497 lines
23 KiB
Plaintext
497 lines
23 KiB
Plaintext
Executive Guide to the Protection of Information
|
||
Resources
|
||
|
||
National Institute of Standards and Technology
|
||
|
||
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), is
|
||
responsible for developing standards, providing technical
|
||
assistance, and conducting research for computers and related
|
||
telecommunications systems. These activities provide technical
|
||
support to government and industry in the effective, safe, and
|
||
economical use of computers. With the passage of the Computer
|
||
Security Act of 1987 (P.L. 100-235), NIST's activities also
|
||
include the development of standards and guidelines needed to
|
||
assure the cost-effective security and privacy of sensitive
|
||
information in Federal computer systems. This guide is just one
|
||
of three brochures designed for a specific audience. The
|
||
"Managers Guide to the Protection of Information Resources" and
|
||
the "Computer User's Guide to the Protection of Information
|
||
Resources" complete the series.
|
||
|
||
Acknowledgments
|
||
This guide was written by Cheryl Helsing of Deloitte, Haskins &
|
||
Sells in conjunction with Marianne Swanson and Mary Anne Todd,
|
||
National Institute of Standards and Technology.
|
||
|
||
Table of Contents
|
||
Introduction 1
|
||
Executive Responsibilities 3
|
||
Executive Goals 5
|
||
Information Protection Program Elements 7
|
||
Information Protection Program Implementation 11
|
||
For Additional Information 15
|
||
Introduction
|
||
|
||
Federal agencies are becoming increasingly
|
||
dependent upon automated information systems to carry out their
|
||
missions. While in the past, executives have taken a hands-off
|
||
approach in dealing with these resources, essentially leaving the
|
||
area to the computer technologist, they are now recognizing that
|
||
computers and computer-related problems must be understood and
|
||
managed, the same as any other resource.
|
||
|
||
The success of an information resources protection
|
||
program depends on the policy generated, and on the attitude of
|
||
management toward securing information on automated systems.
|
||
You, the policy maker, set the tone and the emphasis on how
|
||
important a role information security will have within your
|
||
agency. Your primary responsibility is to set the information
|
||
resource security policy for the organization with the objectives
|
||
of reduced risk, compliance with laws and regulations and
|
||
assurance of operational continuity, information integrity, and
|
||
confidentiality.
|
||
|
||
Purpose of this Guide
|
||
This guide is designed to help you, the policy
|
||
maker, address a host of questions regarding the protection and
|
||
safety of computer systems and data processed within your agency.
|
||
It introduces information systems security concerns, outlines the
|
||
management issues that must be addressed by agency policies and
|
||
programs, and describes essential components of an effective
|
||
implementation process.
|
||
|
||
The Risks
|
||
The proliferation of personal computers,
|
||
local-area networks, and distributed processing has drastically
|
||
changed the way we manage and control information resources.
|
||
Internal controls and control points that were present in the
|
||
past when we were dealing with manual or batch processes have not
|
||
always been replaced with comparable controls in many of today's
|
||
automated systems. Reliance upon inadequately controlled
|
||
information systems can have serious consequences, including:
|
||
|
||
Inability or impairment of the agency's ability to
|
||
perform its mission
|
||
|
||
Inability to provide needed services to the public
|
||
|
||
Waste, loss, misuse, or misappropriation of funds
|
||
|
||
Loss of credibility or embarrassment to an agency
|
||
|
||
To avoid these consequences, a broad set of
|
||
information security issues must be addressed effectively and
|
||
comprehensively. Towards this end, executives should take a
|
||
traditional risk management approach, recognizing that risks are
|
||
taken in the day-to-day management of an organization, and that
|
||
there are alternatives to consider in managing these risks. Risk
|
||
is accepted as part of doing business or is reduced or eliminated
|
||
by modifying operations or by employing control mechanisms.
|
||
|
||
Executive Responsibilities
|
||
Set the Security Policy of the Organization
|
||
Protecting information resources is an important goal for all
|
||
organizations. This goal is met by establishing an
|
||
information resource security program. It will require staff,
|
||
funding and positive incentives to motivate employees to
|
||
participate in a program to protect these valuable assets.
|
||
This information resource protection policy should
|
||
state precisely:
|
||
|
||
the value to the agency of data and information
|
||
resources and the need to preserve their integrity, availability,
|
||
and confidentiality
|
||
|
||
the intent of the organization to protect the resources
|
||
from accidental or deliberate unauthorized disclosure,
|
||
modification, or destruction by employing cost-effective controls
|
||
|
||
the assignment of responsibility for data security
|
||
throughout the organization
|
||
|
||
the requirement to provide computer security and
|
||
awareness training to all employees having access to information
|
||
resources
|
||
|
||
the intent to hold employees personally accountable for
|
||
information resources entrusted to them
|
||
|
||
the requirement to monitor and assess data security via
|
||
internal and external audit procedures
|
||
|
||
the penalties for not adhering to the policy
|
||
|
||
Executive Goals
|
||
The policy established for securing information
|
||
resources should meet the basic goals of reducing the risk,
|
||
complying with applicable laws and regulations, and assuring
|
||
operational continuity, integrity and confidentiality. This
|
||
section briefly describes these objectives and how they can be
|
||
met.
|
||
|
||
Reduce Risk To An Acceptable Level
|
||
The dollars spent for security measures to control
|
||
or contain losses should never be more than the projected dollar
|
||
loss if something adverse happened to the information resource.
|
||
Cost-effective security results when reduction in risk is
|
||
balanced with the cost of implementing safeguards. The greater
|
||
the value of information processed, or the more severe the
|
||
consequences if something happens to it, the greater the need
|
||
for control measures to protect it. It is important that these
|
||
trade-offs of cost versus risk reduction be explicitly
|
||
considered, and that executives understand the degree of risk
|
||
remaining after selected controls are implemented.
|
||
|
||
Assure Operational Continuity
|
||
With ever-increasing demands for timely
|
||
information and greater volumes of information being processed,
|
||
availability of essential systems, networks, and data is a major
|
||
protection issue. In some cases, service disruptions of just a
|
||
few hours are unacceptable. Agency reliance on essential
|
||
computer systems requires that advance planning be done to allow
|
||
timely restoration of processing capabilities in the event of
|
||
severe service disruption. The impact due to inability to process
|
||
data should be assessed, and action taken to assure availability
|
||
of those systems considered essential to agency operation.
|
||
|
||
Comply with Applicable Laws and Regulations
|
||
As the pervasiveness of computer systems increases
|
||
and the risks and vulnerabilities associated with information
|
||
systems become better understood, the body of law and regulations
|
||
compelling positive action to protect information resources
|
||
grows. OMB Circular No. A-130, "Management of Federal Information
|
||
|
||
ystems," and Public Law 100-235, "Computer Security Act of 1987"
|
||
are two documents where the knowledge of these laws provide a
|
||
baseline for an information resources security program.
|
||
|
||
Assure Integrity and Confidentiality
|
||
An important objective of an information resource
|
||
management program is to ensure that the information is accurate.
|
||
Integrity of information means you can trust the data and the
|
||
processes that manipulate it. A system has integrity when it
|
||
provides sufficient accuracy and completeness to meet the needs
|
||
of the user(s). It should be properly designed to automate all
|
||
functional requirements, include appropriate accounting and
|
||
integrity controls, and accommodate the full range of potential
|
||
conditions that might be encountered in its operation.
|
||
|
||
Agency information should also be protected from
|
||
intruders, as well as from employees with authorized computer
|
||
access privileges who attempt to perform unauthorized actions.
|
||
Assured confidentiality of sensitive data is
|
||
often, but not always, a requirement of agency systems. Privacy
|
||
requirements for personal information are generally dictated by
|
||
statute, while protection requirements for other agency
|
||
information are a function of the nature of that information.
|
||
Determination of requirements in the latter case is made by the
|
||
official responsible for that information. The impact of
|
||
wrongful disclosure should be considered in understanding
|
||
confidentiality requirements.
|
||
|
||
Information Protection Program Elements
|
||
|
||
Need for Policies and Procedures
|
||
Successful execution of the responsibilities previously outlined
|
||
requires establishing agency policies and practices regarding
|
||
information protection. The security policy
|
||
directive facilitates consistent protection of information
|
||
resources. Supporting procedures are most effectively
|
||
implemented with top management support, through a program
|
||
focused on areas of highest risk. A compliance assessment
|
||
process ensures ongoing effectiveness of the information
|
||
protection program throughout the agency.
|
||
|
||
Scope
|
||
Although the protection of automated information
|
||
resources is emphasized in this publication, protection
|
||
requirements will usually extend to information on all forms of
|
||
media. Agency programs should apply safeguards to all
|
||
information requiring protection, regardless of its form or
|
||
location. Comprehensive information resource protection
|
||
procedures will address: accountability for information,
|
||
vulnerability assessment, data access, hardware/software control,
|
||
systems development, and operational controls. Protection should
|
||
be afforded throughout the life cycle of information, from
|
||
creation through ultimate disposition.
|
||
Accountability for Information
|
||
An effective information resource protection
|
||
program identifies the information used by the agency and assigns
|
||
primary responsibility for information protection to the managers
|
||
of the respective functional areas supported by the data. These
|
||
managers know the importance of the data to the organization and
|
||
are able to quantify the economic consequences of undesirable
|
||
happenings. They are also able to detect deficiencies in data
|
||
and know definitively who must have access to the data supporting
|
||
their operations. A fundamental information protection issue is
|
||
assignment of accountability. Information flows throughout the
|
||
organization and can be shared by many individuals. This tends
|
||
to blur accountability and disperse decision-making regarding
|
||
information protection. Accountability should be explicitly
|
||
assigned for determining and monitoring security for appropriate
|
||
agency information.
|
||
|
||
When security violations occur, management must be
|
||
accountable for responding and investigating. Security
|
||
violations should trigger a re-evaluation of access
|
||
authorizations, protection decisions, and control techniques.
|
||
All apparent violations should be resolved; since absolute
|
||
protection will never be achieved, some losses are inevitable.
|
||
It is important, however, that the degree of risk assumed be
|
||
commensurate with the sensitivity or importance of the
|
||
information resource to be protected.
|
||
|
||
Vulnerability Assessment
|
||
A risk assessment program ensures management that
|
||
periodic reviews of information resources have considered the
|
||
degree of vulnerability to threats causing destruction,
|
||
modification, disclosure, and delay of information availability,
|
||
in making protection decisions and investments in safeguards.
|
||
The official responsible for a specific
|
||
information resource determines protection requirements.
|
||
Less-sensitive, less-essential information will require minimal
|
||
safeguards, while highly sensitive or critical information might
|
||
merit strict protective measures. Assessment of vulnerability is
|
||
essential in specifying cost-effective safeguards; overprotection
|
||
can be needlessly costly and add unacceptable operational
|
||
overhead.
|
||
|
||
Once cost-effective safeguards are selected,
|
||
residual risk remains and is accepted by management. Risk status
|
||
should be periodically re-examined to identify new threats,
|
||
vulnerabilities, or other changes that affect the degree of risk
|
||
that management has previously accepted.
|
||
|
||
Data Access
|
||
Access to information should be delegated
|
||
according to the principles of need-to-know and least possible
|
||
privilege. For a multi-user application system, only individuals
|
||
with authorized need to view or use data are granted access
|
||
authority, and they are allowed only the minimum privileges
|
||
needed to carry out their duties. For personal computers with
|
||
one operator, data should be protected from unauthorized viewing
|
||
or use. It is the individual's responsibility to ensure that the
|
||
data is secure.
|
||
|
||
Systems Development
|
||
All information systems software should be
|
||
developed in a controlled and systematic manner according to
|
||
agency standards. Agency policy should require that appropriate
|
||
controls for accuracy, security, and availability are identified
|
||
during system design, approved by the responsible official, and
|
||
implemented. Users who design their own systems, whether on a
|
||
personal computer or on a mainframe, must adhere to the systems
|
||
development requirements.
|
||
|
||
Systems should be thoroughly tested according to
|
||
accepted standards and moved into a secure production environment
|
||
through a controlled process. Adequate documentation should be
|
||
considered an integral part of the information system and be
|
||
completed before the system can be considered ready for use.
|
||
|
||
Hardware/Software Configuration Control
|
||
Protection of hardware and resources of computer
|
||
systems and networks greatly contributes to the overall level of
|
||
control and protection of information. The information
|
||
protection policies should provide substantial direction
|
||
concerning the management and control of computer hardware and
|
||
software.
|
||
|
||
Agency information should be protected from the
|
||
potentially destructive impact of unauthorized hardware and
|
||
software. For example, software "viruses" have been inserted
|
||
into computers through games and apparently useful software
|
||
acquired via public access bulletin boards; viruses can spread
|
||
from system to system before being detected. Also, unauthorized
|
||
hardware additions to personal computers can introduce unknown
|
||
dial-in access paths. Accurate records of hardware/software
|
||
inventory, configurations, and locations should be maintained,
|
||
and control mechanisms should provide assurance that unauthorized
|
||
changes have not occurred.
|
||
|
||
To avoid legal liability, no unauthorized copying
|
||
of software should be permitted. Agencies should also address
|
||
the issue of personal use of Federal computer systems, giving
|
||
employees specific direction about allowable use and providing
|
||
consistent enforcement.
|
||
|
||
Operational Controls
|
||
Agency standards should clearly communicate
|
||
minimum expected controls to be present in all computer
|
||
facilities, computer operations, input/output handling, network
|
||
management, technical support, and user liaison. More stringent
|
||
controls would apply to those areas that process very sensitive
|
||
or critical information.
|
||
|
||
Protection of these areas would include:
|
||
Security management;
|
||
Physical security;
|
||
Security of system/application software and data;
|
||
Network security; and
|
||
Contingency planning.
|
||
|
||
The final section of this guide describes the
|
||
organizational process of developing, implementing, and managing
|
||
the ongoing information protection program.
|
||
|
||
Information Protection Program Implementation
|
||
|
||
Information Protection Management
|
||
In most cases, agency executive management is not
|
||
directly involved in the details of achieving a controlled
|
||
information processing environment. Instead, executive action
|
||
should focus on effective planning, implementation, and an
|
||
ongoing review structure. Usually, an explicit group or
|
||
organization is assigned specific responsibility for providing
|
||
day-to-day guidance and direction of this process. Within this
|
||
group an information security manager (ISM) should be identified
|
||
as a permanent focal point for information protection issues
|
||
within the agency.
|
||
|
||
The ISM must be thoroughly familiar with the
|
||
agency mission, organization, and operation. The manager should
|
||
have sufficient authority to influence the organization and have
|
||
access to agency executives when issues require escalation.
|
||
|
||
Independence
|
||
In determining the reporting relationship of the
|
||
ISM, independence of functional areas within the agency is
|
||
desirable. Plans and budget for the ISM function should be
|
||
approved by agency management, rather than being part of any
|
||
functional area budget. This approach avoids conflicts of
|
||
interest and facilitates development and maintenance of a
|
||
comprehensive and consistent protection program that serves the
|
||
needs of agency management.
|
||
Degree of Centralization
|
||
|
||
The desirability of centralized versus
|
||
decentralized security is heavily debated and largely depends on
|
||
size, organizational structure, and management approach at the
|
||
individual agency. A centralized approach to security has the
|
||
advantages of being directly responsive to executive direction
|
||
and specifically accountable for progress and status.
|
||
A decentralized approach to security has the
|
||
advantages of being close to the functional area involved. In
|
||
the long term, decentralization may provide better integration of
|
||
security with other entity functions.
|
||
|
||
An effective combined approach offers advantages.
|
||
A small dedicated resource at the agency level can direct the
|
||
information protection program, while additional resources are
|
||
utilized at the functional area level to implement the program in
|
||
each area.
|
||
|
||
Dedicated Staff
|
||
The common practice of assigning responsibility
|
||
for information security to existing staff with other major
|
||
responsibilities is often unsuccessful. At least one dedicated
|
||
staff member is recommended at the program management level.
|
||
The need for additional full-time resources depends on the
|
||
agency's computer environment. The number of information
|
||
systems, their technical complexity, the degree of
|
||
networking, the importance of information processed, adequacy of
|
||
existing controls, and extent of agency dependence on information
|
||
systems affect the resources needed.
|
||
|
||
Implementation Stages
|
||
Development of a comprehensive information
|
||
protection program that is practiced and observed widely
|
||
throughout a Federal agency occurs in stages and requires ongoing
|
||
monitoring and maintenance to remain viable.
|
||
|
||
First, organizational requirements for information
|
||
protection are identified. Different agencies have varying
|
||
levels of need for security, and the information protection
|
||
program should be structured to most effectively meet those
|
||
needs.
|
||
|
||
Next, organizational policies are developed that
|
||
provide a security architecture for agency operations, taking
|
||
into consideration the information protection program elements
|
||
discussed in the previous section of this guide. The policies
|
||
undergo normal review procedures, then are approved by agency
|
||
management for implementation.
|
||
|
||
Activities are then initiated to bring the agency
|
||
into compliance with the policies. Depending on the degree of
|
||
centralization, this might require development of further plans
|
||
and budgets within functional entities of the agency to implement
|
||
the necessary logical and physical controls.
|
||
|
||
Training
|
||
Training is a major activity in the implementation
|
||
process. Security violations are the result of human action, and
|
||
problems can usually be identified in their earliest stages by
|
||
people. Developing and maintaining personnel awareness of
|
||
information security issues can yield large benefits in
|
||
prevention and early detection of problems and losses.
|
||
|
||
Target audiences for this training are executives
|
||
and policy makers, program and functional managers, IRM security
|
||
and audit personnel, computer management and operations, and end
|
||
users. Training can be delivered through existing policy and
|
||
procedures manuals, written materials, presentations and classes,
|
||
and audio-visual training programs.
|
||
|
||
The training provided should create an awareness
|
||
of risks and the importance of safeguards, underscoring the
|
||
specific responsibilities of each of the individuals being
|
||
trained.
|
||
|
||
Monitoring and Enforcement
|
||
An ongoing monitoring and enforcement program
|
||
assures continued effectiveness of information protection
|
||
measures. Compliance may be measured in a number of ways,
|
||
including audits, management reviews or self-assessments,
|
||
surveys, and other informal indicators. A combination of
|
||
monitoring mechanisms provides greater reliability of results.
|
||
|
||
Variances from policy requirements should be
|
||
accepted only in cases where the responsible official has
|
||
evaluated, documented, and accepted the risk of noncompliance.
|
||
Enforcement of agency policies and practices is important to the
|
||
overall success of an information protection program.
|
||
Inconsistent or lax enforcement quickly results in deterioration
|
||
of internal controls over information resources.
|
||
|
||
A positive benefit of an effective monitoring and
|
||
enforcement process is an increased understanding of the degree
|
||
of information-related risk in agency operations. Without such a
|
||
feedback process, management unknowingly accepts too much risk.
|
||
An effective information protection program allows the agency to
|
||
continue to rely upon and expand the use of information
|
||
technology while maintaining an acceptable level of risk.
|
||
|
||
Maintenance
|
||
As agency initiatives and operations change, and
|
||
as the computer environment evolves, some elements of the
|
||
information protection program will require change as well.
|
||
Information protection cannot be viewed as a project with a
|
||
distinct end; rather, it is a process that should be maintained
|
||
to be realistic and useful to the agency. Procedures for review
|
||
and update of policies and other program elements should be
|
||
developed and followed.
|
||
|
||
For Additional Information
|
||
|
||
National Institute Of Standards and Technology
|
||
Computer Security Program Office
|
||
A-216 Technology
|
||
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
|
||
(301) 975-5200
|
||
|
||
For further information on the management of information
|
||
resources, NIST publishes Federal Information Processing
|
||
Standards Publications (FIBS PUBS). These publications deal with
|
||
many aspects of computer security, including password usage, data
|
||
encryption, ADP risk management and contingency planning, and
|
||
computer system security certification and accreditation. A list
|
||
of current publications is available from:
|
||
|
||
Standards Processing Coordinator (ADP)
|
||
National Computer Systems Laboratory
|
||
National Institute of Standards and technology
|
||
Technology Building, B-64
|
||
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
|
||
Phone: (301) 975-2817
|
||
|