.
|
|
I hate to see GE lose a part of itself, but it was a wise move.
|
|
|
|
Does anyone know what is to become of the Ft. Worth, IN plant?
|
|
I didnt see it listed in the buisness locations to be
|
|
taken over by MM.
|
|
Is there going to be some work done by GE somewhat autonomously
|
|
still in the biz?
|
|
|
|
Thanks,
|
|
|
|
Derek
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 1 23:15:22 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: Christopher Davis <ckd@eff.org>
|
|
Subject: Quote of the Day
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Tue, 1 Dec 1992 19:00:23 -0500
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.63@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <199212020000.AA08356@eff.org>
|
|
Date: 01 Dec 92 23:15:22 PST
|
|
|
|
Seen in Aviation Week & Space Technology, November 23, 1992, p. 73:
|
|
|
|
``We and Boeing have completely different philosophies,'' and Airbus
|
|
official said. ``Ours is based on experience--Boeing is quite different.
|
|
Airbus has a tremendous heritage of technology; Boeing does not.''
|
|
|
|
I will refrain from comment other than to say that technology is not the
|
|
object of commercial airliner design--safety and efficiency are.
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 1 23:15:23 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett)
|
|
Subject: Re: Boeing Book
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Tue, 1 Dec 92 21:29:20 CST
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.41@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.64@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <9212020329.AA05534@cactus.org>
|
|
Date: 01 Dec 92 23:15:23 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.52@ohare.Chicago.COM> you write:
|
|
>In article <airliners.1992.41@ohare.Chicago.COM> michael@is3000.bmr.gov.au (System Support) writes:
|
|
>>Maybe someone can help me. I'm trying to get hold of a new book about
|
|
>>Boeing entitled something like "The Boeing Story". Does anyone have
|
|
>>any ideas about such a book, author?
|
|
>
|
|
>As Christopher Davis pointed out, "Legend and Legacy" sounds like the
|
|
>book you're after.
|
|
|
|
It might also be "Boeing: Planemaker since 1916," by one Philip M. Bowers.
|
|
It's an exhaustive review of all the airplanes (and variants) Boeing's
|
|
produced, sort of a mini Jane's. It's a long book (over 600 pages). It
|
|
appeared at Bookstop here in Austin sometime this summer; it's about $36.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
Robert Dorsett
|
|
rdd@cactus.org
|
|
...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 1 23:15:24 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard)
|
|
Subject: Re: 757 highest thrust to weight ratio ?
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 2 Dec 1992 03:32:35 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.39@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.65@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Boeing
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <ByM4ID.As6@bcstec.ca.boeing.com>
|
|
Date: 01 Dec 92 23:15:24 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.39@ohare.Chicago.COM> Bob Coggeshall <coggs@Hongkong.Cogwheel.COM> writes:
|
|
>I've heard that the 757 has a very high thrust to weight ratio. Just
|
|
>how high is it ? Is it the highest of any commercial jetliner ?
|
|
|
|
My back-of-the-envelope calculations would suggest about a .38 thrust to
|
|
weight ratio. That is assuming the RR RB211-535E4B gives around 42,000 lb
|
|
thrust (SLST) at a MTOW of 220,000 lb. I'm not aware of anyone who
|
|
actually bought that configuration, though. Oh, and on their acceptance
|
|
flight tests, (I got to fly one on a 737-400 once) these babies are *empty*
|
|
and climb like homesick angels. I have seen VSIs pegged (6,000fpm+).
|
|
|
|
>I've also heard that there is a boeing-internal video of it
|
|
>during tests doing an [almost?] straight vertical climb.
|
|
|
|
I've never seen it, but then I don't do any flight test stuff.
|
|
|
|
>What are the facts here ?
|
|
|
|
Excellent question! :-)
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Terry
|
|
drinkard@bcstec.boeing.com
|
|
"Anyone who thinks they can hold the company responsible for what I say has
|
|
more lawyers than sense."
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Dec 2 03:49:46 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: fxm4993@hertz.njit.edu (Farhan Muhammad)
|
|
Subject: Concorde-landing procedures
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Tue, 1 Dec 1992 21:50:26 GMT
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.66@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: New Jersey Institute of Technology, Newark, N.J.
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-ID: <1992Dec1.215026.29278@njitgw.njit.edu>
|
|
Date: 02 Dec 92 03:49:46 PST
|
|
|
|
|
|
Landing approach of Concord.
|
|
---------------------------
|
|
|
|
Excerpt from the book "Flying Concorde".
|
|
|
|
'200 feet.'
|
|
|
|
The flight engineer, who cannot see the runway since he is behind and
|
|
a little below the pilots, is reading the radio altimeters which are
|
|
bouncing signals off the groiund to determine height to within a foot.
|
|
|
|
'100 feet ...
|
|
'50, 40, 30, 20, 15.'
|
|
|
|
At 40 feet the autothrottles are disconnected by pressing a small button
|
|
on either side of the levers. A slight backward movement of the stick
|
|
slows the rate of descent a little, pitching up perhaps a degree, from
|
|
10.5 to 11.5 degrees. The pilot's eye is still 75 feet above the runway
|
|
(about the same height as a 747 pilot's) and he aims at a point about
|
|
2000 feet down the runway, knowing that the main wheels, trailing below
|
|
and behind, will arrive well before that point.
|
|
|
|
From about 100-feet altitude we have been about to hear the 'ground effect'
|
|
starting. A large wing, approaching the ground, begins at some point to
|
|
squeeze the air between it and the surface, settling into a cushion of its own
|
|
making. The large wing area and the high angle of attack make this effect
|
|
more pronounced on Concorde than on conventional swept-wing aircraft, and
|
|
seems to throw back some of the noise of air rushing into the engines.
|
|
That is what it sounds like, at any rate.
|
|
|
|
At fifteen feet, the throttles are closed. The immediate effect is
|
|
a tendency for the nose to drop. Landing is largely a matter of countering
|
|
this tendency as the aeroplane settles into its ground effect. A slow
|
|
backward movement of the stick keeps the nose where it is. The rate of
|
|
movement depends on the strength of the pitch-down tendency. Good landings
|
|
are simply a question of getting the balance right, so that the nose stays
|
|
rock-steady against the far end of the runway.
|
|
|
|
Once on the ground there is a second landing to perform- the nosewheel
|
|
is still a long way in the air. A nudge forward with the stick to get it
|
|
on its way, followed by a backward movement to cushion its descent, and
|
|
all the wheels have arrived.
|
|
|
|
As soon as the main wheels are on the ground, reverse thrust is engaged.
|
|
Once the nosewheel is on, power is increased in reverse to kill the speed.
|
|
At this point the stick is pushed fully forward to keep the nosewheel on
|
|
the ground, as the low-slung engines, producing their reverse thrust below
|
|
the body line, would tend to raise it again if allowed.
|
|
|
|
The elevons are still effective, though, and the nosewheel is kept firmly
|
|
on the runway as braking starts. The powerful carbon discs get to work, the
|
|
speed reduces, and the runway, which on touchdown didn't seem as long as it
|
|
shuold be, with the eye still 35 feet in the air, lengthens again to its
|
|
proper shape.
|
|
|
|
'100 knots.'
|
|
The two outboard throttles are pushed into reverse idle.
|
|
'75 knots.'
|
|
The inner follow.
|
|
'40 knots.'
|
|
|
|
All the engines are returned to forward idle power and the aeroplane
|
|
is nearly ready to be turned off. It is easy, in any aeroplane, to think
|
|
that the speed just after landing is lower than it really is, so a glance at
|
|
the INS groundspeed is useful here.
|
|
|
|
Once we have turned off the runway, he nose is raised to the 5-degree
|
|
position again, and the two inboard engines are shut down (at this weight,
|
|
at the end of a flight, two engines provide quite enough power for taxiing).
|
|
|
|
From runway 31 Left it is a longish taxi round to the British Airways
|
|
terminal on the other side of the circle of airport buildings. As we
|
|
approach it the time is a few minutes after 3.00 pm in London. Here, in
|
|
New York, we are nearing out scheduled arrival time of 10.15 - apparently
|
|
an hour before we left our gate at Heathrow. Just under four hours, gate
|
|
to gate: an hour less than it takes the earth to rotate through the
|
|
angular distance separating London and New York. Three and a half hours'
|
|
flight-time to cover three and half thousand miles - an average speed
|
|
of a thousand miles an hour.
|
|
|
|
Some of the disembarking passengers show signs of excitement - it has
|
|
been their first supersonic flight, and it will be a while before they have
|
|
sorted out the mixture of unreality and normality they have experienced.
|
|
Others, the majority now, take it all for granted - they have probably
|
|
used Concorde several times. And it has been normal. So it should be
|
|
by now; but this normality had to be present from the first flight, in
|
|
January 1976, and that took a little doing.
|
|
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Dec 2 03:49:48 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners,rec.travel.air
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett)
|
|
Subject: Re: Airbus safety
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 2 Dec 92 01:30 PST
|
|
References: <1992Nov26.000453.4729@cactus.org> <1992Dec01.025604.17493@news.mentorg.com> <ByL8Hp.LM8@apollo.hp.com>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.67@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Summary:
|
|
Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx
|
|
Expires:
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <m0mwqPF-0000caC@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 02 Dec 92 03:49:48 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <ByL8Hp.LM8@apollo.hp.com> nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:
|
|
>>Remember that the standard definition of an airline pilot's job is 99.999%
|
|
>>pute boredom, and 0.001% pure terror (I forget where this quote came from,
|
|
>>and the ratios may be incorrect) - if this is anything like true, maybe
|
|
>>human pilots really are on the edge of extinction ?
|
|
>
|
|
> _New Scientist_ had an article devoted to this about 3 issues ago.
|
|
>
|
|
> Basically they said that as the % of "pilot error" crashes increases
|
|
> we may already be at the point where more lives would be saved by
|
|
> pilotless airplanes.
|
|
|
|
This is certainly a debatable contention. Airbus certainly seems to believe
|
|
it: but it's also in the business of selling products "differentiated" by
|
|
their style of protection.
|
|
|
|
The reality of the situation is that the safety record has remained pretty
|
|
much constant since the late 1970's--note: not the early 1980's, when the
|
|
first automated aircraft were introduced. It has stabilized at about 1500
|
|
lives per year. What IS true is that as mechanical failures are isolated
|
|
and fixed, the proportion of pilot-induced failures must, necessarily, in-
|
|
crease. The problem facing the industry is how to get the death rate to
|
|
zero: we don't seem to wish to recognize that, with current technology, it
|
|
may not be possible, and that we may see steadily diminishing returns in
|
|
our efforts to do so.
|
|
|
|
The proportion of pilot-error incidents range from 60% to 95% of the total
|
|
number of crashes, with Airbus generally supporting the latter figure. The
|
|
problem, of course, is how one defines *pilot error*. Is "pilot error"
|
|
pushing the wrong switch? Suddenly pushing, instead of pulling, on the
|
|
yoke? A psychotic break? Naturally, none of these things: in all instances,
|
|
"pilot error" has been a case of a broader *system* failure, the system being
|
|
a combination of the pilot, his peers, the airplane, its interface, the
|
|
airline, and the regulatory backdrop. In precious few cases were the pilots
|
|
"asleep at the wheel," or criminally incapacitated.
|
|
|
|
What is debatable is how many of these factors can be eliminated, simply
|
|
by increasing automation, reducing oversight authority, or transferring
|
|
responsibility for operations to ground controllers.
|
|
|
|
It is EXTREMELY important to realize that we're struggling against an *ideal*:
|
|
no crashes. It is also important to note that if, indeed, pilot error is
|
|
*increasing*, then it's probably a result of over-automation in the cockpit,
|
|
since virtually no other part of the infrastructure has changed since the
|
|
late 70's. The simple, short-term solution is to reduce the degree of auto-
|
|
mation, or at least bring the pilot back into the loop (not necessarily
|
|
exclusive concepts!).
|
|
|
|
You would have a hard time convincing me that the number of fundamental errors
|
|
would not increase GREATLY with ground-based oversight, that the safety
|
|
margins would not go DOWN, as people fundamentally distanced from the reality
|
|
of a flight have a go/no-go say.
|
|
|
|
|
|
>And moreover, the technology to do this either
|
|
> already exists or is close at hand.
|
|
|
|
The technology isn't close to create safe, fully autonomous aircraft.
|
|
And, in lack of that, we'd need ground-based control, with a high degree of
|
|
automation in-flight. The infrastructure needed to support this would be
|
|
exhorbitantly expensive (and who would run it: the dispatch controller, who
|
|
just sees a number on a status board, and wants to make his schedule? A
|
|
government specialist?). In addition, we'd almost certainly be replacing the
|
|
existing social and interface problems that currently exist in the *air*, with
|
|
a new, untried set of problems on the ground.
|
|
|
|
More than any other trend in aviation, this sort of talk, much of which seems
|
|
to originate with Airbus, and which deliberately, blithely underrates the
|
|
problems involved in reducing pilot authority, worries me that we've passed
|
|
the point of negative returns. The problem, again, is not automation: to
|
|
paraphrase Don Norman, it's appropriate feedback. Or, in mil-speak, the
|
|
minimum capability needed to carry out the mission requirements. There is
|
|
abundant evidence that, in fact, this requirement can be met with *less*
|
|
automation, *better* interfaces, and keeping the pilots in the loop.
|
|
However, there is also evidence that flight deck design is engineering-and
|
|
marketing-driven, and that "good" human factors does not play a primary role
|
|
in flight deck design, except as a rubber-stamp on a pre-existing systemic
|
|
intent.
|
|
|
|
There is also increasing evidence that hybrid designs: with high degree of
|
|
automation, and relegating the pilot to a passive, supervisory role, out of
|
|
the loop, are *not* the way to go.
|
|
|
|
|
|
> They said, however, that it would be a public-relations nightmare and
|
|
> felt there was no hope of selling the idea to the public.
|
|
|
|
Was Bernard Ziegler the author of this article, perchance? :-) It's
|
|
symptomatic of the technocratic solution: full-speed ahead with quantifiable
|
|
solutions, damn the pilots. Even if we don't fully understand the
|
|
consequences of the resulting environment, when these solutions have to
|
|
ultimately interact with human beings, at least at some level.
|
|
|
|
|
|
> People will
|
|
> continue to cite those cases where coolness or quick thinking on
|
|
> the part of the crew did save the airplane or at least many lives.
|
|
|
|
I wouldn't. Rather, I would ask how well we understand the *totality* of
|
|
in-flight incidents and actions, which are corrected by appropriate air-
|
|
manship. An old, true saying, is that a good pilot is a pilot who doesn't
|
|
have to show he's a good pilot. Is the capability of being able to maintain
|
|
control in a thunderstorm really that relevant, when 99% of all pilots would
|
|
simply have flown around the same thunderstorm?
|
|
|
|
|
|
We can automate easily quantifiable issues: simple tasks. Judgement and
|
|
airmanship has thus far evaded us, on all levels. Until we get a grip on
|
|
it, talk of fully autonomous aircraft or ground control is nothing more
|
|
than science fiction.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
Robert Dorsett
|
|
rdd@cactus.org
|
|
...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd
|
|
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Dec 2 03:49:49 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz)
|
|
Subject: 747SP
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 2 Dec 1992 10:22:10 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.27@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.43@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.61@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.68@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Chicago Software Works
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-ID: <1992Dec2.102210.15645@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Date: 02 Dec 92 03:49:49 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.61@ohare.Chicago.COM> ncole@nyx.cs.du.edu (Noah Cole) writes:
|
|
>How many airlines use 747SP's today? I have a poster from Popular Mechanics
|
|
>that was around the arrival of the 747-400 with a drawing of a United
|
|
>747SP and it said that the 747SP set a record flying from Payne Field,
|
|
>Washington to South Africa. Was that SAA? Who flies the 747SP Today
|
|
>and on what routes?
|
|
|
|
I believe United still has the largest fleet, with the ten 747SP-21s
|
|
which were acquired from Pan Am in February, 1986. They also got a
|
|
-27 in that deal (originally owned by Braniff) but it was sold just
|
|
a few months ago. (One reference I have shows Pan Am as having had
|
|
a grand total of 13 747SPs -- I think they had another two ex-Braniff
|
|
planes but I'm not sure.)
|
|
|
|
United first used the 747SPs on the trans-Pacific routes. Currently,
|
|
they are used primarily for flights to South America, from JFK and
|
|
perhaps other US airports. There's also a daily SFO-JFK round-trip.
|
|
They also tend to show up as fill-ins on random other 747 flights --
|
|
I have often flown on them SFO-ORD when they subbed for the 747-100
|
|
scheduled for the flight, and I've seen them in LHR as well.
|
|
|
|
American had a pair of 747SP-31s (built for TWA) acquired for their
|
|
DFW-NRT route. The MD-11 is now used on that route; AA last used
|
|
their pair of SPs for JFK-LHR before retiring them last summer.
|
|
|
|
QANTAS and South African each have a pair, not surprising how far away
|
|
they are from most everything. I think QANTAS bought theirs for SYD-
|
|
SFO or perhaps LAX, though I think the US routes are now all 747-400
|
|
or 767-300(ER). South African actually owns five but seems to lease
|
|
them out fairly regularly.
|
|
|
|
After United and South African, Air China (mainland), China Airlines
|
|
(Taiwan), and Air Mauritius probably have the largest fleets with four
|
|
each. I see the CAL ones at SFO on occasion. The Air Mauritius
|
|
planes, three of which are leased from South African, are used on
|
|
routes to LHR and probably other European cities from Mauritius which
|
|
is in the Indian ocean.
|
|
|
|
Beyond that, the operators are pretty random -- Oman has one and the
|
|
United Arab Emirates have two, all of which are listed as being used
|
|
for Royal Flight. Saudia and Korean each have a pair. Others are
|
|
tucked away in various obscure places which I haven't yet stumbled
|
|
upon, or have and have since forgotten.
|
|
|
|
Oh yes, it was a South African 747SP delivery that held a record for
|
|
longest flight (time or distance or both) for a jetliner or some such.
|
|
That may still stand but I wouldn't be too surprised if a 747-400 had
|
|
subsequently established a new record.
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com
|
|
1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls
|
|
|Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA
|
|
Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Dec 2 03:49:50 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz)
|
|
Subject: Re: GE aerospace
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 2 Dec 1992 10:33:34 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.51@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.62@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.69@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Chicago Software Works
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-ID: <1992Dec2.103334.15730@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Date: 02 Dec 92 03:49:50 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.62@ohare.Chicago.COM> cid@athena.mit.edu (Derek H Cedillo) writes:
|
|
>In article <airliners.1992.51@ohare.Chicago.COM> duchad@rpi.edu (David Benedict Ducharme) writes:
|
|
>>I was in an argument the other day that I hope that can be cleared up here
|
|
>>was GE aerospace sold straightout, or was it merged with MM.
|
|
|
|
>According to UPI reports on the dealing the whole deal is worth $3.05 Billion
|
|
>In the deal GE Gets $1 billion in convertible preffered stock.
|
|
|
|
Right. GE sold GE Aerospace, based in Valley Forge, PA, and GE
|
|
Government Services, based in Cherry Hill, NJ, to Martin Marietta,
|
|
but got a substantial chunk of MM in return as well as two seats on
|
|
the MM board. The agreement also includes provisions for a fair
|
|
amount of work to continue at GE R&D. So, while it was an outright
|
|
sale, GE has by no means washed their hands of the whole thing.
|
|
|
|
>Does anyone know what is to become of the Ft. Worth, IN plant?
|
|
>I didnt see it listed in the buisness locations to be
|
|
>taken over by MM.
|
|
|
|
What division is that? Note that the transaction did *not* include
|
|
the GE division most relavent to this newsgroup, namely GE Aircraft
|
|
Engines, based jointly in Evendale, OH (commercial) and Lynn, MA
|
|
(millitary).
|
|
|
|
>Is there going to be some work done by GE somewhat autonomously
|
|
>still in the biz?
|
|
|
|
Yes, Aircraft Engines Div.
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com
|
|
1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls
|
|
|Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA
|
|
Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Dec 2 03:49:50 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: cyberoid@stein.u.washington.edu (Robert Jacobson)
|
|
Subject: Re: The Sporty Game -- Boeing 757
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 2 Dec 1992 10:34:15 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.15@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.27@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.43@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.70@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: WORLDESIGN, Seattle
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <1992Dec2.103415.11330@u.washington.edu>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 02 Dec 92 03:49:50 PST
|
|
|
|
|
|
As a frequent air traveler, I find the 757 to be positively the most
|
|
uncomfortable aircraft now flying. One can begin with the ubiquitous
|
|
TV monitors hanging from the ceilings every few rows, which cannot be
|
|
dimmed or turned off even on a red-eye, and progress to the remarkable
|
|
number of seats that can be squeezed into row upon row of stifled
|
|
passengers. It may be a technical feat, but I know instruct my travel
|
|
agent to pass on any flight requiring me to take a 757. Yeck.
|
|
|
|
Bob Jacobson
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Dec 2 03:49:51 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz)
|
|
Subject: Re: 757 highest thrust to weight ratio ?
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 2 Dec 1992 11:27:34 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.39@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.65@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.71@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Chicago Software Works
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-ID: <1992Dec2.112734.15956@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Date: 02 Dec 92 03:49:51 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.65@ohare.Chicago.COM> drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard) writes:
|
|
>In article <airliners.1992.39@ohare.Chicago.COM> Bob Coggeshall <coggs@Hongkong.Cogwheel.COM> writes:
|
|
>>I've heard that the 757 has a very high thrust to weight ratio. Just
|
|
>>how high is it ? Is it the highest of any commercial jetliner ?
|
|
|
|
>My back-of-the-envelope calculations would suggest about a .38 thrust to
|
|
>weight ratio. That is assuming the RR RB211-535E4B gives around 42,000 lb
|
|
>thrust (SLST) at a MTOW of 220,000 lb. I'm not aware of anyone who
|
|
>actually bought that configuration, though.
|
|
|
|
The various RB.211-535 variants used on the 757 range from 37,400 lb
|
|
thrust up to 43,100; the PW2037 is rated at 38,250. Most airlines
|
|
choose a 230,000 or 240,000 lb MGTOW, however. The only one I could
|
|
find on a quick scan with only 220,000 was Northwest, which with the
|
|
PW2037 works out to 0.3477.
|
|
|
|
Curiosity drove me to dig out the March 16, 1992 AW&ST with the big
|
|
specifications section and look up the power/weight ratios for some
|
|
common transports. Where a choice was available I tried to pick the
|
|
heaviest version with the highest thrust verion of a common engine
|
|
type, and tossed in a couple of other interesting cases. Over 24
|
|
samples the power/weight ratios ranged from 0.2428 to 0.3477. The
|
|
higher figure is the 757 in Northwest's configuration; a better
|
|
comparison point is the 240,000 MGTOW 757 which comes in at 0.3187,
|
|
trailing only the A320/A321, MD-90, and 737-500 (and of course the
|
|
lighter 757).
|
|
|
|
Not surprisingly, the top 11 were all twins. At the other end of the
|
|
scale, the heaviest 737-200 Advanced, at 0.2488, was only ahead of the
|
|
727-200 Advanced. Judging by these numbers it would seem the 737-200
|
|
is a rather underpowered aircraft.
|
|
|
|
Subjectively, pilots I've talked to love the 757 for its abundant
|
|
power and from the cabin once I was impressed with how quickly a 757
|
|
got us out of a wind-shear situation at O'Hare.
|
|
|
|
Another factor that may give an illusion of power is that most 757s
|
|
are used on medium-range routes, yet they've got a 4550 mile range.
|
|
Typical flights probably carry a light fuel load and thus may be well
|
|
short of MGTOW.
|
|
|
|
As for highest of any commercial airliner, even the lightest 757 is
|
|
still well short of the Concorde's 0.3725 power/weight ratio. :-)
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com
|
|
1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls
|
|
|Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA
|
|
Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Dec 2 13:18:55 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett)
|
|
Subject: Re: Flight envelope protections
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 2 Dec 92 05:37:33 CST
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.54@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.72@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <9212021137.AA12970@cactus.org>
|
|
Date: 02 Dec 92 13:18:55 PST
|
|
|
|
palmer@icat.larc.nasa.gov (Michael T. Palmer) wrote:
|
|
|
|
> This has some serious consequences. For example, in the China Airlines
|
|
> B-747 incident 300 nm northwest of San Francisco in 1985 (NTSB/AAR-86-03),
|
|
> the crew was forced to overstress (and structurally damage)
|
|
^^^^^^
|
|
|
|
That might be overstating the case a bit. :-) The NTSB report suggests
|
|
they didn't have a clue how to recover from the spiral, once they entered
|
|
it, lacking military aerobatic training and being completely disoriented. I
|
|
don't believe the report distinguishes the tailplane's damage as being
|
|
incidental or intentional.
|
|
|
|
|
|
> the horizontal
|
|
> tail surfaces to recover from a roll and near-vertical dive following an
|
|
> automatic disconnect of the autopilot when it could no longer compensate
|
|
> for an asymmetric thrust condition. At the time of disconnect, full
|
|
> rudder was engaged to one side and the crew was unaware of this. The
|
|
> crew recovered control with about 10,000 ft of altitude left (from an
|
|
> original high-altitude cruise). It is very likely that if the aircraft
|
|
> had prevented the crew from initiating control commands that would lead
|
|
> to aircraft damage, the aircraft (and passengers) would have been lost.
|
|
|
|
Your point's well taken, and the risks are certainly worth considering. But
|
|
allow me to play devil's advocate, for a minute, without diluting your argu-
|
|
ment, and suggest that the EFCS would have prevented an A3[2-4]0 from getting
|
|
into the unusual attitude to begin with. The protections are both aerodynamic
|
|
and input-filtering (and configuration-evaluating, and...). In the China
|
|
Air incident, the flip-over was caused by a "dumb" autopilot/autothrottle
|
|
design configuration oversight, following an engine abnormality. If a similar
|
|
event had occurred on an A3[2-4]0, the EFCS would probably have limited both
|
|
the authority of the FMS to put the airplane into the steep bank, *and* would
|
|
have provided maximum corrective action, using opposing controls, to keep the
|
|
airplane in the prescribed operating envelope.
|
|
|
|
But let's suppose some other kind of fault flips the airplane over: rotor,
|
|
wake turbulence, transient EFCS bug (REALLY unlikely). I would have less
|
|
confidence in the system than in a 747, but there are saving graces in the
|
|
system design.
|
|
|
|
During the flip-over itself, the system would have reverted to Alternate Law
|
|
when one of these conditions were met:
|
|
Pitch > 50 degrees nosePup or < 30 degrees nosePdown.
|
|
Bank > 125 degrees.
|
|
AOA > 30 degrees or < P10 degrees.
|
|
Speed > 460 knots or < 60 knots.
|
|
Mach > 0.91 or < 0.1.
|
|
There would not have been protections or auto-trim; there would have been
|
|
full-authority direct law in roll, without yaw-damper services. It is not
|
|
clear whether "device-saving" protections would have been in place (likely,
|
|
no doubt, considering the extensive use of composites in the tail surfaces).
|
|
(don't forget: you have to remember all this when the shiny side's the wrong
|
|
way up :-))
|
|
|
|
I also wonder how well the four accelerometers the EFCS uses would have
|
|
held up to all this. No matter: they're durable.
|
|
|
|
A320 simulators use pretty much the same EFCS code as the actual airplane.
|
|
Since programming errors often show up in 90-degree increments (tan 90!),
|
|
I suspect it would be interesting to turn off the motion system and take
|
|
the thing up for a spin, so to speak... :-)
|
|
|
|
|
|
More grist for the mill:
|
|
|
|
In an unnamed regulatory agency's commentary on a paper that Pete Mellor and I
|
|
are cooking up, there was a note that in the case of even a
|
|
"run-away" surface (actuator OR software malfunction), the remaining devices/
|
|
governing software would function to provide a "virtual" effect, providing
|
|
handling qualities that would mask the abnormality. I was aware that a
|
|
"make-up" feature existed, but the precise wording raises the question of how
|
|
much loading, exactly, the run-away surface might introduce, or how violent
|
|
an oscillation the system could be trying to cover up.
|
|
|
|
I find this *quite* disquieting, especially since, in the FAA's Special
|
|
Conditions for the A320's certification in the United States, the point was
|
|
clearly made that the FAA does *not* believe the pilots have a right to be
|
|
warned of failures of this sort:
|
|
|
|
This is from the Federal Register 54:17, January 27, 1989, pages 3989 and
|
|
3996:
|
|
|
|
P. 3996: paragraph 2(a)2(i), the item under discussion: active controls, basic
|
|
criteria, with the system in failure conditions:
|
|
|
|
"(i) Warnings must be provided to annunciate the existence of failure
|
|
conditions which affect the structural capability of the airplane and
|
|
for which the associated reduction in airworthiness can be minimized by
|
|
suitable flight limitations. Failure conditions which affect the
|
|
structural capability of the airplane and for which there is no
|
|
suitable compensating flight limitation need not be annunciated to the
|
|
flightcrew, but must be detected before the next flight."
|
|
|
|
P. 3989, the oh-so-enlightening, explanatory commentary:
|
|
|
|
"The second commenter believes that the flightcrew must be aware of any
|
|
failure conditions which affect the structural capability of the
|
|
airplane, whether or not a compensating procedure exists. The FAA does
|
|
not concur with this comment. It is not necessary for the flight crew
|
|
to be aware of a failure in the active control system during the flight
|
|
on which the failure occurs if there is no available corrective
|
|
action; however, the airplane should not be exposed to the failure
|
|
condition for an extended period of time. The flightcrew must
|
|
therefore be alerted to the failure condition prior to the next flight."
|
|
|
|
This is from the FAA, the agency in charge of establishing airworthiness and
|
|
certification practices in the United States! In reality, the A320 likely
|
|
*does* provide enough feedback: but the FAA, apparently unnecessarily, has
|
|
certainly opened the door for the practice to be introduced in subsequent
|
|
types.
|
|
|
|
|
|
> Unfortunately, it appears that engine manufacturers may be heading down
|
|
> the same path as Airbus with respect to their electronic engine controllers.
|
|
|
|
Beyond "dumb" smartness, Pete Mellor has uncovered reason to believe
|
|
the engine controllers do not use dissimilar software. On the A320, there
|
|
are two FADECS per engine: a common-cause-of-failure logic fault could con-
|
|
ceivably take out both controllers. It's not clear whether this could happen
|
|
in tandem, based on environmental conditions, or serially, which could intro-
|
|
duce a short timing delay in which the input parameters could be "corrected."
|
|
|
|
|
|
> If nothing else, I hope I have brought up some topics that deserve
|
|
> discussion among readers of this newsgroup. After all, aren't we the
|
|
> ones in positions to influence our industry (all in our own way, of
|
|
> course)?
|
|
|
|
Especially in software, of particular relevance to the net. A lot (if not
|
|
most) of the people writing this code--4M on the A320, 10M+ on the
|
|
A330 and A340--are *not* aero engineers: just programmers, ostensibly with
|
|
CS backgrounds (a more frightening thought I can't imagine! :-)), performing
|
|
under strictly governed, structured, controlled environments: to specif-
|
|
ication.
|
|
|
|
Airbus even mentioned the "CS" types it brought in from "outside" to
|
|
buttress a comment on its quality-control practices, in an article, as if
|
|
to make the point that mere engineers weren't writing this stuff: the
|
|
"pros" are doing it. :-) Yeah, we know what we're doing, SURE... :-)
|
|
|
|
Computers on the brain...
|
|
|
|
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Alphabet soup:
|
|
|
|
AOA Angle of Attack
|
|
CS Computer Science
|
|
EFCS Electronic Flight Control System
|
|
FADEC Full-Authority Digital Engine Control
|
|
FMS Flight Management System
|
|
M Megabyte
|
|
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
Robert Dorsett
|
|
rdd@cactus.org
|
|
...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd
|
|
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Dec 2 13:18:56 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: ulfwbadg@w228zrz.zrz.tu-berlin.de (Ulf Weber)
|
|
Subject: abandoning the APU on four engine / long range aircraft
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 2 Dec 92 17:15:35 +0100
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.73@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <9212021615.AA05495@w228zrz.zrz.tu-berlin.de>
|
|
Date: 02 Dec 92 13:18:56 PST
|
|
|
|
Schoenen Guten Tag,
|
|
|
|
who can help me with my cost/benefit analysis about "abandoning the APU
|
|
on four engine / long range aircraft"?
|
|
|
|
I need info about the FAA requirements (EROPS ?), the cost of installing
|
|
GPUs (Ground Power Units, 400 Hz), ASUs (Air Starter Units, if possible
|
|
mobile (mounted on pulling tractors?) in order to delay engine start as
|
|
long as possible) and last but not least the technical feasibility of
|
|
making the engines do what the APU has traditionally been doing. So.
|
|
what do you think what an engine for a "zero-APU-747-400" would look
|
|
like?
|
|
|
|
'Hope to hear from you, Ciao Ulf.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Dec 2 13:18:57 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: Christopher Davis <ckd@eff.org>
|
|
Subject: Re: The Sporty Game -- Boeing 757
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 2 Dec 1992 13:52:26 -0500
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.15@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
<airliners.1992.27@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.43@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
<airliners.1992.70@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.74@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <199212021852.AA09487@loiosh.eff.org>
|
|
Date: 02 Dec 92 13:18:57 PST
|
|
|
|
RJ> == Robert Jacobson <cyberoid@stein.u.washington.edu>
|
|
|
|
RJ> As a frequent air traveler, I find the 757 to be positively the
|
|
RJ> most uncomfortable aircraft now flying. One can begin with the
|
|
RJ> ubiquitous TV monitors hanging from the ceilings every few rows,
|
|
RJ> which cannot be dimmed or turned off even on a red-eye, and
|
|
RJ> progress to the remarkable number of seats that can be squeezed
|
|
RJ> into row upon row of stifled passengers. It may be a technical
|
|
RJ> feat, but I know instruct my travel agent to pass on any flight
|
|
RJ> requiring me to take a 757. Yeck.
|
|
|
|
What airlines are you flying? The 757's monitors *are* turned off on
|
|
most of the flights I've seen (except for the coast-to-coast nonstops,
|
|
where they're on for the movie and/or the "video magazine"). The seat
|
|
pitch seems to be better than the predecessor 727-200s usually have
|
|
(especially if you get the right seats; the NW 757s have four large
|
|
doors per side instead of 3 large doors and two overwing exits, making
|
|
for a number of seats with immense legroom).
|
|
|
|
The 757 isn't a widebody, but (to me anyway) it has many of the best
|
|
features of widebodies (it only lacks the second aisle for use in
|
|
getting around meal carts :).
|
|
|
|
(What aircraft *are* you flying on, if you're not on 757s?)
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Dec 2 13:18:58 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: ncole@nyx.cs.du.edu (Noah Cole)
|
|
Subject: Re: 747SP
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 2 Dec 92 19:48:13 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.27@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.43@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.61@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.68@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.75@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Macalester College, St. Paul Minnesota USA
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <1992Dec2.194813.2984@mnemosyne.cs.du.edu>
|
|
Date: 02 Dec 92 13:18:58 PST
|
|
|
|
kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) writes:
|
|
|
|
>In article <airliners.1992.61@ohare.Chicago.COM> ncole@nyx.cs.du.edu (Noah Cole) writes:
|
|
>>How many airlines use 747SP's today? I have a poster from Popular Mechanics
|
|
>>that was around the arrival of the 747-400 with a drawing of a United
|
|
>>747SP and it said that the 747SP set a record flying from Payne Field,
|
|
>>Washington to South Africa. Was that SAA? Who flies the 747SP Today
|
|
>>and on what routes?
|
|
(Info on ownership of 747SP deleted- it was very interesting though. Thanks)
|
|
|
|
|
|
>Oh yes, it was a South African 747SP delivery that held a record for
|
|
>longest flight (time or distance or both) for a jetliner or some such.
|
|
>That may still stand but I wouldn't be too surprised if a 747-400 had
|
|
>subsequently established a new record.
|
|
|
|
I thin k that the record was set by a Qantas 747-400 from LHR to SYD in the
|
|
summer of 1989 with the poassengers being the British Cricket Team and the
|
|
only article in the cargo was a cricket ball.
|
|
|
|
-Noah Cole
|
|
--
|
|
Noah Cole "Outside is America, NCOLE@MACALSTR.EDU
|
|
Macalester College and also the car park" ncole@nyx.cs.du.edu
|
|
St. Paul, MN 55105 - Bono, 27 December 1989 cncole@coos.dartmouth.edu
|
|
612-696-7388 Dublin aj909@cleveland.freenet.edu
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Dec 2 13:18:59 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: hfunk@src.honeywell.com (Harry Funk)
|
|
Subject: Re: maintenance (was Re: pair (sorry, couldn't resist the pun))
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 2 Dec 1992 20:02:42 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.26@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.40@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.60@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.76@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Reply-To: hfunk@src.honeywell.com (Harry Funk)
|
|
Organization: Honeywell Systems & Research Center
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <1992Dec2.200242.26692@src.honeywell.com>
|
|
Date: 02 Dec 92 13:18:59 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.60@ohare.Chicago.COM> gary@maestro.mitre.org (Gary Bisaga) writes:
|
|
>In article <airliners.1992.40@ohare.Chicago.COM>, weiss@wright.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss) writes:
|
|
>|>
|
|
>|> primarily). He said that DC-10s are notorious for repairs being all-day
|
|
>|> operations, whereas Boeing's 737-300 and -400, 747-300 and -400, 757, and 767
|
|
>|> have self-diagnostic systems that go so far as to direct the location of the
|
|
>|> repair instructions down to the page, turning the repairs into a half-day
|
|
|
|
>Nor would I - but you're comparing apples to oranges. The other aircraft you
|
|
>mention probably have much more extensive electronic maintenance aids since
|
|
>most have much more extensive avionics in general. It wouldn't surprise me
|
|
>if there was also more electronic diagnosis.
|
|
|
|
>The MD-11, of course, is just as highly outfitted with electronics as any
|
|
>of those others - and the FMC design is newer as well, if I'm not mistaken -
|
|
>so a comparison with the MD-11 would almost certainly be different.
|
|
|
|
I agree. There are several factors involved here:
|
|
|
|
how often does stuff break or require scheduled maintenance,
|
|
how well is the fault isolated by on-board or off-board
|
|
maintenance aiding systems,
|
|
how well does the documentation aid you in further isolating and
|
|
subsequently rectifying the fault,
|
|
how difficult does the design of the aircraft make it to perform
|
|
the directed operations.
|
|
|
|
The MD-11 has a Centralized Fault Display System (CFDS), which serves as a
|
|
gateway to the BIT information provided by other avionics. ARINC report
|
|
604 describes the characteristics of a CFDS system. The 747-400 (but not
|
|
older versions of the 747, nor the 757/767) has a Central Maintenance
|
|
Computer, which takes the individual reports provided by the avionics,
|
|
merges them to form a consistent picture, which it provides to the
|
|
maintenance tech by means of a fault message. The message is associated
|
|
with a entry point into the (paper) maintenance documentation fault tree.
|
|
Airbus has a similar system. B777 will have a similar system. These last
|
|
three are all (I think) ARINC Report 624 (On-board Maintenance System)
|
|
systems.
|
|
|
|
The more advanced systems, such as those found on the B747-400, A320/340
|
|
and B777, are quite difficult to build, since a change in the design of any
|
|
reporting subsystem may affect the design/operation of the CMC. During
|
|
flight test, when things change rapidly, the CMC changes as the sum of all
|
|
the subsystem changes (best case - worst case is that the changes
|
|
interact.)
|
|
|
|
"I am not, have never been, and hope never to be, a spokesperson for
|
|
Honeywell."
|
|
|
|
H.
|
|
--
|
|
Harry A. Funk Principal Research Scientist Voice: (612)-782-7396
|
|
Honeywell Systems and Research Center FAX: (612)-782-7438
|
|
3660 Technology Dr. MS:MN65-2500 Inet: hfunk@src.honeywell.com
|
|
Minneapolis, MN 55418 Bang: <any-smart-host>!srcsip!funk
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Dec 2 13:18:59 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners,rec.travel.air
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: philip@rainbow.mentorg.com (Philip Peake)
|
|
Subject: Re: Airbus safety
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 02 Dec 1992 20:08:19 GMT
|
|
References: <1992Nov26.000453.4729@cactus.org> <1992Dec01.025604.17493@news.mentorg.com> <ByL8Hp.LM8@apollo.hp.com> <airliners.1992.67@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.77@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Mentor Graphics
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <1992Dec02.200819.19590@news.mentorg.com>
|
|
Date: 02 Dec 92 13:18:59 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.67@ohare.Chicago.COM>, rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) writes:
|
|
|> We can automate easily quantifiable issues: simple tasks. Judgement and
|
|
|> airmanship has thus far evaded us, on all levels. Until we get a grip on
|
|
|> it, talk of fully autonomous aircraft or ground control is nothing more
|
|
|> than science fiction.
|
|
|
|
Robert,
|
|
in general, you write extremely well argued and researched cases,
|
|
but occasionally you spoil the whole effect by little "throw away" comments
|
|
such as the above - history, even modern history is littered with comments from
|
|
people writing off things as "science fiction", "can't be done", "will never replace
|
|
the current ...." etc who have had to eat their words shortly after.
|
|
|
|
Anyway, getting back to the A320 ...
|
|
|
|
I suppose that I should now admit to not actually being a strong a supporter of
|
|
this machine as might have been assumed from past postings (I have flown on
|
|
them too many times :-)
|
|
|
|
My concernes are not based so much on the ergonomic design, so much as the engineering
|
|
of the computerised systems, and the numerous "cover-ups", which are apparently
|
|
inspired by the French government - if you read French, you might be interested
|
|
in a series of articles in "Science et Vie", which is a sort of "Scientific American".
|
|
|
|
There, the concerns expressed are simply that:
|
|
|
|
- There have been many documented occurences of sudden altitiude
|
|
changes which were uncorrectable by the pilot.
|
|
|
|
- Airbus Industrie REFUSES to let independent experts audit their software,
|
|
that say that the control system can only be examined as a "black box",
|
|
which either performs correctly, or it doesn't - anyone at all familiar
|
|
with software engineering will recognise this as being close to garbage.
|
|
|
|
- Refusal by AI to acknowlege that there may be problems at all.
|
|
|
|
- Attempts by members of the French government to abort independent
|
|
investigations (including that of Science et Vie).
|
|
|
|
This is getting away from our discussion about pilot contributions to "incidents",
|
|
but if you want to knock the A320, there are much better grounds for doing so
|
|
than ergonomics - without the more serious design problems, there would probably have
|
|
been many fewer "accidents", and hence less reason to blame the ergonomics.
|
|
|
|
Besides "cosmetic" issues like tactile feedback, and some layout issues, the 767
|
|
is pretty close to an A320 - as you have said (I think - sorry if I misquote you)
|
|
the 767 is just more conventional in cockpit design - its a pity its automatic
|
|
landing system can be as good as the best pilot on a good day, and a rough as
|
|
the worst on a bad day ... usually more towards the latter ...
|
|
|
|
Philip
|
|
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Dec 2 13:19:00 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: Stephen L Nicoud <stephen@boeing.com>
|
|
Subject: AVIATION DAILY - 12/1/92 - International Lease Finance Corp
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 2 Dec 92 12:13:26 PST
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.78@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <9212022013.AA05689@moclips.boeing.com>
|
|
Date: 02 Dec 92 13:19:00 PST
|
|
|
|
Spotted on a Boeing Electronic Bulletin Board:
|
|
|
|
12/2/92
|
|
|
|
3. AVIATION DAILY - International Lease Finance Corp.
|
|
President Steven Udvar-Hazy yesterday confirmed the company
|
|
will place, probably by mid-December, orders and options for
|
|
at least 80 aircraft and possibly as many as 100. He said he
|
|
hoped the orders, which will involve most big engine
|
|
manufacturers, "will be a spark plug to give confidence back
|
|
to the airline industry." The orders also should provide a
|
|
big boost to Boeing and Airbus, but not Douglas. Udvar-Hazy
|
|
said Douglas "made vanilla-type proposals, whereas Boeing and
|
|
Airbus have been more appreciative of ILFC steadiness in
|
|
keeping their production lines going."
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Stephen L Nicoud <stephen@Boeing.Com> bcstec!bcsaic!stephen
|
|
Boeing Computer Services Research and Technology
|
|
Bellevue, Washington USA
|
|
"I ask unanimous consent to revise and extend my remarks."
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Dec 3 00:40:06 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: ashabana@agsm.ucla.edu (Ahmed Shabana)
|
|
Subject: Re: Boeing 747-300
|
|
X-Submission-Date: 2 Dec 92 18:35:23 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.4@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.11@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.25@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.59@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.79@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <ashabana.723321323@uclagsm>
|
|
Date: 03 Dec 92 00:40:06 PST
|
|
|
|
drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard) writes:
|
|
|
|
>In article <airliners.1992.25@ohare.Chicago.COM> kls@ohare.chicago.com (Karl Swartz) writes:
|
|
>>In article <airliners.1992.11@ohare.Chicago.COM> drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard) writes:
|
|
>>>In article <airliners.1992.4@ohare.Chicago.COM> jerry@telecom.ksu.edu (Jerry And
|
|
>>
|
|
>>>>I've heard Boeing, McDonnell-Douglas and Airbus all have plans
|
|
>>>>in the works for Really Big Planes in the 600-700 passenger,
|
|
>>>>7500-8000 mile range.
|
|
>>
|
|
>>>The Boeing and the Airbus offerings in this market seem to both hover
|
|
>>>around 600 seats and 7,000 mile range. Takeoff weights in the million
|
|
>>>pound plus range. The anticipated market, as described by John Hayhurst,
|
|
>>>Director of New Large Airplane Division, is only a couple hundred airplanes
|
|
>>>TOTAL. From my knothole, it looks like a prestige fight.
|
|
>>
|
|
>>That's an *awful* lot of cash to dump down a hole simply for bragging
|
|
>>rights.
|
|
|
|
Terry ( drinkard@bcstec.boeing.com) writes:
|
|
|
|
>It isn't just bragging rights. Prestige has a market value. There are
|
|
>several airlines who are not out to make a profit. The national airlines
|
|
>of some oil rich countries for example, are not expected to make buck,
|
|
>rather to 'carry the flag'. Thai, as another example bought 747s some
|
|
>years ago largely because of prestige. Therefore, you have some airlines
|
|
>who fly the <superlative of your choice> airplane in the world to make a
|
|
>political statement.
|
|
|
|
While I agree with you that some airlines buy planes for prestige ( I
|
|
think the cake goes to Iran Air during the Shah days when they had several
|
|
Concordes on order), Thai is a world class airline that is profit
|
|
oriented. They have a very close relationship with KLM and are one of
|
|
the most successfull airlines in the fast growing Asian market.
|
|
Moreover they have at least 9 747's in their fleet ( 6 -200, 3 -400) and an
|
|
order for 5 more -400. Such commitement to an aircraft type stems from simple
|
|
economics and not prestige.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Ahmed
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
_____________________________________________________________________
|
|
Ahmed A. Shabana |" Bill, now you can get rid of THAT watch"
|
|
Anderson Graduate School of Mgmt.| Omega watches commercial aired on
|
|
U.C.L.A. | Election day referring to Clinton's Timex
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Dec 3 00:40:08 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: davidm@questor.rational.com (David Moore)
|
|
Subject: Re: 747SP
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 2 Dec 1992 21:18:56 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.27@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.43@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.61@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.68@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.80@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Rational
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <davidm.723331136@questor>
|
|
Date: 03 Dec 92 00:40:08 PST
|
|
|
|
kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) writes:
|
|
|
|
|
|
>Oh yes, it was a South African 747SP delivery that held a record for
|
|
>longest flight (time or distance or both) for a jetliner or some such.
|
|
>That may still stand but I wouldn't be too surprised if a 747-400 had
|
|
>subsequently established a new record.
|
|
|
|
QANTAS was crowing about their non-stop 747-400 delivery flight from
|
|
London to Sydney when I flew with them a couple of years back. I think
|
|
they were claiming records, but I do not remember for sure. Certainly, it
|
|
is a long flight.
|
|
|
|
To do it, they had to get a specially formulated (higher energy/kilo) fuel
|
|
and the crew's luggage flew separately. Naturally, the flight magazine
|
|
was silent on the question, but I imagine the crew also flew in their under-wear
|
|
to further reduce weight.
|
|
|
|
I have no idea why they were delivering via London.
|
|
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Dec 3 00:40:09 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: yarvin@CS.YALE.EDU (Norman Yarvin)
|
|
Subject: Re: GE aerospace
|
|
X-Submission-Date: 2 Dec 1992 17:24:15 -0500
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.51@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.62@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.81@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Yale Computer Science Department
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <1fjd2fINN46n@CATHY.NA.CS.YALE.EDU>
|
|
Date: 03 Dec 92 00:40:09 PST
|
|
|
|
cid@athena.mit.edu (Derek H Cedillo) writes:
|
|
>I hate to see GE lose a part of itself, but it was a wise move.
|
|
|
|
A relative of mine works in a satellite manufacturing plant in New Jersey
|
|
which is part of the deal. (He refers to that plant, and I don't know how
|
|
much else, as "Astro".) It was bought by GE from RCA two or three years ago.
|
|
He says that when GE took charge, they made many changes for the worse. For
|
|
instance they brought in a computerized procurement system which was
|
|
inappropriate for the satellite business -- it would have been better suited
|
|
to a light bulb factory.
|
|
|
|
Since Martin Marietta has much more interest in satellites than GE did, he
|
|
has hopes that the new transition will not be as bad.
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Norman Yarvin yarvin@cs.yale.edu
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Dec 3 00:40:11 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners,rec.travel.air
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: cid@athena.mit.edu (Derek H Cedillo)
|
|
Subject: GE Ft. Wayne Plant (was: Re: GE Aerospace)
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Thu, 3 Dec 1992 00:22:03 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.51@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.62@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.69@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.82@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Followup-To: rec.travel.air
|
|
Organization: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <1992Dec3.002203.1831@athena.mit.edu>
|
|
Date: 03 Dec 92 00:40:11 PST
|
|
|
|
[all kinds of talk about what the Ft. Wayne Plant was]
|
|
|
|
I'm sorry, but for the life of me I cannot find any info
|
|
about Ft. Wayne being an AE plant.
|
|
With my other GE stuff still on loan, I cant prove that it
|
|
was Aerospace.
|
|
But, As of 10/91 it was not listed as an AE plant.
|
|
(this info is a listing of AE plants accross the country)
|
|
the list includes all AE plants inluding the tiny satalite
|
|
plants that make mini parts and the test center at Edwards AFB
|
|
here is a listing:
|
|
|
|
Lynn, MA (major production and engineering)
|
|
Hooksett, NH
|
|
Rutland, VA (both sat. parts prodution plants)
|
|
Wilmington, NC
|
|
Peebles OH
|
|
Evendale, OH (Major production and engineering)
|
|
Madisonville, KY
|
|
Strother, KS
|
|
Alburquerque, NM
|
|
Ontario, CA (california, not canada)
|
|
Edwards AFB, Mojave, CA
|
|
and
|
|
Seattle, WA
|
|
|
|
and international in Singapore and Bromont, Canada
|
|
|
|
Is this innacurate? It was produced by GE itself, as a recuiting
|
|
brochure. So I dont think there would be editing errors.
|
|
Some of the info other people have been laying out is from the mid 80's
|
|
perhaps did it change hands? (again this is from 10/91)
|
|
Thanks alot. (sorry if I am beating a dead horse, but this is really bugging
|
|
me)
|
|
|
|
Derek
|
|
|
|
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
"He lived a life of going-to-do,
|
|
and died with nothing done"
|
|
-J. Albery
|
|
|
|
In other words---JUST DO IT!
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Dec 3 00:40:13 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners,rec.travel.air
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: cid@athena.mit.edu (Derek H Cedillo)
|
|
Subject: Re: Airbus safety
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Thu, 3 Dec 1992 01:15:24 GMT
|
|
References: <ByL8Hp.LM8@apollo.hp.com> <airliners.1992.67@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.77@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.83@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <1992Dec3.011524.2917@athena.mit.edu>
|
|
Date: 03 Dec 92 00:40:13 PST
|
|
|
|
>Besides "cosmetic" issues like tactile feedback, and some layout issues,
|
|
>the 767 is pretty close to an A320 - as you have said (I think -
|
|
>sorry if I misquote you)
|
|
|
|
Im sorry, but I dont think cockpit layout and feedback are
|
|
"cosmetic". These are pretty important issues. Actually, these
|
|
are the main gripes about teh A320.
|
|
If the cockpit is non-convential, its not a cosmetic issue,
|
|
but rather a problematic issue. And think about steering your car
|
|
without knowing how much of a turn will take you until your there.
|
|
A prime example of lack of feedback is a digital stereo.
|
|
Think of how many times you over shoot the radio station your
|
|
looking for because you get no feel of how fast the thing is
|
|
going through stations (other than visually).
|
|
Or perhaps if you put the radio knob where the lights knob
|
|
was and vice versa. As these two things are not life or death
|
|
threatening, imagine if they were something for steering and braking.
|
|
Oh well, maybe some dumb analogies but i hope you get the picture.
|
|
Feedback and layout are not "cosmetic".
|
|
|
|
Derek
|
|
|
|
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
"He lived a life of going-to-do,
|
|
and died with nothing done"
|
|
-J. Albery
|
|
|
|
In other words---JUST DO IT!
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Dec 3 00:40:14 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard)
|
|
Subject: Re: The Sporty Game -- Boeing 757
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Thu, 3 Dec 1992 02:27:00 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.27@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.43@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.70@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.84@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Boeing
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <Bynw51.75M@bcstec.ca.boeing.com>
|
|
Date: 03 Dec 92 00:40:14 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.70@ohare.Chicago.COM> cyberoid@stein.u.washington.edu (Robert Jacobson) writes:
|
|
>
|
|
>As a frequent air traveler, I find the 757 to be positively the most
|
|
>uncomfortable aircraft now flying. One can begin with the ubiquitous
|
|
>TV monitors hanging from the ceilings every few rows, which cannot be
|
|
>dimmed or turned off even on a red-eye, and progress to the remarkable
|
|
>number of seats that can be squeezed into row upon row of stifled
|
|
>passengers. It may be a technical feat, but I know instruct my travel
|
|
>agent to pass on any flight requiring me to take a 757. Yeck.
|
|
|
|
I hasten to point out that it is no fault of the airplane, or of the
|
|
manufacturer for that matter, that you have been overcrowded. The interior
|
|
of the airplane is determined by the operator. All the interiors.
|
|
Interiors, sometimes called 'payloads', fall in the category of 'BFE', or
|
|
Buyer Furnished Equipment. That means that when Delta stuffs 38 rows (or
|
|
whatever the precise number happens to be) into a 757, you get a 30" seat
|
|
pitch (or a 29" or a 28"!). Don't blame the manufacturer or the airplane.
|
|
|
|
As another illustration, take a look at American's 727-200s. Originally
|
|
designed as a 150+ seat transport, they use it as a 129 seater. Nice 34"
|
|
seat pitch over almost the entire airplane (the first class has it even
|
|
better). But the American ticket typically costs more. You pays your
|
|
money and you takes your pick.
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Terry
|
|
drinkard@bcstec.boeing.com
|
|
"Anyone who thinks they can hold the company responsible for what I say has
|
|
more lawyers than sense."
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Dec 3 00:40:16 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: weiss@turing.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss)
|
|
Subject: Re: hydraulic problems with DC-10's??
|
|
X-Submission-Date: 3 Dec 92 04:50:46 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.8@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.30@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.50@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.85@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: SEASnet, University of California, Los Angeles
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <8793@lee.SEAS.UCLA.EDU>
|
|
Date: 03 Dec 92 00:40:16 PST
|
|
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.50@ohare.Chicago.COM> drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard) writes:
|
|
>In article <airliners.1992.30@ohare.Chicago.COM> weiss@curtiss.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss) writes:
|
|
>>I have a hard time believing that an intact hydraulic system would have
|
|
>>prevented AA191 from crashing. Let's face it, a wing-mounted engine falling
|
|
>>off produces such a rediculous unbalance that even full aileron wouldn't be
|
|
>>able to counter it.
|
|
>Not true. An engine departing the airplane is a planned for event, in
|
|
>terms of stability and control. An aileron would have no problem
|
|
>countering just the imbalance of thrust (and it would actually be mostly
|
|
>rudder), in fact, without the added drag of a windmilling engine, the
|
|
>problem is a bit simplified.
|
|
|
|
After the third post with this answer, I figure it's time to clarify my
|
|
statement. I am referring to the unbalance of WEIGHT, not THRUST. Nonetheless
|
|
I suppose we should go on...
|
|
|
|
>Flight AA 191 lost the slats on the left hand
|
|
>wing (if memory serves) because of Douglas' failure to include mechanical
|
|
>lockouts on the slat actuators. They were not required to certify the
|
|
>airplane.
|
|
|
|
Which doesn't disprove my theory. As it is, though, the loss of the slats
|
|
(which, according to all my aero classes, only lowers the stall speed but does
|
|
NOT increase the coefficient of lift!) was enough to stall the wing, more than
|
|
"countering" the loss of weight on the wing.
|
|
--
|
|
\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | /
|
|
- Michael weiss@seas.ucla.edu | School of Engineering & Applied Science -
|
|
- Weiss izzydp5@oac.ucla.edu | University of California, Los Angeles -
|
|
/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | \
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Dec 3 00:40:17 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: geoff@peck.com (Geoff Peck)
|
|
Subject: Re: Boeing Book
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Thu, 3 Dec 1992 06:35:32 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.41@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.48@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.86@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Geoffrey G. Peck, Consultant, San Jose CA
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <1992Dec3.063532.13163@peck.com>
|
|
Date: 03 Dec 92 00:40:17 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.48@ohare.Chicago.COM> Christopher Davis
|
|
<ckd@eff.org> writes:
|
|
> This might be the Robert Serling _Legend & Legacy_, which I hope to find
|
|
> the time to do a book review on, eventually. *Very* good book.
|
|
|
|
OK, I'll bite. Here's a review of "Legend and Legacy" which I wrote for
|
|
rec.aviation in mid-September:
|
|
|
|
From: geoff@peck.com (Geoff Peck)
|
|
Subject: Book Review: Legend and Legacy
|
|
Message-ID: <1992Sep20.180822.7903@peck.com>
|
|
Date: Sun, 20 Sep 1992 18:08:22 GMT
|
|
|
|
I just finished the book "Legend and Legacy: The Story of Boeing and Its
|
|
People" by Robert J. Serling (St. Martins Press, New York, 1992). It's
|
|
an incredibly well-written corporate biography of Boeing at its seventy-
|
|
fifth anniversary, and is superb reading for Boeing fans, aviation fans,
|
|
and those interested in corporate management, philosophy, and
|
|
development. Besides, the book is chock-full of reliably-documented
|
|
anecdotes, incredibly funny deeds, and priceless one-line quotes from a
|
|
huge variety of Boeing folks.
|
|
|
|
One example, which seems to come up on the net with some regularity, is
|
|
the question of the Famous 707 Barrel Roll. I've included as an
|
|
attachment below a slightly generous excerpt from the book which
|
|
describes this famous incident to whet your appetite.
|
|
|
|
The book, of course, details many of the projects that the immensely
|
|
complex and diverse organization has worked on -- from commercial
|
|
aircraft to cruise missiles to the lunar roving module to military
|
|
aircraft to bedroom furniture (no, I'm not kidding) to the never-
|
|
produced passenger SST to helicopters and light rail vehicles to
|
|
completely overhauling NASA's project management structure. The variety
|
|
of projects, and the number of innovative experiments, will truly boggle
|
|
one's mind. I was most impressed by the personal and corporate
|
|
integrity of the people who are Boeing -- this book really almost
|
|
justifies the well-worn phrase "if it doesn't say Boeing, I'm not
|
|
going."
|
|
|
|
A minor word of caution on this book -- once you start reading it, you'll
|
|
find it incredibly hard to put down, much like a Robert Ludlum novel. You
|
|
may find yourself staying up all night trying to finish its generous
|
|
460-plus pages in one sitting. You're also likely to exclaim, after
|
|
reading a particularly favorite chapter (I only had about 10 or 12 such
|
|
chapters) "goodness -- that was much too short -- there should be a whole
|
|
_book_ on this subject!"
|
|
|
|
The book, as one might expect, does see Boeing through the rose-colored
|
|
glasses of memory. It's well-researched -- Serling spent quite a bit
|
|
of time interviewing Boeing employees and searching company documents.
|
|
But one doesn't read this kind of book expecting a critical exposee of
|
|
mis-deeds ... nor would one really expect much of that in a corporate
|
|
biography of a company as principled as Boeing.
|
|
|
|
Now, what might be the ideal reading environment for Legend and Legacy?
|
|
Well, I read most of it ... while flying inside Boeing jetliners. (And
|
|
I'm still sitting inside a 737, bouncing around in light, occasionally
|
|
moderate, turbulence, as I type this article!) Although the order of
|
|
flying the Boeings didn't quite match their presentation in the book, on
|
|
this trip I flew in 757's, a 737, a 727, and even a 707. Well, sort of.
|
|
The 707 was actually UAL flight 707 from Newark to Denver, operating today
|
|
as a 757. :-) Ah, well. I still do very fondly remember the 707 (and
|
|
the 320B, and the 727-100, the 727-200, and the 737-100, and the 737-200,
|
|
and ...). Alas, no 747 or 767 on this trip, but I certainly have enough
|
|
passenger-hours in those types. If it doesn't say Boeing, _I'm_ not
|
|
going! For those amused by historical significance, my 727 flight ended
|
|
by landing on runway 22 at New York's LaGuardia airport.
|
|
|
|
I can't recommend this book highly enough! It should be available at
|
|
most general booksellers (I bought mine at a B. Dalton in a mall) in
|
|
hard cover at $24.95.
|
|
|
|
Geoff
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
[Excerpt from _Legend_and_Legacy regarding the 707 roll]
|
|
|
|
[This occurred] when the same Aircraft Industries Association group and
|
|
representatives of the International Air Transport Association held
|
|
joint meetings in Seattle. The Gold Cup hydroplane races were being
|
|
held at the same time, and Allen [Boeing's CEO] invited the industry
|
|
dignitaries to watch the events from three yachts Boeing had chartered
|
|
for the occasion. As a special treat he also told Tex Johnston to stage
|
|
a flyby in the Dash-80 on the day of the races so everyone could see the
|
|
airplane of the future.
|
|
|
|
Tex never did anything halfway. PR director Carl Cleveland had told him
|
|
to come over Lake Washington, where the boat races were being held, at a
|
|
prearranged time. When that moment arrived, the Dash-80 was in the
|
|
middle of a routine test flight over the Olympic Peninsula and Johnston
|
|
said to copilot Jim Gannett, "I'm gonna roll this bird over the Gold Cup
|
|
course."
|
|
|
|
"They're liable to fire you," Gannett warned.
|
|
|
|
"Maybe, but I don't think so."
|
|
|
|
The Dash-80 was doing 450mph when Tex brought it over Lake Washington at
|
|
only 300 feet, put the jet into a 35-degree climb and proceeded to do a
|
|
complete 360-degree barrel roll. Then he reversed course, came back
|
|
over the lake and repeated the maneuver -- again in full view of 300,000
|
|
awed spectators, some vastly impressed industry officials, and a very
|
|
unhappy William McPherson Allen.
|
|
|
|
After the second roll, Allen turned to Larry Bell of Bell Aircraft, one
|
|
of his guests. "Larry, give me about the of those heart pills you've
|
|
been taking. I need them worse than you do."
|
|
|
|
Bell laughed. "Bill, I think he just sold your airplane."
|
|
|
|
Allen ignored him and said to Carl Cleveland, "I don't think we should
|
|
have anything in the newspapers about this."
|
|
|
|
Poor Carl pointed out it was going to be a little difficult to keep
|
|
something out of the papers that 300,000 people had just witnessed.
|
|
Allen didn't pursue that matter further, but at eight o'clock Monday
|
|
morning, Johnston appeared in his office where not only Allen but Wells,
|
|
Beall, Schairer, and Martin were waiting.
|
|
|
|
Allen's first question was directed not at Tex but at Schairer.
|
|
|
|
"Did you tell him to do it?"
|
|
|
|
Schairer never had a chance to reply, for Johnson immediately said, "No,
|
|
he didn't."
|
|
|
|
Allen turned to Tex. "What made you do it?"
|
|
|
|
"I was selling the airplane," the test pilot answered. He went on to
|
|
explain that the Dash-80 was never in any danger, that an airplane
|
|
doesn't recognize altitude if the forces imposed on its structure do not
|
|
exceed one g (the force of gravity).
|
|
|
|
Allen, still openly upset, was silent for a moment. "You know that," he
|
|
finally said, "and now we know that. But the public doesn't know it.
|
|
Don't ever do it again."
|
|
|
|
Tex promised to behave. What he didn't tell Allen, however, was that he
|
|
had rolled the prototype near Mt. Rainier on a previous flight and his
|
|
fellow test pilots agreed with him that the maneuver, while spectacular,
|
|
never endangered the airplane because the roll was slow and carefully
|
|
controlled. They heard later of one incident in which an Air Force
|
|
pilot actually did a _full_loop_ with a KC-135, the 707's military
|
|
designation, and got away with it, although both outboard pods were torn
|
|
off.
|
|
|
|
Maynard Pennell didn't get mad at Tex, either. "It was an unnecessary
|
|
sales job," Pennell commented, "but it really was a spectacular way to
|
|
demonstrate the airplane. With a skilled pilot, the risk was minimal."
|
|
|
|
Johnston believed Allen had forgiven him. In fact, he was invited to
|
|
Allen's home for dinner the same day of the on-the-carpet session, and
|
|
the first person to greet him was Eastern's crusty Eddie Rickenbacker.
|
|
|
|
He grabbed Tex's Stetson hat, pulled it down over the pilot's ears, and
|
|
chortled, "You slow-rolling son of a bitch -- why didn't you let me know
|
|
you were gonna pull that? I would have been riding the jump seat!"
|
|
Allen overheard this and smiled when Rickenbacker added, "Damn, Bill,
|
|
_that's_ the way to get attention with a new airplane."
|
|
|
|
Mef Allen said the roll was the talk of that evening, most of it
|
|
expressions of approval and admiration that a huge commercial jet could
|
|
be rolled safely. But while Tex left the house convinced he had been
|
|
exonerated, there is considerable evidence that it took a long time
|
|
before Allen really forgave him.
|
|
|
|
Many months went by and Johnston was attending the annual management
|
|
lawn party at the Allen home. He poked Allen in the chest with a finger
|
|
and asked, "Bill, are you finally willing to admit that slow-rolling the
|
|
Dash-80 was the greatest thing that ever happened to that program?"
|
|
|
|
Allen gave him a look that would have frozen boiling water.
|
|
|
|
"No," he said icily.
|
|
|
|
In a 1977 speech to the Washington State Historical Society, Allen said
|
|
he thought at first the rolls might have been unintentional and that he
|
|
summoned Johnston to his office merely to ask if something had gone
|
|
wrong with the controls. He didn't get angry, he insisted, until the
|
|
test pilot admitted he rolled the $16 million prototype deliberately.
|
|
|
|
"It has taken nearly twenty-two years for me to reach the point where I
|
|
can discuss the event with a modicum of humor," he told the audience.
|
|
|
|
-----
|
|
|
|
There are at least two other interesting stories about rolling an
|
|
airplane in the book -- but for those, you get to go read the book!
|
|
|
|
Okay, okay. One more short excerpt:
|
|
|
|
-----
|
|
|
|
There was Mark Miller, for example, who was an absolute terror when it
|
|
came to spelling. He actually got angry at anyone who would misspell a
|
|
word. One day he was reviewing a Minuteman progress presentation being
|
|
delivered on a chart by Bob Edelman of engineering. The word _relieve_
|
|
appeared on the chart, but it was spelled _releive_.
|
|
|
|
"Dammit, Edelman," Miller scolded, "_i_ always goes before _e_."
|
|
|
|
"You're absolutely right," Edelman agreed. He took out a grease pencil
|
|
and at the bottom of the chart, he changed _Boeing_ to _Boieng_."
|
|
|
|
-----
|
|
|
|
Go buy the book!
|
|
|
|
G
|
|
|
|
|
|
----- End Included Message -----
|
|
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Dec 3 03:18:15 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: jaap@cs.ruu.nl (Jaap Romers)
|
|
Subject: Re: AVIATION DAILY - 12/1/92 - International Lease Finance Corp
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Thu, 3 Dec 1992 10:47:47 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.78@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.87@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Utrecht University, Dept. of Computer Science
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-ID: <1992Dec3.104747.23121@cs.ruu.nl>
|
|
Date: 03 Dec 92 03:18:15 PST
|
|
|
|
In <airliners.1992.78@ohare.Chicago.COM> stephen@boeing.com (Stephen L Nicoud) writes:
|
|
|
|
>Spotted on a Boeing Electronic Bulletin Board:
|
|
>
|
|
>[stuff deleted]
|
|
>
|
|
|
|
Is it connected to the Internet, can we telnet to that BBS ??
|
|
|
|
jaap
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Dec 3 05:01:33 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu (Robert Dorsett)
|
|
Subject: Night landings and the 727 in the 1960's
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Thu, 3 Dec 92 06:14:38 CST
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.88@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <9212031214.AA21446@rascal.ics.utexas.edu>
|
|
Date: 03 Dec 92 05:01:33 PST
|
|
|
|
|
|
Those interested in the night-landing problem described in Dave Rogers'
|
|
excerpt from _Legend & Legacy_ would probably find the following of
|
|
interest; it describes the original research. The descriptions of the
|
|
experimental apparatus, and the simulator test regime, are fascinating.
|
|
|
|
Kraft, Conrad L. "A psychophysical contribution to air safety: simulator
|
|
studies of visual illusions in night visual approaches." In _Psychology:
|
|
from research to practice_, Herbert L. Pick, Jr., ed. (New York: Plenum
|
|
Press), 1978. Pages 363-385. ISBN 0-306-31132-1.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Robert Dorsett
|
|
Internet: rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu
|
|
UUCP: ...cs.utexas.edu!rascal.ics.utexas.edu!rdd
|
|
|
|
From kls Fri Dec 4 22:30:29 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: David.B.Horvath@rave.larc.nasa.gov, CDP <MBADBH@rohvm1.rohmhaas.com>
|
|
Subject: Re: GE aerospace
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Tue, 1 Dec 1992 15:08:32 EST
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.51@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.89@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Hidden - I don't speak for them...
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <92336.150832MBADBH@rohvm1.rohmhaas.com>
|
|
Date: 04 Dec 92 22:30:29 PST
|
|
|
|
I was layed off by GE Aerospace, Astro-space division (satelites) last year
|
|
and have kept up with the goings-on in the company. I've also grabbed
|
|
information via the Dow Jones News Service:
|
|
|
|
Martin Marietta Corporation is acquiring General Electric Company's
|
|
Aerospace operations. These will be *merged* in with MM's current operations.
|
|
MM plans on closing the transaction by March 1, 1993. Before the arrangement
|
|
was announced, GE signed a pledge not to hire any (soon to be) former GE
|
|
employees for a period of 2 years (the GE term is "the employees are
|
|
Frozen in their jobs").
|
|
|
|
MM will probably close the GE Aerospace HQ in Valley Forge, PA (suburban
|
|
Philadelphia) as the MM HQ is in Bethesda, MD. GE is getting $1B in
|
|
convertable preferred stock, 2 seats on an expanded MM board, and about
|
|
$2B in cash.
|
|
|
|
MM is financing somewhere around $500M of the cash and issuing the new
|
|
stock to GE.
|
|
|
|
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney was briefed and was supportive. The FTC
|
|
has not passed on the transaction yet.
|
|
|
|
GE Aerospace consists of the GE units and units acquired from RCA a few
|
|
years ago. Jack Welch bought RCA for $600M (cash - no debt); what will
|
|
he buy with $2B? GE has (essentially) no debt and the stock is trading
|
|
rather high for a massive stock-repurchase to take place.
|
|
|
|
The sale includes GE Aerospace, GE Government Services, Knoll Atomic Power
|
|
Labs (Schy., NY) and GE MAO.
|
|
|
|
- David Horvath
|
|
|
|
(BTW: GE also sold GE Consulting Services to Keane, Inc recently. #$%^,
|
|
that's 2 parts of GE that I used to work for that got sold).
|
|
=========================================================================
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Michael T. Palmer, M/S 152, NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA 23681
|
|
Voice: 804-864-2044, FAX: 804-864-7793, Email: m.t.palmer@larc.nasa.gov
|
|
PGP 2.0 Public Key now available -- Consider it an envelope for your e-mail
|
|
|
|
From kls Fri Dec 4 22:30:31 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners,rec.travel.air
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson)
|
|
Subject: Re: Airbus safety
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Thu, 3 Dec 1992 21:37:01 GMT
|
|
References: <1992Dec01.025604.17493@news.mentorg.com> <ByL8Hp.LM8@apollo.hp.com> <airliners.1992.67@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.90@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Hewlett-Packard Corporation, Chelmsford, MA
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <BypDDp.4p9@apollo.hp.com>
|
|
Date: 04 Dec 92 22:30:31 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.67@ohare.Chicago.COM> rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) writes:
|
|
>In article <ByL8Hp.LM8@apollo.hp.com> nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:
|
|
|
|
>> _New Scientist_ had an article devoted to this about 3 issues ago.
|
|
>>
|
|
>> Basically they said that as the % of "pilot error" crashes increases
|
|
>> we may already be at the point where more lives would be saved by
|
|
>> pilotless airplanes.
|
|
>
|
|
>This is certainly a debatable contention. Airbus certainly seems to believe
|
|
>it: but it's also in the business of selling products "differentiated" by
|
|
>their style of protection.
|
|
|
|
Actually they cited Airbus as a good example of the *problem*. They
|
|
said that most "human error" crashes have resulted from poor "situational
|
|
awareness" and that this resuts from the way Airbus-like "glass cock-
|
|
pits" take the pilot out of the loop.
|
|
|
|
|
|
>The reality of the situation is that the safety record has remained pretty
|
|
>much constant since the late 1970's--note: not the early 1980's, when the
|
|
>first automated aircraft were introduced. It has stabilized at about 1500
|
|
>lives per year.
|
|
|
|
Considering that RevenuePassengerMiles have been climbing steadily
|
|
since that time this is not "stabilization"; it's steady improvement!
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
>You would have a hard time convincing me that the number of fundamental errors
|
|
>would not increase GREATLY with ground-based oversight, that the safety
|
|
>margins would not go DOWN, as people fundamentally distanced from the reality
|
|
>of a flight have a go/no-go say.
|
|
|
|
I agree. But the article was discussing taking humans out of the
|
|
loop altogether, not replacing pilots with ground-based controllers.
|
|
|
|
The problem that exists now is that the pilot is partially out of
|
|
the loop -- he still has the authority to fly the plane into a
|
|
mountain, but he can't maintain the situational awareness to
|
|
avoid it. According to the article the period just prior to
|
|
landing (and to a lesser extent at t.o.) overburdens the pilot
|
|
with vast amounts of system management tasks, so he loses a sense
|
|
of where he (or the plane) really is.
|
|
|
|
|
|
>>And moreover, the technology to do this either
|
|
>> already exists or is close at hand.
|
|
>
|
|
>The technology isn't close to create safe, fully autonomous aircraft.
|
|
|
|
The article seemed to feel that it's closer than many people think.
|
|
|
|
|
|
>Was Bernard Ziegler the author of this article, perchance? :-)
|
|
|
|
Julian Moxon. October 17 issue, pg 22.
|
|
|
|
>> People will
|
|
>> continue to cite those cases where coolness or quick thinking on
|
|
>> the part of the crew did save the airplane or at least many lives.
|
|
>
|
|
>I wouldn't. Rather, I would ask how well we understand the *totality* of
|
|
>in-flight incidents and actions, which are corrected by appropriate air-
|
|
>manship. An old, true saying, is that a good pilot is a pilot who doesn't
|
|
>have to show he's a good pilot. Is the capability of being able to maintain
|
|
>control in a thunderstorm really that relevant, when 99% of all pilots would
|
|
>simply have flown around the same thunderstorm?
|
|
|
|
Except the examples I cited (DC 10 fan blade, 747 door) were not
|
|
avoidable by pilot action.
|
|
|
|
|
|
---peter
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
From kls Fri Dec 4 22:30:32 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard)
|
|
Subject: Re: 747SP
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Fri, 4 Dec 1992 01:45:27 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.61@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.68@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.80@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.91@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Boeing
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <Bypovt.3KM@bcstec.ca.boeing.com>
|
|
Date: 04 Dec 92 22:30:32 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.80@ohare.Chicago.COM> davidm@questor.rational.com (David Moore) writes:
|
|
>I have no idea why they were delivering via London.
|
|
|
|
Possibly to reproduce the MacRobertson Race of 1932 or '33. That went from
|
|
London to Sydney, as I recall. The Boeing 247 and the Douglas DC-2 came in
|
|
second and third behind a special build DeHavilland racer. That was a
|
|
remarkable period of change in the airplane industry. However, that race
|
|
tooks a few weeks (all of this is from memory - I don't have any references
|
|
on it, or if I do I don't know where they are :-).
|
|
|
|
Just a theory...
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Terry
|
|
drinkard@bcstec.boeing.com
|
|
"Anyone who thinks they can hold the company responsible for what I say has
|
|
more lawyers than sense."
|
|
|
|
From kls Fri Dec 4 22:30:32 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard)
|
|
Subject: Re: hydraulic problems with DC-10's??
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Fri, 4 Dec 1992 01:55:18 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.30@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.50@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.85@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.92@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Boeing
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <ByppC7.44K@bcstec.ca.boeing.com>
|
|
Date: 04 Dec 92 22:30:32 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.85@ohare.Chicago.COM> weiss@turing.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss) writes:
|
|
>
|
|
>After the third post with this answer, I figure it's time to clarify my
|
|
>statement. I am referring to the unbalance of WEIGHT, not THRUST. Nonetheless
|
|
>I suppose we should go on...
|
|
|
|
It doesn't matter, the loss of weight on that wing was actually a
|
|
short-term plus in that incident (effectively generated a right-hand
|
|
(positive) roll moment to help counter the loss of lift on the left wing).
|
|
The adverse affect (aside from the obvious one of damage occuring during
|
|
the departure of the engine and strut) is the increase in wing-root bending
|
|
moment.
|
|
|
|
>>Flight AA 191 lost the slats on the left hand
|
|
>>wing (if memory serves) because of Douglas' failure to include mechanical
|
|
>>lockouts on the slat actuators. They were not required to certify the
|
|
>>airplane.
|
|
>
|
|
>Which doesn't disprove my theory. As it is, though, the loss of the slats
|
|
>(which, according to all my aero classes, only lowers the stall speed but does
|
|
>NOT increase the coefficient of lift!) was enough to stall the wing, more than
|
|
>"countering" the loss of weight on the wing.
|
|
|
|
You may wish to recheck your math. It isn't possible to lower the stall
|
|
speed without improving the coefficient of lift (assuming constant weight,
|
|
air density, and wing area).
|
|
|
|
What is not increased is the total amount of lift produced, assuming
|
|
unaccelerated, level flight.
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Terry
|
|
drinkard@bcstec.boeing.com
|
|
"Anyone who thinks they can hold the company responsible for what I say has
|
|
more lawyers than sense."
|
|
|
|
From kls Fri Dec 4 22:30:33 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: palmer@icat.larc.nasa.gov (Michael T. Palmer)
|
|
Subject: Re: Flight envelope protections
|
|
X-Submission-Date: 4 Dec 92 14:14:18 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.54@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.72@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.93@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA USA
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <palmer.723478458@news.larc.nasa.gov>
|
|
Date: 04 Dec 92 22:30:33 PST
|
|
|
|
rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) writes:
|
|
|
|
>palmer@icat.larc.nasa.gov (Michael T. Palmer) wrote:
|
|
|
|
>> This has some serious consequences. For example, in the China Airlines
|
|
>> B-747 incident 300 nm northwest of San Francisco in 1985 (NTSB/AAR-86-03),
|
|
>> the crew was forced to overstress (and structurally damage)
|
|
> ^^^^^^
|
|
|
|
>That might be overstating the case a bit. :-) The NTSB report suggests
|
|
>they didn't have a clue how to recover from the spiral, once they entered
|
|
>it, lacking military aerobatic training and being completely disoriented. I
|
|
>don't believe the report distinguishes the tailplane's damage as being
|
|
>incidental or intentional.
|
|
|
|
Agreed. I didn't mean to imply necessarily that they KNEW they needed to
|
|
overstress the airframe, and it is *possible* that this occurred during
|
|
control inputs that did not actually contribute to the recovery. It's been
|
|
awhile since I read that report, and I didn't have it handy to refer to.
|
|
|
|
|
|
>> crew recovered control with about 10,000 ft of altitude left (from an
|
|
>> original high-altitude cruise). It is very likely that if the aircraft
|
|
>> had prevented the crew from initiating control commands that would lead
|
|
>> to aircraft damage, the aircraft (and passengers) would have been lost.
|
|
|
|
>Your point's well taken, and the risks are certainly worth considering. But
|
|
>allow me to play devil's advocate, for a minute, without diluting your argu-
|
|
>ment, and suggest that the EFCS would have prevented an A3[2-4]0 from getting
|
|
>into the unusual attitude to begin with. The protections are both aerodynamic
|
|
>and input-filtering (and configuration-evaluating, and...). In the China
|
|
>Air incident, the flip-over was caused by a "dumb" autopilot/autothrottle
|
|
>design configuration oversight, following an engine abnormality. If a similar
|
|
>event had occurred on an A3[2-4]0, the EFCS would probably have limited both
|
|
>the authority of the FMS to put the airplane into the steep bank, *and* would
|
|
>have provided maximum corrective action, using opposing controls, to keep the
|
|
>airplane in the prescribed operating envelope.
|
|
|
|
Well... given the recent post here about the A310 in Moscow going 88 degrees
|
|
nose-up, I'm not sure that I agree that the Airbus EFCS would necessarily
|
|
prevent the aircraft from attaining "unusual" attitudes. In fact, it was the
|
|
"smarts" of the A310 autopilot that actually contributed to that incident.
|
|
As that poster also mentioned, though, I would like VERY MUCH to see more
|
|
documentation and a fuller description of exactly what happened.
|
|
|
|
|
|
>This is from the Federal Register 54:17, January 27, 1989, pages 3989 and
|
|
>3996:
|
|
|
|
>P. 3989, the oh-so-enlightening, explanatory commentary:
|
|
|
|
> "The second commenter believes that the flightcrew must be aware of any
|
|
> failure conditions which affect the structural capability of the
|
|
> airplane, whether or not a compensating procedure exists. The FAA does
|
|
> not concur with this comment. It is not necessary for the flight crew
|
|
> to be aware of a failure in the active control system during the flight
|
|
> on which the failure occurs if there is no available corrective
|
|
> action; however, the airplane should not be exposed to the failure
|
|
> condition for an extended period of time. The flightcrew must
|
|
> therefore be alerted to the failure condition prior to the next flight."
|
|
|
|
Oh, I get it! Just because a condition exists that may affect OTHER choices
|
|
I make about how to respond to OTHER occurrences during that flight, that
|
|
doesn't mean that I have the right to know what is going on with my aircraft.
|
|
Hmm, seems reasonable... NOT!
|
|
|
|
|
|
>This is from the FAA, the agency in charge of establishing airworthiness and
|
|
>certification practices in the United States! In reality, the A320 likely
|
|
>*does* provide enough feedback: but the FAA, apparently unnecessarily, has
|
|
>certainly opened the door for the practice to be introduced in subsequent
|
|
>types.
|
|
|
|
I agree completely. I work in the Human/Automation Integration Branch in
|
|
the Flight Management Division at NASA Langley. We have worked for some
|
|
time examining the complicated interrelationships between events that lead
|
|
to accidents, and have even constructed software prototypes that try to
|
|
determine these relationships and make them more explicit.
|
|
|
|
What really scares us is the prevalent attitude of many in the industry
|
|
that they can anticipate ALL the "important" ways that things will interact,
|
|
and provide procedures for dealing with them. And whenever you point to
|
|
an example of how they failed and how that lead to an accident, they respond
|
|
"Oh, but we've already fixed that." Sure. But what about the NEXT one
|
|
that you haven't "fixed" yet!?!
|
|
|
|
By the way, the charter of our organization (as if you couldn't tell from
|
|
what I've said so far) is NOT to solve problems in the cockpit by increasing
|
|
the amount of automation. Rather, we seek to propose better ways of using
|
|
the capabilities of both the automation and the flight crew, which may even
|
|
mean rethinking many of the traditional tasks that automation is used for
|
|
now. And we do NOT see the "pilot as manager" scenario as being necessarily
|
|
ideal. Humans tend to make lousy system monitors. Ask the Nuclear people.
|
|
Human-machine systems work best when the humans are actively *involved*.
|
|
|
|
|
|
>> If nothing else, I hope I have brought up some topics that deserve
|
|
>> discussion among readers of this newsgroup. After all, aren't we the
|
|
>> ones in positions to influence our industry (all in our own way, of
|
|
>> course)?
|
|
|
|
>Especially in software, of particular relevance to the net. A lot (if not
|
|
>most) of the people writing this code--4M on the A320, 10M+ on the
|
|
>A330 and A340--are *not* aero engineers: just programmers, ostensibly with
|
|
>CS backgrounds (a more frightening thought I can't imagine! :-)), performing
|
|
>under strictly governed, structured, controlled environments: to specif-
|
|
>ication.
|
|
|
|
>Airbus even mentioned the "CS" types it brought in from "outside" to
|
|
>buttress a comment on its quality-control practices, in an article, as if
|
|
>to make the point that mere engineers weren't writing this stuff: the
|
|
>"pros" are doing it. :-) Yeah, we know what we're doing, SURE... :-)
|
|
|
|
Ummm... this point came up in a Newsweek article (now THERE'S an accurate
|
|
and unbiased source of information!) about digital flight control systems.
|
|
They were shocked that programmers, not pilots, were writing the software.
|
|
I feel at least somewhat qualified to address this issue, since my undergrad
|
|
is Aerospace Engineering, my master's is Computer Science, and I'm working
|
|
on the Ph.D. in Human-Machine Systems.
|
|
|
|
Pilots and engineers tend to be experts in specifying how things should
|
|
happen. My experience with their programming ability is that they tend to
|
|
not be aware of most of the advances in Computer Science that have occurred
|
|
over the past 25 years. The result is poorly designed and implemented code
|
|
that takes Herculean efforts to get working properly and maintain. On the
|
|
other hand, programmers do not necessarily make good system designers... they
|
|
tend to think in terms of how things will be implemented (and the limitations
|
|
of that implementation) rather than in terms of what the system MUST be able
|
|
to do. I have met only a few people who can combine both talents, to become
|
|
very good system designers AND software designers.
|
|
|
|
These people have the ability to hear what the pilots and engineers say, and
|
|
translate that into a total system design, including software design, that
|
|
meets the requirements and can be implemented. At THIS point, the actual
|
|
programmers become involved. If changes need to be made due to, say, hardware
|
|
limitations, then these can be incorporated by either a requirements OR an
|
|
implementation change.
|
|
|
|
So, I don't think you should be afraid that CS people are writing the code.
|
|
In fact, you should be glad that they are. You just need to make sure that
|
|
they are filling in the pieces of a software design that was put together
|
|
by a competent person like I described above.
|
|
|
|
|
|
>Robert Dorsett
|
|
>rdd@cactus.org
|
|
>...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd
|
|
|
|
I hope I get to meet you at a conference sometime soon! It's great to see
|
|
that other people are grappling with the same issues.
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Michael T. Palmer, M/S 152, NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA 23681
|
|
Voice: 804-864-2044, FAX: 804-864-7793, Email: m.t.palmer@larc.nasa.gov
|
|
PGP 2.0 Public Key now available -- Consider it an envelope for your e-mail
|
|
|
|
From kls Fri Dec 4 22:30:34 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: ditka!sgiblab!acd4.acd.com!HDFS1.acd.com!jbii ( John O. Bell II )
|
|
Subject: Re: Flight envelope protections, and mistrust of CS people
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Fri, 4 Dec 1992 16:30:15 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.54@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.72@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.94@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Summary: Don't walk out in the rain w/o an umbrella AEs... you might drown
|
|
Organization: Applied Computing Devices, Inc., Terre Haute IN
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <1992Dec4.163015.1333@acd4.acd.com>
|
|
Date: 04 Dec 92 22:30:34 PST
|
|
|
|
>Especially in software, of particular relevance to the net. A lot (if not
|
|
>most) of the people writing this code--4M on the A320, 10M+ on the
|
|
>A330 and A340--are *not* aero engineers: just programmers, ostensibly with
|
|
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
|
|
|
I used to think that way as an AE grad, until I got my CS degree. Let's face
|
|
it, guys, most AEs don't even know where to _begin_ coding this stuff. They
|
|
don't have the experience or the background to make clean, fast, fault-
|
|
tolerant code for these kind of applications. However, it is true that the CS
|
|
types better have a good math/engineering background if they are going to
|
|
understand exactly what is required for the code. You can't be a specialist
|
|
in everything (much to the company's chagrin >:-)... "Darn, we gotta pay money
|
|
to those CS people too? I thought our AEs could handle this!").
|
|
|
|
Side Note: Every time I see some aerospace article talk about how engineers
|
|
are becoming accomplished computer scientists, I laugh my head off.
|
|
I've been on both sides of the tracks, and I know better. Doing
|
|
scientific programming in FORTRAN does not make you a CS god.
|
|
|
|
>CS backgrounds (a more frightening thought I can't imagine! :-)), performing
|
|
>under strictly governed, structured, controlled environments: to specif-
|
|
>ication.
|
|
|
|
Unlike the AEs, who are allowed to be creative, free-wheeling, loose cannons.
|
|
Shyeah, and I'm the Easter Bunny... unless you are a conceptual designer, you
|
|
are a glorified paper shuffler just like anyone else. Why do you think they
|
|
call Boeing "The Lazy B", anyway (just an example).
|
|
|
|
>Airbus even mentioned the "CS" types it brought in from "outside" to
|
|
>buttress a comment on its quality-control practices, in an article, as if
|
|
>to make the point that mere engineers weren't writing this stuff: the
|
|
>"pros" are doing it. :-) Yeah, we know what we're doing, SURE... :-)
|
|
|
|
Yeah, they do. Evidently the AEs on the project couldn't handle the task
|
|
or they wouldn't have hired CS types. Either that, or the code they were
|
|
putting together was such a spaghetti-mess of calls and gotos that they
|
|
had to get CS people just so they could trace and fix the bugs.
|
|
|
|
>Robert Dorsett
|
|
>rdd@cactus.org
|
|
>...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd
|
|
|
|
John Bell
|
|
jbii@hdfs1.acd.com
|
|
Applied Computing Devices, Inc.
|
|
|
|
From kls Fri Dec 4 22:30:35 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: gregw@tribble.rational.com (Greg Wilson)
|
|
Subject: Re: Boeing Book
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Fri, 4 Dec 1992 23:08:39 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.41@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.95@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Rational
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <gregw.723510519@tribble>
|
|
Date: 04 Dec 92 22:30:35 PST
|
|
|
|
michael@is3000.bmr.gov.au (System Support) writes:
|
|
|
|
>Maybe someone can help me. I'm trying to get hold of a new book about
|
|
>Boeing entitled something like "The Boeing Story". Does anyone have
|
|
>any ideas about such a book, author? Any help would be much
|
|
>appreciated. Does Boeing (Seattle) have an email address?
|
|
|
|
>Thanking You in appreciation,
|
|
>Michael
|
|
|
|
Interestingly, I happen to be just about finished reading "Vision: The Story
|
|
of Boeing," by Harold Mansfield. This is an older book (1966) that I picked
|
|
up in a used bookstore. Published by Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, New York.
|
|
|
|
Haven't read "Legend and Legacy" yet - but it looks like I will have to!
|
|
|
|
>michael@is3000.bmr.gov.au
|
|
|
|
>--
|
|
|
|
|
|
Greg Wilson
|
|
gregw@rational.com
|
|
|
|
From kls Fri Dec 4 22:30:37 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: Robert Dorsett <rdd@cactus.org>
|
|
Subject: More _Legend_and_Legacy_
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Thu, 3 Dec 92 5:57:18 CST
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.41@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.48@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.96@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Reply-To: rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <CMM.0.90.2.723383838.rdd@cactus.org>
|
|
Date: 04 Dec 92 22:30:37 PST
|
|
|
|
This was posted to rec.aviation.misc in October...
|
|
|
|
---------------
|
|
|
|
From: mtc@hpcc01.corp.hp.com (Mark Cousins)
|
|
Date: Fri, 9 Oct 1992 08:42:00 GMT
|
|
Subject: More _Legend_and_Legacy_
|
|
Message-ID: <87330001@hpcc01.corp.hp.com>
|
|
Organization: HP General Systems Division
|
|
Newsgroups: rec.aviation.misc
|
|
|
|
Okay, now it's my turn to post my favorite parts of _Lengend_and_Legacy_, the
|
|
book about Boeing that Geoff Peck reviewed a while back.
|
|
|
|
I have two:
|
|
|
|
"Frye ordered six Stratoliners for TWA, and Pan Am signed for four; the only
|
|
other potential 'launch' customer was the Netherlands' KLM, which expressed
|
|
enough serious interest to send a technical delegation to Seattle for
|
|
evaluation. Lindbergh, too, arrived at Boeing as a technical consultant for
|
|
Pan Am, and secretarial hearts fluttered enough to generate a strong breeze.
|
|
As was his custom, he went through the charade of using a fictitious name, a
|
|
transparent device because he was easier to recognize than any movie star; at
|
|
Boeing he was knwn either as 'Mr. Charles' or 'Mr. Morrow.'
|
|
|
|
"He showed up ahead of schedule for a meeting one day, found Marge Blair
|
|
rearranging some chairs, and offered to help. While they were lifting a chair
|
|
together, his hand accidentally brushed hers. Lindbergh's face turned beet
|
|
red, he mumbled an apology, and fled the room.
|
|
|
|
"'Talk about being bashful and shy,' Marge laughed. 'You would have thought
|
|
he tried to assault me. Most of the time he looked like a young farmer lost
|
|
in the big city.'"
|
|
|
|
=====
|
|
|
|
To be sure, I don't have that effect on secretarial hearts, and he flew better
|
|
than I, but the story struck a resonance in me. I'm pretty bashful also and
|
|
probably would react similarly (smile) . . .
|
|
|
|
=====
|
|
|
|
This next one is, so far, my favorite of them all.
|
|
|
|
"Another early 707 was involved in an incident that might be termed the Great
|
|
Boeing Air Raid. This was Pan Am's second airplane off the line, being flown
|
|
by Boeing's Lew Wallick and Water Haldeman, an FAA check pilot. They were
|
|
doing some tests around the Los Angeles area and just before heading back to
|
|
Edwards Air Force Base for refueling, Wallick remembered that the DC-8 was to
|
|
make its first flight that day.
|
|
|
|
"They were about 20 miles from Long Beach where the maiden flight was
|
|
scheduled to take place later that morning, and Wallick asked the Long Beach
|
|
control tower for permission to fly over the airport. He requested a modest
|
|
5,000 feet but the tower turned out to be more cooperative than requested.
|
|
|
|
"'What is your identification number?'
|
|
|
|
"'Seven-oh-seven Peter Alpha.'
|
|
|
|
"'Are you a Boeing 707?'
|
|
|
|
"'Affirmative.'
|
|
|
|
"'Well, you're cleared to cross the airport at one thousand.'
|
|
|
|
"About one mile out the tower controller, apparently a Boeing fan, changed his
|
|
mind.
|
|
|
|
"'You're cleared to cross the airport as low as you want,' he decreed.
|
|
|
|
"At this particular moment, the airport coffee shop was jammed with media
|
|
people having breakfast before covering the long-anticipated first flight of
|
|
the DC-8. Wallick came screaming over the field at 500 feet, rattling the
|
|
coffee shop windows. Everyone rushed outside in time to see a four-engine
|
|
jetliner clawing skyward, four black plumes streaming in its wake. Reporters
|
|
did the natural thing; they phoned their offices to report that the DC-8 had
|
|
just taken off on its maiden flight.
|
|
|
|
"Once that news was broadcast, Douglas employees planning to attend the
|
|
first-flight ceremonies stayed away by the droves. Donald Douglas was livid;
|
|
Wallick heard later that he called Bill Allen, raised hell, and when he found
|
|
out that Wallick's copilot was an FAA employee, tried to get Haldeman fired."
|
|
|
|
=====
|
|
|
|
Enjoy!
|
|
|
|
Mark
|
|
--
|
|
Mark Cousins Hewlett-Packard Co. mtc@hpsemc.cup.hp.com
|
|
HP-UX VAB programs 19055 Pruneridge Ave., MS 46T5
|
|
(408) 447-4659 Cupertino, CA 95014 FAX: (408) 447-4364
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
From kls Fri Dec 4 22:30:38 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: Robert Dorsett <rdd@cactus.org>
|
|
Subject: night landings
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Thu, 3 Dec 92 5:59:51 CST
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.88@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.97@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Reply-To: rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <CMM.0.90.2.723383991.rdd@cactus.org>
|
|
Date: 04 Dec 92 22:30:38 PST
|
|
|
|
Yet another comment on Legend & Legacy, from last month.
|
|
|
|
---------------
|
|
|
|
From: dfr@usna.navy.mil (PROF D. Rogers (EAS FAC))
|
|
Newsgroups: rec.aviation.misc
|
|
Subject: night landings
|
|
Keywords: night, landings
|
|
Message-ID: <2341@usna.NAVY.MIL>
|
|
Date: 1 Nov 92 02:10:45 GMT
|
|
|
|
G'day,
|
|
|
|
Here is another quote without permission from `Legend and Legacy'
|
|
The Story of Boeing and Its People.
|
|
|
|
Now that winter has come and most of us will be flying more
|
|
at night it's something to consider.
|
|
|
|
Between late 1965 and early 1966 there were 4 fatal 727 crashes.
|
|
The common denominator in each crash was excessive rate of
|
|
descent at night. Two aircraft were flown into the water, a
|
|
third hit high terrain near the airport over an unlighted
|
|
sloping terrain.
|
|
|
|
"Boeing engineers built a make-believe city on a table top place
|
|
in front of a cockpit simulator, and put 12 experienced company
|
|
pilots through identical approaches to the miniature city's
|
|
airport. All 12 were told they were making a routine approach
|
|
on a clear night to `Nighterton Field,' well-lighted and just
|
|
south of the city, locate on a three-degree slope. Bisecting
|
|
Nighterton was a river. The city lights were bright, but there
|
|
were no lights between the beginning of the approach path and
|
|
the runway---a typical approach over water or unlighted sloping
|
|
terrain.
|
|
|
|
Noe of the pilots had altimeters for reference. They were told
|
|
to concentrate on flying the best approach path possible,
|
|
reporting their estimated altitude every two miles starting at
|
|
a point 18 miles from the airport. Their only active
|
|
instruments were an airspeed indicator and a vertical velocity
|
|
gauge.
|
|
|
|
Eleven of the 12 crashed while making the approach. The closest
|
|
any of these 11 got to the runway before pranging into imaginary
|
|
ground was five miles. ....."
|
|
|
|
'Nuff said.
|
|
|
|
Dave Rogers
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
From kls Fri Dec 4 22:30:38 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: libove@libove.alf.dec.com (Jay Vassos-Libove)
|
|
Subject: cost and names of assorted airliners?
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Thu, 3 Dec 1992 21:50:43 GMT
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.98@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Digital Equipment Corporation, Atlanta Customer Support Center
|
|
X-Submission-Message-ID: <LIBOVE.92Dec3165043@libove.alf.dec.com>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 04 Dec 92 22:30:38 PST
|
|
|
|
Does someone have a rundown of the approximate purchase cost
|
|
(either current, or for out-of-production craft, the last
|
|
price) of all jet passenger airliners?
|
|
|
|
While we're at it, these are the jet passenger commercial
|
|
airliners that I know of; what am I missing?
|
|
|
|
(is the DC-8 a jet?)
|
|
DC-9
|
|
DC-10
|
|
MD-80 series
|
|
MD-11
|
|
BAC-111
|
|
B-727
|
|
B-737
|
|
B-747
|
|
B-757
|
|
B-767
|
|
L-1011
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
|
|
Jay Vassos-Libove libove@alf.dec.com
|
|
Digital Equipment Corporation decwrl!alf.dec.com!libove
|
|
Atlanta Customer Support Center Opinions? They're mine, mine, all mine!
|
|
Alpharetta, Georgia and D.E.C. Can't have 'em!
|
|
|
|
From kls Fri Dec 4 22:30:39 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: Keith Barr <barrk@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
|
|
Subject: Re: hydraulic problems with DC-10s??
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Thu, 3 Dec 92 11:12:07 MST
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.6@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.8@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.30@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.32@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.99@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <199212031812.AA10282@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
|
|
Date: 04 Dec 92 22:30:39 PST
|
|
|
|
Subject: Re: hydraulic problems with DC-10's??
|
|
Robert Dorsett Says:
|
|
> Normally, given asymmetric thrust, you bank into the good engine(s): rudder's
|
|
> normally used to augment the ailerons as necessary to control sideslip.
|
|
|
|
Actually, you have this backwards. Rudder is used to control the yaw,
|
|
and by controlling the yaw you introduce some sideslip that should be
|
|
counteracted by banking into the good engine (raise the dead is the way
|
|
I was tought to remember that :^)
|
|
|
|
The way this works is as follows....we will have to make due with ASCII
|
|
graphics:
|
|
|
|
Normal Flight (Multi-Engine, Both turning)
|
|
Left thrust Right thrust
|
|
| |
|
|
| A |
|
|
------X--A--X------
|
|
A
|
|
A
|
|
--A--
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Drag
|
|
|
|
Engine Out Flight (no correction)
|
|
left thrust
|
|
|
|
|
| A
|
|
------X--A--X------
|
|
A CW Moment
|
|
A |_
|
|
--A--
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Drag
|
|
|
|
Engine Out Flight (Yaw (moment) correction)
|
|
left thrust
|
|
|
|
|
| A
|
|
------X--A--X------
|
|
A
|
|
A
|
|
--A--===>Rudder Force to counteract rotation
|
|
|
|
|
| Now you can see we have fixed the
|
|
| Rotation with rudder, but we have an
|
|
| unbalanced vector diagram, so the aircraft
|
|
Drag will sideslip to the right
|
|
|
|
By raising the dead engine we tilt the lift vector to the left which balances
|
|
the force from the rudder.
|
|
|
|
> The second issue is the moment produced by the combination of the "dead"
|
|
> engine (with its drag) and the "good" engines. This is generally a minimal
|
|
> issue, assuming the airspeed is there, and the pilot applies correct
|
|
> technique. Most transport aircraft can fly with all engines out on one side,
|
|
> although I do not know if this is an explicit regulatory requirement. As
|
|
> long as the inherent longitudinal stability of the airplane (contributed
|
|
> by the vertical stabilizer, rudder, wings, and fuselage) is sufficient to
|
|
> overcome the yawing moment, the airplane can be controlled. So *correcting*
|
|
> for a lost engine is a near-instantaneous correction, applied by the pilot,
|
|
> needing no altitude reserve.
|
|
|
|
Correct, but here is an added explanation for those who care:
|
|
There is really only one concern of the pilot in an engine out situation, that
|
|
is airspeed. The pilot, if he has done an appropriate preflight, will know
|
|
whether he/she is able to climb on one engine out, so that is not a suprise.
|
|
The biggest problem with an engine out is loss of control. This airspeed,
|
|
called Vmc (Velocity Minimum Controllable) is the speed at which the rudder
|
|
doesn't have enough air flowing over it to create enough force to counteract
|
|
the moment from the good/dead engine. As long as you are above this speed,
|
|
you should be controllable (ignoring the fact that one wing may stall if
|
|
the slat comes up, but I am not talking about that case in particular).
|
|
|
|
On the same thread, but different argument...
|
|
Michael Weiss writes:
|
|
>I have a hard time believing that an intact hydraulic system would have
|
|
>prevented AA191 from crashing. Let's face it, a wing-mounted engine falling
|
|
>off produces such a rediculous unbalance that even full aileron wouldn't be
|
|
>able to counter it.
|
|
|
|
>After the third post with this answer, I figure it's time to clarify my
|
|
>statement. I am referring to the unbalance of WEIGHT, not THRUST. Nonetheless
|
|
>I suppose we should go on...
|
|
|
|
The change in weight from a lost engine is minimal. A fully loaded DC-10-30
|
|
weighs 572,000 pounds. A GE CF6-50C2B weighs only 8,731 pounds. This means
|
|
that in normal flight each wing needs to support 286,000 pounds. If each
|
|
wing supports the weight of its engine, now the left wing only needs to
|
|
create 277,269 pounds of lift, a 3.05% decrease. I would imagine that
|
|
ailerons easily can create a 3.05% increase in lift per side.
|
|
|
|
References: Aviation Week and Space Technology 3/16/92 p. 102
|
|
Illustrated Encyclopedia of Commercial Aircraft pp 148-157
|
|
_____________________________ _____
|
|
| Keith Barr \ \ K \__ _____
|
|
| barr@ncar.ucar.edu \___________\ \/_______\___\_____________
|
|
| Comm/AS&MEL/Inst/IGI / < /_/ ..................... `-.
|
|
|_____________________________/ `-----------,----,--------------'
|
|
When you think how well basic appliances work, it's _/____/
|
|
hard to believe anyone ever gets on an airplane.--Calvin
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 8 15:50:51 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: greg@octopus.dpsi.com (Gregory R. Travis)
|
|
Subject: Re: hydraulic problems with DC-10s??
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Sat, 5 Dec 1992 16:28:27 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.6@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.8@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.30@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.32@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.99@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.100@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Data Parallel Systems, Inc
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-ID: <greg.723572907@octopus>
|
|
Date: 08 Dec 92 15:50:51 PST
|
|
|
|
Keith Barr <barrk@ucsu.Colorado.EDU> writes:
|
|
|
|
>The change in weight from a lost engine is minimal. A fully loaded DC-10-30
|
|
>weighs 572,000 pounds. A GE CF6-50C2B weighs only 8,731 pounds. This means
|
|
>that in normal flight each wing needs to support 286,000 pounds. If each
|
|
>wing supports the weight of its engine, now the left wing only needs to
|
|
>create 277,269 pounds of lift, a 3.05% decrease. I would imagine that
|
|
>ailerons easily can create a 3.05% increase in lift per side.
|
|
|
|
It seems to me that they each have to perform at only half this figure:
|
|
I.e. - the aileron on the wing that lost the engine needs to increase lift
|
|
by about 1.5% while the aileron on the "good" wing needs to go negative
|
|
and decrease that wing's lift by 1.5%.
|
|
|
|
This is quite muddled though, as other anti-lift devices (such as spoilers)
|
|
will deploy at a given amount of aileron deflection. In fact, and I don't
|
|
have my DC-10 refs handy, I imagine that the ailerons on a -10 are locked
|
|
in place when the flaps are up (not the case in the Chicago crash, I know)
|
|
and that the loss of an engine AT CRUISE would have to be countered entirely by
|
|
lift spoiling devices (i.e. spoilers) on the opposite wing with a
|
|
suitable increase in the aircraft's overall AOA.
|
|
|
|
In any case, the ORIGINAL poster's position that the loss of an engine
|
|
from a wing, considering the engine's moment and weight, would render the plane
|
|
uncontrollable is not supported either by analysis or historic precedent.
|
|
Engines depart planes all the time...
|
|
|
|
BTW, just to be pedantic: The wings do not each contribute exactly
|
|
50% of the total lift. Remember that that fuselage itself contributes
|
|
a SUBSTANTIAL amount of lift at cruise as do the horizontal stabilizer
|
|
surfaces (in certain flight regimes!).
|
|
|
|
greg, the math bimbo
|
|
--
|
|
Gregory Reed Travis D P S I
|
|
Data Parallel Systems Incorporated greg@dpsi.com (For MX mailers only!)
|
|
Bloomington, IN greg@indiana.edu (For the others)
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 8 15:50:53 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: sandee@Think.COM (Daan Sandee)
|
|
Subject: Re: 747-400 delivery flight (was :747SP
|
|
X-Submission-Date: 5 Dec 1992 21:44:28 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.61@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.68@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.80@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.91@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.101@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: TMC
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <1fr7rsINN57s@early-bird.think.com>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 08 Dec 92 15:50:53 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.91@ohare.Chicago.COM>, drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard) writes:
|
|
|> In article <airliners.1992.80@ohare.Chicago.COM> davidm@questor.rational.com (David Moore) writes:
|
|
|> >I have no idea why they were delivering via London.
|
|
|>
|
|
|> Possibly to reproduce the MacRobertson Race of 1932 or '33. That went from
|
|
|> London to Sydney, as I recall. The Boeing 247 and the Douglas DC-2 came in
|
|
|> second and third behind a special build DeHavilland racer. That was a
|
|
|> remarkable period of change in the airplane industry. However, that race
|
|
|> tooks a few weeks (all of this is from memory - I don't have any references
|
|
|> on it, or if I do I don't know where they are :-).
|
|
|
|
For the sake of historical accuracy, London to Melbourne, 1932.
|
|
As I remember, the DC-2 (a standard version flown by a KLM crew) came in
|
|
second (first in the handicapped class) and might have won overall if it
|
|
hadn't had engine trouble a couple of hundred miles from Melbourne.
|
|
The race took around ten days. Cruising speed, 250-300 mph. Individual
|
|
legs 1000 miles max (they couldn't fly Darwin to Sydney nonstop, had to
|
|
refuel in some awful place in the interior). As Terry says, it showed the
|
|
ongoing revolution in the airline industry.
|
|
|
|
As to the Qantas delivery, LHR-SYD was presumably the route they needed to
|
|
advertize, more so than LAX-SYD which would have been the obvious one.
|
|
|
|
Daan Sandee sandee@think.com
|
|
Thinking Machines Corporation
|
|
Cambridge, Mass 02142 (617) 234-5044
|
|
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 8 15:50:54 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu (Robert Dorsett)
|
|
Subject: REVIEW of TEX JOHNSTON
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Sun, 6 Dec 92 03:59:13 CST
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.102@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <9212060959.AA08798@rascal.ics.utexas.edu>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 08 Dec 92 15:50:54 PST
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Tex Johnston, Jet-Age Test Pilot
|
|
|
|
By A. M. Johnston, with Charles Barton.
|
|
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991.
|
|
274 pp., illustrated.
|
|
ISBN 1-56098-013-3, hardbound.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Contents:
|
|
|
|
Forward by William Randolph Hearst, Jr.
|
|
|
|
First Flights
|
|
Barnstorming
|
|
Instructing and Ferrying
|
|
Test Pilot Beginnings
|
|
The First U.S. Jet
|
|
Swept Wings and Rocket Power
|
|
Cobra I and II: The Thompson Trophy
|
|
Remote Control and Swept-wing Tests
|
|
The X-1
|
|
Bell Helicopters
|
|
The Move to Boeing
|
|
The XB-47
|
|
The B-52 Program
|
|
Problems and Prospects
|
|
KC-135 Jet Tanker and the Dash 80 Jet Transport
|
|
Public Relations, Hot Brakes and Flutter, and the 707 Barrel Roll
|
|
707 Certification and Pan Am Route Survey
|
|
The Russian Tu-104 and the 707 European Round-Robin
|
|
Transition Problems and Sales Trips
|
|
Air India
|
|
Accidents and Consequences
|
|
Dyna Soar and Apollo
|
|
|
|
Index
|
|
|
|
Tex Johnston has gone down in history as "the guy who rolled the 707
|
|
prototype," but his career was much more extensive, fascinating one,
|
|
ranging from flying a home-built glider as a teenager in the 1930's,
|
|
to barnstorming, to serving as Boeing's most famous test pilot. This
|
|
book provides an outline of that career, outlining his major
|
|
life-events, and offering a collection of anecdotes on specific,
|
|
important, problems and issues, many of which continue to befuddle
|
|
net.dwellers. :-) These include, among other things, discussions of
|
|
his ferry work during World War II; his work on the P-39; work on the
|
|
XB-59; the first American jet aircraft; the X-1, the first American
|
|
supersonic fighter; the XB-47, the first American jet bomber; the
|
|
YB-52 (with tandem seating!); the 367-80, the 707 prototype; and the
|
|
707 itself.
|
|
|
|
Johnston's best compared to Chuck Yeager, in terms of the legend that
|
|
has built up around his accomplishments in the industry. His
|
|
autobiography, however, is written for pilots, not the masses: just
|
|
the facts. For example: his discussion of the first instance of
|
|
in-flight spoilers on large aircraft:
|
|
|
|
"The XB-47 contained many new, state-of-the-art configuration and
|
|
structural design concepts. One of significance was the flexible-
|
|
stress wing design, which provided a strong, flexible structure,
|
|
allowing the wing to flex during gust and maneuvering loads, thus
|
|
relieving high-stress areas and providing a smoother ride.
|
|
|
|
"During a low-level flight demonstration at Wichita for observing
|
|
dignitaries, I increased the air speed to approximately 435 mph and
|
|
applied right aileron and up elevator for a right climbing turn. The
|
|
airplane rolled left. I snapped the throttles closed and the lateral
|
|
control to neutral, simultaneously increasing the climb angle. As
|
|
the speed decreased to 425, the lateral control became normal.
|
|
Analysis of the problem determined that at the high air loads at
|
|
speeds above 425 mph, when the ailerons were deflected, the flexible
|
|
wing began to twist, changing the angle of attack of the outboard
|
|
wing sections, resulting in control reversal. This twist was called
|
|
wing windup. 'It sure gets your attention,' I said.
|
|
|
|
"That event led to the development of lateral control spoilers to
|
|
eliminate the wing-twist problem on all Boeing airplanes. A lateral
|
|
control spoiler is a rectangular door, hinged on its forward edge,
|
|
which fits flush with the upper surface of the wing. During a turn
|
|
in flight the doors are raised on the wing at the inside of the turn,
|
|
decreasing the lieft of that wing so that the airplane rolls in that
|
|
direction. When the spoilers are raised on both wings
|
|
simultaneously, they serve as air brakes while retaining their
|
|
lateral control function, and extremely valuable control for
|
|
dissipating excessive airspeed."
|
|
|
|
His analysis and discussion of early 707 crashes has particular
|
|
relevance for the recent "safety" discussions: a snapshot into the
|
|
industry's early learning curve, which we seem destined to repeat.
|
|
|
|
The book is somewhat stiltish, and certainly doesn't share _Yeager_'s
|
|
14-point type and hick dialect. It doesn't provide a very good sense
|
|
of historical continuity (certain major events never have a date attached
|
|
to them, and there's sometimes little "filler" between major events, some
|
|
of which were separated by years). It reads like it may have been a more
|
|
lengthy text, edited down, perhaps excessively, by non-technical editors.
|
|
There is a tad too much "pilot's ego" about certain events, but this is
|
|
certainly forgivable, and a part of the character.
|
|
|
|
But it remains highly readable, fascinating fare for those interested
|
|
in the advent of jet aircraft in the 1940's and 1950's. About a third
|
|
involves the barnstorming/WWII days, a third on the B-47 and B-52, and
|
|
the rest on the 707.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Robert Dorsett
|
|
Internet: rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu
|
|
UUCP: ...cs.utexas.edu!rascal.ics.utexas.edu!rdd
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 8 15:50:56 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: lhe@sics.se (Lars-Henrik Eriksson)
|
|
Subject: Re: hydraulic problems with DC-10's??
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Mon, 07 Dec 92 09:04:21
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.85@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.92@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.103@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <9212070801.AA08453@sics.se>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 08 Dec 92 15:50:56 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.92@ohare.Chicago.COM> drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com
|
|
(Terrell D. Drinkard) writes:
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.85@ohare.Chicago.COM> weiss@turing.SEAS.UCLA.EDU
|
|
(Michael Weiss) writes:
|
|
>Which doesn't disprove my theory. As it is, though, the loss of the slats
|
|
>(which, according to all my aero classes, only lowers the stall speed but
|
|
does
|
|
>NOT increase the coefficient of lift!)
|
|
|
|
You may wish to recheck your math. It isn't possible to lower the stall
|
|
speed without improving the coefficient of lift (assuming constant weight,
|
|
air density, and wing area).
|
|
|
|
>From what I've learned, slats don't increase the coefficient of lift
|
|
*for a given angle of attack*, but they do increase the critical angle
|
|
of attack. That is, using slats you can get a higher coefficient of
|
|
lift by having a higher angle of attack than normally possible.
|
|
|
|
(So you are both right :-)
|
|
|
|
Of course, this means that when the slats retract, either nothing
|
|
happens to the lift at all (if the angle of attack is below the
|
|
no-slats critical angle of attack), or the wing stalls instantly.
|
|
----
|
|
Lars-Henrik Eriksson Internet: lhe@sics.se
|
|
Swedish Institute of Computer Science Phone (intn'l): +46 8 752 15 09
|
|
Box 1263 Telefon (nat'l): 08 - 752 15 09
|
|
S-164 28 KISTA, SWEDEN Fax: +46 8 751 72 30
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 8 15:50:58 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: dowlatir@cu1.crl.aecl.ca.crl.aecl.ca (Ramin Dowlati)
|
|
Subject: Re: objects on wing tips
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Mon, 7 Dec 1992 22:33:46 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.11@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.25@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.59@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.104@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: AECL Research
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <1992Dec7.223346.25913@cu23.crl.aecl.ca>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 08 Dec 92 15:50:58 PST
|
|
|
|
I have a few questions for any of you passenger airplane gurus.
|
|
Several years ago, the aeropspace industry introduced vertical
|
|
flap-like things on the ends of their airplane wings. I've
|
|
only noticed these on 'larger' planes such Airbus, 747-400 and
|
|
MD-11.
|
|
Q1. What is the technical name for these flap-like things?
|
|
Q2. Are they mobile or fixed?
|
|
Q3. Do they only serve to stabilize the flight?
|
|
Q4. Why haven't they appeared on smaller aircraft?
|
|
Q5. The ones I saw on the Airbus were shaped like a 'V'
|
|
and symmetric with the wing tip, ie. one leg of the 'V'
|
|
was above the wing and the other pointed below the wing.
|
|
Whereas the ones on the 747-400 looked like extensions
|
|
of the actually wing, but bent 90 degrees upwards.
|
|
Why the difference?
|
|
|
|
I would greatly appreciate any answers.
|
|
|
|
-Cheers
|
|
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 8 15:51:04 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett)
|
|
Subject: New Scientist article
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Mon, 7 Dec 92 20:19:54 CST
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.105@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <9212080219.AA19173@cactus.org>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 08 Dec 92 15:51:04 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <ByL8Hp.LM8@apollo.hp.com> nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writ
|
|
es:
|
|
>>Remember that the standard definition of an airline pilot's job is 99.999%
|
|
>>pute boredom, and 0.001% pure terror (I forget where this quote came from,
|
|
>>and the ratios may be incorrect) - if this is anything like true, maybe
|
|
>>human pilots really are on the edge of extinction ?
|
|
>
|
|
> _New Scientist_ had an article devoted to this about 3 issues ago.
|
|
>
|
|
> Basically they said that as the % of "pilot error" crashes increases
|
|
> we may already be at the point where more lives would be saved by
|
|
> pilotless airplanes.
|
|
|
|
I looked through recent issues of _New Scientist_, seeking the article
|
|
Peter referred to. It appears to be a 2-page essay from the October 17
|
|
issue, entitled "Will Accidents Always Happen?"
|
|
|
|
The author of the article, Julian Moxon, has written for FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL
|
|
for a number of years: his specialty appears to be safety; he's produced
|
|
a number of good, comprehensive summaries and analyses of various crashes.
|
|
|
|
Peter's comment seemed to suggest Moxon was advocating pilotless aircraft;
|
|
in the context of previous post, I construed this as along the lines of
|
|
Bernard Ziegler's "The computer can do it better" rhetoric, and reacted
|
|
accordingly. :-) Moxon's point, however, is a bit more, well, integrated,
|
|
and, if anything, far more ambitious. It's less an attack against *pilots*,
|
|
per se, which has characterized Ziegler's remarks, but more a criticism of
|
|
the ATC system. His basic point is that most crashes are landing crashes,
|
|
controlled-flight-into-terrain. Some are caused by ATC malfeasance, some are
|
|
interface problems. From the concluding remarks:
|
|
|
|
"More worrying is that the skies are becoming increasingly congested,
|
|
with predictions (despite the recession) of a doubling in air traffic movements
|
|
over the coming decade. This puts extra pressure on the whole air transport
|
|
system, not least on the pilots and air traffic controllers in the front
|
|
line. In general, the system is (or will be) good enough to handle the
|
|
extra traffic but--the statistics suggest--probably not good enough to
|
|
prevent crashes like that in Kathmandu. It is as if we have arrived at the
|
|
bare minimum of accidents. The challenge will be to maintain this minimum,
|
|
given denser air traffic.
|
|
|
|
"An inevitable question being asked in an increasingly automated world
|
|
is whether we still need pilots. In many modern aircraft, the entire flight
|
|
apart from the takeoff can handled by the autopilot, once programmed. But
|
|
for obvious reasons, this is an emotive subject, which aircraft manufacturers
|
|
carefully avoid in their official statements. Still, some designers are
|
|
beginning to think seriously about the possibilities of making the flight
|
|
crew's role more to do with systems management than flying the aircraft.
|
|
|
|
"This would make the pilot part of a team including the entire air traffic
|
|
system. Direct communication with the aircraft and its systems would be
|
|
established by a radio-borne digital data link. This would send information
|
|
on the aircraft's behavior to the ground and receive navigation data and
|
|
commands that could be fed directly into its flight management system.
|
|
Global positioning satellites would meanwhile observe it constantly.
|
|
|
|
"Pilots worry that this would reduce them to little more than highly paid
|
|
observers monitoring the aircraft's progress through the skies. But that
|
|
time is a long way off. In the meantime, the focus remains on the behavior
|
|
of the human brain."
|
|
|
|
Those interested in a more extreme version of this would enjoy David
|
|
Learmount's interview with Bernard Ziegler, in Flight International,
|
|
September 23-29, 1992, Pp. 35-36. Ziegler is sort of Airbus's chief priest.
|
|
|
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---
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Robert Dorsett
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rdd@cactus.org
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|
...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd
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From kls Tue Dec 8 15:51:09 1992
|
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Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
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Path: news
|
|
From: weiss@ada.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss)
|
|
Subject: Re: hydraulic problems with DC-10's??
|
|
X-Submission-Date: 8 Dec 92 05:27:28 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.50@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.85@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.92@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.106@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
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Organization: SEASnet, University of California, Los Angeles
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <8852@lee.SEAS.UCLA.EDU>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
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Date: 08 Dec 92 15:51:09 PST
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In article <airliners.1992.92@ohare.Chicago.COM> drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard) writes:
|
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>In article <airliners.1992.85@ohare.Chicago.COM> weiss@turing.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss) writes:
|
|
>>I am referring to the unbalance of WEIGHT, not THRUST.
|
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>It doesn't matter, the loss of weight on that wing was actually a
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>short-term plus in that incident (effectively generated a right-hand
|
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>(positive) roll moment to help counter the loss of lift on the left wing).
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|
I'll reply to this below.
|
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|
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>>Which doesn't disprove my theory. As it is, though, the loss of the slats
|
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>>(which, according to all my aero classes, only lowers the stall speed but does
|
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>>NOT increase the coefficient of lift!) was enough to stall the wing
|
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>It isn't possible to lower the stall
|
|
>speed without improving the coefficient of lift (assuming constant weight,
|
|
>air density, and wing area).
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|
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Actually, assuming constant wing GEOMETRY, which includes, besides area, shape
|
|
as well. Slats change the geometry. Their benefit is a reduction of the
|
|
stall speed, through delay of separation. I believe the way that it does this
|
|
is by directing a stream of air along the upper surface of the wing.
|
|
|
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In any case, my point is that there would have been a severe weight unbalance
|
|
between the wings, and I have doubts that it could have been countered by the
|
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ailerons. The whole reason that there was a negative roll moment was that the
|
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left wing STALLED, not that it lost lift directly from the retracting slats.
|
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I'm still not convinced that even WITH the slats extended it could have been
|
|
prevented.
|
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--
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|
\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | /
|
|
- Michael weiss@seas.ucla.edu | School of Engineering & Applied Science -
|
|
- Weiss izzydp5@oac.ucla.edu | University of California, Los Angeles -
|
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/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | \
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From kls Tue Dec 8 15:51:12 1992
|
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Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: raveling@Unify.com (Paul Raveling)
|
|
Subject: Re: hydraulic problems with DC-10's??
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Tue, 8 Dec 92 20:18:22 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.30@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.50@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.85@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.92@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.107@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Unify Corporation (Sacramento)
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <ohxbhjv@Unify.Com>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 08 Dec 92 15:51:12 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.92@ohare.Chicago.COM>, drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard) writes:
|
|
> In article <airliners.1992.85@ohare.Chicago.COM> weiss@turing.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss) writes:
|
|
> >
|
|
> >>Flight AA 191 lost the slats on the left hand
|
|
> >>wing (if memory serves) because of Douglas' failure to include mechanical
|
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> >>lockouts on the slat actuators. They were not required to certify the
|
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> >>airplane.
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|
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I'd be inclined to phrase that a bit differently. The certification
|
|
requirements were satisfield by demonstrating safe flight with
|
|
asymmetric slats. The catch is that (a) flying safely in this
|
|
configuration requires keeping airspeed above the minimum (or
|
|
AOA below the maximum) needed with slats retracted and (b) the
|
|
crew didn't have a sufficient indication to judge immediately
|
|
that they had asymmetric slats.
|
|
|
|
This fits in with a pattern that's shown up in virtually
|
|
all breeds of airliners where the cockpit's 'human interface'
|
|
fails to supply needed information. This shows up in a fair
|
|
variety of accidents in various forms -- unloading the autopilot
|
|
produces surprising gyrations, aircraft FBW control logic reacted
|
|
to factors other than the pilot's directions and the pilot
|
|
didn't anticipate it, etc.
|
|
|
|
One human factors problem is how to best inform the crew of
|
|
simultaneous failures that each can be critical. For this
|
|
DC-10 accident, they experienced loss of an engine at low altitude,
|
|
followed quickly by partial loss of hydraulics and asymmetric slats.
|
|
Each of these three primary circumstances call for prompt attention,
|
|
and cockpit warnings of these and other consequent failures
|
|
can overload the crew with failure alarms, becoming more of a
|
|
problem than a solution.
|
|
|
|
Bottom line: IMHO human factors engineering in the cockpit
|
|
is more a more important target than airframe engineering
|
|
for risk reduction.
|
|
|
|
|
|
------------------
|
|
Paul Raveling
|
|
Raveling@Unify.com
|
|
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 8 15:51:14 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: Pete Mellor <pm@cs.city.ac.uk>
|
|
Subject: Re: Gordon Corps
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Tue, 8 Dec 92 21:26:41 GMT
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.108@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <10689.9212082126@csrsun8.cs.city.ac.uk>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 08 Dec 92 15:51:14 PST
|
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|
|
Edwin,
|
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|
|
> Can you provide me with any more details on the death of Gordon Corps.
|
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|
|
The following appeared in The Guardian, Saturday, August 15th 1992, p26:-
|
|
|
|
Triple Tragedy in Nepal
|
|
-----------------------
|
|
|
|
Bill Raeper, Martin Hoftun, Gordon Corps
|
|
|
|
[Helen Kidd provided an obituary of Bill Raeper and Martin Hoftun, two
|
|
British writers who were passengers on the Thai Airbus which crashed in
|
|
the Himalayas on July 31st, killing all on board. Norman Barfield wrote
|
|
the following about Gordon Corps.]
|
|
|
|
Gordon Corps, one of Britain's most distinguished and accomplished test
|
|
pilots, has died of mountain sickness in Nepal, aged 62. He was acting
|
|
as deputy flight safety director with a team of Airbus Industrie on its
|
|
way from Katmandu to investigate the Thai Airways crash on the Talkuassir
|
|
mountain at 11,500ft.
|
|
|
|
He was a graduate of the de Havilland Aeronautical Technical School,
|
|
Hatfield, and his career took him to the RAF, to the Armament and Aircraft
|
|
Experimental Establishment at Boscombe Down, and then to the Air
|
|
Registration Board. He became chief test pilot to the Civil Aviation
|
|
Authority in 1980.
|
|
|
|
The development of major European commercial aircraft is now in the hands
|
|
of the Airbus Industrie consortium and Gordon Corps took the significant
|
|
step of joining AI in Toulouse in 1982 as an engineering test pilot. In
|
|
the intervening 10 years, he has been involved in flight-testing the
|
|
Airbus A310, A300-600 and A320 airliner family, with special responsibility
|
|
for flying qualities.
|
|
|
|
-----------------------
|
|
|
|
I'm sorry. That is all the information I have.
|
|
|
|
Peter Mellor, Centre for Software Reliability, City University, Northampton
|
|
Sq., London EC1V 0HB, Tel: +44(0)71-477-8422, JANET: p.mellor@city.ac.uk
|
|
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 8 15:51:19 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: Pete Mellor <pm@cs.city.ac.uk>
|
|
Subject: Northwest cancels Airbus
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Tue, 8 Dec 92 10:36:45 GMT
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.109@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <9660.9212081036@csrsun8.cs.city.ac.uk>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 08 Dec 92 15:51:19 PST
|
|
|
|
BBC Radio 4 news, 0700 GMT today:-
|
|
|
|
Northwest Airlines has cancelled orders for 50 A320s and 14 A340s in
|
|
a cost-cutting exercise. This was described as a serious blow to the
|
|
European aircraft industry.
|
|
|
|
Peter Mellor, Centre for Software Reliability, City University, Northampton
|
|
Sq., London EC1V 0HB, Tel: +44(0)71-477-8422, JANET: p.mellor@city.ac.uk
|
|
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 8 15:51:20 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: hoyme@src.honeywell.com (Ken Hoyme)
|
|
Subject: Northwest cancels Airbus
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Tue, 8 Dec 92 09:51:54 CST
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.109@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.110@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <9212081551.AA03298@schrodinger.src.honeywell.com>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 08 Dec 92 15:51:20 PST
|
|
|
|
|
|
In article mumble mumble Pete Mellor <pm@cs.city.ac.uk> writes:
|
|
|
|
> BBC Radio 4 news, 0700 GMT today:-
|
|
|
|
> Northwest Airlines has cancelled orders for 50 A320s and 14 A340s in
|
|
> a cost-cutting exercise. This was described as a serious blow to the
|
|
> European aircraft industry.
|
|
|
|
According to this mornings Minneapolis Star-Tribune (the home paper of
|
|
NWA), that was 24 A340's canceled - 74 plane cancellations worth $3.4B.
|
|
According to what I can find, they had 24 firm and 6 options for the
|
|
A340. The 50 canceled A320s were the options, I believe. (Their
|
|
original order was 50 firm and 50 options, if I recall correctly.)
|
|
|
|
Their 16 A330s were not affected, but they aren't scheduled to receive
|
|
any of those until 1997, so they felt no need to address that plane in
|
|
this agreement. An additional 16 A320s will be delivered in 1993 (they
|
|
currently have 34) along with two more B747-400s. With these
|
|
cancellations and the delay of additional 747 and 757 deliveries, NWA
|
|
currently is not scheduled to receive any new planes in 1994. (It is
|
|
interesting to note that no Boeing planes were cancelled, but were
|
|
slipped out instead.)
|
|
|
|
Along with the cancellations, NWA announced $250M in new financing --
|
|
including financing from Airbus for the additional A320s! The analysts
|
|
considered it quite remarkable that Airbus offered financing while at
|
|
the same time getting a $3.4B cancellation. (But then, NWA is already
|
|
deeply in debt to Airbus, since they decided to buy A320s based on a
|
|
dynamite financing package that Boeing could not match.) This, combined
|
|
with $900M worth of labor concessions (over three years) makes it
|
|
unlikely that NWA will declare Chapter 11 in 1993.
|
|
|
|
One local note of interest. The big buzz in Minnesota is whether this
|
|
dooms the Airbus maintenance bases planned for the northern part of the
|
|
state. About 18 months ago, NWA drove a deal with the state for an
|
|
operating loan plus financing for the building of two maintenance bases
|
|
- one for engines, the other for the larger structural checks (C/D).
|
|
The construction of the bases has been held up in legal wrangling (over
|
|
whether it is constitutional to use taxpayer money for such a purpose).
|
|
With these cancellations, it is suspected that the bases will not be
|
|
built, and NWA will fly their planes to Europe for C/D checks. Of
|
|
course, they already have received and spent the operating loan....
|
|
|
|
Ken
|
|
|
|
Ken Hoyme Honeywell Systems and Research Center
|
|
(612)951-7354 3660 Technology Dr., Minneapolis, MN 55418
|
|
Internet: hoyme@src.honeywell.com
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 8 15:51:21 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: Pete Mellor <pm@cs.city.ac.uk>
|
|
Subject: Re: Northwest cancels Airbus
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Tue, 8 Dec 92 21:31:58 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.109@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.110@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.111@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <10699.9212082131@csrsun8.cs.city.ac.uk>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 08 Dec 92 15:51:21 PST
|
|
|
|
> According to this mornings Minneapolis Star-Tribune (the home paper of
|
|
> NWA), that was 24 A340's canceled - 74 plane cancellations worth $3.4B.
|
|
|
|
You're right, Ken. (I'm not too wide awake at 7 am!)
|
|
|
|
Pete
|
|
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 8 15:51:22 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: Bob Coggeshall <coggs@Hongkong.Cogwheel.COM>
|
|
Subject: Thai Airlines (was: Re: Boeing 747-300)
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Sun, 6 Dec 1992 10:32:46 +0800
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.4@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.11@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.25@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.59@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.79@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.112@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Reply-To: coggs@Cogwheel.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <199212060232.AA11601@drewll.cogwheel.com>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 08 Dec 92 15:51:22 PST
|
|
|
|
|> From: ashabana@agsm.ucla.edu (Ahmed Shabana)
|
|
|> Thai is a world class airline that is profit
|
|
|> oriented. They have a very close relationship with KLM and are one of
|
|
|> the most successfull airlines in the fast growing Asian market.
|
|
|
|
Thai's cabin service is reknowned, yes. But I really wonder what their
|
|
finances really look like; I've seen alot of press that portrays Thai Air
|
|
as just a quasi-private venture of the Thai military.
|
|
|
|
A thread of discussion I'd like to see is _Two_ fatal incidents
|
|
in as many months involving airbuses aborting approaches at Kathmandu.
|
|
One of them invovled a Thai Air airbus.
|
|
|
|
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
|
Bob Coggeshall, President
|
|
Cogwheel Incorporated - Producers of Low-cost dial-up IP Routers
|
|
coggs@Cogwheel.COM
|
|
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Dec 9 18:45:30 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: fredch@phx.mcd.mot.com (Fred Christiansen)
|
|
Subject: Re: 757 highest thrust to weight ratio ?
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Thu, 3 Dec 92 13:23:11 -0700
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.39@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.65@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.71@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.113@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Motorola Computer Group, RT Software
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <9212032023.AA21978@quad4.phx.mcd.mot.com>
|
|
Date: 09 Dec 92 18:45:30 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.71@ohare.Chicago.COM> kls@chicago.com (Karl Swartz) writes:
|
|
>Not surprisingly, the top 11 were all twins.
|
|
|
|
Why "not surprisingly"? As a layman with no background in this stuff,
|
|
I would have tho't that manufacturers would keep the thrust-to-weight
|
|
in some ballpark range (for economic reasons). And that the advent
|
|
of larger twins is because more powerful engines have become available,
|
|
eliminating the need for a 3rd (or in the case of, say, MD-10 class
|
|
aircraft, the need for a 4th).
|
|
--
|
|
Fred Christiansen, Motorola, 2900 S Diablo Way, Tempe, AZ 85282 "Canajun, eh?"
|
|
fredch@phx.mcd.mot.com || uunet!phx.mcd.mot.com!fredch || +1 602-438-3464
|
|
".. I have set before you Life and Death, blessing and cursing; therefore
|
|
choose Life, that both you and your children may live" Deut 30:19
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Dec 9 18:45:32 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: Robert Dorsett <rdd@cactus.org>
|
|
Subject: Re: Northwest cancels Airbus
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Tue, 8 Dec 92 19:32:23 CST
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.109@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.110@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.114@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Reply-To: rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <CMM.0.90.2.723864743.rdd@cactus.org>
|
|
Date: 09 Dec 92 18:45:32 PST
|
|
|
|
|
|
>Their 16 A330s were not affected, but they aren't scheduled to receive
|
|
>any of those until 1997, so they felt no need to address that plane in
|
|
>this agreement.
|
|
|
|
The 1997 figure was apparently arrived at in September, when they deferred
|
|
the A330 deliveries (originally scheduled between 1994 and 1996) to 1997
|
|
to 1999.
|
|
|
|
|
|
>With these cancellations, it is suspected that the bases will not be
|
|
>built, and NWA will fly their planes to Europe for C/D checks. Of
|
|
>course, they already have received and spent the operating loan....
|
|
|
|
It'll be interesting to see what ramifications this has on the UAL deal:
|
|
did United plan on using Airbus/NWA North American facilities?
|
|
|
|
|
|
R.
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Dec 9 18:45:32 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: Pete Mellor <pm@cs.city.ac.uk>
|
|
Subject: Re: Re: Gordon Corps
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 9 Dec 92 09:36:10 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.108@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.115@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <10870.9212090936@csrsun8.cs.city.ac.uk>
|
|
Date: 09 Dec 92 18:45:32 PST
|
|
|
|
Ed,
|
|
|
|
> Thanks for the information.
|
|
|
|
You're very welcome. I forgot to add the following footnote from the
|
|
obituary in The Guardian:
|
|
|
|
Gordon Corps, born November 11, 1929; died August 4, 1992.
|
|
|
|
(At least this tells you the precise date of his death. I do not know
|
|
why it took so long for the obituary to appear.)
|
|
|
|
Pete
|
|
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Dec 9 18:45:33 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: dmarble@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Duane F Marble)
|
|
Subject: Re: New Scientist article
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 9 Dec 1992 14:05:55 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.105@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.116@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: The Ohio State University
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <1992Dec9.140555.25889@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>
|
|
Date: 09 Dec 92 18:45:33 PST
|
|
|
|
A small point with respect to the material quoted from the New
|
|
Scientist: Global Positioning System (GPS) birds do not "observe"
|
|
anything, they just permit a ground based unit to compute it's
|
|
location.
|
|
--
|
|
Duane F. Marble E-mail: dmarble@magnus.acs.osu.edu
|
|
Department of Geography Telephone: (614) 292-2250
|
|
The Ohio State University
|
|
Columbus, Ohio 43210 Fax: (614) 292-6213
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Dec 9 18:45:35 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: ckd@eff.org (Christopher Davis)
|
|
Subject: Re: Boeing Book
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 9 Dec 1992 18:14:20 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.41@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.64@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.117@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Electronic Frontier Foundation Tech Central
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <CKD.92Dec9131418@loiosh.eff.org>
|
|
Date: 09 Dec 92 18:45:35 PST
|
|
|
|
RD> == Robert Dorsett <rdd@cactus.org>
|
|
|
|
RD> It might also be "Boeing: Planemaker since 1916," by one Philip M. Bowers.
|
|
RD> It's an exhaustive review of all the airplanes (and variants) Boeing's
|
|
RD> produced, sort of a mini Jane's. It's a long book (over 600 pages). It
|
|
RD> appeared at Bookstop here in Austin sometime this summer; it's about $36.
|
|
|
|
There are three books about Boeing that, together, do an exemplary job
|
|
of covering the company's growth, products, and people.
|
|
|
|
_Legend & Legacy_ is the best for "reading"; it is the one most likely
|
|
to keep you up all night until you finish. (I believe it is also the
|
|
newest.) It focuses on the people, rather than the products, and has
|
|
been extensively discussed here recently.
|
|
|
|
_Boeing: Planemaker to the World_ is a "coffee-table" book with plenty
|
|
of wonderful photos and charts and the like, including discussion of the
|
|
Boeing hydrofoils, furniture, Lunar Roving Vehicle, and streetcars.
|
|
(Oh, and airplanes :)
|
|
|
|
_Boeing Aircraft since 1916_ (title may not be exact, I have to find my
|
|
copy) goes into much more detail on the aircraft, including lists of
|
|
customer codes, production information, and the like. Many b&w photos,
|
|
though it lacks the spectacular color photos of _Planemaker to the World_.
|
|
|
|
There are others, of course. _Vision_ is a bit out of date. _Boeing
|
|
Trivia_, by Carl Cleveland (former PR director, as I recall) is a good
|
|
companion to _Legend & Legacy_, lacking the "storyline" aspects but
|
|
adding a number of wonderful anecdotes from the "inside".
|
|
--
|
|
Christopher K. Davis | ``Usenet seems to run much like the Kif (or,
|
|
<ckd@eff.org> EFF #14 | for the TV generation, Klingon) high command.
|
|
System Administrator, EFF | Whoever takes action and can be heard wins.''
|
|
+1 617 864 0665 [CKD1] | --Peter da Silva <peter@ferranti.com>
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Dec 9 18:45:37 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: ckd@eff.org (Christopher Davis)
|
|
Subject: Re: REVIEW of TEX JOHNSTON
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 9 Dec 1992 18:18:11 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.102@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.118@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Electronic Frontier Foundation Tech Central
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <CKD.92Dec9131808@loiosh.eff.org>
|
|
Date: 09 Dec 92 18:45:37 PST
|
|
|
|
RD> == Robert Dorsett <rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu>
|
|
|
|
RD> Tex Johnston, Jet-Age Test Pilot
|
|
|
|
RD> By A. M. Johnston, with Charles Barton.
|
|
RD> Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991.
|
|
RD> 274 pp., illustrated.
|
|
RD> ISBN 1-56098-013-3, hardbound.
|
|
|
|
The (excellent) Bantam Air & Space series has this available in
|
|
softcover for a lot less money (and a lot more portability). They also
|
|
have some other good books for airliner fans, including Gann's _Band of
|
|
Brothers_ and a treatment of the DC-3.
|
|
--
|
|
Christopher K. Davis | ``Usenet seems to run much like the Kif (or,
|
|
<ckd@eff.org> EFF #14 | for the TV generation, Klingon) high command.
|
|
System Administrator, EFF | Whoever takes action and can be heard wins.''
|
|
+1 617 864 0665 [CKD1] | --Peter da Silva <peter@ferranti.com>
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Dec 9 18:45:37 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: driscoll@src.honeywell.com (Kevin Driscoll)
|
|
Subject: Re: Northwest cancels Airbus
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 9 Dec 92 13:31:04 CST
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.109@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.110@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.118@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.119@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <9212091931.AA08647@couqusmungus.src.honeywell.co>
|
|
Date: 09 Dec 92 18:45:37 PST
|
|
|
|
> >With these cancellations, it is suspected that the bases will not be
|
|
> >built, and NWA will fly their planes to Europe for C/D checks. Of
|
|
> >course, they already have received and spent the operating loan....
|
|
>
|
|
> It'll be interesting to see what ramifications this has on the UAL deal:
|
|
> did United plan on using Airbus/NWA North American facilities?
|
|
|
|
A local (Minneapolis) TV story said that NWA is considering other
|
|
airlines' use of the facilities in deciding when/if to build.
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Dec 10 00:52:08 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: Robert Dorsett <rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu>
|
|
Subject: Re: hydraulic problems with DC-10's??
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 9 Dec 92 7:50:44 CST
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.50@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
<airliners.1992.85@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
<airliners.1992.92@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
<airliners.1992.106@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.120@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Reply-To: rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <CMM.0.90.2.723909044.rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu>
|
|
Date: 10 Dec 92 00:52:08 PST
|
|
|
|
|
|
Before starting: the left pylon assembly weight, btw, was 13,477 lbs, from
|
|
the accident report. A whole bunch of figures had been floating around...
|
|
|
|
|
|
In <airliners.1992.106@ohare.Chicago.COM> Michael Weiss writes:
|
|
|
|
>In any case, my point is that there would have been a severe weight unbalance
|
|
>between the wings, and I have doubts that it could have been countered by the
|
|
>ailerons. The whole reason that there was a negative roll moment was that the
|
|
>left wing STALLED, not that it lost lift directly from the retracting slats.
|
|
>I'm still not convinced that even WITH the slats extended it could have been
|
|
>prevented.
|
|
|
|
Allow me to throw in my $0.02 worth.
|
|
|
|
1. A slat increases the maximum effective lift coefficient for a wing section.
|
|
How this is done is irrelevant to this discussion: the result is that the
|
|
lift coefficient goes up. Slats permit the wing to produce a greater lift at
|
|
slower airspeeds, i.e., they drive the stall speed down. When used with
|
|
trailing edge flaps, they offer even better lift characteristics, and improve
|
|
handling characteristics.
|
|
|
|
2. If we take away the slats, then the maximum lift coefficient goes down.
|
|
By definition. This means the stall speed goes up for the resulting
|
|
configuration. By definition.
|
|
|
|
3. The accepted procedure was to climb at V2 until 800' AGL, then to lower
|
|
the nose and accelerate.
|
|
|
|
For a normal, undamaged aircraft, at 379,000 lbs, V2 was 153 knots.
|
|
|
|
In the damaged aircraft, the minimum controllable airspeed, with a 4 degree
|
|
left bank, into the missing engine, was 159 knots.
|
|
|
|
Therefore, if the crew were to fly a standard engine-out profile, at 153
|
|
knots, they would have been beneath the minimum controllable airspeed for
|
|
the damaged aircraft (159 knots).
|
|
|
|
During the investigation, the NTSB asked 13 qualified pilots to fly various
|
|
takeoff profiles. 70 takeoff simulations were flown. All crashed the
|
|
airplane when flying the crash profile. Several pilots, when left to their
|
|
own devices, and with extensive knowledge of the events, managed to control
|
|
the airplane, nonetheless, by recognizing the initial roll and applying full
|
|
opposite aileron and significant rudder, and lowering the nose to gain air-
|
|
speed. All pilots who received appropriate feedback, via a functioning
|
|
stickshaker, and who increased their airspeed to stay above the stickshaker
|
|
value--168 knots--saved the airplane.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
I really fail to see what the problem is, here. The engine fell off after
|
|
V1. This didn't affect the aerodynamic characteristics of the wing itself:
|
|
it became a control problem. It also killed the electrical system driving
|
|
the captain's stick-shaker, and killed a hydraulic system. The latter
|
|
caused the slats to retract within 20 seconds of failure.
|
|
|
|
The slat retraction DID affect the wing: it then became both a control and
|
|
aerodynamic problem. Exercising established control practices in an
|
|
unknown aerodynamic regime crashed the airplane (I'd love to know whether
|
|
this went into Airbus's "pilot error" database :-)). Had the slats remained
|
|
down, the airplane would have survived the engine failure, even with the
|
|
failure of the stall warning system. Other airframe manufacturers have
|
|
manual locking mechanisms for their slat jackscrews. McDonnell Douglas
|
|
relied on hydraulic pressure to hold it all together.
|
|
|
|
Incidentally, this problem wasn't corrected: the SUX DC-10 also experienced
|
|
extension of its slats after it lost all its hydraulics.
|
|
|
|
I'd suggest you obtain a copy of the accident report (NTSB-AAR-79-17), and
|
|
look it over, closely. It has more than enough data for back-of-the-
|
|
envelope calculations. Nothing in it suggests that weight or moments
|
|
following engine separation played a significant role.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Lastly, I'd note that there was SIGNIFICANT public and industry concern
|
|
about the DC-10's safety after this crash: the FAA's extraordinary grounding
|
|
of the airplane, inappropriate though it may have been, is testimony to
|
|
that. All of the manufacturers had something to contribute, and a great
|
|
deal of manpower was invested in finding the cause. There was REAL concern
|
|
that the airplane wasn't airworthy, even by FAA's standards. Every analysis
|
|
or comment I've ever seen on this crash has concentrated on the slat retrac-
|
|
tion being the proximal cause for the crash. I've never seen the weight
|
|
issue raised. If you have "hard" evidence that it HAS been, some references
|
|
would be useful, since it's not a well-publicised theory. If you're
|
|
basing your comments on classroom experience, as I believe you indicated,
|
|
it might be a worthwhile learning exercise to raise it in class, or print
|
|
this discussion and privately discuss it with your professor: but be sure
|
|
to let us know the outcome.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Robert Dorsett
|
|
Internet: rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu
|
|
UUCP: ...cs.utexas.edu!rascal.ics.utexas.edu!rdd
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Dec 10 00:52:10 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: barr@ash.mmm.ucar.EDU (Keith Barr)
|
|
Subject: Re: hydraulic problems with DC-10s??
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 9 Dec 92 8:39:46 MST
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.6@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.8@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.30@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.32@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.99@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.100@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.121@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <9212091539.AA01844@walnut.mmm.ucar.edu>
|
|
Date: 10 Dec 92 00:52:10 PST
|
|
|
|
greg@octopus.dpsi.com (Gregory R. Travis) writes:
|
|
> BTW, just to be pedantic: The wings do not each contribute exactly
|
|
> 50% of the total lift. Remember that that fuselage itself contributes
|
|
> a SUBSTANTIAL amount of lift at cruise as do the horizontal stabilizer
|
|
> surfaces (in certain flight regimes!).
|
|
|
|
What flight regimes might those be? Unstable flight, as in the F-16?
|
|
|
|
Actually, in most aircraft the horizontal stabilizer is downlifting, so
|
|
the wings have to create more lift, and the body contributes to the
|
|
pitching moment, but contributes very little lift (unless we are talking
|
|
about the B-2).
|
|
|
|
For the horizontal stabilizer to lift up, the CG would have to behind the
|
|
Center of lift, which is not usually allowed. I would bet a dollar that
|
|
the DC-10 has a down lifting tail, although I don't know for sure.
|
|
|
|
If you want references for either of these points, I recommend that you
|
|
look at Etkin's book on stability (an engineering text I used in my
|
|
aircraft design class that would explain in painful detail why you need
|
|
the CG in front of the Center of Lift), and you might check out K.D.
|
|
Wood's text on aircraft design for discussions about pitching moment and
|
|
lift created by the fuselage.
|
|
|
|
(is it just me, or is this thread becoming less and less appropriate for
|
|
this newsgroup?)
|
|
_____________________________ _____
|
|
| Keith Barr \ \ K \__ _____
|
|
| barr@ncar.ucar.edu \___________\ \/_______\___\_____________
|
|
| Comm/AS&MEL/Inst/IGI / < /_/ ..................... `-.
|
|
|_____________________________/ `-----------,----,--------------'
|
|
When you think how well basic appliances work, it's _/____/
|
|
hard to believe anyone ever gets on an airplane.--Calvin
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Dec 10 00:52:11 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: greg@saltydog.dpsi.com (Gregory R. Travis)
|
|
Subject: Re: objects on wing tips
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 9 Dec 1992 16:24:48 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.11@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.25@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.59@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.104@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.122@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Data Parallel Systems, Inc
|
|
X-Submission-Message-ID: <greg.723918288@saltydog>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 10 Dec 92 00:52:11 PST
|
|
|
|
In <airliners.1992.104@ohare.Chicago.COM> dowlatir@cu1.crl.aecl.ca.crl.aecl.ca (Ramin Dowlati) writes:
|
|
|
|
>Q1. What is the technical name for these flap-like things?
|
|
|
|
Winglets.
|
|
|
|
>Q2. Are they mobile or fixed?
|
|
|
|
I've always seen them fixed.
|
|
|
|
>Q3. Do they only serve to stabilize the flight?
|
|
|
|
No.
|
|
|
|
>Q4. Why haven't they appeared on smaller aircraft?
|
|
|
|
They have. Look at the new Learjets or, heck, any Cessna after about
|
|
1974.
|
|
|
|
|
|
As I understand it, the winglets serve to prevent "spillage" of air
|
|
from the high-pressure area under the wing to the low-pressure area
|
|
above it.
|
|
|
|
In flight, there is a considerable difference in air pressure between the
|
|
lower side of the wing and the upper side. Nature, being as it is, finds
|
|
this situation abhorrent and constantly tries to find ways to equalize the
|
|
air pressure between the two surfaces. One way of doing this is to allow air
|
|
to spill out of the underside of the wing at the tip and curl upward to the
|
|
upper side of the wing.
|
|
|
|
Unfortunately for the airline bean-counters and aerodynamicists, this
|
|
spillage of air creates strong vortices - miniature tornados lying
|
|
horizontally along the axis of the fuselage. The vortices themselves and
|
|
the loss of pressure from the lower side of the wing both contribute to drag
|
|
and loss of lift & wing efficiency.
|
|
|
|
The "winglets" prevent the spillage up to the upper wing surface via a
|
|
physical wall. The air escapes from the bottom surface and tries to
|
|
curl up to the upper surface and is stopped by the winglet.
|
|
|
|
There are several different winglet designs. As I mentioned, Cessna and others
|
|
have been doing it for some time with drooped wingtips. One can
|
|
put the barrier so that it is either hanging DOWN (Cessna) from the wing, or
|
|
so that it protrudes ABOVE the wing (Boeing) - the net effect is, roughly,
|
|
the same.
|
|
|
|
Likewise, an airplane in ground-effect flies much more efficiently because
|
|
the proximity of the wing to the ground prevents the full formation of the
|
|
wingtip vorticies and thus air spillage to the top of the wing is greatly
|
|
reduced.
|
|
|
|
The big issue is in constructing a winglet that recovers more lost lift than it
|
|
effectively destroys with added drag.
|
|
|
|
It's interesting that Airbus, I believe, is intending to offer a device which
|
|
would trail from each wingtip and employ a propeller of some sort. The
|
|
propeller would hook to a electrical generator and produce power from the
|
|
wingtip vortices.
|
|
|
|
greg
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Gregory Reed Travis D P S I
|
|
Data Parallel Systems Incorporated greg@dpsi.com (For MX mailers only!)
|
|
Bloomington, IN greg@indiana.edu (For the others)
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Dec 10 00:52:13 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: gregory@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Greg Wright)
|
|
Subject: Re: hydraulic problems with DC-10s??
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 9 Dec 1992 20:23:39 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.32@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.99@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.100@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.123@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Boeing
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <Bz0DzG.E6s@bcstec.ca.boeing.com>
|
|
Date: 10 Dec 92 00:52:13 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.100@ohare.Chicago.COM> greg@octopus.dpsi.com (Gregory R. Travis) writes:
|
|
>
|
|
>BTW, just to be pedantic: The wings do not each contribute exactly
|
|
>50% of the total lift. Remember that that fuselage itself contributes
|
|
>a SUBSTANTIAL amount of lift at cruise as do the horizontal stabilizer
|
|
>surfaces (in certain flight regimes!).
|
|
>
|
|
|
|
This is not as substantial as one might think. While some lifting bodies
|
|
are very good at producing lift the typical commercial fuselage is not.
|
|
Because of it's inablility to be a very efficient producer of lift, ie.
|
|
it makes LOTS of drag in doing so, we try to keep the lift of the body
|
|
to a minimun. As far as the stab's go, at cruise they will be counter-
|
|
acting a nose-down or nose-up pitching moment depending on the CG and
|
|
gross weight at that particular time in the flight. Because, again, with
|
|
lift you get drag, the horiz. stab. is best kept at zero lift if possible.
|
|
|
|
|
|
>greg, the math bimbo
|
|
>--
|
|
>Gregory Reed Travis D P S I
|
|
>Data Parallel Systems Incorporated greg@dpsi.com (For MX mailers only!)
|
|
>Bloomington, IN greg@indiana.edu (For the others)
|
|
>
|
|
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
________Greg Wright____________ "I struggle to be brief
|
|
| gregory@bcstec.ca.boeing.com | and become obscure."
|
|
| gregory@halcyon.com |
|
|
|____uunet!bcstec!gregory_______| NOT A BOEING SPOKESPERSON.
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Dec 10 00:52:14 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: gregory@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Greg Wright)
|
|
Subject: Re: objects on wing tips
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 9 Dec 92 12:45:47 PST
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.11@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.25@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.59@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.104@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.124@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: The Boeing Co. (Aerodynamics)
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <9212092045.AA20037@bcstec.ca.boeing.com>
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Date: 10 Dec 92 00:52:14 PST
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I have a few questions for any of you passenger airplane gurus.
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|
Several years ago, the aeropspace industry introduced vertical
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flap-like things on the ends of their airplane wings. I've
|
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only noticed these on 'larger' planes such Airbus, 747-400 and
|
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MD-11.
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Q1. What is the technical name for these flap-like things?
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Winglets....
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Q2. Are they mobile or fixed?
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Fixed on our airframes....
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Q3. Do they only serve to stabilize the flight?
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|
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They help to reduce the induced drag by preventing the wingtip
|
|
vorticies from forming...well keep them from being as strong at
|
|
the tips anyway. They also produce lift since they are not
|
|
mounted absolutly vertical. In the same vain, they produce a little
|
|
thrust.
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|
|
Q4. Why haven't they appeared on smaller aircraft?
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|
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The weight. Also, in theory they have big effect on the reduction of
|
|
total drag, however, this has not been the case. The effect is small
|
|
enough that we put them only on the long range planes. This is why
|
|
we removed them from the wings of the 747-400D, which was made for
|
|
short hauls..
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|
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Q5. The ones I saw on the Airbus were shaped like a 'V'
|
|
and symmetric with the wing tip, ie. one leg of the 'V'
|
|
was above the wing and the other pointed below the wing.
|
|
Whereas the ones on the 747-400 looked like extensions
|
|
of the actually wing, but bent 90 degrees upwards.
|
|
Why the difference?
|
|
|
|
Same principle, just different methods. As the technology advances
|
|
you will see many different devices designed to to the same thing.
|
|
NASA flew a plane that had six or seven winglets, all at different
|
|
angles to the freestream....
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|
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I would greatly appreciate any answers.
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-Cheers
|
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|
________Greg Wright____________ High Lift Development
|
|
| gregory@bcstec.ca.boeing.com | Aerodynamics
|
|
| gregory@halcyon.com |
|
|
|____uunet!bcstec!gregory_______| NOT A BOEING SPOKESPERSON.
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Dec 10 00:52:14 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz)
|
|
Subject: Re: 757 highest thrust to weight ratio ?
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Thu, 10 Dec 1992 07:19:56 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.65@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.71@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.113@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.125@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Chicago Software Works
|
|
X-Submission-Message-ID: <1992Dec10.071956.2591@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 10 Dec 92 00:52:14 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.113@ohare.Chicago.COM> fredch@phx.mcd.mot.com (Fred Christiansen) writes:
|
|
>In article <airliners.1992.71@ohare.Chicago.COM> kls@chicago.com (Karl Swartz) writes:
|
|
>>Not surprisingly, the top 11 were all twins.
|
|
|
|
>Why "not surprisingly"? As a layman with no background in this stuff,
|
|
>I would have tho't that manufacturers would keep the thrust-to-weight
|
|
>in some ballpark range (for economic reasons). And that the advent
|
|
>of larger twins is because more powerful engines have become available,
|
|
>eliminating the need for a 3rd (or in the case of, say, MD-10 class
|
|
>aircraft, the need for a 4th).
|
|
|
|
The catch here is that once committed to takeoff, the aircraft must be
|
|
able to fly long enough to return for a safe landing with one engine
|
|
out. With four engines, this in effect means you've got to carry 33%
|
|
more power than the bare minimum to keep you in the air; with two you
|
|
need a full 100%. Note that this does not *necessarily* imply a much
|
|
higher thrust/weight ratio -- depending on how the certification regs
|
|
are written, one could figure maybe twenty minutes to dump fuel and
|
|
return and certify the engine for a substantial overload thrust quite
|
|
a bit above the normal "maximum" thrust. But since essentially the
|
|
same engines would also be used on three- and four-engine aircraft
|
|
this probably wouldn't make much difference.
|
|
|
|
Looking at this from the view of normal operations, the engines on a
|
|
twin will normally not be worked as hard which should lead to higher
|
|
reliability and lower maintenance costs. And, as mentioned in regard
|
|
to the 757, better climb performance when needed.
|
|
|
|
The Airbus A330 and A340 offer an interesting comparison, since they
|
|
are identical save the engines (two on the A330, four on the A340),
|
|
their wing attachments, and those parts of the controls directly
|
|
affected by the engine differences. (Fuselage lengths differ too
|
|
though this is true even amongst A340 models.) The A340, with four
|
|
engines, offers freedom from ETOPS restrictions for long, overwater
|
|
routes. The A330, with two larger engines, offers the maintenance
|
|
economies of fewer engines for shorter or overland routes.
|
|
|
|
It's interesting, then, that Lufthansa chose the A340 even though
|
|
the A330 would have served most of the routes they had in mind. As
|
|
I recall, they felt that four less-stressed engines would be cheaper
|
|
to operate and maintain than two larger engines. Given the overall
|
|
popularity of twins this doesn't seem to be a widespread view; it may
|
|
simply reflect greater confidence in the more mature engines of the
|
|
A340 compared to the A330.
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com
|
|
1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls
|
|
|Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA
|
|
Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Dec 10 00:52:16 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz)
|
|
Subject: Re: Northwest cancels Airbus
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Thu, 10 Dec 1992 07:25:37 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.109@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.110@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.114@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.126@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Chicago Software Works
|
|
X-Submission-Message-ID: <1992Dec10.072537.2670@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 10 Dec 92 00:52:16 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.114@ohare.Chicago.COM> rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu writes:
|
|
>>With these cancellations, it is suspected that the bases will not be
|
|
>>built, and NWA will fly their planes to Europe for C/D checks. Of
|
|
>>course, they already have received and spent the operating loan....
|
|
|
|
>It'll be interesting to see what ramifications this has on the UAL deal:
|
|
>did United plan on using Airbus/NWA North American facilities?
|
|
|
|
I've never seen any mention of United's plans with regard to
|
|
maintenance of their A320 fleet. However, all of them were to be
|
|
leased (from GPA and Kawasaki, amongst others) and half of the 50
|
|
firm orders came with three-year, walkaway leases. This would not
|
|
lead one to expect a tremendous investment in maintenance.
|
|
|
|
Perhaps someone from Indiana might be able to shed more light on
|
|
this -- I believe United's upcoming Indianapolis maintenance base
|
|
was intended to take over the 737s from San Francisco, and thus it
|
|
would be the obvious candidate for A320 maintenance if done in-house.
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com
|
|
1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls
|
|
|Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA
|
|
Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Dec 10 00:52:18 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: sajja@vu-vlsi.vill.edu (Go Skins....)
|
|
Subject: Book's on Jets
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Tue, 8 Dec 1992 04:21:12 GMT
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.127@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Villanova University
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <ByxArD.1zq@vu-vlsi.ee.vill.edu>
|
|
Date: 10 Dec 92 00:52:18 PST
|
|
|
|
Iam looking for books on Passenger Jets (Boeing,Concord), Please suggest me
|
|
the books I could buy and also preferably the Authors.
|
|
|
|
ASAP
|
|
|
|
--Ravi.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Dec 10 02:09:23 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: gregory@halcyon.com (Gregory Wright)
|
|
Subject: Re: 757 highest thrust to weight ratio ?
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Thu, 10 Dec 1992 06:01:45 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.65@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.71@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.113@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.128@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: The 23:00 News and Mail Service
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-ID: <1992Dec10.060145.1919@nwnexus.WA.COM>
|
|
Date: 10 Dec 92 02:09:23 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.113@ohare.Chicago.COM> fredch@phx.mcd.mot.com (Fred Christiansen) writes:
|
|
>In article <airliners.1992.71@ohare.Chicago.COM> kls@chicago.com (Karl Swartz) writes:
|
|
>>Not surprisingly, the top 11 were all twins.
|
|
>
|
|
>Why "not surprisingly"? As a layman with no background in this stuff,
|
|
>I would have tho't that manufacturers would keep the thrust-to-weight
|
|
>in some ballpark range (for economic reasons). And that the advent
|
|
>of larger twins is because more powerful engines have become available,
|
|
>eliminating the need for a 3rd (or in the case of, say, MD-10 class
|
|
>aircraft, the need for a 4th).
|
|
>--
|
|
|
|
The reason for the this may, as you say, may not be so obvious so
|
|
alow me to put in my two cents. The FAA, along with the CAA and others,
|
|
require that we demonstrate a minimum climb out gradient with one engine
|
|
inoperative. In the case of a two engine aircraft this requires that
|
|
the airplane be able to climb out with a 50% reduction in gross thrust.
|
|
For a four engine platform this one engine out condition represents only
|
|
a 25% reduction in thrust. You can see then, that for a two engine plane
|
|
it is required to "over" engine the plane...
|
|
|
|
Hope this helps to clear things up,
|
|
greg
|
|
HIgh lift development
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
>Fred Christiansen, Motorola, 2900 S Diablo Way, Tempe, AZ 85282 "Canajun, eh?"
|
|
>fredch@phx.mcd.mot.com || uunet!phx.mcd.mot.com!fredch || +1 602-438-3464
|
|
> ".. I have set before you Life and Death, blessing and cursing; therefore
|
|
> choose Life, that both you and your children may live" Deut 30:19
|
|
>
|
|
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
________Greg Wright____________ "Sure my YMP is fast, but if it doesn't
|
|
| gregory@bcstec.boeing.com | run OS2 I don't need it....."
|
|
| gregory@halcyon.com |
|
|
|____uunet!bcstec!gregory_______| NOT A BOEING SPOKESPERSON.
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Dec 10 02:09:25 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: hoyme@src.honeywell.com (Ken Hoyme)
|
|
Subject: Northwest cancels Airbus
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Thu, 10 Dec 92 01:32:05 CST
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.109@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.110@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.118@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.119@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.129@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <9212100732.AA12591@darkstar.src.honeywell.com>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 10 Dec 92 02:09:25 PST
|
|
|
|
|
|
In article mumble mumble driscoll@src.honeywell.com (Kevin Driscoll) writes:
|
|
|
|
KH>With these cancellations, it is suspected that the bases will not be
|
|
KH>built, and NWA will fly their planes to Europe for C/D checks. Of
|
|
KH>course, they already have received and spent the operating loan....
|
|
|
|
RD> It'll be interesting to see what ramifications this has on the UAL deal:
|
|
RD>> did United plan on using Airbus/NWA North American facilities?
|
|
|
|
KD> A local (Minneapolis) TV story said that NWA is considering other
|
|
KD> airlines' use of the facilities in deciding when/if to build.
|
|
|
|
I seem to recall that at the time of the United announcement, the
|
|
Minneapolis Star-Tribune business section specifically addressed the
|
|
issue of whether United would use NWA's proposed Airbus bases in
|
|
Minnesota. I recall a United spokesperson saying that United planned to
|
|
do their own maintenance.
|
|
|
|
NWA has always held out the possibility of contracting out to other
|
|
airlines as the economic justification for the security of the state
|
|
taxpayer's money. America West is one possibility. Airlines in Canada
|
|
are another. (Heck - they might even think northern Minnesota is warm!!
|
|
:^|) It was only in the recent announcement that I heard that they also
|
|
planned to maintain some of their Boeing planes in these new bases. I
|
|
don't know what this means, since they seem to have adequate facilities
|
|
at MSP for their existing equipment. Maybe that land has more value as
|
|
something else (like more gates...).
|
|
|
|
Ken
|
|
|
|
Ken Hoyme Honeywell Systems and Research Center
|
|
(612)951-7354 3660 Technology Dr., Minneapolis, MN 55418
|
|
Internet: hoyme@src.honeywell.com
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Dec 10 16:07:03 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners,rec.travel.air
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett)
|
|
Subject: Re: Airbus safety (was Re: TWAs Status)
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Thu, 10 Dec 92 5:16:04 CST
|
|
References: <1992Nov25.191925.27991@news.mentorg.com>
|
|
<8762@lee.SEAS.UCLA.EDU> <1992Dec01.173212.27936@news.mentorg.com>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.130@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Followup-To: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <CMM.0.90.2.723986164.rdd@cactus.org>
|
|
Date: 10 Dec 92 16:07:03 PST
|
|
|
|
|
|
In article <1992Dec01.173212.27936@news.mentorg.com> philip@mentorg.com (Philip Peake) writes:
|
|
>
|
|
>It wasn't unintentional - it was a deliberately (contrived) example.
|
|
>The arguments I have heard so far seem to say that just because its always
|
|
>been done that way, it always should be - aircraft design has changed a LOT
|
|
>since the stick control was introduced - maybe this is no longer the
|
|
>correct control mechanisim ?
|
|
|
|
Transport aircraft design hasn't changed much at all in the last 30 years.
|
|
We fine-tune various features, change the aspect ratio, develop better drag
|
|
profiles, better powerplants, occasionally build a better, lighter system.
|
|
Certainly improved manufacturing techniques. But the *engineering* discipline
|
|
is so WELL defined that if you give three manufacturers the task of developing
|
|
three different airplanes for the same mission profile, you'll now come up
|
|
with almost identical airplanes. It is a discipline so evolved that we can
|
|
come up with physical implementations which can match design performance
|
|
objectives to within a percentage point.
|
|
|
|
This is not the result of "wild-catting," or breaking the rules: it's the
|
|
result of decades of working over the same problem, developing a very
|
|
intimate understanding of this particular type of development problem. We
|
|
should expect that the same considerations must be applied to how the
|
|
pilots control the airplane. The "old" model may not be the best available,
|
|
but it's well-understood, and is likely preferable to any "replacement"
|
|
we are likely to produce with current technology.
|
|
|
|
|
|
>If you are against the idea of insulating the pilot, maybe we should
|
|
>remove servo brakes and power steering from cars too ?
|
|
|
|
The pilot IS in the loop. You can complain about that, and try to eliminate
|
|
that, if you want to. However, since he IS in the loop, the unique feedback
|
|
requirements needed to let him do his job require a more interactive environ-
|
|
ment than either contemporary glass cockpits *or*, in this case, the A320
|
|
sidestick, provide.
|
|
|
|
Christopher Davis already addressed your point in his reply: *hydraulics*
|
|
is the equivalent of power steering, not FBW control. However, note that
|
|
we've been providing completely artificial feel to go along with this, for
|
|
the past thirty years. Yet all of a sudden, on the pretext that the "FBW"
|
|
in their airplane mandates it, Airbus, which is in the business of selling
|
|
technology, cavalierly introduces a control device which:
|
|
|
|
1. Has no interconnect between the pilots.
|
|
2. Has no active feedback.
|
|
3. Utilizes artificial control laws in the normal and alternate
|
|
flight modes.
|
|
|
|
I suggest that the issue has NOTHING to do with technological "advantages"
|
|
human requirements: it is completely marketing-driven.
|
|
|
|
|
|
>|> In essence, my point is that standards don't exist because of happenstance.
|
|
>|> They exist because it makes life easier for everyone. This is particularly
|
|
>|> important when human lives are at stake.
|
|
>
|
|
>Standards are also perpetuated by vested interests,
|
|
|
|
Yeah, that powerful yoke-manufacturer lobby. The bastards. Just because
|
|
they won't retool to build sidesticks, they gotta ruin it for the rest of
|
|
us. :-)
|
|
|
|
Seriously, this is a tremendously conservative industry. What isn't broken,
|
|
doesn't get fixed. However, when a better mouse-trap is invented, it is
|
|
almost always adopted, universally. The fact that no other manufacturer
|
|
is rushing to repeat Airbus' example suggests the arbitrariness of the
|
|
use of the sidesticks: if there were even minor operational or material
|
|
advantages in using them (and modified control laws) as interfaces to the
|
|
EFCS, you could bet your last dollar every other manufacturer would be doing
|
|
so, not least as the result of airline demand. We don't see that.
|
|
|
|
|
|
> even when better ideas
|
|
>ar around.
|
|
|
|
This isn't one of them. We aren't operating in a vacuum: NASA, as one example,
|
|
has been running a lot of research (over, and over) over the last 20 years,
|
|
addressing precisely these issues: the Airbus implementation is arguably on
|
|
the weaker of a variety of choices available.
|
|
|
|
|
|
>If all new pilots were taught nothing but the side stick,
|
|
>how long would the old arangementy last - and if the old arangement
|
|
|
|
Why should pilots be taught nothing but a unique, *proprietary* side-stick
|
|
design that no pilot had any experience with before four years ago, and which
|
|
is only one of a variety of other possible designs?
|
|
|
|
You imply that the sidestick's just a yoke wrapped up in a little handle. It
|
|
isn't: the issue's a lot more complex, and, within that simple interface,
|
|
there are *many* ways to proceed. The certification authorities, you will
|
|
note, have not codified mandatory control qualities of this interface (and
|
|
WON'T): thus, in a worst-case, we could have Airbus running its stick (+
|
|
control laws), Boeing running its own, MDC running its own, etc.
|
|
|
|
|
|
>is so wonderful, why do military fighter aircraft, where tight control
|
|
>by the pilot os ESSENTIAL use side stick controls ?
|
|
|
|
Not all do: several continue to use center-sticks. In either case, the
|
|
issue is in large degree driven by the need to effectively control
|
|
the aircraft at high g's--but even then, it's a significantly different
|
|
design than that used in the A320.
|
|
|
|
I would also note that in fighter aircraft, there isn't the issue of
|
|
two-pilot "peers" having to quickly and instinctively figure out who is
|
|
flying the airplane. On the A320, there is no interconnect between the
|
|
sidesticks: the captain can command a full-left in an emergency evasive
|
|
maneuver, the F/O full-right, and the net result will be an algebraically
|
|
added "zero."
|
|
|
|
|
|
>The problem is the PILOTS, not the design
|
|
|
|
Here we flip to cockpit integration, not sidesticks.
|
|
|
|
The problem is a design philosophy which is unwilling to accomodate the human
|
|
element. I also see a great deal of "stick it to the pilots" going on: a
|
|
number of proponents of pilot-isolation don't even bother to cite alleged
|
|
economic or safety benefits, anymore: the pilot-isolation increasingly appears
|
|
to be an engineering-driven goal in itself.
|
|
|
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The Airbus approach has gone too far. Thankfully, however, it seems to be
|
|
on its way out: new designs, such as the 777, are more sophisticated,
|
|
yet have more conventional and interactive interfaces. And the research
|
|
community is coming squarely on the side of more interactive, appropriate
|
|
feedback. New designs will be more human-factors-driven, not engineering-
|
|
driven. And, with luck, we'll see a return to the *evolutionary* application
|
|
of high technology, rather than the *revolutionary* application of the same.
|
|
|
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And who knows, in 20 years, when we have enough underlying experience and
|
|
research under our belts, we can try a *standardized* alternate interface.
|
|
|
|
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BTW, and for the record, I *like* the idea of sidesticks: for no other reason
|
|
than to be able to see the entire instrument panel, unencumbered. I simply
|
|
don't like this particular implementation, and have concerns about the
|
|
human requirements any sidestick design could introduce.
|
|
|
|
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>Philip
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---
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|
Robert Dorsett
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|
rdd@cactus.org
|
|
...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd
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|
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|
From kls Thu Dec 10 16:07:06 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett)
|
|
Subject: Re: Flight controls
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Thu, 10 Dec 92 5:22:58 CST
|
|
References: <1992Nov26.000453.4729@cactus.org>
|
|
<1992Dec01.025604.17493@news.mentorg.com> <ByL8Hp.LM8@apollo.hp.com>
|
|
<airliners.1992.67@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
airliners.1992.77@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.131@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <CMM.0.90.2.723986578.rdd@cactus.org>
|
|
Date: 10 Dec 92 16:07:06 PST
|
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|
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In <airliners.1992.77@ohare.Chicago.COM> philip@rainbow.mentorg.com (Philip
|
|
Peake) wrote:
|
|
|
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> In article <airliners.1992.67@ohare.Chicago.COM>, rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett
|
|
|
|
> if you want to knock the A320, there are much better grounds for doing so
|
|
> than ergonomics - without the more serious design problems, there would probably
|
|
> have been many fewer "accidents", and hence less reason to blame the ergonomics.
|
|
|
|
I am hard pressed to think of many other things. Structurally, the A320 is
|
|
extremely conservative, highly conventional. In systems layout and design,
|
|
highly conventional. There are a few frills, such as the cabin lighting
|
|
system, toilets, or window heat, which have been "automated," but only in
|
|
relatively self-contained manners (toilet going out doesn't have the slightest
|
|
ramification on ELAC 1 being able to do its job, for instance: they aren't
|
|
on the same networks :-)).
|
|
|
|
The EFCS, in turn, has been the focus of so much attention that at least one
|
|
pundit suggested that other aspects may have been allowed to lapse, as
|
|
evidenced by the initial problems with the toilets or the cabin intercom/
|
|
lighting system, the latter of which, in the words of a BA maintenance
|
|
engineer, had software so simple "a child could have done it better." These
|
|
aren't safety-critical items (well, maybe the lighting is: it didn't work at
|
|
Habsheim).
|
|
|
|
Two of the three accidents were misuses of the FMGS MCU; the other--the
|
|
first--was so bizarre, such an outrageous case of poor airmanship, that I've
|
|
yet to fully assess the implications. This therefore seems to call for better
|
|
ergonomics or training, with the latter recognized as precisely what it is: a
|
|
kludge, covering up poor design.
|
|
|
|
It's important to note that while, on a quantifiable basis, the A320's EFCS
|
|
is most subject to criticism, it's equally clear that, thus far, the EFCS has
|
|
performed almost flawlessly. And even if it doesn't meet the 1-in-a-billion
|
|
failure rate, it's likely that if it produces even one EFCS-induced
|
|
catastrophic failure every 10 years, the human and material costs can be
|
|
easily absorbed by the industry--and when it does fail, we probably wouldn't
|
|
be able to determine what happens, since the DFDR certainly doesn't record
|
|
the myriad execution paths.
|
|
|
|
The real issue, of course, is whether this is as safe as a conventional
|
|
system. And if it isn't, there are tremendous ethical and moral issues
|
|
at play.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
> Besides "cosmetic" issues like tactile feedback, and some layout issues,
|
|
|
|
This isn't cosmetic. The choice of using sidesticks, the four major flight
|
|
control modes, the many possible permutations within those modes, are part of
|
|
a highly integrated *system* design. If one looks at it for itself, it's a
|
|
very "sexy" design, a startingly coherent design philosophy. How well it
|
|
adapts to the real world is another issue, entirely, of course.
|
|
|
|
I would even suggest that if one disqualifies one aspect of this model:
|
|
sidestick, throttle control, switch design--the totality could suffer
|
|
irreparable damage. None of this is "cosmetic." It's the heart of how the
|
|
airplane is controlled.
|
|
|
|
|
|
> the 767
|
|
> is pretty close to an A320 - as you have said (I think - sorry if I misquote
|
|
> you)
|
|
> the 767 is just more conventional in cockpit design - its a pity its automatic
|
|
> landing system can be as good as the best pilot on a good day, and a rough as
|
|
> the worst on a bad day ... usually more towards the latter ...
|
|
|
|
I would not have rated the airplanes as equivalents. The 767 is "equivalent"
|
|
to an A310, but even then, there are significant differences in cockpit
|
|
design. If I've given the impression of "equivalency," it was by mistake:
|
|
perhaps in avionics maintenance practices, or the A320 or 747-400 as
|
|
"consumers" of the benefits of the 767/A310 learning curve; little else. The
|
|
airplane I'd compare with the A320 is the 747-400, at least in cockpit design,
|
|
systems design, and AIDS/BITE integration; certainly not the mission
|
|
requirements.
|
|
|
|
|
|
> ) writes:
|
|
> |> We can automate easily quantifiable issues: simple tasks. Judgement and
|
|
> |> airmanship has thus far evaded us, on all levels. Until we get a grip on
|
|
> |> it, talk of fully autonomous aircraft or ground control is nothing more
|
|
> |> than science fiction.
|
|
>
|
|
> [...] history, even modern history is littered with comments from
|
|
> people writing off things as "science fiction", "can't be done", "will never rep
|
|
> lace
|
|
> the current ...." etc who have had to eat their words shortly after.
|
|
|
|
In the software engineering community, words like "Oh, that's easy," or "I can
|
|
do that on time, on schedule, and under budget" are *always* eaten, later on.
|
|
Software is an art, not an engineering discipline.
|
|
|
|
I wonder what the aero manufacturers are doing that the rest of us poor sods
|
|
aren't, that let them miraculously produce highly complex packages right on
|
|
schedule, in a certification environment in which even a day's delay can costs
|
|
millions of dollars. 10M of code in an A330/340, indeed. I have a hard enough
|
|
time keeping my little 1M Microsoft Word in line.
|
|
|
|
Usually, when I write "stupid" things, I regret it an hour later. It's
|
|
been over 72 hours, now, and I stand by my words. At this point in time,
|
|
it is not feasible to create fully autonomous transport aircraft, as implied
|
|
in the original article. By the time it is, I expect my bones to be dust.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Incidentally, a few people seem to have interpreted my comments about software
|
|
engineering as coming from an AE perspective: they weren't. I'm not sanguine
|
|
about CS types writing this stuff: I simply don't think development
|
|
technology's at a point where we can write reliable software with the level
|
|
of confidence I feel is necessary. This is a whole other discussion, though.
|
|
|
|
I actually have little experience with the capabilities of AE-types to write
|
|
code. Although I suppose if they had done it, the EFCS would have been
|
|
written in FORTRAN, not C/Pascal/assembly. :-)
|
|
|
|
I will concede that the CS approach is likely the lesser of two evils.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
Robert Dorsett
|
|
rdd@cactus.org
|
|
...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd
|
|
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Dec 10 16:07:07 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: greg@saltydog.dpsi.com (Gregory R. Travis)
|
|
Subject: Re: 757 highest thrust to weight ratio ?
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Thu, 10 Dec 1992 14:28:02 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.65@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.71@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.113@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.125@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.132@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Data Parallel Systems, Inc
|
|
X-Submission-Message-ID: <greg.723997682@saltydog>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 10 Dec 92 16:07:07 PST
|
|
|
|
Karl makes some excellent points regarding the reasons twins tend to be
|
|
overpowered compared to 3 and 4 engined jets.
|
|
|
|
I would just like to add that FAA certification requires not only that an
|
|
airplane be able to finish takeoff, return, and land with AN engine out,
|
|
but that it also meet certain climb performance criteria during a
|
|
single-engine climb.
|
|
|
|
Karl is absolutely right that, on a 747 that loses one, the remaining three
|
|
need to make up, individually, much less of the lost thrust. Whereas on
|
|
a 757 the remaining engine must make up ALL of the lost thrust.
|
|
|
|
However, I am confused by Karl's statement that Lufthansa chose the A340
|
|
over the A330 because of concerns that the twin-engined A330 would place more
|
|
stress on its two engines whereas the A340 would enjoy higher engine
|
|
reliability as its four engines loafed along.
|
|
|
|
Since a twin engine jet is nominally overpowered compared to a four engine
|
|
jet, it should be able to operate, on aggregate, at a lower thrust setting
|
|
during takeoff or be operated at high thrust for a shorter overall climb.
|
|
|
|
Since a four-engine jet has all four operating closer to the margin, in
|
|
normal operation, the engines should suffer from higher demands all around.
|
|
|
|
greg
|
|
--
|
|
Gregory Reed Travis D P S I
|
|
Data Parallel Systems Incorporated greg@dpsi.com (For MX mailers only!)
|
|
Bloomington, IN greg@indiana.edu (For the others)
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Dec 10 16:07:11 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: pab@po.CWRU.Edu (Pete Babic)
|
|
Subject: Re: hydraulic problems with DC-10's??
|
|
X-Submission-Date: 10 Dec 1992 14:36:36 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.120@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.50@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.133@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Reply-To: pab@po.CWRU.Edu (Pete Babic)
|
|
Organization: Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH (USA)
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <1g7klkINNagb@usenet.INS.CWRU.Edu>
|
|
Date: 10 Dec 92 16:07:11 PST
|
|
|
|
|
|
In a previous article, rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu (Robert Dorsett) says:
|
|
|
|
>
|
|
>The slat retraction DID affect the wing: it then became both a control and
|
|
>aerodynamic problem. Exercising established control practices in an
|
|
>unknown aerodynamic regime crashed the airplane (I'd love to know whether
|
|
>this went into Airbus's "pilot error" database :-)). Had the slats remained
|
|
>down, the airplane would have survived the engine failure, even with the
|
|
>failure of the stall warning system. Other airframe manufacturers have
|
|
>manual locking mechanisms for their slat jackscrews. McDonnell Douglas
|
|
>relied on hydraulic pressure to hold it all together.
|
|
>
|
|
>Incidentally, this problem wasn't corrected: the SUX DC-10 also experienced
|
|
>extension of its slats after it lost all its hydraulics.
|
|
|
|
Does anyone know if the MD-11 has a proper locking mechanism for the slats?
|
|
I'm a layman when it comes to aircraft design, but the DC-10 really looks
|
|
like a substandard design that has killed a bunch of people due to cost
|
|
cutting short cuts.
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Pete Babic - pab@po.cwru.edu ///
|
|
LIVE TO PARTY, SKI TO DIE!!! /// /\
|
|
Member of ACE \\\ /// /--\MIGA
|
|
(American Coaster Enthusiasts) \\\/// MS-DOS or a Mac? What's that?
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Dec 10 16:07:13 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: greg@saltydog.dpsi.com (Gregory R. Travis)
|
|
Subject: Re: hydraulic problems with DC-10s??
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Thu, 10 Dec 1992 14:44:27 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.6@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.8@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.30@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.32@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.99@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.100@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.121@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.134@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Data Parallel Systems, Inc
|
|
X-Submission-Message-ID: <greg.723998667@saltydog>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 10 Dec 92 16:07:13 PST
|
|
|
|
In <airliners.1992.121@ohare.Chicago.COM> barr@ash.mmm.ucar.EDU (Keith Barr) writes:
|
|
|
|
>greg@octopus.dpsi.com (Gregory R. Travis) writes:
|
|
>> BTW, just to be pedantic: The wings do not each contribute exactly
|
|
>> 50% of the total lift. Remember that that fuselage itself contributes
|
|
>> a SUBSTANTIAL amount of lift at cruise as do the horizontal stabilizer
|
|
>> surfaces (in certain flight regimes!).
|
|
|
|
>What flight regimes might those be? Unstable flight, as in the F-16?
|
|
|
|
>Actually, in most aircraft the horizontal stabilizer is downlifting, so
|
|
>the wings have to create more lift, and the body contributes to the
|
|
>pitching moment, but contributes very little lift (unless we are talking
|
|
>about the B-2).
|
|
|
|
As I understand it (and I'm not an aero geek, just an historian geek :-))
|
|
there are flight regimes in which the horizontal stabilizer on conventional
|
|
(i.e. dynamically stable) aircraft contributes POSITIVE lift, even when
|
|
said aircraft is loaded within acceptable C.G. ranges.
|
|
|
|
It is possible (and likely) during slow flight for
|
|
the center of lift to move forward of the center of gravity on the wing.
|
|
At such time, the horizontal stabilizer becomes a LIFTING surface, restoring
|
|
normal stability to the aircraft and the pilot's never the wiser.
|
|
|
|
If you look at many horizontal stabilizers, especially on small GA aircraft,
|
|
you'll note that the airfoil is completely symmetric top and bottom. If
|
|
the horizontal stabilizer contributed ONLY to negative lift, one would think
|
|
it more efficient to design it as an upside-down wing and shorten its overall
|
|
span.
|
|
|
|
I've talked to a couple of Cessna engineers about this (when I was completely
|
|
incredulous that it actually happened) and they agreed that the horizontal
|
|
stabilizer does contribute positive lift and that Cessna routinely measured
|
|
this lift with strain gauges when evaluating stabilizer structure. The
|
|
lift is not present only during extreme maneuvering (such as a violent
|
|
pitch-down) but also during straight and level flight.
|
|
|
|
My good friend Moshe Braner (braner@emily.emba.uvm.edu) can give you a much
|
|
better technical explanation of the phenomena and, no doubt, correct all
|
|
my mis-explanations and errors.
|
|
|
|
greg
|
|
--
|
|
Gregory Reed Travis D P S I
|
|
Data Parallel Systems Incorporated greg@dpsi.com (For MX mailers only!)
|
|
Bloomington, IN greg@indiana.edu (For the others)
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Dec 10 16:07:15 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: hfunk@src.honeywell.com (Harry Funk)
|
|
Subject: Re: New Scientist article
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Thu, 10 Dec 1992 15:13:01 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.105@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.116@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.135@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Reply-To: hfunk@src.honeywell.com (Harry Funk)
|
|
Organization: Honeywell Systems & Research Center
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <1992Dec10.151301.10339@src.honeywell.com>
|
|
Date: 10 Dec 92 16:07:15 PST
|
|
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.116@ohare.Chicago.COM> dmarble@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Duane F Marble) writes:
|
|
>A small point with respect to the material quoted from the New
|
|
>Scientist: Global Positioning System (GPS) birds do not "observe"
|
|
>anything, they just permit a ground based unit to compute it's
|
|
>location.
|
|
|
|
My guess is that he was referring to Automatic Dependent Surveillance (ADS)
|
|
systems based on SATCOM, which has even less to to with GPS/Glonass birds.
|
|
|
|
The planes [would] communicate their positions by means of a satellite link
|
|
to a ground-based tracking/control system. United currently has a few
|
|
747-400's that are so equipped. The major benefit envisioned is for
|
|
oceanic routes, where the fixed spacing (slots) system currently used
|
|
results in suboptimal tracks for a number of users of the system. ADS is
|
|
the successor to the Oceanic Display and Planning System (ODAPS), which I
|
|
think is currently installed at the Oakland and NY Air Route Traffic
|
|
Control Centers (ARTCCs).
|
|
--
|
|
Harry A. Funk Principal Research Scientist Voice: (612)-782-7396
|
|
Honeywell Systems and Research Center FAX: (612)-782-7438
|
|
3660 Technology Dr. MS:MN65-2500 Inet: HFunk@src.honeywell.com
|
|
Minneapolis, MN 55418 Bang: <any-smart-host>!srcsip!funk
|
|
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Dec 10 16:07:18 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: ckd@eff.org (Christopher Davis)
|
|
Subject: Re: objects on wing tips
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Thu, 10 Dec 1992 17:28:58 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.11@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.25@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
<airliners.1992.59@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
<airliners.1992.104@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.136@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Electronic Frontier Foundation Tech Central
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <CKD.92Dec10122857@loiosh.eff.org>
|
|
Date: 10 Dec 92 16:07:18 PST
|
|
|
|
RD> == Ramin Dowlati <dowlatir@cu1.crl.aecl.ca.crl.aecl.ca>
|
|
|
|
(Um, your software's broken.... ^^^^^^^^^^^^)
|
|
|
|
RD> Several years ago, the aeropspace industry introduced vertical
|
|
RD> flap-like things on the ends of their airplane wings. I've only
|
|
RD> noticed these on 'larger' planes such Airbus, 747-400 and MD-11.
|
|
|
|
They're on smaller aircraft as well. The Canadair Challenger bizjet and
|
|
its big brother, the Canadair Regional Jet (which makes this article
|
|
about airliners :) have them, for example.
|
|
|
|
(Side note: ComAir (The Delta Connection) has a HUGE model of the RJ in
|
|
their gate area at CVG. [We had a long (2 hrs) connection on Delta, I
|
|
was bored, so after having some chili I walked all the way down the
|
|
concourse.])
|
|
--
|
|
Christopher K. Davis | ``Usenet seems to run much like the Kif (or,
|
|
<ckd@eff.org> EFF #14 | for the TV generation, Klingon) high command.
|
|
System Administrator, EFF | Whoever takes action and can be heard wins.''
|
|
+1 617 864 0665 [CKD1] | --Peter da Silva <peter@ferranti.com>
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Dec 10 16:07:19 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: rbarnick@mitre.org (Barnick, R.)
|
|
Subject: 737 Crash In Colorado Springs
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Thu, 10 Dec 1992 20:05:35 GMT
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.137@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Followup-To: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Organization: MITRE
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <rbarnick-101292124133@cosadpm12.mitre.org>
|
|
Date: 10 Dec 92 16:07:19 PST
|
|
|
|
In March 1991 a UAL 737 went down on final approach into COS. The final
|
|
accident investigation report was released a couple of days ago and carried
|
|
no cause. About four months ago a TWA flight leaving COS picked up a
|
|
federal investigator working the accident. The investigator sat up front
|
|
in the jump seat. The TWA flight deck crew wanted to know how the
|
|
investigation was going. The following was relayed to me via one of the
|
|
flight crew members.
|
|
|
|
UAL recently lost some kind of case from its female employees which charged
|
|
gender discrimination. UAL either lost or agreed to settle out of court.
|
|
UAL agreed to correct conditions which caused the suit. One correction was
|
|
to get more females in the cockpit. The ill-fated 737 had a very junior
|
|
female first officer. The pilot was male and also junior. Cockpit voice
|
|
recordings (never yet fully released to public) indicated that when the
|
|
crew was informed of very gusty wind conditions in the COS area, they
|
|
seemed overly concerned. They kept commenting about the wind. These
|
|
frequent comments seemed irregular to the investigators. Experienced
|
|
pilots wouldn't have spent so much time discussing the wind. On final it
|
|
was speculated the aircraft took a good jolt from an air current or eddy.
|
|
The crew, having psyched themselves up substantially, reacted in some
|
|
uncoordinated knee-jerk fashion resulting in the fatal error. The
|
|
investigator went on to say that even if this sort of story could be
|
|
proven, it would never be made public. To do would discredit UAL's gender
|
|
action, UAL's training, FAA's certification, and maybe further hurt an
|
|
already hurting industry.
|
|
|
|
It seems odd that the final accident report that came out indeed did say
|
|
nothing.
|
|
|
|
Please remember, this is a story told me second hand. You're getting it
|
|
third hand. But, if any truth about this crash is known, a sharing thought
|
|
would be interesting.
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Dec 10 18:07:49 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz)
|
|
Subject: Re: Flight controls
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Fri, 11 Dec 1992 01:40:40 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.67@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.77@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.131@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.138@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Chicago Software Works
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-ID: <1992Dec11.014040.5031@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Date: 10 Dec 92 18:07:49 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.131@ohare.Chicago.COM> rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) writes:
|
|
|
|
>The EFCS, in turn, has been the focus of so much attention that at least one
|
|
>pundit suggested that other aspects may have been allowed to lapse, as
|
|
>evidenced by the initial problems with the toilets or the cabin intercom/
|
|
>lighting system, the latter of which, in the words of a BA maintenance
|
|
>engineer, had software so simple "a child could have done it better." These
|
|
>aren't safety-critical items (well, maybe the lighting is: it didn't work at
|
|
>Habsheim).
|
|
|
|
I believe both intercom and lighting are considered safety-critical
|
|
items. Not long ago, I sat for half an hour at O'Hare with a United
|
|
747 while they fixed the intercom. They considered this critial --
|
|
justifiably so, IMO -- because it would be necessary for instructing
|
|
passengers in the event of an emergency.
|
|
|
|
Lighting in general may not be deemed critical, though certainly the
|
|
directional lighting in the floor is.
|
|
|
|
>I would not have rated the airplanes as equivalents. The 767 is "equivalent"
|
|
>to an A310, but even then, there are significant differences in cockpit
|
|
>design. If I've given the impression of "equivalency," it was by mistake:
|
|
>perhaps in avionics maintenance practices, or the A320 or 747-400 as
|
|
>"consumers" of the benefits of the 767/A310 learning curve; little else. The
|
|
>airplane I'd compare with the A320 is the 747-400, at least in cockpit design,
|
|
|
|
Is the MD-11 comparable to the 747-400 in this regard? I would assume
|
|
so since they are of comparable vintage.
|
|
|
|
Where do the new generation 737s (-300/-400/-500) fit into this? With
|
|
the first flight of the 737-300 coming several years after the 767 came
|
|
on the scene I would expect it to be comparable, yet some of what I've
|
|
seen suggests it is less sophisticated. I've been in the cockpits of
|
|
each (well, 757s, not 767s that I recall) but really don't know enough
|
|
about what I'm looking at to tell the difference.
|
|
|
|
And, for completeness, where do the glass-cockpit version of the MD-80
|
|
family fit into the picture?
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com
|
|
1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls
|
|
|Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA
|
|
Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Dec 10 18:07:52 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz)
|
|
Subject: Re: 737 Crash In Colorado Springs
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Fri, 11 Dec 1992 01:59:27 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.137@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.139@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Chicago Software Works
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-ID: <1992Dec11.015927.5148@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Date: 10 Dec 92 18:07:52 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.137@ohare.Chicago.COM> rbarnick@mitre.org (Barnick, R.) writes:
|
|
>In March 1991 a UAL 737 went down on final approach into COS. The
|
|
>final accident investigation report was released a couple of days ago
|
|
>and carried no cause.
|
|
|
|
Just to complete the record, it was UA 585 (DEN-COS) on March 3, 1991;
|
|
5 crew and 20 passengers were killed. The aircraft was N999UA, msn
|
|
22742, ln 875, a 737-291 (Advanced). It was acquired from Frontier in
|
|
May, 1986, the last of 25 such aircraft. (Two were 737-2A1(A) models.)
|
|
|
|
>The following was relayed to me via one of the flight crew members.
|
|
|
|
Fascinating. Most of the speculation has been that the aircraft flew
|
|
into the eye of a rotor (much has been said about this on rec.aviation
|
|
by folks from the area) which proceeded to flip it. Another story I
|
|
heard, from some United folks, was that there was some difference in
|
|
the rudder controls betwee these planes and United's 737-222s, and
|
|
that this in some way contributed to the crash. I can't recall the
|
|
details, including whether it was a difference between the Advanced
|
|
and non-Advanced 737-200s, or an airline-related change that United
|
|
had not yet applied to the ex-Frontier aircraft.
|
|
|
|
>The investigator went on to say that even if this sort of story could be
|
|
>proven, it would never be made public. To do would discredit UAL's gender
|
|
>action, UAL's training, FAA's certification, and maybe further hurt an
|
|
>already hurting industry.
|
|
|
|
This seems reasonable, and I've heard the same logic applied to
|
|
snuffing a report that allegedly recommended the immediate grounding
|
|
of Continental (c. 1989) on grounds of inadequate maintenance. But
|
|
the CVR from the Air Florida 737 crash into the Potomac in Washington
|
|
certainly made those pilots look incompetent, and the United DC-8 that
|
|
went down in Portland in 1978 didn't seem much better. Indeed, the
|
|
latter, as I understand it, motivated a *major* revision of United's
|
|
training program. Perhaps gender-discrimination is a more sensitive
|
|
issue, though.
|
|
|
|
>It seems odd that the final accident report that came out indeed did say
|
|
>nothing.
|
|
|
|
I believe this is unique insofar as the NTSB is concerned. Robert,
|
|
is this indeed true?
|
|
|
|
>Please remember, this is a story told me second hand. You're getting it
|
|
>third hand. But, if any truth about this crash is known, a sharing thought
|
|
>would be interesting.
|
|
|
|
Thanks for sharing it. If anybody else has anything substantial to
|
|
contribute on the matter, please send it in.
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com
|
|
1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls
|
|
|Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA
|
|
Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Dec 10 20:58:52 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: Robert Dorsett <rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu>
|
|
Subject: MD-11 (Re: hydraulic problems on DC-10)
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Thu, 10 Dec 92 20:47:23 CST
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.120@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
<airliners.1992.50@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
<airliners.1992.133@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.140@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Reply-To: rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <CMM.0.90.2.724042043.rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu>
|
|
Date: 10 Dec 92 20:58:52 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.133@ohare.Chicago.COM> pab@po.CWRU.Edu (Pete Babic) writes:
|
|
>Does anyone know if the MD-11 has a proper locking mechanism for the slats?
|
|
>I'm a layman when it comes to aircraft design, but the DC-10 really looks
|
|
>like a substandard design that has killed a bunch of people due to cost
|
|
>cutting short cuts.
|
|
|
|
I had wondered about this, and researched it about a year ago. I wasn't
|
|
able to find a clear-cut answer.
|
|
|
|
Otherwise, my conclusion is that the MD-11 is a very marginal upgrade of the
|
|
basic DC-10 design. The systems layout is almost identical; none of the major
|
|
"complaint areas" have changed. There's a high degree of commonality between
|
|
the DC-10 and MD-11, the "hydraulics plug" adopted after the SUX crash being a
|
|
good example.
|
|
|
|
The changes incorporate a 6-meter fuselage stretch, the winglets, composites
|
|
in the tail, new engines, and a new cockpit. The latter appears to be the
|
|
most radical change, but other than that, what characterizes the industry
|
|
media is a lot of manufacturer "gee whiz" propaganda, long on "radical
|
|
changes," but short on specifics.
|
|
|
|
I recall an Av Leak article a couple of years ago, which suggested the
|
|
full new type-certification wasn't necessary, but McDonnell-Douglas did it
|
|
anyway, to try to exorcise itself from the political "ghosts" of the DC-10:
|
|
a regulatory face-lift, if you will. Problem is, not much has changed.
|
|
|
|
So: I see no objective reason to conclude the MD-11 is any "safer" than the
|
|
DC-10, if one accepts the existence of the problems that characterized the
|
|
DC-10's development.
|
|
|
|
More detailed information would be welcome. I was really appalled by how
|
|
little "hard" info was out there, and I spent quite a bit of time on it.
|
|
Literally hundreds of articles on 767-X and 777 aerodynamic and systems
|
|
development, dozens on Airbus, but only two or three "skimpy" treaments on
|
|
the MD-11, the kind of things you'd find in "Aerospace America." Does MDC
|
|
have some kind of anti-publishing policy or something?
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Robert Dorsett
|
|
Internet: rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu
|
|
UUCP: ...cs.utexas.edu!rascal.ics.utexas.edu!rdd
|
|
|
|
From kls Fri Dec 11 00:38:19 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: cid@athena.mit.edu (Derek H Cedillo)
|
|
Subject: Re: 757 highest thrust to weight ratio ?
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Fri, 11 Dec 1992 06:16:27 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.113@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.125@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.132@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.141@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <1992Dec11.061627.6973@athena.mit.edu>
|
|
Date: 11 Dec 92 00:38:19 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.132@ohare.Chicago.COM> greg@saltydog.dpsi.com (Gregory R. Travis) writes:
|
|
[good outline of engine loading]
|
|
|
|
|
|
>However, I am confused by Karl's statement that Lufthansa chose the A340
|
|
>over the A330 because of concerns that the twin-engined A330 would place more
|
|
>stress on its two engines whereas the A340 would enjoy higher engine
|
|
>reliability as its four engines loafed along.
|
|
>
|
|
>Since a twin engine jet is nominally overpowered compared to a four engine
|
|
>jet, it should be able to operate, on aggregate, at a lower thrust setting
|
|
>during takeoff or be operated at high thrust for a shorter overall climb.
|
|
>
|
|
>Since a four-engine jet has all four operating closer to the margin, in
|
|
>normal operation, the engines should suffer from higher demands all around.
|
|
|
|
I think the thing here, is that you are imagining two different engines
|
|
entirely. This isnt exactly the case. I dont have thrust data handy,
|
|
so I cant compare the A330 engine performance with the A340, but as a quick
|
|
example, I'd like to point out that the A340, A320 and A321 all have
|
|
the same GE engine spec (CFM56-5) while the A340 is a four engine plane
|
|
and the A320 and 21 are two engine planes.
|
|
Althought the 340 is definately bigger than the 320/1, I dont think the
|
|
engine loading would be twice as much. (can someone come up with stats
|
|
to prove or disprove please)
|
|
|
|
Another look is the 767-200ER/300/300ER, MD-11 and 747-200/300/400 which
|
|
can choose the GE CF6-80C2.
|
|
All are relatively large planes, and they gradually increase
|
|
in size, but is it huge enough to say the 747 is Twice as heavy/aero dyn
|
|
loaded, etc, to require twice the thrust as the 767?
|
|
Note that they have 2,3,4 engines respectively
|
|
Again, I would appreciate any airframe data to support the
|
|
weight/thrust/loading claim, or shoot me out of the sky as seen fit.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Can someone help?
|
|
Thanks,
|
|
|
|
|
|
Derek
|
|
|
|
-------------------------------
|
|
"He lived a life of going-to-do,
|
|
and died with nothing done"
|
|
-J. Albery
|
|
|
|
In other words---JUST DO IT!
|
|
|
|
From kls Fri Dec 11 03:35:19 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: lhe@sics.se (Lars-Henrik Eriksson)
|
|
Subject: Re: 737 Crash In Colorado Springs
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Fri, 11 Dec 1992 08:41:57 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.137@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.142@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Followup-To: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <LHE.92Dec11094157@yang.sics.se>
|
|
Date: 11 Dec 92 03:35:19 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.137@ohare.Chicago.COM> rbarnick@mitre.org (Barnick, R.) writes:
|
|
UAL recently lost some kind of case from its female employees which charged
|
|
gender discrimination. UAL either lost or agreed to settle out of court.
|
|
UAL agreed to correct conditions which caused the suit. One correction was
|
|
to get more females in the cockpit. The ill-fated 737 had a very junior
|
|
female first officer. The pilot was male and also junior.
|
|
|
|
Please remember, this is a story told me second hand. You're getting it
|
|
third hand. But, if any truth about this crash is known, a sharing thought
|
|
would be interesting.
|
|
|
|
I suspect that many people - particularly people not familiar with
|
|
aircraft operations - would believe that the problem was that UAL had
|
|
been "forced" to put a "a very junior female first officer" on the
|
|
flight. (We must assume that the F/O was had sufficient
|
|
qualifications, even if she was quite new - every pilot is very junior
|
|
in the beginning of their careers). That was not the problem at all -
|
|
it was UALs decision to put a junior captain on the flight together
|
|
with a very junior first officer.
|
|
--
|
|
Lars-Henrik Eriksson Internet: lhe@sics.se
|
|
Swedish Institute of Computer Science Phone (intn'l): +46 8 752 15 09
|
|
Box 1263 Telefon (nat'l): 08 - 752 15 09
|
|
S-164 28 KISTA, SWEDEN Fax: +46 8 751 72 30
|
|
|
|
From kls Fri Dec 11 03:35:21 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz)
|
|
Subject: Re: 757 highest thrust to weight ratio ?
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Fri, 11 Dec 1992 11:33:35 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.125@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.132@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.141@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.143@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Chicago Software Works
|
|
X-Submission-Message-ID: <1992Dec11.113335.6455@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 11 Dec 92 03:35:21 PST
|
|
|
|
In response to Derek H Cedillo's reply to Gregory R. Travis' reply to
|
|
my post ...
|
|
|
|
Greg sez ...
|
|
|
|
However, I am confused by Karl's statement that Lufthansa chose the A340
|
|
over the A330 because of concerns that the twin-engined A330 would place more
|
|
stress on its two engines whereas the A340 would enjoy higher engine
|
|
reliability as its four engines loafed along.
|
|
|
|
Just to make it clear, this was a rather fuzzy memory. I believe I
|
|
read the details, which I may have distorted badly, in AW&ST, but
|
|
cannot place it better than that. At the time, it kinda made sense
|
|
to me, but I'm not sure it does now.
|
|
|
|
If anyone can fill in the missing details I would be most appreciative.
|
|
|
|
Greg continues ...
|
|
|
|
Since a twin engine jet is nominally overpowered compared to a four engine
|
|
jet, it should be able to operate, on aggregate, at a lower thrust setting
|
|
during takeoff or be operated at high thrust for a shorter overall climb.
|
|
|
|
Since a four-engine jet has all four operating closer to the margin, in
|
|
normal operation, the engines should suffer from higher demands all around.
|
|
|
|
and Derek replies ...
|
|
|
|
I think the thing here, is that you are imagining two different engines
|
|
entirely. This isnt exactly the case.
|
|
|
|
Eh? Don't you have that backwards? Since an A330 is little more than
|
|
an A340 with two big engines instead of four little ones, it's very
|
|
much the case that the engines are entirely different. And this may
|
|
well be the case -- at least by some metrics, a 67,500 lb. thrust
|
|
engine endures more stress than a 31,200 lb. thrust engine. Of course
|
|
it depends on the core from which one started, and a lot of other
|
|
factors.
|
|
|
|
Or perhaps Lufthansa feels the CFM56 is inherently more reliably than
|
|
any of the engine options for the A330 (CF6-80 first, then PW4000, and
|
|
RR Trent and GE 90 options later). Not that there's anything *bad*
|
|
about any of the larger engines, but the CFM56 has the best record of
|
|
any of the larger jet engines if I'm not mistaken.
|
|
|
|
Derek continues ...
|
|
|
|
I dont have thrust data handy,
|
|
so I cant compare the A330 engine performance with the A340, but as a quick
|
|
example, I'd like to point out that the A340, A320 and A321 all have
|
|
the same GE engine spec (CFM56-5) while the A340 is a four engine plane
|
|
and the A320 and 21 are two engine planes.
|
|
|
|
It's actually a CFM International (GE and Snecma are equal partners, I
|
|
believe) engine, and the -5 simply means its for an Airbus as far as I
|
|
can tell. In its various incarnations a CFM56 ranges from 20,000 lbs.
|
|
thrust up to 34,000 lbs. The A320 uses a -5A2 (25,000 lbs.) or -5A3
|
|
(26,500 lbs.) version, while the initial A340 version uses a -5C2
|
|
(31,200 lbs.).
|
|
|
|
Althought the 340 is definately bigger than the 320/1, I dont think the
|
|
engine loading would be twice as much. (can someone come up with stats
|
|
to prove or disprove please)
|
|
|
|
I'm not sure this will answer the question or not, but I dug out the
|
|
power/weight specs I gathered earlier, added numbers for the A330/A340,
|
|
and added a column for power/weight ratio with one engine out. Here's
|
|
what I came up with:
|
|
|
|
model pass range MGTOW engines thrust p/wt 1out
|
|
----- ---- ----- ----- ------- ------ ---- ----
|
|
A320-200 140-179 ? 162 2 CFM56-5A3 26500 0.3272 0.1636
|
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A321-100 180-220 ? 181.2 2 CFM56-5B2 31000 0.3422 0.1711
|
|
A330 280-440 ? 467.5 2 CF6-80E1A2 67500 0.2888 0.1444
|
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A340-200 220-440 ? 558.8 4 CFM56-5C2 31200 0.2233 0.1675
|
|
A340-300 280-440 ? 558.9 4 CFM56-5C2 31200 0.2233 0.1675
|
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The one-engine-out numbers are remarkably similar for the A320 and A340.
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|
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Another look is the 767-200ER/300/300ER, MD-11 and 747-200/300/400 which
|
|
can choose the GE CF6-80C2.
|
|
All are relatively large planes, and they gradually increase
|
|
in size, but is it huge enough to say the 747 is Twice as heavy/aero dyn
|
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loaded, etc, to require twice the thrust as the 767?
|
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|
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Well, sucking a few more figures out of my files:
|
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|
|
model pass range MGTOW engines thrust p/wt 1out
|
|
----- ---- ----- ----- ------- ------ ---- ----
|
|
747-400 412-509 8380 870 4 PW4056 56000 0.2575 0.1931
|
|
767-300(ER) 204-290 6650 400 2 PW4060 60000 0.3000 0.1500
|
|
|
|
I picked these two particular airframe/engine combinations as the best
|
|
comparison points but have more data if anybody wants it. In any case,
|
|
yes, the 747 *is* twice as heavy, more than that in fact, but because
|
|
it uses a slightly lesser rated engine has a bit less than twice the
|
|
thrust.
|
|
|
|
Again, I would appreciate any airframe data to support the
|
|
weight/thrust/loading claim, or shoot me out of the sky as seen fit.
|
|
|
|
Can someone help?
|
|
|
|
There's some data, but I'm not understanding Lufthansa's position much
|
|
better. Maybe it's just the late hour, or the flu I've been fighting
|
|
off.
|
|
|
|
How 'bout one of you folks from Boeing? (Better yet, Airbus, if any
|
|
of you are out there!)
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com
|
|
1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls
|
|
|Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA
|
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Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com
|
|
|
|
From kls Fri Dec 11 17:42:28 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: Robert Dorsett <rdd@cactus.org>
|
|
Subject: Re: Safety and design rankings (was Re: Flight controls)
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Fri, 11 Dec 92 6:44:01 CST
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.67@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
<airliners.1992.77@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
<airliners.1992.131@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
<airliners.1992.138@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.144@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Reply-To: rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <CMM.0.90.2.724077841.rdd@cactus.org>
|
|
Date: 11 Dec 92 17:42:28 PST
|
|
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.138@ohare.Chicago.COM> kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) writes:
|
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|
|
>> These aren't safety-critical items (well, maybe the lighting is: it didn't
|
|
>> work at Habsheim).
|
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>
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> I believe both intercom and lighting are considered safety-critical
|
|
> items.
|
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|
|
Sorry: that was poorly phrased. It is a must-have, and, yes, it did
|
|
fail. However, I understand the problem was mechanical in nature (CCF?); the
|
|
software problems were eventually fixed.
|
|
|
|
I don't know about the intercom, but the PA system is, as well.
|
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|
|
|
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>Lighting in general may not be deemed critical, though certainly the
|
|
>directional lighting in the floor is.
|
|
|
|
Floor directional lighting is relatively new. It complements, but does not
|
|
replace, the regular emergency floods: both are now considered critical.
|
|
|
|
For the semantics fans: we should probably be careful in our use of the term
|
|
"safety-critical" with respect to these systems: it is not, for instance, in
|
|
the same league as the EFCS, and the software likely doesn't require the
|
|
same confidence. Anyone known for sure? I would suspect emergency lighting
|
|
is listed as an "essential function," not critical.
|
|
|
|
|
|
> Is the MD-11 comparable to the 747-400 in this regard? I would assume
|
|
> so since they are of comparable vintage.
|
|
|
|
I would suggest not: the former is more of a derivative, the latter more of
|
|
a new type, with its new wing (which was designed to support the all-upper-
|
|
deck concept, plus maybe one more derivative after that), electrical system,
|
|
extensive use of composites, new APU, etc. Each has a high degree of direct
|
|
commonality with its predecessor, but from a technology basis, I don't think
|
|
they're in the same league.
|
|
|
|
One commenter to the paper Pete and I are brewing up took exception to my
|
|
comparison, though: he feels the 767 was more of an equivalent to the A320.
|
|
I disagree, from both design and avionics perspectives.
|
|
|
|
Perhaps some of the Boeing people posting here can comment on the
|
|
commonality of the various versions of the 747.
|
|
|
|
|
|
> Where do the new generation 737s (-300/-400/-500) fit into this?
|
|
|
|
FMS, new engines, composites, just about everything else is derivative. The
|
|
"glass" in the cockpits is hackwork, IMHO, nowhere NEAR as integrated as
|
|
the "all-new" glass airplanes such as the 747-400. I don't believe systems
|
|
control has changed much at all.
|
|
|
|
|
|
> And, for completeness, where do the glass-cockpit version of the MD-80
|
|
> family fit into the picture?
|
|
|
|
My PERSONAL mental "ranking" of the sophistication of these airplanes is
|
|
about:
|
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|
|
|
|
High-high automation/integration
|
|
One philosophy
|
|
|
|
|
777 Another philosophy
|
|
|
|
|
747-400<--------------------------------------------------->A320/A330/A340
|
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|
|
|
HIgh automation/integration
|
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|
|
MD-11
|
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|
|
|
757/767<--------------------->A310, A300-600
|
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|
|
|
FMS only, varying or no glass, no standards
|
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|
|
|
747-300,737-300,-400,-500, MD-8X, F.100
|
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|
|
|
INS/PMS, conventional otherwise
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|
|
|
747-200/SP
|
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|
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INS only, very smart autopilot, fair integration
|
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|
|
|
L1011
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|
|
A300
|
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|
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INS only, simple, coupled autopilots, fair integration
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|
|
747-100/200, DC-10
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|
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First/second-generation design, little integration
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|
|
two-man | three-man
|
|
DC-9,737-100,737-200<-----|
|
|
|
|
|
KC-135
|
|
|
|
|
--------------->727, DC-9, 707, DC-8
|
|
|
|
Two-man airplanes have always used more automation than three-man crews;
|
|
hence, I give them a slight edge among the "first-generation" airplanes.
|
|
|
|
Others may have differing impressions; there's no hard and fast rule to
|
|
apply.
|
|
|
|
Of all these airplanes, the original 747 family has the best internal
|
|
cockpit consistency, by far. Otherwise, the new Airbusses have the best
|
|
design consistency. But I count some 19 fundamental cockpit designs in
|
|
operation, countless permutations existing in most of them, depending on
|
|
customer preferences in avionics and cockpit layout.
|
|
|
|
The FMS's used on these airplanes are generally done by Honeywell, except
|
|
that Boeing's using Smiths Industries for the 737, for some reason.
|
|
|
|
Note that INS's on older-generation airplanes were often not purchased by
|
|
customers who intended to use them for domestic service: EAL's A300-B4's, for
|
|
instance, didn't even have them for service to South America. All of the
|
|
first-generation airplanes currently have INS retrofits available; there are
|
|
also on-again, off-again plans to offer a relatively sophisticated glass
|
|
cockpit for the 727, with new engines.
|
|
|
|
But it's important to note that INS interfaces were pretty much localized,
|
|
with maybe a coupled mode for the autopilot. The devices were nowhere near
|
|
as integrated in the cockpit design as 1980's/1990's crop, even if they were
|
|
explicitly sold with airplanes (such as the early 747). They were "packages,"
|
|
not the "essence."
|
|
|
|
LASTLY, note that the manufacturers are MUCH more assertive about preventing
|
|
customers customizing their cockpits. This really got out of hand: for
|
|
instance, I have a picture of a KLM 747-200 with some seven HSI's and CDI's
|
|
and four full-sized ADI's, blanketing every spare square inch of the pilots'
|
|
panels--that's what THEIR chief pilot apparently felt comfortable with. :-)
|
|
Options are much more limited on modern airplanes; all customer variations
|
|
are much "closer" to the manufacturer standard cockpit (the one that gets
|
|
in all the publicity photos) than they used to be. Then again, nearly all
|
|
the major airlines don't have anything resembling the engineering and design
|
|
departments that they used to have, so they've forfeited the right to
|
|
comment, to a large degree. Performance is now ensured by legal contract,
|
|
rather than design, with the dollar being the bottom line.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Caveat: I generally don't know that much about Douglas products
|
|
(except for the DC-10 :-)); Boeing and Airbus have always caught my
|
|
interests.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
Robert Dorsett
|
|
rdd@cactus.org
|
|
...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd
|
|
|
|
From kls Fri Dec 11 17:42:30 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: palmer@icat.larc.nasa.gov (Michael T. Palmer)
|
|
Subject: Re: Airbus safety (was Re: TWAs Status)
|
|
X-Submission-Date: 11 Dec 92 16:22:39 GMT
|
|
References: <1992Nov25.191925.27991@news.mentorg.com> <8762@lee.SEAS.UCLA.EDU> <1992Dec01.173212.27936@news.mentorg.com> <airliners.1992.130@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.145@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA USA
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <palmer.724090959@news.larc.nasa.gov>
|
|
Date: 11 Dec 92 17:42:30 PST
|
|
|
|
rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) writes:
|
|
|
|
>Seriously, this is a tremendously conservative industry. What isn't broken,
|
|
>doesn't get fixed. However, when a better mouse-trap is invented, it is
|
|
>almost always adopted, universally. The fact that no other manufacturer
|
|
>is rushing to repeat Airbus' example suggests the arbitrariness of the
|
|
>use of the sidesticks: if there were even minor operational or material
|
|
>advantages in using them (and modified control laws) as interfaces to the
|
|
>EFCS, you could bet your last dollar every other manufacturer would be doing
|
|
>so, not least as the result of airline demand. We don't see that.
|
|
|
|
>This isn't one of them. We aren't operating in a vacuum: NASA, as one example,
|
|
>has been running a lot of research (over, and over) over the last 20 years,
|
|
>addressing precisely these issues: the Airbus implementation is arguably on
|
|
>the weaker of a variety of choices available.
|
|
|
|
My contacts at Boeing agree - Boeing Flight Deck Research has been looking
|
|
at sidestick controllers for a long time. They have decided that until they
|
|
develop an airplane that is flown *differently* they will continue to use
|
|
the column/yoke arrangement. Now, what I mean by differently really refers
|
|
to switching from ATTITUDE control laws to VELOCITY VECTOR control laws.
|
|
Mr Dorsett is correct; NASA Langley has decades of experience with sidestick
|
|
controllers in our B-737 aircraft (it has TWO cockpits - standard in front,
|
|
and an aft research cab from which you can fly the entire flight profile
|
|
including landing).
|
|
|
|
The sidestick control has been shown to be best when commanding velocity
|
|
vector changes instead of attitude changes. This is an interesting way of
|
|
using automation to ease the burden on the pilot while allowing him to
|
|
also remain in the loop, since the automation configures the control
|
|
surfaces to maintain the commanded direction of flight, but the pilot
|
|
still "flies" the airplane (when not in full-autopilot). The velocity
|
|
vector control-stick steering mode is by far the mode of choice of the
|
|
pilots we bring in for experiments.
|
|
|
|
Based on the work here and their own efforts, Boeing has decided that until
|
|
they build a velocity vector airplane (hint: High-Speed Civil Transport)
|
|
they will not provide a totally different way to fly an airplane designed
|
|
with attitude control laws in mind.
|
|
|
|
Please note that I am neither a Boeing employee nor spokesman, and I neither
|
|
(officially) recommend nor approve of actions taken by them. All the info
|
|
provided here (about Boeing's position) was provided to me personally by
|
|
Boeing employees, though, so I have no reason to doubt it. It would be nice
|
|
if some of you lurking Boeing people jumped in to correct any mistakes I
|
|
have made. :-)
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Michael T. Palmer, M/S 152, NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA 23681
|
|
Voice: 804-864-2044, FAX: 804-864-7793, Email: m.t.palmer@larc.nasa.gov
|
|
PGP 2.0 Public Key now available -- Consider it an envelope for your e-mail
|
|
|
|
From kls Fri Dec 11 17:42:31 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: smith@cyclone.mitre.org (Ralph N. Smith)
|
|
Subject: Automatic Dependent Surveillance (ADS)
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Fri, 11 Dec 1992 17:21:25 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.105@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.116@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.135@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.146@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Mitre Corporation, McLean, VA
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <1992Dec11.172125.27058@linus.mitre.org>
|
|
Date: 11 Dec 92 17:42:31 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.135@ohare.Chicago.COM> hfunk@src.honeywell.com (Harry Funk) writes:
|
|
>
|
|
>In article <airliners.1992.116@ohare.Chicago.COM> dmarble@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Duane F Marble) writes:
|
|
>>A small point with respect to the material quoted from the New
|
|
>>Scientist: Global Positioning System (GPS) birds do not "observe"
|
|
>>anything, they just permit a ground based unit to compute it's
|
|
>>location.
|
|
>
|
|
>My guess is that he was referring to Automatic Dependent Surveillance (ADS)
|
|
>systems based on SATCOM, which has even less to to with GPS/Glonass birds.
|
|
>
|
|
>The planes [would] communicate their positions by means of a satellite link
|
|
>to a ground-based tracking/control system. United currently has a few
|
|
>747-400's that are so equipped. The major benefit envisioned is for
|
|
>oceanic routes, where the fixed spacing (slots) system currently used
|
|
>results in suboptimal tracks for a number of users of the system. ADS is
|
|
>the successor to the Oceanic Display and Planning System (ODAPS), which I
|
|
>think is currently installed at the Oakland and NY Air Route Traffic
|
|
>Control Centers (ARTCCs).
|
|
|
|
A few clarifying remarks about ADS. Technically, what United is currently
|
|
doing in the Pacific is position reporting, where the aircraft sends a
|
|
given set of information to the ground at fixed intervals. ADS systems
|
|
involve more ground interaction, with the ground-based systems
|
|
specifying the types of information desired, and the circumstances under
|
|
which that information is provided, either periodically or at the
|
|
occurrence of certain events in a flight.
|
|
|
|
Also, there needs to be a differentiation made between the service
|
|
provided by the aircraft, in this case ADS, and the communications by
|
|
which the information is being sent. With a proper communications
|
|
infrastructure, ADS and other air-ground communications based
|
|
applications, can run without being concerned which particular
|
|
air-ground data link is carrying the data, whether it be satellite, VHF
|
|
radio, or any of a variety of communications links. ADS can also be
|
|
used to retrieve intent information from an aircraft, in addition to
|
|
current status information.
|
|
|
|
Work is currently under way to integrate ADS reporting into the ODAPS
|
|
system, rather than replacing it, at least in the near term. Also, an
|
|
ADS-based application is one of the products to be produced by the
|
|
Aeronautical Telecommunication Network (ATN) Project (ATNP). Several
|
|
organizations in the aviation community are involved in the ATNP,
|
|
including airlines (United is among them), avionics manufacturers, and
|
|
the FAA.
|
|
|
|
The potential benefits of ADS are substantial, including increased
|
|
safety, and substantial savings in fuel and flight time.
|
|
|
|
Ralph N. Smith ralph@mitre.org
|
|
The MITRE Corporation (703)883-6084
|
|
McLean, Virginia
|
|
|
|
All views and opinions are my own, so don't try to hold my employer
|
|
responsible.
|
|
|
|
From kls Fri Dec 11 17:42:32 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: palmer@icat.larc.nasa.gov (Michael T. Palmer)
|
|
Subject: Re: Airbus safety (was Re: TWAs Status)
|
|
X-Submission-Date: 11 Dec 92 17:26:55 GMT
|
|
References: <1992Nov25.191925.27991@news.mentorg.com> <8762@lee.SEAS.UCLA.EDU> <1992Dec01.173212.27936@news.mentorg.com> <airliners.1992.130@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.147@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA USA
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <palmer.724094815@news.larc.nasa.gov>
|
|
Date: 11 Dec 92 17:42:32 PST
|
|
|
|
rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) writes:
|
|
|
|
>I would also note that in fighter aircraft, there isn't the issue of
|
|
>two-pilot "peers" having to quickly and instinctively figure out who is
|
|
>flying the airplane. On the A320, there is no interconnect between the
|
|
>sidesticks: the captain can command a full-left in an emergency evasive
|
|
>maneuver, the F/O full-right, and the net result will be an algebraically
|
|
>added "zero."
|
|
|
|
I believe this is incorrect, though I don't have the documentation here
|
|
right now. My understanding is that whenever one of the sticks reaches
|
|
a critical percentage of deflection (say, 75%), it becomes automatically
|
|
the selected input device. At this point, the other control stick is
|
|
ignored. So it's a race. Whoever slams their stick to the stops first
|
|
wins, and the only way for the other crewmember to override is to physically
|
|
attack the winner. Neat, huh?
|
|
|
|
I'm not sure how sub-critical deflections are handled - they may indeed
|
|
be algebraically summed. If any Airbus people can provide the straight
|
|
scoop, I'd appreciate it.
|
|
|
|
In the sidestick implementations used at NASA, the sticks are interconnected
|
|
("logically", really, since they are hydraulically back-driven) so that,
|
|
like in current cockpits, whoever is strongest (i.e., most scared-to-death)
|
|
wins.
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Michael T. Palmer, M/S 152, NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA 23681
|
|
Voice: 804-864-2044, FAX: 804-864-7793, Email: m.t.palmer@larc.nasa.gov
|
|
PGP 2.0 Public Key now available -- Consider it an envelope for your e-mail
|
|
|
|
From kls Fri Dec 11 17:42:32 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: philip@rainbow.mentorg.com (Philip Peake)
|
|
Subject: Re: Airbus safety (was Re: TWAs Status)
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Fri, 11 Dec 1992 18:11:36 GMT
|
|
References: <1992Nov25.191925.27991@news.mentorg.com> <airliners.1992.130@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.148@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Followup-To:
|
|
Organization: Mentor Graphics
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <1992Dec11.181136.2160@news.mentorg.com>
|
|
Date: 11 Dec 92 17:42:32 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.130@ohare.Chicago.COM>, rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) writes:
|
|
|>
|
|
|> >If all new pilots were taught nothing but the side stick,
|
|
|> >how long would the old arangementy last - and if the old arangement
|
|
|>
|
|
|> Why should pilots be taught nothing but a unique, *proprietary* side-stick
|
|
|> design that no pilot had any experience with before four years ago, and which
|
|
|> is only one of a variety of other possible designs?
|
|
|
|
You are avoiding the question - read it again, the operative word is "if".
|
|
I really don't think that a side-stick qualifies as "*proprietary*" does it ?
|
|
Does Airbus hold patents on some aspect of it ? (I don't know the answer to
|
|
this one - but if that IS true, then the result would be proprietary, and
|
|
would deserve to fail).
|
|
|
|
Changing the subject slightly, the world's safest aircraft (Concorde) uses
|
|
technology which was new, and for a time unacceptable to various licensing
|
|
authorities - it didn't have a MECHANICAL link between the stick and the control
|
|
surfaces - only hydraulic. There was *much* concern over this, and lots of
|
|
reaction from the pilots and safety mob - they almost won, and the Concorde almost
|
|
had to be produced with a mechanical linkage, which no FULL CREW would be able
|
|
to budge one mm if they all tried together - in fact, the linkages would probably
|
|
have failed, before it would have been possible to move a control surface, when
|
|
moving at full speed.
|
|
|
|
As I said, it has proved to be the worlds' safest aircraft.
|
|
Presumably, had a few airlines other than BA and Air France used them, someone
|
|
would have flown one or two of them into the ground, and we would be arguing
|
|
(or would have been arguing) about the safety of aircraft with no mechanical
|
|
backup systems.
|
|
|
|
Technology changes, old interfaces eventually HAVE to give way as they begin to
|
|
fit less and less well with the new technologies.
|
|
|
|
I don't seem to have noticed any raving about the TGV, the latest versions of
|
|
which achieve speeds comparable to that of aircraft, and use a side-stick ...
|
|
(yes, I know, French again ...) There is MUCH more prior art in train design,
|
|
and they can write off considerably more people than even a fully loaded 747/400
|
|
if something goes drastically wrong.
|
|
|
|
Philip
|
|
|
|
|
|
From kls Fri Dec 11 17:42:33 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: raveling@Unify.com (Paul Raveling)
|
|
Subject: Re: objects on wing tips
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Fri, 11 Dec 92 20:58:52 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.11@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.25@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.59@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.104@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.149@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Unify Corporation (Sacramento)
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <j5tbpyt@Unify.Com>
|
|
Date: 11 Dec 92 17:42:33 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.104@ohare.Chicago.COM>, dowlatir@cu1.crl.aecl.ca.crl.aecl.ca (Ramin Dowlati) writes:
|
|
> I have a few questions for any of you passenger airplane gurus.
|
|
> Several years ago, the aeropspace industry introduced vertical
|
|
> flap-like things on the ends of their airplane wings. I've
|
|
> only noticed these on 'larger' planes such Airbus, 747-400 and
|
|
> MD-11.
|
|
> Q1. What is the technical name for these flap-like things?
|
|
|
|
Winglets. The most common name usage was "Whitcomb winglets"
|
|
until they became fairly common. Many would say that Whitcomb
|
|
was their inventor, but watching the tip feathers of large
|
|
soaring birds suggests that Mother Nature should get some credit.
|
|
|
|
> Q2. Are they mobile or fixed?
|
|
|
|
Fixed
|
|
|
|
> Q3. Do they only serve to stabilize the flight?
|
|
|
|
No. Their purpose is to reduce induced drag, which they do
|
|
by reducing circulation in wingtip vortices.
|
|
|
|
> Q4. Why haven't they appeared on smaller aircraft?
|
|
|
|
They have. In fact recent times have brought some controversy
|
|
to competitive soaring, about whether winglets should count
|
|
for measuring sailplane wingspan. This application uses winglets
|
|
on airframes that weigh a few hundred pounds and carry one person,
|
|
sometimes with about 1/4 inch of headroom for a pilot who's
|
|
already laid out almost flat on his [or her] back.
|
|
|
|
> Q5. The ones I saw on the Airbus were shaped like a 'V'
|
|
> and symmetric with the wing tip, ie. one leg of the 'V'
|
|
> was above the wing and the other pointed below the wing.
|
|
> Whereas the ones on the 747-400 looked like extensions
|
|
> of the actually wing, but bent 90 degrees upwards.
|
|
> Why the difference?
|
|
|
|
The 'V' form sounds like the classic Whitcomb design. Sailplanes
|
|
don't use the downward-pointing winglet because ground clearance
|
|
at the wingtips won't allow it. The same might be true of many
|
|
airliners, with variations. This is just a guess: Many need
|
|
clearance under the wings for servicing vehicles, such as fuel
|
|
trucks. Having "hanging" winglets would increase the rate of
|
|
ground damage. Some might also have a ground clearance problem
|
|
for landing with an engine out, where designers usually plan
|
|
for the certification limit of 5 degrees of bank (plus rudder
|
|
of course) to compensate for asymmetric thrust. Finally,
|
|
the extra winglet might require enough extra structure to
|
|
negate most of the aerodynamic benefit it would produce.
|
|
|
|
|
|
------------------
|
|
Paul Raveling
|
|
Raveling@Unify.com
|
|
|
|
|
|
From kls Fri Dec 11 17:42:34 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: raveling@Unify.com (Paul Raveling)
|
|
Subject: Re: hydraulic problems with DC-10's??
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Fri, 11 Dec 92 21:21:35 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.85@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.92@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.103@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.150@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Unify Corporation (Sacramento)
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <x4tbh4s@Unify.Com>
|
|
Date: 11 Dec 92 17:42:34 PST
|
|
|
|
Several people:
|
|
lhe@sics.se (Lars-Henrik Eriksson)
|
|
drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com
|
|
weiss@turing.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss)
|
|
write about the question of whether slats do or don't improve Cl (coefficient
|
|
of lift), in addition to affecting stall speed (critical angle of attack)...
|
|
|
|
I'd surmise that slats should increase Cl at any given AOA.
|
|
The reason should be that they should delay boundary layer
|
|
transitions (laminar-to-turbulent, turbulent-to-detached),
|
|
increasing the wing area that's working efficiently. It's
|
|
also true that this allows using a higher AOA, as noted by
|
|
Lars-Henrik Eriksson; deployment of slats (and flaps too)
|
|
DOES increase the AOA at which the wing achieves max Cl.
|
|
|
|
An exaggerated example of this is adding a jib to a sailboat
|
|
that formerly had only a mainsail. Adding even a small jib
|
|
improves the main's Cl substantially.
|
|
|
|
|
|
------------------
|
|
Paul Raveling
|
|
Raveling@Unify.com
|
|
|
|
|
|
From kls Sat Dec 12 00:06:27 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: barney@skat.usc.edu (Barney Lum)
|
|
Subject: Re: 737 Crash In Colorado Springs
|
|
X-Submission-Date: 11 Dec 1992 18:05:01 -0800
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.137@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.151@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: USC University Computing Services, Los Angeles
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <1gbhcdINN23m@sol.usc.edu>
|
|
Date: 12 Dec 92 00:06:27 PST
|
|
|
|
rbarnick@mitre.org (Barnick, R.) writes:
|
|
>In March 1991 a UAL 737 went down on final approach into COS. The final
|
|
>accident investigation report was released a couple of days ago and carried
|
|
>no cause.
|
|
[ ... possible "hushing of report" due to UA's situation with
|
|
gender/hiring/crewmember second-hand story by friend...]
|
|
|
|
>It seems odd that the final accident report that came out indeed did say
|
|
>nothing.
|
|
|
|
(the following is derived from UPI articles in The Wall Street Journal
|
|
and clari.news.aviation )
|
|
|
|
The final report issued by the National Transportation Safety Board
|
|
did not "say nothing", but rather was unable to come to a definite
|
|
conclusion as to the cause of the crash. However, it did indicate
|
|
two "most likely" events leading to the crash:
|
|
|
|
1) malfunction in the directional control system.
|
|
(The rudder is referenced, but could not be id'd as causal)
|
|
2) unusually severe atmospheric disturbance. (rotor)
|
|
|
|
The articles go on to say that it's the "first time since 1974 that the
|
|
board could not identify the cause of a major aviation accident."
|
|
|
|
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
>|
|
|
>| barney@usc.edu Barney@USCVM
|
|
--> --> --> | ======= --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
|
|
>| Permanent Student Pilot, On the Numbers
|
|
>|
|
|
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
From kls Sat Dec 12 00:06:28 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: weiss@curtiss.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss)
|
|
Subject: Re: hydraulic problems with DC-10s??
|
|
X-Submission-Date: 12 Dec 92 06:43:30 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.32@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.99@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.100@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.152@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: SEASnet, University of California, Los Angeles
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <8905@lee.SEAS.UCLA.EDU>
|
|
Date: 12 Dec 92 00:06:28 PST
|
|
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.100@ohare.Chicago.COM> greg@octopus.dpsi.com (Gregory R. Travis) writes:
|
|
>This is quite muddled though, as other anti-lift devices (such as spoilers)
|
|
>will deploy at a given amount of aileron deflection. In fact, and I don't
|
|
>have my DC-10 refs handy, I imagine that the ailerons on a -10 are locked
|
|
>in place when the flaps are up (not the case in the Chicago crash, I know)
|
|
|
|
Not true, at least in the case of the inboard ailerons. I still can remember
|
|
back in 1984 flying a DC-10 from LAX to HON, and noting that when the inboard
|
|
ailerons deflected to a certain point, the spoilers came up, too. I don't
|
|
remember about the outboards (at the time, the inboard ones were more
|
|
interesting to me).
|
|
|
|
>In any case, the ORIGINAL poster's position that the loss of an engine
|
|
>from a wing, considering the engine's moment and weight, would render the plane
|
|
>uncontrollable is not supported either by analysis or historic precedent.
|
|
|
|
And I stand (sit?) corrected on this issue. It struck me as an awfully large
|
|
moment at first (and second, and third) glance, but I didn't have any actual
|
|
weight numbers to compare. Now that I do, it makes perfect sense.
|
|
--
|
|
\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | /
|
|
- Michael weiss@seas.ucla.edu | School of Engineering & Applied Science -
|
|
- Weiss izzydp5@oac.ucla.edu | University of California, Los Angeles -
|
|
/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | \
|
|
|
|
From kls Sun Dec 13 12:14:14 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: Robert Dorsett <rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu>
|
|
Subject: Re: Airbus safety
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Sat, 12 Dec 92 6:35:56 CST
|
|
References: <1992Nov25.191925.27991@news.mentorg.com>
|
|
<airliners.1992.130@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
<airliners.1992.148@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.153@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Reply-To: rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <CMM.0.90.2.724163756.rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu>
|
|
Date: 13 Dec 92 12:14:14 PST
|
|
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.148@ohare.Chicago.COM> philip@rainbow.mentorg.com
|
|
(Philip Peake) writes:
|
|
|
|
> |> >If all new pilots were taught nothing but the side stick,
|
|
> |> >how long would the old arangementy last - and if the old arangement
|
|
> |>
|
|
> |> Why should pilots be taught nothing but a unique, *proprietary* side-stick
|
|
> |> design that no pilot had any experience with before four years ago, and
|
|
> |> which is only one of a variety of other possible designs?
|
|
>
|
|
> You are avoiding the question - read it again, the operative word is "if".
|
|
> I really don't think that a side-stick qualifies as "*proprietary*" does it ?
|
|
|
|
Not if one views it merely as a "substitute" interface. The A320 sidestick
|
|
is not a "parallel" substitute: it's a replacement design concept.
|
|
Besides the ergonomics, which raise their own issues, and which, as you note,
|
|
would be duplicated by just about any manufacturer attempting to develop its
|
|
own, it's what it DOES that determines its uniqueness.
|
|
|
|
For instance, some pilots seem to like a specific feature: pull straight
|
|
back on the stick to activate the TOGA mode. A few pilots *prefer* this to
|
|
the regular stick-throttle combination one would instinctively use in such
|
|
modes, despite the fact that if you did this on a "real" airplane, you'd
|
|
soon stall it.
|
|
|
|
So, should Boeing adopt this paradigm, if it goes to a sidestick design? This
|
|
is one of MANY unique characteristics that solely characterize *Airbus'*
|
|
sidestick. There are no official standards; no "sidestick specification" is
|
|
in the public record. The software is jealously guarded. If Boeing decides
|
|
to duplicate the stick concept, should it do so by examining operating manuals
|
|
and hope it catches most of the idiosyncrasies? Or should it run away with
|
|
the *idea*, and improve on it, offering its own version?
|
|
|
|
In many ways, what I fear is what happens with "consumer software." Take a
|
|
word processor, for instance: a simple idea, with *many* variations. Different
|
|
companies have different ways of looking at the same problem: indeed, none of
|
|
them may be a "best" solution. I don't think this comparison is off base:
|
|
Airbus has REPEATEDLY and PUBLICLY stated that its technology is its selling
|
|
point: to distinguish itself from Boeing, it MUST continue to do its own
|
|
thing.
|
|
|
|
The problem is that software is so much more easily changed than hardware,
|
|
that we could very well start an avionics equivalent of "creeping featurism."
|
|
Changing the way a stick behaves can be done in just one firmware update: no
|
|
need to develop new tooling, production techniques, train assemblers and
|
|
maintenance engineers, offer the retrofit during the next C check, etc.
|
|
Just the internal development process, which one can assume is faster and
|
|
cheaper than for hardware. But, by virtue of this ease, it's also more
|
|
*unstable* than hardware-based solutions.
|
|
|
|
Evidence to support this position? The A320 has about 4M of code. The A330/
|
|
A340, 10M. It's happening as we speak...
|
|
|
|
Do any Honeywell people reading know how big the 777 EFCS is going to be?
|
|
|
|
|
|
> Changing the subject slightly, the world's safest aircraft (Concorde) uses
|
|
> technology which was new, and for a time unacceptable to various licensing
|
|
> authorities - it didn't have a MECHANICAL link between the stick and the
|
|
> control
|
|
> surfaces - only hydraulic. There was *much* concern over this, and lots of
|
|
> reaction from the pilots and safety mob - they almost won, and the Concorde
|
|
> almost had to be produced with a mechanical linkage, which no FULL CREW would
|
|
> be able to budge one mm if they all tried together - in fact, the linkages
|
|
> would probably have failed, before it would have been possible to move a
|
|
> control surface, when moving at full speed.
|
|
|
|
I think you're overstating the situation considerably. Like they'd build
|
|
an unflyable mock-up? :-)
|
|
|
|
In the late 1950's and 1960's, there was considerable controversy over
|
|
hydraulics, much of it justified: there was a low confidence level among
|
|
pilots with conventional hydraulic systems. O-ring seals tended to break
|
|
down, and the systems were rather "leaky"; many a flight had at least a
|
|
partial failure. Pilots fully realized the benefits of hydraulics, and,
|
|
starting after the 707, accepted the desirability of flying by hydraulics.
|
|
However, what a lot of pilots wanted was a hybrid system, fly-by-cable,
|
|
COMBINED with hydraulic boost. So, for instance, the 727 was developed with
|
|
full-time hydraulic flight controls, but also a cable-driven "back-up" mode,
|
|
which used control tabs to aerodynamically move the surfaces. When hydraul-
|
|
ics were completely lost, controls became heavy, but the airplane had a
|
|
"get it on the ground" capability. The 727 was the last such airliner to
|
|
have this capability.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Much of the controversy surrounding the BIG airliners, such as the 747, but
|
|
even the 737, was that the manufacturers wanted to take away these tabs.
|
|
This debate was an important part of an industry-wide *process*, which helped
|
|
induce the manufacturers to develop more reliable systems: a 747 with the
|
|
hydraulics reliability of, say, a 707, would not have been acceptable. This
|
|
technological advance, combined with the *necessity* of using it in the
|
|
specified mission profiles, helped silence objections.
|
|
|
|
So Concorde certainly wasn't the first to go all-hydraulic, and the debate
|
|
didn't start there.
|
|
|
|
I can't comment on Concorde-ish control forces, but on even the 747, the
|
|
"raw" forces in cruise, while high, don't require superhuman effort: the
|
|
figures I've seen ranged from 50 lbs to 150 lbs. This would be unacceptable
|
|
for normal operations, but is hardly the equivalent of trying to lift a
|
|
ton of cement with one's little finger.
|
|
|
|
|
|
> As I said, it has proved to be the worlds' safest aircraft.
|
|
|
|
Sure, 14 airplanes, piloted by superbly qualified and trained aircrews,
|
|
with immaculate and detailed maintenance. Flying what, TWO flights a day (no,
|
|
not two per plane, two FLIGHTs, in the fleet) on 2 or so very well-defined
|
|
routes, to major international airports?
|
|
|
|
Concorde's an interesting experiment, but let's face it: its contribution is
|
|
merely that it can be done, not that it can be done economically, or, even,
|
|
safely, in the same types of conditions other airplanes are flown in. It is,
|
|
however, an engineering achievement that France and England can be proud of,
|
|
and I hope British Airways and Air France continue turning their Concorde
|
|
profits, if, for nothing else, the living history the airplane represents.
|
|
|
|
|
|
> I don't seem to have noticed any raving about the TGV, the latest versions of
|
|
> which achieve speeds comparable to that of aircraft, and use a side-stick ...
|
|
|
|
You will no doubt be DELIGHTED to note that I know nothing about trains.
|
|
Nor do I particularly care to learn. :-) My interest here is airliners, not
|
|
mass transportation. I'd suggest we compare standards within the genre.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Robert Dorsett
|
|
Internet: rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu
|
|
UUCP: ...cs.utexas.edu!rascal.ics.utexas.edu!rdd
|
|
|
|
From kls Sun Dec 13 12:14:17 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: Robert Dorsett <rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu>
|
|
Subject: A320 sidestick description + references (Re: Airbus safety)
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Sat, 12 Dec 92 6:44:02 CST
|
|
References: <1992Nov25.191925.27991@news.mentorg.com>
|
|
<8762@lee.SEAS.UCLA.EDU> <1992Dec01.173212.27936@news.mentorg.com>
|
|
<airliners.1992.130@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
<airliners.1992.147@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.154@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Reply-To: rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <CMM.0.90.2.724164242.rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu>
|
|
Date: 13 Dec 92 12:14:17 PST
|
|
|
|
|
|
In <airliners.1992.147@ohare.Chicago.COM> palmer@icat.larc.nasa.gov (Michael T. Palmer) writes:
|
|
|
|
> rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) writes:
|
|
> >On the A320, there is no interconnect between the
|
|
> >sidesticks: the captain can command a full-left in an emergency evasive
|
|
> >maneuver, the F/O full-right, and the net result will be an algebraically
|
|
> >added "zero."
|
|
|
|
> I believe this is incorrect, though I don't have the documentation here
|
|
> right now. My understanding is that whenever one of the sticks reaches
|
|
> a critical percentage of deflection (say, 75%), it becomes automatically
|
|
> the selected input device. At this point, the other control stick is
|
|
> ignored. So it's a race. Whoever slams their stick to the stops first
|
|
> wins, and the only way for the other crewmember to override is to physically
|
|
> attack the winner. Neat, huh?
|
|
|
|
I've looked into this closely. Unless there have been significant, recent
|
|
changes, it doesn't work this way (other designs do, though). Here's an
|
|
excerpt from the impending A320 paper that Pete Mellor and I are writing
|
|
("The A320 Electronic Flight Control System," title subject to change), which
|
|
might help clear things up.
|
|
|
|
I've inserted a couple of comments in brackets; these clarify passages,
|
|
based on respondent comments.
|
|
|
|
|
|
---------------------------
|
|
|
|
4.1. Sidesticks; [AIRB88, 1.09.20, 3-5; ZIE86, COR88]
|
|
|
|
The main flight control interface for the EFCS is one of two
|
|
"sidestick" controllers. Conventional airplanes have two "control
|
|
columns," mounted between each pilot's legs. The A320 does away with
|
|
these, and instead has sidesticks mounted on the side-walls of the
|
|
cockpit (incidentally resulting in outstanding pilot visibility of
|
|
flight instrumentation).
|
|
|
|
Conventional control devices reflect control forces to some degree.
|
|
This "feel" is usually either supplied aerodynamically by the airplane,
|
|
or, as in most airliners, via an artificial feed-back system. The
|
|
sidesticks on the A320 do not have artificial feel. On the A320,
|
|
springs are used to discourage abrupt control movements. Flight
|
|
control specialists seem to regard this as a valid "artificial"
|
|
feedback mechanism, but the point must be emphasized that the pilot is
|
|
only reacting to the qualities of the spring: no tactile feedback
|
|
relates to what the airplane may be doing (unlike a conventional
|
|
control system); thus, secondary cues, such as the design of the flight
|
|
displays, take on more importance.
|
|
|
|
[...]
|
|
|
|
Following are some of the force-characteristics of the sidesticks on
|
|
the A320 [adapted from COR86]:
|
|
|
|
Limits:
|
|
Roll
|
|
Pitch In Out
|
|
Max. load 10 daN 3 daN 2 daN
|
|
Threshold 0.5 daN 0.4 daN 0.4 daN
|
|
Deflection +-16 deg. 20 deg. 20 deg.
|
|
Orientation 20 deg fwd. 12 deg in 12 deg in.
|
|
|
|
Proper pilot arm position is important for proper use of the sidestick.
|
|
[actually, not that important: an early concern that proved unjustified]
|
|
Thus, Airbus has included a fully-adjustable seat-arm, which features
|
|
an LCD readout for arm angle. A pilot entering an aircraft need only
|
|
remember his optimal settings, and set them up. The arm-rest rest
|
|
position may be changed within an interval of [+20,-15] degrees.
|
|
Supporting arm position may be adapted in the interval of [+15, -12]
|
|
degrees.
|
|
|
|
The sidesticks are not mechanically interconnected: inputs to one can't
|
|
be felt on the other. Their inputs are algebraically added, with a
|
|
maximum limit corresponding to the maximum deflection of one sidestick.
|
|
No weight is given to the captain. Thus, if the captain pulls full
|
|
left, and his first officer pulls full right, the net effect is zero.
|
|
The last pilot to click on an override thumb-button (also used to
|
|
disconnect the autopilot) obtains control: a small indicator light in
|
|
front of the other pilot signals this fact. The potential exists for
|
|
the pilots to "fight" over control of the sidesticks. Rather than the
|
|
"strongest" pilot winning, the one with the fastest thumb will win. If
|
|
the override button is held down for more than 30 seconds, it will
|
|
"deactivate" the other sidestick. If the deactivated sidestick's
|
|
override button is pushed, it will re-activate.
|
|
|
|
This scheme has been the subject of much criticism from pilots: it is
|
|
widely felt that one pilot should feel what the other pilot is up to,
|
|
through the stick. Inter-pilot communication in an emergency may also
|
|
be enhanced through better tactile feedback [PIK88, HEL86, SUM87].
|
|
|
|
Note that there is no trim control on the sidestick, since this is
|
|
normally handled by the Normal and Alternate control laws (see below).
|
|
In Direct law, pitch [trim!] must be set through controls on the center
|
|
control pedestal.
|
|
|
|
The only other button, besides the override switch, is a push-to-talk
|
|
trigger, for the radios.
|
|
|
|
The sidesticks are not merely a different interface, otherwise causing
|
|
the same functional effects as a conventional airplane. The pilot's
|
|
role in flight management is fundamentally changed, depending upon the
|
|
mode the flight control computers are in. For example, in Normal Law,
|
|
which is what the airplane is normally flown in (see below, 5.1), in
|
|
a turn, a pilot must normally pull back on the stick, to compensate for
|
|
lost lift. On the A320, this is not necessary: the pilot just moves
|
|
the stick in the direction he wishes to turn, and the airplane will
|
|
turn, automatically supplying the necessary elevator to maintain
|
|
altitude [HOP87]. The sidestick is more of a "flight path command"
|
|
interface, rather than a conventional "flight control surface
|
|
deflection" interface. If, that is, the appropriate computer support
|
|
is there: if not, the same sidesticks are used with one of the other
|
|
"redundant" control laws, which are much more conventional in design.
|
|
This raises an interesting issue of whether a pilot, who, with a
|
|
properly-functioning system, will fly in "Normal" law almost all the
|
|
time, will be "current" enough to satisfactorily fly the airplane in a
|
|
significantly degraded mode, more akin to conventional control laws.
|
|
This issue is addressed in training, not the interface.
|
|
|
|
AIRB88 Airbus Industrie/Aeroformation, Flight Crew Operating
|
|
Manual, 1988.
|
|
|
|
COR88 S. G. Corps, "Airbus A320 side stick and flyPbyPwirePPan
|
|
update," Society of Automotive Engineers Paper 861801. [Very GOOD
|
|
paper]
|
|
|
|
HEL86 Peter H. Heldt, "Airline requirements on a fly-by-wire
|
|
aircraft--a pilot's view," Society of Automotive Engineers paper 861804.
|
|
[so-so]
|
|
|
|
HOP87 Harry Hopkins, "Simulating the A320," Flight International,
|
|
12 September 1987. [good article, weak on this issue]
|
|
|
|
PIK88 J. R. Pike, "A320 in service--initial report," British Air
|
|
Line Pilots Association, July 31, 1988. [extensive comments]
|
|
|
|
SUM87 L.G. Summers, et. al., "Fly-by-wire sidestick controller
|
|
evaluation," a paper presented at the SAE Aerospace Technology
|
|
Conference and Exposition, Oct. 5-8, 1987. [ this is a decent overview
|
|
of the MANY options available ]
|
|
|
|
ZIE86 Bernard Ziegler, "Front seat on the future," Aerospace
|
|
America, April 1986. [nicely-illustrated pap]
|
|
|
|
|
|
----------------------
|
|
|
|
How accurate is all this? Besides the cited sources, I've run into
|
|
several other comments on the "algebraic" nature of the sidesticks.
|
|
I haven't tried a neutral deflection in a simulator, but a recent email
|
|
comment indicated that pilots, while trying to avoid an aircraft on the
|
|
ground, commanded opposite inputs, thus leaving the flight path
|
|
unchanged. If true, this would also tend to support the "algebraic,"
|
|
additive nature of inputs.
|
|
|
|
In addition, of the A320 pilots who have reviewed the paper thus far,
|
|
none have contested this point. One pilot did raise the issue that
|
|
later transition work isn't as difficult as might be gathered from the
|
|
last paragraph. So far, this is a minority viewpoint.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Robert Dorsett
|
|
Internet: rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu
|
|
UUCP: ...cs.utexas.edu!rascal.ics.utexas.edu!rdd
|
|
|
|
From kls Sun Dec 13 12:14:17 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: Christopher Davis <ckd@eff.org>
|
|
Subject: Hysterical movie goof
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Sat, 12 Dec 1992 16:11:38 -0500
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.155@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <199212122111.AA26421@loiosh.eff.org>
|
|
Date: 13 Dec 92 12:14:17 PST
|
|
|
|
I was just watching a movie on TV ("Gotcha"). One of the characters
|
|
flew to Paris, and there was the obligatory "airplane landing" shot to
|
|
establish that he "really flew" there...
|
|
|
|
...on an Air France Cargo 747. (The side titles very clearly had three
|
|
words, though the last was hard to read; however, the "under-nose"
|
|
titles indicated the 747 cargo variant with a nose door.)
|
|
|
|
Wonder what the in-flight meal was...
|
|
|
|
From kls Sun Dec 13 18:07:13 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: ctillier@phoenix.princeton.edu (Clemens Emmanuel Tillier)
|
|
Subject: Re: Control Sticks (was Re: Airbus safety)
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Sun, 13 Dec 1992 13:01:53 GMT
|
|
References: <1992Nov25.191925.27991@news.mentorg.com> <airliners.1992.130@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.148@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.156@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Princeton University
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <1992Dec13.130153.3984@Princeton.EDU>
|
|
Date: 13 Dec 92 18:07:13 PST
|
|
|
|
philip@rainbow.mentorg.com (Philip Peake) writes:
|
|
|
|
(discussion about control technologies deleted)
|
|
|
|
>I don't seem to have noticed any raving about the TGV, the latest versions of
|
|
>which achieve speeds comparable to that of aircraft, and use a side-stick ...
|
|
>(yes, I know, French again ...) There is MUCH more prior art in train design,
|
|
>and they can write off considerably more people than even a fully loaded 747/400
|
|
>if something goes drastically wrong.
|
|
>
|
|
>Philip
|
|
|
|
This may be a little bit off the subject, but I think comparison with the TGV
|
|
is unwarranted. The engineer in a train has control over only one degree of
|
|
freedom of motion; the pilot in an aircraft has control over all three. It is
|
|
therefore not surprising that entrusting so much control to one component will
|
|
cause some questions.
|
|
Besides, the TGV is utterly devoid of any control sticks... It uses the same
|
|
throttle control as previous French locomotives (a horizontal wheel).
|
|
Commercial TGV speed (300 kph) is not quite comparable to airliner speed. The
|
|
maximum speed ever achieved by a TGV (515 kph) is also lower.
|
|
|
|
Clem <ctillier@phoenix.princeton.edu>
|
|
|
|
From kls Sun Dec 13 18:07:14 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: weinss@rpi.edu (Stephen Andrew Weinstein)
|
|
Subject: Re: Hysterical movie goof
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Sun, 13 Dec 1992 22:28:11 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.155@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.157@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy NY
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <+-j2lnh@rpi.edu>
|
|
Date: 13 Dec 92 18:07:14 PST
|
|
|
|
At one time (i.e. 1st half of 20th century ?), it was common for
|
|
people flying between places without regular comercial airline service to
|
|
hitch rides with either cargo or military planes.
|
|
Scientists going to Antartica still do this and reporters needing
|
|
local transportation in Vietnam when roads were closed did during the war
|
|
there. (In 'Nam, helicopters were more common though because it was too
|
|
expensive to build a runway that might get blown up.)
|
|
|
|
Stephen Weinstein
|
|
weinss@rpi.edu
|
|
I will be away from the net and e-mail 12/17-1/10.
|
|
If more college students voted (and could afford lobbyists), there would
|
|
be more financial aid.
|
|
|
|
From kls Mon Dec 14 14:11:42 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett)
|
|
Subject: Yet more on the El Al crash
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Mon, 14 Dec 92 00:56:54 CST
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.158@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <9212140656.AA22726@cactus.org>
|
|
Date: 14 Dec 92 14:11:42 PST
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Today, I ran across a copy of a real, live, 747-200 Airplane Flight Manual.
|
|
The AFM is the manufacturer's legal statement of airplane capabilities; it
|
|
is custom-outfitted for each customer configuration, must be kept up to date,
|
|
and is kept in the actual airplane: it's the bottom line for normal
|
|
operations, , "outranking" even normal pilot Operations Manuals, which
|
|
present processed data, based on the AFM, in a more user-friendly format.
|
|
|
|
It contained some information which might be of interest to the net,
|
|
particularly given the impression some people seemed to have of the
|
|
ramifications of a two-engine failure. I'm also referring to the AvLeak
|
|
of October 12 for particulars on the flight.
|
|
|
|
The manual describes a 747-200, with CF6-50E engines, which produce a
|
|
static thrust of ~52,000 lbs. The El Al airplane was powered with JT9D-7J's,
|
|
which produce ~50,000 lbs of thrust). So it's not entirely applicable to
|
|
the El Al crash, and I emphasize that the following is simply a "what-if,"
|
|
using the crash profile. We'll use a basic operating weight empty of 170,000
|
|
kgs, and the actual cargo load of 114,000 kg and the fuel load of 70,000 kgs.
|
|
That gives us a gross weight of 354,000 kgs.
|
|
|
|
The crash airplane achieved a maximum altitude of 5000' at 285 knots. It later
|
|
achieved a maximum airspeed of 313 knots at 4900'. About six minutes after
|
|
the initial failure, the captain reported problems with flaps. By the time
|
|
the plane had descended to 2900', 25 seconds later, the crew issued a mayday
|
|
call, indicating they were losing control; impact was 45 seconds after that.
|
|
The slowest airspeed the airplane attained was 260 knots or so.
|
|
|
|
The AFM gives some information that wasn't available during the original
|
|
discussion.
|
|
|
|
Such as:
|
|
|
|
- 2-engine operation is *certainly* an in-envelope contingency.
|
|
- It is possible to maintain altitude at up to 360,000 kgs.
|
|
|
|
Some numbers. Draw your own conclusions: again, we're talking a different
|
|
airplane, with different thrust capabilities.
|
|
|
|
1. Placarded flap speed limits. We can assume that if the crash airplane
|
|
was following these limits, it was at flaps-up by the time the failure
|
|
occurred.
|
|
|
|
1 275 knots
|
|
5 250 knots
|
|
10 238 knots
|
|
20 231 knots
|
|
25 205 knots
|
|
|
|
2. Gear-up stall speeds at 355,000 kgs:
|
|
|
|
Flaps Speed
|
|
1 203 knots
|
|
5 153 knots
|
|
10 150 knots
|
|
20 144 knots
|
|
|
|
25 124 knots (landing flaps: assumes weight is down to 295,000 kgs).
|
|
|
|
3. At 355,000 kgs, *with two engines out*, our -200 would have been able
|
|
to maintain level flight. It should also have been able to establish a climb
|
|
gradient of 0.4% (175 ft./min) at 280 knots, the prescribed en route climb
|
|
speed for this condition.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
Robert Dorsett
|
|
rdd@cactus.org
|
|
...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd
|
|
|
|
From kls Mon Dec 14 14:11:43 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: palmer@icat.larc.nasa.gov (Michael T. Palmer)
|
|
Subject: Re: A320 sidestick description + references (Re: Airbus safety)
|
|
X-Submission-Date: 14 Dec 92 11:56:02 GMT
|
|
References: <1992Nov25.191925.27991@news.mentorg.com> <8762@lee.SEAS.UCLA.EDU> <1992Dec01.173212.27936@news.mentorg.com> <airliners.1992.130@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.147@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.154@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.159@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA USA
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <palmer.724334162@news.larc.nasa.gov>
|
|
Date: 14 Dec 92 14:11:43 PST
|
|
|
|
Robert Dorsett <rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu> writes:
|
|
|
|
>In <airliners.1992.147@ohare.Chicago.COM> palmer@icat.larc.nasa.gov (Michael T. Palmer) writes:
|
|
|
|
>> rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) writes:
|
|
>> >On the A320, there is no interconnect between the
|
|
>> >sidesticks: the captain can command a full-left in an emergency evasive
|
|
>> >maneuver, the F/O full-right, and the net result will be an algebraically
|
|
>> >added "zero."
|
|
|
|
>> I believe this is incorrect, though I don't have the documentation here
|
|
>> right now. My understanding is that whenever one of the sticks reaches
|
|
>> a critical percentage of deflection (say, 75%), it becomes automatically
|
|
>> the selected input device. At this point, the other control stick is
|
|
>> ignored. So it's a race. Whoever slams their stick to the stops first
|
|
>> wins, and the only way for the other crewmember to override is to physically
|
|
>> attack the winner. Neat, huh?
|
|
|
|
>I've looked into this closely. Unless there have been significant, recent
|
|
>changes, it doesn't work this way (other designs do, though). Here's an
|
|
>excerpt from the impending A320 paper that Pete Mellor and I are writing
|
|
>("The A320 Electronic Flight Control System," title subject to change), which
|
|
>might help clear things up.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Okee dokee. You're right; I must have been remembering the specs for a
|
|
different system. I can now recall the stories about the thumb switch for
|
|
overriding the other stick (my officemate and some of our test pilots
|
|
participated in a week of A320 training down in Florida last year). Their
|
|
reaction to it sparked quite a lengthy debate about the various sidestick
|
|
implementations.
|
|
|
|
Personally, the lack of feedback about what the other crewmember is doing
|
|
is just astounding. Does nobody remember their flight training?!? How
|
|
do you think your instructors (or YOU, if you teach) were able to know what
|
|
you were doing even before the aircraft responded to your inputs? Tactile
|
|
feedback can be a powerful and rich source of information.
|
|
|
|
And when, pray tell, would an algebraic sum of the control inputs be the
|
|
desired method of responding to the flight crew's actions? Did the
|
|
designers think that the pilots would agree that the captain would only
|
|
move his stick left/right and the first officer only fore/aft? "I'll be
|
|
the base of the triangle, you be the height, and we'll let the EFCS do the
|
|
hypoteneuse!" (For those with a math/statics background: "I'll be the
|
|
i, you be the j, and we'll let the EFCS do the resultant vector!").
|
|
|
|
My point is that if the crewmembers are trying to do something different,
|
|
the system should make that MORE not LESS visible. Otherwise, when the
|
|
aircraft does not respond as they expect it to, each crewmember will simply
|
|
increase the magnitude of his control input without really understanding
|
|
what the h--- is going on. I guess this is what Reason would identify as
|
|
a "latent system error." The pilots will eventually make an error; yep,
|
|
the designers made sure of that.
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Michael T. Palmer, M/S 152, NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA 23681
|
|
Voice: 804-864-2044, FAX: 804-864-7793, Email: m.t.palmer@larc.nasa.gov
|
|
PGP 2.0 Public Key now available -- Consider it an envelope for your e-mail
|
|
|
|
From kls Mon Dec 14 14:11:44 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: ncole@nyx.cs.du.edu (Noah Cole)
|
|
Subject: Re: Hysterical movie goof
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Mon, 14 Dec 92 04:11:44 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.155@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.160@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Macalester College, St. Paul Minnesota USA
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <1992Dec14.041144.7723@mnemosyne.cs.du.edu>
|
|
Date: 14 Dec 92 14:11:44 PST
|
|
|
|
ckd@eff.org (Christopher Davis) writes:
|
|
|
|
>I was just watching a movie on TV ("Gotcha"). One of the characters
|
|
>flew to Paris, and there was the obligatory "airplane landing" shot to
|
|
>establish that he "really flew" there...
|
|
|
|
>...on an Air France Cargo 747. (The side titles very clearly had three
|
|
>words, though the last was hard to read; however, the "under-nose"
|
|
>titles indicated the 747 cargo variant with a nose door.)
|
|
|
|
I think that it would be interesting to list all of the errors that TV and Film
|
|
writers make in the airline/avation market. For example, on Dir Hard II many
|
|
of the flights were not wide-bodied flights that came from the West VCoast
|
|
etc..
|
|
Anyone else seen things like this in films?
|
|
|
|
-MN, er Noah Cole
|
|
--
|
|
Noah Cole "Outside is America, NCOLE@MACALSTR.EDU
|
|
Macalester College and also the car park" ncole@nyx.cs.du.edu
|
|
St. Paul, MN 55105 - Bono, 27 December 1989 cncole@coos.dartmouth.edu
|
|
612-696-7388 Dublin aj909@cleveland.freenet.edu
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 15 00:13:24 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett)
|
|
Subject: Errata (Re: A320 sidestick description + references)
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Mon, 14 Dec 92 20:55:35 CST
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.161@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <9212150255.AA13063@cactus.org>
|
|
Date: 15 Dec 92 00:13:24 PST
|
|
|
|
|
|
I thought I had caught most of these, but someone pointed them out:
|
|
|
|
1. A "daN" is a deca Newton, or 2.248 lbs. Airbus's main redeeming feature
|
|
is that it's gone SI.
|
|
|
|
2. The "thumb-override" design means the guy with the *slowest* thumb will
|
|
win, in the final estimation, not the fastest. Then again, if we really
|
|
did have a thumb-war, the next guy would be fast to hit it again; I believe
|
|
that's what I was thinking when I originally wrote the sentence. Apologies
|
|
for any confusion this caused.
|
|
|
|
3. The comments on the necessity of applying back-stick in a turn were
|
|
ambiguous. I was using as an example a situation of an airplane, straight
|
|
and level. Suppose you're in a conventional airplane. You want to turn.
|
|
You'd turn the wheel. This causes the airplane to bank. However, this
|
|
decreases the net lift vector, which means the airplane will also descend.
|
|
To counteract this effect, you'd apply slight back-stick, to command up-
|
|
elevator, thus a greater angle of attack, thus more lift, to maintain level
|
|
flight in the turn. It's all very coordinated, very natural.
|
|
|
|
On the A320, one would simply use the stick to command a yaw. The system
|
|
automagically applies the appropriate elevator correction to maintain the
|
|
ancipated flight-path. If the pilot were to command any pitch-up, the
|
|
airplane would CLIMB in the turn.
|
|
|
|
This takes place in "Normal" law, the default flight mode. This is not
|
|
"normal" as in "conventional": that's the "Direct" law, which is also the
|
|
landing mode, so as to allow the pilot to handle a cross-wind landing and
|
|
flare properly.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If there are any more ways I can make this more confusing, please let me know.
|
|
:-)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
Robert Dorsett
|
|
rdd@cactus.org
|
|
...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 15 00:13:28 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz)
|
|
Subject: Re: Hysterical movie goof
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Tue, 15 Dec 1992 07:33:23 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.155@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.160@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.162@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Chicago Software Works
|
|
X-Submission-Message-ID: <1992Dec15.073323.297@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 15 Dec 92 00:13:28 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.160@ohare.Chicago.COM> ncole@nyx.cs.du.edu (Noah Cole) writes:
|
|
|
|
>I think that it would be interesting to list all of the errors that
|
|
>TV and Film writers make in the airline/avation market.
|
|
|
|
I agree. But TV and film is a bit far afield from airliners; perhaps
|
|
rec.arts.movies would be a better place. If someone compiles a list
|
|
I'll consider it as for sci.aeronautics.airliners.
|
|
|
|
One bit of film goof trivia that perhaps *is* directly relavnt to
|
|
airliners is in United's safety video. As has been mentioned else-
|
|
where on Usenet, the shot of folks sliding down the emergency slides
|
|
in the DC-10 version depicts a 747, as can be identified by the doors
|
|
and the fact that they open out to the side, not inside and up. The
|
|
757 appears to use the same shot (awfully high up and it doesn't look
|
|
like a narrow-body aircraft).
|
|
|
|
One question I've had about this film, besides where they could find
|
|
a flight attendent or model who could smile so continuously, is what
|
|
type of aircraft the opener of the cockpit was taken on. I always
|
|
manage to think about it when the scene is almost over.
|
|
|
|
>For example, on Dir Hard II many of the flights were not wide-bodied
|
|
>flights that came from the West VCoast etc..
|
|
|
|
Are you suggesting that all flights from the West Coast are wide
|
|
bodies? That's hardly the case, of course.
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com
|
|
1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls
|
|
|Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA
|
|
Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 15 00:13:29 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz)
|
|
Subject: Re: Safety and design rankings (was Re: Flight controls)
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Tue, 15 Dec 1992 08:11:13 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.131@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.138@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.144@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.163@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Chicago Software Works
|
|
X-Submission-Message-ID: <1992Dec15.081113.632@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 15 Dec 92 00:13:29 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.144@ohare.Chicago.COM> rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu writes:
|
|
|
|
>> Is the MD-11 comparable to the 747-400 in this regard? I would assume
|
|
>> so since they are of comparable vintage.
|
|
|
|
>I would suggest not: the former is more of a derivative, the latter more of
|
|
>a new type, with its new wing (which was designed to support the all-upper-
|
|
>deck concept, plus maybe one more derivative after that) ...
|
|
|
|
My understanding was that the 747-400 does *not* have a new wing but
|
|
rather a tweaked version of the original. I recall some statement
|
|
from Boeing regarding the lack of winglets on the 777, which noted
|
|
that the 777 had a new wing and starting from a clean slate it was
|
|
more efficient to not have them, whereas working from an existing
|
|
design as with the 747-400 it was helpful to have them.
|
|
|
|
>... electrical system, extensive use of composites, new APU, etc.
|
|
|
|
Hmmm ... sounds a lot like the MD-11 as well the 747-400.
|
|
|
|
>My PERSONAL mental "ranking" of the sophistication of these airplanes is
|
|
>about:
|
|
|
|
...
|
|
|
|
> FMS only, varying or no glass, no standards
|
|
> |
|
|
> 747-300,737-300,-400,-500, MD-8X, F.100
|
|
|
|
What I've seen suggests the F.100 is quite advanced, probably not far
|
|
behind the A320 and perhaps closer to the Airbus philosophy than to
|
|
Boeing's.
|
|
|
|
> INS/PMS, conventional otherwise
|
|
|
|
Ok, I'll risk it ... what's PMS? (We're talking about airplanes!)
|
|
|
|
> two-man | three-man
|
|
> DC-9,737-100,737-200<-----|
|
|
|
|
Every first-generation 737 I've seen has a third seat for the flight
|
|
engineer. I believe this was one of the selling points of the DC-9
|
|
over the 737.
|
|
|
|
>The FMS's used on these airplanes are generally done by Honeywell, except
|
|
>that Boeing's using Smiths Industries for the 737, for some reason.
|
|
|
|
Boeing recently made a substantial change to the FMS on new 737s, and
|
|
offers a retrofit kit for older new-generation 737s. I believe this
|
|
was a replacement ... perhaps away from Smiths? Having observed the
|
|
trials and tribulations of friends with MGs and their Smiths electrics
|
|
I'm not enthusiastic about a Smiths FMS! :-)
|
|
|
|
>LASTLY, note that the manufacturers are MUCH more assertive about preventing
|
|
>customers customizing their cockpits. This really got out of hand ...
|
|
|
|
I've always wondered just what the flight engineer really does on a
|
|
767 equipped for three flight crew. I believe QANTAS does this.
|
|
Also, some A310s lack the FFCS (Forward Facing Crew Cockpit) having
|
|
instead what I assume is a cockpit more like an older A300. All of
|
|
these are due primarily to union/labor pressures.
|
|
|
|
>Performance is now ensured by legal contract, rather than design,
|
|
>with the dollar being the bottom line.
|
|
|
|
Well, mandated, at least, if not ensured.
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com
|
|
1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls
|
|
|Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA
|
|
Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Dec 16 04:19:47 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: gregory@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Greg Wright)
|
|
Subject: Re: Yet more on the El Al crash
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Tue, 15 Dec 1992 20:15:58 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.158@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.164@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Boeing
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <BzBHMM.2np@bcstec.ca.boeing.com>
|
|
Date: 16 Dec 92 04:19:47 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.158@ohare.Chicago.COM> rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) writes:
|
|
>
|
|
>The manual describes a 747-200, with CF6-50E engines, which produce a
|
|
>static thrust of ~52,000 lbs. The El Al airplane was powered with JT9D-7J's,
|
|
>which produce ~50,000 lbs of thrust). So it's not entirely applicable to
|
|
>the El Al crash, and I emphasize that the following is simply a "what-if,"
|
|
|
|
There is also a difference in engine mountings, fairings, and low speed
|
|
behavior. You could find a significant change in CLmax because of these
|
|
things.
|
|
|
|
>
|
|
>---
|
|
>Robert Dorsett
|
|
>rdd@cactus.org
|
|
>...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd
|
|
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
________Greg Wright____________ "I struggle to be brief
|
|
| gregory@bcstec.ca.boeing.com | and become obscure."
|
|
| gregory@halcyon.com |
|
|
|____uunet!bcstec!gregory_______| NOT A BOEING SPOKESPERSON.
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Dec 16 04:19:48 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: John DiMarco <jdd@cdf.toronto.edu>
|
|
Subject: Economics of new vs. older planes
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Tue, 15 Dec 1992 15:32:59 -0500
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.165@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <92Dec15.153313est.30980@marvin.cdf.toronto.edu>
|
|
Date: 16 Dec 92 04:19:48 PST
|
|
|
|
I understand there's an airfield in Arizona where unused airliners are parked
|
|
for extended periods. I'm wondering, considering the economic doldrums
|
|
most airline companies seem to be in, why these planes are not put into
|
|
use in lieu of buying new ones?
|
|
|
|
The answer, I think, would depend on the difference in operating costs between
|
|
new and older planes. Could someone with a better understanding of these issues
|
|
shed some light on this? Solid numbers (eg. purchase prices of new vs. used
|
|
planes, fuel consumption differences, etc.) would be highly appreciated.
|
|
|
|
Thanks,
|
|
|
|
John
|
|
--
|
|
John DiMarco jdd@cdf.toronto.edu
|
|
Computing Disciplines Facility Systems Manager jdd@cdf.utoronto.ca
|
|
University of Toronto EA201B,(416)978-1928
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Dec 16 04:19:48 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners,rec.aviation.simulators
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: gary@maestro.mitre.org (Gary Bisaga)
|
|
Subject: Simulation software for transport category aircraft
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Tue, 15 Dec 1992 21:31:11 GMT
|
|
References: <1992Dec11.033041.4518@nmsu.edu>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.166@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Reply-To: gbisaga@mitre.org
|
|
Organization: The Mitre Corporation, McLean Virginia
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <1992Dec15.213111.296@linus.mitre.org>
|
|
Date: 16 Dec 92 04:19:48 PST
|
|
|
|
I am looking for some real-time flight simulation software for commercial
|
|
transport category aircraft, preferably public domain. It can run on
|
|
most any kind of Unix platform (we use Sun, SGI, HP, IBM) or DOS. It
|
|
need not have any graphical output (out the window, avionics, etc.) as
|
|
we have existing software to provide all of those functions, but it does
|
|
need a couple of things:
|
|
1) Relatively realistic (simple 6dof?) equations that can support commercial
|
|
airliner-type flight models
|
|
2) Autoflight system including:
|
|
a) At a minimum, inner loop auto-pitch/roll/throttle control
|
|
b) Much better, outer loop altitude/heading/VS capture
|
|
c) Preferably VOR/LOC/APP tracking loop
|
|
3) Flight model to go with all this
|
|
|
|
We have looked at point-mass models and they can do many things but we
|
|
need to be able to hand-fly with or without FD for certain operations.
|
|
(Obviously FD was not included in the above list because we can easily
|
|
develop that given the pitch/roll commands and other software we have.)
|
|
|
|
Any information is much appreciated.
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Gary Bisaga (gbisaga@mitre.org, 703-883-5543)
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Dec 16 04:19:49 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard)
|
|
Subject: Re: Northwest cancels Airbus
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 16 Dec 1992 02:37:14 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.109@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.110@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.167@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Boeing
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <BzBzA3.EC@bcstec.ca.boeing.com>
|
|
Date: 16 Dec 92 04:19:49 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.110@ohare.Chicago.COM> hoyme@src.honeywell.com (Ken Hoyme) writes:
|
|
|
|
[much deleted material about the NWA/Airbus cancelations]
|
|
|
|
>.... (But then, NWA is already
|
|
>deeply in debt to Airbus, since they decided to buy A320s based on a
|
|
>dynamite financing package that Boeing could not match.)
|
|
|
|
We here at Boeing also like to think that the Northwest, and the United,
|
|
purchase of the A320 were both driven by financial considerations only.
|
|
Not true. The plain facts are that the A320 flies higher, faster, and
|
|
farther than the competing Boeing 737-400 while carrying a heavier load and
|
|
burning less gas to boot. That isn't fuel per seat, that is trip fuel.
|
|
Northwest's decision, as noted by their VP of Finance a couple of months
|
|
ago, was based on superior performance and a higher acquisition cost than
|
|
that of the 737. United came to pretty much the same conclusion.
|
|
|
|
None of the above is intended to make little of the financial implications
|
|
of each of those deals, just put it in a technical frame of reference.
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Terry
|
|
drinkard@bcstec.boeing.com
|
|
"Anyone who thinks they can hold the company responsible for what I say has
|
|
more lawyers than sense."
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Dec 16 04:19:50 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard)
|
|
Subject: Re: hydraulic problems with DC-10's??
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 16 Dec 1992 02:50:15 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.85@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.92@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.106@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.168@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Boeing
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <BzBzvt.vo@bcstec.ca.boeing.com>
|
|
Date: 16 Dec 92 04:19:50 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.106@ohare.Chicago.COM> weiss@ada.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss) writes:
|
|
|
|
[Much aero-techie argument deleted]
|
|
|
|
>In any case, my point is that there would have been a severe weight unbalance
|
|
>between the wings, and I have doubts that it could have been countered by the
|
|
>ailerons. The whole reason that there was a negative roll moment was that the
|
|
>left wing STALLED, not that it lost lift directly from the retracting slats.
|
|
>I'm still not convinced that even WITH the slats extended it could have been
|
|
>prevented.
|
|
|
|
As one gentleman pointed out earlier, there is a history of airplanes
|
|
losing engines and remaining perfectly controllable. A 737-200 lost one, I
|
|
believe it was the #2, on takeoff just last week. It impacted along the side
|
|
of the runway, the airplane turned around without further incident and
|
|
landed safely. While certainly not as common as an airline misplacing your
|
|
luggage :-), engine departures do happen and the airplanes do tend to land
|
|
without further damage or excitement.
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Terry
|
|
drinkard@bcstec.boeing.com
|
|
"Anyone who thinks they can hold the company responsible for what I say has
|
|
more lawyers than sense."
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Dec 16 04:19:50 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard)
|
|
Subject: Re: Northwest cancels Airbus
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 16 Dec 1992 02:59:37 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.109@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.110@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.114@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.169@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Boeing
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <BzC0BF.184@bcstec.ca.boeing.com>
|
|
Date: 16 Dec 92 04:19:50 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.114@ohare.Chicago.COM> rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu writes:
|
|
>
|
|
>It'll be interesting to see what ramifications this has on the UAL deal:
|
|
>did United plan on using Airbus/NWA North American facilities?
|
|
>
|
|
It is my understanding from chatting with the maintenance engineers at UAL
|
|
on separate occassions that UAL is forming an A320 maintenance group (I
|
|
have a resume in, therefore might not be considered an unbiased observer)
|
|
which may be based at their new maintenance facility in Indianapolis.
|
|
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Terry
|
|
drinkard@bcstec.boeing.com
|
|
"Anyone who thinks they can hold the company responsible for what I say has
|
|
more lawyers than sense."
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Dec 16 04:47:56 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: Karl Swartz <kls@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Subject: archive of articles (and other stuff) now available
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 16 Dec 92 4:40:07 PST
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.170@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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X-Submission-Message-Id: <m0n1y2r-0000SCC@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Date: 16 Dec 92 04:47:56 PST
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|
|
|
A first pass at an Airliners ftp archive is now available on
|
|
ftp.eff.org, thanks to Helen Rose <hrose@eff.org>. Access is via the
|
|
usual anonymous ftp; the following files are in the /pub/airliners
|
|
directory:
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|
|
|
archive-1992.Z (187393 bytes)
|
|
|
|
A compressed mail folder of the first 160 articles
|
|
posted to sci.aeronautics.airliners. (The last was
|
|
dated December 14, 1992.)
|
|
|
|
Next month, hopefully, the archive will be updated
|
|
as soon as articles are posted, but for now this is
|
|
being done by hand when the mood strikes. :-)
|
|
|
|
boeing-code (6726 bytes)
|
|
|
|
A list of Boeing customer codes -- the xx part of a
|
|
designation such as 747-2xxB.
|
|
|
|
specifications (1776 bytes)
|
|
|
|
Some e-scribblings of mine showing various useful
|
|
parameters of some airliners, from which I computed
|
|
the power/weight ratios discussed a few weeks ago.
|
|
Hopefully this will evolve (or be replaced) into a
|
|
complete reference.
|
|
|
|
Again, this is a first pass, mainly to get something out for some
|
|
folks who wanted it before the holidays. In the next month or two
|
|
real-time archives of the newsgroup will be implemented, as will
|
|
several other sites. More reference data will be made available
|
|
as well.
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com
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|
1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls
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|
|Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA
|
|
Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Dec 16 14:00:40 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: Robert Dorsett <rdd@cactus.org>
|
|
Subject: Re: Safety and design rankings (was Re: Flight controls)
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 16 Dec 92 6:03:09 CST
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.138@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
<airliners.1992.144@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
<airliners.1992.163@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.171@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Reply-To: rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <CMM.0.90.2.724507389.rdd@cactus.org>
|
|
Date: 16 Dec 92 14:00:40 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.163@ohare.Chicago.COM> kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Sw
|
|
artz) writes:
|
|
>In article <airliners.1992.144@ohare.Chicago.COM> rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu wri
|
|
tes:
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|
>My understanding was that the 747-400 does *not* have a new wing but
|
|
>rather a tweaked version of the original.
|
|
|
|
There were significant changes in structure and composition, plus the
|
|
addition of the wingtip extensions and the winglets. As I understand it,
|
|
the new wing is intended to support both the 747-400 and a full-upper-
|
|
deck 747-500.
|
|
|
|
|
|
>I recall some statement
|
|
>from Boeing regarding the lack of winglets on the 777, which noted
|
|
>that the 777 had a new wing and starting from a clean slate it was
|
|
>more efficient to not have them, whereas working from an existing
|
|
>design as with the 747-400 it was helpful to have them.
|
|
|
|
One doesn't really relate to the other: the 777 has a high-aspect-ratio
|
|
wing, reducing drag in its long-range profile. The drag reduction is
|
|
what the winglets were purportedly for; the 777 will achieve a better
|
|
effect, naturally.
|
|
|
|
|
|
>> INS/PMS, conventional otherwise
|
|
>
|
|
>Ok, I'll risk it ... what's PMS? (We're talking about airplanes!)
|
|
|
|
Performance Management System. It's the precursor of FMS's; it was
|
|
originally deployed on the 747-SP. It was used to provide a lot of "nice
|
|
to know" and performance-related flight guidance, to obtain optimal
|
|
fuel burn.
|
|
|
|
|
|
>Every first-generation 737 I've seen has a third seat for the flight
|
|
>engineer.
|
|
|
|
Hmm. I have some vague recollection of a three-man 737, but I think I'm
|
|
thinking of that 767. The 737 was designed for a two-man crew. If three-
|
|
man ships were produced, there are precious few of them. I wasn't able
|
|
to find any explicit references to three-man variants in my notes.
|
|
|
|
Be careful to distinguish between a "flight engineer" and someone occupying
|
|
the jump seat. Quite a few airlines will run a "third man" due to either
|
|
union pressures, or to provide training experience for new-hires; one often
|
|
sees "transients" (instructors, check pilots, deadheading pilots) in
|
|
the jump seat.
|
|
|
|
Lufthansa, I believe, ran a third man on the 747-400 for a long time; Air
|
|
Inter's unions had a major fight over the A320. The 737 itself is certifi-
|
|
cated for two-man operation, and that's what is legally needed in order to
|
|
fly it.
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|
|
|
It's an interesting question whether the union desire to safeguard its
|
|
members' economic interests might actually *decrease* safety, in this case.
|
|
I question the wisdom of inserting a third man "for the ride," who has
|
|
no real operational significance in the cockpit. It would seem that such
|
|
a person could serve as a destabilizing influence. If they're going to
|
|
go three-man, they should go whole-hog, and give him something to do, in
|
|
the fundamental cockpit design. But I digress.
|
|
|
|
|
|
>I believe this was one of the selling points of the DC-9
|
|
>over the 737.
|
|
|
|
Yet ANOTHER excerpt from _Legend & Legacy_, pp. 255-257:
|
|
|
|
"The DC-9 head start was a killer for Boeing's sales force, yet it
|
|
wasn't the only handicap Boeing's new baby faced in its adolescence.
|
|
A deep hole was dug by the men who would fly the plane, and unwittingly
|
|
it was Delta's pilots who handed their brethren the shovel that almost
|
|
buried the 737. When Delta bought the DC-9, it won an agreement from its
|
|
pilots that the cockpit be designed for a two-man crew, eliminating the
|
|
flight engineer. This was permissible under an FAA regulation that
|
|
allowed any jet transport weighing less than 80,000 lbs to be flown by two
|
|
pilots. Both the original DC-9 and BAC-111 met the so-called '80,000-pound
|
|
rule,' heresy and anathema to the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA).
|
|
It could do nothing about the precedent Delta's pilots had set for the
|
|
DC-9, but the union began pressuring the FAA to change it regulation for
|
|
the 737, and at the same time warned US airlines planning to buy the
|
|
Boeing jet that future pilot contracts would specify a three-man crew for
|
|
the 737.
|
|
|
|
"ALPA argued that with no flight engineer to help them, the pilots'
|
|
increased workload made it difficult to watch out for other traffic, thus
|
|
enhancing the chances for mid-air collisions, and also created more
|
|
danger during bad-weather landings. The union's case might have sounded
|
|
logical until one began wondering why a two-man crew was safe for the DC-9
|
|
and BAC-111, and not for the 737. Nevertheless, the FAA changed its
|
|
regulations to the extent of requiring Boeing to prove that the 737
|
|
could be operated safely with two pilots. The irony was that once having
|
|
been certificated for a two-man crew, three subsequent larger DC-9
|
|
models weighing far more than 80,000 pounds also were automatically
|
|
certificated for two pilots, but not the 737.
|
|
|
|
"Thus the baby Boeing's late start was saddled with a further sales han-
|
|
dicap--many airlines considering the 737 bought the DC-9 instead,
|
|
unwilling to add the expense of a third cockpit crew member who literally
|
|
was nothing except an extra set of eyeballs. United and Western,
|
|
after arbitration, agreed to a three-man crew, although that third
|
|
man was a classic case of feather-bedding--or 'feather birding,' as
|
|
then-FAA administrator Najeeb Halaby expressed it.
|
|
|
|
"Western's pilots referred to the extra crew member as GIBs, for 'Guy
|
|
in Back,' but abandoned this nomenclature hastily when a pilot ran
|
|
across the word 'gib' in a dictionary and discovered it meant castrated
|
|
tomcat.
|
|
|
|
"Lew Wallick once asked a Piedmont captain what the third crew member did,
|
|
riding in a jump seat just behind the pilots, unable to reach any controls.
|
|
|
|
"'He doesn't do much,' the captain admitted. 'He sits back there and
|
|
spills coffee in my brainback [nickname for the briefcase holding air-
|
|
way maps and aircraft manuals]. But come next summer, he's gonna mow my
|
|
lawn.'
|
|
|
|
"Brien Wygle was in charge of the 737's flight test program, and worked
|
|
with engineering to design a cockpit whose workload would put the least
|
|
possible stress on two pilots.
|
|
|
|
"'We went to a lot of trouble proving this out,' Wygle said. 'We didn't
|
|
have much computer input--they weren't as sophisticated then--but we
|
|
designed a simple cockpit management system because the FAA told us that
|
|
when we came up for certification, they were going to be very tough. They
|
|
were under great pressure from ALPA, which wanted the FAA to say that
|
|
the 737 needed a flight engineer or any third crew member.'
|
|
|
|
"Tough they were.
|
|
|
|
"'The FAA made us jump through a lot of hoops,' Wygle recalled. 'There
|
|
was an unprecedented amount of testing, all kinds of simulated engine and
|
|
systems failures, low-visibility approaches and landings, and even test
|
|
flights through high-density traffic on the eastern seaboard. And to the
|
|
FAA's credit, they ruled that the 737 was completely safe to fly with a
|
|
two-man crew.
|
|
|
|
"The ruling, however, couldn't recoup the sales Boeing had already lost
|
|
because of the ALPA campaign; the union itself eventually came around to
|
|
admitting that a sophisticated, well-designed cockpit didn't need a flight
|
|
engineer [MUCH later! --rdd] And in one sense, ALPA did the 737 a
|
|
favor. It forced Boeing to improve the plane to the point where it would
|
|
be so good it didn't matter how many men were in the cockpit."
|
|
|
|
|
|
>I've always wondered just what the flight engineer really does on a
|
|
>767 equipped for three flight crew. I believe QANTAS does this.
|
|
|
|
There was only one 3-man 767 built, and that was for UAL.
|
|
|
|
Ansett uses a three-man crew, but there's no major change to the structure--
|
|
probably just a CDU interface on the rear on the control pedestal, so the
|
|
third man can play navigator, to keep busy. Again, be sure to distinguish
|
|
between a "GIB" (:-)) and someone who plays an intended operational role
|
|
in the cockpit.
|
|
|
|
|
|
>Also, some A310s lack the FFCS (Forward Facing Crew Cockpit) having
|
|
>instead what I assume is a cockpit more like an older A300. All of
|
|
>these are due primarily to union/labor pressures.
|
|
|
|
This is the first I've heard of it. Got any references? It'd be REAL
|
|
difficult to do, and I'd question whether the returns would be enough
|
|
to entice the manufacturer to do it.
|
|
|
|
|
|
>>Performance is now ensured by legal contract, rather than design,
|
|
>>with the dollar being the bottom line.
|
|
>
|
|
>Well, mandated, at least, if not ensured.
|
|
|
|
I suspect that when dollar figures reach low earth orbit, performance is
|
|
whatever you say it is. :-)
|
|
|
|
|
|
Two good references:
|
|
|
|
Incidentally, there are good design summaries of the 757/767 and
|
|
A310/A300-600 cockpits in _Aerospace Crew Station Design_, G. P. Carr,
|
|
editor, Elsevier Science Publishers, 1984.
|
|
|
|
There's also a superb design overview of the 737 in the February 3, 1966
|
|
issue of FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
Robert Dorsett
|
|
rdd@cactus.org
|
|
...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Dec 16 14:00:43 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: jongsma@esseye.si.com (Ken Jongsma)
|
|
Subject: FMS Suppliers (Was: Safety)
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 16 Dec 1992 09:42:37 -0500 (EST)
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.138@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
<airliners.1992.144@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
<airliners.1992.163@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.172@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <m0n1zxO-0001bIC@esseye.si.com>
|
|
Date: 16 Dec 92 14:00:43 PST
|
|
|
|
|
|
>>The FMS's used on these airplanes are generally done by Honeywell, except
|
|
>>that Boeing's using Smiths Industries for the 737, for some reason.
|
|
|
|
Perhaps because Smiths offered a better product at the time? Perhaps because
|
|
Boeing does not want to depend on one supplier for all it's FMS design?
|
|
|
|
>Boeing recently made a substantial change to the FMS on new 737s, and
|
|
>offers a retrofit kit for older new-generation 737s. I believe this
|
|
>was a replacement ... perhaps away from Smiths? Having observed the
|
|
>trials and tribulations of friends with MGs and their Smiths electrics
|
|
>I'm not enthusiastic about a Smiths FMS! :-)
|
|
|
|
Ohh... It helps to know a bit about the corporate history before one
|
|
makes comments like "Smiths electrics."
|
|
|
|
OK. The division of Smiths that makes the 737 FMS is located in Grand
|
|
Rapids, Michigan. Prior to being purchased by Smiths a few years back,
|
|
it used to be known as Lear Siegler, Inc. (LSI) and was originally
|
|
formed by Bill Lear, the designer of the Lear Jet.
|
|
|
|
All of the FMS work that this division does was initiated well before
|
|
SI bought the division, so references to UK product lines aren't really
|
|
valid.
|
|
|
|
Some history on the 737 FMS. The original 737-300 FMS was based on work
|
|
done for the 727 and early 737s (Performance Data Computer) and a system
|
|
that was not fielded called the PNCS.
|
|
|
|
A few years ago, along with Update 4 of the software, the "Eagle" FMS
|
|
hardware was fielded. It had a faster processor and more memory. More
|
|
recently, Update 6 came with additional memory. I assume this is the
|
|
update you were refering to.
|
|
|
|
Next month, the "Dual" FMS will be shipped. This system is a 4 MCU,
|
|
two computer system.
|
|
|
|
In addition to commercial FMSs, SI also makes the Nav System for all
|
|
600+ USAF C-130s. This same system has been installed on some international
|
|
C-130s.
|
|
|
|
(Although I work on the military side of the house, I checked with our
|
|
commercial people to verify the above. Obligatory Disclaimer: I speak
|
|
for myself...)
|
|
|
|
Ken
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Ken Jongsma
|
|
Smiths Industries jongsma@esseye.si.com
|
|
Grand Rapids, Michigan 73115.1041@compuserve.com
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Dec 16 14:00:44 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: hoyme@src.honeywell.com (Ken Hoyme)
|
|
Subject: Re: Safety and design rankings (was Re: Flight controls)
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 16 Dec 1992 18:43:16 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.131@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
<airliners.1992.138@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
<airliners.1992.144@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
<airliners.1992.163@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.173@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Honeywell Systems & Research Center, Mpls. MN, USA.
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <HOYME.92Dec16124316@schrodinger.src.honeywell.com>
|
|
Date: 16 Dec 92 14:00:44 PST
|
|
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.163@ohare.Chicago.COM> kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) writes:
|
|
> My understanding was that the 747-400 does *not* have a new wing but
|
|
> rather a tweaked version of the original. I recall some statement
|
|
> from Boeing regarding the lack of winglets on the 777, which noted
|
|
> that the 777 had a new wing and starting from a clean slate it was
|
|
> more efficient to not have them, whereas working from an existing
|
|
> design as with the 747-400 it was helpful to have them.
|
|
|
|
I believe the winglets issue on the 777 was also complicated by the
|
|
folding wing option. Which no one has ordered -- even those airlines
|
|
who originally expressed interest in the option. Has development on the
|
|
folding wing stopped?? I had heard that Boeing was getting tired of the
|
|
investment required to keep the option open while not receiving any
|
|
orders for it.
|
|
|
|
>>The FMS's used on these airplanes are generally done by Honeywell, except
|
|
>>that Boeing's using Smiths Industries for the 737, for some reason.
|
|
|
|
> Boeing recently made a substantial change to the FMS on new 737s, and
|
|
> offers a retrofit kit for older new-generation 737s. I believe this
|
|
> was a replacement ... perhaps away from Smiths? Having observed the
|
|
> trials and tribulations of friends with MGs and their Smiths electrics
|
|
> I'm not enthusiastic about a Smiths FMS! :-)
|
|
|
|
Me too! But then, I *am* biased on this issue. :-) However, I do not
|
|
believe that the part of Smiths that supports cars and the part that
|
|
designs avionics has a whole lot to do with each other. I suspect (but
|
|
do not know for certain) that Boeing's choice of Smiths might be related
|
|
to trying to get some competition in this area.
|
|
|
|
Ken Hoyme Honeywell Systems and Research Center
|
|
(612)951-7354 3660 Technology Dr., Minneapolis, MN 55418
|
|
Internet: hoyme@src.honeywell.com
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Dec 16 14:00:45 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: hoyme@src.honeywell.com (Ken Hoyme)
|
|
Subject: Re: Airbus safety
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 16 Dec 1992 19:16:27 GMT
|
|
References: <1992Nov25.191925.27991@news.mentorg.com>
|
|
<airliners.1992.130@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
<airliners.1992.148@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
<airliners.1992.153@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.174@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Honeywell Systems & Research Center, Mpls. MN, USA.
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <HOYME.92Dec16131627@schrodinger.src.honeywell.com>
|
|
Date: 16 Dec 92 14:00:45 PST
|
|
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.153@ohare.Chicago.COM> Robert Dorsett <rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu> writes:
|
|
|
|
> The problem is that software is so much more easily changed than hardware,
|
|
> that we could very well start an avionics equivalent of "creeping featurism."
|
|
> Changing the way a stick behaves can be done in just one firmware update: no
|
|
> need to develop new tooling, production techniques, train assemblers and
|
|
> maintenance engineers, offer the retrofit during the next C check, etc.
|
|
> Just the internal development process, which one can assume is faster and
|
|
> cheaper than for hardware. But, by virtue of this ease, it's also more
|
|
> *unstable* than hardware-based solutions.
|
|
|
|
> Evidence to support this position? The A320 has about 4M of code. The A330/
|
|
> A340, 10M. It's happening as we speak...
|
|
|
|
> Do any Honeywell people reading know how big the 777 EFCS is going to be?
|
|
|
|
Well, this is an apples-to-oranges comparison. I can only speak (and
|
|
only in vauge terms, of course) about the portion of the 777 that
|
|
Honeywell is producing. Honeywell's Airplane Information Management
|
|
System (AIMS) contains the FMS function similar to previous generation
|
|
airplanes, but does not encompass the autopilot (Rockwell Collins) nor
|
|
the FBW Flight Controls (GEC). The FMS alone requires about 2Mbytes of
|
|
executable code. It also requires a Nav Data Base and RAM for
|
|
operation. I do not know the complexity of the other components of the
|
|
"EFCS". Of course, Displays could be considered another part of the
|
|
system. That function lives in AIMS on the 777.
|
|
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Dec 17 03:35:15 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett)
|
|
Subject: Re: Safety and design rankings (was Re: Flight controls)
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Thu, 17 Dec 92 02:34:17 CST
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.131@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.138@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.144@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.163@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.175@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <9212170834.AA17343@cactus.org>
|
|
Date: 17 Dec 92 03:35:15 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.173@ohare.Chicago.COM> you write:
|
|
>> was a replacement ... perhaps away from Smiths? Having observed the
|
|
>> trials and tribulations of friends with MGs and their Smiths electrics
|
|
>> I'm not enthusiastic about a Smiths FMS! :-)
|
|
>
|
|
>Me too! But then, I *am* biased on this issue. :-) However, I do not
|
|
>believe that the part of Smiths that supports cars and the part that
|
|
>designs avionics has a whole lot to do with each other. I suspect (but
|
|
>do not know for certain) that Boeing's choice of Smiths might be related
|
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>to trying to get some competition in this area.
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|
|
|
And if we're going to pick on Smiths for that, we should note that Delco
|
|
Electronics, which produced the INS used on just about every airliner produced
|
|
in the late 60's and 70's, was a subsidiary of General Motors. :-) Same
|
|
logo as the car-stereo systems, too. :-)
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|
|
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But boy, is Smiths' 737 engine display tacky. :-)
|
|
|
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|
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---
|
|
Robert Dorsett
|
|
rdd@cactus.org
|
|
...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Dec 17 03:35:17 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett)
|
|
Subject: REVIEW of _FMC User's Guide_
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Thu, 17 Dec 92 02:43:07 CST
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.176@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <9212170843.AA17392@cactus.org>
|
|
Date: 17 Dec 92 03:35:17 PST
|
|
|
|
|
|
Title: FMC User's Guide: Advanced Guide to the Flight Management Computer
|
|
|
|
Author: Bill Bulfer
|
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|
|
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Published by:
|
|
|
|
Bill Bulfer
|
|
Technical Publications
|
|
2031 River Falls Drive
|
|
Kingwood, TX 77339
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|
|
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713-358-7252
|
|
|
|
Cost: $40. Optional update service, $12.
|
|
|
|
Pages: ~200; extensive illustrations. It is designed to be carried in a
|
|
flight bag, printed on "half-pages," in a flexible, compact, three-ring
|
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binder.
|
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|
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No ISBN.
|
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|
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The Flight Management System is the "heart" of modern transport operations.
|
|
It is the core of navigation functionality and automatic flight control,
|
|
and permits a flight to be flown very economically. Despite its overall
|
|
usefulness, standard interfaces leave something to be desired: consequently,
|
|
a high proportion of training time is currently dedicated to the FMS, at the
|
|
inevitable expense of other systems. There is evidence this training is
|
|
somewhat lacking, with hands-on time limited. This means that "real
|
|
learning" occurs in-flight, on the job. This is not a desirable situation,
|
|
since it increases heads-down operations, thus decreasing the situational
|
|
awareness of the pilot(s).
|
|
|
|
The author, a Continental 737 pilot, wrote the book (manual, really) in
|
|
an attempt to provide a high-quality, goal-oriented overview of FMS functions,
|
|
as a supplement to airline training programs. It is a result of his own
|
|
exposure, extensive research, and feedback from the manufacturers.
|
|
|
|
The book is oriented around the Smiths Industries FMS, in use on the 737,
|
|
but the author explicitly addresses differences and similarities with the
|
|
Honeywell lineage, which is in use on more types of airplanes.
|
|
|
|
The book is written for pilots, but may also be of interest to researchers
|
|
and hard-core airliner enthusiasts. It is oriented around CDU (control data
|
|
unit) operation, but includes mode control unit notes, where appropriate. As
|
|
indicated, it's heavily goal-oriented, showing precisely what the pilot would
|
|
see on various screens, with relevant fields highlighted, as he attempts
|
|
to set up a solution to a given problem.
|
|
|
|
An update service is available, on a yearly basis, for a nominal fee.
|
|
Bulfer plans on issuing updates about every six months: the current update
|
|
is about 80 pages. He's also working on a "final exam," to go with the
|
|
manual.
|
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|
|
|
|
My main gripe is that, although the book is based on laser-printed originals,
|
|
his printing service seems to have scaled the originals to fit on the pages.
|
|
Consequently, some thin lines, such as boxes surrounding notes, look somewhat
|
|
odd, with varying print intensity along the line. Otherwise, the type and
|
|
illustrations look fine.
|
|
|
|
|
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I heartily recommend this book for anyone seriously interested in the
|
|
intricacies of FMS operation. It is one of the best pilot-oriented
|
|
technical publications I've ever seen.
|
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|
|
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|
|
Disclaimer: I have no financial connection with or interest in this project;
|
|
I'm just a very satisfied customer. I received my copy in September, and
|
|
have been working through it (slowly :-)) since then.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
Robert Dorsett
|
|
rdd@cactus.org
|
|
...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Dec 17 13:27:31 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: pal@regent.e-technik.tu-muenchen.dbp.de (Peter Loibl)
|
|
Subject: Re: Northwest cancels Airbus
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Thu, 17 Dec 1992 10:41:31 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.109@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.110@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.114@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.169@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.177@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Technical University of Munich, Germany
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-ID: <pal.724588891@regent.e-technik.tu-muenchen.de>
|
|
Date: 17 Dec 92 13:27:31 PST
|
|
|
|
drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard) writes:
|
|
|
|
>In article <airliners.1992.114@ohare.Chicago.COM> rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu writes:
|
|
>>
|
|
>>It'll be interesting to see what ramifications this has on the UAL deal:
|
|
>>did United plan on using Airbus/NWA North American facilities?
|
|
>>
|
|
>It is my understanding from chatting with the maintenance engineers at UAL
|
|
>on separate occassions that UAL is forming an A320 maintenance group (I
|
|
>have a resume in, therefore might not be considered an unbiased observer)
|
|
>which may be based at their new maintenance facility in Indianapolis.
|
|
|
|
BTW: The Sueddeutsche Zeitung here in Germany (one of the best ones
|
|
here) wrote yesterday, that UA is negotiating with Boeing about
|
|
delays and cancellations of their orders. No other details given.
|
|
|
|
Peter Loibl
|
|
pal@regent.e-technik.tu-muenchen.de
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Dec 17 13:27:34 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: driscoll@src.honeywell.com (Kevin Driscoll)
|
|
Subject: Re: REVIEW of _FMC User's Guide_
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Thu, 17 Dec 92 10:48:24 CST
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.176@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.178@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <9212171648.AA18464@couqusmungus.src.honeywell.co>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 17 Dec 92 13:27:34 PST
|
|
|
|
> The book is oriented around the Smiths Industries FMS, in use on the 737,
|
|
> but the author explicitly addresses differences and similarities with the
|
|
> Honeywell lineage, which is in use on more types of airplanes.
|
|
|
|
The phrase "more types" more correctly should be "all other types" since
|
|
the FMS on all commercial transport airplanes except the 737 are Honeywell's.
|
|
However, saying that there is a lineage is a bit strong. Being a
|
|
modern customer driven company 8^), we build the FMS that the airframer
|
|
wants. That is why on over half the flights where I fly the A320 jump
|
|
seat, the pilots ask me why the A320 FMS is not as good as the Boeing
|
|
versions. And the answer is -- "That is the way Airbus wanted it."
|
|
With the differences in FMSs, it is hard to see how one manual can cover
|
|
them all. The NW pilots I have talked to universal like the A320's FMS
|
|
manual. You may want to order one from Honeywell pubs. With the way
|
|
that ATAs are now piloted, I think an FMS manual is the closest thing
|
|
there is to a "pilot's guide" to the airplane.
|
|
|
|
From kls Thu Dec 17 13:27:35 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: palmer@icat.larc.nasa.gov (Michael T. Palmer)
|
|
Subject: Re: Safety and design rankings (was Re: Flight controls)
|
|
X-Submission-Date: 17 Dec 92 18:47:22 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.138@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.144@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.163@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.171@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.179@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA USA
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <palmer.724618042@news.larc.nasa.gov>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 17 Dec 92 13:27:35 PST
|
|
|
|
In a previous post, somebody wrote:
|
|
|
|
>>Every first-generation 737 I've seen has a third seat for the flight
|
|
>>engineer.
|
|
|
|
Then, somebody else wrote:
|
|
|
|
>Hmm. I have some vague recollection of a three-man 737, but I think I'm
|
|
>thinking of that 767. The 737 was designed for a two-man crew. If three-
|
|
>man ships were produced, there are precious few of them. I wasn't able
|
|
>to find any explicit references to three-man variants in my notes.
|
|
|
|
Well, NASA Langley operates Boeing B-737-100 Hull Number 1. That's right,
|
|
Number 1. I can tell you for a fact that it was designed for two pilots.
|
|
|
|
|
|
>Be careful to distinguish between a "flight engineer" and someone occupying
|
|
>the jump seat. Quite a few airlines will run a "third man" due to either
|
|
>union pressures, or to provide training experience for new-hires; one often
|
|
>sees "transients" (instructors, check pilots, deadheading pilots) in
|
|
>the jump seat.
|
|
|
|
Correct. However, putting a third pilot on that tiny, flip/fold-down seat
|
|
would require hazardous duty pay. I have ridden in that seat for quite a
|
|
few hours, and it is NOT repeat NOT like riding in a 767 cockpit!! Still,
|
|
there is no rear "engineer's station" for a third crewmember anyway. And
|
|
the seat blocks access to the cabin door! It was never designed for constant
|
|
use.
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Michael T. Palmer, M/S 152, NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA 23681
|
|
Voice: 804-864-2044, FAX: 804-864-7793, Email: m.t.palmer@larc.nasa.gov
|
|
RIPEM Public Key available soon --- Consider it an envelope for your e-mail
|
|
|
|
From kls Fri Dec 18 04:51:00 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz)
|
|
Subject: Happy Holidays!
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Fri, 18 Dec 1992 12:48:08 GMT
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.180@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Chicago Software Works
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-ID: <1992Dec18.124808.6922@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Date: 18 Dec 92 04:51:00 PST
|
|
|
|
I'll be in Chicago for the holidays, starting tomorrow (courtesy
|
|
a United 747 for the obligatory airliner content!) until after
|
|
Christmas. My brother has network access so I'll be processing
|
|
submissions to the group from there, though response will not be
|
|
quite as timely as I usually try to maintain. My machines here
|
|
in California will be cared for, so you needn't (and shouldn't)
|
|
change how you submit articles.
|
|
|
|
I hope the holidays are safe and happy for all of you, and I'll
|
|
look forward to the continuing interesting airliners discussions
|
|
and debates in the new year!
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com
|
|
1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls
|
|
|Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA
|
|
Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com
|
|
|
|
From kls Sun Dec 20 16:07:59 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners,rec.travel.air
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: eandersn@mach1.wlu.ca (Niels Ejvind Andersen)
|
|
Subject: Surviving a Commercial Aircraft Accident
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Thu, 17 Dec 1992 21:36:21 GMT
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.181@royko.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@royko.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Wilfrid Laurier University
|
|
Sender: kls@royko.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-ID: <BzFAoL.JDD@mach1.wlu.ca>
|
|
Date: 20 Dec 92 16:07:59 CST
|
|
|
|
I attended the Toronto Transport Canada Aviation Safety Seminar last night.
|
|
One of the topics was "Surviving a Commercial Aviation Accident", and it
|
|
was interesting enough that I'll post it here.
|
|
|
|
Please bear in mind that flying is extremely safe. These comments are
|
|
intended as *risk management*. In the very remote possibility that your
|
|
aircraft has an accident, and your survival depends on your knowledge of
|
|
the aircraft exits and safety systems, do the smart thing, and learn them.
|
|
|
|
According to a survey of airline passengers, the commonly held opinion is
|
|
that 75% of commercial aircraft accidents have one or more fatalities. In
|
|
reality, only 15% of such accidents have fatalities. The belief in an
|
|
inflated death rate is a result of media concentration on accidents with
|
|
fatalities.
|
|
|
|
Pay attention to the safety briefing given by the cabin attendants at the
|
|
beginning of the flight. Read the pamphlet that describes the aircraft
|
|
exits and safety systems such as oxygen masks and life vests (life vests
|
|
are difficult to put on, and it is important that you understand). Make
|
|
sure your family pays attention. Explain the items to your family, if
|
|
need be. Take note of which passengers between you and your exit don't
|
|
pay attention to the safety briefing -- these people won't know what to do
|
|
after an accident, and they may well keep you and your family from getting
|
|
out safely as well.
|
|
|
|
The rules follow, but first, remember that flying is the safest mode of
|
|
transportation available to you. ENJOY YOUR FLIGHT.
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Six Rules for Surviving a Commercial Aviation Accident (as a passenger).
|
|
|
|
1. Bring a coat that won't burn or melt, and wear it both during takeoff
|
|
and during landing.
|
|
|
|
2. Wear flat shoes. Don't remove them until after takeoff, and put them
|
|
back on for the landing.
|
|
|
|
3. Make sure your seatbelt is snug, and not too high on your hips, during
|
|
the takeoff and the landing.
|
|
|
|
4. Know what brace position you need to get into for a crash (this should
|
|
be the position your body will end up in after the deceleration, if
|
|
you were sitting upright). With a 1.5G or 2G deceleration in the forward
|
|
direction, your head, arms and legs will strike the seat in front of
|
|
you. If an accident is imminent, get into the brace position immediately.
|
|
Don't wait for "brace" instructions from the crew. The brace position
|
|
will minimize your risk of injury.
|
|
|
|
5. Know where the nearest exits are. Get an aisle seat within three rows
|
|
of an emergency exit, and note the position of the next nearest exit as
|
|
well (your alternate exit). Count the number of seats between you and
|
|
your exit, as well as the number of seats between you and your alternate
|
|
exit. Make sure you know where the nearest exits are, because if there
|
|
is a post-crash fire, the signs and lights above the exits will be
|
|
obscured by dense smoke. [I have difficulty with this rule -- I like
|
|
to sit by a window -- if I wanted an aisle seat, I'd go see a movie
|
|
at our local theatre!]
|
|
|
|
6. Know how to open the exit doors.
|
|
|
|
After a crash, get to an exit as quickly as you can, any way you can.
|
|
Remember to release your seat belt first. Climb over the seats, if you
|
|
have to. Leave all your possessions behind; some items will have sharp
|
|
protrusions that can puncture the escape slide, and any item you carry
|
|
will slow down your progress. The cabin attendants will confiscate
|
|
any possession you are carrying anyway, as you pass by them on your way
|
|
out the exit.
|
|
|
|
Smoke and fumes kill more people than the impact forces, so it is
|
|
extremely important to evacuate the aircraft as quickly as possible; you
|
|
may only have a few seconds. The smoke tends to form in layers, with the
|
|
most toxic and thick layers near the ceiling. Stay down low, in crouch
|
|
position, as you make your way to the exit. Try to keep on your feet,
|
|
but crawl if necessary.
|
|
|
|
Once outside the aircraft, get well clear, preferably upwind.
|
|
|
|
If the aircraft has ditched, don't inflate your life vest until you are
|
|
outside the aircraft. If the water is cold, try to climb up onto a
|
|
piece of floating debris, to get out of the water. Move around as little
|
|
as possible in the water, to conserve your body heat.
|
|
--
|
|
Niels Ejvind Andersen [eandersn@mach2.wlu.ca / 70511.2302@compuserve.com]
|
|
Information Systems, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, ON N2L 3C5 Canada
|
|
... VFR NC4
|
|
|
|
From kls Sun Dec 20 16:08:03 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett)
|
|
Subject: Re: REVIEW of _FMC User's Guide_
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Fri, 18 Dec 92 01:50:15 CST
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.176@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.182@royko.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@royko.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <9212180750.AA15197@cactus.org>
|
|
Sender: kls@royko.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 20 Dec 92 16:08:03 CST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.178@ohare.Chicago.COM> you write:
|
|
>> The book is oriented around the Smiths Industries FMS, in use on the 737,
|
|
>> but the author explicitly addresses differences and similarities with the
|
|
>> Honeywell lineage, which is in use on more types of airplanes.
|
|
>
|
|
>The phrase "more types" more correctly should be "all other types" since
|
|
>the FMS on all commercial transport airplanes except the 737 are Honeywell's.
|
|
|
|
Good point!
|
|
|
|
|
|
>However, saying that there is a lineage is a bit strong. Being a
|
|
>modern customer driven company 8^), we build the FMS that the airframer
|
|
>wants. That is why on over half the flights where I fly the A320 jump
|
|
>seat, the pilots ask me why the A320 FMS is not as good as the Boeing
|
|
>versions. And the answer is -- "That is the way Airbus wanted it."
|
|
|
|
The author notes that there are two major "baselines": one Boeing, the
|
|
other "European," which he lumps the MD-11, Fokker, and Airbus aircraft
|
|
into. He explicitly notes that he's describing the Boeing baseline.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
Robert Dorsett
|
|
rdd@cactus.org
|
|
...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd
|
|
|
|
From kls Sun Dec 20 16:08:05 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: todamhyp@unlv.edu (Brian M. Huey)
|
|
Subject: Tire burn-out during landings
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Fri, 18 Dec 92 18:06:49 GMT
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.183@royko.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@royko.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: University of Nevada at Las Vegas, College of Engineering
|
|
Sender: kls@royko.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-ID: <1992Dec18.180649.15191@unlv.edu>
|
|
Date: 20 Dec 92 16:08:05 CST
|
|
|
|
I realize this a relatively basic question (I think) nevertheless:
|
|
|
|
I am neither a pilot nor an airliner engineer. However,
|
|
everytime I watch a airliner land, a cloud of smoke is produced when
|
|
the wheels come in contact from the ground due to friction. Couldn't
|
|
this cloud and the effect of friction be lessened by inducing a
|
|
angular velocity upon the wheels to match the airliners speed with
|
|
respect to the runway?
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
DISCLAIMER: I can neither confirm nor deny any opinions
|
|
expressed in this article directly reflect my own personal or
|
|
political views and furthermore, if they did, I would not be at
|
|
liberty to yield such an explanation of these alleged opinions.
|
|
|
|
From kls Sun Dec 20 16:08:07 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: James R Ebright <jebright@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>
|
|
Subject: Re: Hysterical movie goofs
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Fri, 18 Dec 92 13:56:45 EST
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.155@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.184@royko.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@royko.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <9212181856.AA06323@bottom.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>
|
|
Sender: kls@royko.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 20 Dec 92 16:08:07 CST
|
|
|
|
>I was just watching a movie on TV ("Gotcha"). One of the characters
|
|
>flew to Paris, and there was the obligatory "airplane landing" shot to
|
|
>establish that he "really flew" there...
|
|
>
|
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>...on an Air France Cargo 747. (The side titles very clearly had three
|
|
>words, though the last was hard to read; however, the "under-nose"
|
|
>titles indicated the 747 cargo variant with a nose door.)
|
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>
|
|
>Wonder what the in-flight meal was...
|
|
|
|
About eight years ago I flew LAX to CDG direct on Air Chance and it was
|
|
ACTUALLY a CARGO 747 with one cabin (appx 80 seats) of passengers.
|
|
|
|
The in-flight meal was normal US airline food...quite a let down from
|
|
normal Air Chance fare -- so much so, it prompted me to complain in writing.
|
|
(Why else fly AF except for the food?)
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Jim Ebright (james.ebright@osu.edu)
|
|
"Spam, eggs, sausage and spam - that's not got much spam in it."
|
|
>>> All kids can be educated -- even yours and mine. <<<
|
|
|
|
From kls Sun Dec 20 16:08:08 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett)
|
|
Subject: Aha! The three-man 767 rears its ugly head...
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Sun, 20 Dec 92 05:36:50 CST
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.185@royko.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@royko.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <9212201136.AA13911@cactus.org>
|
|
Sender: kls@royko.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 20 Dec 92 16:08:08 CST
|
|
|
|
|
|
I knew I wasn't going mad... In a recent post, I commented on a three-man
|
|
767. Karl hadn't heard of it, which surprised me, so I went looking for
|
|
it--and couldn't find it--which surprised me even more. I finally ran across
|
|
this blurb.
|
|
|
|
I have no recollection of a picture of one of these critters, though. Can
|
|
someone clear up this matter?
|
|
|
|
|
|
FI, 3/20/82, p. 685:
|
|
|
|
"So far, most of the "live" flight-test experience has been with a three-
|
|
pilot-configured flightdeck on the first four 767s. [...] All 757s, and
|
|
the fifth and many subsequent 767s will have a two-pilot-configured cockpit.
|
|
In the two-man flightdeck, the early 767's conventional bank of engine
|
|
instruments on the center panel is replaced by the two CRT screens. These are
|
|
the display element of the engine-indicating/crew-alerting system (EICAS),
|
|
which replaces normal engine instruments and continually scans the aircraft
|
|
systems for abnormalities, relaying any findings."
|
|
|
|
|
|
I interpret that as meaning the three-man ships had electromechanical in-
|
|
struments, which means there had to be a real, live, flight engineer.
|
|
|
|
I am certain three of the four were retrofitted to two-man configuration,
|
|
but am almost certain the first one lingers on, somewhere. Memory suggests
|
|
it's Boeing's 767 testbed. The maddening thing is, I read an article within
|
|
the last two or three years, which went into all this in great detail, but
|
|
I can't remember where it was published... This article seemed to indicate
|
|
that the customer (UAL, I THINK) which initially wanted three-man ships saw
|
|
the two-man configuration, fell in love with it, and abandoned all plans for
|
|
three-man operation.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
R.
|
|
|
|
From kls Mon Dec 21 11:30:44 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: megazone@obsidian.WPI.EDU (MegaZone23)
|
|
Subject: Re: Tire burn-out during landings
|
|
X-Submission-Date: 21 Dec 1992 04:08:11 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.183@royko.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.186@royko.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@royko.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: WPI USAF -- United Society of Animation Fans
|
|
Sender: kls@royko.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <1h3fvbINNs9a@bigboote.WPI.EDU>
|
|
Date: 21 Dec 92 11:30:44 CST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.183@royko.Chicago.COM> todamhyp@unlv.edu (Brian M. Huey) writes:
|
|
>the wheels come in contact from the ground due to friction. Couldn't
|
|
>this cloud and the effect of friction be lessened by inducing a
|
|
>angular velocity upon the wheels to match the airliners speed with
|
|
|
|
Spinning the wheels would indeed cut down on the tire wear, and I believe that
|
|
this has been tested. However, there are problems. When you spin a tire it acts
|
|
as a gyroscope and will resists having it's course altered. This can make
|
|
handling tricky as you would have 10 or more wheels all spinning on most
|
|
airliners. Have you ever held a spinning bicycle tire in your hands and tried
|
|
to move it? Same effect.
|
|
|
|
You also need to weigh the advantages against the disadvantages. How much does
|
|
the tire wear cost the airline? How much would mantenance on a system to spin
|
|
the wheels cost?
|
|
|
|
Plus you will have the initial cost for the system and the added weight. It is
|
|
one more system to break down, etc...
|
|
|
|
All in all it just doesn't appear to be worth it...
|
|
|
|
###############################################################################
|
|
# I have one prejudice, and that is against stupidity. Use your mind, think! #
|
|
#Email megazone@wpi.wpi.edu Moderator, WPI anime FTP site 130.215.24.1 /anime#
|
|
###############################################################################
|
|
|
|
From kls Sat Dec 26 00:01:45 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: van_heel@rz-berlin.mpg.de
|
|
Subject: Martinair DC10 crash?
|
|
X-Submission-Date: 21 Dec 92 14:05:17 +0100
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.187@royko.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@royko.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Rechenzentrum MPG Berlin
|
|
Sender: kls@royko.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-ID: <1992Dec21.140517.7887@rz-berlin.mpg.de>
|
|
Date: 26 Dec 92 00:01:45 CST
|
|
|
|
Martinair DC10 crash around 9.30 am in Portugal.
|
|
|
|
According to a news broadcast which I heard at
|
|
10 o'clock this morning, a Martinair DC10 charter plane
|
|
had just crash-landed on a Portuguese airport with 322 passenger
|
|
aboard after being struck by lightning. The plane exploded
|
|
immediately after the unsuccesful crash-landing.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Marin van Heel
|
|
|
|
From kls Sat Dec 26 00:01:47 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: Hayes_Press@qmgate.larc.nasa.gov (Hayes N. Press)
|
|
Subject: Re: Aha! The three-man 767 rears its ugly head...
|
|
X-Submission-Date: 22 Dec 1992 13:25:26 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.185@royko.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.188@royko.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@royko.Chicago.COM
|
|
Reply-To: Hayes_Press@qmgate.larc.nasa.gov (Hayes N. Press)
|
|
Organization: Lockheed Engineering and Sciences Company
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <1h7507INNo79@rave.larc.nasa.gov>
|
|
Sender: kls@royko.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 26 Dec 92 00:01:47 CST
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
>I knew I wasn't going mad... In a recent post, I commented on a three-man
|
|
>767. Karl hadn't heard of it, which surprised me, so I went looking for
|
|
>it--and couldn't find it--which surprised me even more. I finally ran across
|
|
>this blurb.
|
|
|
|
>I have no recollection of a picture of one of these critters, though. Can
|
|
>someone clear up this matter?
|
|
|
|
I don't know if I can clear this up but I can assure you that you are not
|
|
going mad, unless madness is common in aerospace professionals.
|
|
|
|
The original design for the 767 was indeed for a 3 person-crew (even though
|
|
the anthropometrics were probably 3 man-crew biased). There was an extensive
|
|
article done in Harvard Business Review (sorry I don't recall the year but it
|
|
is pre-1990) on the design/production aspects. The article dealt with the
|
|
management approaches used to determine whether the production line of the
|
|
first 30 or so, 767 should be stopped and retrofited "in-position" or whether
|
|
the line should be allowed to continue with the first ~30 being 3 person-crew
|
|
and the ~31st and then on being the two person variety. In summary, the
|
|
decision was to build the first ~30 as 3 person-crew and then if (when) they
|
|
got certification of a two person configuration they would tear-out the third
|
|
station and make the other necessary changes needed by use of "RAMS" teams.
|
|
These teams would then have only one learning curve on the modifications
|
|
needed, rather than ~30 since the aircraft on the line would all be at
|
|
different stages of production.
|
|
|
|
There was even one airline (which I don't recall either, but it may have been
|
|
UAL or someone in the South Pacific) that accepted their aircraft in the
|
|
three person configuration, whether that configuration has since been changed
|
|
or not I'm also not so sure.
|
|
|
|
The extra flight station being removed from the original design may also
|
|
explain the roominess of the 767 cockpit. It is by far the largest I have
|
|
been in with more free space and comfort for the jumpseat passenger.
|
|
|
|
Speaking only for myself.
|
|
|
|
Hayes N. Press
|
|
e-mail address: Hayes_Press@qmgate.larc.nasa.gov
|
|
phone (804) 864-2715 fax (804) 864-7793
|
|
Good old Postal Service: Lockheed Engineering and Sciences Co.
|
|
144 Research Drive MS 156A
|
|
Hampton, Virginia 23666
|
|
|
|
From kls Sat Dec 26 00:01:48 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners,rec.travel.air
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: davidm@questor.rational.com (David Moore)
|
|
Subject: Re: Surviving a Commercial Aircraft Accident
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Tue, 22 Dec 1992 20:48:48 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.181@royko.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.189@royko.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@royko.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Rational
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <davidm.725057328@questor>
|
|
Sender: kls@royko.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 26 Dec 92 00:01:48 CST
|
|
|
|
eandersn@mach1.wlu.ca (Niels Ejvind Andersen) writes:
|
|
|
|
>If the aircraft has ditched, don't inflate your life vest until you are
|
|
>outside the aircraft.
|
|
|
|
One is usually instructed to inflate one half of the life vest while
|
|
in the cabin, and to fully inflate the vest once you have left the
|
|
aircraft. Were reasons given why this alternative procedure is
|
|
preferable?
|
|
|
|
Did they say anything about US flights on which life vests are not provided?
|
|
I find it hard to believe that those floating cushions are of any value at all.
|
|
|
|
There is one other point which comes across clearly from the crew demonstrations - it
|
|
is important to remain smiling at all times during emergency procedures. Would
|
|
I be right in thinking this is to reduce panic?
|
|
|
|
From kls Sat Dec 26 00:01:49 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett)
|
|
Subject: First Flights on airliners
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Thu, 24 Dec 92 06:30:34 CST
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.190@royko.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@royko.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <9212241230.AA19239@cactus.org>
|
|
Sender: kls@royko.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 26 Dec 92 00:01:49 CST
|
|
|
|
I caught the tail-end of an episode of "First Flights," on the Arts &
|
|
Entertainment Network, which dealt with advanced-technology airliners,
|
|
Wednesday night. There were segments on the MD-12, the Fokker 100, and
|
|
the MD-80. I only saw about the last 8 minutes, so assume the A320 or A310,
|
|
and Boeing products, were featured in the first 20.
|
|
|
|
A&E also shows a "First Flights" early Sunday evening, but I don't know
|
|
whether it's a repeat of the Wednesday show. Whichever it is, they repeat
|
|
that night's episode at 0530 EST on Monday.
|
|
|
|
There was nothing earth-shattering about what they were talking about (Neil
|
|
Armstrong: "So I guess the pilot's turning into more of a... supervisor...").
|
|
But the visuals are pretty, with little flicker. "First Flights" is a nicely
|
|
photographed, half-hour show, about *aviation*, and not all about blowing up
|
|
things to a rock & roll beat, unlike "Wings." :-)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
Robert Dorsett
|
|
rdd@cactus.org
|
|
...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd
|
|
|
|
From kls Sat Dec 26 00:01:49 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: Geoff.Miller@Corp.Sun.COM (Geoff Miller)
|
|
Subject: Re: Tire burn-out during landings
|
|
X-Submission-Date: 24 Dec 1992 20:54:29 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.186@royko.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.191@royko.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@royko.Chicago.COM
|
|
Followup-To: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Reply-To: Geoff.Miller@Corp.Sun.COM
|
|
Organization: Sun Microsystems, Menlo Park, Ca.
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <1hd825INN7v@jethro.Corp.Sun.COM>
|
|
Sender: kls@royko.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 26 Dec 92 00:01:49 CST
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
megazone@obsidian.WPI.EDU (MegaZone23) writes:
|
|
|
|
>Spinning the wheels would indeed cut down on the tire wear, and I
|
|
>believe that this has been tested.
|
|
|
|
It was tested on the Lockheed Constitution, back in the late Forties
|
|
or early Fifties.
|
|
|
|
|
|
>When you spin a tire it acts as a gyroscope and will resists having it's
|
|
>course altered. This can make handling tricky as you would have 10 or more
|
|
>wheels all spinning on most airliners.
|
|
|
|
Two points:
|
|
|
|
First, I'd think that the mass of the spinning wheels, and therefore the
|
|
magnitude of their gyroscopic effect on handling, would be insignificant
|
|
compared to the mass of the rest of the airframe and payload and the
|
|
power of the control surfaces.
|
|
|
|
Second, assuming that the effect *was* significant, wouldn't it simply be
|
|
a stabilizing influence, i.e., a resistance to changes in attitude about
|
|
the longitudinal (roll) axis? That doesn't sound all that hazardous.
|
|
|
|
|
|
>Plus you will have the initial cost for the system and the added weight.
|
|
>It is one more system to break down, etc...
|
|
|
|
I suspect that this is the most likely reason this idea hasn't been
|
|
implemented; tires are simply cheaper to deal with in the long run.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Geoff
|
|
|
|
|
|
-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
|
|
Geoff Miller + + + + + + + + Sun Microsystems
|
|
geoffm@purplehaze.Corp.Sun.COM + + + + + + + + Menlo Park, California
|
|
-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
|
|
|
|
|
|
From kls Sun Dec 27 17:34:54 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: inc@tc.fluke.COM (Gary Benson)
|
|
Subject: Re: Tire burn-out during landings
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 23 Dec 1992 19:11:28 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.183@royko.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.186@royko.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.192@royko.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@royko.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: John Fluke Mfg. Co., Inc., Everett, WA
|
|
Sender: kls@royko.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-ID: <1992Dec23.191128.13678@tc.fluke.COM>
|
|
Date: 27 Dec 92 17:34:54 CST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.186@royko.Chicago.COM> megazone@obsidian.WPI.EDU (MegaZone23) writes:
|
|
>In article <airliners.1992.183@royko.Chicago.COM> todamhyp@unlv.edu (Brian M. Huey) writes:
|
|
>>the wheels come in contact from the ground due to friction. Couldn't
|
|
>>this cloud and the effect of friction be lessened by inducing a
|
|
>>angular velocity upon the wheels to match the airliners speed with
|
|
>
|
|
>Spinning the wheels would indeed cut down on the tire wear, and I believe that
|
|
>this has been tested. However, there are problems. When you spin a tire it acts
|
|
>as a gyroscope and will resists having it's course altered. This can make
|
|
>handling tricky as you would have 10 or more wheels all spinning on most
|
|
>airliners. Have you ever held a spinning bicycle tire in your hands and tried
|
|
>to move it? Same effect.
|
|
>
|
|
>You also need to weigh the advantages against the disadvantages. How much does
|
|
>the tire wear cost the airline? How much would mantenance on a system to spin
|
|
>the wheels cost?
|
|
>
|
|
>Plus you will have the initial cost for the system and the added weight. It is
|
|
>one more system to break down, etc...
|
|
>
|
|
>All in all it just doesn't appear to be worth it...
|
|
>
|
|
>###############################################################################
|
|
># I have one prejudice, and that is against stupidity. Use your mind, think! #
|
|
>#Email megazone@wpi.wpi.edu Moderator, WPI anime FTP site 130.215.24.1 /anime#
|
|
>###############################################################################
|
|
>
|
|
|
|
I'm glad this question was asked - I've often wondered the same thing! And I
|
|
think the answer was very thoughtful and all in all, probably states the
|
|
real reason spinnning the wheels is not done. However, if I may opine:
|
|
|
|
RE: Gyroscope effect
|
|
|
|
It seems that this could be used to advantage. After all, the wheels would
|
|
tend to make the bird retain its current course. If you didn't start
|
|
spinning till you were lined up with the runway, it seems that the spinning
|
|
wheels could conceivably even help counteract sheer forces.
|
|
|
|
RE: Maintenance
|
|
|
|
Maybe there would be NO cost, for example if the tires were designed so that
|
|
their tread caught the wind and got their spin from that. Or maybe the hubs
|
|
could be fitted with fans.
|
|
|
|
RE: Initial cost of system
|
|
|
|
I think this could be done for free, too; particularly if the tread- or hub-
|
|
induced spin just mentioned were employed. All you'd need to do is apply the
|
|
breaks to keep them from spinning until you were ready. For safety's sake,
|
|
you might want to have a "mini-brake" that would be enough to keep the
|
|
wheels from spinning but which would easily be overcome if you landed with
|
|
it applied. Seems cheap enough.
|
|
|
|
Does anyone have any estimates about the costs using the current "cloud of
|
|
smoke" and friction method of landing? How much does one of those tires
|
|
cost? What is the expected number of landings it can endure? How fast would
|
|
you have to spin the tire to get a 10% reduction in wear? 10% of the speed
|
|
of the aircraft?
|
|
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Gary Benson -_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-inc@sisu.fluke.com_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-
|
|
|
|
Stupidity cannot be cured with money, or through education, or by legislation.
|
|
Stupidity is not a sin; the victim can't help being stupid. But stupidity
|
|
is the only universal capital crime; the sentence is death, there is no
|
|
appeal, and execution is carried out automatically and without pity.
|
|
-Lazarus Long
|
|
|
|
|
|
From kls Mon Dec 28 22:47:43 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: megazone@obsidian.WPI.EDU (MegaZone23)
|
|
Subject: Re: Tire burn-out during landings
|
|
X-Submission-Date: 28 Dec 1992 03:13:01 GMT
|
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References: <airliners.1992.186@royko.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.191@royko.Chicago.COM>
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Message-ID: <airliners.1992.193@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Organization: WPI USAF -- United Society of Animation Fans
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Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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X-Submission-Message-Id: <1hlrbtINN5dp@bigboote.WPI.EDU>
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Date: 28 Dec 92 22:47:43 PST
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In article <airliners.1992.191@royko.Chicago.COM> Geoff.Miller@Corp.Sun.COM writes:
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>megazone@obsidian.WPI.EDU (MegaZone23) writes:
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>>When you spin a tire it acts as a gyroscope and will resists having it's
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>>course altered. This can make handling tricky as you would have 10 or more
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>>wheels all spinning on most airliners.
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>First, I'd think that the mass of the spinning wheels, and therefore the
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>magnitude of their gyroscopic effect on handling, would be insignificant
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>compared to the mass of the rest of the airframe and payload and the
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>power of the control surfaces.
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That's probably correct, although I don't have the weight of an average wheel
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and tire on hand to compare it seems so. Though a 26" 12-speed tire is enough
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to affect my 300lb body, I uspect the ratio of the gear to the aircraft weight
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is MUCH less...
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I too feel the major reason is cost, both for the hardware and lifetime costs.
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>Second, assuming that the effect *was* significant, wouldn't it simply be
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>a stabilizing influence, i.e., a resistance to changes in attitude about
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>the longitudinal (roll) axis? That doesn't sound all that hazardous.
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Arg,old physics comes back to haunt me...
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Making the large assumption that the mass is significant and the effect is as
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stated; I can see a few problems in that course correction includes rolling
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for turns, although I realize the angles used by airliners are a bit less than
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what I use in a C-172....
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But that is just speculation, thinking about it now I would agree that the
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mass difference makes the gyroscopic effects negligible.
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###############################################################################
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# I have one prejudice, and that is against stupidity. Use your mind, think! #
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#Email megazone@wpi.wpi.edu Moderator, WPI anime FTP site 130.215.24.1 /anime#
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###############################################################################
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From kls Mon Dec 28 22:47:45 1992
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Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
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Path: news
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From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett)
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Subject: Re: Tire burn-out during landings
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X-Submission-Date: Mon, 28 Dec 92 06:48:40 CST
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References: <airliners.1992.183@royko.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.186@royko.Chicago.COM>
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Message-ID: <airliners.1992.194@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx
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Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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X-Submission-Message-Id: <9212281248.AA13397@cactus.org>
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Date: 28 Dec 92 22:47:45 PST
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In article <airliners.1992.192@royko.Chicago.COM> you write:
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>
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>I'm glad this question was asked - I've often wondered the same thing! And I
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>think the answer was very thoughtful and all in all, probably states the
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>real reason spinnning the wheels is not done. However, if I may opine:
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>
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>RE: Gyroscope effect
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>
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>It seems that this could be used to advantage. After all, the wheels would
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>tend to make the bird retain its current course. If you didn't start
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>spinning till you were lined up with the runway, it seems that the spinning
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>wheels could conceivably even help counteract sheer forces.
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Strictly speaking, I don't see this as a gyroscopic effect. We're just
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talking about the rotational momentum set up by a spinning tire, and what to
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do about it.
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We need to consider three issues: (1), the means by which the tires get
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"spinning," (2) the actual control benefits by having the tires spinning on
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touch-down, and (3) the *additional* wear and tear on the brakes, as they
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must absorb the spinning energy, in addition to performing their normal
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task of slowing down the airplane. We could also add a (4), having the
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wheel assemblies spinning at high speed for extended periods of flight
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(outer marker to completion of roll-out), with the ramifications on the
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wheel structure (for one thing, a balancer to stop in-air "wobbling" would
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be needed).
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(3) seems the major disqualifier of the idea. With an inert tire, you'll
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have *minor* control problems ("bump", and that's it), but the energy absorbed
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by the tire in *spinning up*, on landing, in itself helps slow the airplane.
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That smoke's the energy being absorbed by the tire. If the tire's already up
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to landing speed, I can easily see landing distances lengthened considerably.
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In addition, with the excess energy being mopped up by the brakes, you've
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got a mandatory "cooling-down" time to consider. This could lengthen
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stop-over times considerably: an airplane can't take off again with hot
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brakes, since braking efficiency (which one would need for a rejected
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takeoff) goes WAY down, not to mention the resulting dangers of tire damage
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or wheel well fires.
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In reality, the issue is distance, not controllability. Anything to shorten
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takeoff and landing distances is to be supported; anything increasing them
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had better have some whopping benefits. :-) The current system is obviously
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cost-effective enough to be used. I don't have stats on tires handy, but
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the airlines do get a lot of wear out of them.
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>Does anyone have any estimates about the costs using the current "cloud of
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>smoke" and friction method of landing? How much does one of those tires
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>cost? What is the expected number of landings it can endure? How fast would
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>you have to spin the tire to get a 10% reduction in wear? 10% of the speed
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>of the aircraft?
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How would a "modified" tire design work on wet or snowy runways? And would
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a 20% increase in landing distance, resulting in a 30% reduction in the number
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of airports the carrier can service, be worth it? With companies eliminating
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movable autothrottles for 20-lb savings, do we really expect them to go for
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something with a potentially high number of "unforeseen" variables? :-)
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Landing and takeoff performance is an awesomely complex discipline. There
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are a lot of variables to consider.
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---
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Robert Dorsett
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rdd@cactus.org
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...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd
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From kls Mon Dec 28 22:47:45 1992
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Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
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Path: news
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From: EGEISELMAN@FALCON.AAMRL.WPAFB.AF.MIL
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Subject: VR COCKPIT QUESTION 12/16-3
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X-Submission-Date: Mon, 28 Dec 1992 16:11 EDT
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Message-ID: <airliners.1992.195@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Followup-To: poster
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Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Date: 28 Dec 92 22:47:45 PST
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I have an exercise that I would like to propose to the net. This exercise is
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intended to demonstrate that the collective creativity and expertise of net
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participants can be harnessed via a specific methodology. I think the net
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should be exploited as a population of subject matter experts and a source of
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user input from which the extracted information may be applied to solving real
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design problems. Through an iterative process of concept refinement, using
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the collective knowledge base of the net, it may be possible that otherwise
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undiscovered design questions, problems, concepts, capabilities, and etc be
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revealed. I am going to take a look at this idea by doing the following: I
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will post a purposely vague design question to the participants of the net. Do
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with the information what you will. For those of you who choose to
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participate in the exercise, e-mail your individual responses to me. Please
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use the date of the post you are responding to in the subject field of the
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message. Also, be sure to include the date of the post you are responding to
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in the body of the mail message. Feel free to submit questions to the net for
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clarification and discussion but I will not extract information directly from
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the net. If you need a definition or have a question, ask the net first.
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About four weeks after the original post I will submit an edited compilation
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of the net response. This post will hopefully act to spark more ideas, make
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clarifications, and identify problem areas. The refinement process will
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continue. The net may then respond to the new description in order to patch
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holes, make corrections, and propose changes. This iterative process will
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continue until responses die off and/or the concept is solidified. I will
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document this process and report the results (I will post the report).
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Sample question:
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Let's say your are given a virtual reality system. Your system consists of a
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high resolution wide field-of-view full color head mounted display devise
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(display), an extremely accurate head tracking system (transducer), and a 60Hz
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graphics generator (image generator). Given this technology, how should it be
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applied to the flight deck of a commercial airliner?
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Note: Please indicate, in your e-mail responses, if you would like your name
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and/or affiliation to be excluded from any publication which may result from
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this exercise. Any information on personal background or experience you want
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to include may be of some use. All credit and acknowledgements will be made
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as appropriate. My thanks to all who participate.
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e-mail to: EGEISELMAN@FALCON.AAMRL.WPAFB.AF.MIL
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From kls Mon Dec 28 22:49:50 1992
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Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners,sci.aeronautics
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Path: news
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From: Chris Scott <scottcr@WKUVX1.BITNET>
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Subject: GPS (DGPS) RTCA std.?
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X-Submission-Date: 21 Dec 92 13:52:52 CST
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Message-ID: <airliners.1992.196@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Followup-To: sci.aeronautics
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Organization: Western Kentucky University, Bowling Green, KY
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Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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X-Submission-Message-ID: <1992Dec21.135252.4665@wkuvx1.bitnet>
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Date: 28 Dec 92 22:49:50 PST
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Clearly GPS is going to change aviation navigation; The power
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it has to create approaches into anywhere makes the imagination
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wander...
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--
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Differential GPS has been demonstrated by (Trimble?) for the FAA
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and I think it has been discussed somewhat in *Navigation*.
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The concept is relatively simple, so it seems to me that all that is
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lacking is 1. A correction data protocol standard, and 2. The
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transport medium: (sat, vhf, atis burst, awos append...?)
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Recently I read in *Avionics* a mention about GPS GIC ..GPS
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Integrity Channel, but I have not heard about any RTCA or FAA
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formal standards being proposed in this area.
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Anyone know the direction that this is likely to go?
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Chris Scott, C/E Public Radio, Western KY Univ, (502) 745-3834
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SCOTTCR@WKUVX1.BITNET FAX OFFICE: 745-2084 FAX HM: 781-1232
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From kls Tue Dec 29 09:43:53 1992
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Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
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Path: news
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From: spackman@disco-sol.dfki.uni-sb.de (Stephen Spackman)
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Subject: Re: Tire burn-out during landings
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X-Submission-Date: 29 Dec 1992 11:47:44 GMT
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References: <airliners.1992.183@royko.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.186@royko.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.194@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Message-ID: <airliners.1992.197@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Reply-To: stephen@acm.org
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Organization: DFKI Saarbruecken GmbH, D-W 6600 Saarbruecken
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Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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X-Submission-Message-Id: <SPACKMAN.92Dec29125212@disco-sol.dfki.uni-sb.de>
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Date: 29 Dec 92 09:43:53 PST
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|
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In article <airliners.1992.194@ohare.Chicago.COM> rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) writes:
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|>RE: Gyroscope effect
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|>It seems that this could be used to advantage. After all, the wheels would
|
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|>tend to make the bird retain its current course. If you didn't start
|
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|>spinning till you were lined up with the runway, it seems that the spinning
|
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|>wheels could conceivably even help counteract sheer forces.
|
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|
|
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|Strictly speaking, I don't see this as a gyroscopic effect. We're just
|
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|talking about the rotational momentum set up by a spinning tire, and what to
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|do about it.
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|
|
There *is* definitely also a gyroscopic effect, but I agree that it's
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hard to imagine that it would be very significant.
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|
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|(3) seems the major disqualifier of the idea. With an inert tire, you'll
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|have *minor* control problems ("bump", and that's it), but the energy absorbed
|
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|by the tire in *spinning up*, on landing, in itself helps slow the airplane.
|
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|That smoke's the energy being absorbed by the tire. If the tire's already up
|
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|to landing speed, I can easily see landing distances lengthened considerably.
|
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|
|
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|In addition, with the excess energy being mopped up by the brakes, you've
|
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|got a mandatory "cooling-down" time to consider. This could lengthen
|
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|stop-over times considerably: an airplane can't take off again with hot
|
|
|brakes, since braking efficiency (which one would need for a rejected
|
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|takeoff) goes WAY down, not to mention the resulting dangers of tire damage
|
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|or wheel well fires.
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We should go carefully here. The auto industry has only recently started
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putting anitlock brakes on consumer vehicles because it is "intuitively
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obvious" that a sliding tire brakes you better than a rolling one. It's
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also completely false - sliding friction is significantly lower than
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static friction (and it's static friction, not rolling friction, that's
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the right analysis when the brakes are on and you are on a good surface)
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- which is part of the reason trucks have used such brakes for much of
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my lifetime (the other is to avoid jackknifing. If aircraft have trouble
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in bad weather from uneven lateral braking forces causing them to slew
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suddenly at touchdown, that argument applies here, too; theoretically it
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might also help compensate for crosswinds, but now it's *really* time
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for me to defer to an expert). The effect is so pronounced that the
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method of *releasing the brakes completely* whenever adhesion drops is
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apparently a win (of course, you reapply them as soon as the sliding
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stops).
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I would guess that in fact having the tyres hit the ground synchronous
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would let you apply full mechanical braking force *immediately* without
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having to wait for the bumping and sliding to stop, and this should let
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you stop sooner.
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As to the brake cooling issue (assuming it is real and you can't just
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put bigger fins on :-), my computer scientist's instinct (not
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necessarily to be followed in the mechanical domain...) is to say, let
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the brakes look to themselves: we could put a processor in there that
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measures *both* temperature and adhesion and controls brake application
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- with respect to measured speed and a reported distance left to roll.
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It should be easy enough to programme the thing so that it is kinder to
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the brakes when there is lots of room, but knows enough to overstress
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them in emergencies. We can easily arrange it so that there is a
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mechanical override, if you like, too.
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Increased complexity, perhaps, but a more tightly controlled braking
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profile would again argue in favour of the non-slip approach.
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|Landing and takeoff performance is an awesomely complex discipline. There
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|are a lot of variables to consider.
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Sounds like we may have found another whole batch.
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Disclaimer: I'm in programming languages, so what would I know?
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
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stephen p spackman +49 681 302 5288(o) 5282(sec) stephen@acm.org
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dfki / stuhlsatzenhausweg 3 / d-w-6600 saarbruecken 11 / germany
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
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From kls Tue Dec 29 12:39:16 1992
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Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
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Path: news
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From: drchambe@tekig5.pen.tek.com (Dennis Chamberlin)
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Subject: Re: Tire burn-out during landings
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X-Submission-Date: 29 Dec 92 17:38:58 GMT
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References: <airliners.1992.183@royko.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.186@royko.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.192@royko.Chicago.COM>
|
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Message-ID: <airliners.1992.198@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
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Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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Reply-To: drchambe@tekig5.pen.tek.com (Dennis Chamberlin)
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Organization: Tektronix, Inc., Beaverton, OR.
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Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
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X-Submission-Message-Id: <8105@tekig7.PEN.TEK.COM>
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Date: 29 Dec 92 12:39:16 PST
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In article <airliners.1992.192@royko.Chicago.COM> inc@tc.fluke.COM (Gary Benson) writes:
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>
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>Does anyone have any estimates about the costs using the current "cloud of
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>smoke" and friction method of landing? How much does one of those tires
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>cost?
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>
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I recall an old issue of AWST that described the certification flight test
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program for the first 747. The flight test budget included a 3 million $
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line item for "Wheels, tires, and brakes".
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At least one of these tests was known to be destructive. The worst-case
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demonstration of a takeoff abort would seem to thoroughly cook all of the
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tires and brakes. I don't know if any of the wheels were savable.
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From kls Tue Dec 29 22:53:45 1992
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Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
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Path: news
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From: wolfgang@trout.nosc.mil (Lewis E. Wolfgang)
|
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Subject: Re: Tire burn-out during landings
|
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X-Submission-Date: Tue, 29 Dec 1992 19:45:12 GMT
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References: <airliners.1992.194@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
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Message-ID: <airliners.1992.199@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Reply-To: wolfgang@trout.nosc.mil
|
|
Organization: NCCOSC, NRaD Division
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <1992Dec29.194512.10054@nosc.mil>
|
|
Date: 29 Dec 92 22:53:45 PST
|
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|
|
In article 194@ohare.Chicago.COM, rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) writes:
|
|
|
|
>Strictly speaking, I don't see this as a gyroscopic effect. We're just
|
|
>talking about the rotational momentum set up by a spinning tire, and what to
|
|
>do about it.
|
|
|
|
(Stuff deleted)
|
|
>
|
|
> (3) the *additional* wear and tear on the brakes, as they
|
|
>must absorb the spinning energy, in addition to performing their normal
|
|
>task of slowing down the airplane.
|
|
|
|
>(3) seems the major disqualifier of the idea. With an inert tire, you'll
|
|
>have *minor* control problems ("bump", and that's it), but the energy absorbed
|
|
>by the tire in *spinning up*, on landing, in itself helps slow the airplane.
|
|
>That smoke's the energy being absorbed by the tire. If the tire's already up
|
|
>to landing speed, I can easily see landing distances lengthened considerably.
|
|
|
|
(lots more stuff deleted)
|
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|
|
Robert, I think you have your mass off by several orders of magnitude. If the
|
|
mass of the rotating tires is insignificant compared to the total mass of the
|
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airframe (to negate the gyroscopic effect) then it will contribute negligibly
|
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to the stopping distance.
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Consider, if you will, when the pilot manages to "grease" one on: no noticeable
|
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deceleration is observe at the moment of touchdown. There may be a vertical
|
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"bump", but not a horizontal one. (if there is no crosswind component)
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IMHO you would see no measurable difference in rollout distance or residual heat
|
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in the brake system.
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Luck
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Lewie
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wolfgang@nosc.mil
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From kls Tue Dec 29 22:53:48 1992
|
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Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: yarvin-norman@CS.YALE.EDU (Norman Yarvin)
|
|
Subject: Re: Tire burn-out during landings
|
|
X-Submission-Date: 29 Dec 1992 17:32:00 -0500
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.183@royko.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.186@royko.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.194@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.200@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Yale Computer Science Department
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <1hqjl0INNsk6@CATHY.NA.CS.YALE.EDU>
|
|
Date: 29 Dec 92 22:53:48 PST
|
|
|
|
rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) writes:
|
|
> [...] (3) the *additional* wear and tear on the brakes, as they
|
|
>must absorb the spinning energy, in addition to performing their normal
|
|
>task of slowing down the airplane. [...]
|
|
|
|
This additional energy is negligible. Consider just the energy of the wheel
|
|
itself. For a wheel which is rolling along the ground there is the relation:
|
|
|
|
(rotational energy) = (some constant) * (energy of forward motion)
|
|
|
|
where the constant is independent of speed. I seem to recall that for a
|
|
cylindrical wheel of uniform consistency, the constant is 2/7. At absolute
|
|
worst the constant will be 1. (This would occur if the entire mass of the
|
|
wheel were on the tread of the tire.)
|
|
|
|
Furthermore the energy of forward motion of the wheel is an insignificant
|
|
portion of the energy of the entire aircraft. This goes by weight; if the
|
|
airliner weighs 100,000 pounds and a wheel weighs 300, the proportion of
|
|
energy in that wheel would be 3/1000 of the aircraft's energy. Then, using
|
|
the 2/7 figure, the spinning energy of the wheel would be 3/1000*2/7 = .08%
|
|
of the energy of forward motion of the aircraft.
|
|
|
|
Assuming constant deceleration force, stopping distance would be lengthened
|
|
by that same .08%. Even the weight of the mechanism required to speed up the
|
|
tires might be a bigger factor.
|
|
|
|
In any case, the practicality of preventing tires from disintegrating
|
|
depends on how fast tires presently disintegrate. How much matter really is
|
|
there in that cloud of smoke? Perhaps a gram per cubic meter of smoke? And
|
|
how much tire is left on the runway? Do they have to go out and scrape it
|
|
off now and then? (I imagine not.) Seems to me the loss of tire material
|
|
is negligible also. Compared, that is, with the other costs of running the
|
|
airplane.
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Norman Yarvin yarvin@cs.yale.edu
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 29 22:53:48 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: mweiss@mis.mi04.zds.com (Mitchell Weiss)
|
|
Subject: Re: Aha! The three-man 767 rears its ugly head...
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Tue, 29 Dec 1992 23:26:40 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.185@royko.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.201@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Zenith Data Systems
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <1992Dec29.232640.16703@mis.mi04.zds.com>
|
|
Date: 29 Dec 92 22:53:48 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.185@royko.Chicago.COM> rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) writes:
|
|
>
|
|
>I knew I wasn't going mad... In a recent post, I commented on a three-man
|
|
>767. Karl hadn't heard of it, which surprised me, so I went looking for
|
|
>it--and couldn't find it--which surprised me even more. I finally ran across
|
|
>this blurb.
|
|
>
|
|
Harvard MBA folks publish an entire case study on the changeover from
|
|
a three-man cockpit to a two man cockpit. It seems that the initial
|
|
production runs of the 767's were three-man. Now, as a case study
|
|
they never said what Boeing did. Did they change them before sale?
|
|
|
|
I don't know. I know little about airlines, except of course
|
|
how to buckle a seat belt and pray that my luggage arrives. :-)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 29 22:53:49 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard)
|
|
Subject: Re: Safety and design rankings (was Re: Flight controls)
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Tue, 29 Dec 1992 23:35:50 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.138@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.144@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.163@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.202@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Boeing
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <C01o7s.6up@bcstec.ca.boeing.com>
|
|
Date: 29 Dec 92 22:53:49 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.163@ohare.Chicago.COM> kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) writes:
|
|
>In article <airliners.1992.144@ohare.Chicago.COM> rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu writes:
|
|
>>I would suggest not: the former is more of a derivative, the latter more of
|
|
>>a new type, with its new wing (which was designed to support the all-upper-
|
|
>>deck concept, plus maybe one more derivative after that) ...
|
|
|
|
Both airplanes are derivatives, actually. The MD-11 was certified under
|
|
the DC-10's certification basis.
|
|
|
|
>My understanding was that the 747-400 does *not* have a new wing but
|
|
>rather a tweaked version of the original. I recall some statement
|
|
>from Boeing regarding the lack of winglets on the 777, which noted
|
|
>that the 777 had a new wing and starting from a clean slate it was
|
|
>more efficient to not have them, whereas working from an existing
|
|
>design as with the 747-400 it was helpful to have them.
|
|
|
|
I can't speak to exactly how much of the 747-400's wing design could be
|
|
considered 'new', but I do know that it was modified extensively to
|
|
change the pressure distribution across the wing - particularly the
|
|
inboard wing where we were seeing double shocks on the older models.
|
|
|
|
>What I've seen suggests the F.100 is quite advanced, probably not far
|
|
>behind the A320 and perhaps closer to the Airbus philosophy than to
|
|
>Boeing's.
|
|
|
|
The Fokker 100's flight deck is much more Boeing-esk than Airbus-ish.
|
|
There are control columns, and the FMS is very similar to the Boeing
|
|
models. The F 100 does have envelope protection, as do the Airbus
|
|
airplanes, but I don't think you would find it much different from
|
|
what is already flying. It is a very advanced flight deck, very
|
|
clean.
|
|
|
|
>> INS/PMS, conventional otherwise
|
|
>
|
|
>Ok, I'll risk it ... what's PMS? (We're talking about airplanes!)
|
|
|
|
Could it be the Performance Management System, a la Douglas MD-80? :-)
|
|
|
|
>I've always wondered just what the flight engineer really does on a
|
|
>767 equipped for three flight crew. I believe QANTAS does this.
|
|
>Also, some A310s lack the FFCS (Forward Facing Crew Cockpit) having
|
|
>instead what I assume is a cockpit more like an older A300. All of
|
|
>these are due primarily to union/labor pressures.
|
|
|
|
You are quite right, three-crew cockpits are union requirements on some
|
|
airlines. The flight engineer on a 767 would do the same job done
|
|
on other three-crew airplanes - deal with onboard systems. All those
|
|
nifty controller boxes are left behind in Seattle. :-)
|
|
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Terry
|
|
drinkard@bcstec.boeing.com
|
|
"Anyone who thinks they can hold the company responsible for what I say has
|
|
more lawyers than sense."
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 29 22:53:50 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard)
|
|
Subject: Re: Economics of new vs. older planes
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Tue, 29 Dec 1992 23:46:42 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.165@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.203@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Boeing
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <C01opw.76F@bcstec.ca.boeing.com>
|
|
Date: 29 Dec 92 22:53:50 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.165@ohare.Chicago.COM> John DiMarco <jdd@cdf.toronto.edu> writes:
|
|
>I understand there's an airfield in Arizona where unused airliners are parked
|
|
>for extended periods. I'm wondering, considering the economic doldrums
|
|
>most airline companies seem to be in, why these planes are not put into
|
|
>use in lieu of buying new ones?
|
|
>
|
|
>The answer, I think, would depend on the difference in operating costs between
|
|
>new and older planes. Could someone with a better understanding of these issues
|
|
>shed some light on this? Solid numbers (eg. purchase prices of new vs. used
|
|
>planes, fuel consumption differences, etc.) would be highly appreciated.
|
|
|
|
Well, it is not a simple question John asks here. For instance, lots of
|
|
727-200s parked at Davis-Monthan, and at Mojave. A used 727-200 Advanced
|
|
should bring between one and two million (prices are subject to
|
|
inbelieveable fluctuations). 727s of any sort are no longer available new.
|
|
The nearest replacement airplane, regardless of what the Boeing PR office
|
|
may say, is the Airbus A320 - catalog price of about $41 MILLION. Granted,
|
|
the 727 has a fuel burn half again larger for the same route, same payload,
|
|
same speed, but it costs a whole lot less to acquire. Unfortunately for
|
|
727 owners, they are stage two noise compliant. This means that they will
|
|
no longer be allowed to operate in the domestic US after 2000 or so.
|
|
Europe is much the same. This short economic life must be take into
|
|
account before purchasing our hypothetical 727.
|
|
|
|
Another aspect is if one has already purchased a 757, for instance, then
|
|
one is still obligated to make the loan payment each month. And the loan
|
|
payments are huge. So, if you already have the airplane, you may as well
|
|
put it to work, especially if it is more efficient than some other
|
|
airplane.
|
|
|
|
Lastly, I'd like to mention that over-capacity is one primary problem that
|
|
the airlines are trying to deal with. Adding more available seat miles is
|
|
not a solution.
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Terry
|
|
drinkard@bcstec.boeing.com
|
|
"Anyone who thinks they can hold the company responsible for what I say has
|
|
more lawyers than sense."
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 29 22:53:50 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: chuckh@apex.com (Chuck Huffington)
|
|
Subject: Re: Tire burn-out during landings
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Tue, 29 Dec 1992 23:57:30 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.183@royko.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.186@royko.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.192@royko.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.204@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Apex Computer Company
|
|
X-Submission-Message-ID: <1992Dec29.235730.7247@apex.com>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 29 Dec 92 22:53:50 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.192@royko.Chicago.COM> inc@tc.fluke.COM (Gary Benson) writes:
|
|
>RE: Maintenance
|
|
>
|
|
>Maybe there would be NO cost, for example if the tires were designed so that
|
|
>their tread caught the wind and got their spin from that. Or maybe the hubs
|
|
>could be fitted with fans.
|
|
|
|
This has been done. I have seen old tires with molded in "scoops" on
|
|
the sidewall that spun them up in the airstream.
|
|
|
|
I'm not sure but I seem to recall the idea was dropped because the
|
|
the additional wear on the brakes more than made up for the reduced
|
|
wear on the tires. Apparently a lot of braking action occurs
|
|
when the not spinning tires hit the pavement.
|
|
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 29 22:53:51 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard)
|
|
Subject: Re: Safety and design rankings (was Re: Flight controls)
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 30 Dec 1992 00:01:22 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.144@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.163@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.173@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.205@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Boeing
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <C01pEB.7sA@bcstec.ca.boeing.com>
|
|
Date: 29 Dec 92 22:53:51 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.173@ohare.Chicago.COM> hoyme@src.honeywell.com (Ken Hoyme) writes:
|
|
>
|
|
>In article <airliners.1992.163@ohare.Chicago.COM> kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) writes:
|
|
>> My understanding was that the 747-400 does *not* have a new wing but
|
|
>> rather a tweaked version of the original. I recall some statement
|
|
>> from Boeing regarding the lack of winglets on the 777, which noted
|
|
>> that the 777 had a new wing and starting from a clean slate it was
|
|
>> more efficient to not have them, whereas working from an existing
|
|
>> design as with the 747-400 it was helpful to have them.
|
|
|
|
One further comment. The 747 is constrained on span, therefore the
|
|
winglets were the optimal choice for improving the efficiency of the wing.
|
|
The 777 has chosen to offer two options: folding wingtips, and 'ignore the
|
|
existing infrastructure'. Both options allow an unconstrained span, which
|
|
gives better induced drag performance.
|
|
|
|
>I believe the winglets issue on the 777 was also complicated by the
|
|
>folding wing option. Which no one has ordered -- even those airlines
|
|
>who originally expressed interest in the option. Has development on the
|
|
>folding wing stopped?? I had heard that Boeing was getting tired of the
|
|
>investment required to keep the option open while not receiving any
|
|
>orders for it.
|
|
|
|
I don't think I'm giving anything away by saying that the folding wingtip
|
|
option is still being studied, primarily by the New Large Airplane
|
|
Division. They apparently don't think they can get away with a 'damn the
|
|
infrastructure' attitude. :-)
|
|
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Terry
|
|
drinkard@bcstec.boeing.com
|
|
"Anyone who thinks they can hold the company responsible for what I say has
|
|
more lawyers than sense."
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 29 22:53:52 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz)
|
|
Subject: Re: Aha! The three-man 767 rears its ugly head...
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 30 Dec 1992 06:51:50 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.185@royko.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.206@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Chicago Software Works
|
|
X-Submission-Message-ID: <1992Dec30.065150.13652@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Date: 29 Dec 92 22:53:52 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.185@royko.Chicago.COM> rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) writes:
|
|
|
|
>I have no recollection of a picture of one of these critters, though. Can
|
|
>someone clear up this matter?
|
|
|
|
Yesterday I flew back from Chicago on a 757, and since United takes
|
|
advantage of the common rating for flight crews on 757s and 767s I
|
|
figured the guys up front might be able to answer this question.
|
|
|
|
They agreed that none of the United 767s have a three-person flight
|
|
deck, including the second 767 built (N601UA; the first is still with
|
|
Boeing) which one of the guys had been on recently. As far as either
|
|
could recall these aircraft were delivered without the third position
|
|
though they pointed out that the luxuriously roomy cockpit was because
|
|
the original design did have the third position, and one mentioned
|
|
that the first simulators had the FE panel.
|
|
|
|
Note that the first 767 actually delivered (to United) was the ninth
|
|
built. The second one (again, Boeing kept the first) was delivered to
|
|
United six months later, time which could well have been spent removing
|
|
the FE panel as well as restoring the aircraft after the flight tests.
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com
|
|
1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls
|
|
|Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA
|
|
Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com
|
|
|
|
From kls Tue Dec 29 23:02:31 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz)
|
|
Subject: Re: Safety and design rankings (was Re: Flight controls)
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 30 Dec 1992 07:00:42 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.163@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.173@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.205@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.207@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Chicago Software Works
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-ID: <1992Dec30.070042.13889@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Date: 29 Dec 92 23:02:31 PST
|
|
|
|
In article <airliners.1992.205@ohare.Chicago.COM> drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard) writes:
|
|
|
|
>I don't think I'm giving anything away by saying that the folding wingtip
|
|
>option is still being studied, primarily by the New Large Airplane
|
|
>Division. They apparently don't think they can get away with a 'damn the
|
|
>infrastructure' attitude. :-)
|
|
|
|
It's also still being offered on the 777, as far as I know. My
|
|
understanding was the part of United's reason for not ordering the
|
|
option was the weight penalty -- 3,900 lbs., or 2,000 for just the
|
|
hinges and stuff without the actuation mechanism, which allows easy
|
|
addition later on. United preferred the weight savings and even at
|
|
that went with a higher MGTOW version in order to operate the 777
|
|
on Chicago to Hawaii routes, which are right at the range limits of
|
|
the A-market 777.
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com
|
|
1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls
|
|
|Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA
|
|
Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Dec 30 11:20:04 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: barnett@convex.com (Paul Barnett)
|
|
Subject: Re: Tire burn-out during landings
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 30 Dec 1992 15:37:40 GMT
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.183@royko.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.186@royko.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.194@ohare.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.200@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.208@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Engineering, CONVEX Computer Corp., Richardson, Tx., USA
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <barnett.725729860@convex.convex.com>
|
|
Date: 30 Dec 92 11:20:04 PST
|
|
|
|
In <airliners.1992.200@ohare.Chicago.COM> yarvin-norman@CS.YALE.EDU (Norman Yarvin) writes:
|
|
|
|
>In any case, the practicality of preventing tires from disintegrating
|
|
>depends on how fast tires presently disintegrate. How much matter really is
|
|
>there in that cloud of smoke? Perhaps a gram per cubic meter of smoke? And
|
|
>how much tire is left on the runway? Do they have to go out and scrape it
|
|
>off now and then? (I imagine not.) Seems to me the loss of tire material
|
|
>is negligible also. Compared, that is, with the other costs of running the
|
|
>airplane.
|
|
|
|
Actually, yes, they do go out and "scrape" it off now and then.
|
|
One popular method is very high pressure water jets.
|
|
|
|
Having said that, I will comment that the most convincing argument I
|
|
have heard so far is that the additional weight added by any spin-up
|
|
system would negate any reduction in tire wear.
|
|
--
|
|
Paul Barnett
|
|
MPP OS Development (214)-497-4846
|
|
Convex Computer Corp. Richardson, TX
|
|
|
|
From kls Wed Dec 30 12:55:24 1992
|
|
Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
|
|
Path: news
|
|
From: Tony Heatwole <HEATWOLE@LANDO.HNS.COM>
|
|
Subject: Re: Boeing 767 Cockpit Size
|
|
X-Submission-Date: Wed, 30 Dec 1992 13:21 EST
|
|
References: <airliners.1992.185@royko.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.209@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-Id: <CDC8CF352001CDF9@LANDO.HNS.COM>
|
|
Date: 30 Dec 92 12:55:24 PST
|
|
|
|
I have a reprint of the Harvard Business School case study on
|
|
the Boeing 767 (#9-688-040, Rev. 2/89). It's a fascinating
|
|
look at technology, manufacturing, and the culture of the
|
|
Boeing Corporation. With regard to the 767 crew size:
|
|
|
|
"In August 1981, eleven months before the first scheduled
|
|
delivery of Boeing's new airplane, the 767, Dean Thornton,
|
|
program's vice president - general manager, faced a critical
|
|
decision. For several years, Boeing had lobbied the FAA
|
|
for permission to build wide-bodied aircraft with two-, rather
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than three person cockpits. Permission had been granted late
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in July. Unfortunately, the 767 had originally been designed
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with a three-person cockpit, and 30 of those planes were
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already in various stages of production.
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" . . . Engineers concluded that the thirty-first 767 was
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still far enough from completion that it, and all subsequent
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planes, could be built with two-person cockpits without
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modification. Thirty planes, however, were in relatively
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advanced stages of production. Some were nearly ready to
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to be rolled out and flown; others had complete cockpits but
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were not yet tested; others had bare cockpits without any
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electronics installed. But since all thirty were being built
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according to the plane's original, three-person cockpit design,
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all would require some modification.
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" . . . Customers were notified of the additional cost and
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delivery delay they could expect on these thirty planes. The
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|
impact was not large: a small percentage increase in costs and
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an average delay of one month from promised delivery dates.
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All but one airline chose to have their planes built with
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two-person cockpits."
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So, the interesting question is, what was the *one* airline, and
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what has become of their 3-person cockpit 767s? Were these
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planes later converted to 2-person cockpits? I don't know the
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answers, but I'm curious.
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Interestingly, Boeing decided to complete the first 30 767s as
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originally designed, for 3-person cockpits. Then, they converted
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the 30 (less the set to be delivered as 3-person cockpit) to
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2-person operation as a batch. This avoided the safety and
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manufacturing problems of trying to convert a number of planes in
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different stages of manufacture.
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Tony Heatwole
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Gaithersburg, MD
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heatwole@hns.com
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From kls Wed Dec 30 13:27:32 1992
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Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners
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Path: news
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From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz)
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Subject: Re: Boeing 767 Cockpit Size
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X-Submission-Date: Wed, 30 Dec 1992 21:24:22 GMT
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References: <airliners.1992.185@royko.Chicago.COM> <airliners.1992.209@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Message-ID: <airliners.1992.210@ohare.Chicago.COM>
|
|
Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
Organization: Chicago Software Works
|
|
Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM
|
|
X-Submission-Message-ID: <1992Dec30.212422.15659@ohare.Chicago.COM>
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Date: 30 Dec 92 13:27:32 PST
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In article <airliners.1992.209@ohare.Chicago.COM> Tony Heatwole <HEATWOLE@LANDO.HNS.COM> writes:
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> "In August 1981, eleven months before the first scheduled
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> delivery of Boeing's new airplane, the 767, Dean Thornton,
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> program's vice president - general manager, faced a critical
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> decision ...
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> " . . . Customers were notified of the additional cost and
|
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> delivery delay they could expect on these thirty planes. The
|
|
> impact was not large: a small percentage increase in costs and
|
|
> an average delay of one month from promised delivery dates.
|
|
> All but one airline chose to have their planes built with
|
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> two-person cockpits."
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>
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>So, the interesting question is, what was the *one* airline, and
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>what has become of their 3-person cockpit 767s? Were these
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>planes later converted to 2-person cockpits? I don't know the
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|
>answers, but I'm curious.
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Here are the first thirty-one 767s:
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ln sn model first flt customer reg'n
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-- ----- ------- --------- -------- -----
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1 22233 767-200 8/26/81 Boeing N767BA
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2 21862 767-222 11/ 4/81 United N601UA
|
|
3 21863 767-222 11/24/81 United N602UA
|
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4 21864 767-222 12/19/81 United N603UA
|
|
5 21865 767-222 1/18/82 United N604UA
|
|
6 22213 767-232 2/19/82 Delta N101DA
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7 21866 767-222 3/25/82 United N605UA
|
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8 22307 767-223 10/ 6/82 American N301AA
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9 21867 767-222 7/20/82 United N606UA
|
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10 21868 767-222 8/13/82 United N607UA
|
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11 21869 767-222 7/19/82 United N608UA
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12 22214 767-232 8/27/82 Delta N102DA
|
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13 21870 767-222 9/17/82 United N609UA
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14 22564 767-231 10/15/82 TWA N601TW
|
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15 21871 767-222 10/30/82 United N610UA
|
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16 22517 767-233 10/ 9/82 Air Canada C-GAUB
|
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17 22215 767-232 9/25/82 Delta N103DA
|
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18 22681 767-209 11/23/82 China Airlines B-1836
|
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19 22308 767-223 11/ 1/82 American N302AA
|
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20 21872 767-222 1/27/83 United N611UA
|
|
21 22565 767-231 11/13/82 TWA N602TW
|
|
22 22518 767-233 11/ 9/82 Air Canada C-GAUE
|
|
23 22309 767-223 11/16/82 American N303AA
|
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24 22692 767-277 5/ 4/83 Ansett VH-RMD
|
|
25 22310 767-223 1/18/83 American N304AA
|
|
26 22216 767-232 11/24/82 Delta N104DA
|
|
27 22217 767-232 12/17/82 Delta N105DA
|
|
28 22693 767-277 5/20/83 Ansett VH-RME
|
|
29 22566 767-231 12/14/82 TWA N603TW
|
|
30 22567 767-231 1/28/83 TWA N604TW
|
|
31 22218 767-232 11/10/82 Delta N106DA
|
|
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|
I know United's are two-man and would bet the same for American,
|
|
Delta, and TWA. Probably Air Canada. That leaves China Airlines
|
|
and Ansett. I suspect the latter as I recall hearing about some
|
|
Australian airline having three-man 767s. Any Aussie friends know
|
|
for sure? Do their later 767s have three-man crews as well?
|
|
|
|
BTW, I believe all thirty-one of these are still with their original
|
|
owners with the possibly exception of TWA's -- some TWA 767s were
|
|
sold earlier this year though I'm not sure if they were the oldest
|
|
or newest ones.
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--
|
|
Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com
|
|
1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls
|
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|Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA
|
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Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com
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