textfiles/etext/NONFICTION/spinoza-theologico-743.txt

                     A THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL TREATISE 
                      Part 1 of 4 - Chapters I to V

                        Published 1670 anonymously

                             Baruch Spinoza
                              1632 - 1677

____________________________________________________________________________

JBY Notes:

1.  Text was scanned from Benedict de Spinoza's
    "A Theologico-Political Treatise", and "A Political
    Treatise" as published in Dover's ISBN 0-486-20249-6.

2.  The text is that of the translation of "A Theologico-Political
    Treatise" by R. H. M. Elwes.   This text is "an unabridged and
    unaltered republication of the Bohn Library edition originally
    published by George Bell and Sons in 1883."

3.  JBY added sentence numbers and search strings.

4.  Sentence numbers are shown thus (yy:xx). 
       yy = Chapter Number when given.    
       xx = Sentence Number.

5.  Search strings are enclosed in [square brackets]:
       a. Roman numeral, when given before a search string,
          indicates Part Number.  If a different Part, bring
          up that Part and then search.
       b. Include square brackets in search string.
       c. Do not include Part Number in search string.
       d. Search Down with the same string to facilitate return.

6.  Please report any errors in the text, search formatting,
    or sentence numbering to jyselman@erols.com.

7.  HTML version:
       Part 1  - http://www.erols.com/jyselman/ttpelws1.htm
       

____________________________________________________________________________

[P:0] Preface
[1:0] Chapter I
[2:0] Chapter II
[3:0] Chapter III
[4:0] Chapter IV
[5:0] Chapter V

____________________________________________________________________________

TABLE OF CONTENTS: Search strings are shown thus [*:x].
                   Search forward and back with the same string.
                   Include square brackets in search string.

[P:0] PREFACE.
                                                                     
[P:1] Origin and consequences of superstition.
[P:2] Causes that have led the author to write.
[P:3] Course of his investigation.
[P:4] For what readers the treatise is designed.
      Submission of author to the rulers of his country.

[1:0] CHAPTER I - Of Prophecy.
[1:1] Definition of prophecy.
[1:2] Distinction between revelation to Moses and
      to the other prophets.
[1:3] Between Christ and other recipients of
      revelation.
[1:4] Ambiguity of the word "Spirit."
[1:5] The different senses in which things may
      be referred to God.
[1:6] Different senses of "Spirit of God."
[1:7] Prophets perceived revelation by imagination.

[2:0] CHAPTER II - Of Prophets.
[2:1] A mistake to suppose that prophecy can give
       knowledge of phenomena.
[2:2] Certainty of prophecy based on:
        (1) Vividness of imagination,
        (2) A Sign,
        (3) Goodness of the Prophet.
[2:3] Variation of prophecy with the temperament and
      opinions of the individual.

[3:0] CHAPTER III - Of the Vocation of the Hebrews, and
      whether the Gift of Prophecy was peculiar to them.
[3:1] Happiness of Hebrews did not consist in the
      inferiority of the Gentile.
[3:2] Nor in philosophic knowledge or virtue.
[3:3] But in their conduct of affairs of state and
      escape from political dangers.
[3:4] Even this Distinction did not exist in the
       time of Abraham.
[3:5] Testimony from the Old Testament itself to
      the share of the Gentiles in the law and
      favour of God.
[3:6] Explanation of apparent discrepancy of the
      Epistle to the Romans.
[3:7] Answer to the arguments for the eternal
      election of the Jews.

[4:0] CHAPTER IV - Of the Divine Law.
[4:1] Laws either depend on natural necessity or on
      human decree.  The existence of the latter not
      inconsistent with the former class of laws.
[4:2] Divine law a kind of law founded on human decree:
      called Divine from its object.
[4:3] Divine law:
        (1) universal;
        (2) independent of the truth of any historical narrative;
        (3) independent of rites and ceremonies;
        (4) its own reward.
[4:4] Reason does not present God as a law-giver for men.
[4:5] Such a conception a proof of ignorance - in Adam -
      in the Israelites - in Christians.
[4:6] Testimony of the Scriptures in favour of reason and
      the rational view of the Divine.

[5:0] CHAPTER V. - Of the Ceremonial Law.
[5:1] Ceremonial law of the Old Testament no
      part of the Divine universal law, but
      partial and temporary. Testimony of the
      prophets themselves to this.
[5:2] Testimony of the New Testament.
[5:3] How the ceremonial law tended to
      preserve the Hebrew kingdom.
  
[5:4] Christian rites on a similar footing.
[5:5] What part of the Scripture narratives
      is one bound to believe?

[Author's Endnotes] to the Treatise.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[P:0] PREFACE. 
[P:1} (1)Men would never be superstitious, if they could govern
all their circumstances by set rules, or if they were always
favoured by fortune: but being frequently driven into straits
where rules are useless, and being often kept fluctuating
pitiably between hope and fear by the uncertainty of fortune's
greedily coveted favours, they are consequently, for the most
part, very prone to credulity.  (2) The human mind is readily
swayed this way or that in times of doubt, especially when
hope and fear are struggling for the mastery, though usually
it is boastful, over-confident, and vain.

(P:3) This as a general fact I suppose everyone knows, though 
few, I believe, know their own nature; no one can have lived
in the world without observing that most people, when in
prosperity, are so over-brimming with wisdom (however
inexperienced they may be), that they take every offer of
advice as a personal insult, whereas in adversity they know
not where to turn, but beg and pray for counsel from every
passer-by.  (P:4) No plan is then too futile, too absurd, or
too fatuous for their adoption; the most frivolous causes
will raise them to hope, or plunge them into despair - if
anything happens during their fright which reminds them of
some past good or ill, they think it portends a happy or
unhappy issue, and therefore (though it may have proved
abortive a hundred times before) style it a lucky or unlucky
omen.  (P:5) Anything which excites their astonishment they
believe to be a portent signifying the anger of the gods or
of the Supreme Being, and, mistaking superstition for
religion, account it impious not to avert the evil with
prayer and sacrifice.  (6) Signs and wonders of this sort
they conjure up perpetually, till one might think Nature as
mad as themselves, they interpret her so fantastically.

(P:7) Thus it is brought prominently before us, that superstition's
chief victims are those persons who greedily covet temporal
advantages; they it is, who (especially when they are in danger,
and cannot help themselves) are wont with Prayers and womanish
tears to implore help from God: upbraiding Reason as blind,
because she cannot show a sure path to the shadows they
pursue, and rejecting human wisdom as vain; but believing the
phantoms of imagination, dreams, and other childish absurdities,
to be the very oracles of Heaven. (P:8) As though God had turned
away from the wise, and written His decrees, not in the mind of
man but in the entrails of beasts, or left them to be proclaimed
by the inspiration and instinct of fools, madmen, and birds. Such
is the unreason to which terror can drive mankind!

(P:9) Superstition, then, is engendered, preserved, and fostered by
fear. If anyone desire an example, let him take Alexander, who only
began superstitiously to seek guidance from seers, when he first
learnt to fear fortune in the passes of Sysis (Curtius, v. 4);
whereas after he had conquered Darius he consulted prophets no more,
till a second time frightened by reverses.  (10) When the Scythians
were provoking a battle, the Bactrians had deserted, and he himself
was lying sick of his wounds, "he once more turned to superstition,
the mockery of human wisdom, and bade Aristander, to whom he
confided his credulity, inquire the issue of affairs with sacrificed 
victims."  (P:11) Very numerous examples of a like nature might be
cited, clearly showing the fact, that only while under the dominion
of fear do men fall a prey to superstition; that all the portents
ever invested with the reverence of misguided religion are mere
phantoms of dejected and fearful minds; and lastly, that prophets
have most power among the people, and are most formidable to rulers, 
precisely at those times when the state is in most peril.  (12) I
think this is sufficiently plain to all, and will therefore say no
more on the subject.

[P:1] (P:13) The origin of superstition above given affords us a clear
reason for the fact, that it comes to all men naturally, though
some refer its rise to a dim notion of God, universal to mankind,
and also tends to show, that it is no less inconsistent and
variable than other mental hallucinations and emotional impulses,
and further that it can only be maintained by hope, hatred, anger,
and deceit; since it springs, not from reason, but solely from the
more powerful phases of emotion.  (P:14) Furthermore, we may readily
understand how difficult it is, to maintain in the same course men
prone to every form of credulity.  (15) For, as the mass of mankind
remains always at about the same pitch of misery, it never assents
long to any one remedy, but is always best pleased by a novelty
which has not yet proved illusive.

(P:16) This element of inconsistency has been the cause of many
terrible wars and revolutions; for, as Curtius well says
(lib. iv. chap. 10): "The mob has no ruler more potent than
superstition," and is easily led, on the plea of religion, at
one moment to adore its kings as gods, and anon to execrate and
abjure them as humanity's common bane.  (P:17) Immense pains
have therefore been taken to counteract this evil by investing
religion, whether true or false, with such pomp and ceremony,
that it may rise superior to every shock, and be always observed
with studious reverence by the whole people - a system which has
been brought to great perfection by the Turks, for they consider
even controversy impious, and so clog men's minds with dogmatic
formulas, that they leave no room for sound reason, not even
enough to doubt with.

(P:18) But if, in despotic statecraft, the supreme and essential
mystery be to hoodwink the subjects, and to mask the fear, which
keeps them clown, with the specious garb of religion, so that
men may fight as bravely for slavery as for safety, and count it
not shame but highest honour to risk their blood and their lives
for the vainglory of a tyrant; yet in a free state no more
mischievous expedient could be planned or attempted.  (P:19) Wholly
repugnant to the general freedom are such devices as enthralling
men's minds with prejudices, forcing their judgment, or employing
any of the weapons of quasi-religious sedition; indeed, such
seditions only spring up, when law enters the domain of speculative
thought, and opinions are put on trial and condemned on the same
footing as crimes, while those who defend and follow them are
sacrificed, not to public safety, but to their opponents' hatred
and cruelty.  (P:19a) If deeds only could be made the grounds of
criminal charges, and words were always allowed to pass free, such
seditions would be divested of every semblance of justification,
and would be separated from mere controversies by a hard and fast line.

(P:20) Now, seeing that we have the rare happiness of living in a
republic, where everyone's judgment is free and unshackled, where
each may worship God as his conscience dictates, and where freedom
is esteemed before all things dear and precious, I have believed
that I should be undertaking no ungrateful or unprofitable task,
in demonstrating that not only can such freedom be granted without
prejudice to the public peace, but also, that without such freedom,
piety cannot flourish nor the public peace be secure.

[P:2] (21) Such is the chief conclusion I seek to establish
in this treatise; but, in order to reach it, I must first
point out the misconceptions which, like scars of our former
bondage, still disfigure our notion of religion, and must
expose the false views about the civil authority which many
have most impudently advocated, endeavouring to turn the
mind of the people, still prone to heathen superstition,
away from its legitimate rulers, and so bring us again into
slavery.  (P:22) As to the order of my treatise I will speak
presently, but first I will recount the causes which led me
to write. 

(P:23) I have often wondered, that persons who make a boast of
professing the Christian religion, namely, love, joy, peace,
temperance, and charity to all men, should quarrel with such
rancorous animosity, and display daily towards one another
such bitter hatred, that this, rather than the virtues they
claim, is the readiest criterion of their faith.  (24) Matters
have long since come to such a pass, that one can only pronounce
a man Christian, Turk, Jew, or Heathen, by his general appearance
and attire, by his frequenting this or that place of worship,
or employing the phraseology of a particular sect - as for manner
of life, it is in all cases the same.  (25) Inquiry into the
cause of this anomaly leads me unhesitatingly to ascribe it to
the fact, that the ministries of the Church are regarded by the
masses merely as dignities, her offices as posts of emolument -
in short, popular religion may be summed up as respect for
ecclesiastics.  (P:26) The spread of this misconception inflamed
every worthless fellow with an intense desire to enter holy
orders, and thus the love of diffusing God's religion degenerated
into sordid avarice and ambition.  (27) Every church became a
theatre, where orators, instead of church teachers, harangued,
caring not to instruct the people, but striving to attract
admiration, to bring opponents to public scorn, and to preach
only novelties and paradoxes, such as would tickle the ears
of their congregation.  (P:28) This state of things necessarily
stirred up an amount of controversy, envy, and hatred, which no
lapse of time could appease; so that we can scarcely wonder that
of the old religion nothing survives but its outward forms (even
these, in the mouth of the multitude, seem rather adulation than
adoration of the Deity), and that faith has become a mere compound
of credulity and prejudices - aye, prejudices too, which degrade
man from rational being to beast, which completely stifle the
power of judgment between true and false, which seem,  in fact,
carefully fostered for the purpose of extinguishing the last spark
of reason!  (P:29) Piety, great God! and religion are become a
tissue of ridiculous mysteries; men, who flatly despise reason,
who reject and turn away from understanding as naturally corrupt,
these, I say, these of all men, are thought, 0 lie most horrible!
to possess light from on High.  (30) Verily, if they had but one
spark of light from on High, they would not insolently rave, but
would learn to worship God more wisely, and would be as marked
among their fellows for mercy as they now are for malice; if they
were concerned for their opponents' souls, instead of for their own
reputations, they would no longer fiercely persecute, but rather be
filled with pity and compassion.

(P:31) Furthermore, if any Divine light were in them, it would
appear from their doctrine.  (32) I grant that they are never
tired of professing their wonder at the profound mysteries of
Holy Writ; still I cannot discover that they teach anything
but speculations of Platonists and Aristotelians, to which (in
order to save their credit for Christianity) they have made Holy
Writ conform; not content to rave with the Greeks themselves,
they want to make the prophets rave also; showing conclusively,
that never even in sleep have they caught a glimpse of Scripture's
Divine nature.  (P:33) The very vehemence of their admiration for
the mysteries plainly attests, that their belief in the Bible is a
formal assent rather than a living faith: and the fact is made
still more apparent by their laying down beforehand, as a
foundation for the study and true interpretation of Scripture,
the principle that it is in every passage true and divine.
(34) Such a doctrine should be reached only after strict scrutiny
and thorough comprehension of the Sacred Books (which would teach
it much better, for they stand in need no human factions), and
not be set up on the threshold, as it were, of inquiry.

[P:3] (35) As I pondered over the facts that the light of reason
is not only despised, but by many even execrated as a source of
impiety, that human commentaries are accepted as divine records,
and that credulity is extolled as faith; as I marked the fierce
controversies of philosophers raging in Church and State, the 
source of bitter hatred and dissension, the ready instruments
of sedition and other ills innumerable, I determined to examine
the Bible afresh in a careful, impartial, and unfettered spirit,
making no assumptions concerning it, and attributing to it no
doctrines, which I do not find clearly therein set down.  
(36) With these precautions I constructed a method of Scriptural
interpretation, and thus equipped proceeded to inquire - what
is prophecy?  (37) In what sense did God reveal himself to the
prophets, and why were these particular men - chosen by him?
(P:38) Was it on account of the sublimity of their thoughts about
the Deity and nature, or was it solely on account of their piety?
(39) These questions being answered, I was easily able to conclude,
that the authority of the prophets has weight only in matters of
morality, and that their speculative doctrines affect us little.

(P:40) Next I inquired, why the Hebrews were called God's chosen
people, and discovering that it was only because God had chosen
for them a certain strip of territory, where they might live
peaceably and at ease, I learnt that the Law revealed by God to
Moses was merely the law of the individual Hebrew state, therefore
that it was binding on none but Hebrews, and not even on Hebrews
after the downfall of their nation.  (P:41) Further, in order to
ascertain, whether it could be concluded from Scripture, that
the human understanding standing is naturally corrupt, I inquired
whether the Universal Religion, the Divine Law revealed through
the Prophets and Apostles to the whole human race, differs from
that which is taught by the light of natural reason, whether
miracles can take place in violation of the laws of nature, and
if so, whether they imply the existence of God more surely and
clearly than events, which we understand plainly and distinctly
through their immediate natural causes.

(P:42) Now, as in the whole course of my investigation I found
nothing taught expressly by Scripture, which does not agree with
our understanding, or which is repugnant thereto, and as I saw
that the prophets taught nothing, which is not very simple and
easily to be grasped by all, and further, that they clothed
their leaching in the style, and confirmed it with the reasons,
which would most deeply move the mind of the masses to devotion
towards God, I became thoroughly convinced, that the Bible
leaves reason absolutely free, that it has nothing in common with
philosophy, in fact, that Revelation and Philosophy stand on
different footings. In order to set this forth categorically and
exhaust the whole question, I point out the way in which the Bible
should be interpreted, and show that all of spiritual questions
should be sought from it alone, and not from the objects of
ordinary knowledge.  (P:43) Thence I pass on to indicate the
false notions, which have from the fact that the multitude -
ever prone to superstition, and caring more for the shreds of
antiquity for eternal truths - pays homage to the Books of the
Bible, rather than to the Word of God.  (P:44) I show that the
Word of God has not been revealed as a certain number of books,
was displayed to the prophets as a simple idea of the mind,
namely, obedience to God in singleness of heart, and in the
practice of justice and charity; and I further point out, that
this doctrine is set forth in Scripture in accordance with the
opinions and understandings of those, among whom the Apostles
and Prophets preached, to the end that men might receive it
willingly, and with their whole heart.

(P:45) Having thus laid bare the bases of belief, I draw the
conclusion that Revelation has obedience for its sole object,
therefore, in purpose no less than in foundation and method,
stands entirely aloof from ordinary knowledge; each has its
separate province, neither can be called the handmaid of the other.

(P:46) Furthermore, as men's habits of mind differ, so that some
more readily embrace one form of faith, some another, for what
moves one to pray may move another only to scoff, I conclude,
in accordance with what has gone before, that everyone should
be free to choose for himself the foundations of his creed, and
that faith should be judged only by its fruits; each would then
obey God freely with his whole heart, while nothing would be
publicly honoured save justice and charity.

(P:47) Having thus drawn attention to the liberty conceded to
everyone by the revealed law of God, I pass on to another part
of my subject, and prove that this same liberty can and should
be accorded with safety to the state and the magisterial
authority - in fact, that it cannot be withheld without great
danger to peace and detriment to the community.

(P:48) In order to establish my point, I start from the natural
rights of the individual, which are co-extensive with his desires
and power, and from the fact that no one is bound to live as
another pleases, but is the guardian of his own liberty.  (49) I
show that these rights can only be transferred to those whom we
depute to defend us, who acquire with the duties of defence the
power of ordering our lives, and I thence infer that rulers
possess rights only limited by their power, that they are the
sole guardians of justice and liberty, and that their subjects
should act in all things as they dictate: nevertheless, since no
one can so utterly abdicate his own power of self-defence as to
cease to be a man, I conclude that no one can be deprived of his
natural rights absolutely, but that subjects, either by tacit
agreement, or by social contract, retain a certain number, which
cannot be taken from them without great danger to the state.

(P:50) From these considerations I pass on to the Hebrew State,
which I describe at some length, in order to trace the manner
in which Religion acquired the force of law, and to touch on
other noteworthy points.  (51) I then prove, that the holders
of sovereign power are the depositories and interpreters of
religious no less than of civil ordinances, and that they alone
have the right to decide what is just or unjust, pious or impious;
lastly, I conclude by showing, that they best retain this right
and secure safety to their state by allowing every man to think 
what he likes, and say what he thinks. 

[P:4] (52) Such, Philosophical Reader, are the questions I submit
to your notice, counting on your approval, for the subject matter
of the whole book and of the several chapters is important and
profitable.  (53) I would say more, but I do not want my preface
to extend to a volume, especially as I know that its leading
propositions are to Philosophers but commonplaces.  (54) To the
rest of mankind I care not to commend my treatise, for I cannot
expect that it contains anything to please them: I know how deeply
rooted are the prejudices embraced under the name of religion;
I am aware that in the mind of the masses superstition is no less
deeply rooted than fear; I recognize that their constancy is mere
obstinacy, and that they are led to praise or blame by impulse
rather than reason.  (P:55) Therefore the multitude, and those of
like passions with the multitude, I ask not to read my book; nay,
I would rather that they should utterly neglect it, than that they
should misinterpret it after their wont.  (56) They would gain no
good themselves, and might prove a stumbling-block to others, whose 
philosophy is hampered by the belief that Reason is a mere handmaid
to Theology, and whom I seek in this work especially to benefit.
(P:57) But as there will be many who have neither the leisure, nor,
perhaps, the inclination to read through all I have written, I feel
bound here, as at the end of my treatise, to declare that I have
written nothing, which I do not most willingly submit to the
examination and judgment of my country's rulers, and that I am ready
to retract anything, which they shall decide to be repugnant to the
laws or prejudicial to the public good.  (58) I know that I am a man
and, as a man, liable to error, but against error I have taken
scrupulous care, and striven to keep in entire accordance with the
laws of my country, with loyalty, and with morality.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1:0] CHAPTER I. - Of Prophecy

[1:1] (1) Prophecy, or revelation is sure knowledge revealed by
God to man. (2) A prophet is one who interprets the revelations
of God to those who are unable to attain to sure knowledge of
the matters revealed, and therefore can only apprehend them by
simple faith.

(1:3) The Hebrew word for prophet is "naw-vee'", Strong:5030,
[Endnote 1] i.e. speaker or interpreter, but in Scripture its
meaning is restricted to interpreter of God, as we may learn
from Exodus vii:1, where God says to Moses, "See, I have made
thee a god to Pharaoh, and Aaron thy brother shall be thy
prophet;" implying that, since in interpreting Moses' words to
Pharaoh, Aaron acted the part of a prophet, Moses would be to
Pharaoh as a god, or in the attitude of a god.

(1:4) Prophets I will treat of in the next chapter, and at
present consider prophecy.

(1:5) Now it is evident, from the definition above given, that
prophecy really includes ordinary knowledge; for the knowledge
which we acquire by our natural faculties depends on knowledge
of God and His eternal laws; but ordinary knowledge is common
to all men as men, and rests on foundations which all share,
whereas the multitude always strains after rarities and
exceptions, and thinks little of the gifts of nature; so that,
when prophecy is talked of, ordinary knowledge is not supposed
to be included.  (1:6) Nevertheless it has as much right as any
other to be called Divine, for God's nature, in so far as we
share therein, and God's laws, dictate it to us; nor does it
suffer from that to which we give the preeminence, except in so
far as the latter transcends its limits and cannot be accounted
for by natural laws taken in themselves.  (7) In respect to the
certainty it involves, and the source from which it is derived,
i.e. God, ordinary knowledge is no whit inferior to prophetic,
unless indeed we believe, or rather dream, that the prophets had
human bodies but superhuman minds, and therefore that their
sensations and consciousness were entirely different from our own.

(1:8) But, although ordinary knowledge is Divine, its professors
cannot be called prophets [Endnote 2] , for they teach what the
rest of mankind could perceive and apprehend, not merely by
simple faith, but as surely and honourably as themselves.

(1:9) Seeing then that our mind subjectively contains in itself
and partakes of the nature of God, and solely from this cause is
enabled to form notions explaining natural phenomena and
inculcating morality, it follows that we may rightly assert the
nature of the human mind (in so far as it is thus conceived) to
be a primary cause of Divine revelation.  (1:10) All that we
clearly and distinctly understand is dictated to us, as I have
just pointed out, by the idea and nature of God; not indeed
through words, but in a way far more excellent and agreeing
perfectly with the nature of the mind, as all who have enjoyed
intellectual certainty will doubtless attest.  (11) Here,
however, my chief purpose is to speak of matters having
reference to Scripture, so these few words on the light
of reason will suffice.

(1:12) I will now pass on to, and treat more fully, the other
ways and means by which God makes revelations to mankind, both
of that which transcends ordinary knowledge, and of that within
its scope; for there is no reason why God should not employ
other means to communicate what we know already by the power
of reason. 

(1:13) Our conclusions on the subject must be drawn solely from
Scripture; for what can we affirm about matters transcending
our knowledge except what is told us by the words or writings
of prophets?  (14) And since there are, so far as I know, no
prophets now alive, we have no alternative but to read the books
of prophets departed, taking care the while not to reason from
metaphor or to ascribe anything to our authors which they do
not themselves distinctly state.  (15) I must further premise
that the Jews never make any mention or account of secondary,
or particular causes, but in a spirit of religion, piety, and
what is commonly called godliness, refer all things directly
to the Deity. (1:16) For instance if they make money by a
transaction, they say God gave it to them; if they desire
anything, they say God has disposed their hearts towards it;
if they think anything, they say God told them.  (17) Hence we
must not suppose that everything is prophecy or revelation
which is described in Scripture as told by God to anyone, but
only such things as are expressly announced as prophecy or
revelation, or are plainly pointed to as such by the context.

(1:18) A perusal of the sacred books will show us that all God's
revelations to the prophets were made through words or appearances,
or a combination of the two.  (19) These words and appearances
were of two kinds;
   1.- real when external to the mind of the prophet
       who heard or saw them,
   2.- imaginary when the imagination of the prophet
       was in a state which led him distinctly to
       suppose that he heard or saw them.

(1:20) With a real voice God revealed to Moses the laws which
He wished to be transmitted to the Hebrews, as we may see from
Exodus xxv:22, where God says, "And there I will meet with
thee and I will commune with thee from the mercy seat which is
between the Cherubim."  (21) Some sort of real voice must
necessarily have been employed, for Moses found God ready to
commune with him at any time. This, as I shall shortly show,
is the only instance of a real voice.

(1:22) We might, perhaps, suppose that the voice with which God
called Samuel was real, for in 1 Sam. iii:21, we read, "And the
Lord appeared again in Shiloh, for the Lord revealed Himself to
Samuel in Shiloh by the word of the Lord;" implying that the
appearance of the Lord consisted in His making Himself known to
Samuel through a voice; in other words, that Samuel heard the
Lord speaking.  [1:2] (23) But we are compelled to distinguish
between the prophecies of Moses and those of other prophets,
and therefore must decide that this voice was imaginary, a
conclusion further supported by the voice's resemblance to the
voice of Eli, which Samuel was in the habit of hearing, and
therefore might easily imagine; when thrice called by the Lord,
Samuel supposed it to have been Eli.

(1:24) The voice which Abimelech heard was imaginary, for it is
written, Gen. xx:6, "And God said unto him in a dream."  (25) So
that the will of God was manifest to him, not in waking, but only
in sleep, that is, when the imagination is most active and
uncontrolled.  (1:26) Some of the Jews believe that the actual
words of the Decalogue were not spoken by God, but that the
Israelites heard a noise only, without any distinct words, and
during its continuance apprehended the Ten Commandments by pure
intuition; to this opinion I myself once inclined, seeing that
the words of the Decalogue in Exodus are different from the words
of the Decalogue in Deuteronomy, for the discrepancy seemed to
imply (since God only spoke once) that the Ten Commandments were
not intended to convey the actual words of the Lord, but only His
meaning.  (1:27) However, unless we would do violence to Scripture,
we must certainly admit that the Israelites heard a real voice, for
Scripture expressly says, Deut. v:4, "God spake with you face to
face," i.e. as two men ordinarily interchange ideas through the
instrumentality of their two bodies; and therefore it seems more
consonant with Holy Writ to suppose that God really did create a
voice of some kind with which the Decalogue was revealed.  (28) The 
discrepancy of the two versions is treated of in Chap. VIII.

(1:29) Yet not even thus is all difficulty removed, for it seems
scarcely reasonable to affirm that a created thing, depending on
God in the same manner as other created things, would be able to
express or explain the nature of God either verbally or really by
means of its individual organism: for instance, by declaring in
the first person, "I am the Lord your God."

(1:30) Certainly when anyone says with his mouth, "I understand,"
we do not attribute the understanding to the mouth, but to the
mind of the speaker; yet this is because the mouth is the natural
organ of a man speaking, and the hearer, knowing what understanding
is, easily comprehends, by a comparison with himself, that the
speaker's mind is meant; but if we knew nothing of God beyond the
mere name and wished to commune with Him, and be assured of His
existence, I fail to see how our wish would be satisfied by the
declaration of a created thing (depending on God neither more nor
less than ourselves), "I am the Lord."  (31) If God contorted the
lips of Moses, or, I will not say Moses, but some beast, till they
pronounced the words, "I am the Lord," should we apprehend the Lord's 
existence therefrom?

(1:32) Scripture seems clearly to point to the belief that God spoke
Himself, having descended from heaven to Mount Sinai for the purpose -
and not only that the Israelites heard Him speaking, but that their
chief men beheld Him (Ex:xxiv.)  (1:33) Further the law of Moses, which
might neither be added to nor curtailed, and which was set up as a
national standard of right, nowhere prescribed the belief that God
is without body, or even without form or figure, but only ordained that
the Jews should believe in His existence and worship Him alone: it
forbade them to invent or fashion any likeness of the Deity, but this
was to insure purity of service; because, never having seen God, they
could not by means of images recall the likeness of God, but only the 
likeness of some created thing which might thus gradually take the
place of God as the object of their adoration.  (34) Nevertheless,
the Bible clearly implies that God has a form, and that Moses when he
heard God speaking was permitted to behold it, or at least its hinder
parts. 

(1:35) Doubtless some mystery lurks in this question which we will
discuss more fully below.  (36) For the present I will call attention
to the passages in Scripture indicating the means by which God has
revealed His laws to man.

(1:37) Revelation may be through figures only, as in I Chron:xxii.,
where God displays his anger to David by means of an angel bearing
a sword, and also in the story of Balaam.

(1:38) Maimonides and others do indeed maintain that these and
every other instance of angelic apparitions (e.g. to Manoah and
to Abraham offering up Isaac) occurred during sleep, for that
no one with his eyes open ever could see an angel, but this is
mere nonsense.  (39) The sole object of such commentators seems
to be to extort from Scripture confirmations of Aristotelian
quibbles and their own inventions, a proceeding which I regard
as the acme of absurdity.

(1:40) In figures, not real but existing only in the prophet's
imagination, God revealed to Joseph his future lordship, and in
words and figures He revealed to Joshua that He would fight for
the Hebrews, causing to appear an angel, as it were the Captain
of the Lord's host, bearing a sword, and by this means
communicating verbally.  (41) The forsaking of Israel by
Providence was portrayed to Isaiah by a vision of the Lord,
the thrice Holy, sitting on a very lofty throne, and the Hebrews,
stained with the mire of their sins, sunk as it were in
uncleanness, and thus as far as possible distant from God.
(42) The wretchedness of the people at the time was thus revealed,
while future calamities were foretold in words.  (42a) I could
cite from Holy Writ many similar examples, but I think they are
sufficiently well known already.

(1:43) However, we get a still more clear confirmation of our
position in Num xii:6,7, as follows: "If there be any prophet
among you, I the Lord will make myself known unto him in a vision"
(i.e. by appearances and signs, for God says of the prophecy of
Moses that it was a vision without signs), "and will speak unto
him in a dream " (i.e. not with actual words and an actual voice).
(1:44) "My servant Moses is not so; with him will I speak mouth to
mouth, even apparently, and not in dark speeches, and the
similitude of the Lord he shall behold," i.e. looking on me as
a friend and not afraid, he speaks with me (cf. Ex xxxiii:17).

(1:45) This makes it indisputable that the other prophets did not
hear a real voice, and we gather as much from Deut. xxiv:10:
"And there arose not a prophet since in Israel like unto Moses
whom the Lord knew face to face," which must mean that the Lord
spoke with none other; for not even Moses saw the Lord's face.
(1:46) These are the only media of communication between God and
man which I find mentioned in Scripture, and therefore the only
ones which may be supposed or invented.  (47) We may be able quite
to comprehend that God can communicate immediately with man, for
without the intervention of bodily means He communicates to our
minds His essence; still, a man who can by pure intuition
comprehend ideas which are neither contained in nor deducible
from the foundations of our natural knowledge, must necessarily
possess a mind far superior to those of his fellow men, nor do
I believe that any have been so endowed save Christ.  (1:48) To Him
the ordinances of God leading men to salvation were revealed
directly without words or visions, so that God manifested Himself
to the Apostles through the mind of Christ as He formerly did to
Moses through the supernatural voice.  (49) In this sense the voice
of Christ, like the voice which Moses heard, may be called the voice
of God, and it may be said that the wisdom of God (,i.e. wisdom
more than human) took upon itself in Christ human nature, and that
Christ was the way of salvation.  (1:50) I must at this juncture
declare that those doctrines which certain churches put forward
concerning Christ, I neither affirm nor deny, for I freely confess
that I do not understand them.  (1:51) What I have just stated I
gather from Scripture, where I never read that God appeared to
Christ, or spoke to Christ, but that God was revealed to the
Apostles through Christ; that Christ was the Way of Life, and
that the old law was given through an angel, and not immediately
by God; whence it follows that if Moses spoke with God face to
face as a man speaks with his friend (i.e. by means of their two
bodies) Christ communed with God mind to mind.

[1:3] (52) Thus we may conclude that no one except Christ received
the revelations of God without the aid of imagination, whether in
words or vision.  (53) Therefore the power of prophecy implies not
a peculiarly perfect mind, but a peculiarly vivid imagination, as
I will show more clearly in the next chapter.  [1:4] (54) We will
now inquire what is meant in the Bible by the Spirit of God
breathed into the prophets, or by the prophets speaking with
the Spirit of God; to that end we must determine the exact
signification of the Hebrew word roo'-akh, Strong:7307, commonly
translated spirit.

(1:55) The word roo'-akh, Strong:7307, literally means a wind,
e.g. the south wind, but it is frequently employed in other
derivative significations.

It is used as equivalent to,
(56) (1.) Breath: "Neither is there any spirit in his mouth,"
          Ps. cxxxv:17.
(57) (2.) Life, or breathing: "And his spirit returned to him"
          1 Sam. xxx:12; i.e. he breathed again.
(58) (3.) Courage and strength: "Neither did there remain any
          more spirit in any man," Josh. ii:11; "And the spirit
          entered into me, and made me stand on my feet," Ezek. ii:2.
(59) (4.) Virtue and fitness: "Days should speak, and multitudes
          of years should teach wisdom; but there is a spirit in
          man,"Job xxxii:7; i.e. wisdom is not always found among
          old men for I now discover that it depends on individual
          virtue and capacity. So, "A man in whom is the Spirit,"
          Numbers xxvii:18.
(1:60)(5) Habit of mind: "Because he had another spirit with him,"
          Numbers xiv:24; i.e. another habit of mind. "Behold I
          will pour out My Spirit unto you," Prov. i:23.
(61) (6.) Will, purpose, desire, impulse: "Whither the spirit was
          to go, they went," Ezek. 1:12; "That cover with a covering,
          but not of My Spirit," Is. xxx:1; "For the Lord hath
          poured out on you the spirit of deep sleep," Is. xxix:10;
          "Then was their spirit softened," Judges viii:3; "He that
          ruleth his spirit, is better than he that taketh a city,"
          Prov. xvi:32; "He that hath no rule over his own spirit,"
          Prov. xxv:28; "Your spirit as fire shall devour you,"
          Isaiah xxxiii:l.

From the meaning of disposition we get -
(1:62)(7) Passions and faculties. A lofty spirit means pride, a
          lowly spirit humility, an evil spirit hatred and
          melancholy. So, too, the expressions spirits of
          jealousy, fornication, wisdom, counsel, bravery, stand
          for a jealous, lascivious, wise, prudent, or brave mind
          (for we Hebrews use substantives in preference to
          adjectives), for these various qualities.
(63) (8.) The mind itself, or the life: "Yea, they have all one
          spirit," Eccles. iii:19 "The spirit shall return to God
          Who gave it."
(64) (9.) The quarters of the world (from the winds which blow
          thence), or even the side of anything turned towards a
          particular quarter - Ezek. xxxvii:9; xlii:16, 17, 18, 19, &c.

[1:5] (65) I have already alluded to the way in which things are
           referred to God, and said to be of God.
(66) (1.) As belonging to His nature, and being, as it were,
          part of Him; e.g. the power of God, the eyes of God.
(67) (2.) As under His dominion, and depending on His pleasure;
          thus the heavens are called the heavens of the Lord,
          as being His chariot and habitation. So Nebuchadnezzar is
          called the servant of God, Assyria the scourge of God, &c.
(68) (3.) As dedicated to Him, e.g. the Temple of God, a Nazarene
          of God, the Bread of God.
(69) (4.) As revealed through the prophets and not through our
          natural faculties. In this sense the Mosaic law is
          called the law of God.
(70) (5.) As being in the superlative degree. Very high mountains
          are styled the mountains of God, a very deep sleep, the
          sleep of God, &c. In this sense we must explain Amos iv:11:
          "I have overthrown you as the overthrow of the Lord came
          upon Sodom and Gomorrah," i.e. that  memorable overthrow,
          for since God Himself is the Speaker, the passage cannot
          well be taken otherwise. The wisdom of Solomon is called
          the wisdom of God, or extraordinary. The size of the cedars
          of Lebanon is alluded to in the Psalmist's expression,
          "the cedars of the Lord."

(1:71) Similarly, if the Jews were at a loss to understand any
phenomenon, or were ignorant of its cause, they referred it to
God.  (72) Thus a storm was termed the chiding of God, thunder
and lightning the arrows of God, for it was thought that God
kept the winds confined in caves, His treasuries; thus differing
merely in name from the Greek wind-god Eolus.  (73) In like manner
miracles were called works of God, as being especially marvellous;
though in reality, of course, all natural events are the works of
God, and take place solely by His power.  (74) The Psalmist calls
the miracles in Egypt the works of God, because the Hebrews found
in them a way of safety which they had not looked for, and
therefore especially marvelled at.

(1:75) As, then, unusual natural phenomena are called works of
God, and trees of unusual size are called trees of God, we
cannot wonder that very strong and tall men, though impious
robbers and whoremongers, are in Genesis called sons of God. 

(1:76) This reference of things wonderful to God was not
peculiar to the Jews.  (77) Pharaoh, on hearing the
interpretation of his dream, exclaimed that the mind
of the gods was in Joseph.  (78) Nebuchadnezzar told Daniel
that he possessed the mind of the holy gods; so also in
Latin anything well made is often said to be wrought with
Divine hands, which is equivalent to the Hebrew phrase,
wrought with the hand of God.

[1:6] (80) We can now very easily understand and explain those
passages of Scripture which speak of the Spirit of God.  (81) In
some places the expression merely means a very strong, dry, and
deadly wind, as in Isaiah xl:7, "The grass withereth, the flower
fadeth, because the Spirit of the Lord bloweth upon it."
(82) Similarly in Gen. i:2: "The Spirit of the Lord moved
over the face of the waters."  (83) At other times it is used
as equivalent to a high courage, thus the spirit of Gideon and
of Samson is called the Spirit of the Lord, as being very bold,
and prepared for any emergency.  (84) Any unusual virtue or power
is called the Spirit or Virtue of the Lord, Ex. xxxi:3: "I will
fill him (Bezaleel) with the Spirit of the Lord," i.e., as the
Bible itself explains, with talent above man's usual endowment.
(85) So Isa. xi:2: "And the Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon
him," is explained afterwards in the text to mean the spirit of
wisdom and understanding, of counsel and might.

(1:86) The melancholy of Saul is called the melancholy of the
Lord, or a very deep melancholy, the persons who applied the
term showing that they understood by it nothing supernatural,
in that they sent for a musician to assuage it by harp-playing.
(87) Again, the "Spirit of the Lord" is used as equivalent to
the mind of man, for instance, Job xxvii:3: "And the Spirit
of the Lord in my nostrils," the allusion being to Gen. ii:7:
"And God breathed into man's nostrils the breath of life."
(1:88) Ezekiel also, prophesying to the dead, says (xxvii:14),
"And I will give to you My Spirit, and ye shall live;" i.e.
I will restore you to life.  (1:89) In Job xxxiv:14, we read:
"If He gather unto Himself His Spirit and breath;" in
Gen. vi:3: "My Spirit shall not always strive with man,
for that he also is flesh," i.e. since man acts on the
dictates of his body, and not the spirit which I gave
him to discern the good, I will let him alone.  (90) So,
too, Ps. li:12: "Create in me a clean heart, 0 God, and
renew a right spirit within me; cast me not away from
Thy presence, and take not Thy Holy Spirit from me."
(1:91) It was supposed that sin originated only from the
body, and that good impulses come from the mind;
therefore the Psalmist invokes the aid of God against
the bodily appetites, but prays that the spirit which
the Lord, the Holy One, had given him might be renewed.
(1:92) Again, inasmuch as the Bible, in concession to
popular ignorance, describes God as having a mind, a
heart, emotions - nay, even a body and breath - the
expression Spirit of the Lord is used for God's mind,
disposition, emotion, strength, or breath.  (93) Thus,
Isa. xl:13: "Who hath disposed the Spirit of the Lord?"
i.e. who, save Himself, hath caused the mind of the Lord
to will anything,? and Isa. lxiii:10: "But they rebelled,
and vexed the Holy Spirit."

(94) The phrase comes to be used of the law of Moses, which
in a sense expounds God's will, Is. lxiii. 11, "Where is He
that put His Holy Spirit within him?" meaning, as we clearly
gather from the context, the law of Moses.  (95) Nehemiah,
speaking of the giving of the law, says, i:20, "Thou gavest
also thy good Spirit to instruct them."  (96) This is referred
to in Deut. iv:6, "This is your wisdom and understanding,"
and in Ps. cxliii:10, "Thy good Spirit will lead me into the
land of uprightness."  (1:97) The Spirit of the Lord may mean
the breath of the Lord, for breath, no less than a mind, a
heart, and a body are attributed to God in Scripture, as in
Ps. xxxiii:6.  (98) Hence it gets to mean the power, strength,
or faculty of God, as in Job xxxiii:4, "The Spirit of the Lord
made me," i.e. the power, or, if you prefer, the decree of the
Lord.  (99) So the Psalmist in poetic language declares, xxxiii:6,
"By the word of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the
host of them by the breath of His mouth," i.e. by a mandate
issued, as it were, in one breath.  (100) Also Ps. cxxxix:7,
"Wither shall I go from Thy Spirit, or whither shall I flee
from Thy presence?" i.e. whither shall I go so as to be beyond
Thy power and Thy presence?

(1:101) Lastly, the Spirit of the Lord is used in Scripture to
express the emotions of God, e.g. His kindness and mercy,
Micah ii:7, "Is the Spirit [i.e. the mercy] of the Lord
straitened?  (102) Are these cruelties His doings?"
(1:103) Zech. iv:6, "Not by might or by power, but My Spirit
[i.e. mercy], saith the Lord of hosts."  (104) The twelfth
verse of the seventh chapter of the same prophet must, I
think, be interpreted in like manner: "Yea, they made their
hearts as an adamant stone, lest they should hear the law,
and the words which the Lord of hosts hath sent in His Spirit
[i.e. in His mercy] by the former prophets."  (105) So also
Haggai ii:5: "So My Spirit remaineth among you: fear not."

(1:106) The passage in Isaiah xlviii:16, "And now the Lord
and His Spirit hath sent me," may be taken to refer to God's
mercy or His revealed law; for the prophet says, "From the
beginning" (i.e. from the time when I first came to you, to
preach God's anger and His sentence forth against you) "I
spoke not in secret; from the time that it was, there am I,"
and now I am sent by the mercy of God as a joyful messenger
to preach your restoration.  (1:107) Or we may understand him
to mean by the revealed law that he had before come to warn
them by the command of the law (Levit. xix:17) in the same
manner under the same conditions as Moses had warned them,
that now, like Moses, he ends by preaching their restoration.
(108) But the first explanation seems to me the best.

(1:109) Returning, then, to the main object of our discussion,
we find that the Scriptural phrases, "The Spirit of the Lord
was upon a prophet," "The Lord breathed His Spirit into men,"
"Men were filled with the Spirit of God, with the Holy Spirit,"
&c., are quite clear to us, and mean that prophets were endowed
with a peculiar and extraordinary power, and devoted themselves
to piety with especial constancy(3); that thus they perceived
the mind or the thought of God, for we have shown that God's
Spirit signifies in Hebrew God's mind or thought, and that the
law which shows His mind and thought is called His Spirit; hence
that the imagination of the prophets, inasmuch as through it
were revealed the decrees of God, may equally be called the mind
of God, and the prophets be said to have possessed the mind of God.
(1:109a) On our minds also the mind of God and His eternal thoughts
are impressed; but this being the same for all men is less taken
into account, especially by the Hebrews, who claimed a
pre-eminence, and despised other men and other men's knowledge.

(110) Lastly, the prophets were said to possess the Spirit of
God because men knew not the cause of prophetic knowledge, and
in their wonder referred it with other marvels directly to the
Deity, styling it Divine knowledge.

[1:7] (111) We need no longer scruple to affirm that the prophets
only perceived God's revelation by the aid of imagination, that is,
by words and figures either real or imaginary.  (112) We find no
other means mentioned in Scripture, and therefore must not invent
any.  (113) As to the particular law of Nature by which the
communications took place, I confess my ignorance.  (114) I might,
indeed, say as others do, that they took place by the power of God;
but this would be mere trifling, and no better than explaining some
unique specimen by a transcendental term.  (115) Everything takes
place by the power of God.  (116) Nature herself is the power of
God under another name, and our ignorance of the power of God is
co-extensive with our ignorance of Nature.  (117) It is absolute
folly, therefore, to ascribe an event to the power of God when
we know not its natural cause, which is the power of God.

(1:118) However, we are not now inquiring into the causes of
prophetic knowledge.  (119) We are only attempting, as I have
said, to examine the Scriptural documents, and to draw our
conclusions from them as from ultimate natural facts; the
causes of the documents do not concern us.

III:[1:120] As the prophets perceived the revelations of God by the
aid of imagination, they could indisputably perceive much that
is beyond the boundary of the intellect, for many more ideas can
be constructed from words and figures than from the principles
and notions on which the whole fabric of reasoned knowledge is
reared.

(1:121) Thus we have a clue to the fact that the prophets perceived
nearly everything in parables and allegories, and clothed spiritual
truths in bodily forms, for such is the usual method of imagination.
(122) We need no longer wonder that Scripture and the prophets speak
so strangely and obscurely of God's Spirit or Mind (cf. Numbers xi:17,
1 Kings xxii:21, &c.), that the Lord was seen by Micah as sitting,
by Daniel as an old man clothed in white, by Ezekiel as a fire, that
the Holy Spirit appeared to those with Christ as a descending dove,
to the apostles as fiery tongues, to Paul on his conversion as a great
light.  (123) All these expressions are plainly in harmony with the
current ideas of God and spirits.

(1:124) Inasmuch as imagination is fleeting and inconstant, we find
that the power of prophecy did not remain with a prophet for long,
nor manifest itself frequently, but was very rare; manifesting
itself only in a few men, and in them not often.

(1:125)We must necessarily inquire how the prophets became assured
of the truth of what they perceived by imagination, and not by sure
mental laws; but our investigation must be confined to Scripture,
for the subject is one on which we cannot acquire certain knowledge,
and which we cannot explain by the immediate causes.  (126) Scripture
teaching about the assurance of prophets I will treat of in the next
chapter.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

[2:0] CHAPTER II. - OF PROPHETS.

(2:1) It follows from the last chapter that, as I have said, the
prophets were endowed with unusually vivid imaginations, and not
with unusually, perfect minds.  (2) This conclusion is amply
sustained by Scripture, for we are told that Solomon was the
wisest of men, but had no special faculty of prophecy.  (3) Heman,
Calcol, and Dara, though men of great talent, were not prophets,
whereas uneducated countrymen, nay, even women, such as Hagar,
Abraham's handmaid, were thus gifted.  (4) Nor is this contrary to
ordinary experience and reason.  (5) Men of great imaginative power
are less fitted for abstract reasoning, whereas those who excel in
intellect and its use keep their imagination more restrained and
controlled, holding it in subjection, so to speak, lest it should
usurp the place of reason.

[2:1] (6) Thus to suppose that knowledge of natural and spiritual
phenomena can be gained from the prophetic books, is an utter
mistake, which I shall endeavour to expose, as I think philosophy,
the age, and the question itself demand.  (7) I care not for the
girdings of superstition, for superstition is the bitter enemy
of all true knowledge and true morality.  (8) Yes; it has come to
this!  (9) Men who openly confess that they can form no idea of God,
and only know Him through created things, of which they know not
the causes, can unblushingly accuse philosophers of Atheism.
(2:10) Treating the question methodically, I will show that
prophecies varied, not only according to the imagination and
physical temperament of the prophet, but also according to his
particular opinions; and further that prophecy never rendered the
prophet wiser than he was before.  (11) But I will first discuss
the assurance of truth which the prophets received, for this is
akin to the subject-matter of the chapter, and will serve to
elucidate somewhat our present point.

(2:12) Imagination does not, in its own nature, involve any
certainty of truth, such as is implied in every clear and distinct
idea, but requires some extrinsic reason to assure us of its
objective reality: hence prophecy cannot afford certainty, and the
prophets were assured of God's revelation by some sign, and not by
the fact of revelation, as we may see from Abraham, who, when he
had heard the promise of God, demanded a sign, not because he did
not believe in God, but because he wished to be sure that it was God
Who made the promise.  (13) The fact is still more evident in the
case of Gideon: "Show me," he says to God, "show me a sign, that I
may know that it is Thou that talkest with me."  (14) God also says
to Moses: "And let this be a sign that I have sent thee."
(2:15) Hezekiah, though he had long known Isaiah to be a prophet,
none the less demanded a sign of the cure which he predicted.
(15a) It is thus quite evident that the prophets always received
some sign to certify them of their prophetic imaginings; and for
this reason Moses bids the Jews (Deut. xviii.) ask of the prophets
a sign, namely, the prediction of some coming event.  (16) In this
respect, prophetic knowledge is inferior to natural knowledge,
which needs no sign, and in itself implies certitude.
(2:17) Moreover, Scripture warrants the statement that the
certitude of the prophets was not mathematical, but moral.
(18) Moses lays down the punishment of death for the prophet
who preaches new gods, even though he confirm his doctrine by
signs and wonders (Deut. xiii.); "For," he says, "the Lord
also worketh signs and wonders to try His people."  (19) And
Jesus Christ warns His disciples of the same thing
(Matt. xxiv:24).  (20) Furthermore, Ezekiel (xiv:9) plainly
states that God sometimes deceives men with false revelations;
and Micaiah bears like witness in the case of the prophets of Ahab.

(2:21) Although these instances go to prove that revelation is
open to doubt, it nevertheless contains, as we have said, a
considerable element of certainty, for God never deceives the
good, nor His chosen, but (according to the ancient proverb,
and as appears in the history of Abigail and her speech), God
uses the good as instruments of goodness, and the wicked as
means to execute His wrath. (22) This may be seen from the case
of Micaiah above quoted; for although God had determined to
deceive Ahab, through prophets, He made use of lying prophets;
to the good prophet He revealed the truth, and did not forbid his
proclaiming it.

(2:23) Still the certitude of prophecy remains, as I have said,
merely moral; for no one can justify himself before God, nor
boast that he is an instrument for God's goodness.  (24) Scripture
itself teaches and shows that God led away David to number the
people, though it bears ample witness to David's piety.

[2:2] (25) The whole question of the certitude of prophecy was
based on these three considerations:
   1. That the things revealed were imagined very
      vividly, affecting the prophets in the same
      way as things seen when awake;
   2. The presence of a sign;
   3. Lastly and chiefly, that the mind of the
      prophet was given wholly to what was right
      and  good.

(2:26) Although Scripture does not always make mention of a sign,
we must nevertheless suppose that a sign was always vouchsafed;
for Scripture does not always relate every condition and
circumstance (as many have remarked), but rather takes them for
granted.  (27) We may, however, admit that no sign was needed when
the prophecy declared nothing that was not already contained in
the law of Moses, because it was confirmed by that law.  (28) For
instance, Jeremiah's prophecy of the destruction of Jerusalem was
confirmed by the prophecies of other prophets, and by the threats
in the law, and, therefore, it needed no sign; whereas Hananiah,
who, contrary to all the prophets, foretold the speedy restoration
of the state, stood in need of a sign, or he would have been in
doubt as to the truth of his prophecy, until it was confirmed by
facts.  (29) "The prophet which prophesieth of peace, when the word
of the prophet shall come to pass, then shall the prophet be known
that the Lord hath truly sent him."

(2:30) As, then, the certitude afforded to the prophet by signs
was not mathematical (i.e. did not necessarily follow from the
perception of the thing perceived or seen), but only moral, and
as the signs were only given to convince the prophet, it follows
that such signs were given according to the opinions and capacity
of each prophet, so that a sign which convince one prophet would
fall far short of convincing another who was imbued with different
opinions.  (31) Therefore the signs varied according to the
individual prophet. 

[2:3] (32) So also did the revelation vary, as we have stated,
according to individual disposition and temperament, and
according to the opinions previously held.

(2:33) It varied according to disposition, in this way: if a
prophet was cheerful, victories, peace, and events which make
men glad, were revealed to him; in that he was naturally more
likely to imagine such things.  (34) If, on the contrary, he
was melancholy, wars, massacres, and calamities were revealed;
and so, according as a prophet was merciful, gentle, quick to
anger, or severe, he was more fitted for one kind of revelation
than another. (35) It varied according to the temper of
imagination in this way: if a prophet was cultivated he
perceived the mind of God in a cultivated way, if he was
confused he perceived it confusedly.  (36) And so with
revelations perceived through visions.  (37) If a prophet was
a countryman he saw visions of oxen, cows, and the like; if
he was a soldier, he saw generals and armies; if a courtier,
a royal throne, and so on.

(2:38) Lastly, prophecy varied according to the opinions held
by the prophets; for instance, to the Magi, who believed in
the follies of astrology, the birth of Christ was revealed
through the vision of a star in the East.  (39) To the augurs
of Nebuchadnezzar the destruction of Jerusalem was revealed
through entrails, whereas the king himself inferred it from
oracles and the direction of arrows which he shot into the air.
(40) To prophets who believed that man acts from free choice
and by his own power, God was revealed as standing apart from
and ignorant of future human actions.  (41) All of which we will
illustrate from Scripture.

(2:42) The first point is proved from the case of Elisha, who,
in order to prophecy to Jehoram, asked for a harp, and was unable
to perceive the Divine purpose till he had been recreated by its
music; then, indeed, he prophesied to Jehoram and to his allies
glad tidings, which previously he had been unable to attain to
because he was angry with the king, and these who are angry with
anyone can imagine evil of him, but not good.  (43) The theory
that God does not reveal Himself to the angry or the sad, is a
mere dream: for God revealed to Moses while angry, the terrible
slaughter of the firstborn, and did so without the intervention
of a harp.  (2:44) To Cain in his rage, God was revealed, and to
Ezekiel, impatient with anger, was revealed the contumacy and
wretchedness of the Jews.  (45) Jeremiah, miserable and weary of
life, prophesied the disasters of the Hebrews, so that Josiah
would not consult him, but inquired of a woman, inasmuch as it
was more in accordance with womanly nature that God should reveal
His mercy thereto.  (46) So, Micaiah never prophesied good to Ahab,
though other true prophets had done so, but invariably evil.
(46a) Thus we see that individual prophets were by temperament
more fitted for one sort of revelation than another.

(2:47) The style of the prophecy also varied according to the
eloquence of the individual prophet.  (48) The prophecies of
Ezekiel and Amos are not written in a cultivated style like
those of Isaiah and Nahum, but more rudely.  (49) Any Hebrew
scholar who wishes to inquire into this point more closely,
and compares chapters of the different prophets treating of
the same subject, will find great dissimilarity of style.
(2:50) Compare, for instance, chap. i. of the courtly Isaiah,
verse 11 to verse 20, with chap. v. of the countryman Amos,
verses 21-24.  (51) Compare also the order and reasoning of the
prophecies of Jeremiah, written in Idumaea (chap. xhx.), with
the order and reasoning of Obadiah.  (52) Compare, lastly,
Isa. xl:19, 20, and xliv:8, with Hosea viii:6, and xiii:2.
And so on.

(2:53) A due consideration of these passage will clearly show us
that God has no particular style in speaking, but, according to
the learning and capacity of the prophet, is cultivated,
compressed, severe, untutored, prolix, or obscure.

(2:54) There was, moreover, a certain variation in the visions
vouchsafed to the prophets, and in the symbols by which they
expressed them, for Isaiah saw the glory of the Lord departing
from the Temple in a different form from that presented to
Ezekiel.  (55) The Rabbis, indeed, maintain that both visions
were really the same, but that Ezekiel, being a countryman, was
above measure impressed by it, and therefore set it forth in
full detail; but unless there is a trustworthy tradition on
the subject, which I do not for a moment believe, this theory
is plainly an invention. Isaiah saw seraphim with six wings,
Ezekiel beasts with four wings; Isaiah saw God clothed and
sitting on a royal throne, Ezekiel saw Him in the likeness of a
fire; each doubtless saw God under the form in which he usually
imagined Him.

(2:56) Further, the visions varied in clearness as well as in
details; for the revelations of Zechariah were too obscure to
be understood by the prophet without explanation, as appears
from his narration of them; the visions of Daniel could not be
understood by him even after they had been explained, and this
obscurity did not arise from the difficulty of the matter revealed
(for being merely human affairs, these only transcended human
capacity in being future), but solely in the fact that Daniel's
imagination was not so capable for prophecy while he was awake
as while he was asleep; and this is further evident from the
fact that at the very beginning of the vision he was so
terrified that he almost despaired of his strength.  (2:57) Thus,
on account of the inadequacy of his imagination and his strength,
the things revealed were so obscure to him that he could not
understand them even after they had been explained.  (58) Here
we may note that the words heard by Daniel, were, as we have
shown above, simply imaginary, so that it is hardly wonderful
that in his frightened state he imagined them so confusedly and
obscurely that afterwards he could make nothing of them.
(2:59) Those who say that God did not wish to make a clear
revelation, do not seem to have read the words of the angel,
who expressly says that he came to make the prophet understand
what should befall his people in the latter days (Dan. x:14).

(2:60) The revelation remained obscure because no one was found,
at that time, with imagination sufficiently strong to conceive
it more clearly.  (61) Lastly, the prophets, to whom it was
revealed that God would take away Elijah, wished to persuade
Elisha that he had been taken somewhere where they would find
him; showing sufficiently clearly that they had not understood
God's revelation aright.

(2:62) There is no need to set this out more amply, for nothing
is more plain in the Bible than that God endowed some prophets
with far greater gifts of prophecy than others.  (63) But I will
show in greater detail and length, for I consider the point more
important, that the prophecies varied according to the opinions
previously embraced by the prophets, and that the prophets held
diverse and even contrary opinions and prejudices.  (2:64) (I speak,
be it understood, solely of matters speculative, for in regard to
uprightness and morality the case is widely different.)  (65) From
thence I shall conclude that prophecy never rendered the prophets
more learned, but left them with their former opinions, and that
we are, therefore, not at all bound to trust them in matters of
intellect.

(2:66) Everyone has been strangely hasty in affirming that the
prophets knew everything within the scope of human intellect;
and, although certain passages of Scripture plainly affirm that
the prophets were in certain respects ignorant, such persons
would rather say that they do not understand the passages than
admit that there was anything which the prophets did not know;
or else they try to wrest the Scriptural words away from their
evident meaning.

(2:67) If either of these proceedings is allowable we may as well
shut our Bibles, for vainly shall we attempt to prove anything
from them if their plainest passages may be classed among obscure
and impenetrable mysteries, or if we may put any interpretation
on them which we fancy.  (68) For instance, nothing is more clear
in the Bible than that Joshua, and perhaps also the author who
wrote his history, thought that the sun revolves round the earth,
and that the earth is fixed, and further that the sun for a certain
period remained still.  (2:69) Many, who will not admit any movement in
the heavenly bodies, explain away the passage till it seems to mean
something quite different; others, who have learned to philosophize
more correctly, and understand that the earth moves while the sun
is still, or at any rate does not revolve round the earth, try with
all their might to wrest this meaning from Scripture, though plainly
nothing of the sort is intended. (70) Such quibblers excite my wonder!
(2:71) Are we, forsooth, bound to believe that Joshua the Soldier was
a learned astronomer? or that a miracle could not be revealed to him,
or that the light of the sun could not remain longer than usual above
the horizon, without his knowing the cause?  (72) To me both
alternatives appear ridiculous, and therefore I would rather say
that Joshua was ignorant of the true cause of the lengthened day,
and that he and the whole host with him thought that the sun moved
round the earth every day, and that on that particular occasion it
stood still for a time, thus causing the light to remain longer; and
I would say, that they did not conjecture that, from the amount of
snow in the air (see Josh. x:11), the refraction may have been
greater than usual, or that there may have been some other cause
which we will not now inquire into.

(2:73) So also the sign of the shadow going back was revealed to
Isaiah according to his understanding; that is, as proceeding from
a going backwards of the sun; for he, too, thought that the sun
moves and that the earth is still; of parhelia he perhaps never
even dreamed.  (74) We may arrive at this conclusion without any
scruple, for the sign could really have come to pass, and have been
predicted by Isaiah to the king, without the prophet being aware of
the real cause.

(2:75) With regard to the building of the Temple by Solomon, if it
was really dictate by God we must maintain the same doctrine: namely,
that all the measurements were revealed according to the opinions
and understanding of the king; for as we are not bound to believe
that Solomon was a mathematician, we may affirm that he was ignorant
of the true ratio between the circumference and the diameter of a
circle, and that, like the generality of workmen, he thought that it
was as three to one.  (76) But if it is allowable to declare that we
do not understand the passage, in good sooth I know nothing in the
Bible that we can understand; for the process of building is there
narrated simply and as a mere matter of history.  (2:77) If, again,
it is permitted to pretend that the passage has another meaning,
and was written as it is from some reason unknown to us, this is
no less than a complete subversal of the Bible; for every absurd
and evil invention of human perversity could thus, without detriment
to Scriptural authority, be defended and fostered.  (78) Our
conclusion is in no wise impious, for though Solomon, Isaiah,
Joshua, &c. were prophets, they were none the less men, and as
such not exempt from human shortcomings.

(79) According to the understanding of Noah it was revealed to
him that God as about to destroy the whole human race, for Noah
thought that beyond the limits of Palestine the world was not
inhabited.

(2:80) Not only in matters of this kind, but in others more
important, the about the Divine attributes, but held quite
ordinary notions about God, and to these notions their
revelations were adapted, as I will demonstrate by ample
Scriptural testimony; from all which one may easily see
that they were praised and commended, not so much for the
sublimity and eminence of their intellect as for their
piety and faithfulness.  (2:81) Adam, the first man to whom God
was revealed, did not know that He is omnipotent and omniscient;
for he hid himself from Him, and attempted to make excuses for
his fault before God, as though he had had to do with a man;
therefore to him also was God revealed according to his
understanding - that is, as being unaware of his situation or
his sin, for Adam heard, or seemed to hear, the Lord walling,
in the garden, calling him and asking him where he was; and then,
on seeing his shamefacedness, asking him whether he had eaten of
the forbidden fruit.  (82) Adam evidently only knew the Deity as
the Creator of all things.  (82a) To Cain also God was revealed,
according to his understanding, as ignorant of human affairs,
nor was a higher conception of the Deity required for repentance
of his sin.

(2:83) To Laban the Lord revealed Himself as the God of Abraham,
because Laban believed that each nation had its own special
divinity see Gen. xxxi:29).  (84) Abraham also knew not that
God is omnipresent, and has foreknowledge of all things; for
when he heard the sentence against the inhabitants of Sodom,
he prayed that the Lord should not execute it till He had
ascertained whether they all merited such punishment; for he
said (see Gen. xviii:24), "Peradventure there be fifty righteous
within the city," and in accordance with this belief God was
revealed to him; as Abraham imagined, He spake thus: "I will
go down now, and see whether they have done altogether according
to the cry of it which is come unto Me; and, if not, I will know."
(2:85) Further, the Divine testimony concerning Abraham asserts
nothing but that he was obedient, and that he "commanded his
household after him that they should keep the way of the Lord"
(Gen. xviii:19); it does not state that he held sublime
conceptions of the Deity.

(2:86) Moses, also, was not sufficiently aware that God is
omniscient, and directs human actions by His sole decree,
for although God Himself says that the Israelites should
hearken to Him, Moses still considered the matter doubtful
and repeated, "But if they will not believe me, nor hearken
unto my voice."  (87) To him in like manner God was revealed
as taking no part in, and as being ignorant of, future human
actions: the Lord gave him two signs and said, "And it
shall come to pass that if they will not believe thee,
neither hearken to the voice of the first sign, that they
will believe the voice of the latter sign; but if not, thou
shalt take of the water of the river," &c.  (2:88) Indeed,
if any one considers without prejudice the recorded opinions
of Moses, he will plainly see that Moses conceived the Deity
as a Being Who has always existed, does exist, and always
will exist, and for this cause he calls Him by the name
Jehovah, which in Hebrew signifies these three phases of
existence: as to His nature, Moses only taught that He is
merciful, gracious, and exceeding jealous, as appears from
many passages in the Pentateuch. (89) Lastly, he believed
and taught that this Being was so different from all other
beings, that He could not be expressed by the image of any
visible thing; also, that He could not be looked upon, and
that not so much from inherent impossibility as from human
infirmity; further, that by reason of His power He was without
equal and unique.  (2:90) Moses admitted, indeed, that there were
beings (doubtless by the plan and command of the Lord) who
acted as God's vicegerents - that is, beings to whom God had
given the right, authority, and power to direct nations, and
to provide and care for them; but he taught that this Being
Whom they were bound to obey was the highest and Supreme God,
or (to use the Hebrew phrase) God of gods, and thus in the song
(Exod. xv:11) he exclaims, "Who is like unto Thee, 0 Lord,
among the gods?" and Jethro says (Exod. xviii:11), "Now I know 
that the Lord is greater than all gods." (91) That is to say,
"I am at length compelled to admit to Moses that Jehovah is
greater than all gods, and that His power is unrivalled."
(2:92) We must remain in doubt whether Moses thought that these
beings who acted as God's vicegerents were created by Him, for he
has stated nothing, so far as we know, about their creation and
origin.  (93) He further taught that this Being had brought the
visible world into order from Chaos, and had given Nature her germs,
and therefore that He possesses supreme right and power over all
things; further, that by reason of this supreme right and power
He had chosen for Himself alone the Hebrew nation and a certain
strip of territory, and had handed over to the care of other gods
substituted by Himself the rest of the nations and territories,
and that therefore He was called the God of Israel and the God
of Jerusalem, whereas the other gods were called the gods of the
Gentiles.  (2:94) For this reason the Jews believed that the strip of
territory which God had chosen for Himself, demanded a Divine worship
quite apart and different from the worship which obtained elsewhere,
and that the Lord would not suffer the worship of other gods adapted
to other countries.  (95) Thus they thought that the people whom the
king of Assyria had brought into Judaea were torn in pieces by lions
because they knew not the worship of the National Divinity
(2 Kings xvii:25).

(2:96) Jacob, according to Aben Ezra's opinion, therefore admonished
his sons when he wished them to seek out a new country, that they
should prepare themselves for a new worship, and lay aside the
worship of strange, gods - that is, of the gods of the land where
they were (Gen. xxxv:2, 3).

(2:97) David, in telling Saul that he was compelled by the king's
persecution to live away from his country, said that he was driven
out from the heritage of the Lord, and sent to worship other gods
(1 Sam. xxvi:19).  (98) Lastly, he believed that this Being or Deity
had His habitation in the heavens (Deut. xxxiii:27), an opinion
very common among the Gentiles.

(2:99) If we now examine the revelations to Moses, we shall find
that they were accommodated to these opinions; as he believed
that the Divine Nature was subject to the conditions of mercy,
graciousness, &c., so God was revealed to him in accordance with
his idea and under these attributes (see Exodus xxxiv:6, 7, and
the second commandment).  (100) Further it is related (Ex. xxxiii:18)
that Moses asked of God that he might behold Him, but as Moses
(as we have said) had formed no mental image of God, and God
(as I have shown) only revealed Himself to the prophets in
accordance with the disposition of their imagination, He did not
reveal Himself in any form.  (2:101) This, I repeat, was because
the imagination of Moses was unsuitable, for other prophets bear
witness that they saw the Lord; for instance, Isaiah, Ezekiel,
Daniel, &c.  (102) For this reason God answered Moses, "Thou canst
not see My face;" and inasmuch as Moses believed that God can be
looked upon - that is, that no contradiction of the Divine nature
is therein involved (for otherwise he would never have preferred
his request) - it is added, "For no one shall look on Me and live,"
thus giving a reason in accordance with Moses' idea, for it is not
stated that a contradiction of the Divine nature would be involved,
as was really the case, but that the thing would not come to pass
because of human infirmity.

(2:103) When God would reveal to Moses that the Israelites,
because they worshipped the calf, were to be placed in the
same category as other nations, He said (ch. xxxiii:2, 3),
that He would send an angel (that is, a being who should
have charge of the Israelites, instead of the Supreme Being),
and that He Himself would no longer remain among them; thus
leaving Moses no ground for supposing that the Israelites
were more beloved by God than the other nations whose
guardianship He had entrusted to other beings or angels
(vide verse 16).

(2:104) Lastly, as Moses believed that God dwelt in the heavens,
God was revealed to him as coming down from heaven on to a mountain,
and in order to talk with the Lord Moses went up the mountain,
which he certainly need not have done if he could have conceived
of God as omnipresent.

(2:105) The Israelites knew scarcely anything of God, although
He was revealed to them; and this is abundantly evident from
their transferring, a few days afterwards, the honour and
worship due to Him to a calf, which they believed to be the
god who had brought them out of Egypt.  (106) In truth, it is
hardly likely that men accustomed to the superstitions of Egypt,
uncultivated and sunk in most abject slavery, should have held
any sound notions about the Deity, or that Moses should have
taught them anything beyond a rule of right living; inculcating
it not like a philosopher, as the result of freedom, but like a
lawgiver compelling them to be moral by legal authority.
(2:107) Thus the rule of right living, the worship and love
of God, was to them rather a bondage than the true liberty,
the gift and grace of the Deity.  (108) Moses bid them love God
and keep His law, because they had in the past received benefits
from Him (such as the deliverance from slavery in Egypt), and
further terrified them with threats if they transgressed His
commands, holding out many promises of good if they should
observe them; thus treating them as parents treat irrational
children.  (108a) It is, therefore, certain that they knew not
the excellence of virtue and the true happiness.

(2:109) Jonah thought that he was fleeing from the sight of God,
which seems to show that he too held that God had entrusted the
care of the nations outside Judaea to other substituted powers.
(110) No one in the whole of the Old Testament speaks more
rationally of God than Solomon, who in fact surpassed all the
men of his time in natural ability.  (111) Yet he considered
himself above the law (esteeming it only to have been given for
men without reasonable and intellectual grounds for their actions),
and made small account of the laws concerning kings, which are
mainly three: nay, he openly violated them (in this he did wrong,
and acted in a manner unworthy of a philosopher, by indulging in
sensual pleasure), and taught that all Fortune's favours to
mankind are vanity, that humanity has no nobler gift than wisdom,
and no greater punishment than folly.  (112) See Proverbs xvi:22, 23.

(2:113) But let us return to the prophets whose conflicting
opinions we have undertaken to note.  (114) The expressed
ideas of Ezekiel seemed so diverse from those of Moses to the
Rabbis who have left us the extant prophetic books (as is
told in the treatise of Sabbathus, i:13, 2), that they had
serious thoughts of omitting his prophecy from the canon, and
would doubtless have thus excluded it if a certain Hananiah
had not undertaken to explain it; a task which (as is there
narrated) he with great zeal and labour accomplished.
(2:115) How he did so does not sufficiently appear, whether
it was by writing a commentary which has now perished, or
by altering Ezekiel's words and audaciously - striking out
phrases according to his fancy.  (2:116) However this may be,
chapter xviii. certainly does not seem to agree with
Exodus xxxiv:7, Jeremiah xxxii:18, &c.

(2:117) Samuel believed that the Lord never repented of
anything He had decreed (1 Sam. xv:29), for when Saul was
sorry for his sin, and wished to worship God and ask for
forgiveness, Samuel said that the Lord would not go back
from his decree.

(2:118) To Jeremiah, on the other hand, it was revealed that,
"If that nation against whom I (the Lord) have pronounced,
turn from their evil, I will repent of the evil that I thought
to do unto them.  (119) If it do evil in my sight, that it obey
not my voice, then I will repent of the good wherewith I said
I would benefit them" (Jer. xviii:8-10).  (120) Joel (ii:13)
taught that the Lord repented Him only of evil.  (121) Lastly,
it is clear from Gen iv: 7 that a man can overcome the
temptations of sin, and act righteously; for this doctrine is
told to Cain, though, as we learn from Josephus and the
Scriptures, he never did so overcome them.  (2:122) And this
agrees with the chapter of Jeremiah just cited, for it is
there said that the Lord repents of the good or the evil
pronounced, if the men in question change their ways and
manner of life.  (123) But, on the other hand, Paul (Rom.ix:10)
teaches as plainly as possible that men have no control over
the temptations of the flesh save by the special vocation and
grace of God.  (124) And when (Rom. iii:5 and vi:19) he
attributes righteousness to man, he corrects himself as
speaking merely humanly and through the infirmity of the flesh.

(2:125) We have now more than sufficiently proved our point,
that God adapted revelations to the understanding and opinions
of the prophets, and that in matters of theory without bearing
on charity or morality the prophets could be, and, in fact,
were, ignorant, and held conflicting opinions.  (126) It
therefore follows that we must by no means go to the prophets
for knowledge, either of natural or of spiritual phenomena.

(2:127) We have determined, then, that we are only bound to
believe in the prophetic writings, the object and substance
of the revelation; with regard to the details, every one
may believe or not, as he likes.  (128) For instance, the
revelation to Cain only teaches us that God admonished him
to lead the true life, for such alone is the object and
substance of the revelation, not doctrines concerning free
will and philosophy.  (129) Hence, though the freedom of the
will is clearly implied in the words of the admonition,
we are at liberty to hold a contrary opinion, since the
words and reasons were adapted to the understanding of Cain.

(2:130) So, too, the revelation to Micaiah would only teach
that God revealed to him the true issue of the battle between
Ahab and Aram; and this is all we are bound to believe.
 
(131) Whatever else is contained in the revelation concerning
the true and the false Spirit of God, the army of heaven
standing on the right hand and on the left, and all the other
details, does not affect us at all.  (131a) Everyone may
believe as much of it as his reason allows.

(2:132) The reasonings by which the Lord displayed His power to
Job (if they really were a revelation, and the author of the
history is narrating, and not merely, as some suppose,
rhetorically adorning his own conceptions), would come under
the same category - that is, they were adapted to Job's
understanding, for the purpose of convincing him, and are not
universal, or for the convincing of all men.

(2:133) We can come to no different conclusion with respect to the
reasonings of Christ, by which He convicted the Pharisees of pride
and ignorance, and exhorted His disciples to lead the true life.
(134) He adapted them to each man's opinions and principles.
(2:135) For instance, when He said to the Pharisees (Matt. xii:26),
"And if Satan cast out devils, his house is divided against itself,
how then shall his kingdom stand?  (136) "He only wished to convince
the Pharisees according, to their own principles, not to teach
that there are devils, or any kingdom of devils.  (137) So, too,
when He said to His disciples (Matt. viii:10), "See that ye despise
not one of these little ones, for I say unto you that their angels,"
&c.  (137a) He merely desired to warn them against pride and despising any
of their fellows, not to insist on the actual reason given, which was
simply adopted in order to persuade them more easily.

(2:138) Lastly, we should say exactly the same of the apostolic
signs and reasonings, but there is no need to go further into
the subject.  (139) If I were to enumerate all the passages of
Scripture addressed only to individuals, or to a particular man's
understanding, and which cannot, without great danger to philosophy,
be defended as Divine doctrines, I should go far beyond the brevity
at which I aim.  (140) Let it suffice, then, to have indicated a few
instances of general application, and let the curious reader
consider others by himself.  (141) Although the points we have just
raised concerning prophets and prophecy are the only ones which
have any direct bearing on the end in view, namely, the separation
of Philosophy from Theology, still, as I have touched on the general
question, I may here inquire whether the gift of prophecy was
peculiar to the Hebrews, or whether it was common to all nations.
(2:142) I must then come to a conclusion about the vocation of the
Hebrews, all of which I shall do in the ensuing chapter.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

[3:0] CHAPTER III.  OF THE VOCATION OF THE HEBREWS, AND
      WHETHER THE GIFT OF PROPHECY WAS PECULIAR TO THEM.

(3:1) Every man's true happiness and blessedness consist solely
in the enjoyment of what is good, not in the pride that he alone
is enjoying it, to the exclusion of others.  (2) He who thinks
himself the more blessed because he is enjoying benefits which
others are not, or because he is more blessed or more fortunate
than his fellows, is ignorant of true happiness and blessedness,
and the joy which he feels is either childish or envious and
malicious.  (3:3) For instance, a man's true happiness consists
only in wisdom, and the knowledge of the truth, not at all in
the fact that he is wiser than others, or that others lack such
knowledge: such considerations do not increase his wisdom or
true happiness.

(3:4) Whoever, therefore, rejoices for such reasons, rejoices in
another's misfortune, and is, so far, malicious and bad, knowing
neither true happiness nor the peace of the true life.

[3:1] (5) When Scripture, therefore, in exhorting the Hebrews to
obey the law, says that the Lord has chosen them for Himself before
other nations (Deut. x:15); that He is near them, but not near
others (Deut. iv:7); that to them alone He has given just laws
(Deut. iv:8); and, lastly, that He has marked them out before
others (Deut. iv:32); it speaks only according to the
understanding of its hearers, who, as we have shown in the
last chapter, and as Moses also testifies (Deut. ix:6, 7),
knew not true blessedness.  (6) For in good sooth they would
have been no less blessed if God had called all men equally
to salvation, nor would God have been less present to them for
being equally present to others; their laws, would have been
no less just if they had been ordained for all, and they
themselves would have been no less wise.  (3:7) The miracles would
have shown God's power no less by being wrought for other nations
also; lastly, the Hebrews would have been just as much bound
to worship God if He had bestowed all these gifts equally on
all men.

(3:8) When God tells Solomon (1 Kings iii:12) that no one shall
be as wise as he in time to come, it seems to be only a manner
of expressing surpassing wisdom; it is little to be believed
that God would have promised Solomon, for his greater happiness,
that He would never endow anyone with so much wisdom in time to
come; this would in no wise have increased Solomon's intellect,
and the wise king would have given equal thanks to the Lord if
everyone had been gifted with the same faculties.

(3:9) Still, though we assert that Moses, in the passages of the
Pentateuch just cited, spoke only according to the understanding
of the Hebrews, we have no wish to deny that God ordained the Mosaic
law for them alone, nor that He spoke to them alone, nor that they
witnessed marvels beyond those which happened to any other nation;
but we wish to emphasize that Moses desired to admonish the Hebrews
in such a manner, and with such reasonings as would appeal most
forcibly to their childish understanding, and constrain them to
worship the Deity.  [3:2] (10) Further, we wished to show that the
Hebrews did not surpass other nations in knowledge, or in piety,
but evidently in some attribute different from these; or (to speak
like the Scriptures, according to their understanding), that the
Hebrews were not chosen by God before others for the sake of the
true life and sublime ideas, though they were often thereto
admonished, but with some other object.  (11) What that object was,
I will duly show.

(3:12) But before I begin, I wish in a few words to explain what I
mean by the guidance of God, by the help of God, external and inward,
and, lastly, what I understand by fortune.

(3:13) By the help of God, I mean the fixed and unchangeable order
of nature or the chain of natural events: for I have said before
and shown elsewhere that the universal laws of nature, according
to which all things exist and are determined, are only another name
for the eternal decrees of God, which always involve eternal truth
and necessity.

(3:14) So that to say that everything happens according to natural
laws, and to say that everything is ordained by the decree and
ordinance of God, is the same thing.  (15) Now since the power in
nature is identical with the power of God, by which alone all
things happen and are determined, it follows that whatsoever man,
as a part of nature, provides himself with to aid and preserve his
existence, or whatsoever nature affords him without his help, is
given to him solely by the Divine power, acting either through
human nature or through external circumstance.  (16) So whatever
human nature can furnish itself with by its own efforts to preserve
its existence, may be fitly called the inward aid of God, whereas
whatever else accrues to man's profit from outward causes may be
called the external aid of God.

(3:17) We can now easily understand what is meant by the election
of God.  (18) For since no one can do anything save by the
predetermined  order of nature, that is by God's eternal ordinance
and decree, it follows that no one can choose a plan of life for
himself, or accomplish any work save by God's vocation choosing him
for the work or the plan of life in question, rather than any other.
(3:19) Lastly, by fortune, I mean the ordinance of God in so far as
it directs human life through external and unexpected means.
(20) With these preliminaries I return to my purpose of discovering
the reason why the Hebrews were said to be elected by God before
other nations, and with the demonstration I thus proceed.

(3:21) All objects of legitimate desire fall, generally
speaking, under one of these three categories:
    1. The knowledge of things through
       their primary causes.
    2. The government of the passions,
       or the acquirement of the habit
       of virtue.
    3. Secure and healthy life.

(3:22) The means which most directly conduce towards the first two
of these ends, and which may be considered their proximate an
efficient causes are contained in human nature itself, so that their
acquisition hinges only on our own power, and on the laws of human
nature.  (23) It may be concluded that these gifts are not peculiar
to any nation, but have always been shared by the whole human race,
unless, indeed, we would indulge the dream that nature formerly
created men of different kinds.  (24) But the means which conduce to
security and health are chiefly in external circumstance, and are
called the gifts of fortune because they depend chiefly on objective
causes of which we are ignorant; for a fool may be almost as liable
to happiness or unhappiness as a wise man.  (25) Nevertheless, human
management and watchfulness can greatly assist towards living in
security and warding off the injuries of our fellow-men, and even of
beasts.  (3:26) Reason and experience show no more certain means of
attaining this object than the formation of a society with fixed laws,
the occupation of a strip of territory and the concentration of all
forces, as it were, into one body, that is the social body.  (27) Now
for forming and preserving a society, no ordinary ability and care is
required: that society will be most secure, most stable, and least
liable to reverses, which is founded and directed by far-seeing and
careful men; while, on the other hand, a society constituted by men
without trained skill, depends in a great measure on fortune, and is
less constant.  (3:28) If, in spite of all, such a society lasts a long
time, it is owing to some other directing influence than its own; if
it overcomes great perils and its affairs prosper, it will perforce
marvel at and adore the guiding Spirit of God (in so far, that is, as
God works through hidden means, and not through the nature and mind of
man), for everything happens to it unexpectedly and contrary to
anticipation, it may even be said and thought to be by miracle.
[3:3] (29) Nations, then, are distinguished from one another in respect
to the social organization and the laws under which they live and are
governed; the Hebrew nation was not chosen by God in respect to its
wisdom nor its tranquillity of mind, but in respect to its social
organization and the good fortune with which it obtained supremacy and
kept it so many years.  (30) This is abundantly clear from Scripture.
(3:30a) Even a cursory perusal will show us that the only respects
in which the Hebrews surpassed other nations, are in their successful
conduct of matters relating to government, and in their surmounting
great perils solely by God's external aid; in other ways they were on
a par with their fellows, and God was equally gracious to all.
(3:31) For in respect to intellect (as we have shown in the last chapter)
they held very ordinary ideas about God and nature, so that they cannot
have been God's chosen in this respect; nor were they so chosen in
respect of virtue and the true life, for here again they, with the
exception of a very few elect, were on an equality with other nations:
therefore their choice and vocation consisted only in the temporal
happiness and advantages of independent rule.  (32) In fact, we do not
see that God promised anything beyond this to the patriarchs [Endnote 4]
or their successors; in the law no other reward is offered for obedience
than the continual happiness of an independent commonwealth and other
goods of this life; while, on the other hand, against contumacy and the
breaking of the covenant is threatened the downfall of the commonwealth
and great hardships.  (33) Nor is this to be wondered at; for the ends
of every social organization and commonwealth are (as appears from what
we have said, and as we will explain more at length hereafter) security
and comfort; a commonwealth can only exist by the laws being binding on
all.  (34) If all the members of a state wish to disregard the law, by
that very fact they dissolve the state and destroy the commonwealth.
(3:35) Thus, the only reward which could be promised to the Hebrews for
continued obedience to the law was security [Endnote 5] and its
attendant advantages, while no surer punishment could be threatened for
disobedience, than the ruin of the state and the evils which generally
follow therefrom, in addition to such further consequences as might
accrue to the Jews in particular from the ruin of their especial state.
(36) But there is no need here to go into this point at more length.
(3:37) I will only add that the laws of the Old Testament were revealed
and ordained to the Jews only, for as God chose them in respect to the
special constitution of their society and government, they must, of
course, have had special laws.  (38) Whether God ordained special laws
for other nations also, and revealed Himself to their lawgivers
prophetically, that is, under the attributes by which the latter were
accustomed to imagine Him, I cannot sufficiently determine.  (39) It is
evident from Scripture itself that other nations acquired supremacy
and particular laws by the external aid of God; witness only the two
following passages:

[3:4] (40) In Genesis xiv:18, 19, 20, it is related that Melchisedek
was king of Jerusalem and priest of the Most High God, that in exercise
of his priestly functions he blessed Abraham, and that Abraham the
beloved of the Lord gave to this priest of God a tithe of all his
spoils.  (41) This sufficiently shows that before He founded the
Israelitish nation God constituted kings and priests in Jerusalem,
and ordained for them rites and laws.  (42) Whether He did so
prophetically is, as I have said, not sufficiently clear; but I am
sure of this, that Abraham, whilst he sojourned in the city, lived
scrupulously according to these laws, for Abraham had received no
special rites from God; and yet it is stated (Gen. xxvi:5), that he
observed the worship, the precepts, the statutes, and the laws of
God, which must be interpreted to mean the worship, the statutes,
the precepts, and the laws of king Melchisedek.  (43) Malachi chides
the Jews as follows (i:10-11.): "Who is there among you that will shut
the doors? [of the Temple]; neither do ye kindle fire on mine altar for
nought.  (44) I have no pleasure in you, saith the Lord of Hosts.
(3:45) For from the rising of the sun, even until the going down of the
same My Name shall be great among the Gentiles; and in every place
incense shall be offered in My Name, and a pure offering; for My Name
is great among the heathen, saith the Lord of Hosts."  (3:46) These words,
which, unless we do violence to them, could only refer to the current
period, abundantly testify that the Jews of that time were not more
beloved by God than other nations, that God then favoured other nations
with more miracles than He vouchsafed to the Jews, who had then partly
recovered their empire without miraculous aid; and, lastly, that the
Gentiles possessed rites and ceremonies acceptable to God.  (47) But I
pass over these points lightly: it is enough for my purpose to have
shown that the election of the Jews had regard to nothing but temporal
physical happiness and freedom, in other words, autonomous government,
and to the manner and means by which they obtained it; consequently to
the laws in so far as they were necessary to the preservation of that
special government; and, lastly, to the manner in which they were
revealed. In regard to other matters, wherein man's true happiness
consists, they were on a par with the rest of the nations.

[3:5] (48) When, therefore, it is said in Scripture (Deut. iv:7) that
the Lord is not so nigh to any other nation as He is to the Jews,
reference is only made to their government, and to the period when so
many miracles happened to them, for in respect of intellect and virtue -
that is, in respect of blessedness - God was, as we have said already,
and are now demonstrating, equally gracious to all.  (49) Scripture itself
bears testimony to this fact, for the Psalmist says (cxlv:18), "The Lord
is near unto all them that call upon Him, to all that call upon Him in
truth."  (3:50) So in the same Psalm, verse 9, "The Lord is good to all,
and His tender mercies are over all His works." In Ps. xxxiii:16, it is
clearly stated that God has granted to all men the same intellect, in
these words, He fashioneth their hearts alike."  (50a) The heart was
considered by the Hebrews, as I suppose everyone knows, to be the seat
of the soul and the intellect.

(3:51) Lastly, from Job xxxviii:28, it is plain that God had ordained
for the whole human race the law to reverence God, to keep from evil
doing, or to do well, and that Job, although a Gentile, was of all men
most acceptable to God, because he exceeded all in piety and religion.
(52) Lastly, from Jonah iv:2, it is very evident that, not only to the
Jews but to all men, God was gracious, merciful, long-suffering, and
of great goodness, and repented Him of the evil, for Jonah says:
"Therefore I determined to flee before unto Tarshish, for I know that
Thou art a gracious God, and merciful, slow to anger, and of great
kindness," &c., and that, therefore, God would pardon the Ninevites.
(3:53) We conclude, therefore (inasmuch as God is to all men equally
gracious, and the Hebrews were only chosen by him in respect to their
social organization and government), that the individual Jew, taken
apart from his social organization and government, possessed no gift
of God above other men, and that there was no difference between Jew
and Gentile.  (54) As it is a fact that God is equally gracious,
merciful, and the rest, to all men; and as the function of the
prophet was to teach men not so much the laws of their country,
as true virtue, and to exhort them thereto, it is not to be doubted
that all nations possessed prophets, and that the prophetic gift was
not peculiar to the Jews.  (3:55) Indeed, history, both profane and
sacred, bears witness to the fact.  (56) Although, from the sacred
histories of the Old Testament, it is not evident that the other
nations had as many prophets as the Hebrews, or that any Gentile
prophet was expressly sent by God to the nations, this does not
affect the question, for the Hebrews were careful to record their
own affairs, not those of other nations.  (57) It suffices, then,
that we find in the Old Testament Gentiles, and uncircumcised, as
Noah, Enoch, Abimelech, Balaam, &c., exercising prophetic gifts;
further, that Hebrew prophets were sent by God, not only to their
own nation but to many others also.  (3:58) Ezekiel prophesied to all
the nations then known; Obadiah to none, that we are ware of, save
the Idumeans; and Jonah was chiefly the prophet to the Ninevites.
(3:59) Isaiah bewails and predicts the calamities, and hails the
restoration not only of the Jews but also of other nations, for he
says (chap. xvi:9), "Therefore I will bewail Jazer with weeping;"
and in chap. xix. he foretells first the calamities and then the
restoration of the Egyptians (see verses 19, 20, 21, 25), saying
that God shall send them a Saviour to free them, that the Lord
shall be known in Egypt, and, further, that the Egyptians shall
worship God with sacrifice and oblation; and, at last, he calls
that nation the blessed Egyptian people of God; all of which
particulars are specially noteworthy.

(3:60) Jeremiah is called, not the prophet of the Hebrew nation,
but simply the prophet of the nations (see Jer:i.5).  (61) He also
mournfully foretells the calamities of the nations, and predicts
their restoration, for he says (xlviii:31) of the Moabites,
"Therefore will I howl for Moab, and I will cry out for all Moab"
(verse 36), "and therefore mine heart shall sound for Moab like
pipes;" in the end he prophesies their restoration, as also the
restoration of the Egyptians, Ammonites, and Elamites.
(62) Wherefore it is beyond doubt that other nations also,
like the Jews, had their prophets, who prophesied to them.

(3:63) Although Scripture only makes mention of one man, Balaam,
to whom the future of the Jews and the other nations was revealed,
we must not suppose that Balaam prophesied only once, for from
the narrative itself it is abundantly clear that he had long
previously been famous for prophesy and other Divine gifts.
(64) For when Balak bade him to come to him, he said (Num. xxii:6),
"For I know that he whom thou blessest is blessed, and he whom thou
cursest is cursed."  (65) Thus we see that he possessed the gift
on Abraham. Further, as accustomed to prophesy, Balaam bade the
messengers wait for him till the will of the Lord was revealed
to him. (3:66) When he prophesied, that is, when he interpreted
the true mind of God, he was wont to say this of himself: "He hath
said, which heard the words of God and knew the knowledge of the
Most High, which saw the vision of the Almighty falling into a
trance, but having his eyes open."  (3:67) Further, after he had
blessed the Hebrews by the command of God, he began (as was his
custom) to prophesy to other nations, and to predict their future;
all of which abundantly shows that he had lways been a prophet,
or had often prophesied, and (as we may also remark here) possessed
that which afforded the chief certainty to prophets of the truth of
their prophecy, namely, a mind turned wholly to what is right and
good, for he did not bless those whom he wished to bless, nor curse
those whom he wished to curse, as Balak supposed, but only those
whom God wished to be blessed or cursed.  (68) Thus he answered
Balak: "If Balak should give me his house full of silver and gold,
I cannot go beyond the commandment of the Lord to do either good
or bad of my own mind; but what the Lord saith, that will I speak."
(3:69) As for God being angry with him in the way, the same happened
to Moses when he set out to Egypt by the command of the Lord;
and as o his receiving money for prophesying, Samuel did the same
(1 Sam. ix:7, 8); if in anyway he sinned, "there is not a just man
upon earth that doeth good and sinneth not," Eccles. vii:20.
(Vide 2 Epist. Peter ii:15, 16, and Jude 5:11.)

(3:70) His speeches must certainly have had much weight with God,
and His power for cursing must assuredly have been very great from
the number of times that we find stated in Scripture, in proof of
God's great mercy to the Jews, that God would not hear Balaam, and
that He changed the cursing to blessing (see Deut. xxiii:6,
Josh. xxiv:10, Neh. xiii:2).  (71) Wherefore he was without doubt
most acceptable to God, for the speeches and cursings of the wicked
move God not at all.  (3:72) As then he was a true prophet, and
nevertheless Joshua calls him a soothsayer or augur, it is certain
that this title had an honourable signification, and that those whom
the Gentiles called augurs and soothsayers were true prophets,
while those whom Scripture often accuses and condemns were false
soothsayers, who deceived the Gentiles as false prophets deceived
the Jews; indeed, this is made evident from other passages in the
Bible, whence we conclude that the gift of prophecy was not peculiar
to the Jews, but common to all nations.  (3:73) The Pharisees, however,
vehemently contend that this Divine gift was peculiar to their nation,
and that the other nations foretold the future (what will superstition
invent next?) by some unexplained diabolical faculty. (3:74) The
principal passage of Scripture which they cite, by way of confirming
their theory with its authority, is Exodus xxxiii:16, where Moses says
to God, "For wherein shall it be known here that I and Thy people have
found grace in Thy sight? is it not in that Thou goest with us? so
shall we be separated, I and Thy people, from all the people that are
upon the face of the earth."  (75) From this they would infer that Moses
asked of God that He should be present to the Jews, and should reveal
Himself to them prophetically; further, that He should grant this
favour to no other nation.  (3:76) It is surely absurd that Moses should
have been jealous of God's presence among the Gentiles, or that he
should have dared to ask any such thing.  (77) The act is, as Moses
knew that the disposition and spirit of his nation was rebellious,
he clearly saw that they could not carry out what they had begun
without very great miracles and special external aid from God; nay,
that without such aid they must necessarily perish: as it was evident
that God wished them to be preserved, he asked for this special
external aid.  (3:78) Thus he says (Ex. xxxiv:9), "If now I have found
grace in Thy sight, 0 Lord, let my Lord, I pray Thee, go among us;
for it is a stiffnecked people."  (79) The reason, therefore, for his
seeking special external aid from God was the stiffneckedness of the
people, and it is made still more plain, that he asked for nothing
beyond this special external aid by God's answer - for God answered
at once (verse 10 of the same chapter) - "Behold, I make a covenant:
before all Thy people I will do marvels, such as have not been done
in all the earth, nor in any nation."  (80) Therefore Moses had in view
nothing beyond the special election of the Jews, as I have explained it,
and made no other request to God. ( 81) I confess that in Paul's Epistle
to the Romans, I find another text which carries more weight, namely,
where Paul seems to teach a different doctrine from that here set down,
for he there says (Rom. iii:1): "What advantage then hath the Jew? or
what profit is there of circumcision?  (82) Much every way: chiefly,
because that unto them were committed the oracles of God."

(3:83) But if we look to the doctrine which Paul especially desired
to teach, we shall find nothing repugnant to our present contention;
on the contrary, his doctrine is the same as ours, for he says
(Rom. iii:29) "that God is the God of the Jews and of the Gentiles,
and" (ch. ii:25, 26) "But, if thou be a breaker of the law, thy
circumcision is made uncircumcision.  (84) Therefore if the
uncircumcision keep the righteousness of the law, shall not his
uncircumcision be counted for circumcision?"  (85) Further, in
chap. iv:verse 9, he says that all alike, Jew and Gentile, were
under sin, and that without commandment and law there is no sin.
(3:86) Wherefore it is most evident that to all men absolutely was
revealed the law under which all lived - namely, the law which has
regard only to true virtue, not the law established in respect to,
and in the formation of a particular state and adapted to the
disposition of a particular people.  (3:87) Lastly, Paul concludes
that since God is the God of all nations, that is, is equally
gracious to all, and since all men equally live under the law
and under sin, so also to all nations did God send His Christ,
to free all men equally from the bondage of the law, that they
should no more do right by the command of the law, but by the
constant determination of their hearts.  (88) So that Paul teaches
exactly the same as ourselves.  [3:6] (89) When, therefore, he
says "To the Jews only were entrusted the oracles of God," we
must either understand that to them only were the laws entrusted
in writing, while they were given to other nations merely in
revelation and conception, or else (as none but Jews would object
to the doctrine he desired to advance) that Paul was answering only
in accordance with the understanding and current ideas of the Jews,
for in respect to teaching things which he had partly seen, partly
heard, he was to the Greeks a Greek, and to the Jews a Jew.

 
[3:7] (90) It now only remains to us to answer the arguments of
those who would persuade themselves that the election of the Jews
was not temporal, and merely in respect of their commonwealth,
but eternal; for, they say, we see the Jews after the loss of their
commonwealth, and after being scattered so many years and separated
from all other nations, still surviving, which is without parallel
among other peoples, and further the Scriptures seem to teach that
God has chosen for Himself the Jews for ever, so that though they
have lost their commonwealth, they still nevertheless remain God's
elect.

(3:91) The passages which they think teach most clearly
this eternal election, are chiefly:

1. Jer. xxxi:36, where the prophet testifies
   that the seed of Israel shall for ever remain
   the nation of God, comparing them with the
   stability of the heavens and nature;

2. Ezek. xx:32, where the prophet seems to intend
   that though the Jews wanted after the help afforded
   them to turn their backs on the worship of the Lord,
   that God would nevertheless gather them together
   again from all the lands in which they were dispersed,
   and lead them to the wilderness of the peoples -
   as He had led their fathers to the wilderness of the
   land of Egypt - and would at length, after purging
   out from among them the rebels and transgressors,
   bring them thence to his Holy mountain, where the
   whole house of Israel should worship Him. Other
   passages are also cited, especially by the Pharisees,
   but I think I shall satisfy everyone if I answer these
   two, and this I shall easily accomplish after showing
   from Scripture itself that God chose not the Hebrews
   for ever, but only on the condition under which He
   had formerly chosen the Canaanites, for these last,
   as we have shown, had priests who religiously
   worshipped God, and whom God at length rejected
   because of their luxury, pride, and corrupt worship.

(3:92) Moses (Lev. xviii:27) warned the Israelites that they be not
polluted with whoredoms, lest the land spue them out as it had spued
out the nations who had dwelt there before, and in Deut. viii:19, 20,
in the plainest terms He threatens their total ruin, for He says,
"I testify against you that ye shall surely perish.  (93) As the
nations which the Lord destroyeth before your face, so shall ye
perish." In like manner many other passages are found in the law
which expressly show that God chose the Hebrews neither absolutely
nor for ever.  (3:94) If, then, the prophets foretold for them a new
covenant of the knowledge of God, love, and grace, such a promise
is easily proved to be only made to the elect, for Ezekiel in the
chapter which we have just quoted expressly says that God will
separate from them the rebellious and transgressors, and
Zephaniah (iii:12, 13), says that "God will take away the proud
from the midst of them, and leave the poor."  (3:95) Now, inasmuch
as their election has regard to true virtue, it is not to be
thought that it was promised to the Jews alone to the exclusion
of others, but we must evidently believe that the true Gentile
prophets (and every nation, as we have shown, possessed such)
promised the same to the faithful of their own people, who were
thereby comforted. (96) Wherefore this eternal covenant of the
knowledge of God and love is universal, as is clear, moreover,
from Zeph. iii:10, 11 : no difference in this respect can be
admitted between Jew and Gentile, nor did the former enjoy any
special election beyond that which we have pointed out.

(3:97) When the prophets, in speaking of this election which regards
only true virtue, mixed up much concerning sacrifices and ceremonies,
and the rebuilding of the temple and city, they wished by such
figurative expressions, after the manner and nature of prophecy,
to expound matters spiritual, so as at the same time to show to the
Jews, whose prophets they were, the true restoration of the state and
of the temple to be expected about the time of Cyrus.
(3:98) At the present time, therefore, there is absolutely nothing
which the Jews can arrogate to themselves beyond other people.

(3:99) As to their continuance so long after dispersion and the loss
of empire, there is nothing marvellous in it, for they so separated
themselves from every other nation as to draw down upon themselves
universal hate, not only by their outward rites, rites conflicting
with those of other nations, but also by the sign of circumcision
which they most scrupulously observe.  (100) That they have been
preserved in great measure by Gentile hatred, experience demonstrates.
(3:101) When the king of Spain formerly compelled the Jews to embrace
the State religion or to go into exile, a large number of Jews accepted
Catholicism.  (102) Now, as these renegades were admitted to all the
native privileges of Spaniards, and deemed worthy of filling all
honourable offices, it came to pass that they straightway became so
intermingled with the Spaniards as to leave of themselves no relic
or remembrance.  (103) But exactly the opposite happened to those
whom the king of Portugal compelled to become Christians, for they
always, though converted, lived apart, inasmuch as they were considered
unworthy of any civic honours.

(3:104) The sign of circumcision is, as I think, so important, that
I could persuade myself that it alone would preserve the nation for
ever.  (105) Nay, I would go so far as to believe that if the
foundations of their religion have not emasculated their minds they
may even, if occasion offers, so changeable are human affairs, raise
up their empire afresh, and that God may a second time elect them.

(3:106) Of such a possibility we have a very famous example in the
Chinese.  (107) They, too, have some distinctive mark on their heads
which they most scrupulously observe, and by which they keep themselves
apart from everyone else, and have thus kept themselves during so many
thousand years that they far surpass all other nations in antiquity.
(108) They have not always retained empire, but they have recovered
it when lost, and doubtless will do so again after the spirit of the
Tartars becomes relaxed through the luxury of riches and pride.

(3:109) Lastly, if any one wishes to maintain that the Jews, from
this or from any other cause, have been chosen by God for ever, I
will not gainsay him if he will admit that this choice, whether
temporary or eternal, has no regard, in so far as it is peculiar
to the Jews, to aught but dominion and physical advantages (for
such alone can one nation be distinguished from another), whereas
in regard to intellect and true virtue, every nation is on a with
the rest, and God has not in these respects chosen one people
rather than another.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

[4:0] CHAPTER IV. - OF THE DIVINE LAW.

(4:1) The word law, taken in the abstract, means that by which an
individual, or all things, or as many things as belong to a particular
species, act in one and the same fixed and definite manner, which
manner depends either on natural necessity or on human decree.  (2) A
law which depends on natural necessity is one which necessarily follows
from the nature, or from the definition of the thing in question; a law
which depends on human decree, and which is more correctly called an
ordinance, is one which men have laid down for themselves and others in
order to live more safely or conveniently, or from some similar reason.

(4:3) For example, the law that all bodies impinging on lesser bodies,
lose as much of their own motion as they communicate to the latter is
a universal law of all bodies, and depends on natural necessity.  (4) So,
too, the law that a man in remembering one thing, straightway remembers
another either like it, or which he had perceived simultaneously with it,
is a law which necessarily follows from the nature of man.  (5) But the
law that men must yield, or be compelled to yield, somewhat of their
natural right, and that they bind themselves to live in a certain way,
depends on human decree.  (6) Now, though I freely admit that all things
are predetermined by universal natural laws to exist and operate in a
given, fixed, and definite manner, I still assert that the laws I have
just mentioned depend on human decree.

[4:1] 
1.  (4:7)Because man, in so far as he is a part of nature,
    constitutes a part of the power of nature.  (8) Whatever,
    therefore, follows necessarily from the necessity of
    human nature (that is, from nature herself, in so far
    as we conceive of her as acting through man) follows,
    even though it be necessarily, from human power.
    (9) Hence the sanction of such laws may very well be
    said to depend on man's decree, for it principally
    depends on the power of the human mind; so that the
    human mind in respect to its perception of things as
    true and false, can readily be conceived as without
    such laws, but not without necessary law as we have
    just defined it.

2.  (4:10)I have stated that these laws depend on human
    decree because it is well to define and explain things
    by their proximate causes.  (11) The general consideration
    of fate and the concatenation of causes would aid us
    very little in forming and arranging our ideas
    concerning particular questions.  (12) Let us add that
    as to the actual coordination and concatenation of things,
    that is how things are ordained and linked together, we
    are obviously ignorant; therefore, it is more profitable
    for right living, nay, it is necessary for us to consider
    things as contingent.  (13) So much about law in the abstract.

(4:14) Now the word law seems to be only applied to natural phenomena
by analogy, and is commonly taken to signify a command which men can
either obey or neglect, inasmuch as it restrains human nature within
certain originally exceeded limits, and therefore lays down no rule
beyond human strength.  (15) Thus it is expedient to define law more
particularly as a plan of life laid down by man for himself or others
with a certain object.  (16) However, as the true object of legislation
is only perceived by a few, and most men are almost incapable of
grasping it, though they live under its conditions, legislators, with
a view to exacting general obedience, have wisely put forward another
object, very different from that which necessarily follows from the
nature of law: they promise to the observers of the law that which the
masses chiefly desire, and threaten its violators with that which they
chiefly fear: thus endeavouring to restrain the masses, as far as may be,
like a horse with a curb; whence it follows that the word law is chiefly
applied to the modes of life enjoined on men by the sway of others;
hence those who obey the law are said to live under it and to be under
compulsion.  (4:17) In truth, a man who renders everyone their due
because he fears the gallows, acts under the sway and compulsion of
others, and cannot be called just.  (18) But a man who does the same
from a knowledge of the true reason for laws and their necessity, acts
from a firm purpose and of his own accord, and is therefore properly
called just.  (19) This, I take it, is Paul's meaning when he says, that
those who live under the law cannot be justified through the law, for
justice, as commonly defined, is the constant and perpetual will to
render every man his due.  (4:20) Thus Solomon says (Prov. xxi:15),
"It is a joy to the just to do judgment," but the wicked fear.

(II:[4:2] ) (4:21) Law, then, being a plan of living which men have for
a certain object laid down for themselves or others, may, as it seems,
be divided into human law and Divine law.  (22) By human law I mean
a plan of living which serves only to render life and the state secure.
(23) By Divine law I mean that which only regards the highest good,
in other words, the true knowledge of God and love.

(4:24) I call this law Divine because of the nature of the
highest good, which I will here shortly explain as clearly
as I can.

(4:25) Inasmuch as the intellect is the best part of our being,
it is evident that we should make every effort to perfect it as far
as possible if we desire to search for what is really profitable to
us.  (26) For in intellectual perfection the highest good should
consist.  (27) Now, since all our knowledge, and the certainty which
removes every doubt, depend solely on the knowledge of God;- firstly,
because without God nothing can exist or be conceived; secondly,
because so long as we have no clear and distinct idea of God we may
remain in universal doubt - it follows that our highest good and
perfection also depend solely on the knowledge of God.  (4:28) Further,
since without God nothing can exist or be conceived, it is evident
that all natural phenomena involve and express the conception of God
as far as their essence and perfection extend, so that we have greater
and more perfect knowledge of God in proportion to our knowledge of
natural phenomena: conversely (since the knowledge of an effect through
its cause is the same thing as the knowledge of a particular property
of a cause) the greater our knowledge of natural phenomena, the more
perfect is our knowledge of the essence of God (which is the cause of
all things).  (4:29) So, then, our highest good not only depends on the
knowledge of God, but wholly consists therein; and it further follows
that man is perfect or the reverse in proportion to the nature and
perfection of the object of his special desire; hence the most perfect
and the chief sharer in the highest blessedness is he who prizes above
all else, and takes especial delight in, the intellectual knowledge of
God, the most perfect Being.

(4:30) Hither, then, our highest good and our highest blessedness aim -
namely, to the knowledge and love of God; therefore the means demanded
by this aim of all human actions, that is, by God in so far as the idea
of him is in us, may be called the commands of God, because they proceed,
as it were, from God Himself, inasmuch as He exists in our minds, and
the plan of life which has regard to this aim may be fitly called the
law of God.  (4:31) The nature of the means, and the plan of life which
this aim demands, how the foundations of the best states follow its
lines, and how men's life is conducted, are questions pertaining to
general ethics.  (32) Here I only proceed to treat of the Divine law in
a particular application.  (33) As the love of God is man's highest
happiness and blessedness, and the ultimate end and aim of all human
actions, it follows that he alone lives by the Divine law who loves God
not from fear of punishment, or from love of any other object, such as
sensual pleasure, fame, or the like; but solely because he has knowledge
of God, or is convinced that the knowledge and love of God is the highest
good. (4:34) The sum and chief precept, then, of the Divine law is to love
God as the highest good, namely, as we have said, not from fear of any
pains and penalties, or from the love of any other object in which we
desire to take pleasure.  (35) The idea of God lays down the rule that
God is our highest good - in other words, that the knowledge and love of
God is the ultimate aim to which all our actions should be directed.
(4:36) The worldling cannot understand these things, they appear
foolishness to him. because he has too meager a knowledge of God, and
also because in this highest good he can discover nothing which he can
handle or eat, or which affects the fleshly appetites wherein he chiefly
delights, for it consists solely in thought and the pure reason.
(37) They, on the other hand, who know that they possess no greater
gift than intellect and sound reason, will doubtless accept what I have
said without question.

(4:38) We have now explained that wherein the Divine law chiefly
consists, and what are human laws, namely, all those which have a
different aim unless they have been ratified by revelation, for in
this respect also things are referred to God (as we have shown above)
and in this sense the law of Moses, although it was not universal,
but entirely adapted to the disposition and particular preservation
of a single people, may yet be called a law of God or Divine law,
inasmuch as we believe that it was ratified by prophetic insight.

[4:3] (39) If we consider the nature of natural Divine law as we
have just explained it, we shall see:
I.  (4:40) That it is universal or common to all men, for we
    have deduced it from universal human nature.
II. (4:41) That it does not depend on the truth of any historical
    narrative whatsoever, for inasmuch as this natural
    Divine law is comprehended solely by the consideration
    of human nature, it is plain that we can conceive it as
    existing as well in Adam as in any other man, as well
    in a man living among his fellows, as in a man who lives
    by himself.
        (4:42) The truth of a historical narrative, however assured,
    cannot give us the knowledge nor consequently the love of God,
    for love of God springs from knowledge of Him, and knowledge of
    Him should be derived from general ideas, in themselves
    and known, so that the truth of a historical narrative is very
    far from being a necessary requisite for our attaining our
    highest good.
        (4:43) Still, though the truth of histories cannot give us
    the knowledge and love of God, I do not deny that reading them
    is very useful with a view to life in the world, for the more we
    have observed and known of men's customs and circumstances, which
    are best revealed by their actions, the more warily we shall be
    able to order our lives among them, and so far as reason dictates
    to adapt our actions to their dispositions.

III. (4:44)We see that this natural Divine law does not demand the
     performance of ceremonies - that is, actions in themselves
     indifferent, which are called good from the fact of their
     institution, or actions symbolizing something for salvation
     or (if one prefers this definition) actions of which the
     meaning surpasses human understanding.  (45) The natural
     light of reason does not demand anything which it is
     itself unable to supply, but only such as it can very
     clearly show to be good, or a means to our blessedness.
     (46) Such things as are good simply because they have been
     commanded or instituted, or as being symbols of something
     good, are mere shadows which cannot be reckoned among actions
     that are the offsprings as it were, or fruit of a sound mind
     and of intellect.  (47) There is no need for me to go into
     this now in more detail.
IV.  (4:48) Lastly, we see that the highest reward of the Divine
     law is the law itself, namely, to know God and to love Him
     of our free choice, and with an undivided and fruitful spirit;
     while its penalty is the absence of these things, and being
     in bondage to the flesh - that is, having an inconstant and
     wavering spirit.

[4:4] (4:49) These points being noted, I must now inquire: 
I.   (50) Whether by the natural light of reason we can
     conceive of God as a law-giver or potentate
     ordaining laws for men?
II.  (51) What is the teaching of Holy Writ concerning
     this natural light of reason and natural law?
III. (52) With what objects were ceremonies formerly
     instituted?
IV.  (53) Lastly, what is the good gained by knowing
     the sacred histories and believing them?

(4:54) Of the first two I will treat in this chapter, of the remaining
two in the following one.  (55) Our conclusion about the first is easily
deduced from the nature of God's will, which is only distinguished from
His understanding in relation to our intellect - that is, the will and
the understanding of God are in reality one and the same, and are only
distinguished in relation to our thoughts which we form concerning God's
understanding.  (4:56) For instance, if we are only looking to the fact
that the nature of a triangle is from eternity contained in the Divine
nature as an eternal verity, we say that God possesses the idea of a
triangle, or that He understands the nature of a triangle; but if
afterwards we look to the fact that the nature of a triangle is thus
contained in the Divine nature, solely by the necessity of the Divine
nature, and not by the necessity of the nature and essence of a triangle -
in fact, that the necessity of a triangle's essence and nature, in so
far as they are conceived of as eternal verities, depends solely on the
necessity of the Divine nature and intellect, we then style God's will
or decree, that which before we styled His intellect.  (57) Wherefore
we make one and the same affirmation concerning God when we say that
He has from eternity decreed that three angles of a triangle are equal
to two right angles, as when we say that He has understood it.

[4:5] (58) Hence the affirmations and the negations of God always
involve necessity or truth; so that, for example, if God said to
Adam that He did not wish him to eat of the tree of knowledge of
good and evil, it would have involved a contradiction that Adam
should have been able to eat of it, and would therefore have been
impossible that he should have so eaten, for the Divine command
would have involved an eternal necessity and truth.  (4:59) But
since Scripture nevertheless narrates that God did give this
command to Adam, and yet that none the less Adam ate of the tree,
we must perforce say that God revealed to Adam the evil which would
surely follow if he should eat of the tree, but did not disclose
that such evil would of necessity come to pass.  (60) Thus it was
that Adam took the revelation to be not an eternal and necessary
truth, but a law - that is, an ordinance followed by gain or loss,
not depending necessarily on the nature of the act performed, but
solely on the will and absolute power of some potentate, so that
the revelation in question was solely in relation to Adam, and
solely through his lack of knowledge a law, and God was, as it were,
a lawgiver and potentate.  (4:61) From the same cause, namely, from
lack of knowledge, the Decalogue in relation to the Hebrews was a law,
for since they knew not the existence of God as an eternal truth,
they must have taken as a law that which was revealed to them in the
Decalogue, namely, that God exists, and that God only should be
worshipped. (62) But if God had spoken to them without the
intervention of any bodily means, immediately they would have
perceived it not as a law, but as an eternal truth.

(4:63) What we have said about the Israelites and Adam, applies also
to all the prophets who wrote laws in God's name - they did not
adequately conceive God's decrees as eternal truths.  (64) For
instance, we must say of Moses that from revelation, from the basis
of what was revealed to him, he perceived the method by which the
Israelitish nation could best be united in a particular territory,
and could form a body politic or state, and further that he perceived
the method by which that nation could best be constrained to obedience;
but he did not perceive, nor was it revealed to him, that this method
was absolutely the best, nor that the obedience of the people in a
certain strip of territory would necessarily imply the end he had in
view.  (4:65) Wherefore he perceived these things not as eternal truths,
but as precepts and ordinances, and he ordained them as laws of God,
and thus it came to be that he conceived God as a ruler, a legislator,
a king, as merciful, just, &c., whereas such qualities are simply
attributes of human nature, and utterly alien from the nature of the
Deity. (64:6)Thus much we may affirm of the prophets who wrote laws in
the name of God; but we must not affirm it of Christ, for Christ,
although He too seems to have written laws in the name of God, must be
taken to have had a clear and adequate perception, for Christ was not
so much a prophet as the mouthpiece of God.  (67) For God made
revelations to mankind through Christ as He had before done through
angels - that is, a created voice, visions, &c.  (68) It would be as
unreasonable to say that God had accommodated his revelations to the
opinions of Christ as that He had before accommodated them to the
opinions of angels (that is, of a created voice or visions) as matters
to be revealed to the prophets, a wholly absurd hypothesis.
(4:69) Moreover, Christ was sent to teach not only the Jews but
the whole human race, and therefore it was not enough that His
mind should be accommodated to the opinions the Jews alone, but
also to the opinion and fundamental teaching common to the whole
human race - in other words, to ideas universal and true. (70) Inasmuch
as God revealed Himself to Christ, or to Christ's mind immediately,
and not as to the prophets through words and symbols, we must needs
suppose that Christ perceived truly what was revealed, in other words,
He understood it, for a, matter is understood when it is perceived
simply by the mind without words or symbols.

(4:71) Christ, then, perceived (truly and adequately) what was revealed,
and if He ever proclaimed such revelations as laws, He did so because
of the ignorance and obstinacy of the people, acting in this respect
the part of God; inasmuch as He accommodated Himself to the
comprehension of the people, and though He spoke somewhat more
clearly than the other prophets, yet He taught what was revealed
obscurely, and generally through parables, especially when He was
speaking to those to whom it was not yet given to understand the
kingdom of heaven. (See Matt. xiii:10, &c.)  (72) To those to whom it
was given to understand the mysteries of heaven, He doubtless taught
His doctrines as eternal truths, and did not lay them down as laws,
thus freeing the minds of His hearers from the bondage of that law
which He further confirmed and established.  (4:73) Paul apparently
points to this more than once (e.g. Rom. vii:6, and iii:28), though
he never himself seems to wish to speak openly, but, to quote his own
words (Rom. iii:6, and vi:19), "merely humanly."  (74) This he expressly
states when he calls God just, and it was doubtless in concession to
human weakness that he attributes mercy, grace, anger, and similar
qualities to God, adapting his language to the popular mind, or, as
he puts it (1 Cor. iii:1, 2), to carnal men. [4:6] (75) In Rom. ix:18,
he teaches undisguisedly that God's auger and mercy depend not on the
actions of men, but on God's own nature or will; further, that no one
is justified by the works of the law, but only by faith, which he seems
to identify with the full assent of the soul; lastly, that no one is
blessed unless he have in him the mind of Christ (Rom. viii:9), whereby
he perceives the laws of God as eternal truths.  (76) We conclude,
therefore, that God is described as a lawgiver or prince, and styled
just, merciful, &c., merely in concession to popular understanding,
and the imperfection of popular knowledge; that in reality God acts and
directs all things simply by the necessity of His nature and perfection,
and that His decrees and volitions are eternal truths, and always involve
necessity.  (77) So much for the first point which I wished to explain
and demonstrate.

(4:78) Passing on to the second point, let us search the sacred
pages for their teaching concerning the light of nature and this
Divine law.  (79) The first doctrine we find in the history of
the first man, where it is narrated that God commanded Adam not
to eat of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil;
this seems to mean that God commanded Adam to do and to seek after
righteousness because it was good, not because the contrary was evil:
that is, to seek the good for its own sake, not from fear of evil.
(4:80) We have seen that he who acts rightly from the true knowledge 
and love of right, acts with freedom and constancy, whereas he who
acts from fear of evil, is under the constraint of evil, and acts
in bondage under external control.  (81) So that this commandment
of God to Adam comprehends the whole Divine natural law, and absolutely
agrees with the dictates of the light of nature; nay, it would be easy
to explain on this basis the whole history or allegory of the first man.
(4:82) But I prefer to pass over the subject in silence, because, in
the first place, I cannot be absolutely certain that my explanation
would be in accordance with the intention of the sacred writer; and,
secondly, because many do not admit that this history is an allegory,
maintaining it to be a simple narrative of facts.  (83) It will be
better, therefore, to adduce other passages of Scripture, especially
such as were written by him, who speaks with all the strength of his
natural understanding, in which he surpassed all his contemporaries,
and whose sayings are accepted by the people as of equal weight with
those of the prophets.  (84) I mean Solomon, whose prudence and wisdom
are commended in Scripture rather than his piety and gift of prophecy.
(4:85) Life being taken to mean the true life (as is evident from Deut.
xxx:19), the fruit of the understanding consists only in the true life,
and its absence constitutes punishment.  (86) All this absolutely agrees
with what was set out in our fourth point concerning natural law.
(4:87) Moreover our position that it is the well-spring of life, and that
the intellect alone lays down laws for the wise, is plainly taught by
the sage, for he says (Prov. xiii14): "The law of the wise is a fountain
of life" - that is, as we gather from the preceding text, the
understanding.  (4:88) In chap. iii:13, he expressly teaches that the
understanding renders man blessed and happy, and gives him true peace
of mind. "Happy is the man that findeth wisdom, and the man that
getteth understanding," for "Wisdom gives length of days, and
riches and honour; her ways are ways of pleasantness, and all her
paths peace" (xiiii6, 17).  (89) According to Solomon, therefore, it is 
only the wise who live in peace and equanimity, not like the wicked
whose minds drift hither and thither, and (as Isaiah says, chap. Ivii:20)
"are like the troubled sea, for them there is no peace."

(4:90) Lastly, we should especially note the passage in chap. ii. of 
Solomon's proverbs which most clearly confirms our contention:
"If thou criest after knowledge, and liftest up thy voice for
understanding . . . then shalt thou understand the fear of the Lord,
and find the knowledge of God; for the Lord giveth wisdom; out of His
mouth cometh knowledge and understanding."  (91) These words clearly
enunciate (1), that wisdom or intellect alone teaches us to fear God
wisely - that is, to worship Him truly; (2), that wisdom and knowledge
flow from God's mouth, and that God bestows on us this gift; this we
have already shown in proving that our understanding and our knowledge
depend on, spring from, and are perfected by the idea or knowledge of
God, and nothing else.  (4:92) Solomon goes on to say in so many words
that this knowledge contains and involves the true principles of
ethics and politics: "When wisdom entereth into thy heart, and
knowledge is pleasant to thy soul, discretion shall preserve thee,
understanding shall keep thee, then shalt thou understand righteousness,
and judgment, and equity, yea every good path."  (93) All of which is
in obvious agreement with natural knowledge: for after we have come to
the understanding of things, and have tasted the excellence of
knowledge, she teaches us ethics and true virtue.

(4:94) Thus the happiness and the peace of him who cultivates his
natural understanding lies, according to Solomon also, not so much
under the dominion of fortune (or God's external aid) as in inward
personal virtue (or God's internal aid), for the latter can to a
great extent be preserved by vigilance, right action, and thought.

(4:95) Lastly, we must by no means pass over the passage in Paul's
Epistle to the Romans, i:20, in which he says: "For the invisible
things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being
understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and
Godhead; so that they are without excuse, because, when they knew God,
they glorified Him not as God, neither were they thankful."
(4:96) These words clearly show that everyone can by the light
of nature clearly understand the goodness and the eternal divinity
of God, and can thence know and deduce what they should seek for and
what avoid; wherefore the Apostle says that they are without excuse
and cannot plead ignorance, as they certainly might if it were a
question of supernatural light and the incarnation, passion, and
resurrection of Christ.  (97) "Wherefore," he goes on to say (ib. 24),
"God gave them up to uncleanness through the lusts of their own
hearts;" and so on, through the rest of the chapter, he describes
the vices of ignorance, and sets them forth as the punishment of
ignorance.  (98) This obviously agrees with the verse of Solomon,
already quoted, "The instruction of fools is folly," so that it is
easy to understand why Paul says that the wicked are without excuse.
(4:99) As every man sows so shall he reap: out of evil, evils
necessarily spring, unless they be wisely counteracted.  (100) Thus
we see that Scripture literally approves of the light of natural
reason and the natural Divine law, and I have fulfilled the promises
made at the beginning of this chapter.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

[5:0] CHAPTER V. - OF THE CEREMONIAL LAW.

(5:1) In the foregoing chapter we have shown that the Divine law,
which renders men truly blessed, and teaches them the true life,
is universal to all men; nay, we have so intimately deduced it
from human nature that it must be esteemed innate, and, as it were,
ingrained in the human mind.

(5:2) But with regard to the ceremonial observances which were
ordained in the Old Testament for the Hebrews only, and were so
adapted to their state that they could for the most part only be
observed by the society as a whole and not by each individual,
it is evident that they formed no part of the Divine law, and
had nothing to do with blessedness and virtue, but had reference
only to the election of the Hebrews, that is (as I have shown in
Chap. II.), to their temporal bodily happiness and the tranquillity
of their kingdom, and that therefore they were only valid while
that kingdom lasted.  (3) If in the Old Testament they are spoken
of as the law of God, it is only because they were founded on
revelation, or a basis of revelation.  (4) Still as reason,
however sound, has little weight with ordinary theologians,
I will adduce the authority of Scripture for what I here assert,
and will further show, for the sake of greater clearness, why and
how these ceremonials served to establish and preserve the Jewish
kingdom.  [5:1] (5) Isaiah teaches most plainly that the Divine
law in its strict sense signifies that universal law which consists
in a true manner of life, and does not signify ceremonial
observances.  (6) In chapter i:10, the prophet calls on his
countrymen to hearken to the Divine law as he delivers it, and
first excluding all kinds of sacrifices and all feasts, he at
length sums up the law in these few words, "Cease to do evil,
learn to do well: seek judgment, relieve the oppressed."
(5:7) Not less striking testimony is given in Psalm xl:7- 9, where
the Psalmist addresses God: "Sacrifice and offering Thou didst not
desire; mine ears hast Thou opened; burnt offering and sin-offering
hast Thou not required; I delight to do Thy will, 0 my God; yea,
Thy law is within my heart."  (8) Here the Psalmist reckons as the
law of God only that which is inscribed in his heart, and excludes
ceremonies therefrom, for the latter are good and inscribed on the
heart only from the fact of their institution, and not because of
their intrinsic value.

(5:9) Other passages of Scripture testify to the same truth, but
these two will suffice.  (10) We may also learn from the Bible that
ceremonies are no aid to blessedness, but only have reference to the
temporal prosperity of the kingdom; for the rewards promised for
their observance are merely temporal advantages and delights,
blessedness being reserved for the universal Divine law.   (11) In 
all the five books commonly attributed to Moses nothing is promised,
as I have said, beyond temporal benefits, such as honours, fame,
victories, riches, enjoyments, and health.  (12) Though many moral
precepts besides ceremonies are contained in these five books, they
appear not as moral doctrines universal to all men, but as commands
especially adapted to the understanding and character of the Hebrew
people, and as having reference only to the welfare of the kingdom.
(5:13) For instance, Moses does not teach the Jews as a prophet not
to kill or to steal, but gives these commandments solely as a lawgiver
and judge; he does not reason out the doctrine, but affixes for its
non-observance a penalty which may and very properly does vary in
different nations.  (14) So, too, the command not to commit adultery
is given merely with reference to the welfare of the state; for if
the moral doctrine had been intended, with reference not only to the
welfare of the state, but also to the tranquillity and blessedness of
the individual, Moses would have condemned not merely the outward act,
but also the mental acquiescence, as is done by Christ, Who taught
only universal moral precepts, and for this cause promises a
spiritual instead of a temporal reward.  (5:15) Christ, as I have
said, was sent into the world, not to preserve the state nor to
lay down laws, but solely to teach the universal moral law, so we
can easily understand that He wished in nowise to do away with the
law of Moses, inasmuch as He introduced no new laws of His own -
His sole care was to teach moral doctrines, and distinguish them
from the laws of the state; for the Pharisees, in their ignorance,
thought that the observance of the state law and the Mosaic law
was the sum total of morality; whereas such laws merely had
reference to the public welfare, and aimed not so much at
instructing the Jews as at keeping them under constraint. (16) But
let us return to our subject, and cite other passages of Scripture
which set forth temporal benefits as rewards for observing the
ceremonial law, and blessedness as reward for the universal law.

(5:17) None of the prophets puts the point more clearly than Isaiah.
(18) After condemning hypocrisy he commends liberty and charity
towards one's self and one's neighbours, and promises as a reward:
"Then shall thy light break forth as the morning, and thy health
shall spring forth speedily, thy righteousness shall go before thee,
and the glory of the Lord shall be thy reward" (chap. lviii:8).
(5:19) Shortly afterwards he commends the Sabbath, and for a due
observance of it, promises: "Then shalt thou delight thyself in the
Lord, and I will cause thee to ride upon the high places of the
earth, and feed thee with the heritage of Jacob thy father: for
the mouth of the Lord has spoken it."  (20) Thus the prophet for
liberty bestowed, and charitable works, promises a healthy mind
in a healthy body, and the glory of the Lord even after death;
whereas, for ceremonial exactitude, he only promises security
of rule, prosperity, and temporal happiness.

(5:21) In Psalms xv. and xxiv. no mention is made of ceremonies,
but only of moral doctrines, inasmuch as there is no question
of anything but blessedness, and blessedness is symbolically
promised: it is quite certain that the expressions, "the hill
of God," and "His tents and the dwellers therein," refer to
blessedness and security of soul, not to the actual mount of
Jerusalem and the tabernacle of Moses, for these latter were
not dwelt in by anyone, and only the sons of Levi ministered
there.  (22) Further, all those sentences of Solomon to which
I referred in the last chapter, for the cultivation of the
intellect and wisdom, promise true blessedness, for by wisdom
is the fear of God at length understood, and the knowledge of
God found. 

(5:23) That the Jews themselves were not bound to practise their
ceremonial observances after the destruction of their kingdom
is evident from Jeremiah.  (24) For when the prophet saw and
foretold that the desolation of the city was at hand, he said
that God only delights in those who know and understand that He
exercises loving-kindness, judgment, and righteousness in the
earth, and that such persons only are worthy of praise. (Jer. ix:23.)
(5:25) As though God had said that, after the desolation of the city,
He would require nothing special from the Jews beyond the natural law
by which all men are bound.

[5:2] (26) The New Testament also confirms this view, for only
moral doctrines are therein taught, and the kingdom of heaven is
promised as a reward, whereas ceremonial observances are not
touched on by the Apostles, after they began to preach the Gospel
to the Gentiles.  (27) The Pharisees certainly continued to
practise these rites after the destruction of the kingdom, but
more with a view of opposing the Christians than of pleasing God:
for after the first destruction of the city, when they were led
captive to Babylon, not being then, so far as I am aware, split up
into sects, they straightway neglected their rites, bid farewell
to the Mosaic law, buried their national customs in oblivion as
being plainly superfluous, and began to mingle with other nations,
as we may abundantly learn from Ezra and Nehemiah.  (5:28) We cannot,
therefore, doubt that they were no more bound by the law of Moses,
after the destruction of their kingdom, than they had been before
it had been begun, while they were still living among other peoples
before the exodus from Egypt, and were subject to no special law
beyond the natural law, and also, doubtless, the law of the state
in which they were living in so far as it was consonant with the
Divine natural law.

(5:29) As to the fact that the patriarchs offered sacrifices,
I think they did so for the purpose of stimulating their piety,
for their minds had been accustomed from childhood to the idea
of sacrifice, which we know had been universal from the time of
Enoch; and thus they found in sacrifice their most powerful
incentive.  (30) The patriarchs, then, did not sacrifice to God
at the bidding of a Divine right, or as taught by the basis of
the Divine law, but simply in accordance with the custom of the
time; and, if in so doing they followed any ordinance, it was
simply the ordinance of the country they were living in, by
which (as we have seen before in the case of Melchisedek) they
were bound. 

[5:3] (31) I think that I have now given Scriptural authority
for my view: it remains to show why and how the ceremonial
observances tended to preserve and confirm the Hebrew kingdom;
and this I can very briefly do on grounds universally accepted.

(5:32) The formation of society serves not only for defensive
purposes, but is also very useful, and, indeed, absolutely
necessary, as rendering possible the division of labour.  (33) If
men did not render mutual assistance to each other, no one would
have either the skill or the time to provide for his own
sustenance and preservation: for all men are not equally apt for
all work, and no one would be capable of preparing all that he
individually stood in need of.  (34) Strength and time, I repeat,
would fail, if every one had in person to plough, to sow, to reap,
to grind corn, to cook, to weave, to stitch, and perform the other
numerous functions required to keep life going; to say nothing of
the arts and sciences which are also entirely necessary to the
perfection and blessedness of human nature. (35) We see that peoples
living, in uncivilized barbarism lead a wretched and almost animal
life, and even they would not be able to acquire their few rude
necessaries without assisting one another to a certain extent.

(5:36) Now if men were so constituted by nature that they desired
nothing but what is designated by true reason, society would
obviously have no need of laws: it would be sufficient to inculcate
true moral doctrines; and men would freely, without hesitation,
act in accordance with their true interests. (37) But human nature
is framed in a different fashion: every one, indeed, seeks his own
interest, but does not do so in accordance with the dictates of sound
reason, for most men's ideas of desirability and usefulness are
guided by their fleshly instincts and emotions, which take no
thought beyond the present and the immediate object.  (5:38) Therefore,
no society can exist without government, and force, and laws to
restrain and repress men's desires and immoderate impulses.  (39) Still
human nature will not submit to absolute repression.  (40) Violent
governments, as Seneca says, never last long; the moderate governments
endure.  (41) So long as men act simply from fear they act contrary to
their inclinations, taking no thought for the advantages or necessity
of their actions, but simply endeavouring to escape punishment or loss
of life.  (5:42) They must needs rejoice in any evil which befalls
their ruler, even if it should involve themselves; and must long for
and bring about such evil by every means in their power.  (43) Again,
men are especially intolerant of serving and being ruled by their
equals.  (44) Lastly, it is exceedingly difficult to revoke liberties
once granted.

(5:45) From these considerations it follows, firstly, that authority
should either be vested in the hands of the whole state in common,
so that everyone should be bound to serve, and yet not be in
subjection to his equals; or else, if power be in the hands of a
few, or one man, that one man should be something above average
humanity, or should strive to get himself accepted as such.
(5:46) Secondly, laws should in every government be so arranged
that people should be kept in bounds by the hope of some greatly
desired good, rather than by fear, for then everyone will do his
duty willingly.

(5:47) Lastly, as obedience consists in acting at the bidding of
external authority, it would have no place in a state where the
government is vested in the whole people, and where laws are made
by common consent.  (48) In such a society the people would remain
free, whether the laws were added to or diminished, inasmuch as it
would not be done on external authority, but their own free consent.
(5:49) The reverse happens when the sovereign power is vested in
one man, for all act at his bidding; and, therefore, unless they
had been trained from the first to depend on the words of their
ruler, the latter would find it difficult, in case of need, to
abrogate liberties once conceded, and impose new laws.

(5:50) From these universal considerations, let us pass on to the
kingdom of the Jews.  (51) The Jews when they first came out of
Egypt were not bound by any national laws, and were therefore free
to ratify any laws they liked, or to make new ones, and were at
liberty to set up a government and occupy a territory wherever
they chose.  (5:52) However, they were entirely unfit to frame a
wise code of laws and to keep the sovereign power vested in the
community; they were all uncultivated and sunk in a wretched
slavery, therefore the sovereignty was bound to remain vested
in the hands of one man who would rule the rest and keep them
under constraint, make laws and interpret them.  (53) This
sovereignty was easily retained by Moses, because he surpassed
the rest in virtue and persuaded the people of the fact, proving
it by many testimonies (see Exod. chap. xiv., last verse, and
chap. xix:9). (5:54) He then, by the Divine virtue he possessed,
made laws and ordained them for the people, taking the greatest
care that they should be obeyed willingly and not through fear,
being specially induced to adopt this course by the obstinate
nature of the Jews, who would not have submitted to be ruled
solely by constraint; and also by the imminence of war, for it
is always better to inspire soldiers with a thirst for glory
than to terrify them with threats; each man will then strive
to distinguish himself by valour and courage, instead of merely
trying to escape punishment.  (55) Moses, therefore, by his
virtue and the Divine command, introduced a religion, so that
the people might do their duty from devotion rather than fear.
(5:56) Further, he bound them over by benefits, and prophesied
many advantages in the future; nor were his laws very severe,
as anyone may see for himself, especially if he remarks the
number of circumstances necessary in order to procure the
conviction of an accused person.

(5:57) Lastly, in order that the people which could not govern
itself should be entirely dependent on its ruler, he left nothing
to the free choice of individuals (who had hitherto been slaves);
the people could do nothing but remember the law, and follow the
ordinances laid down at the good pleasure of their ruler; they
were not allowed to plough, to sow, to reap, nor even to eat;
to clothe themselves, to shave, to rejoice, or in fact to do
anything whatever as they liked, but were bound to follow the
directions given in the law; and not only this, but they were
obliged to have marks on their door-posts, on their hands, and
between their eyes to admonish them to perpetual obedience.

(5:58) This, then, was the object of the ceremonial law, that men
should do nothing of their own free will, but should always act
under external authority, and should continually confess by their
actions and thoughts that they were not their own masters, but
were entirely under the control of others.

(5:59) From all these considerations it is clearer than day that
ceremonies have nothing to do with a state of blessedness, and
that those mentioned in the Old Testament, i.e. the whole Mosaic
Law, had reference merely to the government of the Jews, and
merely temporal advantages.

[5:6] (60) As for the Christian rites, such as baptism, the Lord's
Supper, festivals, public prayers, and any other observances which
are, and always have been, common to all Christendom, if they were
instituted by Christ or His Apostles (which is open to doubt), they
were instituted as external signs of the universal church, and not
as having anything to do with blessedness, or possessing any
sanctity in themselves.  [5:5] (61) Therefore, though such
ceremonies were not ordained for the sake of upholding a government,
they were ordained for the preservation of a society, and
accordingly he who lives alone is not bound by them: nay, those
who live in a country where the Christian religion is forbidden,
are bound to abstain from such rites, and can none the less live
in a state of blessedness.  (62) We have an example of this in
Japan, where the Christian religion is forbidden, and the Dutch
who live there are enjoined by their East India Company not to
practise any outward rites of religion. (5:63) I need not cite other
examples, though it would be easy to prove my point from the
fundamental principles of the New Testament, and to adduce many
confirmatory instances; but I pass on the more willingly, as I
am anxious to proceed to my next proposition.  (64) I will now,
therefore, pass on to what I proposed to treat of in the second
part of this chapter, namely, what persons are bound to believe
in the narratives contained in Scripture, and how far they are so
bound.  (65) Examining this question by the aid of natural reason,
I will proceed as follows.

(5:66) If anyone wishes to persuade his fellows for or against
anything which is not self-evident, he must deduce his contention
from their admissions, and convince them either by experience or
by ratiocination; either by appealing to facts of natural
experience, or to self-evident intellectual axioms.  (67) Now
unless the experience be of such a kind as to be clearly and
distinctly understood, though it may convince a man, it will
not have the same effect on his mind and disperse the clouds
of his doubt so completely as when the doctrine taught is
deduced entirely from intellectual axioms - that is, by the
mere power of the understanding and logical order, and this
is especially the case in spiritual matters which have nothing
to do with the senses.

(5:68) But the deduction of conclusions from general truths
"a priori," usually requires a long chain of arguments, and, 
moreover, very great caution, acuteness, and self-restraint -
qualities which are not often met with; therefore people
prefer to be taught by experience rather than deduce their
conclusion from a few axioms, and set them out in logical order.
(5:69) Whence it follows, that if anyone wishes to teach a
doctrine to a whole nation (not to speak of the whole human
race), and to be understood by all men in every particular,
he will seek to support his teaching with experience, and will
endeavour to suit his reasonings and the definitions of his
doctrines as far as possible to the understanding of the common
people, who form the majority of mankind, and he will not set
them forth in logical sequence nor adduce the definitions which
serve to establish them.  (5:70) Otherwise he writes only for
the learned - that is, he will be understood by only a small
proportion of the human race.

(5:71) All Scripture was written primarily for an entire people,
and secondarily for the whole human race; therefore its contents
must necessarily be adapted as far as possible to the understanding
of the masses, and proved only by examples drawn from experience.
(5:72) We will explain ourselves more clearly.  (73) The chief
speculative doctrines taught in Scripture are the existence of
God, or a Being Who made all things, and Who directs and sustains
the world with consummate wisdom; furthermore, that God takes the
greatest thought for men, or such of them as live piously and
honourably, while He punishes, with various penalties, those who
do evil, separating them from the good.  (74) All this is proved in
Scripture entirely through experience-that is, through the
narratives there related.  (5:75) No definitions of doctrine are
given, but all the sayings and reasonings are adapted to the
understanding of the masses.  (76) Although experience can give
no clear knowledge of these things, nor explain the nature of God,
nor how He directs and sustains all things, it can nevertheless
teach and enlighten men sufficiently to impress obedience and
devotion on their minds.

(5:77) It is now, I think, sufficiently clear what persons are
bound to believe in the Scripture narratives, and in what degree
they are so bound, for it evidently follows from what has been
said that the knowledge of and belief in them is particularly
necessary to the masses whose intellect is not capable of
perceiving things clearly and distinctly.  (78) Further, he who
denies them because he does not believe that God exists or takes
thought for men and the world, may be accounted impious; but a
man who is ignorant of them, and nevertheless knows by natural
reason that God exists, as we have said, and has a true plan of
life, is altogether blessed - yes, more blessed than the common
herd of believers, because besides true opinions he possesses
also a true and distinct conception.  (79) Lastly, he who is
ignorant of the Scriptures and knows nothing by the light of
reason, though he may not be impious or rebellious, is yet less
than human and almost brutal, having none of God's gifts.

(5:80) We must here remark that when we say that the knowledge
of the sacred narrative is particularly necessary to the masses,
we do not mean the knowledge of absolutely all the narratives
in the Bible, but only of the principal ones, those which,
taken by themselves, plainly display the doctrine we have just
stated, and have most effect over men's minds.

(5:81) If all the narratives in Scripture were necessary for
the proof of this doctrine, and if no conclusion could be drawn
consideration of every one of the histories contained in the
sacred writings, truly the conclusion and demonstration of such
doctrine would over-task the understanding and strength not only
of the masses, but of humanity; who is there who could give
attention to all the narratives at once, and to all the
circumstances, and all the scraps of doctrine to be elicited
from such a host of diverse histories?  (5:82) I cannot believe
that the men who have left us the Bible as we have it were so
abounding in talent that they attempted setting about such a
method of demonstration, still less can I suppose that we cannot
understand Scriptural doctrine till we have given heed to the
quarrels of Isaac, the advice of Achitophel to Absalom, the
civil war between Jews and Israelites, and other similar
chronicles; nor can I think that it was more difficult to teach
such doctrine by means of history to the Jews of early times, the 
contemporaries of Moses, than it was to the contemporaries of Esdras.
(5:83) But more will be said on this point hereafter, we may now
only note that the masses are only bound to know those histories
which can most powerfully dispose their mind to obedience and
devotion.  (5:84) However, the masses are not sufficiently skilled
to draw conclusions from what they read, they take more delight in
the actual stories, and in the strange and unlooked-for issues of
events than in the doctrines implied; therefore, besides reading
these narratives, they are always in need of pastors or church
ministers to explain them to their feeble intelligence.

(5:85) But not to wander from our point, let us conclude with
what has been our principal object - namely, that the truth of
narratives, be they what they may, has nothing to do with the
Divine law, and serves for nothing except in respect of doctrine,
the sole element which makes one history better than another.
(86) The narratives in the Old and New Testaments surpass
profane history, and differ among themselves in merit simply
by reason of the salutary doctrines which they inculcate.
(5:87) Therefore, if a man were to read the Scripture narratives
believing the whole of them, but were to give no heed to the
doctrines they contain, and make no amendment in his life, he
might employ himself just as profitably in reading the Koran
or the poetic drama, or ordinary chronicles, with the attention
usually given to such writings; on the other hand, if a man is
absolutely ignorant of the Scriptures, and none the less has
right opinions and a true plan of life, he is absolutely blessed
and truly possesses in himself the spirit of Christ.

(5:88) The Jews are of a directly contrary way of thinking,
for they hold that true opinions and a true plan of life are
of no service in attaining blessedness, if their possessors
have arrived at them by the light of reason only, and
not like the documents prophetically revealed to Moses.
(5:89) Maimonides ventures openly to make this assertion:
"Every man who takes to heart the seven precepts and
diligently follows them, is counted with the pious among
the nation, and an heir of the world to come; that is to
say, if he takes to heart and follows them because God
ordained them in the law, and revealed them to us by Moses,
because they were of aforetime precepts to the sons of Noah:
but he who follows them as led thereto by reason, is not
counted as a dweller among the pious or among the wise of the
nations."  (5:90) Such are the words Of Maimonides, to which
R. Joseph, the son of Shem Job, adds in his book which he
calls "Kebod Elohim, or God's Glory," that although Aristotle
(whom he considers to have written the best ethics and to be
above everyone else) has not omitted anything that concerns
true ethics, and which he has adopted in his own book,
carefully following the lines laid down, yet this was not able
to suffice for his salvation, inasmuch as he embraced his
doctrines in accordance with the dictates of reason and not
as Divine documents prophetically revealed.

(5:91) However, that these are mere figments, and are not supported
by Scriptural authority will, I think, be sufficiently evident to
the attentive reader, so that an examination of the theory will be
sufficient for its refutation.  (92) It is not my purpose here to
refute the assertions of those who assert that the natural light
of reason can teach nothing, of any value concerning the true way
of salvation.  (93) People who lay no claims to reason for
themselves, are not able to prove by reason this their assertion;
and if they hawk about something superior to reason, it is a mere
figment, and far below reason, as their general method of life
sufficiently shows.  (94) But there is no need to dwell upon such
persons.  (5:95) I will merely add that we can only judge of a man
by his works.  (96) If a man abounds in the fruits of the Spirit,
charity, joy, peace, long-suffering, kindness, goodness, faith,
gentleness, chastity, against which, as Paul says (Gal. v:22),
there is no law, such an one, whether he be taught by reason only
or by the Scripture only, has been in very truth taught by God,
and is altogether blessed.  (97) Thus have I said all that I
undertook to say concerning Divine law.

End of Part 1 of 4

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

AUTHOR'S ENDNOTES TO THE THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL TREATISE
CHAPTERS I to V

Chapter I

[Endnote 1] (1) The word naw-vee', Strong:5030, is rightly
interpreted by Rabbi Salomon Jarchi, but the sense is hardly
caught by Aben Ezra, who was not so good a Hebraist.  (2) We
must also remark that this Hebrew word for prophecy has
a universal meaning and embraces all kinds of prophecy.
(3) Other terms are more special, and denote this or that
sort of prophecy, as I believe is well known to the learned.

[Endnote 2] (1) "Although, ordinary knowledge is Divine, its
professors cannot be called prophets." That is, interpreters
of God.  (2) For he alone is an interpreter of God, who
interprets the decrees which God has revealed to him,
to others who have not received such revelation, and whose
belief, therefore, rests merely on the prophet's authority
and the confidence reposed in him.  (3) If it were otherwise,
and all who listen to prophets became prophets themselves,
as all who listen to philosophers become philosophers,
a prophet would no longer be the interpreter of Divine
decrees, inasmuch as his hearers would know the truth,
not on the, authority of the prophet, but by means of actual
Divine revelation and inward testimony.  (4) Thus the sovereign
powers are the interpreters of their own rights of sway,
because these are defended only by their authority and
supported by their testimony.

[Endnote 3] (1) "Prophets were endowed with a peculiar and
extraordinary power."  (2) Though some men enjoy gifts
which nature has not bestowed on their fellows, they are
not said to surpass the bounds of human nature, unless
their special qualities are such as cannot be said to be
deducible from the definition of human nature.  (3) For
instance, a giant is a rarity, but still human.  (4) The
gift of composing poetry extempore is given to very few,
yet it is human.  (5) The same may, therefore, be said of
the faculty possessed by some of imagining things as
vividly as though they saw them before them, and this not
while asleep, but while awake.  (6) But if anyone could
be found who possessed other means and other foundations
for knowledge, he might be said to transcend the limits
of human nature.
  
CHAPTER III.

[Endnote 4] (1) In Gen. xv. it is written that God promised
Abraham to protect him, and to grant him ample rewards.
(2) Abraham answered that he could expect nothing which
could be of any value to him, as he was childless and well
stricken in years.

[Endnote 5] (1) That a keeping of the commandments of the
old Testament is not sufficient for eternal life, appears
from Mark x:21.

End of Endnotes to Part 1 of 4. -  Chapters I to V.

____________________________________________________________________________

                End of A Theologico-Political Treatise - Part 1

                  "Joseph B. Yesselman" <jyselman@erols.com>
                               August 26, 1997

                     A THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL TREATISE
                     Part 2 of 4 - Chapters VI to X

                        Published 1670 anonymously

                             Baruch Spinoza
                              1632 - 1677

____________________________________________________________________________

JBY Notes:

1.  Text was scanned from Benedict de Spinoza's
    "A Theologico-Political Treatise", and "A Political
    Treatise" as published in Dover's ISBN 0-486-20249-6.

2.  The text is that of the translation of "A Theologico-Political
    Treatise" by R. H. M. Elwes.   This text is "an unabridged and
    unaltered republication of the Bohn Library edition originally
    published by George Bell and Sons in 1883."

3.  JBY added sentence numbers and search strings.

4.  Sentence numbers are shown thus (yy:xx). 
       yy = Chapter Number when given.    
       xx = Sentence Number.

5.  Search strings are enclosed in [square brackets]:
       a. Roman numeral, when given before a search string,
          indicates Part Number.  If a different Part, bring
          up that Part and then search.
       b. Include square brackets in search string.
       c. Do not include Part Number in search string.
       d. Search Down with the same string to facilitate return.

6.  Please report any errors in the text, search formatting,
    or sentence numbering to jyselman@erols.com.

7.  HTML versions:
       Part 2  - http://www.erols.com/jyselman/ttpelws2.htm
       

____________________________________________________________________________

 [6:0] Chapter VI
 [7:0] Chapter VII
 [8:0] Chapter VIII
 [9:0] Chapter IX
[10:0] Chapter X

____________________________________________________________________________

TABLE OF CONTENTS: Search strings are shown thus [*:x].
                   Search forward and back with the same string.
                   Include square brackets in search string.

                                                          
[6:0] CHAPTER VI - Of Miracles.
[6:1] Confused ideas of the vulgar on the subject.
[6:2] Miracle in the sense of a contravention of 
      natural laws an absurdity.
[6:3] In the sense of an event, whose cause is unknown,
      less edifying than an event better understood.
[6:4] God's providence identical with the course of nature.
[6:5] How Scripture miracles may be interpreted.

 
[7:0] CHAPTER VII - Of the Interpretation of Scripture.
[7:1] Current systems of interpretation erroneous.
[7:2] Only true system to interpret it by itself.
[7:3] Reasons why this system cannot now be carried
      out in its entirety.
[7:4] Yet these difficulties do not interfere with our
      understanding the plainest and most important
      passages.
[7:5] Rival systems examined - that of a supernatural
      faculty being necessary - refuted.
[7:6] That of Maimonides.
[7:7] Refuted.
 
[7:8] Traditions of the Pharisees and the Papists rejected.

[8:0] CHAPTER VIII. - Of the authorship of the Pentateuch,
      and the other historical books of the Old Testament.
[8:1] The Pentateuch not written by Moses.
[8:2] His actual writings distinct.
[8:3] Traces of late authorship in the other historical books.
[8:4] All the historical books the work of one man.
[8:5] Probably Ezra.
[8:6] Who compiled first the book of Deuteronomy.
[8:7] And then a history, distinguishing the books by
      the names of their subjects.

[9:0] CHAPTER IX. - Other questions about these books.
[9:1] That these books have not been thoroughly
      revised and made to agree.
[9:2] That there are many doubtful readings.
[9:3] That the existing marginal notes are often such.
[9:4] The other explanations of these notes refuted.
[9:5] The hiatus.

[10:0] CHAPTER X.- An Examination of the remaining books of 
       the Old Testament according to the preceding method.
[10:1] Chronicles, Psalms, Proverbs.
[10:2] Isaiah, Jeremiah.
[10:3] Ezekiel, Hosea.
[10:4] Other prophets, Jonah, Job.
[10:5] Daniel, Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther.
[10:6] The author declines to undertake a similar detailed
       examination of the New Testament.

[Author's Endnotes] to the Treatise

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

[6:0] CHAPTER VI.  -  OF MIRACLES.

(6:1) As men are accustomed to call Divine the knowledge which
transcends human understanding, so also do they style Divine,
or the work of God, anything of which the cause is not generally
known: for the masses think that the power and providence of
God are most clearly displayed by events that are extraordinary
and contrary to the conception they have formed of nature,
especially if such events bring them any profit or convenience:
they think that the clearest possible proof of God's existence
is afforded when nature, as they suppose, breaks her accustomed
order, and consequently they believe that those who explain or
endeavour to understand phenomena or miracles through their
natural causes are doing away with God and His providence.
(6:2) They suppose, forsooth, that God is inactive so long as
nature works in her accustomed order, and vice versa, that the
power of nature and natural causes are idle so long as God is
acting: thus they imagine two powers distinct one from the other,
the power of God and the power of nature, though the latter is
in a sense determined by God, or (as most people believe now)
created by Him.  (3) What they mean by either, and what they
understand by God and nature they do not know, except that
they imagine the power of God to be like that of some royal
potentate, and nature's power to consist in force and energy.

[6:1] (4) The masses then style unusual phenomena, "miracles,"
and partly from piety, partly for the sake of opposing the
students of science, prefer to remain in ignorance of natural
causes, and only to hear of those things which they know least,
and consequently admire most.  (5) In fact, the common people
can only adore God, and refer all things to His power by
removing natural causes, and conceiving things happening out
of their due course, and only admires the power of God when
the power of nature is conceived of as in subjection to it.

(6:6) This idea seems to have taken its rise among the early
Jews who saw the Gentiles round them worshipping visible gods
such as the sun, the moon, the earth, water, air, &c., and in
order to inspire the conviction that such divinities were weak
and inconstant, or changeable, told how they themselves were
under the sway of an invisible God, and narrated their miracles,
trying further to show that the God whom they worshipped
arranged the whole of nature for their sole benefit: this idea
was so pleasing to humanity that men go on to this day
imagining miracles, so that they may believe themselves God's
favourites, and the final cause for which God created and
directs all things.

(6:7) What pretension will not people in their folly advance!
(8) They have no single sound idea concerning either God or
nature, they confound God's decrees with human decrees, they
conceive nature as so limited that they believe man to be its
chief part!  (9) I have spent enough space in setting forth
these common ideas and prejudices concerning nature and
miracles, but in order to afford a regular demonstration I
will show -
[6:2]
I.   (6:10) That nature cannot be contravened, but
     that she preserves a fixed and immutable order,
     and at the same time I will explain what is
     meant by a miracle.
II.  (6:11) II. That God's nature and existence, and
     consequently His providence cannot be known from
     miracles, the fixed and immutable order of nature.
III. (6:12) That by the decrees and volitions, and
     consequently the providence of God, Scripture
     (as I will prove by Scriptural examples) means
     nothing but nature's order following necessarily
     from her eternal laws.
IV.  (6:13) Lastly, I will treat of the method of
     interpreting Scriptural miracles, and the chief
     points to be noted concerning the narratives of them.

(6:14) Such are the principal subjects which will be discussed in
this chapter, and which will serve, I think, not a little to
further the object of this treatise.  (15) Our first point is
easily proved from what we showed in Chap. IV. (I:[4:2] ) about Divine
law - namely, that all that God wishes or determines involves eternal
necessity and truth, for we demonstrated that God's understanding
is identical with His will, and that it is the same thing to say
that God wills a thing, as to say that He understands it; hence,
as it follows necessarily from the Divine nature and perfection
that God understands a thing as it is, it follows no less
necessarily that He wills it as it is.  (6:16) Now, as nothing is
necessarily true save only by Divine decree, it is plain that
the universal laws of nature are decrees of God following from
the necessity and perfection of the Divine nature.  (17) Hence,
any event happening in nature which contravened nature's universal
laws, would necessarily also contravene the Divine decree, nature,
and understanding; or if anyone asserted that God acts in
contravention to the laws of nature, he, ipso facto, would be
compelled to assert that God acted against His own nature - an
evident absurdity. (6:18) One might easily show from the same
premises that the power and efficiency of nature are in
themselves the Divine power and efficiency, and that the Divine
power is the very essence of God, but this I gladly pass over
for the present.

(6:19) Nothing, then, comes to pass in nature (N.B. I do not mean
here by "nature," merely matter and its modifications, but infinite
other things besides matter.) in contravention to her universal
laws, nay, everything agrees with them and follows from them, for
whatsoever comes to pass, comes to pass by the will and eternal
decree of God; that is, as we have just pointed out, whatever comes
to pass, comes to pass according to laws and rules which involve
eternal necessity and truth; nature, therefore, always observes
laws and rules which involve eternal necessity and truth, although
they may not all be known to us, and therefore she keeps a fixed
and mutable order. (6:20) Nor is there any sound reason for limiting
the power and efficacy of nature, and asserting that her laws are
fit for certain purposes, but not for all; for as the efficacy and
power of nature, are the very efficacy and power of God, and as
the laws and rules of nature are the decrees of God, it is in every
way to be believed that the power of nature is infinite, and that
her laws are broad enough to embrace everything conceived by the
Divine intellect; the only alternative is to assert that God has
created nature so weak, and has ordained for her laws so barren,
that He is repeatedly compelled to come afresh to her aid if He
wishes that she should be preserved, and that things should happen
as He desires: a conclusion, in my opinion, very far removed from
reason.  (6:21) Further, as nothing happens in nature which does not
follow from her laws, and as her laws embrace everything conceived
by the Divine intellect, and lastly, as nature preserves a fixed
and immutable order; it most clearly follows that miracles are only
intelligible as in relation to human opinions, and merely mean
events of which the natural cause cannot be explained by a reference
to any ordinary occurrence, either by us, or at any rate, by the
writer and narrator of the miracle.

[6:3] (22) We may, in fact, say that a miracle is an event of
which the causes cannot be explained by the natural reason through
a reference to ascertained workings of nature; but since miracles
were wrought according to the understanding of the masses, who
are wholly ignorant of the workings of nature, it is certain
that the ancients took for a miracle whatever they could not
explain by the method adopted by the unlearned in such cases,
namely, an appeal to the memory, a recalling of something
similar, which is ordinarily regarded without wonder; for most
people think they sufficiently understand a thing when they have
ceased to wonder at it.  (6:23) The ancients, then, and indeed
most men up to the present day, had no other criterion for a
miracle; hence we cannot doubt that many things are narrated
in Scripture as miracles of which the causes could easily be
explained by reference to ascertained workings of nature.
(6:24) We have hinted as much in Chap. II., in speaking of the
sun standing still in the time of Joshua, and to say on the
subject when we come to treat of the interpretation of miracles
later on in this chapter.

(6:25) It is now time to pass on to the second point, and
show that we cannot gain an understanding of God's essence,
existence, or providence by means of miracles, but that
these truths are much better perceived through the fixed
and immutable order of nature.

(8:26) I thus proceed with the demonstration.  (27) As God's
existence is not self-evident [Endnote 6] it must necessarily
be inferred from ideas so firmly and incontrovertibly true, that
no power can be postulated or conceived sufficient to impugn them. 
(6:28) They ought certainly so to appear to us when we infer from
them God's existence, if we wish to place our conclusion beyond
the reach of doubt; for if we could conceive that such ideas could
be impugned by any power whatsoever, we should doubt of their
truth, we should doubt of our conclusion, namely, of God's
existence, and should never be able to be certain of anything. 
(6:29) Further, we know that nothing either agrees with or is
contrary to nature, unless it agrees with or is contrary to these
primary ideas; wherefore if we would conceive that anything could
be done in nature by any power whatsoever which would be contrary
to the laws of nature, it would also be contrary to our primary
ideas, and we should have either to reject it as absurd, or else
to cast doubt (as just shown) on our primary ideas, and
consequently on the existence of God, and on everything howsoever
perceived.  (6:30) Therefore miracles, in the sense of events contrary
to the laws of nature, so far from demonstrating to us the existence
of God, would, on the contrary, lead us to doubt it, where,
otherwise, we might have been absolutely certain of it, as
knowing that nature follows a fixed and immutable order.

(6:31) Let us take miracle as meaning that which cannot be
explained through natural causes.  (32) This may be interpreted
in two senses: either as that which has natural causes, but
cannot be examined by the human intellect; or as that which has
no cause save God and God's will.  (33) But as all things which
come to pass through natural causes, come to pass also solely
through the will and power of God, it comes to this, that a
miracle, whether it has natural causes or not, is a result which
cannot be explained by its cause, that is a phenomenon which
surpasses human understanding; but from such a phenomenon, and
certainly from a result surpassing our understanding, we can
gain no knowledge.  (6:34) For whatsoever we understand clearly
and distinctly should be plain to us either in itself or by means
of something else clearly and distinctly understood; wherefore
from a miracle or a phenomenon which we cannot understand, we can
gain no knowledge of God's essence, or existence, or indeed
anything about God or nature; whereas when we know that all things
are ordained and ratified by God, that the operations of nature
follow from the essence of God, and that the laws of nature are
eternal decrees and volitions of God, we must perforce conclude
that our knowledge of God, and of God's will increases in
proportion to our knowledge and clear understanding of nature,
as we see how she depends on her primal cause, and how she works
according to eternal law. (6:35) Wherefore so far as our
understanding goes, those phenomena which we clearly and
distinctly understand have much better right to be called works
of God, and to be referred to the will of God than those about
which we are entirely ignorant, although they appeal powerfully
to the imagination, and compel men's admiration.

(6:36) It is only phenomena that we clearly and distinctly
understand, which heighten our knowledge of God, and most
clearly indicate His will and decrees. (37) Plainly, they
are but triflers who, when they cannot explain a thing, run
back to the will of God; this is, truly, a ridiculous way
of expressing ignorance.  (6:38) Again, even supposing that
some conclusion could be drawn from miracles, we could not
possibly infer from them the existence of God: for a miracle
being an event under limitations is the expression of a fixed
and limited power; therefore we could not possibly infer from
an effect of this kind the existence of a cause whose power
is infinite, but at the utmost only of a cause whose power is
greater than that of the said effect.  (6:39) I say at the utmost,
for a phenomenon may be the result of many concurrent causes,
and its power may be less than the power of the sum of such
causes, but far greater than that of any one of them taken
individually.  (6:39a) On the other hand, the laws of nature, as
we have shown, extend over infinity, and are conceived by us as,
after a fashion, eternal, and nature works in accordance with
them in a fixed and immutable order; therefore, such laws
indicate to us in a certain degree the infinity, the eternity,
and the immutability of God.

(6:40) We may conclude, then, that we cannot gain knowledge of
the existence and providence of God by means of miracles, but
that we can far better infer them from the fixed and immutable
order of nature.  (41) By miracle, I here mean an event which
surpasses, or is thought to surpass, human comprehension: for
in so far as it is supposed to destroy or interrupt the order
of nature or her laws, it not only can give us no knowledge of
God, but, contrariwise, takes away that which we naturally have,
and makes us doubt of God and everything else.

(6:42) Neither do I recognize any difference between an event
against the laws of nature and an event beyond the laws of nature
(that is, according to some, an event which does not contravene
nature, though she is inadequate to produce or effect it) - for a
miracle is wrought in, and not beyond nature, though it may be
said in itself to be above nature, and, therefore, must
necessarily interrupt the order of nature, which otherwise we
conceive of as fixed and unchangeable, according to God's decrees.
(6:43) If, therefore, anything should come to pass in nature which
does not follow from her laws, it would also be in contravention
to the order which God has established in nature for ever through
universal natural laws: it would, therefore, be in contravention
to God's nature and laws, and, consequently, belief in it would
throw doubt upon everything, and lead to Atheism.

(6:44) I think I have now sufficiently established my second
point, so that we can again conclude that a miracle, whether in
contravention to, or beyond, nature, is a mere absurdity; and,
therefore, that what is meant in Scripture by a miracle can only
be a work of nature, which surpasses, or is believed to surpass,
human comprehension.  (45) Before passing on to my third point, I
will adduce Scriptural authority for my assertion that God cannot
be known from miracles.  (46) Scripture nowhere states the doctrine
openly, but it can readily be inferred from several passages. 
(6:47) Firstly, that in which Moses commands (Deut. xiii.) that a
false prophet should be put to death, even though he work miracles:
"If there arise a prophet among you, and giveth thee a sign or
wonder, and the sign or wonder come to pass, saying, Let us go
after other gods . . . thou shalt not hearken unto the voice of
that prophet; for the Lord your God proveth you, and that prophet
shall be put to death."  (48) From this it clearly follows that
miracles could be wrought even by false prophets; and that, unless
men are honestly endowed with the true knowledge and love of God,
they may be as easily led by miracles to follow false gods as to
follow the true God; for these words are added: "For the Lord your
God tempts you, that He may know whether you love Him with all
your heart and with all your mind."

(6:49) Further, the Israelites, from all their miracles, were
unable to form a sound conception of God, as their experience
testified: for when they had persuaded themselves that Moses
had departed from among them, they petitioned Aaron to give
them visible gods; and the idea of God they had formed as the
result of all their miracles was - a calf!

(6:50) Asaph, though he had heard of so many miracles, yet
doubted of the providence of God, and would have turned himself
from the true way, if he had not at last come to understand true
blessedness. (See Ps. lxxiii.)  (51) Solomon, too, at a time
when the Jewish nation was at the height of its prosperity,
suspects that all things happen by chance. (See Eccles. iii:19,
20, 21; and chap. ix:2, 3, &c.)

(6:52) Lastly, nearly all the prophets found it very hard to
reconcile the order of nature and human affairs with the
conception they had formed of God's providence, whereas
philosophers who endeavour to understand things by clear
conceptions of them, rather than by miracles, have always
found the task extremely easy - at least, such of them as
place true happiness solely in virtue and peace of mind, and
who aim at obeying nature, rather than being obeyed by her.
(6:53) Such persons rest assured that God directs nature
according to the requirements of universal laws, not according
to the requirements of the particular laws of human nature,
and trial, therefore, God's scheme comprehends, not only the
human race, but the whole of nature.

(6:54) It is plain, then, from Scripture itself, that miracles
can give no knowledge of God, nor clearly teach us the providence
of God.  (55) As to the frequent statements in Scripture, that
God wrought miracles to make Himself plain to man - as in
Exodus x:2, where He deceived the Egyptians, and gave signs of
Himself, that the Israelites might know that He was God,- it does
not, therefore, follow that miracles really taught this truth,
but only that the Jews held opinions which laid them easily open
to conviction by miracles.  (6:56) We have shown in Chap. II. that
the reasons assigned by the prophets, or those which are formed
from revelation, are not assigned in accordance with ideas
universal and common to all, but in accordance with the accepted
doctrines, however absurd, and with the opinions of those to
whom the revelation was given, or those whom the Holy Spirit
wished to convince.

(6:57) This we have illustrated by many Scriptural instances,
and can further cite Paul, who to the Greeks was a Greek, and
to the Jews a Jew.  (58) But although these miracles could
convince the Egyptians and Jews from their standpoint, they
could not give a true idea and knowledge of God, but only
cause them to admit that there was a Deity more powerful than
anything known to them, and that this Deity took special care
of the Jews, who had just then an unexpectedly happy issue of
all their affairs. (6:59) They could not teach them that God 
cares equally for all, for this can be taught only by
philosophy: the Jews, and all who took their knowledge of God's
providence from the dissimilarity of human conditions of life
and the inequalities of fortune, persuaded themselves that God
loved the Jews above all men, though they did not surpass their
fellows in true human perfection.

[6:4] (60) I now go on to my third point, and show from Scripture
that the decrees and mandates of God, and consequently His
providence, are merely the order of nature - that is, when Scripture 
describes an event as accomplished by God or God's will, we must
understand merely that it was in accordance with the law and
order of nature, not, as most people believe, that nature had 
for a season ceased to act, or that her order was temporarily interrupted. 
(6:61) But Scripture does not directly teach matters unconnected with its 
doctrine, wherefore it has no care to explain things by their natural 
causes, nor to expound matters merely speculative.  (62) Wherefore our 
conclusion must be gathered by inference from those Scriptural narratives 
which happen to be written more at length and circumstantially than usual. 
(63) Of these I will cite a few. 

(6:64) In the first book of Samuel, ix:15, 16, it is related that
God revealed to Samuel that He would send Saul to him, yet God
did not send Saul to Samuel as people are wont to send one man to
another.  (65) His "sending" was merely the ordinary course of
nature.  (66) Saul was looking for the asses he had lost, and was
meditating a return home without them, when, at the suggestion of
his servant, he went to the prophet Samuel, to learn from him
where he might find them.  (67) From no part of the narrative does
it appear that Saul had any command from God to visit Samuel beyond
this natural motive.

(6:68) In Psalm cv. 24 it is said that God changed the hearts of
the Egyptians, so that they hated the Israelites.  (69) This was
evidently a natural change, as appears from Exodus, chap.i.,
where we find no slight reason for the Egyptians reducing the
Israelites to slavery.

(6:70) In Genesis ix:13, God tells Noah that He will set His
bow in the cloud; this action of God's is but another way of
expressing the refraction and reflection which the rays of the
sun are subjected to in drops of water.

(6:71) In Psalm cxlvii:18, the natural action and warmth of the
wind, by which hoar frost and snow are melted, are styled the
word of the Lord, and in verse 15 wind and cold are called the
commandment and word of God.

(6:72) In Psalm civ:4, wind and fire are called the angels and
ministers of God, and various other passages of the same sort
are found in Scripture, clearly showing that the decree,
commandment, fiat, and word of God are merely expressions for
the action and order of nature.

(6:73) Thus it is plain that all the events narrated in Scripture
came to pass naturally, and are referred directly to God because
Scripture, as we have shown, does not aim at explaining things by
their natural causes, but only at narrating what appeals to the
popular imagination, and doing so in the manner best calculated
to excite wonder, and consequently to impress the minds of the
masses with devotion.  (6:74) If, therefore, events are found in
the Bible which we cannot refer to their causes, nay, which seem
entirely to contradict the order of nature, we must not come to a
stand, but assuredly believe that whatever did really happen
happened naturally.  (75) This view is confirmed by the fact that
in the case of every miracle there were many attendant
circumstances, though these were not always related, especially
where the narrative was of a poetic character.

(6:76) The circumstances of the miracles clearly show, I maintain,
that natural causes were needed. (77) For instance, in order to
infect the Egyptians with blains, it was necessary that Moses
should scatter ashes in the air (Exod. ix: 10); the locusts also
came upon the land of Egypt by a command of God in accordance with
nature, namely, by an east wind blowing for a whole day and night;
and they departed by a very strong west wind (Exod. x:14, 19).
(6:78) By a similar Divine mandate the sea opened a way for the
Jews (Exo. xiv:21), namely, by an east wind which blew very
strongly all night.

(6:79) So, too, when Elisha would revive the boy who was believed
to be dead, he was obliged to bend over him several times until
the flesh of the child waxed warm, and at last he opened his eyes
(2 Kings iv:34, 35).

(6:80) Again, in John's Gospel (chap. ix.) certain acts are
mentioned as performed by Christ preparatory to healing the blind
man, and there are numerous other instances showing that something
further than the absolute fiat of God is required for working a
miracle.

(6:81) Wherefore we may believe that, although the circumstances
attending miracles are not related always or in full detail, yet
a miracle was never performed without them.

(6:82) This is confirmed by Exodus xiv:27, where it is simply
stated that "Moses stretched forth his hand, and the waters of
the sea returned to their strength in the morning," no mention
being made of a wind; but in the song of Moses (Exod. xv:10) we
read, "Thou didst blow with Thy wind (i.e. with a very strong
wind), and the sea covered them."  (83) Thus the attendant
circumstance is omitted in the history, and the miracle is
thereby enhanced.

(6:84) But perhaps someone will insist that we find many things
in Scripture which seem in nowise explicable by natural causes,
as for instance, that the sins of men and their prayers can be
the cause of rain and of the earth's fertility, or that faith
can heal the blind, and so on.  (85) But I think I have already
made sufficient answer: I have shown that Scripture does not
explain things by their secondary causes, but only narrates them
in the order and the style which has most power to move men, and
especially uneducated men, to devotion; and therefore it speaks
inaccurately of God and of events, seeing that its object is not
to convince the reason, but to attract and lay hold of the
imagination.  (6:86) If the Bible were to describe the destruction
of an empire in the style of political historians, the masses
would remain unstirred, whereas the contrary is the case when it
adopts the method of poetic description, and refers all things
immediately to God.  (87) When, therefore, the Bible says that
the earth is barren because of men's sins, or that the blind were
healed by faith, we ought to take no more notice than when it says
that God is angry at men's sins, that He is sad, that He repents of
the good He has promised and done; or that on seeing a sign he
remembers something He had promised, and other similar expressions,
which are either thrown out poetically or related according to the
opinion and prejudices of the writer.

[6:5] (88) We may, then, be absolutely certain that every event
which is truly described in Scripture necessarily happened, like
everything else, according to natural laws; and if anything is
there set down which can be proved in set terms to contravene the
order of nature, or not to be deducible therefrom, we must
believe it to have been foisted into the sacred writings by
irreligious hands; for whatsoever is contrary to nature is also
contrary to reason, and whatsoever is contrary to reason is
absurd, and, ipso facto, to be rejected.

(6:89) There remain some points concerning the interpretation
of miracles to be noted, or rather to be recapitulated, for most
of them have been already stated.  (90) These I proceed to discuss
in the fourth division of my subject, and I am led to do so lest
anyone should, by wrongly interpreting a miracle, rashly suspect
that he has found something in Scripture contrary to human reason.

(6:91) It is very rare for men to relate an event simply as it
happened, without adding any element of their own judgment. 
(92) When they see or hear anything new, they are, unless strictly
on their guard, so occupied with their own preconceived opinions
that they perceive something quite different from the plain facts
seen or heard, especially if such facts surpass the comprehension
of the beholder or hearer, and, most of all, if he is interested
in their happening in a given way.

(6:93) Thus men relate in chronicles and histories their own
opinions rather than actual events, so that one and the same
event is so differently related by two men of different opinions,
that it seems like two separate occurrences; and, further, it is
very easy from historical chronicles to gather the personal
opinions of the historian.

(6:94) I could cite many instances in proof of this from the
writings both of natural philosophers and historians, but I will
content myself with one only from Scripture, and leave the reader
to judge of the rest.

(6:95) In the time of Joshua the Hebrews held the ordinary opinion
that the sun moves with a daily motion, and that the earth remains
at rest; to this preconceived opinion they adapted the miracle
which occurred during their battle with the five kings.  (96) They
did not simply relate that that day was longer than usual, but
asserted that the sun and moon stood still, or ceased from their
motion - a statement which would be of great service to them at
that time in convincing and proving by experience to the Gentiles,
who worshipped the sun, that the sun was under the control of
another deity who could compel it to change its daily course.
(6:97) Thus, partly through religious motives, partly through
preconceived opinions, they conceived of and related the occurrence
as something quite different from what really happened.

(6:98) Thus in order to interpret the Scriptural miracles and
understand from the narration of them how they really happened,
it is necessary to know the opinions of those who first related
them, and have recorded them for us in writing, and to distinguish
such opinions from the actual impression made upon their senses,
otherwise we shall confound opinions and judgments with the
actual miracle as it really occurred: nay, further, we shall
confound actual events with symbolical and imaginary ones. 
(6:99) For many things are narrated in Scripture as real, and
were believed to be real, which were in fact only symbolical
and imaginary.  (100) As, for instance, that God came down from
heaven (Exod. xix:28, Deut. v:28), and that Mount Sinai smoked
because God descended upon it surrounded with fire; or, again
that Elijah ascended into heaven in a chariot of fire, with horses
of fire; all these things were assuredly merely symbols adapted
to the opinions of those who have handed them down to us as they
were represented to them, namely, as real.  (101) All who have any
education know that God has no right hand nor left; that He is
not moved nor at rest, nor in a particular place, but that He is
absolutely infinite and contains in Himself all perfections.

(6:102) These things, I repeat, are known to whoever judges of
things by the perception of pure reason, and not according as his
imagination is affected by his outward senses.  (103) Following
the example of the masses who imagine a bodily Deity, holding a
royal court with a throne on the convexity of heaven, above the
stars, which are believed to be not very far off from the earth.

(6:104) To these and similar opinions very many narrations in
Scripture are adapted, and should not, therefore, be mistaken
by philosophers for realities.

(6:105) Lastly, in order to understand, in the case of miracles,
what actually took place, we ought to be familiar with Jewish
phrases and metaphors; anyone who did not make sufficient
allowance for these, would be continually seeing miracles in
Scripture where nothing of the kind is intended by the writer;
he would thus miss the knowledge not only of what actually
happened, but also of the mind of the writers of the sacred text.
(6:106) For instance, Zechariah speaking of some future war says
(chap. xiv;7): "It shall be one day which shall be known to the
Lord, not day nor night; but at even time it shall be light."
(106a)  In these words he seems to predict a great miracle, yet
he only means that the battle will be doubtful the whole day,
that the issue will be known only to God, but that in the evening
they will gain the victory: the prophets frequently used to
predict victories and defeats of the nations in similar phrases.
(6:107) Thus Isaiah, describing the destruction of Babylon, says
(chap. xiii.): "The stars of heaven, and the constellations
thereof, shall not give their light; the sun shall be darkened
in his going forth, and the moon shall not cause her light to
shine."  (108) Now I suppose no one imagines that at the
destruction of Babylon these phenomena actually occurred any
more than that which the prophet adds, "For I will make the
heavens to tremble, and remove the earth out of her place."

(6:109) So, too, Isaiah in foretelling to the Jews that they would
return from Babylon to Jerusalem in safety, and would not suffer
from thirst on their journey, says: "And they thirsted not when
He led them through the deserts; He caused the waters to flow out
of the rocks for them; He clave the rocks, and the waters gushed
out."  (110) These words merely mean that the Jews, like other
people, found springs in the desert, at which they quenched their
thirst; for when the Jews returned to Jerusalem with the consent
of Cyrus, it is admitted that no similar miracles befell them.

(6:111) In this way many occurrences in the Bible are to be
regarded merely as Jewish expressions.  (112) There is no need
for me to go through them in detail; but I will call attention
generally to the fact that the Jews employed such phrases not
only rhetorically, but also, and indeed chiefly, from devotional
motives.  (113) Such is the reason for the substitution of
"bless God" for "curse God" in 1 Kings xxi:10, and Job ii:9,
and for all things being referred to God, whence it appears
that the Bible seems to relate nothing but miracles, even when
speaking of the most ordinary occurrences, as in the examples
given above.

(6:114) Hence we must believe that when the Bible says that the
Lord hardened Pharaoh's heart, it only means that Pharaoh was
obstinate; when it says that God opened the windows of heaven,
it only means that it rained very hard, and so on.  (115) When
we reflect on these peculiarities, and also on the fact that
most things are related very shortly, with very little details
and almost in abridgments, we shall see that there is hardly
anything in Scripture which can be proved contrary to natural
reason, while, on the other hand, many things which before
seemed obscure, will after a little consideration be understood
and easily explained.

(6:116) I think I have now very clearly explained all that I
proposed to explain, but before I finish this chapter I would
call attention to the fact that I have adopted a different
method in speaking of miracles to that which I employed in
treating of prophecy.  (117) Of prophecy I have asserted
nothing which could not be inferred from promises revealed
in Scripture, whereas in this chapter I have deduced my
conclusions solely from the principles ascertained by the
natural light of reason.  (6:118) I have proceeded in this
way advisedly, for prophecy, in that it surpasses human
knowledge, is a purely theological question; therefore,
I knew that I could not make any assertions about it, nor
learn wherein it consists, except through deductions from
premises that have been revealed; therefore I was compelled
to collate the history of prophecy, and to draw therefrom
certain conclusions which would teach me, in so far as such
teaching is possible, the nature and properties of the gift.
(6:119) But in the case of miracles, as our inquiry is a
question purely philosophical (namely, whether anything can
happen which contravenes, or does not follow from the laws of
nature), I was not under any such necessity: I therefore
thought it wiser to unravel the difficulty through premises
ascertained and thoroughly known by the natural light of reason.
(119a) I say I thought it wiser, for I could also easily have
solved the problem merely from the doctrines and fundamental
principles of Scripture: in order that everyone may acknowledge
this, I will briefly show how it could be done.

(6:120) Scripture makes the general assertion in several passages
that nature's course is fixed and unchangeable.  (121) In 
Ps. cxlviii:6, for instance, and Jer. xxxi:35.  (122) The wise
man also, in Eccles. i:10, distinctly teaches that "there is
nothing new under the sun," and in verses 11, 12, illustrating
the same idea, he adds that although something occasionally
happens which seems new, it is not really new, but "hath been
already of old time, which was before us, whereof there is no
remembrance, neither shall there be any remembrance of things
that are to come with those that come after."  (123) Again in
chap. iii:11, he says, "God hath made everything beautiful in
his time," and immediately afterwards adds, "I know that
whatsoever God doeth, it shall be for ever; nothing can be put
to it, nor anything taken from it."

(6:124) Now all these texts teach most distinctly that nature
preserves a fixed and unchangeable order, and that God in all
ages, known and unknown, has been the same; further, that the
laws of nature are so perfect, that nothing can be added thereto
nor taken therefrom; and, lastly, that miracles only appear as
something new because of man's ignorance.

(6:125) Such is the express teaching of Scripture: nowhere does
Scripture assert that anything happens which contradicts, or
cannot follow from the laws of nature; and, therefore, we should
not attribute to it such a doctrine.

(6:126) To these considerations we must add, that miracles require
causes and attendant circumstances, and that they follow, not from
some mysterious royal power which the masses attribute to God, but
from the Divine rule and decree, that is (as we have shown from
Scripture itself) from the laws and order of nature; lastly, that
miracles can be wrought even by false prophets, as is proved from
Deut. xiii. and Matt. xxiv:24.

(6:127) The conclusion, then, that is most plainly put before us is,
that miracles were natural occurrences, and must therefore be so
explained as to appear neither new (in the words of Solomon) nor
contrary to nature, but, as far as possible, in complete agreement
with ordinary events.  (128) This can easily be done by anyone,
now that I have set forth the rules drawn from Scripture. 
(6:129) Nevertheless, though I maintain that Scripture teaches
this doctrine, I do not assert that it teaches it as a truth
necessary to salvation, but only that the prophets were in
agreement with ourselves on the point; therefore everyone
is free to think on the subject as he likes, according as he
thinks it best for himself, and most likely to conduce to the
worship of God and to singlehearted religion.

(6:130) This is also the opinion of Josephus, for at the conclusion
of the second book of his "Antiquities," he writes: Let no man
think this story incredible of the sea's dividing to save these
people, for we find it in ancient records that this hath been seen
before, whether by God's extraordinary will or by the course of
nature it is indifferent.  (6:131) The same thing happened one time
to the Macedonians, under the command of Alexander, when for want
of another passage the Pamphylian Sea divided to make them way;
God's Providence making use of Alexander at that time as His 
instrument for destroying the Persian Empire.  (132) This is
attested by all the historians who have pretended to write the
Life of that Prince.  (133) But people are at liberty to think what
they please."

(6:134) Such are the words of Josephus, and such is his opinion
on faith in miracles.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

[7:0] CHAPTER VII. - OF THE INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE

(7:1) When people declare, as all are ready to do, that the Bible
is the Word of God teaching man true blessedness and the way of
salvation, they evidently do not mean what they say; for the masses
take no pains at all to live according to Scripture, and we see most
people endeavouring to hawk about their own commentaries as the word
of God, and giving their best efforts, under the guise of religion,
to compelling others to think as they do: we generally see, I say,
theologians anxious to learn how to wring their inventions and
sayings out of the sacred text, and to fortify them with Divine
authority.  [7:1] (2) Such persons never display less scruple or
more zeal than when they are interpreting Scripture or the mind
of the Holy Ghost; if we ever see them perturbed, it is not that
they fear to attribute some error to the Holy Spirit, and to stray
from the right path, but that they are afraid to be convicted of
error by others, and thus to overthrow and bring into contempt
their own authority.  (3) But if men really believed what they
verbally testify of Scripture, they would adopt quite a different
plan of life: their minds would not be agitated by so many
contentions, nor so many hatreds, and they would cease to be excited
by such a blind and rash passion for interpreting the sacred writings,
and excogitating novelties in religion.  (7:4) On the contrary, they
would not dare to adopt, as the teaching of Scripture, anything
which they could not plainly deduce therefrom: lastly, those
sacrilegious persons who have dared, in several passages,
to interpolate the Bible, would have shrunk from so great a
crime, and would have stayed their sacrilegious hands.

(7:5) Ambition and unscrupulousness have waxed so powerful, that
religion is thought to consist, not so much in respecting the
writings of the Holy Ghost, as in defending human commentaries,
so that religion is no longer identified with charity, but with
spreading discord and propagating insensate hatred disguised
under the name of zeal for the Lord, and eager ardour.

(7:6) To these evils we must add superstition, which teaches men
to despise reason and nature, and only to admire and venerate that
which is repugnant to both: whence it is not wonderful that for
the sake of increasing the admiration and veneration felt for
Scripture, men strive to explain it so as to make it appear to
contradict, as far as possible, both one and the other: thus they
dream that most profound mysteries lie hid in the Bible, and weary
themselves out in the investigation of these absurdities, to the
neglect of what is useful.  (7:7) Every result of their diseased
imagination they attribute to the Holy Ghost, and strive to defend
with the utmost zeal and passion; for it is an observed fact that
men employ their reason to defend conclusions arrived at by reason,
but conclusions arrived at by the passions are defended by the
passions.

(7:8) If we would separate ourselves from the crowd and escape
from theological prejudices, instead of rashly accepting human
commentaries for Divine documents, we must consider the true
method of interpreting Scripture and dwell upon it at some length:
for if we remain in ignorance of this we cannot know, certainly,
what the Bible and the Holy Spirit wish to teach.

(7:9)I may sum up the matter by saying that the method of
interpreting Scripture does not widely differ from the method of
interpreting nature - in fact, it is almost the same.  (10) For as
the interpretation of nature consists in the examination of the
history of nature, and therefrom deducing definitions of natural
phenomena on certain fixed axioms, so Scriptural interpretation
proceeds by the examination of Scripture, and inferring the
intention of its authors as a legitimate conclusion from its
fundamental principles.  (7:11) By working in this manner everyone
will always advance without danger of error - that is, if they
admit no principles for interpreting Scripture, and discussing
its contents save such as they find in Scripture itself - and will
be able with equal security to discuss what surpasses our
understanding, and what is known by the natural light of reason.

[7:2] (12) In order to make clear that such a method is not only
correct, but is also the only one advisable, and that it agrees
with that employed in interpreting nature, I must remark that
Scripture very often treats of matters which cannot be deduced
from principles known to reason: for it is chiefly made up of
narratives and revelation: the narratives generally contain
miracles - that is, as we have shown in the last chapter,
relations of extraordinary natural occurrences adapted to the
opinions and judgment of the historians who recorded them:
the revelations also were adapted to the opinions of the prophets,
as we showed in Chap. II., and in themselves surpassed human
comprehension.  (7:13) Therefore the knowledge of all these -
that is, of nearly the whole contents of Scripture, must be sought
from Scripture alone, even as the knowledge of nature is sought
from nature.  (14) As for the moral doctrines which are also
contained in the Bible, they may be demonstrated from received
axioms, but we cannot prove in the same manner that Scripture
intended to teach them, this can only be learned from Scripture
itself.

(7:15) If we would bear unprejudiced witness to the Divine origin
of Scripture, we must prove solely on its own authority that it
teaches true moral doctrines, for by such means alone can its
Divine origin be demonstrated: we have shown that the certitude
of the prophets depended chiefly on their having minds turned
towards what is just and good, therefore we ought to have proof
of their possessing this quality before we repose faith in them.
(7:16) From miracles God's divinity cannot be proved, as I have
already shown, and need not now repeat, for miracles could be
wrought by false prophets.  (17) Wherefore the Divine origin of
Scripture must consist solely in its teaching true virtue.
(7:18) But we must come to our conclusion simply on Scriptural
grounds, for if we were unable to do so we could not, unless
strongly prejudiced accept the Bible and bear witness to its
Divine origin.

(7:19) Our knowledge of Scripture must then be looked for in
Scripture only.

(7:20) Lastly, Scripture does not give us definition of things
any more than nature does: therefore, such definitions must be
sought in the latter case from the diverse workings of nature;
in the former case, from the various narratives about the given
subject which occur in the Bible.

(7:21) The universal rule, then, in interpreting Scripture is
to accept nothing as an authoritative Scriptural statement which
we do not perceive very clearly when we examine it in the light
of its history.  (22) What I mean by its history, and what should
be the chief points elucidated, I will now explain.

(7:23) The history of a Scriptural statement comprises -

(7:23a) I. The nature and properties of the language in which the
   books of the Bible were written, and in which their authors were,
   accustomed to speak.  (24) We shall thus be able to investigate
   every expression by comparison with common conversational usages.
(7:25) Now all the writers both of the Old Testament and the New
  
   were Hebrews: therefore, a knowledge of the Hebrew language
   is before all things necessary, not only for the comprehension
   of the Old Testament, which was written in that tongue, but also
   of the New: for although the latter was published in other
   languages, yet its characteristics are Hebrew.
(7:26) II. An analysis of each book and arrangement of its contents
   under heads; so that we may have at hand the various texts which
   treat of a given subject.  (27) Lastly, a note of all the passages
   which are ambiguous or obscure, or which seem mutually contradictory.
(7:28) I call passages clear or obscure according as their meaning
   is inferred easily or with difficulty in relation to the context,
   not according as their truth is perceived easily or the reverse by
   reason.  (29) We are at work not on the truth of passages, but
   solely on their meaning.  (30) We must take especial care, when we
   are in search of the meaning of a text, not to be led away by our
   reason in so far as it is founded on principles of natural knowledge
   (to say nothing of prejudices): in order not to confound the meaning
   of a passage with its truth, we must examine it solely by means of
   the signification of the words, or by a reason acknowledging no
   foundation but Scripture.
(7:31) I will illustrate my meaning by an example.  (32) The words
   of Moses, "God is a fire" and "God is jealous," are perfectly clear
   so long as we regard merely the signification of the words, and I
   therefore reckon them among the clear passages, though in relation
   to reason and truth they are most obscure: still, although the
   literal meaning is repugnant to the natural light of reason,
   nevertheless, if it cannot be clearly overruled on grounds and
   principles derived from its Scriptural "history," it, that is, the
   literal meaning, must be the one retained: and contrariwise if these
   passages literally interpreted are found to clash with principles
   derived from Scripture, though such literal interpretation were in
   absolute harmony with reason, they must be interpreted in a different
   manner, i.e. metaphorically.
(7:33) If we would know whether Moses believed God to be a fire or
   not, we must on no account decide the question on grounds of the
   reasonableness or the reverse of such an opinion, but must judge
   solely by the other opinions of Moses which are on record.
(7:34) In the present instance, as Moses says in several passages
   that God has no likeness to any visible thing, whether in heaven
   or in earth, or in the water, either all such passages must be
   taken metaphorically, or else the one before us must be so
   explained.  (35) However, as we should depart as little as
   possible from the literal sense, we must first ask whether this
   text, God is a fire, admits of any but the literal meaning - that
   is, whether the word fire ever means anything besides ordinary
   natural fire.  {7:36) If no such second meaning can be found, the
   text must be taken literally, however repugnant to reason it may
   be: and all the other passages, though in complete accordance with
   reason, must be brought into harmony with it.  (37) If the verbal
   expressions would not admit of being thus harmonized, we should
   have to set them down as irreconcilable, and suspend our judgment
   concerning them.  (38) However, as we find the name fire applied to
   anger and jealousy (see Job xxxi:12) we can thus easily reconcile
   the words of Moses, and legitimately conclude that the two
   propositions God is a fire, and God is jealous, are in meaning
   identical.
(7:39) Further, as Moses clearly teaches that God is jealous, and
   nowhere states that God is without passions or emotions, we must
   evidently infer that Moses held this doctrine himself, or at any
   rate, that he wished to teach it, nor must we refrain because
   such a belief seems contrary to reason: for as we have shown, we
   cannot wrest the meaning of texts to suit the dictates of our
   reason, or our preconceived opinions.  (40) The whole knowledge
   of the Bible must be sought solely from itself.
(7:41) III. Lastly, such a history should relate the environment of
   all the prophetic books extant; that is, the life, the conduct,
   and the studies of the author of each book, who he was, what was
   the occasion, and the epoch of his writing, whom did he write for,
   and in what language.  (42) Further, it should inquire into the
   fate of each book: how it was first received, into whose hands it
   fell, how many different versions there were of it, by whose
   advice was it received into the Bible, and, lastly, how all the
   books now universally accepted as sacred, were united into a single 
   whole.

(7:43) All such information should, as I have said, be contained
in the "history" of Scripture.  (44) For, in order to know what
statements are set forth as laws, and what as moral precepts, it
is important to be acquainted with the life, the conduct, and the
pursuits of their author: moreover, it becomes easier to explain
a man's writings in proportion as we have more intimate knowledge
of his genius and temperament.

(7:45) Further, that we may not confound precepts which are eternal
with those which served only a temporary purpose, or were only meant
for a few, we should know what was the occasion, the time, the age,
in which each book was written, and to what nation it was addressed.

(7:46) Lastly, we should have knowledge on the other points I have 
mentioned, in order to be sure, in addition to the authenticity of
the work, that it has not been tampered with by sacrilegious hands,
or whether errors can have crept in, and, if so, whether they have
been corrected by men sufficiently skilled and worthy of credence.
(7:47) All these things should be known, that we may not be led away
by blind impulse to accept whatever is thrust on our notice, instead
of only that which is sure and indisputable.

(7:48) Now when we are in possession of this history of Scripture,
and have finally decided that we assert nothing as prophetic
doctrine which does not directly follow from such history, or
which is not clearly deducible from it, then, I say, it will be
time to gird ourselves for the task of investigating the mind of
the prophets and of the Holy Spirit.  (49) But in this further
arguing, also, we shall require a method very like that employed
in interpreting nature from her history.  (7:50) As in the examination
of natural phenomena we try first to investigate what is most
universal and common to all nature - such, for instance, as motion
and rest, and their laws and rules, which nature always observes,
and through which she continually works - and then we proceed to
what is less universal; so, too, in the history of Scripture, we
seek first for that which is most universal, and serves for the
basis and foundation of all Scripture, a doctrine, in fact, that is
commended by all the prophets as eternal and most profitable to all
men.  (7:51) For example, that God is one, and that He is omnipotent, 
that He alone should be worshipped, that He has a care for all men,
and that He especially loves those who adore Him and love their
neighbour as themselves, &c.  (52) These and similar doctrines,
I repeat, Scripture everywhere so clearly and expressly teaches,
that no one was ever in doubt of its meaning concerning them.

(7:53) The nature of God, His manner of regarding and providing
for things, and similar doctrines, Scripture nowhere teaches
professedly, and as eternal doctrine; on the contrary, we have
shown that the prophets themselves did not agree on the subject;
therefore, we must not lay down any doctrine as Scriptural on
such subjects, though it may appear perfectly clear on rational
grounds.

(7:54) From a proper knowledge of this universal doctrine of
Scripture, we must then proceed to other doctrines less universal,
but which, nevertheless, have regard to the general conduct of
life, and flow from the universal doctrine like rivulets from a
source; such are all particular external manifestations of true
virtue, which need a given occasion for their exercise; whatever
is obscure or ambiguous on such points in Scripture must be
explained and defined by its universal doctrine; with regard to
contradictory instances, we must observe the occasion and the time
in which they were written.  (7:55) For instance, when Christ says,
"Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted" we do
not know, from the actual passage, what sort of mourners are meant;
as, however, Christ afterwards teaches that we should have care for
nothing, save only for the kingdom of God and His righteousness,
which is commended as the highest good (see Matt. vi;33), it follows
that by mourners He only meant those who mourn for the kingdom of
God and righteousness neglected by man: for this would be the only
cause of mourning to those who love nothing but the Divine kingdom
and justice, and who evidently despise the gifts of fortune.  (56) So,
too, when Christ says: "But if a man strike you on the right cheek,
turn to him the left also," and the words which follow.

(7:57) If He had given such a command, as a lawgiver, to judges,
He would thereby have abrogated the law of Moses, but this He
expressly says He did not do (Matt. v:17). (58) Wherefore we must
consider who was the speaker, what was the occasion, and to whom
were the words addressed.  (59) Now Christ said that He did not
ordain laws as a legislator, but inculcated precepts as a teacher:
inasmuch as He did not aim at correcting outward actions so much
as the frame of mind.  (60) Further, these words were spoken
to men who were oppressed, who lived in a corrupt commonwealth
on the brink of ruin, where justice was utterly neglected.
(7:61) The very doctrine inculcated here by Christ just
before the destruction of the city was also taught by
Jeremiah before the first destruction of Jerusalem, that is,
in similar circumstances, as we see from Lamentations iii:25-30.

(7:62) Now as such teaching was only set forth by the prophets
in times of oppression, and was even then never laid down as a
law; and as, on the other hand, Moses (who did not write in
times of oppression, but - mark this - strove to found a
well-ordered commonwealth), while condemning envy and hatred
of one's neighbour, yet ordained that an eye should be given for
an eye, it follows most clearly from these purely Scriptural
grounds that this precept of Christ and Jeremiah concerning
submission to injuries was only valid in places where justice
is neglected, and in a time of oppression, but does not hold
good in a well-ordered state.

(7:63) In a well-ordered state where justice is administered
every one is bound, if he would be accounted just, to demand
penalties before the judge (see Lev:1), not for the sake of
vengeance (Lev. xix:17, 18), but in order to defend justice
and his country's laws, and to prevent the wicked rejoicing
in their wickedness.  (64) All this is plainly in accordance
with reason.  (65) I might cite many other examples in the
same manner, but I think the foregoing are sufficient to
explain my meaning and the utility of this method, and this
is all my present purpose. (7:66) Hitherto we have only shown
how to investigate those passages of Scripture which treat
of practical conduct, and which, therefore, are more easily
examined, for on such subjects there was never really any
controversy among the writers of the Bible.

(7:67) The purely speculative passages cannot be so easily traced
to their real meaning: the way becomes narrower, for as the prophets
differed in matters speculative among themselves, and the narratives
are in great measure adapted to the prejudices of each age, we must
not, on any account infer the intention of one prophet from clearer
passages in the writings of another; nor must we so explain his
meaning, unless it is perfectly plain that the two prophets were
at one in the matter.

(7:68) How we are to arrive at the intention of the prophets in
such cases I will briefly explain. (69) Here, too, we must begin
from the most universal proposition, inquiring first from the
most clear Scriptural statements what is the nature of prophecy
or revelation, and wherein does it consist; then we must proceed
to miracles, and so on to whatever is most general till we come
to the opinions of a particular prophet, and, at last, to the
meaning of a particular revelation, prophecy, history, or miracle. 
(7;70) We have already pointed out that great caution is necessary
not to confound the mind of a prophet or historian with the mind
of the Holy Spirit and the truth of the matter; therefore I need
not dwell further on the subject.  (71) I would, however, here
remark concerning the meaning of revelation, that the present
method only teaches us what the prophets really saw or heard, not
what they desired to signify or represent by symbols.  (72) The
latter may be guessed at but cannot be inferred with certainty
from Scriptural premises.

(7:73) We have thus shown the plan for interpreting Scripture, and
have, at the same time, demonstrated that it is the one and surest
way of investigating its true meaning.  (74) I am willing indeed
to admit that those persons (if any such there be) would be more
absolutely certainly right, who have received either a trustworthy
tradition or an assurance from the prophets themselves, such as is
claimed by the Pharisees; or who have a pontiff gifted with
infallibility in the interpretation of Scripture, such as the Roman
Catholics boast.  (7:75) But as we can never be perfectly sure, either
of such a tradition or of the authority of the pontiff, we cannot
found any certain conclusion on either: the one is denied by the
oldest sect of Christians, the other by the oldest sect of Jews.
(7:76) Indeed, if we consider the series of years (to mention no
other point) accepted by the Pharisees from their Rabbis, during
which time they say they have handed down the tradition from
Moses, we shall find that it is not correct, as I show elsewhere.
(77) Therefore such a tradition should be received with extreme
suspicion; and although, according to our method, we are bound to
consider as uncorrupted the tradition of the Jews, namely, the
meaning of the Hebrew words which we received from them, we may
accept the latter while retaining our doubts about the former.

(7:78) No one has ever been able to change the meaning of a word
in ordinary use, though many have changed the meaning of a
particular sentence.  (79) Such a proceeding would be most
difficult; for whoever attempted to change the meaning of a word,
would be compelled, at the same time, to explain all the authors
who employed it, each according to his temperament and intention,
or else, with consummate cunning, to falsify them.

(7:80) Further, the masses and the learned alike preserve language,
but it is only the learned who preserve the meaning of particular
sentences and books: thus, we may easily imagine that the learned
having a very rare book in their power, might change or corrupt the
meaning of a sentence in it, but they could not alter the
signification of the words; moreover, if anyone wanted to change
the meaning of a common word he would not be able to keep up the
change among posterity, or in common parlance or writing.

(7:81) For these and such-like reasons we may readily conclude
that it would never enter into the mind of anyone to corrupt a
language, though the intention of a writer may often have been
falsified by changing his phrases or interpreting them amiss.
(82) As then our method (based on the principle that the
knowledge of Scripture must be sought from itself alone) is the
sole true one, we must evidently renounce any knowledge which
it cannot furnish for the complete understanding of Scripture.
[7:3] (83) I will now point out its difficulties and shortcomings,
which prevent our gaining a complete and assured knowledge of
the Sacred Text.

(7:84) Its first great difficulty consists in its requiring a
thorough knowledge of the Hebrew language.  (85) Where is such
knowledge to be obtained?  (86) The men of old who employed
the Hebrew tongue have left none of the principles and bases
of their language to posterity; we have from them absolutely
nothing in the way of dictionary, grammar, or rhetoric.

(7:87) Now the Hebrew nation has lost all its grace and beauty
(as one would expect after the defeats and persecutions it has
gone through), and has only retained certain fragments of its
language and of a few books.  (88) Nearly all the names of fruits,
birds, and fishes, and many other words have perished in the wear
and tear of time.  (89) Further, the meaning of many nouns and
verbs which occur in the Bible are either utterly lost, or
are subjects of dispute.  (90) And not only are these gone,
but we are lacking in a knowledge of Hebrew phraseology.
(91) The devouring tooth of time has destroyed turns of
expression peculiar to the Hebrews, so that we know them
no more.

(7:92) Therefore we cannot investigate as we would all the
meanings of a sentence by the uses of the language; and there
are many phrases of which the meaning is most obscure or
altogether inexplicable, though the component words are
perfectly plain.

(7:93) To this impossibility of tracing the history of the
Hebrew language must be added its particular nature and
composition: these give rise to so many ambiguities that it
is impossible to find a method which would enable us to gain
a certain knowledge of all the statements in Scripture. [Endnote 7]
(94) In addition to the sources of ambiguities common to all
languages, there are many peculiar to Hebrew.  (95) These, I think,
it worth while to mention.  (96) Firstly, an ambiguity often arises
in the Bible from our mistaking one letter for another similar one.
(7:97) The Hebrews divide the letters of the alphabet into five
classes, according to the five organs of the month employed in
pronouncing them, namely, the lips, the tongue, the teeth, the
palate, and the throat.  (98) For instance, Alpha, Ghet, Hgain, He,
are called gutturals, and are barely distinguishable, by any sign
that we know, one from the other.  (99) El, which signifies to, is
often taken for hgal, which signifies above, and vice versa. 
(100) Hence sentences are often rendered rather ambiguous or
meaningless.

(7:101) A second difficulty arises from the multiplied meaning
of conjunctions and adverbs.  (102) For instance, vau serves
promiscuously for a particle of union or of separation, meaning,
and, but, because, however, then: ki, has seven or eight meanings,
namely, wherefore, although, if, when, inasmuch as, because, a
burning, &c., and so on with almost all particles.

(7:103) The third very fertile source of doubt is the fact that
Hebrew verbs in the indicative mood lack the present, the past
imperfect, the pluperfect, the future perfect, and other tenses
most frequently employed in other languages; in the imperative
and infinitive moods they are wanting in all except the present,
and a subjunctive mood does not exist.  (104) Now, although all
these defects in moods and tenses may be supplied by certain
fundamental rules of the language with ease and even elegance,
the ancient writers evidently neglected such rules altogether,
and employed indifferently future for present and past, and
vice versa past for future, and also indicative for imperative
and subjunctive, with the result of considerable confusion.

(7:105) Besides these sources of ambiguity there are two others,
one very important.  (106) Firstly, there are in Hebrew no vowels;
secondly, the sentences are not separated by any marks elucidating
the meaning or separating the clauses.  (107) Though the want of
these two has generally been supplied by points and accents, such
substitutes cannot be accepted by us, inasmuch as they were invented
and designed by men of an after age whose authority should carry no
weight.  (108) The ancients wrote without points (that is, without
vowels and accents), as is abundantly testified; their descendants
added what was lacking, according to their own ideas of Scriptural
interpretation; wherefore the existing accents and points are
simply current interpretations, and are no more authoritative than
any other commentaries.

(7:109) Those who are ignorant of this fact cannot justify the
author of the Epistle to the Hebrews for interpreting (chap. xi;21)
Genesis (xlvii:31) very differently from the version given in our
Hebrew text as at present pointed, as though the Apostle had been
obliged to learn the meaning of Scripture from those who added
the points.  (110) In my opinion the latter are clearly wrong.
(7:111) In order that everyone may judge for himself, and also see
how the discrepancy arose simply from the want of vowels, I will
give both interpretations. (112)Those who pointed our version read,
"And Israel bent himself over, or (changing Hqain into Aleph,
a similar letter) towards, the head of the bed."  (113) The author
of the Epistle reads, "And Israel bent himself over the head of
his staff," substituting mate for mita, from which it only differs
in respect of vowels.  (114) Now as in this narrative it is Jacob's
age only that is in question, and not his illness, which is not
touched on till the next chapter, it seems more likely that the
historian intended to say that Jacob bent over the head of his
staff (a thing commonly used by men of advanced age for their
support) than that he bowed himself at the head of his bed,
especially as for the former reading no substitution of letters
is required.  (7:115) In this example I have desired not only to
reconcile the passage in the Epistle with the passage in Genesis,
but also and chiefly to illustrate how little trust should be
placed in the points and accents which are found in our present
Bible, and so to prove that he who would be without bias in
interpreting Scripture should hesitate about accepting them,
and inquire afresh for himself.  (116) Such being the nature and
structure of the Hebrew language, one may easily understand that
many difficulties are likely to arise, and that no possible method
could solve all of them.  (7:117) It is useless to hope for a way out
of our difficulties in the comparison of various parallel passages
(we have shown that the only method of discovering the true sense
of a passage out of many alternative ones is to see what are the
usages of the language), for this comparison of parallel passages
can only accidentally throw light on a difficult point, seeing that
the prophets never wrote with the express object of explaining
their own phrases or those of other people, and also because we
cannot infer the meaning of one prophet or apostle by the meaning
of another, unless on a purely practical question, not when the
matter is speculative, or if a miracle, or history is being narrated.
(7;118) I might illustrate my point with instances, for there are
many inexplicable phrases in Scripture, but I would rather pass on
to consider the difficulties and imperfections of the method under 
discussion.

(7:119) A further difficulty attends the method, from the fact
that it requires the history of all that has happened to every
book in the Bible; such a history we are often quite unable to
furnish.  (120) Of the authors, or (if the expression be preferred),
the writers of many of the books, we are either in complete
ignorance, or at any rate in doubt, as I will point out at length.
(7:121) Further, we do not know either the occasions or the epochs
when these books of unknown authorship were written; we cannot say
into what hands they fell, nor how the numerous varying versions
originated; nor, lastly, whether there were not other versions,
now lost.  (122) I have briefly shown that such knowledge is
necessary, but I passed over certain considerations which I will
now draw attention to.

(7:123) If we read a book which contains incredible or impossible 
narratives, or is written in a very obscure style, and if we know
nothing of its author, nor of the time or occasion of its being
written, we shall vainly endeavour to gain any certain knowledge
of its true meaning.  (124) For being in ignorance on these points
we cannot possibly know the aim or intended aim of the author; if
we are fully informed, we so order our thoughts as not to be in
any way prejudiced either in ascribing to the author or him for
whom the author wrote either more or less than his meaning, and
we only take into consideration what the author may have had in
his mind, or what the time and occasion demanded. (125) I think
this must be tolerably evident to all.

(7:126) It often happens that in different books we read histories
in themselves similar, but which we judge very differently, according
to the opinions we have formed of the authors.  (127) I remember once
to have read in some book that a man named Orlando Furioso used to
drive a kind of winged monster through the air, fly over any
countries he liked, kill unaided vast numbers of men and giants,
and such like fancies, which from the point of view of reason are
obviously absurd.  (128) A very similar story I read in Ovid of 
Perseus, and also in the books of Judges and Kings of Samson, who
alone and unarmed killed thousands of men, and of Elijah, who flew
through the air, said at last went up to heaven in a chariot of fire,
with horses of fire.  (129) All these stories are obviously alike,
but we judge them very differently.  (130) The first only sought to
amuse, the second had a political object, the third a religious
object.  (7:131) We gather this simply from the opinions we had
previously formed of the authors.  (132) Thus it is evidently
necessary to know something of the authors of writings which are
obscure or unintelligible, if we would interpret their meaning;
and for the same reason, in order to choose the proper reading from
among a great variety, we ought to have information as to the
versions in which the differences are found, and as to the
possibility of other readings having been discovered by persons
of greater authority.

(7:133) A further difficulty attends this method in the case of
some of the books of Scripture, namely, that they are no longer
extant in their original language.  (133a) The Gospel according to
Matthew, and certainly the Epistle to the Hebrews, were written,
it is thought, in Hebrew, though they no longer exist in that form.
(7:134) Aben Ezra affirms in his commentaries that the book of
Job was translated into Hebrew out of another language, and that
its obscurity arises from this fact.  (135) I say nothing of the
apocryphal books, for their authority stands on very inferior ground.

(7:136) The foregoing difficulties in this method of interpreting
Scripture from its own history, I conceive to be so great that I
do not hesitate to say that the true meaning of Scripture is in
many places inexplicable, or at best mere subject for guesswork;
but I must again point out, on the other hand, that such
difficulties only arise when we endeavour to follow the meaning
of a prophet in matters which cannot be perceived, but only
imagined, not in things, whereof the understanding can give a
clear idea, and which are conceivable through themselves: [Endnote 8]
matters which by their nature are easily perceived cannot be
expressed so obscurely as to be unintelligible; as the proverb says,
"a word is enough to the wise."  (7:137) Euclid, who only wrote of
matters very simple and easily understood, can easily be comprehended
by anyone in any language; we can follow his intention perfectly, and
be certain of his true meaning, without having a thorough knowledge
of the language in which he wrote; in fact, a quite rudimentary
acquaintance is sufficient.  (138) We need make no researches
concerning the life, the pursuits, or the habits of the author;
nor need we inquire in what language, nor when he wrote, nor the
vicissitudes of his book, nor its various readings, nor how, nor
by whose advice it has been received.

[7:4] (139) What we here say of Euclid might equally be said of
any book which treats of things by their nature perceptible:
thus we conclude that we can easily follow the intention of
Scripture in moral questions, from the history we possess of
it, and we can be sure of its true meaning.

(7:140) The precepts of true piety are expressed in very
ordinary language, and are equally simple and easily understood.
(7:141) Further, as true salvation and blessedness consist in a
true assent of the soul - and we truly assent only to what we
clearly understand - it is most plain that we can follow with
certainty the intention of Scripture in matters relating to
salvation and necessary to blessedness; therefore, we need not
be much troubled about what remains: such matters, inasmuch as
we generally cannot grasp them with our reason and understanding,
are more curious than profitable.

(7:142) I think I have now set forth the true method of Scriptural
interpretation, and have sufficiently explained my own opinion
thereon.  (143) Besides, I do not doubt that everyone will see that
such a method only requires the aid of natural reason.  (144) The
nature and efficacy of the natural reason consists in deducing and
proving the unknown from the known, or in carrying premises to their
legitimate conclusions; and these are the very processes which our
method desiderates.  (7:145) Though we must admit that it does not
suffice to explain everything in the Bible, such imperfection does
not spring from its own nature, but from the fact that the path
which it teaches us, as the true one, has never been tended or
trodden by men, and has thus, by the lapse of time, become very
difficult, and almost impassable, as, indeed, I have shown in the
difficulties I draw attention to.

(7:146) There only remains to examine the opinions of those who
differ from me.  [7:5] (147) The first which comes under our notice
is, that the light of nature has no power to interpret Scripture,
but that a supernatural faculty is required for the task. (148) What
is meant by this supernatural faculty I will leave to its
propounders to explain. (149) Personally, I can only suppose that
they have adopted a very obscure way of stating their complete
uncertainty about the true meaning of Scripture. (150) If we look
at their interpretations, they contain nothing supernatural, at
least nothing but the merest conjectures.

(7:151) Let them be placed side by side with the interpretations
of those who frankly confess that they have no faculty beyond
their natural ones; we shall see that the two are just alike -
both human, both long pondered over, both laboriously invented.
(7:152) To say that the natural reason is insufficient for such
results is plainly untrue, firstly, for the reasons above stated,
namely, that the difficulty of interpreting Scripture arises
from no defect in human reason, but simply from the carelessness
(not to say malice) of men who neglected the history of the Bible
while there were still materials for inquiry; secondly, from the
fact (admitted, I think, by all) that the supernatural faculty is
a Divine gift granted only to the faithful.  (153) But the prophets
and apostles did not preach to the faithful only, but chiefly to
the unfaithful and wicked.  (7:154) Such persons, therefore, were
able to understand the intention of the prophets and apostles,
otherwise the prophets and apostles would have seemed to be
preaching to little boys and infants, not to men endowed with
reason. (155) Moses, too, would have given his laws in vain, if
they could only be comprehended by the faithful, who need no law. 
(7:156) Indeed, those who demand supernatural faculties for
comprehending the meaning of the prophets and apostles seem truly
lacking in natural faculties, so that we should hardly suppose
such persons the possessors of a Divine supernatural gift.

(7:157) The opinion of Maimonides was widely different.  (158) He
asserted that each passage in Scripture admits of various, nay,
contrary, meanings; but that we could never be certain of any
particular one till we knew that the passage, as we interpreted it,
contained nothing contrary or repugnant to reason.  (159) If the
literal meaning clashes with reason, though the passage seems in
itself perfectly clear, it must be interpreted in some metaphorical
sense.  (160) This doctrine he lays down very plainly in 
chap. xxv. part ii. of his book, "More Nebuchim," for he says:
"Know that we shrink not from affirming that the world hath existed
from eternity, because of what Scripture saith concerning the
world's creation.  (7:161) For the texts which teach that the world
was created are not more in number than those which teach that God
hath a body; neither are the approaches in this matter of the
world's creation closed, or even made hard to us: so that we
should not be able to explain what is written, as we did when
we showed that God hath no body, nay, peradventure, we could explain
and make fast the doctrine of the world's eternity more easily than
we did away with the doctrines that God hath a beatified body.
(7:162) Yet two things hinder me from doing as I have said, and
believing that the world is eternal.  (163) As it hath been clearly
shown that God hath not a body, we must perforce explain all those
passages whereof the literal sense agreeth not with the
demonstration, for sure it is that they can be so explained. 
(164) But the eternity of the world hath not been so demonstrated,
therefore it is not necessary to do violence to Scripture in support
of some common opinion, whereof we might, at the bidding of reason,
embrace the contrary."

[7:7] (165) Such are the words of Maimonides, and they are evidently
sufficient to establish our point: for if he had been convinced by
reason that the world is eternal, he would not have hesitated to
twist and explain away the words of Scripture till he made them
appear to teach this doctrine.  (166) He would have felt quite sure
that Scripture, though everywhere plainly denying the eternity of
the world, really intends to teach it.  (167) So that, however clear
the meaning of Scripture may be, he would not feel certain of having
grasped it, so long as he remained doubtful of the truth of what, was
written.  (168) For we are in doubt whether a thing is in conformity
with reason, or contrary thereto, so long as we are uncertain of its
truth, and, consequently, we cannot be sure whether the literal
meaning of a passage be true or false.

(7:169) If such a theory as this were sound, I would certainly
grant that some faculty beyond the natural reason is required for
interpreting Scripture.  (170) For nearly all things that we find
in Scripture cannot be inferred from known principles of the
natural reason, and, therefore, we should be unable to come to any
conclusion about their truth, or about the real meaning and
intention of Scripture, but should stand in need of some further
assistance.

(7:171) Further, the truth of this theory would involve that
the masses, having generally no comprehension of, nor leisure
for, detailed proofs, would be reduced to receiving all their
knowledge of Scripture on the authority and testimony of
philosophers, and, consequently, would be compelled to suppose
that the interpretations given by philosophers were infallible.

(7:172) Truly this would be a new form of ecclesiastical authority,
and a new sort of priests or pontiffs, more likely to excite men's
ridicule than their veneration.  (173) Certainly our method demands
a knowledge of Hebrew for which the masses have no leisure; but no
such objection as the foregoing can be brought against us.
(7:174) For the ordinary Jews or Gentiles, to whom the prophets
and apostles preached and wrote, understood the language, and,
consequently, the intention of the prophet or apostle addressing
them; but they did not grasp the intrinsic reason of what was
preached, which, according to Maimonides, would be necessary for
an understanding of it.

(7:175) There is nothing, then, in our method which renders it
necessary that the masses should follow the testimony of
commentators, for I point to a set of unlearned people who
understood the language of the prophets and apostles; whereas
Maimonides could not point to any such who could arrive at the
prophetic or apostolic meaning through their knowledge of the
causes of things.

(7:176) As to the multitude of our own time, we have shown
that whatsoever is necessary to salvation, though its reasons
may be unknown, can easily be understood in any language,
because it is thoroughly ordinary and usual; it is in such
understanding as this that the masses acquiesce, not in the
testimony of commentators; with regard to other questions,
the ignorant and the learned fare alike.

[7:6] (177) But let us return to the opinion of Maimonides,
and examine it more closely. In the first place, he supposes
that the prophets were in entire agreement one with another,
and that they were consummate philosophers and theologians;
for he would have them to have based their conclusions on the
absolute truth.  (178) Further, he supposes that the sense of
Scripture cannot be made plain from Scripture itself, for the
truth of things is not made plain therein (in that it does not
prove any thing, nor teach the matters of which it speaks
through their definitions and first causes), therefore,
according to Maimonides, the true sense of Scripture cannot
be made plain from itself, and must not be there sought.

(7:179) The falsity of such a doctrine is shown in this very
chapter, for we have shown both by reason and examples that the
meaning of Scripture is only made plain through Scripture
itself, and even in questions deducible from ordinary knowledge
should be looked for from no other source.

(7:180) Lastly, such a theory supposes that we may explain
the words of Scripture according to our preconceived opinions,
twisting them about, and reversing or completely changing the
literal sense, however plain it may be.  (181) Such licence is
utterly opposed to the teaching of this and the preceding
chapters, and, moreover, will be evident to everyone as rash
and excessive.

(7:182) But if we grant all this licence, what can it effect
after all? Absolutely nothing.  (183) Those things which cannot
be demonstrated, and which make up the greater part of Scripture,
cannot be examined by reason, and cannot therefore be explained
or interpreted by this rule; whereas, on the contrary, by
following our own method, we can explain many questions of this
nature, and discuss them on a sure basis, as we have already
shown, by reason and example.  (184) Those matters which are
by their nature comprehensible we can easily explain, as has
been pointed out, simply by means of the context.

(7:185) Therefore, the method of Maimonides is clearly useless:
to which we may add, that it does away with all the certainty which
the masses acquire by candid reading, or which is gained by any
other persons in any other way.  (186) In conclusion, then, we
dismiss Maimonides' theory as harmful, useless, and absurd.

[7:8] (187) As to the tradition of the Pharisees, we have already
shown that it is not consistent, while the authority of the popes
of Rome stands in need of more credible evidence; the latter,
indeed, I reject simply on this ground, for if the popes could
point out to us the meaning of Scripture as surely as did the
high priests of the Jews, I should not be deterred by the fact
that there have been heretic and impious Roman pontiffs; for
among the Hebrew high-priests of old there were also heretics
and impious men who gained the high-priesthood by improper means,
but who, nevertheless, had Scriptural sanction for their supreme
power of interpreting the law. (See Deut. xvii:11, 12, and
xxxiii:10, also Malachi ii:8.)

(7:188) However, as the popes can show no such sanction, their
authority remains open to very grave doubt, nor should anyone be
deceived by the example of the Jewish high-priests and think
that the Catholic religion also stands in need of a pontiff; he
should bear in mind that the laws of Moses being also the
ordinary laws of the country, necessarily required some public
authority to insure their observance; for, if everyone were
free to interpret the laws of his country as he pleased, no
state could stand, but would for that very reason be dissolved
at once, and public rights would become private rights.

(7:189) With religion the case is widely different. Inasmuch as
it consists not so much in outward actions as in simplicity and
truth of character, it stands outside the sphere of law and public
authority.  (190) Simplicity and truth of character are not produced
by the constraint of laws, nor by the authority of the state, no one
the whole world over can be forced or legislated into a state of
blessedness; the means required for such a consummation are faithful
and brotherly admonition, sound education, and, above all, free use
of the individual judgment.

(7:191) Therefore, as the supreme right of free thinking, even
on religion, is in every man's power, and as it is inconceivable
that such power could be alienated, it is also in every man's
power to wield the supreme right and authority of free judgment
in this behalf, and to explain and interpret religion for himself.
(192) The only reason for vesting the supreme authority in the
interpretation of law, and judgment on public affairs in the hands
of the magistrates, is that it concerns questions of public right.
(7:193) Similarly the supreme authority in explaining religion,
and in passing judgment thereon, is lodged with the individual
because it concerns questions of individual right.  (194) So far,
then, from the authority of the Hebrew high-priests telling in
confirmation of the authority of the Roman pontiffs to interpret
religion, it would rather tend to establish individual freedom of
judgment.  (195) Thus in this way also, we have shown that our
method of interpreting Scripture is the best.  (196) For as the
highest power of Scriptural interpretation belongs to every man,
the rule for such interpretation should be nothing but the natural
light of reason which is common to all - not any supernatural light
nor any external authority; moreover, such a rule ought not to be so
difficult that it can only be applied by very skilful philosophers,
but should be adapted to the natural and ordinary faculties and
capacity of mankind. (7:197) And such I have shown our method to be,
for such difficulties as it has arise from men's carelessness,
and are no part of its nature.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

[8:0] (CHAPTER VIII. - OF THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE PENTATEUCH AND
      THE OTHER HISTORICAL BOOKS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT

(8:1) In the former chapter we treated of the foundations and
principles of Scriptural knowledge, and showed that it consists
solely in a trustworthy history of the sacred writings; such a 
history, in spite of its indispensability, the ancients neglected,
or at any rate, whatever they may have written or handed down has
perished in the lapse of time, consequently the groundwork for
such an investigation is to a great extent, cut from under us.
(8:2) This might be put up with if succeeding generations had
confined themselves within the limits of truth, and had handed
down conscientiously what few particulars they had received or
discovered without any additions from their own brains: as it is,
the history of the Bible is not so much imperfect as untrustworthy:
the foundations are not only too scanty for building upon, but are
also unsound.  (8:3) It is part of my purpose to remedy these defects,
and to remove common theological prejudices.  (4) But I fear that
I am attempting my task too late, for men have arrived at the pitch
of not suffering contradiction, but defending obstinately whatever
they have adopted under the name of religion.  (5) So widely have
these prejudices taken possession of men's minds, that very few,
comparatively speaking, will listen to reason.  (6) However, I will
make the attempt, and spare no efforts, for there is no positive
reason for despairing of success.

[8:1] (7) In order to treat the subject methodically, I will begin
with the received opinions concerning the true authors of the
sacred ooks, and in the first place, speak of the author of the
Pentateuch, who is almost universally supposed to have been Moses.
(8) The Pharisees are so firmly convinced of his identity, that
they account as a heretic anyone who differs from them on the
subject.  (8:9) Wherefore, Aben Ezra, a man of enlightened
intelligence, and no small learning, who was the first, so far
as I know, to treat of this opinion, dared not express his meaning
openly, but confined himself to dark hints which I shall not
scruple to elucidate, thus throwing, full light on the subject.

(8:10) The words of Aben Ezra which occur in his commentary on
Deuteronomy are as follows: "Beyond Jordan, &c . . . If so be that
thou understandest the mystery of the twelve . . .  moreover Moses
wrote the law . . .  The Canaanite was then in the land . . . . it
shall be revealed on the mount of God . . . . then also behold his
bed, his iron bed, then shalt thou know the truth."  (11) In these
few words he hints, and also shows that it was not Moses who wrote
the Pentateuch, but someone who lived long after him, and further,
that the book which Moses wrote was something different from any
now extant.

(8:12) To prove this, I say, he draws attention to the facts:

(8:13) 1. That the preface to Deuteronomy could not have been
   written by Moses, inasmuch as he had never crossed the Jordan.

(8:14) II. That the whole book of Moses was written at full
   length on the circumference of a single altar (Deut. xxvii,
   and Josh. viii:37), which altar, according to the Rabbis,
   consisted of only twelve stones: therefore the book of Moses
   must have been of far less extent than the Pentateuch. 
   (8:15) This is what our author means, I think, by the mystery
   of the twelve, unless he is referring to the twelve curses
   contained in the chapter of Deuteronomy above cited, which
   he thought could not have been contained in the law, because
   Moses bade the Levites read them after the recital of the
   law, and so bind the people to its observance.  (16) Or again,
   he may have had in his mind the last chapter of Deuteronomy
   which treats of the death of Moses, and which contains twelve
   verses. (17) But there is no need to dwell further on these
   and similar conjectures.

(8:18) III. That in Deut. xxxi:9, the expression occurs, "and Moses
   wrote the law:" words that cannot be ascribed to Moses, but must
   be those of some other writer narrating the deeds and writings
   of Moses.

(8:19) IV. That in Genesis xii:6, the historian, after narrating
   that Abraham journeyed through the and of Canaan, adds, "and
   the Canaanite was then in the land," thus clearly excluding
   the time at which he wrote.  (20) So that this passage must
   have been written after the death of Moses, when the Canaanites
   had been driven out, and no longer possessed the land.

(8:21) Aben Ezra, in his commentary on the passage, alludes to the
   difficulty as follows:- "And the Canaanite was then in the land:
   it appears that Canaan, the grandson of Noah, took from another
   the land which bears his name; if this be not the true meaning,
   there lurks some mystery in the passage, and let him who
   understands it keep silence."  (22) That is, if Canaan invaded
   those regions, the sense will be, the Canaanite was then in
   the land, in contradistinction to the time when it had been
   held by another: but if, as follows from Gen. chap. x. Canaan
   was the first to inhabit the land, the text must mean to exclude
   the time present, that is the time at which it was written;
   therefore it cannot be the work of Moses, in whose time the
   Canaanites still possessed those territories: this is the
   mystery concerning which silence is recommended.

(8:23) V. That in Genesis xxii:14 Mount Moriah is called the mount
   of God, [Endnote 9] , a name which it did not acquire till after
   the building of the Temple; the choice of the mountain was not
   made in the time of Moses, for Moses does not point out any spot
   as chosen by God; on the contrary, he foretells that God will at
   some future time choose a spot to which this name will be given.

(8:24) VI. Lastly, that in Deut. chap. iii., in the passage relating
   to Og, king of Bashan, these words are inserted: "For only Og
   king of Bashan remained of the remnant of giants: behold, his
   bedstead was a bedstead of iron: is it not in Rabbath of the
   children of Ammon? nine cubits was the length thereof, and four
   cubits the breadth of it, after the cubit of a man."  (25) This
   parenthesis most plainly shows that its writer lived long after
   Moses; for this mode of speaking is only employed by one treating
   of things long past, and pointing to relics for the sake of gaining
   credence: moreover, this bed was almost certainly first discovered
   by David, who conquered the city of Rabbath (2 Sam. xii:30.)
   (8:26) Again, the historian a little further on inserts after the
   words of Moses, "Jair, the son of Manasseh, took all the country
   of Argob unto the coasts of Geshuri and Maachathi; and called them
   after his own name, Bashan-havoth-jair, unto this day."  (27) This
   passage, I say, is inserted to explain the words of Moses which
   precede it.  (28) "And the rest of Gilead, and all Bashan, being
   the kingdom of Og, gave I unto the half tribe of Manasseh; all the
   region of Argob, with all Bashan, which is called the land of the
   giants."  (29) The Hebrews in the time of the writer indisputably
   knew what territories belonged to the tribe of Judah, but did not
   know them under the name of the jurisdiction of Argob, or the land
   of the giants.  (8:30) Therefore the writer is compelled to explain
   what these places were which were anciently so styled, and at the
   same time to point out why they were at the time of his writing
   known by the name of Jair, who was of the tribe of Manasseh, not
   of Judah. (8:31) We have thus made clear the meaning of Aben Ezra
   and also the passages of the Pentateuch which he cites in proof of
   his contention.  (32) However, Aben Ezra does not call attention
   to every instance, or even the chief ones; there remain many of
   greater importance, which may be cited.

(8:33) Namely (I.), that the writer of the books in question not
   only speaks of Moses in the third person, but also bears witness
   to many details concerning him; for instance, "Moses talked with
   God;" "The Lord spoke with Moses face to face; " "Moses was the
   meekest of men" (Numb. xii:3); "Moses was wrath with the captains
   of the host; "Moses, the man of God, "Moses, the servant of the
   Lord, died;" "There was never a prophet in Israel like unto
   Moses," &c.  (8:34) On the other hand, in Deuteronomy, where the
   law which Moses had expounded to the people and written is set
   forth, Moses speaks and declares what he has done in the first
   person: "God spake with me " (Deut. ii:1, 17, &c.), "I prayed to
   the Lord," &c.  (35) Except at the end of the book, when the
   historian, after relating the words of Moses, begins again to
   speak in the third person, and to tell how Moses handed over the
   law which he had expounded to the people in writing, again
   admonishing them, and further, how Moses ended his life.
   (8:36) All these details, the manner of narration, the testimony,
   and the context of the whole story lead to the plain conclusion
   that these books were written by another, and not by Moses in person.

(8:37) II. We must also remark that the history relates not only
   the manner of Moses' death and burial, and the thirty days'
   mourning of the Hebrews, but further compares him with all the
   prophets who came after him, and states that he surpassed them
   all.  (38) "There was never a prophet in Israel like unto Moses,
   whom the Lord knew face to face."  (39) Such testimony cannot
   have been given of Moses by himself, nor by any who immediately
   succeeded him, but it must come from someone who lived centuries
   afterwards, especially, as the historian speaks of past times.
  (8:40) "There was never a prophet," &c.  (41) And of the place of
   burial, "No one knows it to this day."

(8:42) III. We must note that some places are not styled by the
   names they bore during Moses' lifetime, but by others which they
   obtained subsequently.  (43) For instance, Abraham is said to
   have pursued his enemies even unto Dan, a name not bestowed on
   the city till long after the death of Joshua (Gen. xiv;14,
   Judges xviii;29).

(8:44) IV. The narrative is prolonged after the death of Moses,
   for in Exodus xvi:34 we read that " the children of Israel did
   eat manna forty years until they came to a land inhabited, until
   they came unto the borders of the land of Canaan."  (45) In other
   words, until the time alluded to in Joshua vi:12.

(8:46) So, too, in Genesis xxxvi:31 it is stated, "These are the
   kings that reigned in Edom before there reigned any king over
   the children of Israel."  (47) The historian, doubtless, here
   relates the kings of Idumaea before that territory was conquered
   by David [Endnote 10] and garrisoned, as we read in 2 Sam. viii:14.
  
(8:48) From what has been said, it is thus clearer than the sun
at noonday that the Pentateuch was not written by Moses, but by
someone who lived long after Moses.  [8:2] (49) Let us now 
our attention to the books which Moses actually did write,
and which are cited in the Pentateuch; thus, also, shall we 
that they were different from the Pentateuch.  (50) Firstly,
it appears from Exodus xvii:14 that Moses, by the command of God,
wrote an account of the war against Amalek.  (51) The book in
which he did so is not named in the chapter just quoted, but in
Numb. xxi:12 a book is referred to under the title of the wars of
God, and doubtless this war against Amalek and the castrametations
said in Numb. xxxiii:2 to have been written by Moses are therein
described. (8:52) We hear also in Exod. xxiv:4 of another book
called the Book of the Covenant, which Moses read before the
Israelites when they first made a covenant with God.  (53) But this
book or this writing contained very little, namely, the laws or
commandments of God which we find in Exodus xx:22 to the end of
chap. xxiv., and this no one will deny who reads the aforesaid
chapter rationally and impartially.  (54) It is there stated that
as soon as Moses had learnt the feeling of the people on the subject
of making a covenant with God, he immediately wrote down God's laws
and utterances, and in the morning, after some ceremonies had been
performed, read out the conditions of the covenant to an assembly
of the whole people.  (55) When these had been gone through, and
doubtless understood by all, the whole people gave their assent.

(56) Now from the shortness of the time taken in its perusal and
also from its nature as a compact, this document evidently contained
nothing more than that which we have just described.  (57) Further,
it is clear that Moses explained all the laws which he had received
in the fortieth year after the exodus from Egypt; also that he bound
over the people a second time to observe them, and that finally he
committed them to writing (Deut. i:5; xxix:14; xxxi:9), in a book
which contained these laws explained, and the new covenant, and this
book was therefore called the book of the law of God: the same which
was afterwards added to by Joshua when he set forth the fresh
covenant with which he bound over the people and which he entered
into with God (Josh. xxiv:25, 26).

(8:58) Now, as we have extent no book containing this covenant of
Moses and also the covenant of Joshua, we must perforce conclude
that it has perished, unless, indeed, we adopt the wild conjecture
of the Chaldean paraphrast Jonathan, and twist about the words of
Scripture to our heart's content.  (59) This commentator, in the
face of our present difficulty, preferred corrupting the sacred
text to confessing his own ignorance.  (60) The passage in the
book of Joshua which runs, "and Joshua wrote these words in the
book of the law of God," he changes into "and Joshua wrote these
words and kept them with the book of the law of God."  (61) What is
to be done with persons who will only see what pleases them?
(8:62) What is such a proceeding if it is not denying Scripture,
and inventing another Bible out of our own heads? (63) We may
therefore conclude that the book of the law of God which Moses
wrote was not the Pentateuch, but something quite different,
which the author of the Pentateuch duly inserted into his book.
(8:64) So much is abundantly plain both from what I have said and
from what I am about to add.  (65) For in the passage of Deuteronomy
above quoted, where it is related that Moses wrote the book of the
law, the historian adds that he handed it over to the priests and
bade them read it out at a stated time to the whole people.
(8:66) This shows that the work was of much less length than the
Pentateuch, inasmuch as it could be read through at one sitting so as
to be understood by all; further, we must not omit to notice that out
of all the books which Moses wrote, this one book of the second
covenant and the song (which latter he wrote afterwards so that all
the people might learn it), was the only one which he caused to be
religiously guarded and preserved.  (8:67) In the first covenant he had
only bound over those who were present, but in the second covenant he
bound over all their descendants also (Dent. xxix:14), and therefore
ordered this covenant with future ages to be religiously preserved,
together with the Song, which was especially addressed to posterity:
as, then, we have no proof that Moses wrote any book save this of the
covenant, and as he committed no other to the care of posterity; and,
lastly, as there are many passages in the Pentateuch which Moses could
not have written, it follows that the belief that Moses was the author
of the Pentateuch is ungrounded and even irrational.  (68) Someone
will perhaps ask whether Moses did not also write down other laws when
they were first revealed to him - in other words, whether, during the
course of forty years, he did not write down any of the laws which he
promulgated, save only those few which I have stated to be contained
in the book of the first covenant.  (8:69) To this I would answer, that
although it seems reasonable to suppose that Moses wrote down the laws
at the time when he wished to communicate them to the people, yet we
are not warranted to take it as proved, for I have shown above that
we must make no assertions in such matters which we do not gather from
Scripture, or which do not flow as legitimate consequences from its 
fundamental principles.  (70) We must not accept whatever is reasonably
probable.  (71) However even reason in this case would not force such a 
conclusion upon us: for it may be that the assembly of elders wrote
down the decrees of Moses and communicated them to the people, and the
historian collected them, and duly set them forth in his narrative of
the life of Moses.  [8:3] (72) So much for the five books of Moses: it
is now time for us to turn to the other sacred writings. 

(873) The book of Joshua may be proved not to be an autograph by
reasons similar to those we have just employed: for it must be some
other than Joshua who testifies that the fame of Joshua was spread
over the whole world; that he omitted nothing of what Moses had
taught (Josh. vi:27; viii. last verse; xi:15); that he grew old and
summoned an assembly of the whole people, and finally that he
departed this life.  (8:74) Furthermore, events are related which took
place after Joshua's death.  (75) For instance, that the Israelites
worshipped God, after his death, so long as there were any old men
alive who remembered him; and in chap. xvi:10, we read that "Ephraim
and Manasseh did not drive out the Canaanites which dwelt in Gezer,
but the Canaanite dwelt in the land of Ephraim unto this day, and
was tributary to him."  (76) This is the same statement as that in
Judges, chap. i., and the phrase "unto this day" shows that the
 writer was speaking of ancient times.  (77) With these texts we may
compare the last verse of chap. xv., concerning the sons of Judah,
and also the history of Caleb in the same chap. v:14. (78) Further,
the building of an altar beyond Jordan by the two tribes and a half,
chap. xxii:10, sqq., seems to have taken place after the death of
Joshua, for in the whole narrative his name is never mentioned,
but the people alone held council as to waging war, sent out legates,
waited for their return, and finally approved of their answer.

(8:79) Lastly, from chap. x:14, it is clear that the book was
written many generations after the death of Joshua, for it bears
witness, there was never any day like unto that day, either
before or after, that the Lord hearkened to the voice of a man,"
&c.  (80) If, therefore, Joshua wrote any book at all, it was that
which is quoted in the work now before us, chap. x:13.

(8:81) With regard to the book of Judges, I suppose no rational
person persuades himself that it was written by the actual Judges.
(82) For the conclusion of the whole history contained in chap. ii.
clearly shows that it is all the work - of a single historian.
(83) Further, inasmuch as the writer frequently tells us that there
was then no king in Israel, it is evident that the book was written
after the establishment of the monarchy.

(8:84) The books of Samuel need not detain us long, inasmuch
as the narrative in them is continued long after Samuel's death;
but I should like to draw attention to the fact that it was
written many generations after Samuel's death. (85) For in
book i. chap. ix:9, the historian remarks in a, parenthesis,
"Beforetime, in Israel, when a man went to inquire of God,
thus he spake: Come, and let us go to the seer; for he that
is now called a prophet was beforetime called a seer."

(8:86) Lastly, the books of Kings, as we gather from internal
evidence, were compiled from the books of King Solomon
(I Kings xi:41), from the chronicles of the kings of Judah
(1 Kings xiv:19, 29), and the chronicles of the kings of Israel.

(8:87) We may, therefore, conclude that all the books we have
considered hitherto are compilations, and that the events
therein are recorded as having happened in old time.  (88) Now,
if we turn our attention to the connection and argument of all
these books, we shall easily see that they were all written by
a single historian, who wished to relate the antiquities of the
Jews from their first beginning down to the first destruction
of the city.  (8:89) The way in which the several books are
connected one with the other is alone enough to show us that
they form the narrative of one and the same writer.  (90) For as
soon as he has related the life of Moses, the historian thus
passes on to the story of Joshua: "And it came to pass after
that Moses the servant of the Lord was dead, that God spake
unto Joshua," &c., so in the same way, after the death of Joshua
was concluded, he passes with identically the same transition and
connection to the history of the Judges: "And it came to pass
after that Joshua was dead, that the children of Israel sought
from God," &c.  (91) To the book of Judges he adds the story of
Ruth, as a sort of appendix, in these words: "Now it came to
pass in the days that the judges ruled, that there was a famine
in the land."

(8:92) The first book of Samuel is introduced with a similar phrase;
and so is the second book of Samuel.  (93) Then, before the history
of David is concluded, the historian passes in the same way to the
first book of Kings, and, after David's death, to the Second book
of Kings.

[8:4] (94) The putting together, and the order of the narratives,
show that they are all the work of one man, writing with a create
aim; for the historian begins with relating the first origin of
the Hebrew nation, and then sets forth in order the times and the
occasions in which Moses put forth his laws, and made his
predictions.  (95) He then proceeds to relate how the Israelites
invaded the promised land in accordance with Moses' prophecy
(Deut. vii.); and how, when the land was subdued, they turned their
backs on their laws, and thereby incurred many misfortunes
(Deut. xxxi:16, 17).  (96) He tells how they wished to elect rulers,
and how, according as these rulers observed the law, the people
flourished or suffered (Deut. xxviii:36); finally, how destruction
came upon the nation, even as Moses had foretold.  (97) In regard
to other matters, which do not serve to confirm the law, the writer
either passes over them in silence, or refers the reader to other
books for information.  (98) All that is set down in the books we
have conduces to the sole object of setting forth the words and laws
of Moses, and proving them by subsequent events.

(8:99) When we put together these three considerations, namely,
the unity of the subject of all the books, the connection between
them, and the fact that they are compilations made many
generations after the events they relate had taken place,
we come to the conclusion, as I have just stated, that they are
all the work of a single historian.  [8:5] (100) Who this historian
was, it is not so easy to show; but I suspect that he was Ezra,
and there are several strong reasons for adopting this hypothesis.

(8:101) The historian whom we already know to be but one individual
brings his history down to the liberation of Jehoiakim, and adds
that he himself sat at the king's table all his life - that is,
at the table either of Jehoiakim, or of the son of Nebuchadnezzar,
for the sense of the passage is ambiguous: hence it follows that he
did not live before the time of Ezra.  (102) But Scripture does not
testify of any except of Ezra (Ezra vii:10), that he "prepared his
heart to seek the law of the Lord, and to set it forth, and further
that he was a ready scribe in the law of Moses."  (103) Therefore,
I can not find anyone, save Ezra, to whom to attribute the sacred books.

(8:104) Further, from this testimony concerning Ezra, we see that
he prepared his heart, not only to seek the law of the Lord, but also
to set it forth; and, in Nehemiah viii:8, we read that "they read in
the book of the law of God distinctly, and gave the sense, and caused
them to understand the reading."

(8:105) As, then, in Deuteronomy, we find not only the book of the
law of Moses, or the greater part of it, but also many things inserted
for its better explanation, I conjecture that this Deuteronomy is the
book of the law of God, written, set forth, and explained by Ezra,
which is referred to in the text above quoted.  (106) Two examples
of the way matters were inserted parenthetically in the text of
Deuteronomy, with a view to its fuller explanation, we have already
given, in speaking of Aben Ezra's opinion.  (107) Many others are
found in the course of the work: for instance, in chap. ii:12:
"The Horims dwelt also in Seir beforetime; but the children of Esau
succeeded them, when they had destroyed them from before them, and
dwelt in their stead; as Israel did unto the land of his possession,
which the Lord gave unto them." (8:108) This explains verses 3 and 4 of
the same chapter, where it is stated that Mount Seir, which had come
to the children of Esau for a possession, did not fall into their
hands uninhabited; but that they invaded it, and turned out and
destroyed the Horims, who formerly dwelt therein, even as the children
of Israel had done unto the Canaanites after the death of Moses. 

(8:109) So, also, verses 6, 7, 8, 9, of the tenth chapter are
inserted parenthetically among the words of Moses. Everyone must
see that verse 8, which begins, "At that time the Lord separated
the tribe of Levi," necessarily refers to verse 5, and not to
the death of Aaron, which is only mentioned here by Ezra because
Moses, in telling of the golden calf worshipped by the people,
stated that he had prayed for Aaron.

(8:110) He then explains that at the time at which Moses spoke,
God had chosen for Himself the tribe of Levi in order that He may
point out the reason for their election, and for the fact of their
not sharing in the inheritance; after this digression, he resumes
the thread of Moses' speech.  (111) To these parentheses we must
add the preface to the book, and all the passages in which Moses
is spoken of in the third person, besides many which we cannot now
distinguish, though, doubtless, they would have been plainly
recognized by the writer's contemporaries.

(8:112) If, I say, we were in possession of the book of the law
as Moses wrote it, I do not doubt that we should find a great
difference in the words of the precepts, the order in which they
are given, and the reasons by which they are supported.

[8:6] (113) A comparison of the decalogue in Deuteronomy with the
decalogue in Exodus, where its history is explicitly set forth,
will be sufficient to show us a wide discrepancy in all these three
particulars, for the fourth commandment is given not only in a
different form, but at much greater length, while the reason for its
observance differs wholly from that stated in Exodus.  (114) Again,
the order in which the tenth commandment is explained differs in the
two versions.  (115) I think that the differences here as elsewhere
are the work of Ezra, who explained the law of God to his
contemporaries, and who wrote this book of the law of God, before
anything else; this I gather from the fact that it contains the laws
of the country, of which the people stood in most need, and also
because it is not joined to the book which precedes it by any
connecting phrase, but begins with the independent statement,
"these are the words of Moses."  [8:7] (116) After this task was
completed, I think Ezra set himself to give a complete account of the
history of the Hebrew nation from the creation of the world to the
entire destruction of the city, and in this account he inserted the
book of Deuteronomy, and, possibly, he called the first five books
by the name of Moses, because his life is chiefly contained therein,
and forms their principal subject; for the same reason he called the
sixth Joshua, the seventh Judges, the eighth Ruth, the ninth, and
perhaps the tenth, Samuel, and, lastly, the eleventh and twelfth Kings. 
(8:117) Whether Ezra put the finishing touches to this work and finished
it as he intended, we will discuss in the next chapter.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

[9:0] CHAPTER IX  -  OTHER QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE SAME BOOKS: NAMELY,
   WHETHER THEY WERE COMPLETELY FINISHED BY EZRA, AND, FURTHER, WHETHER
   THE MARGINAL NOTES WHICH ARE FOUND IN THE HEBREW TEXTS WERE VARIOUS
   READINGS.

(9:1) How greatly the inquiry we have just made concerning the
real writer of the twelve books aids us in attaining a complete
understanding of them, may be easily gathered solely from the
passages which we have adduced in confirmation of our opinion,
and which would be most obscure without it.  (2) But besides the
question of the writer, there are other points to notice which common
superstition forbids the multitude to apprehend.  [9:1] (3) Of these
the chief is, that Ezra (whom I will take to be the author of the
aforesaid books until some more likely person be suggested) did not
put the finishing touches to the narrative contained therein, but
merely collected the histories from various writers, and sometimes
simply set them down, leaving their examination and arrangement to
posterity.

(9:4) The cause (if it were not untimely death) which prevented
him from completing his work in all its portions, I cannot
conjecture, but the fact remains most clear, although we have lost
the writings of the ancient Hebrew historians, and can only judge
from the few fragments which are still extant.  (5) For the history
of Hezekiah (2 Kings xviii:17), as written in the vision of Isaiah,
is related as it is found in the chronicles of the kings of Judah.
(9:6) We read the same story, told with few exceptions [Endnote 11]
in the same words, in the book of Isaiah which was contained in the
chronicles of the kings of Judah (2 Chron. xxxii:32).  (7) From this
we must conclude that there were various versions of this narrative
of Isaiah's, unless, indeed, anyone would dream that in this, too,
there lurks a mystery. (8) Further, the last chapter of 2 Kings 27-30
is repeated in the last chapter of Jeremiah, v.31-34.

(9:9) Again, we find 2 Sam. vii. repeated in I Chron. xvii., but
the expressions in the two passages are so curiously varied [Endnote 12]
that we can very easily see that these two chapters were taken from
two different versions of the history of Nathan.

(9:10) Lastly, the genealogy of the kings of Idumaea contained
in Genesis xxxvi:31, is repeated in the same words in 1 Chron. i.,
though we know that the author of the latter work took his
materials from other historians, not from the twelve books we have
ascribed to Ezra.  (10a) We may therefore be sure that if we still
possessed the writings of the historians, the matter would be made
clear; however, as we have lost them, we can only examine the
writings still extant, and from their order and connection, their
various repetitions, and, lastly, the contradictions in dates which
they contain, judge of the rest.

(9:11) These, then, or the chief of them, we will now go through.
(12) First, in the story of Judah and Tamar (Gen. xxxviii.) the
historian thus begins: "And it came to pass at that time that Judah
went down from his brethren."  (13) This time cannot refer to what
immediately precedes [Endnote 13] but must necessarily refer to
something else, for from the time when Joseph was sold into Egypt
to the time when the patriarch Jacob, with all his family, set out
thither, cannot be reckoned as more than twenty-two years, for
Joseph, when he was sold by his brethren, was seventeen years old,
and when he was summoned by Pharaoh from prison was thirty; if to
this we add the seven years of plenty and two of famine, the total
amounts to twenty-two years.  (14) Now, in so short a period, no one
can suppose that so many things happened as are described; that Judah
had three children, one after the other, from one wife, whom he
married at the beginning of the period; that the eldest of these,
when he was old enough, married Tamar, and that after he died his
next brother succeeded to her; that, after all this, Judah, without
knowing it, had intercourse with his daughter-in-law, and that she
bore him twins, and, finally, that the eldest of these twins became
a father within the aforesaid period.  (9:15) As all these events cannot
have taken place within the period mentioned in Genesis, the reference
must necessarily be to something treated of in another book: and Ezra
in this instance simply related the story, and inserted it without
examination among his other writings.

(9:16) However, not only this chapter but the whole narrative of
Joseph and Jacob is collected and set forth from various histories,
inasmuch as it is quite inconsistent with itself.  (17) For in
Gen. xlvii. we are told that Jacob, when he came at Joseph's bidding
to salute Pharaoh, was 130 years old. (18) If from this we deduct
the twenty-two years which he passed sorrowing for the absence of
Joseph and the seventeen years forming Joseph's age when he was sold,
and, lastly, the seven years for which Jacob served for Rachel,
we find that he was very advanced in life, namely, eighty four,
when he took Leah to wife, whereas Dinah was scarcely seven years
old when she was violated by Shechem. [Endnote 14]  (19) Simeon and
Levi were aged respectively eleven and twelve when they spoiled the
city and slew all the males therein with the sword.

(9:20) There is no need that I should go through the whole
Pentateuch.  (21) If anyone pays attention to the way in which
all the histories and precepts in these five books are set down
promiscuously and without order, with no regard for dates;
and further, how the same story is often repeated, sometimes in
a different version, he will easily, I say, discern that all the
materials were promiscuously collected and heaped together,
in order that they might at some subsequent time be more readily
examined and reduced to order.  (22) Not only these five books,
but also the narratives contained in the remaining seven, going down
to the destruction of the city, are compiled in the same way.
(9:23) For who does not see that in Judges ii:6 a new historian is
being quoted, who had also written of the deeds of Joshua, and that
his words are simply copied? (24) For after our historian has
stated in the last chapter of the book of Joshua that Joshua died
and was buried, and has promised, in the first chapter of Judges,
to relate what happened after his death, in what way, if he wished
to continue the thread of his history, could he connect the statement
here made about Joshua with what had gone before? 

(9:25) So, too, 1 Sam. 17, 18, are taken from another historian,
who assigns a cause for David's first frequenting Saul's court very
different from that given in chap. xvi. of the same book.  (26) For he
did not think that David came to Saul in consequence of the advice of
Saul's servants, as is narrated in chap. xvi., but that being sent by
chance to the camp by his father on a message to his brothers, he was
for the first time remarked by Saul on the occasion of his victory
over Goliath the Philistine, and was retained at his court.

(9:27) I suspect the same thing has taken place in chap. xxvi. of the
same book, for the historian there seems to repeat the narrative
given in chap. xxiv. according to another man's version.  (28) But I
pass over this, and go on to the computation of dates.

(9:29) In I Kings, chap. vi., it is said that Solomon built the Temple
in the four hundred and eightieth year after the exodus from Egypt;
but from the historians themselves we get a much longer period, for:
                                                                  Years. 
Moses governed the people in the desert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 
Joshua, who lived 110 years, did not, according to Josephus and 
    others' opinion rule more than . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . 26 
Cusban Rishathaim held the people in subjection . . . . . . . . . . . .  8 
Othniel, son of Kenag, was judge for . . . . . . . . . . . [Endnote 15] 40
Eglon, King of Moab, governed the people . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18 
Ehucl and Shamgar were judges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Jachin, King of Canaan, held the people in subjection . . . . . . . . . 20
The people was at peace subsequently for . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . 40
It was under subjection to Median . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 7
It obtained freedom under Gideon for . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
It fell under the rule of Abimelech  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
Tola, son of Puah, was judge  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Jair was judge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 22
The people was in subjection to the Philistines and Ammonites . . . . . 18
Jephthah was judge  . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Ibzan, the Bethlehemite, was judge  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . 7
Elon, the Zabulonite . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Abclon, the Pirathonite . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
The people was again subject to the Philistines . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Samson was judge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [Endnote 16] 20
Eli was judge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 
The people again fell into subjection to the Philistines, 
    till they were delivered by Samuel .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 
David reigned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 
Solomon reigned before he built the temple  . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 4 

(9:30) All these periods added together make a total of 580 years.
(31) But to these must be added the years during which the Hebrew
republic flourished after the death of Joshua, until it was conquered
by Cushan Rishathaim, which I take to be very numerous, for I cannot
bring myself to believe that immediately after the death of Joshua
all those who had witnessed his miracles died simultaneously, nor that
their successors at one stroke bid farewell to their laws, and plunged
from the highest virtue into the depth of wickedness and obstinacy.

(9:32) Nor, lastly, that Cushan Rishathaim subdued them on the instant;
each one of these circumstances requires almost a generation, and there
is no doubt that Judges ii:7, 9, 10, comprehends a great many years
which it passes over in silence.  (33) We must also add the years during
which Samuel was judge, the number of which is not stated in Scripture,
and also the years during which Saul reigned, which are not clearly
shown from his history.  (34) It is, indeed, stated in 1 Sam. xiii:1,
that he reigned two years, but the text in that passage is mutilated,
and the records of his reign lead us to suppose a longer period.
(9:35) That the text is mutilated I suppose no one will doubt who
has ever advanced so far as the threshold of the Hebrew language,
for it runs as follows: "Saul was in his -- year, when he began to
reign, and he reigned two years over Israel."  (36) Who, I say, does
not see that the number of the years of Saul's age when he began to
reign has been omitted?  (37) That the record of the reign presupposes
a greater number of years is equally beyond doubt, for in the same book, 
chap. xxvii:7, it is stated that David sojourned among the Philistines,
to whom he had fled on account of Saul, a year and four months;
thus the rest of the reign must have been comprised in a space of
eight months, which I think no one will credit.  (9:38) Josephus, at 
end of the sixth book of his antiquities, thus corrects the text:
Saul reigned eighteen years while Samuel was alive, and two years
after his death.  (39) However, all the narrative in chap. Xiii. is
in complete disagreement with what goes before.  (40) At the end of
chap. vii. it is narrated that the Philistines were so crushed by
the Hebrews that they did not venture, during Samuel's life, to invade
the borders of Israel; but in chap. xiii. we are told that the Hebrews
were invaded during the life of Samuel by the Philistines, and reduced
by them to such a state of wretchedness and poverty that they were
deprived not only of weapons with which to defend themselves, but also
of the means of making more.  (9:41) I should be at pains enough if I
were to try and harmonize all the narratives contained in this first
book of Samuel so that they should seem to be all written and by a
single historian.  (42) But I return to my object.  (43) The years,
then, during which Saul reigned must be added to the above computation;
and, lastly, I have not counted the years of the Hebrew anarchy, for I
cannot from Scripture gather their number.  (44) I cannot, I say, be
certain as to the period occupied by the events related in Judges 
chap. xvii. on till the end of the book.

(9:45) It is thus abundantly evident that we cannot arrive at a
true computation of years from the histories, and, further, that
the histories are inconsistent themselves on the subject.
(46) We are compelled to confess that these histories were
compiled from various writers without previous arrangement and
examination.  (47) Not less discrepancy is found between the dates
given in the Chronicles of the Kings of Judah, and those in the
Chronicles of the Kings of Israel; in the latter, it is stated that
Jehoram, the son of Ahab, began to reign in the second year of the
reign of Jehoram, the son of Jehoshaphat (2 Kings i:17), but in the
former we read that Jehoram, the son of Jehoshaphat, began to reign
in the fifth year of Jehoram, the son of Ahab (2 Kings viii:16).
(9:48) Anyone who compares the narratives in Chronicles with the
narratives in the books of Kings, will find many similar
discrepancies.  (49) These there is no need for me to examine here,
and still less am I called upon to treat of the commentaries of
those who endeavour to harmonize them.  (50) The Rabbis evidently let
their fancy run wild.  (51) Such commentators as I have, read, dream,
invent, and as a last resort, play fast and loose with the language.
(9:52) For instance, when it is said in 2 Chronicles, that Ahab was
forty-two years old when he began to reign, they pretend that these
years are computed from the reign of Omri, not from the birth of Ahab.
(9:52a) If this can be shown to be the real meaning of the writer of
the book of Chronicles, all I can say is, that he did not know how to
state a fact.  (53) The commentators make many other assertions of this
kind, which if true, would prove that the ancient Hebrews were ignorant
both of their own language, and of the way to relate a plain
narrative.  (54) I should in such case recognize no rule or reason
in interpreting Scripture, but it would be permissible to hypothesize
to one's heart's content.

(9:55) If anyone thinks that I am speaking too generally, and
without sufficient warrant, I would ask him to set himself to showing
us some fixed plan in these histories which might be followed without
blame by other writers of chronicles, and in his efforts at
harmonizing and interpretation, so strictly to observe and explain
the phrases and expressions, the order and the connections, that
we may be able to imitate these also in our writings. [Endnote 17]
(9:56) If he succeeds, I will at once give him my hand, and he shall
be to me as great Apollo; for I confess that after long endeavours
I have been unable to discover anything of the kind.  (57) I may
add that I set down nothing here which I have not long reflected
upon, and that, though I was imbued from my boyhood up with the
ordinary opinions about the Scriptures, I have been unable to
withstand the force of what I have urged.

(9:58) However, there is no need to detain the reader with this
question, and drive him to attempt an impossible task; I merely
mentioned the fact in order to throw light on my intention.

(9:59) I now pass on to other points concerning the treatment of
these books.  (60) For we must remark, in addition to what has been
shown, that these books were not guarded by posterity with such care
that no faults crept in.  (61) The ancient scribes draw attention to
many doubtful readings, and some mutilated passages, but not to all
that exist: whether the faults are of sufficient importance to greatly
embarrass the reader I will not now discuss.  (9:62) I am inclined to
think that they are of minor moment to those, at any rate, who read
the Scriptures with enlightenment: and I can positively affirm I
have not noticed any fault or various reading in doctrinal passages
sufficient to render them obscure or doubtful.

(9:63) There are some people, however, who will not admit that there
is any corruption, even in other passages, but maintain that by some
unique exercise of providence God has preserved from corruption every
word in the Bible: they say that the various readings are the symbols
of profoundest mysteries, and that mighty secrets lie hid in the
twenty-eight hiatus which occur, nay, even in the very form of the
letters.

(9:64) Whether they are actuated by folly and anile devotion, or
whether by arrogance and malice so that they alone may be held to
possess the secrets of God, I know not: this much I do know, that
I find in their writings nothing which has the air of a Divine
secret, but only childish lucubrations.  (65) I have read and known
certain Kabbalistic triflers, whose insanity provokes my unceasing
as astonishment.  (66) That faults have crept in will, I think,
be denied by no sensible person who reads the passage about Saul,
above quoted (1 Sam. xiii:1) and also 2 Sam. vi:2: "And David arose
and went with all the people that were with him from Judah,
to bring up from thence the ark of God."

(9:67) No one can fail to remark that the name of their destination,
viz., Kirjath-jearim [Endnote 18] has been omitted: nor can we
deny that 2 Sam. xiii:37, has been tampered with and mutilated.
(68) "And Absalom fled, and went to Talmai, the son of Ammihud,
king of Geshur.  (68a) And he mourned for his son every day.
(68b) So Absalom fled, and went to Geshur, and was there three years."
(69) I know that I have remarked other passages of the same kind,
but I cannot recall them at the moment.

[9:3] (70) That the marginal notes which are found continually in the
Hebrew Codices are doubtful readings will, I think, be evident to
everyone who has noticed that they often arise from the great
similarity of some of the Hebrew letters, such for instance,
as the similarity between Kaph and Beth, Jod and Van,
Daleth and Reth, &c.  (71) For example, the text in 2 Sam. v:24,
runs "in the time when thou hearest," and similarly in
Judges xxi:22, "And it shall be when their fathers or their
brothers come unto us often," the marginal version is "come unto
us to complain."

(9:72) So also many various readings have arisen from the use
of the letters named mutes, which are generally not sounded in
pronunciation, and are taken promiscuously, one for the other.
(73) For example, in Levit. xxv:29, it is written, "The house
shall be established which is not in the walled city," but the
margin has it, "which is in a walled city."

[9:4] (74) Though these matters are self-evident, it is necessary
to answer the reasonings of certain Pharisees, by which they
endeavour to convince us that the marginal notes serve to indicate
some mystery and were added or pointed out by the writers of the
sacred books.  (75) The first of these reasons, which, in my
opinion, carries little weight, is taken from the practice of
reading the Scriptures aloud.

(9:76) If, it is urged, these notes were added to show various
readings which could not be decided upon by posterity, why has
custom prevailed that the marginal readings should always be
retained?  (77) Why has the meaning which is preferred been set
down in the margin when it ought to have been incorporated in
the text, and not relegated to a side note?

(9:78) The second reason is more specious, and is taken from
the nature of the case.  (79) It is admitted that faults have
crept into the sacred writings by chance and not by design;
but they say that in the five books the word for a girl is,
with one exception, written without the letter "he," contrary
to all grammatical rules, whereas in the margin it is written
correctly according to the universal rule of grammar.
(9:80) Can this have happened by mistake?  (80a) Is it possible
to imagine a clerical error to have been committed every
time the word occurs?  (81) Moreover, it would have been easy
to supply the emendation.  (82) Hence, when these readings are
not accidental or corrections of manifest mistakes, it is
supposed that they must have been set down on purpose by the
original writers, and have a meaning.  (83) However, it is
easy to answer such arguments; as to the question of custom
having prevailed in the reading of the marginal versions, I will
not spare much time for its consideration: I know not the
promptings of superstition, and perhaps the practice may have
arisen from the idea that both readings were deemed equally good
or tolerable, and therefore, lest either should be neglected,
one was appointed to be written, and the other to be read.
(9:84) They feared to pronounce judgment in so weighty a matter
lest they should mistake the false for the true, and therefore
they would give preference to neither, as they must necessarily
have done if they had commanded one only to be both read and
written.  (9:85) This would be especially the case where the marginal
readings were not written down in the sacred books: or the custom
may have originated because some things though rightly written
down were desired to be read otherwise according to the marginal
version, and therefore the general rule was made that the marginal
version should be followed in reading the Scriptures.  (86) The
cause which induced the scribes to expressly prescribe certain
passages to be read in the marginal version, I will now touch on,
for not all the marginal notes are various readings, but some mark
expressions which have passed out of common use, obsolete words
and terms which current decency did not allow to be read in a
public assembly.  (87) The ancient writers, without any evil intention, 
employed no courtly paraphrase, but called things by their plain
names.  (9:88) Afterwards, through the spread of evil thoughts and
luxury, words which could be used by the ancients without offence,
came to be considered obscene.  (9:89) There was no need for this
cause to change the text of Scripture.  (90) Still, as a concession
to the popular weakness, it became the custom to substitute more
decent terms for words denoting sexual intercourse, exereta, &c.,
and to read them as they were given in the margin.

(9:91) At any rate, whatever may have been the origin of the
practice of reading Scripture according to the marginal version,
it was not that the true interpretation is contained therein.
(92) For besides that, the Rabbins in the Talmud often differ
from the Massoretes, and give other readings which they approve of,
as I will shortly show, certain things are found in the margin
which appear less warranted by the uses of the Hebrew language.
(9:93) For example, in 2 Samuel xiv:22, we read, "In that the king
hath fulfilled the request of his servant," a construction plainly
regular, and agreeing with that in chap. xvi.  (94) But the margin
has it "of thy servant," which does not agree with the person of the
verb.  (95) So, too, chap. xvi:25 of the same book, we find, "As if
one had inquired at the oracle of God," the margin adding "someone"
to stand as a nominative to the verb.  (96) But the correction is not 
apparently warranted, for it is a common practice, well known to
grammarians in the Hebrew language, to use the third person singular
of the active verb impersonally.

(9:97) The second argument advanced by the Pharisees is easily
answered from what has just been said, namely, that the scribes
besides the various readings called attention to obsolete words.
(9:98) For there is no doubt that in Hebrew as in other languages,
changes of use made many words obsolete and antiquated, and such
were found by the later scribes in the sacred books and noted by
them with a view to the books being publicly read according to custom. 
(9:99) For this reason the word nahgar is always found marked because
its gender was originally common, and it had the same meaning as the
Latin juvenis (a young person).  (100) So also the Hebrew capital was
anciently called Jerusalem, not Jerusalaim.  (101) As to the pronouns 
himself and herself, I think that the later scribes changed vau into
jod (a very frequent change in Hebrew) when they wished to express
the feminine gender, but that the ancients only distinguished the two 
genders by a change of vowels.  (102) I may also remark that the
irregular tenses of certain verbs differ in the ancient and modern
forms, it being formerly considered a mark of elegance to employ
certain letters agreeable to the ear.

(9:103) In a word, I could easily multiply proofs of this kind if I
were not afraid of abusing the patience of the reader.  (104) Perhaps
I shall be asked how I became acquainted with the fact that all these
expressions are obsolete. (105) I reply that I have found them in the
most ancient Hebrew writers in the Bible itself, and that they have
not been imitated by subsequent authors, and thus they are recognized
as antiquated, though the language in which they occur is dead. 
(9:106) But perhaps someone may press the question why, if it be true,
as I say, that the marginal notes of the Bible generally mark various
readings, there are never more than two readings of a passage, that in
the text and that in the margin, instead of three or more; and further,
how the scribes can have hesitated between two readings, one of which
is evidently contrary to grammar, and the other a plain correction.

(9:107) The answer to these questions also is easy: I will premise
that it is almost certain that there once were more various readings
than those now recorded.  (108) For instance, one finds many in the
Talmud which the Massoretes have neglected, and are so different one
from the other that even the superstitious editor of the Bomberg Bible
confesses that he cannot harmonize them.  (109) "We cannot say
anything," he writes, "except what we have said above, namely, that
the Talmud is generally in contradiction to the Massorete."  (110) So
that we are nor bound to hold that there never were more than two
readings of any passage, yet I am willing to admit, and indeed I
believe that more than two readings are never found: and for the
following reasons:-

(9:111) (I.) The cause of the differences of reading only
   admits of two, being generally the similarity of certain
   letters, so that the question resolved itself into which
   should be written Beth, or Kaf, Jod or Vau, Daleth or Reth:
   cases which are constantly occurring, and frequently
   yielding a fairly good meaning whichever alternative be
   adopted.  (9:112) Sometimes, too, it is a question whether a
   syllable be long or short, quantity being determined by the
   letters called mutes.  (113) Moreover, we never asserted
   that all the marginal versions, without exception, marked
   various readings; on the contrary, we have stated that many
   were due to motives of decency or a desire to explain
   obsolete words.

(9:114) (II.) I am inclined to attribute the fact that more
   than two readings are never found to the paucity of exemplars,
   perhaps not more than two or three, found by the scribes.
   (115) In the treatise of the scribes, chap. vi., mention is
   made of three only, pretended to have been found in the time
   of Ezra, in order that the marginal versions might be
   attributed to him.

(9:116) However that may be, if the scribes only had three codices
we may easily imagine that in a given passage two of them would be
in accord, for it would be extraordinary if each one of the three
gave a different reading of the same text. 

(9:117) The dearth of copies after the time of Ezra will surprise
no one who has read the 1st chapter of Maccabees, or Josephus's
"Antiquities," Bk. 12, chap. 5.  (118) Nay, it appears wonderful
considering the fierce and daily persecution, that even these few
should have been preserved.  (119) This will, I think, be plain
to even a cursory reader of the history of those times.

(9:120) We have thus discovered the reasons why there are never more
than two readings of a passage in the Bible, but this is a long way
from supposing that we may therefore conclude that the Bible was
purposely written incorrectly in such passages in order to signify
some mystery.  (9:121) As to the second argument, that some passages
are so faultily written that they are at plain variance with all
grammar, and should have been corrected in the text and not in the
margin, I attach little weight to it, for I am not concerned to say
what religious motive the scribes may have had for acting as they did:
possibly they did so from candour, wishing to transmit the few
exemplars of the Bible which they had found exactly in their original
state, marking the differences they discovered in the margin, not as
doubtful readings, but as simple variants.  (122) I have myself called
them doubtful readings, because it would be generally impossible to
say which of the two versions is preferable.

[9:5] (123) Lastly, besides these doubtful readings the scribes have
(by leaving a hiatus in the middle of a paragraph) marked several
passages as mutilated.  (124) The Massoretes have counted up such
instances, and they amount to eight-and-twenty.  (125) I do not
know whether any mystery is thought to lurk in the number, at any rate
the Pharisees religiously preserve a certain amount of empty space.

(9:126) One of such hiatus occurs (to give an instance) in
Gen. iv:8, where it is written, "And Cain said to his brother . .
. . and it came to pass while they were in the field, &c.,"
a space being left in which we should expect to hear what it
was that Cain said.

(9:127) Similarly there are (besides those points we have noticed)
eight-and-twenty hiatus left by the scribes.  (128) Many of these
would not be recognized as mutilated if it were not for the empty 
space left.  (129) But I have said enough on this subject.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

[10:0] CHAPTER X. - AN EXAMINATION OF THE REMAINING BOOKS OF
   THE OLD TESTAMENT ACCORDING TO THE PRECEDING METHOD.

[10:1] (1) I now pass on to the remaining books of the Old Testament.
(2) Concerning the two books of Chronicles I have nothing particular
or important to remark, except that they were certainly written after
the time of Ezra, and possibly after the restoration of the Temple by
Judas Maccabaeus.  [Endnote 19] (2) For in chap. ix. of the first book
we find a reckoning of the families who were the first to live in
Jerusalem, and in verse 17 the names of the porters, of which two
recur in Nehemiah.  (3) This shows that the books were certainly
compiled after the rebuilding of the city.  (4) As to their actual
writer, their authority, utility, and doctrine, I come to no conclusion.
(5) I have always been astonished that they have been included in the
Bible by men who shut out from the canon the books of Wisdom, Tobit,
and the others styled apocryphal.  (6) I do not aim at disparaging
their authority, but as they are universally received I will leave
them as they are.

(10:7) The Psalms were collected and divided into five books in the
time of the second temple, for Ps. lxxxviii. was published, according
to Philo-Judaeus, while king Jehoiachin was still a prisoner in Babylon;
and Ps. lxxxix. when the same king obtained his liberty: I do not think
Philo would have made the statement unless either it had been the
received opinion in his time, or else had been told him by trustworthy
persons.

(10:8) The Proverbs of Solomon were, I believe, collected at the same
time, or at least in the time of King Josiah; for in chap. xxv:1,
it is written, "These are also proverbs of Solomon which the men of
Hezekiah, king of Judah, copied out."  (9) I cannot here pass over in
silence the audacity of the Rabbis who wished to exclude from the
sacred canon both the Proverbs and Ecclesiastes, and to put them both
in the Apocrypha.  (9a) In fact, they would actually have done so,
if they had not lighted on certain passages in which the law of Moses
is extolled.  (9b) It is, indeed, grievous to think that the settling
of the sacred canon lay in the hands of such men; however,
I congratulate them, in this instance, on their suffering us to
see these books in question, though I cannot refrain from doubting
whether they have transmitted them in absolute good faith;
but I will not now linger on this point.

(10:10) I pass on, then, to the prophetic books.  (11) An examination
of these assures me that the prophecies therein contained have been
compiled from other books, and are not always set down in the exact
order in which they were spoken or written by the prophets, but are
only such as were collected here and there, so that they are but
fragmentary.

[10:2] (12) Isaiah began to prophecy in the reign of Uzziah, as the
writer himself testifies in the first verse.  (13) He not only
prophesied at that time, but furthermore wrote the history of that
king (see 2 Chron. xxvi:22) in a volume now lost. (13a) That which we 
possess, we have shown to have been taken from the chronicles of the
kings of Judah and Israel.

(10:14) We may add that the Rabbis assert that this prophet
prophesied in the reign of Manasseh, by whom he was eventually
put to death, and, although this seems to be a myth, it yet
shows that they did not think that all Isaiah's prophecies
are extant.

(10:15) The prophecies of Jeremiah, which are related historically
are also taken from various chronicles; for not only are they
heaped together confusedly, without any account being taken of
dates, but also the same story is told in them differently in
different passages.  (16) For instance, in chap. xxi. we are
told that the cause of Jeremiah's arrest was that he had
prophesied the destruction of the city to Zedekiah who
consulted him.  (10:17) This narrative suddenly passes, in
chap xxii., to the prophet's remonstrances to Jehoiakim
(Zedekiah's predecessor), and the prediction he made of that
king's captivity; then, in chap. xxv., come the revelations
granted to the prophet previously, that is in the fourth
year of Jehoiakim, and, further on still, the revelations
received in the first year of the same reign.  (18) The
continuator of Jeremiah goes on heaping prophecy upon
prophecy without any regard to dates, until at last,
in chap. xxxviii. (as if the intervening chapters had been
a parenthesis), he takes up the thread dropped in. chap. xxi.

(10:19) In fact, the conjunction with which chap. xxxviii. begins,
refers to the 8th, 9th, and 10th verses of chap. xxi. Jeremiah's
last arrest is then very differently described, and a totally
separate cause is given for his daily retention in the court of
the prison.

(10:20) We may thus clearly see that these portions of the book
have been compiled from various sources, and are only from this
point of view comprehensible.  (21) The prophecies contained in
the remaining chapters, where Jeremiah speaks in the first person,
seem to be taken from a book written by Baruch, at Jeremiah's
dictation.  (22) These, however, only comprise (as appears from
chap. xxxvi:2) the prophecies revealed to the prophet from the
time of Josiah to the fourth year of Jehoiakim, at which period
the book begins.  (23) The contents of chap. xlv:2, on to
chap. li:59, seem taken from the same volume.

[10:3] (24) That the book of Ezekiel is only a fragment, is clearly
indicated by the first verse.  (25) For anyone may see that the
conjunction with which it begins, refers to something already said,
and connects what follows therewith.  (26) However, not only this
conjunction, but the whole text of the discourse implies other
writings.  (27) The fact of the present work beginning the thirtieth
year shows that the prophet is continuing, not commencing a discourse;
and this is confirmed by the writer, who parenthetically states in
verse 3, "The word of the Lord came often unto Ezekiel the priest,
the son of Buzi, in the land of the Chaldeans," as if to say that
the prophecies which he is about to relate are the sequel to
revelations formerly received by Ezekiel from God.  (28) Furthermore,
Josephus, 11 Antiq." x:9, says that Ezekiel prophesied that Zedekiah
should not see Babylon, whereas the book we now have not only
contains no such statement, but contrariwise asserts in chap. xvii.
that he should be taken to Babylon as a captive. [Endnote 20]

(10:29) Of Hosea I cannot positively state that he wrote more than
is now extant in the book bearing his name, but I am astonished at
the smallness of the quantity we possess, for the sacred writer
asserts that the prophet prophesied for more than eighty years.

[10:4] (30) We may assert, speaking generally, that the compiler
of the prophetic books neither collected all the prophets, nor all
the writings of those we have; for of the prophets who are said to
have prophesied in the reign of Manasseh and of whom general
mention is made in 2 Chron. xxxiii:10, 18, we have, evidently,
no prophecies extant; neither have we all the prophecies of the
twelve who give their names to books.  (31) Of Jonah we have only
the prophecy concerning the Ninevites, though he also prophesied
to the children of Israel, as we learn in 2 Kings xiv:25.

(10:32) The book and the personality of Job have caused much controversy. 
(33) Some think that the book is the work of Moses, and the whole
narrative merely allegorical.  (34) Such is the opinion of the Rabbins
recorded in the Talmud, and they are supported by Maimonides in his
"More Nebuchim."  (35) Others believe it to be a true history, and some
suppose that Job lived in the time of Jacob, and was married to his
daughter Dinah.  (36) Aben Ezra, however, as I have already stated,
affirms, in his commentaries, that the work is a translation into Hebrew
from some other language: I could wish that he could advance more cogent
arguments than he does, for we might then conclude that the Gentiles
also had sacred books.  (37) I myself leave the matter undecided,
but I conjecture Job to have been a Gentile, and a man of very stable
character, who at first prospered, then was assailed with terrible
calamities, and finally was restored to great happiness.  (38) (He
is thus named, among others, by Ezekiel, xiv:12.)  (39) I take it
that he constancy of his mind amid the vicissitudes of his fortune
occasioned many men to dispute about God's providence, or at least
caused the writer of the book in question to compose his dialogues;
for the contents, and also the style, seem to emanate far less from
a man wretchedly ill and lying among ashes, than from one reflecting
at ease in his study.  (10:40) I should also be inclined to agree with
Aben Ezra that the book is a translation, for its poetry seems akin
to that of the Gentiles; thus the Father of Gods summons a council,
and Momus, here called Satan, criticizes the Divine decrees with
the utmost freedom.  (41) But these are mere conjectures without
any solid foundation.

[10:5] (42) I pass on to the book of Daniel, which, from chap. viii.
onwards, undoubtedly contains the writing of Daniel himself.
(43) Whence the first seven chapters are derived I cannot say;
we may, however, conjecture that, as they were first written in
Chaldean, they are taken from Chaldean chronicles.  (44) If this
could be proved, it would form a very striking proof of the fact
that the sacredness of Scripture depends on our understanding of
the doctrines therein signified, and not on the words, the language,
and the phrases in which these doctrines are conveyed to us;
and it would further show us that books which teach and speak of
whatever is highest and best are equally sacred, whatever be the 
tongue in which they are written, or the nation to which they belong.

(10;45) We can, however, in this case only remark that the chapters
in question were written in Chaldee, and yet are as sacred as the
rest of the Bible.

(10:46) The first book of Ezra is so intimately connected with the
book of Daniel that both are plainly recognizable as the work of
the same author, writing of Jewish history from the time of the first 
captivity onwards.  (47) I have no hesitation in joining to this
the book of Esther, for the conjunction with which it begins can
refer to nothing else.  (10:48) It cannot be the same work as that
written by Mordecai, for, in chap. ix:20-22, another person relates
that Mordecai wrote letters, and tells us their contents; further,
that Queen Esther confirmed the days of Purim in their times
appointed, and that the decree was written in the book that is
(by a Hebraism), in a book known to all then living, which, as
Aben Ezra and the rest confess, has now perished.  (49) Lastly,
for the rest of the acts of Mordecai, the historian refers us to
the chronicles of the kings of Persia.  (50) Thus there is no doubt
that this book was written by the same person as he who recounted
the history of Daniel and Ezra, and who wrote Nehemiah, [Endnote 21]
sometimes called the second book of Ezra.  (51) We may, then, affirm
to the personality of the author.  (10:52) However, in order to
determine whence he, whoever he was, had gained a knowledge of the
histories which he had, perchance, in great measure himself written,
we may remark that the governors or chiefs of the Jews, after the
restoration of the Temple, kept scribes or historiographers, who wrote
annals or chronicles of them.  (53) The chronicles of the kings are
often quoted in the books of Kings, but the chronicles of the chiefs
and priests are quoted for the first time in Nehemiah xii:23,
and again in 1 Macc. xvi:24.  (10:54) This is undoubtedly the book
referred to as containing the decree of Esther and the acts of
Mordecai; and which, as we said with Aben Ezra, is now lost.
(55) From it were taken the whole contents of these four books,
for no other authority is quoted by their writer, or is known to us.

(10:56) That these books were not written by either Ezra or Nehemiah
is plain from Nehemiah xii:9, where the descendants of the high priest,
Joshua are traced down to Jaddua, the sixth high priest, who went to
meet Alexander the Great, when the Persian empire was almost subdued
(Josephus, "Ant." ii. 108), or who, according to Philo-Judaeus, was the
sixth and last high priest under the Persians.  (10:57) In the same
chapter of Nehemiah, verse 22, this point is clearly brought out:
"The Levites in the days of Eliashib, Joiada, and Johanan, and Jaddua,
were recorded chief of the fathers: also the priests, to the reign
of Darius the Persian" - that is to say, in the chronicles; and,
I suppose, no one thinks [Endnote 22]  that the lives of Nehemiah
and Ezra were so prolonged that they outlived fourteen kings of
Persia.  (58) Cyrus was the first who granted the Jews permission
to rebuild their Temple: the period between his time and Darius,
fourteenth and last king of Persia, extends over 230 years.
(10:59) I have, therefore, no doubt that these books were written
after Judas Maccabaeus had restored the worship in the Temple,
for at that time false books of Daniel, Ezra, and Esther were
published by evil-disposed persons, who were almost certainly
Sadducees, for the writings were never recognized by the Pharisees,
so far as I am aware; and, although certain myths in the fourth
book of Ezra are repeated in the Talmud, they must not be set down
to the Pharisees, for all but the most ignorant admit that they
have been added by some trifler: in fact, I think, someone must
have made such additions with a view to casting ridicule on all
the traditions of the sect.

(10:60) Perhaps these four books were written out and published
at the time I have mentioned with a view to showing the people
that the prophecies of Daniel had been fulfilled, and thus
kindling their piety, and awakening a hope of future deliverance
in the midst of their misfortunes.  (61) In spite of their recent
origin, the books before us contain many errors, due, I suppose,
to the haste with which they were written.  (62) Marginal readings,
such as I have mentioned in the last chapter, are found here as
elsewhere, and in even greater abundance; there are, moreover,
certain passages which can only be accounted for by supposing
some such cause as hurry.

(10:63) However, before calling attention to the marginal readings,
I will remark that, if the Pharisees are right in supposing them
to have been ancient, and the work of the original scribes, we must
perforce admit that these scribes (if there were more than one)
set them down because they found that the text from which they
were copying was inaccurate, and did yet not venture to alter what
was written by their predecessors and superiors.  (64) I need not
again go into the subject at length, and will, therefore, proceed
to mention some discrepancies not noticed in the margin.

(10:65) I. Some error has crept into the text of the second chapter
of Ezra, for in verse 64 we are told that the total of all those
mentioned in the rest of the chapter amounts to 42,360; but,
when we come to add up the several items we get as result only
29,818.  (66) There must, therefore, be an error, either in the
total, or in the details.  (67) The total is probably correct,
for it would most likely be well known to all as a noteworthy
thing; but with the details, the case would be different.
(10:68) If, then, any error had crept into the total, it would
at once have been remarked, and easily corrected.  (69) This view
is confirmed by Nehemiah vii., where this chapter of Ezra is
mentioned, and a total is given in plain correspondence thereto;
but the details are altogether different - some are larger,
and some less, than those in Ezra, and altogether they amount
to 31,089.  (10:70) We may, therefore, conclude that both in Ezra
and in Nehemiah the details are erroneously given.  (71) The
commentators who attempt to harmonize these evident contradictions
draw on their imagination, each to the best of his ability; and
while professing adoration for each letter and word of Scripture,
only succeed in holding up the sacred writers to ridicule,
as though they knew not how to write or relate a plain narrative.
(10:72) Such persons effect nothing but to render the clearness of
Scripture obscure.  (73) If the Bible could everywhere be interpreted
after their fashion, there would be no such thing as a rational
statement of which the meaning could be relied on.  (74) However,
there is no need to dwell on the subject; only I am convinced that
if any historian were to attempt to imitate the proceedings freely
attributed to the writers of the Bible, the commentators would cover
him with contempt.  (75) If it be blasphemy to assert that there are
any errors in Scripture, what name shall we apply to those who foist
into it their own fancies, who degrade the sacred writers till they
seem to write confused nonsense, and who deny the plainest and most
evident meanings?  (10:76) What in the whole Bible can be plainer than
the fact that Ezra and his companions, in the second chapter of the
book attributed to him, have given in detail the reckoning of all
the Hebrews who set out with them for Jerusalem?  (77) This is proved
by the reckoning being given, not only of those who told their lineage,
but also of those who were unable to do so. (78) Is it not equally
clear from Nehemiah vii:5, that the writer merely there copies the
list given in Ezra?  (79) Those, therefore, who explain these passages
otherwise, deny the plain meaning of Scripture - nay, they deny
Scripture itself. (80) They think it pious to reconcile one passage of
Scripture with another - a pretty piety, forsooth, which accommodates
the clear passages to the obscure, the correct to the faulty, the
sound to the corrupt.

(10:81) Far be it from me to call such commentators blasphemers,
if their motives be pure: for to err is human. But I return to
my subject.

(10:82) Besides these errors in numerical details, there are others
in the genealogies, in the history, and, I fear also in the prophecies.
(83) The prophecy of Jeremiah (chap. xxii.), concerning Jechoniah,
evidently does not agree with his history as given in I Chronicles
iii:17-19, and especially with the last words of the chapter, nor do
I see how the prophecy, "thou shalt die in peace," can be applied to
Zedekiah, whose eyes were dug out after his sons had been slain
before him.  (10:84) If prophecies are to be interpreted by their issue,
we must make a change of name, and read Jechoniah for Zedekiah,
and vice versa.  (85) This, however, would be too paradoxical a
proceeding; so I prefer to leave the matter unexplained,
especially as the error, if error there be, must be set down
to the historian, and not to any fault in the authorities.

(10:86) Other difficulties I will not touch upon, as I should only
weary the reader, and, moreover, be repeating the remarks of other
writers.  (87) For R. Selomo, in face of the manifest contradiction
in the above-mentioned genealogies, is compelled to break forth into
these words (see his commentary on 1 Chron. viii.): "Ezra (whom he
supposes to be the author of the book of Chronicles) gives different
names and a different genealogy to the sons of Benjamin from those
which we find in Genesis, and describes most of the Levites
differently from Joshua, because he found original discrepancies."
(10:88) And, again, a little later: "The genealogy of Gibeon and
others is described twice in different ways, from different tables
of each genealogy, and in writing them down Ezra adopted the version
given in the majority of the texts, and when the authority was equal
he gave both."  (89) Thus granting that these books were compiled
from sources originally incorrect and uncertain.

(10:90) In fact the commentators, in seeking to harmonize
difficulties, generally do no more than indicate their causes:
for I suppose no sane person supposes that the sacred historians
deliberately wrote with the object of appearing to contradict
themselves freely.  

(10:91) Perhaps I shall be told that I am overthrowing the
authority of Scripture, for that, according to me, anyone may
suspect it of error in any passage; but, on the contrary,
I have shown that my object has been to prevent the clear
and uncorrupted passages being accommodated to and corrupted
by the faulty ones; neither does the fact that some passages are
corrupt warrant us in suspecting all.  (92) No book ever was
completely free would ask, who suspects all books to be everywhere
faulty?  (93) Surely no one, especially when the phraseology is
clear and intention of the author plain.

(10:94) I have now finished the task I set myself with respect to
the books of the Old Testament.  (95) We may easily conclude from
what has been said, that before the time of the Maccabees there was
no canon of sacred books, [Endnote 23] but that those which we now
possess were selected from a multitude of others at the period of
the restoration of the Temple by the Pharisees (who also instituted
the set form of prayers), who are alone responsible for their
acceptance.  (96) Those, therefore, who would demonstrate the
authority of Holy Scripture, are bound to show the authority
of each separate book; it is not enough to prove the Divine origin
of a single book in order to infer the Divine origin of the rest.
(10:97) In that case we should have to assume that the council of
Pharisees was, in its choice of books, infallible, and this could
never be proved. (98) I am led to assert that the Pharisees alone
selected the books of the Old Testament, and inserted them in the
canon, from the fact that in Daniel ii. is proclaimed the doctrine
of the Resurrection, which the Sadducees denied; and, furthermore,
the Pharisees plainly assert in the Talmud that they so selected them.
(10:99) For in the treatise of Sabbathus, chapter ii., folio 30,
page 2, it is written: R. Jehuda, surnamed Rabbi, reports that the
experts wished to conceal the book of Ecclesiastes because they found
therein words opposed to the law (that is, to the book of the law of
Moses).  (100) Why did they not hide it?  (101) Because it begins in
accordance with the law, and ends according to the law;" and a little
further on we read: "They sought also to conceal the book of Proverbs."
(10:102) And in the first chapter of the same treatise, fol. 13, page 2:
"Verily, name one man for good, even he who was called Neghunja,
the son of Hezekiah: for, save for him, the book of Ezekiel would been
concealed, because it agreed not with the words of the law."

(10:103) It is thus abundantly clear that men expert in the law
summoned a council to decide which books should be received into
the canon, and which excluded.  (104) If any man, therefore, wishes
to be certified as to the authority of all the books, let him call
a fresh council, and ask every member his reasons. 

[10:6] (105) The time has now come for examining in the same manner
the books in the New Testament; but as I learn that the task has been
already performed by men highly skilled in science and languages,
and as I do not myself possess a knowledge of Greek sufficiently exact
for the task; lastly, as we have lost the originals of those books
which were written in Hebrew, I prefer to decline the undertaking.
(106) However, I will touch on those points which have most bearing
on my subject in the following chapter.

End of Part 2 of 4.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

AUTHOR'S ENDNOTES TO THE THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL TREATISE
Part 2 - Chapters VI to X

CHAPTER VI. 

[Endnote 6] (1) We doubt of the existence of God, and consequently
of all else, so long as we have no clear and distinct idea of God,
but only a confused one.  (2) For as he who knows not rightly the
nature of a triangle, knows not that its three angles are equal to
two right angles, so he who conceives the Divine nature confusedly,
does not see that it pertains to the nature of God to exist.
(3) Now, to conceive the nature of God clearly and distinctly,
it is necessary to pay attention to a certain number of very simple
notions, called general notions, and by their help to associate the
conceptions which we form of the attributes of the Divine nature.
(4) It then, for the first time, becomes clear to us, that God exists
necessarily, that He is omnipresent, and that all our conceptions
involve in themselves the nature of God and are conceived through it.
(5) Lastly, we see that all our adequate ideas are true. (6) Compare
on this point the prologomena to book, "Principles of Descartes's
philosophy set forth geometrically."

CHAPTER VII.  

[Endnote 7] (1) "It is impossible to find a method which would enable
us to gain a certain knowledge of all the statements in Scripture."
(2) I mean impossible for us who have not the habitual use of the
language, and have lost the precise meaning of its phraseology.

[Endnote 8] (1) "Not in things whereof the understanding can gain
a clear and distinct idea, and which are conceivable through
themselves."  (2) By things conceivable I mean not only those
which are rigidly proved, but also those whereof we are morally
certain, and are wont to hear without wonder, though they are
incapable of proof.  (3) Everyone can see the truth of Euclid's
propositions before they are proved.  (4) So also the histories
of things both future and past which do not surpass human credence,
laws, institutions, manners, I call conceivable and clear, though
they cannot be proved mathematically.  (5) But hieroglyphics and
histories which seem to pass the bounds of belief I call
inconceivable; yet even among these last there are many which our
method enables us to investigate, and to discover the meaning of
their narrator.

CHAPTER VIII. 

[Endnote 9] (1) "Mount Moriah is called the mount of God." 
(2) That is by the historian, not by Abraham, for he says that
the place now called "In the mount of the Lord it shall be
revealed," was called by Abraham, "the Lord shall provide."

[Endnote 10] (1) "Before that territory [Idumoea] was conquered
by David." (2) From this time to the reign of Jehoram when they
again separated from the Jewish kingdom (2 Kings viii:20), the
Idumaeans had no king, princes appointed by the Jews supplied the
place of kings (1 Kings xxii:48), in fact the prince of Idumaea
is called a king (2 Kings iii:9).
   (3) It may be doubted whether the last of the Idumaean kings had
begun to reign before the accession of Saul, or whether Scripture
in this chapter of Genesis wished to enumerate only such kings as
were independent.  (4) It is evidently mere trifling to wish to
enrol among Hebrew kings the name of Moses, who set up a dominion
entirely different from a monarchy.

CHAPTER IX. 

[Endnote 11] (1) "With few exceptions." (2) One of these exceptions
is found in 2 Kings xviii:20, where we read, "Thou sayest (but they
are but vain words), "the second person being used.  (3) In 
Isaiah xxxvi:5, we read "I say (but they are but vain words) I have
counsel and strength for war," and in the twenty-second verse of
the chapter in Kings it is written, "But if ye say," the plural
number being used, whereas Isaiah gives the singular.  (4) The text
in Isaiah does not contain the words found in 2 Kings xxxii:32.
(5) Thus there are several cases of various readings where it is
impossible to distinguish the best.

[Endnote 12] (1) "The expressions in the two passages are so varied."
(2) For instance we read in 2 Sam. vii:6, "But I have walked in a
tent and in a tabernacle." (3) Whereas in 1 Chron. xvii:5, "but have
gone from tent to tent and from one tabernacle to another." (4) In
2 Sam. vii:10, we read, "to afflict them,"whereas in 1 Chron. vii:9,
we find a different expression.  (5) I could point out other
differences still greater, but a single reading of the chapters in
question will suffice to make them manifest to all who are neither
blind nor devoid of sense.

[Endnote 13] (1) "This time cannot refer to what immediately precedes."
(2) It is plain from the context that this passage must allude to the
time when Joseph was sold by his brethren.  (3) But this is not all.
(4) We may draw the same conclusion from the age of Judah, who was
than twenty-two years old at most, taking as basis of calculation his
own history just narrated.  (5) It follows, indeed, from the last
verse of Gen. xxx., that Judah was born in the tenth of the years of
Jacob's servitude to Laban, and Joseph in the fourteenth. (6) Now,
as we know that Joseph was seventeen years old when sold by his
brethren, Judah was then not more than twenty-one.  (7) Hence,
those writers who assert that Judah's long absence from his father's
house took place before Joseph was sold, only seek to delude
themselves and to call in question the Scriptural authority which
they are anxious to protect. 

[Endnote 14] (1) "Dinah was scarcely seven years old when she was
violated by Schechem."  (2) The opinion held by some that Jacob
wandered about eight or ten years between Mesopotamia and Bethel,
savours of the ridiculous; if respect for Aben Ezra, allows me to
say so.  (3) For it is clear that Jacob had two reasons for haste:
first, the desire to see his old parents; secondly, and chiefly
to perform, the vow made when he fled from his brother
(Gen. xxviii:10 and xxxi:13, and xxxv:1).  (4) We read (Gen. xxxi:3),
that God had commanded him to fulfill his vow, and promised him
help for returning to his country. (5) If these considerations seem
conjectures rather than reasons, I will waive the point and admit
that Jacob, more unfortunate than Ulysses, spent eight or ten years
or even longer, in this short journey.  (6) At any rate it cannot
be denied that Benjamin was born in the last year of this wandering,
that is by the reckoning of the objectors, when Joseph was sixteen
or seventeen years old, for Jacob left Laban seven years after
Joseph's birth.  (7) Now from the seventeenth year of Joseph's age
till the patriarch went into Egypt, not more than twenty-two years
elapsed, as we have shown in this chapter.  (8) Consequently Benjamin,
at the time of the journey to Egypt, was twenty-three or twenty-four
at the most.  (9) He would therefore have been a grandfather in the
flower of his age (Gen. xlvi:21, cf. Numb. xxvi:38, 40, and
1 Chron. viii;1), for it is certain that Bela, Benjamin's eldest son,
had at that time, two sons, Addai and Naaman.  (10) This is just as
absurd as the statement that Dinah was violated at the age of seven,
not to mention other impossibilities which would result from the
truth of the narrative.  (11) Thus we see that unskillful endeavours
to solve difficulties, only raise fresh ones, and make confusion
worse confounded.

[Endnote 15] (1) "Othniel, son of Kenag, was judge for forty years."
(2) Rabbi Levi Ben Gerson and others believe that these forty years
which the Bible says were passed in freedom, should be counted from
the death of Joshua, and consequently include the eight years during
which the people were subject to Kushan Rishathaim, while the
following eighteen years must be added on to the eighty years of
Ehud's and Shamgar's judgeships.  (3) In this case it would be
necessary to reckon the other years of subjection among those said
by the Bible to have been passed in freedom.  (4) But the Bible
expressly notes the number of years of subjection, and the number
of years of freedom, and further declares (Judges ii:18) that the
Hebrew state was prosperous during the whole time of the judges.
(5) Therefore it is evident that Levi Ben Gerson (certainly a very
learned man), and those who follow him, correct rather than
interpret the Scriptures.
   (6) The same fault is committed by those who assert, that
Scripture, by this general calculation of years, only intended to mark
the period of the regular administration of the Hebrew state, leaving
out the years of anarchy and subjection as periods of misfortune
and interregnum.  (7) Scripture certainly passes over in silence
periods of anarchy, but does not, as they dream, refuse to reckon
them or wipe them out of the country's annals.  (8) It is clear
that Ezra, in 1 Kings vi., wished to reckon absolutely all the
years since the flight from Egypt.  (9) This is so plain, that no
one versed in the Scriptures can doubt it.  (10) For, without going
back to the precise words of the text, we may see that the genealogy
of David given at the end of the book of Ruth, and I Chron. ii.,
scarcely accounts for so great a number of years.  (11) For Nahshon,
who was prince of the tribe of Judah (Numb. vii;11), two years after
the Exodus, died in the desert, and his son Salmon passed the Jordan
with Joshua.  (12) Now this Salmon, according to the genealogy, was
David's great-grandfather.  (13) Deducting, then, from the total of
480 years, four years for Solomon's reign, seventy for David's life,
and forty for the time passed in the desert, we find that David was
born 366 years after the passage of the Jordan.  (14) Hence we must
believe that David's father, grandfather, great-grandfather, and
great-great-grandfather begat children when they were ninety years old.

[Endnote 16] (1) "Samson was judge for twenty years."  (2) Samson
was born after the Hebrews had fallen under the dominion of the
Philistines.
 
[Endnote 17] (1) Otherwise, they rather correct than explain Scripture.

[Endnote 18] (1) "Kirjath-jearim." Kirjath-jearim is also called Baale
of Judah.  (2) Hence Kimchi and others think that the words Baale Judah,
which I have translated "the people of Judah," are the name of a town.
(3) But this is not so, for the word Baale is in the plural.
(4) Moreover, comparing this text in Samuel with I Chron. Xiii:5,
we find that David did not rise up and go forth out of Baale, but
that he went thither.   (5) If the author of the book of Samuel had
meant to name the place whence David took the ark, he would, if he
spoke Hebrew correctly, have said, "David rose up, and set forth
from Baale Judah, and took the ark from thence."

CHAPTER X. 

[Endnote 19] (1) "After the restoration of the Temple by Judas
Maccaboeus."  (2) This conjecture, if such it be, is founded on
the genealogy of King Jeconiah, given in 1 Chron. iii., which
finishes at the sons of Elioenai, the thirteenth in direct descent
from him: whereon we must observe that Jeconiah, before his
captivity, had no children; but it is probable that he had two
while he was in prison, if we may draw any inference from the
names he gave them.  (3) As to his grandchildren, it is evident
that they were born after his deliverance, if the names be any
guide, for his grandson, Pedaiah (a name meaning God hath
delivered me), who, according to this chapter, was the father of
Zerubbabel, was born in the thirty-seventh or thirty-eighth year
of Jeconiah's life, that is thirty-three years before the
restoration of liberty to the Jews by Cyrus. (4) Therefore
Zerubbabel, to whom Cyrus gave the principality of Judaea,
was thirteen or fourteen years old.  (5) But we need not carry
the inquiry so far: we need only read attentively the chapter
of 1 Chron., already quoted, where (v. 17, sqq.) mention is made
of all the posterity of Jeconiah, and compare it with the
Septuagint version to see clearly that these books were not
published, till after Maccabaeus had restored the Temple, the
sceptre no longer belonging to the house of Jeconiah. 

[Endnote 20] (1) "Zedekiah should be taken to Babylon."  (2) No one
could then have suspected that the prophecy of Ezekiel contradicted
that of Jeremiah, but the suspicion occurs to everyone who reads the
narrative of Josephus.  (3) The event proved that both prophets were
in the right. 

[Endnote 21] (1) "And who wrote Nehemiah."  (2) That the greater
part of the book of Nehemiah was taken from the work composed by
the prophet Nehemiah himself, follows from the testimony of its
author. (See chap. i.).  (3) But it is obvious that the whole of
the passage contained between chap. viii. and chap. xii. verse 26,
together with the two last verses of chap. xii., which form a
sort of parenthesis to Nehemiah's words, were added by the
historian himself, who outlived Nehemiah. 
 
[Endnote 22] (1) "I suppose no one thinks" that Ezra was the uncle
of the first high priest , named Joshua (see Ezra vii., and
1 Chron. vi:14), and went to Jerusalem from Babylon with Zerubbabel
(see Nehemiah xii:1).  (2) But it appears that when he saw, that
the Jews were in a state of anarchy, he returned to Babylon, as
also did others (Nehem. i;2), and remained there till the reign of
Artaxerxes, when his requests were granted and he went a second time
to Jerusalem.  (3) Nehemiah also went to Jerusalem with Zerubbabel
in the time of Cyrus (Ezra ii:2 and 63, cf. x:9, and Nehemiah x:1).
(4) The version given of the Hebrew word, translated "ambassador,"
is not supported by any authority, while it is certain that fresh
names were given to those Jews who frequented the court.  (5) Thus
Daniel was named Balteshazzar, and Zerubbabel Sheshbazzar (Dan. i:7).
(6) Nehemiah was called Atirsata, while in virtue of his office he
was styled governor, or president. (Nehem. v. 24, xii:26.)

[Endnote 23] (1) "Before the time of the Maccabees there was no
canon of sacred books."  (2) The synagogue styled "the great" did
not begin before the subjugation of Asia by the Macedonians.
(3) The contention of Maimonides, Rabbi Abraham, Ben-David, and
others, that the presidents of this synagogue were Ezra, Daniel,
Nehemiah, Haggai, Zechariah, &c., is a pure fiction, resting only
on rabbinical tradition. (4) Indeed they assert that the dominion
of the Persians only lasted thirty-four years, and this is their
chief reason for maintaining that the decrees of the "great
synagogue," or synod (rejected by the Sadducees, but accepted by
the Pharisees) were ratified by the prophets, who received them
from former prophets, and so in direct succession from Moses,
who received them from God Himself.  (5) Such is the doctrine
which the Pharisees maintain with their wonted obstinacy.
(6) Enlightened persons, however, who know the reasons for the
convoking of councils, or synods, and are no strangers to the
differences between Pharisees and Sadducees, can easily divine
the causes which led to the assembling of this great synagogue.
(7) It is very certain that no prophet was there present, and
that the decrees of the Pharisees, which they style their
traditions, derive all their authority from it.

End of Part 2 OF 4 Endnotes.

____________________________________________________________________________

                End of A Theologico-Political Treatise - Part 2

                  "Joseph B. Yesselman" <jyselman@erols.com>
                               August 26, 1997

                     A THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL TREATISE
                     Part 3 of 4 - Chapters XI to XV

                        Published 1670 anonymously

                             Baruch Spinoza
                              1632 - 1677

____________________________________________________________________________

JBY Notes:

1.  Text was scanned from Benedict de Spinoza's
    "A Theologico-Political Treatise", and "A Political
    Treatise" as published in Dover's ISBN 0-486-20249-6.

2.  The text is that of the translation of "A Theologico-Political
    Treatise" by R. H. M. Elwes.   This text is "an unabridged and
    unaltered republication of the Bohn Library edition originally
    published by George Bell and Sons in 1883."

3.  JBY added sentence numbers and search strings.

4.  Sentence numbers are shown thus (yy:xx). 
       yy = Chapter Number when given.    
       xx = Sentence Number.

5.  Search strings are enclosed in [square brackets]:
       a. Roman numeral, when given before a search string,
          indicates Part Number.  If a different Part, bring
          up that Part and then search.
       b. Include square brackets in search string.
       c. Do not include Part Number in search string.
       d. Search Down with the same string to facilitate return.

6.  Please report any errors in the text, search formatting,
    or sentence numbering to jyselman@erols.com.

7.  HTML versions:
       Part 3  - http://www.erols.com/jyselman/ttpelws3.htm
       

____________________________________________________________________________

[11:0] Chapter XI
[12:0] Chapter XII
[13:0] Chapter XIII
[14:0] Chapter XIV
[15:0] Chapter XV

____________________________________________________________________________

TABLE OF CONTENTS: Search strings are shown thus [*:x].
                   Search forward and back with the same string.
                   Include square brackets in search string.

[11:0] CHAPTER XI - An Inquiry whether the Apostles wrote their
       Epistles as Apostles and Prophets, or merely as Teachers,
       and an Explanation of what is meant by an Apostle.
[11:1] The epistles not in the prophetic style.
[11:2] The Apostles not commanded to write or preach in
       particular places.
[11:3] Different methods of teaching adopted by the Apostles.

[12:0] CHAPTER XII - Of the true Original of the Divine Law,
       and wherefore Scripture is called Sacred, and the
       Word of  God. How that, in so far as it contains
       the Word of God, it has come down to us uncorrupted.

[13:0] CHAPTER XIII - It is shown, that Scripture teaches only
       very Simple Doctrines, such as suffice for right conduct.
[13:1] Error in speculative doctrine not impious - nor knowledge pious.
       Piety consists in obedience.

[14:0] CHAPTER XIV - Definitions of Faith, the True Faith,
       and the Foundations of Faith, which is once for all
       separated from Philosophy.
[14:1] Danger resulting from the vulgar idea of faith.
[14:2] The only test of faith obedience and good works.
[14:3] As different men are disposed to obedience by different
       opinions, universal faith can contain only the
       simplest doctrines.
[14:4] Fundamental distinction between faith and philosophy -
       the key-stone of the present treatise.
      

[15:0] CHAPTER XV - Theology is shown not to be subservient to
       Reason, nor Reason to Theology: a Definition of the reason
       which enables us to accept the Authority of the Bible.
[15:1] Theory that Scripture must be accommodated to Reason -
       maintained by Maimonides - already refuted in Chapter vii.
[15:2] Theory that Reason must be accommodated to Scripture -
       maintained by Alpakhar - examined.
[15:3] And refuted.
[15:4] Scripture and Reason independent of one another.
[15:5] Certainty of fundamental faith not mathematical but moral.
[15:6] Great utility of Revelation.

[Author's Endnotes] to the Treatise.
____________________________________________________________________________

[11:0] CHAPTER XI - AN INQUIRY WHETHER THE APOSTLES WROTE THEIR
       EPISTLES AS APOSTLES AND PROPHETS, OR MERELY AS TEACHERS;
       AND AN EXPLANATION OF WHAT IS MEANT BY AN APOSTLE.

[11:1] (1) No reader of the New Testament can doubt that the Apostles
were prophets; but as a prophet does not always speak by revelation
but only at rare intervals, as we showed at the end of Chap. I.,
we may fairly inquire whether the Apostles wrote their Epistles as
prophets, by revelation and express mandate, as Moses, Jeremiah,
and others did, or whether only as private individuals or teachers,
especially as Paul, in Corinthians xiv:6, mentions two sorts of
preaching.

(11:2) If we examine the style of the Epistles, we shall find it
totally different from that employed by the prophets.

(11:3) The prophets are continually asserting that they speak by
the command of God: "Thus saith the Lord," "The Lord of hosts saith,"
"The command of the Lord," &c.; and this was their habit not only in
assemblies of the prophets, but also in their epistles containing
revelations, as appears from the epistle of Elijah to Jehoram,
2 Chron. xxi:12, which begins, "Thus saith the Lord."

(11:4) In the Apostolic Epistles we find nothing of the sort.
(5) Contrariwise, in I Cor. vii:40 Paul speaks according to his own
opinion and in many passages we come across doubtful and perplexed
phrase; such as, "We think, therefore," Rom. iii:28; "Now I think,"
[Endnote 24]  Rom. viii:18, and so on.  (6) Besides these, other
expressions are met with very different from those used by the
prophets.  (7) For instance, 1 Cor. vii:6, "But I speak this by
permission, not by commandment;" "I give my judgment as one that
hath obtained mercy of the Lord to be faithful" (1 Cor. vii:25),
and so on in many other passages.  (8) We must also remark that in
the aforesaid chapter the Apostle says that when he states that he
has or has not the precept or commandment of God, he does not mean
the precept or commandment of God revealed to himself, but only the
words uttered by Christ in His Sermon on the Mount.  (9) Furthermore,
if we examine the manner in which the Apostles give out evangelical
doctrine, we shall see that it differs materially from the method
adopted by the prophets.  (11:10) The Apostles everywhere reason as if
they were arguing rather than prophesying; the prophecies, on the
other hand, contain only dogmas and commands.  (11) God is therein
introduced not as speaking to reason, but as issuing decrees by His
absolute fiat.  (12) The authority of the prophets does not submit
to discussion, for whosoever wishes to find rational ground for his
arguments, by that very wish submits them to everyone's private
judgment.  (11:13) This Paul, inasmuch as he uses reason, appears to
have done, for he says in 1 Cor. x:15, "I speak as to wise men,
judge ye what I say."  (14) The prophets, as we showed at the end
of Chapter I., did not perceive what was revealed by virtue of
their natural reason, and though there are certain passages in the
Pentateuch which seem to be appeals to induction, they turn out,
on nearer examination, to be nothing but peremptory commands.
(11:15) For instance, when Moses says, Deut. xxxi:27, "Behold,
while I am yet alive with you, this day ye have been rebellious
against the Lord; and how much more after my death," we must by
no means conclude that Moses wished to convince the Israelites
by reason that they would necessarily fall away from the worship
of the Lord after his death; for the argument would have been
false, as Scripture itself shows: the Israelites continued
faithful during the lives of Joshua and the elders, and afterwards
during the time of Samuel, David, and Solomon.  (16) Therefore the
words of Moses are merely a moral injunction, in which he predicts
rhetorically the future backsliding of the people so as to impress
it vividly on their imagination.  (17) I say that Moses spoke of
himself in order to lend likelihood to his prediction, and not as
a prophet by revelation, because in verse 21 of the same chapter we
are told that God revealed the same thing to Moses in different
words, and there was no need to make Moses certain by argument of
God's prediction and decree; it was only necessary that it should
be vividly impressed on his imagination, and this could not be
better accomplished than by imagining the existing contumacy of
the people, of which he had had frequent experience, as likely
to extend into the future.

(11:18) All the arguments employed by Moses in the five books are
to be understood in a similar manner; they are not drawn from the
armoury of reason, but are merely modes of expression calculated
to instil with efficacy, and present vividly to the imagination
the commands of God.

(11:19) However, I do not wish absolutely to deny that the
prophets ever argued from revelation; I only maintain that
the prophets made more legitimate use of argument in
proportion as their knowledge approached more nearly to
ordinary knowledge, and by this we know that they possessed a
knowledge above the ordinary, inasmuch as they proclaimed
absolute dogmas, decrees, or judgments.  (11:20) Thus Moses, the
chief of the prophets, never used legitimate argument, and, on
the other hand, the long deductions and arguments of Paul, such
as we find in the Epistle to the Romans, are in nowise written
from supernatural revelation.

(11:21) The modes of expression and discourse adopted by the Apostles
in the Epistles, show very clearly that the latter were not written
by revelation and Divine command, but merely by the natural powers
and judgment of the authors.  (22) They consist in brotherly
admonitions and courteous expressions such as would never be employed
in prophecy, as for instance, Paul's excuse in Romans xv:15, "I have
written the more boldly unto you in some sort, my brethren."

[11:2] (23) We may arrive at the same conclusion from observing that
we never read that the Apostles were commanded to write, but only
that they went everywhere preaching, and confirmed their words with
signs.  (24) Their personal presence and signs were absolutely
necessary for the conversion and establishment in religion of the
Gentiles; as Paul himself expressly states in Rom. i:11, "But I long
to see you, that I may impart to you some spiritual gift, to the end
that ye may be established."

(11:25) It may be objected that we might prove in similar fashion
that the Apostles did not preach as prophets, for they did not go
to particular places, as the prophets did, by the command of God.
(26) We read in the Old Testament that Jonah went to Nineveh to
preach, and at the same time that he was expressly sent there,
and told that he most preach.  (27) So also it is related, at great
length, of Moses that he went to Egypt as the messenger of God, and
was told at the same time what he should say to he children of
Israel and to king Pharaoh, and what wonders he should work before
them to give credit to his words.  (28) Isaiah, Jeremiah, and
Ezekiel were expressly commanded to preach to the Israelites.

(11:29)Lastly, the prophets only preached what we are assured by Scripture
they had received from God, whereas this is hardly ever said of the
Apostles in the New Testament, when they went about to preach.
(29a) On the contrary, we find passages expressly implying that
the Apostles chose the places where they should preach on their own
responsibility, for there was a difference amounting to a quarrel
between Paul and Barnabas on the subject (Acts xv:37, 38).
(11:30) Often they wished to go to a place, but were prevented,
as Paul writes, Rom. i:13, "Oftentimes I purposed to come to you,
but was let hitherto;" and in I Cor. xvi:12, "As touching our
brother Apollos, I greatly desired him to come unto you with the
brethren, but his will was not at all to come at this time: but he
will come when he shall have convenient time."

(11:31) From these expressions and differences of opinion among the
Apostles, and also from the fact that Scripture nowhere testifies
of them, as of the ancient prophets, that they went by the command
of God, one might conclude that they preached as well as wrote in
their capacity of teachers, and not as prophets: but the question
is easily solved if we observe the difference between the mission
of an Apostle and that of an Old Testament prophet.  (32) The latter
were not called to preach and prophesy to all nations, but to
certain specified ones, and therefore an express and peculiar
mandate was required for each of them; the Apostles, on the other
hand, were called to preach to all men absolutely, and to turn all
men to religion.  (11:33) Therefore, whithersoever they went, they were
fulfilling Christ's commandment; there was no need to reveal to them
beforehand what they should preach, for they were the disciples of
Christ to whom their Master Himself said (Matt. X:19, 20): "But, when
they deliver you up, take no thought how or what ye shall speak,
for it shall be given you in that same hour what ye shall speak."
(11:34) We therefore conclude that the Apostles were only indebted
to special revelation in what they orally preached and confirmed by
signs (see the beginning of Chap. 11.); that which they taught in
speaking or writing without any confirmatory signs and wonders
they taught from their natural knowledge. (See I Cor. xiv:6.)
(11:35) We need not be deterred by the fact that all the Epistles
begin by citing the imprimatur of the Apostleship, for the Apostles,
as I will shortly show, were granted, not only the faculty of
prophecy, but also the authority to teach.  (36) We may therefore
admit that they wrote their Epistles as Apostles, and for this cause
every one of them began by citing the Apostolic imprimatur,
possibly with a view to the attention of the reader by asserting
that they were the persons who had made such mark among the faithful
by their preaching, and had shown bv many marvelous works that they
were teaching true religion and the way of salvation.  (37) I observe
that what is said in the Epistles with regard to the Apostolic vocation
and the Holy Spirit of God which inspired them, has reference to their
former preaching, except in those passages where the expressions of
the Spirit of God and the Holy Spirit are used to signify a mind pure,
upright, and devoted to God.  (11:38) For instance, in 1 Cor. vii:40,
Paul says: But she is happier if she so abide, after my judgment,
and I think also that I have the Spirit of God."  (39) By the Spirit
of God the Apostle here refers to his mind, as we may see from the
context: his meaning is as follows: "I account blessed a widow who
does not wish to marry a second husband; such is my opinion, for
I have settled to live unmarried, and I think that I am blessed."
(11:40) There are other similar passages which I need not now quote. 

(11:41) As we have seen that the Apostles wrote their Epistles solely
by the light of natural reason, we must inquire how they were enabled
to teach by natural knowledge matters outside its scope.
(42) However, if we bear in mind what we said in Chap. VII. of
this treatise our difficulty will vanish: for although the contents
of the Bible entirely surpass our understanding, we may safely
discourse of them, provided we assume nothing not told us in
Scripture: by the same method the Apostles, from what they saw
and heard, and from what was revealed to them, were enabled to
form and elicit many conclusions which they would have been able
to teach to men had it been permissible.

(11:43) Further, although religion, as preached by the Apostles,
does not come within the sphere of reason, in so far as it
consists in the narration of the life of Christ, yet its essence,
which is chiefly moral, like the whole of Christ's doctrine,
can readily be apprehended by the natural faculties of all.

(11:44) Lastly, the Apostles had no lack of supernatural
illumination for the purpose of adapting the religion they had
attested by signs to the understanding of everyone so that it
might be readily received; nor for exhortations on the subject:
in fact, the object of the Epistles is to teach and exhort men
to lead that manner of life which each of the Apostles judged
best for confirming them in religion.  (45) We may here repeat
our former remark, that the Apostles had received not only the
faculty of preaching the history of Christ as prophets,
and confirming it with signs, but also authority for teaching and
exhorting according as each thought best.  (46) Paul (2 Tim. i:11), 
"Whereunto I am appointed a preacher, and an apostle, and a
teacher of the Gentiles;" and again (I Tim. ii:7), "Whereunto I am
ordained a preacher and an apostle (I speak the truth in Christ
and lie not), a teacher of the Gentiles in faith and verity."
(11:47) These passages, I say, show clearly the stamp both of the
apostleship and the teachership: the authority for admonishing
whomsoever and wheresoever he pleased is asserted by Paul in the
Epistle to Philemon, v:8: "Wherefore, though I might be much bold
in Christ to enjoin thee that which is convenient, yet," &c.,
where we may remark that if Paul had received from God as a prophet
what he wished to enjoin Philemon, and had been bound to speak in
his prophetic capacity, he would not have been able to change the
command of God into entreaties.  [11:3} (48) We must therefore
understand him to refer to the permission to admonish which he had
received as a teacher, and not as a prophet.  (49) We have not yet
made it quite clear that the Apostles might each choose his own
way of teaching, but only that by virtue of their Apostleship
they were teachers as well as prophets; however, if we call reason
to our aid we shall clearly see that an authority to teach implies
authority to choose the method. (50) It will nevertheless be,
perhaps, more satisfactory to draw all our proofs from Scripture;
we are there plainly told that each Apostle chose his particular
method (Rom. xv: 20): "Yea, so have I strived to preach the gospel,
not where Christ was named, lest I should build upon another man's
foundation." (11:51) If all the Apostles had adopted the same
method of teaching, and had all built up the Christian religion on
the same foundation, Paul would have had no reason to call the
work of a fellow-Apostle "another man's foundation," inasmuch as
it would have been identical with his own: his calling it another
man's proved that each Apostle built up his religious instruction
on different foundations, thus resembling other teachers who have
each their own method, and prefer instructing quite ignorant
people who have never learnt under another master, whether the
subject be science, languages, or even the indisputable truths of
mathematics. (11:52) Furthermore, if we go through the Epistles at
all attentively, we shall see that the Apostles, while agreeing
about religion itself, are at variance as to the foundations it
rests on.  (53) Paul, in order to strengthen men's religion,
and show them that salvation depends solely on the grace of God,
teaches that no one can boast of works, but only of faith,
and that no one can be justified by works (Rom. iii:27,28);
in fact, he preaches the complete doctrine of predestination.
(11:54) James, on the other hand, states that man is justified
by works, and not by faith only (see his Epistle, ii:24), and
omitting all the disputations of Paul, confines religion to a
very few elements. 

(11:55) Lastly, it is indisputable that from these different ground;
for religion selected by the Apostles, many quarrels and schisms
distracted the Church, even in the earliest times, and doubtless
they will continue so to distract it for ever, or at least till
religion is separated from philosophical speculations, and reduced
to the few simple doctrines taught by Christ to His disciples;
such a task was impossible for the Apostles, because the Gospel
was then unknown to mankind, and lest its novelty should offend
men's ears it had to be adapted to the disposition of
contemporaries (2 Cor. ix:19, 20), and built up on the groundwork
most familiar and accepted at the time.  (56) Thus none of the
Apostles philosophized more than did Paul, who was called to
preach to the Gentiles; other Apostles preaching to the Jews,
who despised philosophy, similarly adapted themselves to the
temper of their hearers (see Gal. ii. 11), and preached a religion
free from all philosophical speculations.  (11:57) How blest would
our age be if it could witness a religion freed also from all the
trammels of superstition!
____________________________________________________________________________

[12:0] CHAPTER XII - OF THE TRUE ORIGINAL OF THE DIVINE LAW, AND
       WHEREFORE SCRIPTURE IS CALLED SACRED, AND THE WORD OF GOD.
       HOW THAT, IN SO FAR AS IT CONTAINS THE WORD OF GOD,
       IT HAS COME DOWN TO US UNCORRUPTED.

(12:1) Those who look upon the Bible as a message sent down by God from
Heaven to men, will doubtless cry out that I have committed the sin
against the Holy Ghost because I have asserted that the Word of God
is faulty, mutilated, tampered with, and inconsistent; that we
possess it only in fragments, and that the original of the covenant
which God made with the Jews has been lost.  (12:2) However, I have no
doubt that a little reflection will cause them to desist from their
uproar: for not only reason but the expressed opinions of prophets
and apostles openly proclaim that God's eternal Word and covenant,
no less than true religion, is Divinely inscribed in human hearts,
that is, in the human mind, and that this is the true original of
God's covenant, stamped with His own seal, namely, the idea of
Himself, as it were, with the image of His Godhood.

(12:3) Religion was imparted to the early Hebrews as a law written
down, because they were at that time in the condition of children,
but afterwards Moses (Deut. xxx:6) and Jeremiah (xxxi:33)
predicted a time coming when the Lord should write His law in their
hearts.  (4) Thus only the Jews, and amongst them chiefly the
Sadducees, struggled for the law written on tablets; least of all
need those who bear it inscribed on their hearts join in the
contest.  (5) Those, therefore, who reflect, will find nothing
in what I have written repugnant either to the Word of God or to
true religion and faith, or calculated to weaken either one or the
other: contrariwise, they will see that I have strengthened
religion, as I showed at the end of Chapter X.; indeed, had it not
been so, I should certainly have decided to hold my peace, nay,
I would even have asserted as a way out of all difficulties that
the Bible contains the most profound hidden mysteries; however,
as this doctrine has given rise to gross superstition and other
pernicious results spoken of at the beginning of Chapter V.,
I have thought such a course unnecessary, especially as religion
stands in no need of superstitious adornments, but is, on the
contrary, deprived by such trappings of some of her splendour. 

(12:6) Still, it will be said, though the law of God is written in
the heart, the Bible is none the less the Word of God, and it is
no more lawful to say of Scripture than of God's Word that it is
mutilated and corrupted.  (7) I fear that such objectors are too
anxious to be pious, and that they are in danger of turning
religion into superstition, and worshipping paper and ink in place
of God's Word. 

(12:8) I am certified of thus much: I have said nothing unworthy
of Scripture or God's Word, and I have made no assertions which I
could not prove by most plain argument to be true.  (9) I can,
therefore, rest assured that I have advanced nothing which is
impious or even savours of impiety. 

(12:10) I confess that some profane men, to whom religion is a
burden, may, from what I have said, assume a licence to sin,
and without any reason, at the simple dictates of their lusts
conclude that Scripture is everywhere faulty and falsified,
and that herefore its authority is null; but such men are
beyond the reach of help, for nothing, as the proverb has it,
can be said so rightly that it cannot be twisted into wrong.
(12:11) Those who wish to give rein to their lusts are at no
loss for an excuse, nor were those men of old who possessed
the original Scriptures, the ark of the covenant, nay,
the prophets and apostles in person among them, any better than the
people of to-day.  (12) Human nature, Jew as well as Gentile, has
always been the same, and in every age virtue has been exceedingly
rare. 

(12:13) Nevertheless, to remove every scruple, I will here show
in what sense the Bible or any inanimate thing should be called
sacred and Divine; also wherein the law of God consists, and how
it cannot be contained in a certain number of books; and, lastly,
I will show that Scripture, in so far as it teaches what is
necessary for obedience and salvation, cannot have been corrupted.
(11:14) From these considerations everyone will be able to judge
that I have neither said anything against the Word of God nor
given any foothold to impiety. 

(12:15) A thing is called sacred and Divine when it is designed
for promoting piety, and continues sacred so long as it is
religiously used: if the users cease to be pious, the thing ceases
to be sacred: if it be turned to base uses, that which was
formerly sacred becomes unclean and profane.  (16) For instance,
a certain spot was named by the patriarch Jacob the house of God,
because he worshipped God there revealed to him: by the prophets
the same spot was called the house of iniquity (see Amos v:5,
and Hosea x:5), because the Israelites were wont, at the
instigation of Jeroboam, to sacrifice there to idols.  (17) Another
example puts the matter in the plainest light.  (12:18) Words gain
their meaning solely from their usage, and if they are arranged
according to their accepted signification so as to move those who
read them to devotion, they will become sacred, and the book so
written will be sacred also.  (19) But if their usage afterwards
dies out so that the words have no meaning, or the book becomes
utterly neglected, whether from unworthy motives, or because it
is no longer needed, then the words and the book will lose both
their use and their sanctity: lastly, if these same words be
otherwise arranged, or if their customary meaning becomes
perverted into its opposite, then both the words and the book
containing them become, instead of sacred, impure and profane.

(12:20) From this it follows that nothing is in itself absolutely
sacred, or profane, and unclean, apart from the mind, but only
relatively thereto.  (21) Thus much is clear from many passages
in the Bible.  (22) Jeremiah (to select one case out of many)
says (chap. vii:4), that the Jews of his time were wrong in calling
Solomon's Temple, the Temple of God, for, as he goes on to say in
the same chapter, God's name would only be given to the Temple so
long as it was frequented by men who worshipped Him, and defended
justice, but that, if it became the resort of murderers, thieves,
idolaters, and other wicked persons, it would be turned into a den
of malefactors. 

(12:23) Scripture, curiously enough, nowhere tells us what became
of the Ark of the Covenant, though there is no doubt that it was
destroyed, or burnt together with the Temple; yet there was
nothing which the Hebrews considered more sacred, or held in
greater reverence.  (24) Thus Scripture is sacred, and its words
Divine so long as it stirs mankind to devotion towards God:
but if it be utterly neglected, as it formerly was by the Jews,
it becomes nothing but paper and ink, and is left to be
desecrated or corrupted: still, though Scripture be thus corrupted
or destroyed, we must not say that the Word of God has suffered
in like manner, else we shall be like the Jews, who said that
the Temple which would then be the Temple of God had perished in
the flames.  (12:25) Jeremiah tells us this in respect to the law,
for he thus chides the ungodly of his time, "Wherefore, say you we
are masters, and the law of the Lord is with us?  (26) Surely it
has been given in vain, it is in vain that the pen of the scribes"
(has been made) - that is, you say falsely that the Scripture is
in your power, and that you possess the law of God; for ye have
made it of none effect.

(12:27) So also, when Moses broke the first tables of the law, he did
not by any means cast the Word of God from his hands in anger and
shatter it - such an action would be inconceivable, either of Moses
or of God's Word - he only broke the tables of stone, which, though
they had before been holy from containing the covenant wherewith the
Jews had bound themselves in obedience to God, had entirely lost
their sanctity when the covenant had been violated by the worship of
the calf, and were, therefore, as liable to perish as the ark of the
covenant.  (28) It is thus scarcely to be wondered at, that the
original documents of Moses are no longer extant, nor that the books
we possess met with the fate we have described, when we consider
that the true original of the Divine covenant, the most sacred
object of all, has totally perished.

(12:29) Let them cease, therefore, who accuse us of impiety,
inasmuch as we have said nothing against the Word of God, neither
have we corrupted it, but let them keep their anger, if they would
wreak it justly, for the ancients whose malice desecrated the Ark,
the Temple, and the Law of God, and all that was held sacred,
subjecting them to corruption.  (30) Furthermore, if, according
to the saying of the Apostle in 2 Cor. iii:3, they possessed
"the Epistle of Christ, written not with ink, but with the Spirit
of the living God, not in tables of stone, but in the fleshy
tables of the heart," let them cease to worship the letter,
and be so anxious concerning it.

(12:31) I think I have now sufficiently shown in what respect
Scripture should be accounted sacred and Divine; we may now see
what should rightly be understood by the expression, the Word
of the Lord; debar (the Hebrew original) signifies word, speech,
command, and thing.  (32) The causes for which a thing is in
Hebrew said to be of God, or is referred to Him, have been
already detailed in Chap. I., and we can therefrom easily
gather what meaning Scripture attaches to the phrases, the word,
the speech, the command, or the thing of God. (12:33) I need not,
therefore, repeat what I there said, nor what was shown under
the third head in the chapter on miracles. (34) It is enough to
mention the repetition for the better understanding of what I am
about to say - viz., that the Word of the Lord when it has
reference to anyone but God Himself, signifies that Divine law
treated of in Chap. IV.; in other words, religion, universal and
catholic to the whole human race, as Isaiah describes it (chap. i:10),
teaching that the true way of life consists, not in ceremonies,
but in charity, and a true heart, and calling it indifferently God's
Law and God's Word. 

(12:35) The expression is also used metaphorically for the order
of nature and destiny (which, indeed, actually depend and follow
from the eternal mandate of the Divine nature), and especially
for such parts of such order as were foreseen by the prophets,
for the prophets did not perceive future events as the result of
natural causes, but as the fiats and decrees of God.  (36) Lastly,
it is employed for the command of any prophet, in so far as he
had perceived it by his peculiar faculty or prophetic gift, and
not by the natural light of reason; this use springs chiefly from
the usual prophetic conception of God as a legislator, which we
remarked in Chap. IV.  (12:36a) There are, then, three causes for the
Bible's being called the Word of God: because it teaches true
religion, of which God is the eternal Founder; because it narrates
predictions of future events as though they were decrees of God;
because its actual authors generally perceived things not by their
ordinary natural faculties, but by a power peculiar to themselves,
and introduced these things perceived, as told them by God.

(12:37) Although Scripture contains much that is merely historical
and can be perceived by natural reason, yet its name is acquired
from its chief subject matter.

(12:38) We can thus easily see how God can be said to be the Author
of the Bible: it is because of the true religion therein contained,
and not because He wished to communicate to men a certain number of
books.  (39) We can also learn from hence the reason for the
division into Old and New Testament.  (12:40) It was made because the
prophets who preached religion before Christ, preached it as a
national law in virtue of the covenant entered into under Moses;
while the Apostles who came after Christ, preached it to all men as
a universal religion solely in virtue of Christ's Passion: the
cause for the division is not that the two parts are different in
doctrine, nor that they were written as originals of the covenant,
nor, lastly, that the catholic religion (which is in entire
harmony with our nature) was new except in relation to those who
had not known it: "it was in the world," as John the Evangelist
says, "and the world knew it not."

(12:41) Thus, even if we had fewer books of the Old and New Testament
than we have, we should still not be deprived of the Word of God
(which, as we have said, is identical with true religion), even as we
do not now hold ourselves to be deprived of it, though we lack many
cardinal writings such as the Book of the Law, which was religiously
guarded in the Temple as the original of the Covenant, also the Book
of Wars, the Book of Chronicles, and many others, from whence the
extant Old Testament was taken and compiled.  

(12:42) The above conclusion may be supported by many reasons.

I.  (12:43) Because the books of both Testaments were not written
    by express command at one place for all ages, but are
    a fortuitous collection of the works of men, writing
    each as his period and disposition dictated.
    (44) So much is clearly shown by the call of the
    prophets who were bade to admonish the ungodly of
    their time, and also by the Apostolic Epistles.

II. (12:45) Because it is one thing to understand the meaning of
    Scripture and the prophets, and quite another thing
    to understand the meaning of God, or the actual truth.
    (46) This follows from what we said in Chap. II.
    (47) We showed, in Chap. VI., that it applied to
    historic narratives, and to miracles: but it by no
    means applies to questions concerning true religion
    and virtue.
III. (12:48) Because the books of the Old Testament were selected
     from many, and were collected and sanctioned by a
     council of the Pharisees, as we showed in Chap. X.
     (49) The books of the New Testament were also chosen
     from many by councils which rejected as spurious other
     books held sacred by many.  (50) But these councils,
     both Pharisee and Christian, were not composed of
     prophets, but only of learned men and teachers.
     (51) Still, we must grant that they were guided in
     their choice by a regard for the Word of God; and they
     must, therefore, have known what the law of God was.
IV.  (12:52) Because the Apostles wrote not as prophets, but as
     teachers (see last Chapter), and chose whatever method
     they thought best adapted for those whom they addressed:
     and consequently, there are many things in the Epistles
     (as we showed at the end of the last Chapter) which are
     not necessary to salvation.
V.   (12:53) Lastly, because there are four Evangelists in the
     New Testament, and it is scarcely credible that God can have
     designed to narrate the life of Christ four times over,
     and to communicate it thus to mankind.  (54) For though
     there are some details related in one Gospel which are
     not in another, and one often helps us to understand
     another, we cannot thence conclude that all that is set
     down is of vital importance to us, and that God chose
     the four Evangelists in order that the life of Christ
     might be better understood; for each one preached his
     Gospel in a separate locality, each wrote it down as he
     preached it, in simple language, in order that the
     history of Christ might be clearly told, not with any
     view of explaining his fellow-Evangelists.

(12:55) If there are some passages which can be better, and more
easily understood by comparing the various versions, they are the
result of chance, and are not numerous: their continuance in
obscurity would have impaired neither the clearness of the
narrative nor the blessedness of mankind.

(12:56) We have now shown that Scripture can only be called the
Word of God in so far as it affects religion, or the Divine law;
we must now point out that, in respect to these questions, it is
neither faulty, tampered with, nor corrupt. (57) By faulty,
tampered with, and corrupt, I here mean written so incorrectly
that the meaning cannot be arrived at by a study of the language,
nor from the authority of Scripture.  (58) I will not go to such
lengths as to say that the Bible, in so far as it contains the
Divine law, has always preserved the same vowel-points, the same
letters, or the same words (I leave this to be proved by the
Massoretes and other worshippers of the letter), I only maintain
that the meaning by which alone an utterance is entitled to be
called Divine, has come down to us uncorrupted, even though the
original wording may have been more often changed than we suppose.
(12:59) Such alterations, as I have said above, detract nothing
from the Divinity of the Bible, for the Bible would have been no
less Divine had it been written in different words or a different
language.  (60) That the Divine law has in this sense come down
to us uncorrupted, is an assertion which admits of no dispute.
(12:61) For from the Bible itself we learn, without the smallest
difficulty or ambiguity, that its cardinal precept is: To love
God above all things, and one's neighbour as one's self.
(12:62) This cannot be a spurious passage, nor due to a hasty
and mistaken scribe, for if the Bible had ever put forth a
different doctrine it would have had to change the whole of its
teaching, for this is the corner-stone of religion, without
which the whole fabric would fall headlong to the ground.
(63) The Bible would not be the work we have been examining,
but something quite different.

(12:64) We remain, then, unshaken in our belief that this has
always been the doctrine of Scripture, and, consequently, that
no error sufficient to vitiate it can have crept in without
being instantly observed by all; nor can anyone have succeeded
in tampering with it and escaped the discovery of his malice.

(12:65) As this corner-stone is intact, we must perforce admit
the same of whatever other passages are indisputably dependent
on it, and are also fundamental, as, for instance, that a God
exists, that He foresees all things, that He is Almighty, that
by His decree the good prosper and the wicked come to naught,
and, finally, that our salvation depends solely on His grace.

(12:66) These are doctrines which Scripture plainly teaches
throughout, and which it is bound to teach, else all the rest
would be empty and baseless; nor can we be less positive about
other moral doctrines, which plainly are built upon this
universal foundation - for instance, to uphold justice, to
aid the weak, to do no murder, to covet no man's goods, &c.
(12:67) Precepts, I repeat, such as these, human malice and
the lapse of ages are alike powerless to destroy, for if any
part of them perished, its loss would immediately be supplied
from the fundamental principle, especially the doctrine of
charity, which is everywhere in both Testaments extolled
above all others.  (12:68) Moreover, though it be true that
there s no conceivable crime so heinous that it has never
been committed, still there is no one who would attempt in
excuse for his crimes to destroy the law, or introduce an
impious doctrine in the place of what is eternal and salutary;
men's nature is so constituted that everyone (be he king or
subject) who has committed a base action, tries to deck out
his conduct with spurious excuses, till he seems to have
done nothing but what is just and right.

(12:69) We may conclude, therefore, that the whole Divine law,
as taught by Scripture, has come down to us uncorrupted.
(70) Besides this there are certain facts which we may be
sure have been transmitted in good faith.  (71) For instance,
the main facts of Hebrew history, which were perfectly well
known to everyone.  (72) The Jewish people were accustomed in
former times to chant the ancient history of their nation in
psalms.  (12:73) The main facts, also, of Christ's life and
passion were immediately spread abroad through the whole Roman
empire.  (73a) It is therefore scarcely credible, unless
nearly everybody consented thereto, which we cannot suppose,
that successive generations have handed down the broad outline
of the Gospel narrative otherwise than as they received it.

(12:74) Whatsoever, therefore, is spurious or faulty can only
have reference to details - some circumstances in one or the
other history or prophecy designed to stir the people to greater
devotion; or in some miracle, with a view of confounding
philosophers; or, lastly, in speculative matters after they had
become mixed up with religion, so that some individual might
prop up his own inventions with a pretext of Divine authority.
(12:75) But such matters have little to do with salvation,
whether they be corrupted little or much, as I will show in
detail in the next chapter, though I think the question
sufficiently plain from what I have said already, especially
in Chapter II.
____________________________________________________________________________

[13:0] CHAPTER XIII - IT IS SHOWN THAT SCRIPTURE TEACHES ONLY VERY
       SIMPLE DOCTRINES, SUCH AS SUFFICE FOR RIGHT CONDUCT.

(13:1) In the second chapter of this treatise we pointed out that the
prophets were gifted with extraordinary powers of imagination,
but not of understanding; also that God only revealed to them such
things as are very simple - not philosophic mysteries, - and that
He adapted His communications to their previous opinions.  (13:2) We
further showed in Chap. V. that Scripture only transmits and
teaches truths which can readily be comprehended by all; not
deducing and concatenating its conclusions from definitions and
axioms, but narrating quite simply, and confirming its statements,
with a view to inspiring belief, by an appeal to experience as
exemplified in miracles and history, and setting forth its truths
in the style and phraseology which would most appeal to the
popular mind (cf. Chap. VI., third division).

(13:3) Lastly, we demonstrated in Chap. VIII. that the difficulty
of understanding Scripture lies in the language only, and not in
the abstruseness of the argument.

(13:4) To these considerations we may add that the Prophets did
not preach only to the learned, but to all Jews, without exception,
while the Apostles were wont to teach the gospel doctrine in
churches where there were public meetings; whence it follows that
Scriptural doctrine contains no lofty speculations nor philosophic
reasoning, but only very simple matters, such as could be
understood by the slowest intelligence.

(13:5) I am consequently lost in wonder at the ingenuity of those
whom I have already mentioned, who detect in the Bible mysteries
so profound that they cannot be explained in human language,
and who have introduced so many philosophic speculations into
religion that the Church seems like an academy, and religion like
a science, or rather a dispute.

(13:6) It is not to be wondered at that men, who boast of
possessing supernatural intelligence, should be unwilling to
yield the palm of knowledge to philosophers who have only their
ordinary faculties; still I should be surprised if I found them
teaching any new speculative doctrine, which was not a
commonplace to those Gentile philosophers whom, in spite of all,
they stigmatize as blind; for, if one inquires what these
mysteries lurking in Scripture may be, one is confronted with
nothing but the reflections of Plato or Aristotle, or the like,
which it would often be easier for an ignorant man to dream than
for the most accomplished scholar to wrest out of the Bible.

(13:7) However, I do not wish to affirm absolutely that Scripture
contains no doctrines in the sphere of philosophy, for in the last
chapter I pointed out some of the kind, as fundamental principles;
but I go so far as to say that such doctrines are very few and
very simple.  (8) Their precise nature and definition I will now
set forth.  (9) The task will be easy, for we know that Scripture
does not aim at imparting scientific knowledge, and, therefore,
it demands from men nothing but obedience, and censures obstinacy,
but not ignorance.

(13:10) Furthermore, as obedience to God consists solely in love
to our neighbour - for whosoever loveth his neighbour, as a means
of obeying God, hath, as St. Paul says (Rom. xiii:8), fulfilled
the law, - it follows that no knowledge is commended in the Bible
save that which is necessary for enabling all men to obey God in
the manner stated, and without which they would become rebellious,
or without the discipline of obedience.

(13:11) Other speculative questions, which have no direct bearing
on this object, or are concerned with the knowledge of natural
events, do not affect Scripture, and should be entirely separated
from religion.

(13:12) Now, though everyone, as we have said, is now quite able
to see this truth for himself, I should nevertheless wish,
considering that the whole of Religion depends thereon, to
explain the entire question more accurately and clearly.
(13:13) To this end I must first prove that the intellectual
or accurate knowledge of God is not a gift, bestowed upon all
good men like obedience; and, further, that the knowledge of God,
required by Him through His prophets from everyone without
exception, as needful to be known, is simply a knowledge of His
Divine justice and charity.  (14) Both these points are easily
proved from Scripture.  (15) The first plainly follows from
Exodus vi:2, where God, in order to show the singular grace
bestowed upon Moses, says to him: "And I appeared unto Abraham,
unto Isaac, and unto Jacob by the name of El Sadai (A. V. God
Almighty); but by my name Jehovah was I not known to them" - 
for the better understanding of which passage I may remark that
El Sadai, in Hebrew, signifies the God who suffices, in that
He gives to every man that which suffices for him; and,
although Sadai is often used by itself, to signify God,
we  cannot doubt that the word El (God) is everywhere understood.
(13;16) Furthermore, we must note that Jehovah is the only word
found in Scripture with the meaning of the absolute essence of God,
without reference to created things.  (17) The Jews maintain,
for this reason, that this is, strictly speaking, the only name
of God; that the rest of the words used are merely titles; and,
in truth, the other names of God, whether they be substantives or
adjectives, are merely attributive, and belong to Him, in so far
as He is conceived of in relation to created things, or manifested
through them.  (13:18) Thus El, or Eloah, signifies powerful, as is
well known, and only applies to God in respect to His supremacy,
as when we call Paul an apostle; the faculties of his power are
set forth in an accompanying adjective, as El, great, awful, just,
merciful, &c., or else all are understood at once by the use of El
in the plural number, with a singular signification, an expression
frequently adopted in Scripture.

(13:19) Now, as God tells Moses that He was not known to the
patriarchs by the name of Jehovah, it follows that they were not
cognizant of any attribute of God which expresses His absolute
essence, but only of His deeds and promises that is, of His power,
as manifested in visible things.  (20) God does not thus speak
to Moses in order to accuse the patriarchs of infidelity, but,
on the contrary, as a means of extolling their belief and faith,
inasmuch as, though they possessed no extraordinary knowledge
of God (such as Moses had), they yet accepted His promises as
fixed and certain; whereas Moses, though his thoughts about God
were more exalted, nevertheless doubted about the Divine
promises, and complained to God that, instead of the promised
deliverance, the prospects of the Israelites had darkened.

(13:21) As the patriarchs did not know the distinctive name of God,
and as God mentions the fact to Moses, in praise of their faith
and single-heartedness, and in contrast to the extraordinary grace
granted to Moses, it follows, as we stated at first, that men are
not bound by decree to have knowledge of the attributes of God,
such knowledge being only granted to a few of the faithful: it is
hardly worth while to quote further examples from Scripture, for
everyone must recognize that knowledge of God is not equal among
all good men.  (13:22) Moreover, a man cannot be ordered to be wise
any more than he can be ordered to live and exist.  (23) Men, women,
and children are all alike able to obey by commandment, but not to
be wise. If any tell us that it is not necessary to understand the
Divine attributes, but that we must believe them simply without
proof, he is plainly trifling.  (24) For what is invisible and
can only be perceived by the mind, cannot be apprehended by any
other means than proofs; if these are absent the object remains
ungrasped; the repetition of what has been heard on such subjects
no more indicates or attains to their meaning than the words of a
parrot or a puppet speaking without sense or signification.

(13:25) Before I proceed I ought to explain how it comes that we
are often told in Genesis that the patriarchs preached in the name
of Jehovah, this being in plain contradiction to the text above quoted.
(26) A reference to what was said in Chap. VIII. will readily
explain the difficulty.  (27) It was there shown that the writer
of the Pentateuch did not always speak of things and places by the
names they bore in the times of which he was writing, but by the
names best known to his contemporaries.  (28) God is thus said in
the Pentateuch to have been preached by the patriarchs under the
name of Jehovah, not because such was the name by which the patriarchs
knew Him, but because this name was the one most reverenced by the Jews.
(13:29) This point, I say, must necessarily be noticed, for in Exodus
it is expressly stated that God was not known to the patriarchs by
this name; and in chap. iii:13, it is said that Moses desired to
know the name of God.  (30) Now, if this name had been already known
it would have been known to Moses.  (31) We must therefore draw the
conclusion indicated, namely, that the faithful patriarchs did not
know this name of God, and that the knowledge of God is bestowed and
not commanded by the Deity.

(13:32) It is now time to pass on to our second point, and show that
God through His prophets required from men no other knowledge of
Himself than is contained in a knowledge of His justice and charity -
that is, of attributes which a certain manner of life will enable
men to imitate.  (33) Jeremiah states this in so many words
(xxii:15, 16): "Did not thy father eat, and drink, and do judgment
and justice? and then it was well with him.  (34) He judged the
cause of the poor and needy; then it was well with him: was not
this to know Me? saith the Lord."  (35) The words in chap. ix:24
of the same book are equally clear.  (36) "But let him that glorieth
glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth Me, that I am the
Lord which exercise loving-kindness, judgment, and righteousness
in the earth; for in these things I delight, saith the Lord."
(13:37) The same doctrine maybe gathered from Exod. xxxiv:6, where
God revealed to Moses only those of His attributes which display
the Divine justice and charity.  (38) Lastly, we may call attention
to a passage in John which we shall discuss at more length hereafter;
the Apostle explains the nature of God (inasmuch as no one has
beheld Him) through charity only, and concludes that he who possesses
charity possesses, and in very truth knows God.

(13:39) We have thus seen that Moses, Jeremiah, and John sum up
in a very short compass the knowledge of God needful for all,
and that they state it to consist in exactly what we said, namely,
that God is supremely just, and supremely merciful - in other words,
the one perfect pattern of the true life.  (40) We may add that
Scripture nowhere gives an express definition of God, and does not
point out any other of His attributes which should be apprehended
save these, nor does it in set terms praise any others.
(13:41) Wherefore we may draw the general conclusion that an
intellectual knowledge of God, which takes cognizance of His
nature in so far as it actually is, and which cannot by any
manner of living be imitated by mankind or followed as an example,
has no bearing whatever on true rules of conduct, on faith, or on
revealed religion; consequently that men may be in complete
error on the subject without incurring the charge of sinfulness.
(13:42) We need now no longer wonder that God adapted Himself to
the existing opinions and imaginations of the prophets, or that the
faithful held different ideas of God, as we showed in Chap. II.; or,
again, that the sacred books speak very inaccurately of God,
attributing to Him hands, feet, eyes, ears, a mind, and motion
from one place to another; or that they ascribe to Him emotions,
such as jealousy, mercy, &c., or, lastly, that they describe Him
as a Judge in heaven sitting on a royal throne with Christ on His
right hand.  (43) Such expressions are adapted to the understanding
of the multitude, it being the object of the Bible to make men not
learned but obedient.

(13:44) In spite of this the general run of theologians, when they
come upon any of these phrases which they cannot rationally
harmonize with the Divine nature, maintain that they should be
interpreted metaphorically, passages they cannot understand they
say should be interpreted literally.  (45) But if every expression
of this kind in the Bible is necessarily to be interpreted and
understood metaphorically, Scripture must have been written,
not for the people and the unlearned masses, but chiefly for
accomplished experts and philosophers.

(13:46) If it were indeed a sin to hold piously and simply the
ideas about God we have just quoted, the prophets ought to have
been strictly on their guard against the use of such expressions,
seeing the weak-mindedness of the people, and ought, on the
other hand, to have set forth first of all, duly and clearly,
those attributes of God which are needful to be understood.

[13:1] (47) This they have nowhere done; we cannot, therefore,
think that opinions taken in themselves without respect to
actions are either pious or impious, but must maintain that a
man is pious or impious in his beliefs only in so far as he is
thereby incited to obedience, or derives from them license to
sin and rebel.  (48) If a man, by believing what is true, becomes
rebellious, his creed is impious; if by believing what is false
he becomes obedient, his creed is pious; for the true knowledge
of God comes not by commandment, but by Divine gift.  (49) God has
required nothing from man but a knowledge of His Divine justice
and charity, and that not as necessary to scientific accuracy,
but to obedience.
____________________________________________________________________________

[14:0] CHAPTER XIV - DEFINITIONS OF FAITH, THE FAITH, AND THE
       FOUNDATIONS OF FAITH, WHICH IS ONCE FOR ALL SEPARATED
       FROM PHILOSOPHY.

(14:1) For a true knowledge of faith it is above all things necessary
to understand that the Bible was adapted to the intelligence,
not only of the prophets, but also of the diverse and fickle 
Jewish multitude.  (2) This will be recognized by all who give any
thought to the subject, for they will see that a person who accepted
promiscuously everything in Scripture as being the universal and
absolute teaching of God, without accurately defining what was
adapted to the popular intelligence, would find it impossible to
escape confounding the opinions of the masses with the Divine
doctrines, praising the judgments and comments of man as the
teaching of God, and making a wrong use of Scriptural authority.
(14:3) Who, I say, does not perceive that this is the chief reason
why so many sectaries teach contradictory opinions as Divine
documents, and support their contentions with numerous Scriptural
texts, till it has passed in Belgium into a proverb, geen ketter
sonder letter - no heretic without a text?  (4) The sacred books
were not written by one man, nor for the people of a single
period, but by many authors of different temperaments, at times
extending from first to last over nearly two thousand years, and
perhaps much longer.  (14:5) We will not, however, accuse the sectaries
of impiety because they have adapted the words of Scripture to their
own opinions; it is thus that these words were adapted to the
understanding of the masses originally, and everyone is at liberty
so to treat them if he sees that he can thus obey God in matters
relating to justice and charity with a more full consent: but
we do accuse those who will not grant this freedom to their fellows,
but who persecute all who differ from them, as God's enemies,
however honourable and virtuous be their lives; while, on the other
hand, they cherish those who agree with them, however foolish they
may be, as God's elect.  (6) Such conduct is as wicked and dangerous
to the state as any that can be conceived.

[14:1] (7) In order, therefore, to establish the limits to which
individual freedom should extend, and to decide what persons,
in spite of the diversity of their opinions, are to be looked
upon as the faithful, we must define faith and its essentials.
(14:8) This task I hope to accomplish in the present chapter,
and also to separate faith from philosophy, which is the chief
aim of the whole treatise.

(14:9) In order to proceed duly to the demonstration let us
recapitulate the chief aim and object of Scripture; this will
indicate a standard by which we may define faith.

(14:10) We have said in a former chapter that the aim and object
of Scripture is only to teach obedience.  (11) Thus much, I think,
no one can question.  (12) Who does not see that both Testaments
are nothing else but schools for this object, and have neither of
them any aim beyond inspiring mankind with a voluntary obedience?
(14:13) For (not to repeat what I said in the last chapter) I will
remark that Moses did not seek to convince the Jews by reason,
but bound them by a covenant, by oaths, and by conferring benefits;
further, he threatened the people with punishment if they should
infringe the law, and promised rewards if they should obey it. 
(14:14) All these are not means for teaching knowledge, but for
inspiring obedience.  (15) The doctrine of the Gospels enjoins
nothing but simple faith, namely, to believe in God and to honour
Him, which is the same thing as to obey him.  (16) There is no
occasion for me to throw further light on a question so plain
by citing Scriptural texts commending obedience, such as may be
found in great numbers in both Testaments.  (14:17) Moreover,
the Bible teaches very clearly in a great many passages what
everyone ought to do in order to obey God; the whole duty is
summed up in love to one's neighbour.  (18) It cannot, therefore,
be denied that he who by God's command loves his neighbour as
himself is truly obedient and blessed according to the law,
whereas he who hates his neighbour or neglects him is rebellious
and obstinate. 

(14:19) Lastly, it is plain to everyone that the Bible was not
written and disseminated only for the learned, but for men of
every age and race; wherefore we may rest assured that we are
not bound by Scriptural command to believe anything beyond what
is absolutely necessary for fulfilling its main precept.

(14:20) This precept, then, is the only standard of the whole
Catholic faith, and by it alone all the dogmas needful to be
believed should be determined.  (21) So much being abundantly
manifest, as is also the fact that all other doctrines of the
faith can be legitimately deduced therefrom by reason alone,
I leave it to every man to decide for himself how it comes to
pass that so many divisions have arisen in the Church: can it
be from any other cause than those suggested at the beginning
of Chap. VIII.?  (22) It is these same causes which compel me
to explain the method of determining the dogmas of the faith
from the foundation we have discovered, for if I neglected to
do so, and put the question on a regular basis, I might justly
be said to have promised too lavishly, for that anyone might,
by my showing, introduce any doctrine he liked into religion,
under the pretext that it was a necessary means to obedience:
especially would this be the case in questions respecting the
Divine attributes.

(14:23) In order, therefore, to set forth the whole matter
methodically, I will begin with a definition of faith, which
on the principle above given, should be as follows:-

(14:24) Faith consists in a knowledge of God, without which
obedience to Him would be impossible, and which the mere fact
of obedience to Him implies.  (25) This definition is so clear,
and follows so plainly from what we have already proved,
that it needs no explanation.  (14:26) The consequences involved
therein I will now briefly show. 

[14:2]
(I.)  (14:27) Faith is not salutary in itself, but only in respect
      to the obedience it implies, or as James puts it in
      his Epistle, ii:17, "Faith without works is dead"
      (see the whole of the chapter quoted).
(II.) (14:28) He who is truly obedient necessarily possesses
      true and saving faith; for if obedience be granted, faith
      must be granted also, as the same Apostle expressly
      says in these words (ii:18), "Show me thy faith
      without thy works, and I will show thee my faith by
      my works."  (29) So also John, I Ep. iv:7: "Everyone
      that loveth is born of God, and knoweth God: he that
      loveth not, knoweth not God; for God is love."
      (30) From these texts, I repeat, it follows that we
      can only judge a man faithful or unfaithful by his
      works.  (31) If his works be good, he is faithful,
      however much his doctrines may differ from those of
      the rest of the faithful: if his works be evil,
      though he may verbally conform, he is unfaithful.
      (32) For obedience implies faith, and faith without
      works is dead.

(14:33) John, in the 13th verse of the chapter above quoted,
expressly teaches the same doctrine: "Hereby," he says, "know
we that we dwell in Him and He in us, because He hath given
us of His Spirit," i.e. love.  (34) He had said before that
God is love, and therefore he concludes (on his own received
principles), that whoso possesses love possesses truly the
Spirit of God.  (35) As no one has beheld God he infers that
no one has knowledge or consciousness of God, except from love
towards his neighbour, and also that no one can have knowledge
of any of God's attributes, except this of love, in so far as
we participate therein.

(14:36) If these arguments are not conclusive, they, at any rate,
show the Apostle's meaning, but the words in chap. ii:3, 4, of
the same Epistle are much clearer, for they state in so many
words our precise contention: "And hereby we do know that we
know Him, if we keep His commandments.  (37) He that saith,
I know Him, and keepeth not His commandments, is a liar, and
the truth is not in him."

(14:38) From all this, I repeat, it follows that they are the
true enemies of Christ who persecute honourable and justice-loving
men because they differ from them, and do not uphold the same
religious dogmas as themselves: for whosoever loves justice and
charity we know, by that very fact, to be faithful: whosoever
persecutes the faithful, is an enemy to Christ.

(14:39) Lastly, it follows that faith does not demand that dogmas
should be true as that they should be pious - that is, such as
will stir up the heart to obey; though there be many such which
contain not a shadow of truth, so long as they be held in good
faith, otherwise their adherents are disobedient, for how can
anyone, desirous of loving justice and obeying God, adore as
Divine what he knows to be alien from the Divine nature?
(14:40) However, men may err from simplicity of mind, and
Scripture, as we have seen, does not condemn ignorance,
but obstinacy.  (14:41) This is the necessary result of our
definition of faith, and all its branches should spring from
the universal rule above given, and from the evident aim and
object of the Bible, unless we choose to mix our own inventions
therewith.  (42) Thus it is not true doctrines which are
expressly required by the Bible, so much as doctrines necessary
for obedience, and to confirm in our hearts the love of our
neighbour, wherein (to adopt the words of John) we are in God,
and God in us.

[14:3] (43) As, then, each man's faith must be judged pious or
impious only in respect of its producing obedience or obstinacy,
and not in respect of its truth; and as no one will dispute that
men's dispositions are exceedingly varied, that all do not
acquiesce in the same things, but are ruled some by one opinion
some by another, so that what moves one to devotion moves another
to laughter and contempt, it follows that there can be no
doctrines in the Catholic, or universal, religion, which can
give rise to controversy among good men.  (44) Such doctrines
might be pious to some and impious to others, whereas they
should be judged solely by their fruits.

(14:45) To the universal religion, then, belong only such dogmas
as are absolutely required in order to attain obedience to God,
and without which such obedience would be impossible; as for the
rest, each man - seeing that he is the best judge of his own
character should adopt whatever he thinks best adapted to
strengthen his love of justice.  (46) If this were so, I think
there would be no further occasion for controversies in the Church.

(14:47) I have now no further fear in enumerating the dogmas of
universal faith or the fundamental dogmas of the whole of Scripture,
inasmuch as they all tend (as may be seen from what has been said)
to this one doctrine, namely, that there exists a God, that is,
a Supreme Being, Who loves justice and charity, and Who must be
obeyed by whosoever would be saved; that the worship of this Being
consists in the practice of justice and love towards one's
neighbour, and that they contain nothing beyond the following
doctrines :-

I.  (14:48) That God or a Supreme Being exists, sovereignly just
    and merciful, the Exemplar of the true life; that whosoever
    is ignorant of or disbelieves in His existence cannot obey
    Him or know Him as a Judge.

II. (14:49) That He is One.  (50) Nobody will dispute that this
    doctrine is absolutely necessary for entire devotion, admiration,
    and love towards God.  (51) For devotion, admiration, and 
    spring from the superiority of one over all else.

III. (14:52) That He is omnipresent, or that all things are open to
     Him, for if anything could be supposed to be concealed from Him,
     or to be unnoticed by Him, we might doubt or be ignorant of the
     equity of His judgment as directing all things.

IV.  (14:53) That He has supreme right and dominion over all things,
     and that He does nothing under compulsion, but by His absolute
     fiat and grace. (54) All things are bound to obey Him, He is
     not bound to obey any.

V.   (14:55) That the worship of God consists only in
     justice and charity, or love towards one's neighbour.

VI.  (14:56) That all those, and those only, who obey God by their
     manner of life are saved; the rest of mankind, who live under
     the sway of their pleasures, are lost.  (57) If we did not
     believe this, there would be no reason for obeying God rather
     than pleasure.

VII. (14:58) Lastly, that God forgives the sins of those who
     repent.  (59) No one is free from sin, so that without this
     belief all would despair of salvation, and there would
     be no reason for believing in the mercy of God.
     (60) He who firmly believes that God, out of the
     mercy and grace with which He directs all things,
     forgives the sins of men, and who feels his love of
     God kindled thereby, he, I say, does really know Christ
     according to the Spirit, and Christ is in him.

(14:61) No one can deny that all these doctrines are before all
things necessary to be believed, in order that every man, without
exception, may be able to obey God according to the bidding of the
Law above explained, for if one of these precepts be disregarded
obedience is destroyed.  (62) But as to what God, or the Exemplar
of the true life, may be, whether fire, or spirit, or light, or
thought, or what not, this, I say, has nothing to do with faith
any more than has the question how He comes to be the Exemplar
of the true life, whether it be because He has a just and
merciful mind, or because all things exist and act through Him,
and consequently that we understand through Him, and through
Him see what is truly just and good. (63) Everyone may think
on such questions as he likes,

(14:64) Furthermore, faith is not affected, whether we hold that
God is omnipresent essentially or potentially; that He directs
all things by absolute fiat, or by the necessity of His nature;
that He dictates laws like a prince, or that He sets them forth
as eternal truths; that man obeys Him by virtue of free will,
or by virtue of the necessity of the Divine decree; lastly,
that the reward of the good and the punishment of the wicked is
natural or supernatural: these and such like questions have no
bearing on faith, except in so far as they are used as means to
give us license to sin more, or to obey God less.  (14:65) I will
go further, and maintain that every man is bound to adapt these
dogmas to his own way of thinking, and to interpret them
according as he feels that he can give them his fullest and
most unhesitating assent, so that he may the more easily obey
God with his whole heart.

(14:66) Such was the manner, as we have already pointed out,
in which the faith was in old time revealed and written, in
accordance with the understanding and opinions of the prophets
and people of the period; so, in like fashion, every man is
bound to adapt it to his own opinions, so that he may accept
it without any hesitation or mental repugnance.  (67) We have
shown that faith does not so much re quire truth as piety,
and that it is only quickening and pious through obedience,
consequently no one is faithful save by obedience alone.
(14:68) The best faith is not necessarily possessed by him
who displays the best reasons, but by him who displays the
best fruits of justice and charity.  (69) How salutary and
necessary this doctrine is for a state, in order that men
may dwell together in peace and concord; and how many and 
how great causes of disturbance and crime are thereby cut off,
I leave everyone to judge for himself!

(14:70) Before we go further, I may remark that we can, by means
of what we have just proved, easily answer the objections raised
in Chap. I., when we were discussing God's speaking with the
Israelites on Mount Sinai.  (71) For, though the voice heard by
the Israelites could not give those men any philosophical or
mathematical certitude of God's existence, it was yet sufficient
to thrill them with admiration for God, as they already knew Him,
and to stir them up to obedience: and such was the object of the
display.  (72) God did not wish to teach the Israelites the
absolute attributes of His essence (none of which He then revealed),
but to break down their hardness of heart, and to draw them to
obedience: therefore He did not appeal to them with reasons,
but with the sound of trumpets, thunder, and lightnings.

(14:73) It remains for me to show that between faith or theology,
and philosophy, there is no connection, nor affinity.  (74) I think
no one will dispute the fact who has knowledge of the aim and
foundations of the two subjects, for they are as wide apart as
the poles.

[14:4] (75) Philosophy has no end in view save truth: faith,
as we have abundantly proved, looks for nothing but obedience
and piety.  (76) Again, philosophy is based on axioms which
must be sought from nature alone: faith is based on history
and language, and must be sought for only in Scripture and
revelation, as we showed in Chap. VII.  (77) Faith, therefore,
allows the greatest latitude in philosophic speculation,
allowing us without blame to think what we like about anything,
and only condemning, as heretics and schismatics, those who
teach opinions which tend to produce obstinacy, hatred, strife,
and anger; while, on the other hand, only considering as
faithful those who persuade us, as far as their reason and
faculties will permit, to follow justice and charity.

(14:78) Lastly, as what we are now setting forth are the most
important subjects of my treatise, I would most urgently beg
the reader, before I proceed, to read these two chapters with
especial attention, and to take the trouble to weigh them well
in his mind: let him take for granted that I have not written
with a view to introducing novelties, but in order to do away
with abuses, such as I hope I may, at some future time, at last
see reformed.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

[15:0] CHAPTER XV - THEOLOGY IS SHOWN NOT TO BE SUBSERVIENT
       TO REASON, NOR REASON TO THEOLOGY: A DEFINITION OF
       THE REASON WHICH ENABLES US TO ACCEPT THE AUTHORITY
       OF THE BIBLE.  

(15:1) Those who know not that philosophy and reason are distinct,
dispute whether Scripture should be made subservient to reason,
or reason to Scripture: that is, whether the meaning of Scripture
should be made to agreed with reason; or whether reason should
be made to agree with Scripture: the latter position is assumed
by the sceptics who deny the certitude of reason, the former by
the dogmatists.  (2) Both parties are, as I have shown, utterly
in the wrong, for either doctrine would require us to tamper
with reason or with Scripture.

(15:3) We have shown that Scripture does not teach philosophy,
but merely obedience, and that all it contains has been adapted
to the understanding and established opinions of the multitude.
(4) Those, therefore, who wish to adapt it to philosophy,
must needs ascribe to the prophets many ideas which they never
even dreamed of, and give an extremely forced interpretation
to their words: those on the other hand, who would make reason
and philosophy subservient to theology, will be forced to
accept as Divine utterances the prejudices of the ancient Jews,
and to fill and confuse their mind therewith. (5) In short,
one party will run wild with the aid of reason, and the other
will run wild without the aid of reason.

[15:1] (6) The first among the Pharisees who openly maintained that
Scripture should be made to agree with reason, was Maimonides,
whose opinion we reviewed, and abundantly refuted in Chap. VIII.:
[15:2] now, although this writer had much authority among his
contemporaries, he was deserted on this question by almost all,
and the majority went straight over to the opinion of a certain
R. Jehuda Alpakhar, who, in his anxiety to avoid the error of
Maimonides, fell into another, which was its exact contrary.
(15:7) He held that reason should be made subservient, and entirely
give way to Scripture.  (8) He thought that a passage should not be
interpreted metaphorically, simply because it was repugnant to
reason, but only in the cases when it is inconsistent with
Scripture itself - that is, with its clear doctrines.
(15:9) Therefore he laid down the universal rule, that
whatsoever Scripture teaches dogmatically, and affirms
expressly, must on its own sole authority be admitted as
absolutely true: that there is no doctrine in the Bible which
directly contradicts the general tenour of the whole: but only
some which appear to involve a difference, for the phrases of
Scripture often seem to imply something contrary to what has
been expressly taught.  (10) Such phrases, and such phrases only,
we may interpret metaphorically.

(15:11) For instance, Scripture clearly teaches the unity of God
(see Deut. vi:4), nor is there any text distinctly asserting a
plurality of gods; but in several passages God speaks of Himself,
and the prophets speak of Him, in the plural number; such phrases
are simply a manner of speaking, and do not mean that there
actually are several gods: they are to be explained metaphorically,
not because a plurality of gods is repugnant to reason, but
because Scripture distinctly asserts that there is only one.

(15:12) So, again, as Scripture asserts (as Alpakhar thinks)
in Deut. iv:15, that God is incorporeal, we are bound, solely
by the authority of this text, and not by reason, to believe
that God has no body: consequently we must explain metaphorically,
on the sole authority of Scripture, all those passages which
attribute to God hands, feet, &c., and take them merely as
figures of speech.  (13) Such is the opinion of Alpakhar.
(15:13a) In so far as he seeks to explain Scripture by Scripture,
I praise him, but I marvel that a man gifted with reason should
wish to debase that faculty.  (14) It is true that Scripture
should be explained by Scripture, so long as we are in
difficulties about the meaning and intention of the prophets,
but when we have elicited the true meaning, we must of necessity
make use of our judgment and reason in order to assent thereto.
(15:15) If reason, however, much as she rebels, is to be entirely
subjected to Scripture, I ask, are we to effect her submission
by her own aid, or without her, and blindly?  (16) If the latter,
we shall surely act foolishly and injudiciously; if the former,
we assent to Scripture under the dominion of reason, and should
not assent to it without her.  (15:17) Moreover, I may ask now,
is a man to assent to anything against his reason?  (18) What is
denial if it be not reason's refusal to assent?  (19) In short,
I am astonished that anyone should wish to subject reason,
the greatest of gifts and a light from on high, to the dead
letter which may have been corrupted by human malice; that it
should be thought no crime to speak with contempt of mind,
the true handwriting of God's Word, calling it corrupt, blind,
and lost, while it is considered the greatest of crimes to say
the same of the letter, which is merely the reflection and image
of God's Word.  (15:20) Men think it pious to trust nothing to
reason and their own judgment, and impious to doubt the faith of
those who have transmitted to us the sacred books.  (21) Such
conduct is not piety, but mere folly. And, after all, why are
they so anxious? What are they afraid of?  (22) Do they think
that faith and religion cannot be upheld unless - men purposely
keep themselves in ignorance, and turn their backs on reason?
(22a) If this be so, they have but a timid trust in Scripture.

[15:3] (23) However, be it far from me to say that religion
should seek to enslave reason, or reason religion, or that
both should not be able to keep their sovereignty in perfect
harmony.  (24) I will revert to this question presently,
for I wish now to discuss Alpakhar's rule.

(15:26) He requires, as we have stated, that we should accept
as true, or reject as false, everything asserted or denied by
Scripture, and he further states that Scripture never expressly
asserts or denies anything which contradicts its assertions or
negations elsewhere.  (27) The rashness of such a requirement
and statement can escape no one.  (15:28) For (passing over the
act that he does not notice that Scripture consists of different
books, written at different times, for different people,
by different authors: and also that his requirement is made on
his own authority without any corroboration from reason or
Scripture) he would be bound to show that all passages which
are indirectly contradictory of the rest, can be satisfactorily
explained metaphorically through the nature of the language
and the context: further, that Scripture has come down to us 
untampered with.  (15:29) However, we will go into the matter at length.

(15:30) Firstly, I ask what shall we do if reason prove
recalcitrant?  (31) Shall we still be bound to affirm whatever
Scripture affirms, and to deny whatever Scripture denies?
(32) Perhaps it will be answered that Scripture contains nothing
repugnant to reason.  (33) But I insist that it expressly
affirms and teaches that God is jealous (namely, in the decalogue
itself, and in Exod. xxxiv:14, and in Deut. iv:24, and in many
other places), and I assert that such a doctrine is repugnant
to reason.  (34) It must, I suppose, in spite of all, be accepted
as true. If there are any passages in Scripture which imply that
God is not jealous, they must be taken metaphorically as meaning
nothing of the kind.  (15:35) So, also, Scripture expressly states
(Exod. xix:20, &c.) that God came down to Mount Sinai, and it
attributes to Him other movements from place to place, nowhere
directly stating that God does not so move.  (36) Wherefore,
we must take the passage literally, and Solomon's words
(I Kings viii:27), "But will God dwell on the earth?  (37) Behold
the heavens and earth cannot contain thee," inasmuch as they do
not expressly state that God does not move from place to place,
but only imply it, must be explained away till they have no
further semblance of denying locomotion to the Deity. 
(15:38) So also we must believe that the sky is the habitation
and throne of God, for Scripture expressly says so; and similarly
many passages expressing the opinions of the prophets or the
multitude, which reason and philosophy, but not Scripture,
tell us to be false, must be taken as true if we are io follow
the guidance of our author, for according to him, reason has
nothing to do with the matter.  (39) Further, it is untrue that
Scripture never contradicts itself directly, but only by
implication.  (40) For Moses says, in so many words (Deut. iv:24),
"The Lord thy God is a consuming fire," and elsewhere expressly
denies that God has any likeness to visible things. (Deut. iv. 12.)
(15:41) If it be decided that the latter passage only contradicts
the former by implication, and must be adapted thereto, lest it
seem to negative it, let us grant that God is a fire; or rather,
lest we should seem to have taken leave of our senses,
let us pass the matter over and take another example.

(15:42) Samuel expressly denies that God ever repents, "for he
is not a man that he should repent" (I Sam. xv:29). (43) Jeremiah,
on the other hand, asserts that God does repent, both of the evil
and of the good which He had intended to do (Jer. xviii:8-10).
(44) What?  (45) Are not these two texts directly contradictory?
(15:46) Which of the two, then, would our author want to explain
metaphorically?  (47) Both statements are general, and each is the
opposite of the other - what one flatly affirms, the other flatly
denies.  (48) So, by his own rule, he would be obliged at once to
reject them as false, and to accept them as true.

(15:49) Again, what is the point of one passage, not being
contradicted by another directly, but only by implication,
if the implication is clear, and the nature and context of
the passage preclude metaphorical interpretation?
(15:50) There are many such instances in the Bible, as we saw
in Chap. II. (where we pointed out that the prophets held
different and contradictory opinions), and also in Chaps. IX.
and X., where we drew attention to the contradictions in the
historical narratives.  (51) There is no need for me to go
through them all again, for what I have said sufficiently
exposes the absurdities which would follow from an opinion
and rule such as we are discussing, and shows the hastiness
of its propounder.

(15:52) We may, therefore, put this theory, as well as that
of Maimonides, entirely out of court; and we may take it for
indisputable that theology is not bound to serve reason, nor
reason theology, but that each has her own domain.

(15:53) The sphere of reason is, as we have said, truth and
wisdom; the sphere of theology is piety and obedience.
(54) The power of reason does not extend so far as to determine
for us that men may be blessed through simple obedience,
without understanding.  (55) Theology tells us nothing else,
enjoins on us no command save obedience, and has neither the
will nor the power to oppose reason: she defines the dogmas
of faith (as we pointed out in the last chapter) only in so
far as they may be necessary for obedience, and leaves reason
to determine their precise truth: for reason is the light of
the mind, and without her all things are dreams and phantoms.

(15:56) By theology, I here mean, strictly speaking, revelation,
in so far as it indicates the object aimed at by Scripture - namely,
the scheme and manner of obedience, or the true dogmas of piety
and faith.  (57) This may truly be called the Word of God, which
does not consist in a certain number of books (see Chap. XII.).
(15:58) Theology thus understood, if we regard its precepts or
rules of life, will be found in accordance with reason; and,
if we look to its aim and object, will be seen to be in nowise
repugnant thereto, wherefore it is universal to all men.

(15:59) As for its bearing on Scripture, we have shown in
Chap. VII. that the meaning of Scripture should be gathered
from its own history, and not from the history of nature in
general, which is the basis of philosophy.

(15:60) We ought not to be hindered if we find that our
investigation of the meaning of Scripture thus conducted shows
us that it is here and there repugnant to reason; for whatever
we may find of this sort in the Bible, which men may be in
ignorance of, without injury to their charity, has, we may be
sure, no bearing on theology or the Word of God, and may,
therefore, without blame, be viewed by every one as he pleases.

[15:4] (61) To sum up, we may draw the absolute conclusion that
the Bible must not be accommodated to reason, nor reason to the
Bible.

(15:62) Now, inasmuch as the basis of theology - the doctrine that
man may be saved by obedience alone - cannot be proved by reason
whether it be true or false, we may be asked, Why, then, should
we believe it?  (63) If we do so without the aid of reason,
we accept it blindly, and act foolishly and injudiciously; if,
on the other hand, we settle that it can be proved by reason,
theology becomes a part of philosophy, and inseparable therefrom. 
(15:64) But I make answer that I have absolutely established that
this basis of theology cannot be investigated by the natural light
of reason, or, at any rate, that no one ever has proved it by such
means, and, therefore, revelation was necessary.  (65) We should,
however, make use of our reason, in order to grasp with moral
certainty what is revealed - I say, with moral certainty,
for we cannot hope to attain greater certainty than the prophets:
yet their certainty was only moral, as I showed in Chap. II.

[15:5] (66) Those, therefore, who attempt to set forth the 
authority of Scripture with mathematical demonstrations are
wholly in error: for the authority of the Bible is dependent
on the authority of the prophets, and can be supported by no
stronger arguments than those employed in old time by the
prophets for convincing the people of their own authority.
(15:67) Our certainty on the same subject can be founded on
no other basis than that which served as foundation for the
certainty of the prophets.

(15:68) Now the certainty of the prophets consisted
(as we pointed out) in these elements:-

(I.)   (15:69) A distinct and vivid imagination.

(II.)  (15:70) A sign.

(III.) (15:71) Lastly, and chiefly, a mind turned to what
       is just and good.  (71a) It was based on no other
       reasons than these, and consequently they cannot
       prove their authority by any other reasons, either
       to the multitude whom they addressed orally, nor to
       us whom they address in writing.

(15:72) The first of these reasons, namely, the vivid imagination,
could be valid only for the prophets; therefore, our certainty
concerning revelation must, and ought to be, based on the remaining
two - namely, the sign and the teaching.  (73) Such is the express
doctrine of Moses, for (in Deut. xviii.) he bids the people obey
the prophet who should give a true sign in the name of the Lord,
but if he should predict falsely, even though it were in the name
of the Lord, he should be put to death, as should also he who strives
to lead away the people from the true religion, though he confirm his
authority with signs and portents.  (74) We may compare with the above
Deut. xiii.  (75) Whence it follows that a true prophet could be
distinguished from a false one, both by his doctrine and by the
miracles he wrought, for Moses declares such an one to be a true
prophet, and bids the people trust him without fear of deceit.
(15:76) He condemns as false, and worthy of death, those who predict
anything falsely even in the name of the Lord, or who preach false
gods, even though their miracles be real.

(15:77) The only reason, then, which we have for belief in Scripture
or the writings of the prophets, is the doctrine we find therein,
and the signs by which it is confirmed.  (78) For as we see that
the prophets extol charity and justice above all things, and have
no other object, we conclude that they did not write from unworthy
motives, but because they really thought that men might become
blessed through obedience and faith: further, as we see that they
confirmed their teaching with signs and wonders, we become persuaded
that they did not speak at random, nor run riot in their prophecies.
(15:79) We are further strengthened in our conclusion by the fact
that the morality they teach is in evident agreement with reason,
for it is no accidental coincidence that the Word of God which we
find in the prophets coincides with the Word of God written in our
hearts. (80) We may, I say, conclude this from the sacred books as
certainly as did the Jews of old from the living voice of the
prophets: for we showed in Chap. XII. that Scripture has come down
to us intact in respect to its doctrine and main narratives.

(15:81) Therefore this whole basis of theology and Scripture,
though it does not admit of mathematical proof, may yet be accepted
with the approval of our judgment.  (82) It would be folly to
refuse to accept what is confirmed by such ample prophetic
testimony, and what has proved such a comfort to those whose reason
s comparatively weak, and such a benefit to the state; a doctrine,
moreover, which we may believe in without the slightest peril or
hurt, and should reject simply because it cannot be mathematically
proved: it is as though we should admit nothing as true, or as a
wise rule of life, which could ever, in any possible way, be called
in question; or as though most of our actions were not full of
uncertainty and hazards.

(15:83) I admit that those who believe that theology and philosophy
are mutually contradictory, and that therefore either one or the
other must be thrust from its throne - I admit, I say, that such
persons are not unreasonable in attempting to put theology on a
firm basis, and to demonstrate its truth mathematically.  (84) Who,
unless he were desperate or mad, would wish to bid an incontinent
farewell to reason, or to despise the arts and sciences, or to
deny reason's certitude?  (85) But, in the meanwhile, we cannot
wholly absolve them from blame, inasmuch as they invoke the aid
of reason for her own defeat, and attempt infallibly to prove her
fallible.  (15:86) While they are trying to prove mathematically
the authority and truth of theology, and to take away the authority
of natural reason, they are in reality only bringing theology under
reason's dominion, and proving that her authority has no weight
unless natural reason be at the back of it.

(15:87) If they boast that they themselves assent because of the
inward testimony of the Holy Spirit, and that they only invoke
the aid of reason because of unbelievers, in order to convince
them, not even so can this meet with our approval, for we can
easily show that they have spoken either from emotion or vain-glory.
(15:88) It most clearly follows from the last chapter that the Holy
Spirit only gives its testimony in favour of works, called by
Paul (in Gal. v:22) the fruits of the Spirit, and is in itself
really nothing but the mental acquiescence which follows a good
action in our souls.  (89) No spirit gives testimony concerning
the certitude of matters within the sphere of speculation, save only
reason, who is mistress, as we have shown, of the whole realm of
truth.  (90) If then they assert that they possess this Spirit
which makes them certain of truth, they speak falsely, and according
to the prejudices of the emotions, or else they are in great
dread lest they should be vanquished by philosophers and exposed
to public ridicule, and therefore they flee, as it were, to the
altar; but their refuge is vain, for what altar will shelter a man
who has outraged reason?  (15:91) However, I pass such persons over,
for I think I have fulfilled my purpose, and shown how philosophy
should be separated from theology, and wherein each consists;
that neither should be subservient to the other, but that each
should keep her unopposed dominion. (92) Lastly, as occasion 
offered, I have pointed out the absurdities, the inconveniences,
and the evils following from the extraordinary confusion which has
hitherto prevailed between the two subjects, owing to their not
being properly distinguished and separated.  [15:6] (93) Before I
go further I would expressly state (though I have said it before)
that I consider the utility and the need for Holy Scripture or
Revelation to be very great.  (15:94) For as we cannot perceive by
the natural light of reason that simple obedience is the path of
salvation [Endnote 25] and are taught by revelation only that
it is so by the special grace of God, which our reason cannot
attain, it follows that the Bible has brought a very great
consolation to mankind.  (15:95) All are able to obey, whereas
there are but very few, compared with the aggregate of humanity,
who can acquire the habit of virtue under the unaided guidance
of reason.  (96) Thus if we had not the testimony of Scripture,
we should doubt of the salvation of nearly all men.

End of Part 3 of 4 - Chapters XI to XV.

____________________________________________________________________________

[AUTHOR'S ENDNOTES] TO THE THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL TREATISE

CHAPTER XI. 

[Endnote 24] (1) "Now I think." (2) The translators render the
Greek "I infer", and assert that Paul uses it as synonymous with
an other Greek word.  (3) But the former word has, in Greek,
the same meaning as the Hebrew word rendered to think, to esteem,
to judge.  (4) And this signification would be in entire agreement
with the Syriac translation.  (5) This Syriac translation (if it
be a translation, which is very doubtful, for we know neither the
time of its appearance, nor the translators and Syriac was the
vernacular of the Apostles) renders the text before us in a way
well explained by Tremellius as "we think, therefore."

CHAPTER XV. 

[Endnote 25] (1) "That simple obedience is the path of salvation."
(2) In other words, it is enough for salvation or blessedness,
that we should embrace the Divine decrees as laws or commands;
there is no need to conceive them as eternal truths.  (3) This can
be taught us by Revelation, not Reason, as appears from the
demonstrations given in Chapter IV.

End of Part 3 OF 4 Endnotes.

____________________________________________________________________________

                End of A Theologico-Political Treatise - Part 3

                  "Joseph B. Yesselman" <jyselman@erols.com>
                               August 26, 1997

                     A THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL TREATISE
                     Part 4 of 4 - Chapters XVI to XX

                        Published 1670 anonymously

                             Baruch Spinoza
                              1632 - 1677

____________________________________________________________________________

JBY Notes:

1.  Text was scanned from Benedict de Spinoza's
    "A Theologico-Political Treatise", and "A Political
    Treatise" as published in Dover's ISBN 0-486-20249-6.

2.  The text is that of the translation of "A Theologico-Political
    Treatise" by R. H. M. Elwes.   This text is "an unabridged and
    unaltered republication of the Bohn Library edition originally
    published by George Bell and Sons in 1883."

3.  JBY added sentence numbers and search strings.

4.  Sentence numbers are shown thus (yy:xx). 
       yy = Chapter Number when given.    
       xx = Sentence Number.

5.  Search strings are enclosed in [square brackets]:
       a. Roman numeral, when given before a search string,
          indicates Part Number.  If a different Part, bring
          up that Part and then search.
       b. Include square brackets in search string.
       c. Do not include Part Number in search string.
       d. Search Down with the same string to facilitate return.

6.  Please report any errors in the text, search formatting,
    or sentence numbering to jyselman@erols.com.

7.  HTML version:
       Part 4  - http://www.erols.com/jyselman/ttpelws4.htm
       

____________________________________________________________________________

[16:0] Chapter XVI
[17:0] Chapter XVII
[18:0] Chapter XVIII
[19:0] Chapter XIX
[20:0] Chapter XX

____________________________________________________________________________

TABLE OF CONTENTS: Search strings are shown thus [*:x].
                   Search forward and back with the same string.
                   Include square brackets in search string.
                                                          
[16:0] CHAPTER XVI - Of the Foundations of a State;
       of the Natural and Civil Rights of Individuals;
       and of the Rights of the Sovereign Power.
[16:1] In Nature right co-extensive with power.
[16:2] This principle applies to mankind in the state of Nature.
[16:3] How a transition from this state to a civil state is possible.
[16:4] Subjects not slaves.
[16:5] Definition of private civil right - and wrong.
[16:6] Of alliance.
[16:7] Of treason.
[16:8] In what sense sovereigns are bound by Divine law.
[16:9] Civil government not inconsistent with religion.

[17:0] CHAPTER XVII.- It is shown, that no one can or need
       transfer all his Rights to the Sovereign Power. Of the
       Hebrew Republic, as it was during  the lifetime of Moses,
       and after his death till the foundation of the Monarchy;
       and of its Excellence.  Lastly, of the Causes why the
       Theocratic Republic fell, and why it could hardly have
       continued without Dissension.
[17:1] The absolute theory of Sovereignty ideal - No one can
       in fact transfer all his rights to the Sovereign power.
       Evidence of this.
[17:2] The greatest danger in all States from within,
       not without.
[17:3] Original independence of the Jews after the Exodus.
[17:4] Changed first to a pure democratic Theocracy.
[17:5] Then to subjection to Moses.
[17:6] Then to a Theocracy with the power divided
       between the high priest and the captains.
[17:7] The tribes confederate states.
[17:8] Restraints on the civil power.
[17:9] Restraints on the people.
[17:A] Causes of decay involved in the constitution
       of the Levitical priesthood.

[18:0] CHAPTER XVIII.- From the Commonwealth of the Hebrews
       and their History certain Lessons are deduced.
[18:1] The Hebrew constitution no longer possible or desirable,
       yet lessons may be derived from its history.
[18:2] As the danger of entrusting any authority in politics
       to ecclesiastics - the danger of identifying
       religion with dogma.
[18:3] The necessity of keeping all judicial power with
       the sovereign - the danger  of changes in the
       form of a State.
[18:4] This last danger illustrated from the history of
       England - of Rome.
[18:5] And of Holland.

[19:0] CHAPTER XIX -  It is shown that the Right
       over Matters Spiritual lies wholly with the
       Sovereign, and that the Outward Forms of
       Religion should be in accordance with Public
       Peace, if we would worship God aright.
[19:1] Difference between external and inward religion.
[19:2] Positive law established only by agreement.
[19:3] Piety furthered by peace and obedience.
[19:4] Position of the Apostles exceptional.
[19:5] Why Christian States, unlike the Hebrew,
       suffer from disputes between the civil
       and ecclesiastical powers.
[19:6] Absolute power in things spiritual of modern rulers.

[20:0] CHAPTER XX -  That in a Free State every man
       may Think what he Likes, and Say what he Thinks.
[20:1] The mind not subject to State authority.
[20:2] Therefore in general language should not be.
[20:3] A man who disapproving of a law, submits his adverse opinion
       to the judgment of the authorities, while acting in
       accordance  with the law, deserves well of the State.
[20:4] That liberty of opinion is beneficial, shown from
       the history of Amsterdam.
[20:5] Danger to the State of withholding it. -
       Submission of the Author to the
       judgment of his country's rulers.

[Author's Endnotes] to the Treatise.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

[16:0] CHAPTER XVI - OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF A STATE; OF THE
       NATURAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS; AND OF THE
       RIGHTS OF THE SOVEREIGN POWER.

(16:1) Hitherto our care has been to separate philosophy from theology,
and to show the freedom of thought which such separation insures to
both.  (2) It is now time to determine the limits to which such
freedom of thought and discussion may extend itself in the ideal
state.  (3) For the due consideration of this question we must
examine the foundations of a State, first turning our attention to
the natural rights of individuals, and afterwards to religion and
the state as a whole.

(16:4) By the right and ordinance of nature, I merely mean those
natural laws wherewith we conceive every individual to be
conditioned by nature, so as to live and act in a given way.
(5) For instance, fishes are naturally conditioned for swimming,
and the greater for devouring the less; therefore fishes enjoy
the water, and the greater devour the less by sovereign natural
right.  [16:1] (6) For it is certain that nature, taken in the
abstract, has sovereign right to do anything, she can; in other
words, her right is co-extensive with her power.  (7) The power
of nature is the power of God, which has sovereign right over
all things; and, inasmuch as the power of nature is simply the
aggregate of the powers of all her individual components, it
follows that every individual has sovereign right to do all
that he can; in other words, the rights of an individual extend
to the utmost limits of his power as it has been conditioned.
(16:8) Now it is the sovereign law and right of nature that each
individual should endeavour to preserve itself as it is,
without regard to anything but itself; therefore this sovereign
law and right belongs to every individual, namely, to exist and
act according to its natural conditions.  (9) We do not here
acknowledge any difference between mankind and other individual
natural entities, nor between men endowed with reason and those
to whom reason is unknown; nor between fools, madmen, and sane men.
(16:10) Whatsoever an individual does by the laws of its nature it
has a sovereign right to do, inasmuch as it acts as it was
conditioned by nature, and cannot act otherwise.
[16:2] (11) Wherefore among men, so long as they are considered
as living under the sway of nature, he who does not yet know
reason, or who has not yet acquired the habit of virtue, acts
solely according to the laws of his desire with as sovereign a
right as he who orders his life entirely by the laws of reason.

(16:12) That is, as the wise man has sovereign right to do all that
reason dictates, or to live according to the laws of reason, so also
the ignorant and foolish man has sovereign right to do all that
desire dictates, or to live according to the laws of desire.
(13) This is identical with the teaching of Paul, who acknowledges
that previous to the law - that is, so long as men are considered
of as living under the sway of nature, there is no sin.

(16:14) The natural right of the individual man is thus determined,
not by sound reason, but by desire and power.  (15) All are not
naturally conditioned so as to act according to the laws and rules
of reason; nay, on the contrary, all men are born ignorant, and
before they can learn the right way of life and acquire the habit
of virtue, the greater part of their life, even if they have been
well brought up, has passed away.  (16) Nevertheless, they are in
the meanwhile bound to live and preserve themselves as far as they
can by the unaided impulses of desire.  (16:17) Nature has given them
no other guide, and has denied them the present power of living
according to sound reason; so that they are no more bound to live
by the dictates of an enlightened mind, than a cat is bound to live
by the laws of the nature of a lion.

(16:18) Whatsoever, therefore, an individual (considered as under
the sway of nature) thinks useful for himself, whether led by sound
reason or impelled by the passions, that he has a sovereign right
to seek and to take for himself as he best can, whether by force,
cunning, entreaty, or any other means; consequently he may regard
as an enemy anyone who hinders the accomplishment of his purpose.

(16:19) It follows from what we have said that the right and
ordinance of nature, under which all men are born, and under which
they mostly live, only prohibits such things as no one desires,
and no one can attain: it does not forbid strife, nor hatred,
nor anger, nor deceit, nor, indeed, any of the means suggested
by desire.

(16:20) This we need not wonder at, for nature is not bounded by the
laws of human reason, which aims only at man's true benefit and
preservation; her limits are infinitely wider, and have reference
to the eternal order of nature, wherein man is but a speck;
it is by the necessity of this alone that all individuals are
conditioned for living and acting in a particular way.  (16:21) If
anything, therefore, in nature seems to us ridiculous, absurd,
or evil, it is because we only know in part, and are almost entirely
ignorant of the order and interdependence of nature as a whole,
and also because we want everything to be arranged according to the
dictates of our human reason; in reality that which reason considers
evil, is not evil in respect to the order and laws of nature as a
whole, but only in respect to the laws of our reason.

(16:22) Nevertheless, no one can doubt that it is much better for us
to live according to the laws and assured dictates of reason, for,
as we said, they have men's true good for their object.  (23) Moreover,
everyone wishes to live as far as possible securely beyond the reach
of fear, and this would be quite impossible so long as everyone did
everything he liked, and reason's claim was lowered to a par with
those of hatred and anger; there is no one who is not ill at ease
in the midst of enmity, hatred, anger, and deceit, and who does not
seek to avoid them as much as he can.  [16:3] (24) When we reflect
that men without mutual help, or the aid of reason, must needs live
most miserably, as we clearly proved in Chap. V., we shall plainly
see that men must necessarily come to an agreement to live together
as securely and well as possible if they are to enjoy as a whole the
rights which naturally belong to them as individuals, and their life
should be no more conditioned by the force and desire of individuals,
but by the power and will of the whole body.  (16:25) This end they will
be unable to attain if desire be their only guide (for by the laws
of desire each man is drawn in a different direction); they must,
therefore, most firmly decree and establish that they will be guided
in everything by reason (which nobody will dare openly to repudiate
lest he should be taken for a madman), and will restrain any desire
which is injurious to a man's fellows, that they will do to all as
they would be done by, and that they will defend their neighbour's
rights as their own.

(16:26) How such a compact as this should be entered into,
how ratified and established, we will now inquire.

(16:27) Now it is a universal law of human nature that no one ever
neglects anything which he judges to be good, except with the hope
of gaining a greater good, or from the fear of a greater evil;
nor does anyone endure an evil except for the sake of avoiding a
greater evil, or gaining a greater good.  (28) That is, everyone will,
of two goods, choose that which he thinks the greatest; and, of two
evils, that which he thinks the least.  (29) I say advisedly that
which he thinks the greatest or the least, for it does not
necessarily follow that he judges right.  (30) This law is so
deeply implanted in the human mind that it ought to be counted
among eternal truths and axioms.

(16:31) As a necessary consequence of the principle just enunciated,
no one can honestly promise to forego the right which he has over
all things [Endnote 26] and in general no one will abide by his
promises, unless under the fear of a greater evil, or the hope of
a greater good.  (32) An example will make the matter clearer.
(16:33) Suppose that a robber forces me to promise that I will give
him my goods at his will and pleasure.  (34) It is plain (inasmuch
as my natural right is, as I have shown, co-extensive with my power)
that if I can free myself from this robber by stratagem, by assenting
to his demands, I have the natural right to do so, and to pretend to
accept his conditions.  (16:35) Or again, suppose I have genuinely
promised someone that for the space of twenty days I will not taste
food or any nourishment; and suppose I afterwards find that was
foolish, and cannot be kept without very great injury to myself;
as I am bound by natural law and right to choose the least of two
evils, I have complete right to break my compact, and act as if my
promise had never been uttered.  (16:36) I say that I should have
perfect natural right to do so, whether I was actuated by true and
evident reason, or whether I was actuated by mere opinion in
thinking I had promised rashly; whether my reasons were true or
false, I should be in fear of a greater evil, which, by the
ordinance of nature, I should strive to avoid by every means in
my power.

(16:37) We may, therefore, conclude that a compact is only made
valid by its utility, without which it becomes null and void.
(38) It is, therefore, foolish to ask a man to keep his faith with
us for ever, unless we also endeavour that the violation of the
compact we enter into shall involve for the violator more harm
than good.  (39) This consideration should have very great weight
in forming a state.  (40) However, if all men could be easily led
by reason alone, and could recognize what is best and most useful
for a state, there would be no one who would not forswear deceit,
for everyone would keep most religiously to their compact in their
desire for the chief good, namely, the shield and buckler of the 
commonwealth.  (16:41) However, it is far from being the case that all
men can always be easily led by reason alone; everyone is drawn
away by his pleasure, while avarice, ambition, envy, hatred, and
the like so engross the mind that reason has no place therein.
(16:42) Hence, though men make promises with all the appearances
of good faith, and agree that they will keep to their engagement,
no one can absolutely rely on another man's promise unless there
is something behind it. (43) Everyone has by nature a right to act
deceitfully. and to break his compacts, unless he be restrained by
the hope of some greater good, or the fear of some greater evil.

(16:44) However, as we have shown that the natural right of the
individual is only limited by his power, it is clear that by
transferring, either willingly or under compulsion, this power
into the hands of another, he in so doing necessarily cedes also
a part of his right; and further, that the Sovereign right over
all men belongs to him who has sovereign power, wherewith he can
compel men by force, or restrain them by threats of the
universally feared punishment of death; such sovereign right he
will retain only so long as he can maintain his power of
enforcing his will; otherwise he will totter on his throne,
and no one who is stronger than he will be bound unwillingly
to obey him.

(16:45) In this manner a society can be formed without any
violation of natural right, and the covenant can always be
strictly kept - that is, if each individual hands over the
whole of his power to the body politic, the latter will then
possess sovereign natural right over all things; that is,
it will have sole and unquestioned dominion, and everyone
will be bound to obey, under pain of the severest punishment.
(16:46) A body politic of this kind is called a Democracy,
which may be defined as a society which wields all its power
as a whole.  (47) The sovereign power is not restrained by any
laws, but everyone is bound to obey it in all things; such is
the state of things implied when men either tacitly or expressly
handed over to it all their power of self-defence, or in other
words, all their right.  (16:48) For if they had wished to retain
any right for themselves, they ought to have taken precautions
for its defence and preservation; as they have not done so,
and indeed could not have done so without dividing and
consequently ruining the state, they placed themselves
absolutely at the mercy of the sovereign power; and, therefore,
having acted (as we have shown) as reason and necessity demanded,
they are obliged to fulfil the commands of the sovereign
power, however absurd these may be, else they will be public
enemies, and will act against reason, which urges the preservation
of the state as a primary duty. (49) For reason bids us choose the
least of two evils.

(16:50) Furthermore, this danger of submitting absolutely to the
dominion and will of another, is one which may be incurred with a
light heart: for we have shown that sovereigns only possess this
right of imposing their will, so long as they have the full power
to enforce it: if such power be lost their right to command is
lost also, or lapses to those who have assumed it and can keep it.
(16:51) Thus it is very rare for sovereigns to impose thoroughly
irrational commands, for they are bound to consult their own 
interests, and retain their power by consulting the public good and
acting according to the dictates of reason, as Seneca says, "violenta
imperia nemo continuit diu." (52) No one can long retain a tyrant's
sway.

(16:53) In a democracy, irrational commands are still less to be
feared: for it is almost impossible that the majority of a people,
especially if it be a large one, should agree in an irrational
design: and, moreover, the basis and aim of a democracy is to avoid
the desires as irrational, and to bring men as far as possible
under the control of reason, so that they may live in peace and
harmony: if this basis be removed the whole fabric falls to ruin.

(16:54) Such being the ends in view for the sovereign power, the
duty of subjects is, as I have said, to obey its commands, and to
recognize no right save that which it sanctions.

[16:4] (55) It will, perhaps, be thought that we are turning subjects
into slaves: for slaves obey commands and free men live as they like;
but this idea is based on a misconception, for the true slave is he
who is led away by his pleasures and can neither see what is good for
him nor act accordingly: he alone is free who lives with free consent
under the entire guidance of reason.

(16:56) Action in obedience to orders does take away freedom in a
certain sense, but it does not, therefore, make a man a slave, all
depends on the object of the action.  (57) If the object of the
action be the good of the state, and not the good of the agent,
the latter is a slave and does himself no good: but in a state or
kingdom where the weal of the whole people, and not that of the ruler,
is the supreme law, obedience to the sovereign power does not make a
man a slave, of no use to himself, but a subject.  (58) Therefore,
that state is the freest whose laws are founded on sound reason,
so that every member of it may, if he will, be free; [Endnote 27]
that is, live with full consent under the entire guidance of reason.

(16:59) Children, though they are bound to obey all the commands of
their parents, are yet not slaves: for the commands of parents look
generally to the children's benefit.

(16:60) We must, therefore, acknowledge a great difference between
a slave, a son, and a subject; their positions may be thus defined.
(61) A slave is one who is bound to obey his master's orders, though
they are given solely in the master's interest: a son is one who
obeys his father's orders, given in his own interest; a subject obeys
the orders of the sovereign power, given for the common interest,
wherein he is included.

(16:62) I think I have now shown sufficiently clearly the basis of
a democracy: I have especially desired to do so, for I believe it
to be of all forms of government the most natural, and the most
consonant with individual liberty.  (63) In it no one transfers his
natural right so absolutely that he has no further voice in affairs,
he only hands it over to the majority of a society, whereof he is a
unit. Thus all men remain as they were in the state of nature,
equals.

(16:64) This is the only form of government which I have treated of
at length, for it is the one most akin to my purpose of showing the
benefits of freedom in a state.

(16:65) I may pass over the fundamental principles of other forms
of government, for we may gather from what has been said whence
their right arises without going into its origin.  (16:66) The possessor
of sovereign power, whether he be one, or many, or the whole body
politic, has the sovereign right of imposing any commands he pleases:
and he who has either voluntarily, or under compulsion, transferred
the right to defend him to another, has, in so doing, renounced his
natural right and is therefore bound to obey, in all things, the
commands of the sovereign power; and will be bound so to do so 
as the king, or nobles, or the people preserve the sovereign power
which formed the basis of the original transfer.  (67) I need add
no more.

[16:5] (68) The bases and rights of dominion being thus displayed,
we shall readily be able to define private civil right, wrong,
justice, and injustice, with their relations to the state; and also
to determine what constitutes an ally, or an enemy, or the crime of
treason.

(16:69) By private civil right we can only mean the liberty every
man possesses to preserve his existence, a liberty limited by the
edicts of the sovereign power, and preserved only by its authority:
for when a man has transferred to another his right of living as he
likes, which was only limited by his power, that is, has transferred
his liberty and power of self-defence, he is bound to live as that
other dictates, and to trust to him entirely for his defence.
(16:70) Wrong takes place when a citizen, or subject, is forced
by another to undergo some loss or pain in contradiction to the
authority of the law, or the edict of the sovereign power.

(16:71) Wrong is conceivable only in an organized community: nor can
it ever accrue to subjects from any act of the sovereign, who has
the right to do what he likes.  (72) It can only arise, therefore,
between private persons, who are bound by law and right not to injure
one another.  (73) Justice consists in the habitual rendering to every
man his lawful due: injustice consists in depriving a man, under the 
pretence of legality, of what the laws, rightly interpreted, would
allow him.  (74) These last are also called equity and iniquity,
because those who administer the laws are bound to show no respect of
persons, but to account all men equal, and to defend every man's right
equally, neither envying the rich nor despising the poor.

[16:6](75) The men of two states become allies, when for the sake of
avoiding war, or for some other advantage, they covenant to do each
other no hurt, but on the contrary, to assist each other if necessity
arises, each retaining his independence.  (76) Such a covenant is
valid so long as its basis of danger or advantage is in force: no one
enters into an engagement, or is bound to stand by his compacts unless
there be a hope of some accruing good, or the fear of some evil:
if this basis be removed the compact thereby becomes void: this has
been abundantly shown by experience.  (77) For although different
states make treaties not to harm one another, they always take every
possible precaution against such treaties being broken by the stronger
party, and do not rely on the compact, unless there is a sufficiently
obvious object and advantage to both parties in observing it.
(16:78) Otherwise they would fear a breach of faith, nor would there
be any wrong done thereby: for who in his proper senses, and aware of
the right of the sovereign power, would trust in the promises of one
who has the will and the power to do what he likes, and who aims
solely at the safety and advantage of his dominion?  (79) Moreover,
if we consult loyalty and religion, we shall see that no one in
possession of power ought to abide by his promises to the injury of
his dominion; for he cannot keep such promises without breaking the
engagement he made with his subjects, by which both he and they are
most solemnly bound.  (80) An enemy is one who lives apart from the
state, and does not recognize its authority either as a subject or
as an ally. It is not hatred which makes a man an enemy, but the
rights of the state.  (16:81) The rights of the state are the same
in regard to him who does not recognize by any compact the state
authority, as they are against him who has done the state an injury:
it has the right to force him as best it can, either to submit,
or to contract an alliance.

[16:7] (82) Lastly, treason can only be committed by subjects,
who by compact, either tacit or expressed, have transferred all
their rights to the state: a subject is said to have committed
this crime when he has attempted, for whatever reason, to seize
the sovereign power, or to place it in different hands.
(1:83) I say, has attempted, for if punishment were not to
overtake him till he had succeeded, it would often come too
late, the sovereign rights would have been acquired or
transferred already.

(16:84) I also say, has attempted, for whatever reason, to seize
the sovereign power, and I recognize no difference whether such
an attempt should be followed by public loss or public gain.
(85) Whatever be his reason for acting, the crime is treason,
and he is rightly condemned: in war, everyone would admit the
justice of his sentence.  (86) If a man does not keep to his post,
but approaches the enemy without the knowledge of his commander,
whatever may be his motive, so long as he acts on his own motion,
even if he advances with the design of defeating the enemy, he is
rightly put to death, because he has violated his oath, and
infringed the rights of his commander.  (87) That all citizens
are equally bound by these rights in time of peace, is not so
generally recognized, but the reasons for obedience are in both
cases identical.  (16:88) The state must be preserved and directed
by the sole authority of the sovereign, and such authority and
right have been accorded by universal consent to him alone: if,
therefore, anyone else attempts, without his consent, to execute
any public enterprise, even though the state might (as we said)
reap benefit therefrom, such person has none the less infringed
the sovereigns right, and would be rightly punished for treason.

(16:89) In order that every scruple may be removed, we may now
answer the inquiry, whether our former assertion that everyone
who has not the practice of reason, may, in the state of nature,
live by sovereign natural right, according to the laws of his
desires, is not in direct opposition to the law and right of God
as revealed. (90) For as all men absolutely (whether they be less
endowed with reason or more) are equally bound by the Divine
command to love their neighbour as themselves, it may be said that
they cannot, without wrong, do injury to anyone, or live according
to their desires.

(16:91) This objection, so far as the state of nature is concerned,
can be easily answered, for the state of nature is, both in nature
and in time, prior to religion.  (92) No one knows by nature that he
owes any obedience to God [Endnote 28] nor can he attain thereto by
any exercise of his reason, but solely by revelation confirmed by
signs. (93) Therefore, previous to revelation, no one is bound by a
Divine law and right of which he is necessarily in ignorance.
(16:94) The state of nature must by no means be confounded with a
state of religion, but must be conceived as without either religion
or law, and consequently without sin or wrong: this is how we have
described it, and we are confirmed by the authority of Paul.
(16:95) It is not only in respect of ignorance that we conceive the
state of nature as prior to, and lacking the Divine revealed law
and right; but in respect of freedom also, wherewith all men are
born endowed.

(16:96) If men were naturally bound by the Divine law and right,
or if the Divine law and right were a natural necessity, there
would have been no need for God to make a covenant with mankind,
and to bind them thereto with an oath and agreement.

(16:97) We must, then, fully grant that the Divine law and right
originated at the time when men by express covenant agreed to obey
God in all things, and ceded, as it were, their natural freedom,
transferring their rights to God in the manner described in speaking
of the formation of a state.

(98) However, I will treat of these matters more at length presently.

[16:8] (99) It may be insisted that sovereigns are as much bound
by the Divine law as subjects: whereas we have asserted that they
retain their natural rights, and may do whatever they like. 

(16:100) In order to clear up the whole difficulty, which arises
rather concerning the natural right than the natural state,
I maintain that everyone is bound, in the state of nature, to live
according to Divine law, in the same way as he is bound to live
according to the dictates of sound reason; namely, inasmuch as it
is to his advantage, and necessary for his salvation; but, if he
will not so live, he may do otherwise at his own risk.  (101) He is
thus bound to live according to his own laws, not according to
anyone else's, and to recognize no man as a judge, or as a superior
in religion.  (16:102) Such, in my opinion, is the position of a
sovereign, for he may take advice from his fellow-men, but he is
not bound to recognize any as a judge, nor anyone besides himself
as an arbitrator on any question of right, unless it be a prophet
sent expressly by God and attesting his mission by indisputable
signs.  (103) Even then he does not recognize a man, but God
Himself as His judge.

[16:9] (104) If a sovereign refuses to obey God as revealed in His
law, he does so at his own risk and loss, but without violating any
civil or natural right.  (105) For the civil right is dependent on
his own decree; and natural right is dependent on the laws of nature,
which latter are not adapted to religion, whose sole aim is the good
of humanity, but to the order of nature - that is, to God's eternal
decree unknown to us.

(16:106) This truth seems to be adumbrated in a somewhat obscurer
form by those who maintain that men can sin against God's
revelation, but not against the eternal decree by which He has
ordained all things.

(16:107) We may be asked, what should we do if the sovereign commands
anything contrary to religion, and the obedience which we have
expressly vowed to God? should we obey the Divine law or the human
law?  (108) I shall treat of this question at length hereafter,
and will therefore merely say now, that God should be obeyed before
all else, when we have a certain and indisputable revelation of His
will: but men are very prone to error on religious subjects, and,
according to the diversity of their dispositions, are wont with
considerable stir to put forward their own inventions, as experience
more than sufficiently attests, so that if no one were bound to obey
the state in matters which, in his own opinion concern religion,
the rights of the state would be dependent on every man's judgment
and passions.  (16:109) No one would consider himself bound to obey
laws framed against his faith or superstition; and on this pretext
he might assume unbounded license.  (110) In this way, the rights
of the civil authorities would be utterly set at nought, so that we
must conclude that the sovereign power, which alone is bound both
by Divine and natural right to preserve and guard the laws of the
state, should have supreme authority for making any laws about
religion which it thinks fit; all are bound to obey its behests on
the subject in accordance with their promise which God bids them to
keep.

(16:111) However, if the sovereign power be heathen, we should either
enter into no engagements therewith, and yield up our lives sooner
than transfer to it any of our rights; or, if the engagement be made,
and our rights transferred, we should (inasmuch as we should have
ourselves transferred the right of defending ourselves and our
religion) be bound to obey them, and to keep our word: we might even
rightly be bound so to do, except in those cases where God, by
indisputable revelation, has promised His special aid against tyranny,
or given us special exemption from obedience.  (112) Thus we see that,
of all the Jews in Babylon, there were only three youths who were
certain of the help of God, and, therefore, refused to obey
Nebuchadnezzar.  (113) All the rest, with the sole exception of
Daniel, who was beloved by the king, were doubtless compelled by
right to obey, perhaps thinking that they had been delivered up by
God into the hands of the king, and that the king had obtained and
preserved his dominion by God's design.  (16:114) On the other hand,
Eleazar, before his country had utterly fallen, wished to give a proof
of his constancy to his compatriots, in order that they might follow
in his footsteps, and go to any lengths, rather than allow their right
and power to be transferred to the Greeks, or brave any torture rather
than swear allegiance to the heathen.  (115) Instances are occurring
every day in confirmation of what I here advance.  (116) The rulers of
Christian kingdoms do not hesitate, with a view to strengthening their
dominion, to make treaties with Turks and heathen, and to give orders
to their subjects who settle among such peoples not to assume more
freedom, either in things secular or religious, than is set down in
the treaty, or allowed by the foreign government.  (16:117) We may see
this exemplified in the Dutch treaty with the Japanese, which I have
already mentioned.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

[17:0] CHAPTER XVII - IT IS SHOWN THAT NO ONE CAN, OR 
       NEED, TRANSFER ALL HIS RIGHTS TO THE SOVEREIGN POWER. 
       OF THE HEBREW REPUBLIC, AS IT WAS DURING THE LIFETIME 
       OF MOSES, AND AFTER HIS DEATH, TILL THE FOUNDATION 
       OF THE MONARCHY; AND OF ITS EXCELLENCE.  LASTLY, OF 
       THE CAUSES WHY THE THEOCRATIC REPUBLIC FELL, AND WHY 
       IT COULD HARDLY HAVE CONTINUED WITHOUT DISSENSION. 

[17:1] (1) The theory put forward in the last chapter, of the
universal rights of the sovereign power, and of the natural rights
of the individual transferred thereto, though it corresponds
in many respects with actual practice, and though practice may
be so arranged as to conform to it more and more, must nevertheless
always remain in many respects purely ideal.  (2) No one can ever so
utterly transfer to another his power and, consequently, his rights,
as to cease to be a man; nor can there ever be a power so sovereign
that it can carry out every possible wish.  (3) It will always be
vain to order a subject to hate what he believes brings him advantage,
or to love what brings him loss, or not to be offended at insults,
or not to wish to be free from fear, or a hundred other things of
the sort, which necessarily follow from the laws of human nature.
(17:4) So much, I think, is abundantly shown by experience: for men
have never so far ceded their power as to cease to be an object of
fear to the rulers who received such power and right; and dominions
have always been in as much danger from their own subjects as from
external enemies.  (5) If it were really the case, that men could be
deprived of their natural rights so utterly as never to have any
further influence on affairs [Endnote 29] except with the permission
of the holders of sovereign right, it would then be possible to
maintain with impunity the most violent tyranny, which, I suppose,
no one would for an instant admit.

(17:6) We must, therefore, grant that every man retains some part
of his right, in dependence on his own decision, and no one else's.

(17:7) However, in order correctly to understand the extent of the
sovereign's right and power, we must take notice that it does not
cover only those actions to which it can compel men by fear, but
absolutely every action which it can induce men to perform: for it
is the fact of obedience, not the motive for obedience, which makes
a man a subject.

(17:8) Whatever be the cause which leads a man to obey the commands
of the sovereign, whether it be fear or hope, or love of his country,
or any other emotion - the fact remains that the man takes counsel
with himself, and nevertheless acts as his sovereign orders.
(9) We must not, therefore, assert that all actions resulting
from a man's deliberation with himself are done in obedience to
the rights of the individual rather than the sovereign: as a matter
of fact, all actions spring from a man's deliberation with himself,
whether the determining motive be love or fear of punishment;
therefore, either dominion does not exist, and has no rights
over its subjects, or else it extends over every instance in which
it can prevail on men to decide to obey it.  (17:10) Consequently,
every action which a subject performs in accordance with the commands
of the sovereign, whether such action springs from love, or fear,
or (as is more frequently the case) from hope and fear together,
or from reverence. compounded of fear and admiration, or, indeed,
any motive whatever, is performed in virtue of his submission to
the sovereign, and not in virtue of his own authority.

(17:11) This point is made still more clear by the fact that
obedience does not consist so much in the outward act as in the
mental state of the person obeying; so that he is most under
the dominion of another who with his whole heart determines to
obey another's commands; and consequently the firmest dominion
belongs to the sovereign who has most influence over the minds
of his subjects; if those who are most feared possessed the
firmest dominion, the firmest dominion would belong to the
subjects of a tyrant, for they are always greatly feared by
their ruler.  (17:12) Furthermore, though it is impossible to
govern the mind as completely as the tongue, nevertheless minds
are, to a certain extent, under the control of the sovereign,
for he can in many ways bring about that the greatest part of his
subjects should follow his wishes in their beliefs, their loves,
and their hates.  (13) Though such emotions do not arise at the
express command of the sovereign they often result (as experience
shows) from the authority of his power, and from his direction;
in other words, in virtue of his right; we may, therefore, without
doing violence to our understanding, conceive men who follow the
instigation of their sovereign in their beliefs, their loves,
their hates, their contempt, and all other emotions whatsoever.

(17:14) Though the powers of government, as thus conceived,
are sufficiently ample, they can never become large enough to
execute every possible wish of their possessors.  (15) This,
I think, I have already shown clearly enough.  (16) The method
of forming a dominion which should prove lasting I do not,
as I have said, intend to discuss, but in order to arrive at
the object I have in view, I will touch on the teaching of
Divine revelation to Moses in this respect, and we will
consider the history and the success of the Jews, gathering
therefrom what should be the chief concessions made by
sovereigns to their subjects with a view to the security and
increase of their dominion.

[17:2] (17) That the preservation of a state chiefly depends
on the subjects' fidelity and constancy in carrying out the
orders they receive, is most clearly taught both by reason and
experience; how subjects ought to be guided so as best to
preserve their fidelity and virtue is not so obvious.  (18) All,
both rulers and ruled, are men, and prone to follow after their
lusts.  (17:19) The fickle disposition of the multitude almost
reduces those who have experience of it to despair, for it is
governed solely by emotions, not by reason: it rushes headlong
into every enterprise, and is easily corrupted either by avarice
or luxury: everyone thinks himself omniscient and wishes to
fashion all things to his liking, judging a thing to be just or
unjust, lawful or unlawful, according as he thinks it will bring
him profit or loss: vanity leads him to despise his equals, and
refuse their guidance: envy of superior fame or fortune (for such
gifts are never equally distributed) leads him to desire and
rejoice in his neighbour's downfall.  (17:20) I need not go through
the whole list, everyone knows already how much crime results
from disgust at the present - desire for change, headlong anger,
and contempt for poverty - and how men's minds are engrossed and
kept in turmoil thereby.

(17:21) To guard against all these evils, and form a dominion
where no room is left for deceit; to frame our institutions so
that every man, whatever his disposition, may prefer public
right to private advantage, this is the task and this the toil.
(22) Necessity is often the mother of invention, but she has
never yet succeeded in framing a dominion that was in less
danger from its own citizens than from open enemies, or whose
rulers did not fear the latter less than the former.
(17:23) Witness the state of Rome, invincible by her
enemies, but many times conquered and sorely oppressed
by her own citizens, especially in the war between
Vespasian and Vitellius.  (24) (See Tacitus, Hist. bk. iv.
for a description of the pitiable state of the city.)

(17:25) Alexander thought prestige abroad more easy to acquire
than prestige at home, and believed that his greatness could be
destroyed by his own followers.  (26) Fearing such a disaster,
he thus addressed his friends: "Keep me safe from internal
treachery and domestic plots, and I will front without fear the
dangers of battle and of war.  (27) Philip was more secure in
the battle array than in the theatre: he often escaped from
the hands of the enemy, he could not escape from his own subjects.
(17:28) If you think over the deaths of kings, you will count up
more who have died by the assassin than by the open foe."
(Q. Curtius, chap. vi.)

(17:29) For the sake of making themselves secure, kings who
seized the throne in ancient times used to try to spread the
idea that they were descended from the immortal gods, thinking
that if their subjects and the rest of mankind did not look on
them as equals, but believed them to be gods, they would
willingly submit to their rule, and obey their commands. 
(17:30) Thus Augustus persuaded the Romans that he was
descended from AEneas, who was the son of Venus, and numbered
among the gods.  (31) "He wished himself to be worshipped in
temples, like the gods, with flamens and priests."
(Tacitus, Ann. i. 10.) 

(17:32) Alexander wished to be saluted as the son of Jupiter,
not from motives of pride but of policy, as he showed by his
answer to the invective of Hermolaus: "It is almost laughable,"
said he, that Hermolaus asked me to contradict Jupiter,
by whose oracle I am recognized.  (33) Am I responsible for
the answers of the gods?  (34) It offered me the name of son;
acquiescence was by no means foreign to my present designs.
(17:35) Would that the Indians also would believe me to be a
god! (36) Wars are carried through by prestige, falsehoods
that are believed often gain the force of truth."
(Curtius, viii,. Para, 8.)  (37) In these few words he
cleverly contrives to palm off a fiction on the ignorant,
and at the same time hints at the motive for the deception.

(17:38) Cleon, in his speech persuading the Macedonians to
obey their king, adopted a similar device: for after going
through the praises of Alexander with admiration, and
recalling his merits, he proceeds, "the Persians are not
only pious, but prudent in worshipping their kings as gods:
for kingship is the shield of public safety," and he ends
thus, "I, myself, when the king enters a banquet hall,
should prostrate my body on the ground; other men should do
the like, especially those who are wise " (Curtius, viii.
Para. 66). (39) However, the Macedonians were more prudent -
indeed, it is only complete barbarians who can be so openly
cajoled, and can suffer themselves to be turned from subjects
into slaves without interests of their own.  (17:40) Others,
notwithstanding, have been able more easily to spread the
belief that kingship is sacred, and plays the part of God
on the earth, that it has been instituted by God, not by the
suffrage and consent of men; and that it is preserved and
guarded by Divine special providence and aid.  (41) Similar
fictions have been promulgated by monarchs, with the object of
strengthening their dominion, but these I will pass over,
and in order to arrive at my main purpose, will merely recall
and discuss the teaching on the subject of Divine revelation
to Moses in ancient times.

[17:3] (42) We have said in Chap. V. that after the Hebrews
came up out of Egypt they were not bound by the law and right
of any other nation, but were at liberty to institute any new
rites at their pleasure, and to occupy whatever territory
they chose.  (43) After their liberation from the intolerable
bondage of the Egyptians, they were bound by no covenant to
any man; and, therefore, every man entered into his natural
right, and was free to retain it or to give it up, and transfer
it to another.  (44) Being, then, in the state of nature, they
followed the advice of Moses, in whom they chiefly trusted, and
decided to transfer their right to no human being, but only to
God; without further delay they all, with one voice, promised to
obey all the commands of the Deity, and to acknowledge no right
that He did not proclaim as such by prophetic revelation.
(17:45) This promise, or transference of right to God, was
effected in the same manner as we have conceived it to have
been in ordinary societies, when men agree to divest themselves
of their natural rights.  (46) It is, in fact, in virtue of a set
covenant, and an oath (see Exod. xxxiv:10), that the Jews freely,
and not under compulsion or threats, surrendered their rights and
transferred them to God.  (47) Moreover, in order that this
covenant might be ratified and settled, and might be free from
all suspicion of deceit, God did not enter into it till the Jews
had had experience of His wonderful power by which alone they
had been, or could be, preserved in a state of prosperity
(Exod. xix:4, 5).  (17:48) It is because they believed that
nothing but God's power could preserve them that they
surrendered to God the natural power of self-preservation,
which they formerly, perhaps, thought they possessed,
and consequently they surrendered at the same time all
their natural right.

[17:4] (49) God alone, therefore, held dominion over the
Hebrews, whose state was in virtue of the covenant called God's
kingdom, and God was said to be their king; consequently the
enemies of the Jews were said to be the enemies of God, and the
citizens who tried to seize the dominion were guilty of treason
against God; and, lastly, the laws of the state were called the
laws and commandments of God.  (50) Thus in the Hebrew state the
civil and religious authority, each consisting solely of
obedience to God, were one and the same.  (51) The dogmas of
religion were not precepts, but laws and ordinances; piety was
regarded as the same as loyalty, impiety as the same as
disaffection.  (17:52) Everyone who fell away from religion
ceased to be a citizen, and was, on that ground alone, accounted
an enemy: those who died for the sake of religion, were held to
have died for their country; in fact, between civil and religious
law and right there was no distinction whatever.  (53) For this
reason the government could be called a Theocracy, inasmuch as
the citizens were not bound by anything save the revelations of God.

(17:54) However, this state of things existed rather in theory
than in practice, for it will appear from what we are about to
say, that the Hebrews, as a matter of fact, retained absolutely
in their own hands the right of sovereignty: this is shown by
the method and plan by which the government was carried on,
as I will now explain.

(17:55) Inasmuch as the Hebrews did not transfer their rights
to any other person but, as in a democracy, all surrendered their
rights equally, and cried out with one voice, "Whatsoever God 
hall speak (no mediator or mouthpiece being named) that will we
do," it follows that all were equally bound by the covenant,
and that all had an equal right to consult the Deity, to accept
and to interpret His laws, so that all had an exactly equal share
in the government.  [17:5] (56) Thus at first they all approached
God together, so that they might learn His commands, but in this
first salutation, they were so thoroughly terrified and so
astounded to hear God speaking, that they thought their last hour
was at hand: full of fear, therefore, they went afresh to Moses,
and said, "Lo, we have heard God speaking in the fire, and there
is no cause why we should wish to die: surely this great fire
will consume us: if we hear again the voice of God, we shall
surely die.  (57) Thou, therefore, go near, and hear all the words
of our God, and thou (not God) shalt speak with us: all that God
shall tell us, that will we hearken to and perform."

(17:58) They thus clearly abrogated their former covenant, and
absolutely transferred to Moses their right to consult God and
interpret His commands: for they do not here promise obedience
to all that God shall tell them, but to all that God shall tell
Moses (see Deut. v:20 after the Decalogue, and chap. xviii:15, 16).
(17:59) Moses, therefore, remained the sole promulgator and
interpreter of the Divine laws, and consequently also the sovereign
judge, who could not be arraigned himself, and who acted among the
Hebrews the part, of God; in other words, held the sovereign
kingship: he alone had the right to consult God, to give the
Divine answers to the people, and to see that they were carried
out.  (17:60) I say he alone, for if anyone during the life of Moses
was desirous of preaching anything in the name of the Lord, he was,
even if a true prophet, considered guilty and a usurper of the
sovereign right (Numb. xi:28) [Endnote 30].  (61) We may here
notice, that though the people had elected Moses, they could not
rightfully elect Moses's successor; for having transferred to
Moses their right of consulting God, and absolutely promised to
regard him as a Divine oracle, they had plainly forfeited the
whole of their right, and were bound to accept as chosen by God
anyone proclaimed by Moses as his successor.  (17:62) If Moses had
so chosen his successor, who like him should wield the sole right
of government, possessing the sole right of consulting God,
and consequently of making and abrogating laws, of deciding on
peace or war, of sending ambassadors, appointing judges - in fact,
discharging all the functions of a sovereign, the state would have
become simply a monarchy, only differing from other monarchies in
the fact, that the latter are, or should be, carried on in
accordance with God's decree, unknown even to the monarch, whereas
the Hebrew monarch would have been the only person to whom the
decree was revealed.  (17:63) A difference which increases, rather
than diminishes the monarch's authority.  (64) As far as the people
in both cases are concerned, each would be equally subject, and
equally ignorant of the Divine decree, for each would be dependent
on the monarch's words, and would learn from him alone, what was
lawful or unlawful: nor would the fact that the people believed
that the monarch was only issuing commands in accordance with God's
decree revealed to him, make it less in subjection, but rather more.
[17:6] (65) However, Moses elected no such successor, but left the
dominion to those who came after him in a condition which could not
be called a popular government, nor an aristocracy, nor a monarchy,
but a Theocracy.  (66) For the right of interpreting laws was vested
in one man, while the right and power of administering the state
according to the laws thus interpreted, was vested in another man
(see Numb. xxvii:21). [Endnote 31]

(17:67) In order that the question may be thoroughly understood,
I will duly set forth the administration of the whole state.

(17:68) First, the people were commanded to build a tabernacle,
which should be, as it were, the dwelling of God - that is, of
the sovereign authority of the state.  (69) This tabernacle was
to be erected at the cost of the whole people, not of one man,
in order that the place where God was consulted might be public
property.  (70) The Levites were chosen as courtiers and
administrators of this royal abode; while Aaron, the brother
of Moses, was chosen to be their chief and second, as it were,
to God their King, being succeeded in the office by his
legitimate sons.

(17:71) He, as the nearest to God, was the sovereign interpreter
of the Divine laws; he communicated the answers of the Divine
oracle to the people, and entreated God's favour for them.
(72) If, in addition to these privileges, he had possessed
the right of ruling, he would have been neither more nor less
than an absolute monarch; but, in respect to government, he was
only a private citizen: the whole tribe of Levi was so completely
divested of governing rights that it did not even take its share
with the others in the partition of territory.  (73) Moses provided
for its support by inspiring the common people with great reverence
for it, as the only tribe dedicated to God.

(17:74) Further, the army, formed from the remaining twelve
tribes, was commanded to invade the land of Canaan, to divide
it into twelve portions, and to distribute it among the tribes
by lot.  (75) For this task twelve captains were chosen,
one from every tribe, and were, together with Joshua and Eleazar,
the high priest, empowered to divide the land into twelve equal
parts, and distribute it by lot. (76) Joshua was chosen for the
chief command of the army, inasmuch as none but he had the right
to consult God in emergencies, not like Moses, alone in his tent,
or in the tabernacle, but through the high priest, to whom only
the answers of God were revealed.  (17:77) Furthermore, he was
empowered to execute, and cause the people to obey God's commands,
transmitted through the high priests; to find, and to make use of,
means for carrying them out; to choose as many army captains as
he liked; to make whatever choice he thought best; to send
ambassadors in his own name; and, in short, to have the entire
control of the war.  (17:78) To his office there was no rightful
successor - indeed, the post was only filled by the direct order
of the Deity, on occasions of public emergency.  (79) In ordinary
times, all the management of peace and war was vested in the
captains of the tribes, as I will shortly point out.  (80) Lastly,
all men between the ages of twenty and sixty were ordered to
bear arms, and form a citizen army, owing allegiance, not to
its general-in-chief, nor to the high priest, but to Religion and
to God.  (17:81) The army, or the hosts, were called the army
of God, or the hosts of God.  (82) For this reason God was called
by the Hebrews the God of Armies; and the ark of the covenant was
borne in the midst of the army in important battles, when the
safety or destruction of the whole people hung upon the issue,
so that the people might, as it were, see their King among them,
and put forth all their strength.

(17:83) From these directions, left by Moses to his successors,
we plainly see that he chose administrators, rather than despots,
to come after him; for he invested no one with the power of
consulting God, where he liked and alone, consequently, no one
had the power possessed by himself of ordaining and abrogating
laws, of deciding on war or peace, of choosing men to fill
offices both religious and secular: all these are the
prerogatives of a sovereign.  (84) The high priest, indeed,
had the right of interpreting laws, and communicating the
answers of God, but he could not do so when he liked, as Moses
could, but only when he was asked by the general-in-chief
of the army, the council, or some similar authority.
(17:85) The general-in-chief and the council could consult
God when they liked, but could only receive His answers through
the high priest; so that the utterances of God, as reported by
the high priest, were not decrees, as they were when reported
by Moses, but only answers; they were accepted by Joshua and
the council, and only then had the force of commands and decrees.

(17:86) The high priest, both in the case of Aaron and of his
son Eleazar, was chosen by Moses; nor had anyone, after Moses'
death, a right to elect to the office, which became hereditary.
(87) The general-in-chief of the army was also chosen by Moses,
and assumed his functions in virtue of the commands, not of the
high priest, but of Moses: indeed, after the death of Joshua,
the high priest did not appoint anyone in his place, and the
captains did not consult God afresh about a general-in-chief,
but each retained Joshua's power in respect to the contingent
of his own tribe, and all retained it collectively, in respect
to the whole army.  (17:88) There seems to have been no need
of a general-in-chief, except when they were obliged to unite
their forces against a common enemy.  (89) This occurred most
frequently during the time of Joshua, when they had no fixed
dwelling. place, and possessed all things in common.
[17:7] (90) After all the tribes had gained their territories
by right of conquest, and had divided their allotted gains,
they became separated, having no longer their possessions
in common, so that the need for a single commander ceased,
for the different tribes should be considered rather in the
light of confederated states than of bodies of fellow-citizens.
(17:91) In respect to their God and their religion, they were
fellow-citizens; but, in respect to the rights which one
possessed with regard to another, they were only confederated:
they were, in fact, in much the same position (if one excepts
the Temple common to all) as the United States of the Netherlands.
(17:92) The division of property, held in common is only another
phrase for the possession of his share by each of the owners
singly, and the surrender by the others of their rights over
such share.  (93) This is why Moses elected captains of the
tribes - namely, that when the dominion was divided, each might
take care of his own part; consulting God through the high priest
on the affairs of his tribe, ruling over his army, building and
fortifying cities, appointing judges, attacking the enemies of
his own dominion, and having complete control over all civil
and military affairs.  (17:94) He was not bound to acknowledge
any superior judge save God [Endnote 32] or a prophet whom God
should expressly send.  (95) If he departed from the worship of
God, the rest of the tribes did not arraign him as a subject,
but attacked him as an enemy.  (95a) Of this we have examples in
Scripture. (17:96) When Joshua was dead, the children of Israel
(not a fresh general-in-chief) consulted God; it being decided
that the tribe of Judah should be the first to attack its enemies,
the tribe in question contracted a single alliance with the
tribe of Simeon, for uniting their forces, and attacking their
common enemy, the rest of the tribes not being included in the
alliance (Judges i:1, 2, 3).  (97) Each tribe separately made
war against its own enemies, and, according to its pleasure,
received them as subjects or allies, though it had been
commanded not to spare them on any conditions, but to destroy
them utterly.  (98) Such disobedience met with reproof from the
rest of the tribes, but did not cause the offending tribe to be
arraigned: it was not considered a sufficient reason for
proclaiming a civil war, or interfering in one another's affairs.
(17:99) But when the tribe of Benjamin offended against the others,
and so loosened the bonds of peace that none of the confederated
tribes could find refuge within its borders, they attacked it as
an enemy, and gaining the victory over it after three battles,
put to death both guilty and innocent, according to the laws of
war: an act which they subsequently bewailed with tardy repentance.

(17:100) These examples plainly confirm what we have said concerning
the rights of each tribe.  (101) Perhaps we shall be asked who elected
the successors to the captains of each tribe; on this point I can
gather no positive information in Scripture, but I conjecture that
as the tribes were divided into families, each headed by its senior
member, the senior of all these heads of families succeeded by right
to the office of captain, for Moses chose from among these seniors
his seventy coadjutors, who formed with himself the supreme council.
(17:102) Those who administered the government after the death of
Joshua were called elders, and elder is a very common Hebrew
expression in the sense of judge, as I suppose everyone knows;
however, it is not very important for us to make up our minds on
this point.  (103) It is enough to have shown that after the death
of Moses no one man wielded all the power of a sovereign; as affairs
were not all managed by one man, nor by a single council, nor by
the popular vote, but partly by one tribe, partly by the rest in
equal shares, it is most evident that the government, after the
death of Moses, was neither monarchic, nor aristocratic, nor popular,
but, as we have said, Theocratic.  (104) The reasons for applying
this name are:

I.   (17:105) Because the royal seat of government was the Temple,
     and in respect to it alone, as we have shown, all the tribes
     were fellow-citizens,

II.  (17:106) Because all the people owed allegiance to God,
     their supreme Judge, to whom only they had promised
     implicit obedience in all things.

III. (17:107) Because the general-in-chief or dictator, when
     there was need of such, was elected by none save God alone.
     (108) This was expressly commanded by Moses in the name
     of God (Deut. xix:15), and witnessed by the actual choice
     of Gideon, of Samson, and of Samuel; wherefrom we may
     conclude that the other faithful leaders were chosen in
     the same manner, though it is not expressly told us.

(17:109) These preliminaries being stated, it is now time to
inquire the effects of forming a dominion on this plan, and to
see whether it so effectually kept within bounds both rulers
and ruled, that the former were never tyrannical and the
latter never rebellious.

(17:110) Those who administer or possess governing power, always
try to surround their high-handed actions with a cloak of legality,
and to persuade the people that they act from good motives;
this they are easily able to effect when they are the sole
interpreters of the law; for it is evident that they are thus
able to assume a far greater freedom to carry out their wishes
and desires than if the interpretation if the law is vested in
someone else, or if the laws were so self-evident that no one
could be in doubt as to their meaning.  [17:8] (111) We thus see
that the power of evil-doing was greatly curtailed for the Hebrew
captains by the fact that the whole interpretation of the law was
vested in the Levites (Deut. xxi:5), who, on their part, had no
share in the government, and depended for all their support and
consideration on a correct interpretation of the laws entrusted
to them.  (17:112) Moreover, the whole people was commanded to come
together at a certain place every seven years and be instructed
in the law by the high-priest; further, each individual was bidden
to read the book of the law through and through continually with
scrupulous care. (Deut. xxxi:9, 10, and vi:7.)  (113) The captains
were thus for their own sakes bound to take great care to administer
everything according to the laws laid down, and well known to all,
if they wished to be held in high honour by the people, who would
regard them as the administrators of God's dominion, and as God's
vicegerents; otherwise they could not have escaped all the
virulence of theological hatred.  (114) There was another very
important check on the unbridled license of the captains, in the
fact, that the army was formed from the whole body of the
citizens, between the ages of twenty and sixty, without exception,
and that the captains were not able to hire any foreign soldiery.
(17:115) This I say was very important, for it is well known that
princes can oppress their peoples with the single aid of the
soldiery in their pay; while there is nothing more formidable to
them than the freedom of citizen soldiers, who have established
the freedom and glory of their country by their valour, their
toil, and their blood.  (116) Thus Alexander, when he was about
to make war on Darius, a second time, after hearing the advice of
Parmenio, did not chide him who gave the advice, but Polysperchon,
who was standing by. (17:117) For, as Curtius says (iv. Para. 13),
he did not venture to reproach Parmenio again after having shortly
before reproved him too sharply.  (118) This freedom of the
Macedonians, which he so dreaded, he was not able to subdue till
after the number of captives enlisted in the army surpassed that
of his own people: then, but not till then, he gave rein to his
anger so long checked by the independence of his chief
fellow-countrymen.

(17:119) If this independence of citizen soldiers can restrain
the princes of ordinary states who are wont to usurp the whole
glory of victories, it must have been still more effectual
against the Hebrew captains, whose soldiers were fighting, not
for the glory of a prince, but for the glory of God, and who did
not go forth to battle till the Divine assent had been given.

(17:120) We must also remember that the Hebrew captains were
associated only by the bonds of religion: therefore, if any one
of them had transgressed, and begun to violate the Divine right,
he might have been treated by the rest as an enemy and
lawfully subdued.

(17:121) An additional check may be found in the fear of a new
prophet arising, for if a man of unblemished life could show by
certain signs that he was really a prophet, he ipso facto obtained
the sovereign right to rule, which was given to him, as to Moses
formerly, in the name of God, as revealed to himself alone;
not merely through the high priest, as in the case of the captains.
(17:122) There is no doubt that such an one would easily be able
to enlist an oppressed people in his cause, and by trifling signs
persuade them of anything he wished: on the other hand, if affairs
were well ordered, the captain would be able to make provision in
time; that the prophet should be submitted to his approval, and be
examined whether he were really of unblemished life, and possessed
indisputable signs of his mission: also, whether the teaching he
proposed to set forth in the name of the Lord agreed with received 
doctrines, and the general laws of the country; if his credentials
were insufficient, or his doctrines new, he could lawfully be put
to death, or else received on the captain's sole responsibility and
authority.

(17:123) Again, the captains were not superior to the others in
nobility or birth, but only administered the government in virtue
of their age and personal qualities.  (124) Lastly, neither captains
nor army had any reason for preferring war to peace.  (125) The army,
as we have stated, consisted entirely of citizens, so that affairs
were managed by the same persons both in peace and war.  (126) The
man who was a soldier in the camp was a citizen in the market-place,
he who was a leader in the camp was a judge in the law courts, he who
was a general in the camp was a ruler in the state.  (127) Thus no
one could desire war for its own sake, but only for the sake of
preserving peace and liberty; possibly the captains avoided change
as far as possible, so as not to be obliged to consult the high
priest and submit to the indignity of standing in his presence.

(17:128) So much for the precautions for keeping the captains
within bounds.  [17:9] (129) We must now look for the restraints
upon the people: these, however, are very clearly indicated in
the very groundwork of the social fabric.

(17:130) Anyone who gives the subject the slightest attention,
will see that the state was so ordered as to inspire the most
ardent patriotism in the hearts of the citizens, so that the
latter would be very hard to persuade to betray their country,
and be ready to endure anything rather than submit to a foreign
yoke.  (17:131) After they had transferred their right to God,
they thought that their kingdom belonged to God, and that they
themselves were God's children.  (132) Other nations they looked
upon as God's enemies, and regarded with intense hatred (which
they took to be piety, see Psalm cxxxix:21, 22): nothing would
have been more abhorrent to them than swearing allegiance to a
foreigner, and promising him obedience: nor could they conceive
any greater or more execrable crime than the betrayal of their
country, the kingdom of the God whom they adored.

(17:133) It was considered wicked for anyone to settle outside of
the country, inasmuch as the worship of God by which they were
bound could not be carried on elsewhere: their own land alone
was considered holy, the rest of the earth unclean and profane.

(17:134) David, who was forced to live in exile, complained before
Saul as follows: "But if they be the children of men who have
stirred thee up against me, cursed be they before the Lord; for
they have driven me out this day from abiding in the inheritance
of the Lord, saying, Go, serve other gods." (I Sam. xxvi:19.)
(17:135) For the same reason no citizen, as we should especially
remark, was ever sent into exile: he who sinned was liable to
punishment, but not to disgrace.

(17:136) Thus the love of the Hebrews for their country was not
only patriotism, but also piety, and was cherished and nurtured by
daily rites till, like their hatred of other nations, it must have
passed into their nature.  (17:137) Their daily worship was not only
different from that of other nations (as it might well be,
considering that they were a peculiar people and entirely apart
from the rest), it was absolutely contrary.  (138) Such daily
reprobation naturally gave rise to a lasting hatred, deeply
implanted in the heart: for of all hatreds none is more deep and
tenacious than that which springs from extreme devoutness or piety,
and is itself cherished as pious.  (139) Nor was a general cause
lacking for inflaming such hatred more and more, inasmuch as it was
reciprocated; the surrounding nations regarding the Jews with a
hatred just as intense.

(17:140) How great was the effect of all these causes, namely,
freedom from man's dominion; devotion to their country; 
rights over all other men; a hatred not only permitted but pious;
a contempt for their fellow-men; the singularity of their
customs and religious rites; the effect, I repeat, of all these
causes in strengthening the hearts of the Jews to bear all things
for their country, with extraordinary constancy and valour, will
at once be discerned by reason and attested by experience.
(17:141) Never, so long as the city was standing, could they
endure to remain under foreign dominion; and therefore they called
Jerusalem "a rebellious city" (Ezra iv:12).  (17:142) Their state
after its reestablishment (which was a mere shadow of the first,
for the high priests had usurped the rights of the tribal captains)
was, with great difficulty, destroyed by the Romans, as bears
witness (Hist. ii:4):- "Vespasian had closed the war against the
Jews, abandoning the siege of Jerusalem as an enterprise difficult
and arduous rather from the character of the people and the
obstinacy of their superstition, than from the strength left to
the besieged for meeting their necessities."  (17:143) But besides
these characteristics, which are merely ascribed by an individual
opinion, there was one feature peculiar to this state and of great
importance in retaining the affections of the citizens, and checking
all thoughts of desertion, or abandonment of the country: namely,
self-interest, the strength and life of all human action.
(17:144) This was peculiarly engaged in the Hebrew state, for
nowhere else did citizens possess their goods so securely as did
the subjects of this community, for the latter possessed as large
a share in the land and the fields as did their chiefs, and were
owners of their plots of ground in perpetuity; for if any man was
compelled by poverty to sell his farm or his pasture, he received
it back again intact at the year of jubilee: there were other similar 
enactments against the possibility of alienating real property.

(17:145) Again, poverty was nowhere more endurable than in a
country where duty towards one's neighbour, that is, one's
fellow-citizen, was practised with the utmost piety, as a means
of gaining the favour of God the King.  (146) Thus the Hebrew
citizens would nowhere be so well off as in their own country;
outside its limits they met with nothing but loss and disgrace. 

(17:147) The following considerations were of weight, not only
in keeping them at home, but also in preventing civil war and
removing causes of strife; no one was bound to serve his equal,
but only to serve God, while charity and love towards
fellow-citizens was accounted the highest piety; this last
feeling was not a little fostered by the general hatred with
which they regarded foreign nations and were regarded by them.
(17:148) Furthermore, the strict discipline of obedience in which
they were brought up, was a very important factor; for they were
bound to carry on all their actions according to the set rules of
the law: a man might not plough when he liked, but only at certain
times, in certain years, and with one sort of beast at a time; so
too, he might only sow and reap in a certain method and season -
in fact, his whole life was one long school of obedience (see
Chap. V. on the use of ceremonies); such a habit was thus
engendered, that conformity seemed freedom instead of servitude,
and men desired what was commanded rather than what was forbidden.
(17:149) This result was not a little aided by the fact that the
people were bound, at certain seasons of the year, to give
themselves up to rest and rejoicing, not for their own pleasure,
but in order that they might worship God cheerfully.

(17:150) Three times in the year they feasted before the Lord;
on the seventh day of every week they were bidden to abstain from
all work and to rest; besides these, there were other occasions
when innocent rejoicing and feasting were not only allowed but
enjoined.  (151) I do not think any better means of influencing
men's minds could be devised; for there is no more powerful
attraction than joy springing from devotion, a mixture of
admiration and love.  (17:152) It was not easy to be wearied by
constant repetition, for the rites on the various festivals were
varied and recurred seldom.  (153) We may add the deep reverence
for the Temple which all most religiously fostered, on account
of the peculiar rites and duties that they were obliged to perform
before approaching thither.  (17:154) Even now, Jews cannot read
without horror of the crime of Manasseh, who dared to place an
idol in the Temple.  (17:155) The laws, scrupulously preserved in the
inmost sanctuary, were objects of equal reverence to the people.
(17:156) Popular reports and misconceptions were, therefore, very
little to be feared in this quarter, for no one dared decide on
sacred matters, but all felt bound to obey, without consulting
their reason, all the commands given by the answers of God received
in the Temple, and all the laws which God had ordained.

(17:157) I think I have now explained clearly, though briefly,
the main features of the Hebrew commonwealth.  (158) I must now
inquire into the causes which led the people so often to fall
away from the law, which brought about their frequent subjection,
and, finally, the complete destruction of their dominion.
(17:159) Perhaps I shall be told that it sprang from their
hardness of heart; but this is childish, for why should this
people be more hard of heart than others; was it by nature?

[17:A] (160) But nature forms individuals, not peoples;
the latter are only distinguishable by the difference of
their language, their customs, and their laws; while from
the two last - i.e., customs and laws, - it may arise that
they have a peculiar disposition, a peculiar manner of life,
and peculiar prejudices.  (161) If, then, the Hebrews were
harder of heart than other nations, the fault lay with
their laws or customs.

(17:162) This is certainly true, in the sense that, if God had
wished their dominion to be more lasting, He would have given
them other rites and laws, and would have instituted a different
form of government.  (163) We can, therefore, only say that their
God was angry with them, not only, as Jeremiah says, from the
building of the city, but even from the founding of their laws.

(17:164) This is borne witness to by Ezekiel xx:25: "Wherefore
I gave them also statutes that were not good, and judgments
whereby they should not live; and I polluted them in their own
gifts, in that they caused to pass through the fire all that
openeth the womb; that I might make them desolate, to the end
that they might know that I am the Lord."

(17:165) In order that we may understand these words, and the
destruction of the Hebrew commonwealth, we must bear in mind that
it had at first been intended to entrust the whole duties of the
priesthood to the firstborn, and not to the Levites
(see Numb. viii:17).  (166) It was only when all the tribes,
except the Levites, worshipped the golden calf, that the
firstborn were rejected and defiled, and the Levites chosen
in their stead (Deut. x:8). (17:167) When I reflect on this change,
I feel disposed to break forth with the words of Tacitus.
(17:168) God's object at that time was not the safety of the
Jews, but vengeance.  (169) I am greatly astonished that the
celestial mind was so inflamed with anger that it ordained laws,
which always are supposed to promote the honour, well-being,
and security of a people, with the purpose of vengeance, for the
sake of punishment; so that the laws do not seem so much laws -
that is, the safeguard of the people - as pains and penalties.

(17:170) The gifts which the people were obliged to bestow on
the Levites and priests - the redemption of the firstborn, the
poll-tax due to the Levites, the privilege possessed by the
latter of the sole performance of sacred rites - all these,
I say, were a continual reproach to the people, a continual
reminder of their defilement and rejection.  (17:171) Moreover,
we may be sure that the Levites were for ever heaping
reproaches upon them: for among so many thousands there must
have been many importunate dabblers in theology.  (172) Hence
the people got into the way of watching the acts of the
Levites, who were but human; of accusing the whole body of
the faults of one member, and continually murmuring.

(17:173) Besides this, there was the obligation to keep in
idleness men hateful to them, and connected by no ties of
blood.  (174) Especially would this seem grievous when
provisions were dear.  (174a) What wonder, then, if in times of
peace, when striking miracles had ceased, and no men of paramount
authority were forthcoming, the irritable and greedy temper
of the people began to wax cold, and at length to fall away
from a worship, which, though Divine, was also humiliating,
and even hostile, and to seek after something fresh; or can we
be surprised that the captains, who always adopt the popular
course, in order to gain the sovereign power for themselves by
enlisting the sympathies of the people, and alienating the high
priest, should have yielded to their demands, and introduced
new worship?  (17:175) If the state had been formed according
to the original intention, the rights and honour of all the
tribes would have been equal, and everything would have rested
on a firm basis.  (176) Who is there who would willingly violate
the religious rights of his kindred?  (177) What could a man
desire more than to support his own brothers and parents, thus
fulfilling the duties of religion?  (178) Who would not rejoice
in being taught by them the interpretation of the laws, and
receiving through them the answers of God?

(17:179) The tribes would thus have been united by a far closer
bond, if all alike had possessed the right to the priesthood.
(180) All danger would have been obviated, if the choice of the
Levites had not been dictated by anger and revenge.  (181) But,
as we have said, the Hebrews had offended their God, Who, as
Ezekiel says, polluted them in their own gifts by rejecting all
that openeth the womb, so that He might destroy them.

(17:182) This passage is also confirmed by their history.
(182a) As soon as the people in the wilderness began to live in
ease and plenty, certain men of no mean birth began to rebel
against the choice of the Levites, and to make it a cause for
believing that Moses had not acted by the commands of God, but for
his own good pleasure, inasmuch as he had chosen his own tribe
before all the rest, and had bestowed the high priesthood
perpetuity on his own brother.  (17:183) They, therefore, stirred
up a tumult, and came to him crying out that all men were
equally sacred, and that he had exalted himself above his fellows
wrongfully.  (184) Moses was not able to pacify them with reasons;
but by the intervention of a miracle in proof of the faith,
they all perished.  (185) A fresh sedition then arose among the
whole people, who believed that their champions had not been put
to death by the judgment of God, but by the device of Moses.
(17:186) After a great slaughter, or pestilence, the rising
subsided from inanition, but in such a manner that all preferred
death to life under such conditions.

(17:187) We should rather say that sedition ceased than that
harmony was re-established.  (188) This is witnessed by Scripture
(Deut. xxxi:21), where God, after predicting to Moses that the
people after his death will fall away from the Divine worship,
speaks thus: "For I know their imagination which they go about,
even now before I have brought them into the land which I sware;"
and, a little while after (xxxi:27), Moses says: For I know thy
rebellion and thy stiff neck: behold while I am yet alive with you
this day, ye have been rebellious against the Lord; and how much
more after my death!"

(17:189) Indeed, it happened according to his words, as we all know. 
(190) Great changes, extreme license, luxury, and hardness of heart
grew up; things went from bad to worse, till at last the people,
after being frequently conquered, came to an open rupture with
Divine right, and wished for a mortal king, so that the seat of
government might be the Court, instead of the Temple, and that the
tribes might remain fellow-citizens in respect to their king,
instead of in respect to Divine right and the high priesthood.

(17:191) A vast material for new seditions was thus produced,
eventually resulting in the ruin of the entire state.
(191a) Kings are above all things jealous of a precarious
rule, and can in nowise brook a dominion within their own.
(17:192) The first monarchs, being chosen from the ranks of
private citizens, were content with the amount of dignity to
which they had risen; but their sons, who obtained the throne
by right  of inheritance, began gradually to introduce changes,
so as to get all the sovereign rights into their own hands.
(17:193) This they were generally unable to accomplish, so
long as the right of legislation did not rest with them,
but with the high priest, who kept the laws in  
and interpreted them to the people.  (194) The kings were thus
bound to obey the laws as much as were the subjects, and were
unable to abrogate them, or to ordain new laws of equal
authority; moreover, they were prevented by the Levites from
administering the affairs of religion, king and subject being
alike unclean.  (17:195) Lastly, the whole safety of their
dominion depended on the will of one man, if that man appeared
to be a prophet; and of this they had seen an example, namely,
how completely Samuel had been able to command Saul, and how
easily, because of a single disobedience, he had been able to
transfer the right of sovereignty to David.  (196) Thus the
kings found a dominion within their own, and wielded a
precarious sovereignty.

(17:197) In order to surmount these difficulties, they allowed
other temples to be dedicated to the gods, so that there might
be no further need of consulting the Levites; they also sought
out many who prophesied in the name of God, so that they might
have creatures of their own to oppose to the true prophets.
(17:198) However, in spite of all their attempts, they never
attained their end.  (199) For the prophets, prepared against
every emergency, waited for a favourable opportunity, such as
the beginning of a new reign, which is always precarious, while
the memory of the previous reign remains green.  (200) At these
times they could easily pronounce by Divine authority that the
king was tyrannical, and could produce a champion of
distinguished virtue to vindicate the Divine right, and
lawfully to claim dominion, or a share in it.  (17:201) Still,
not even so could the prophets effect much.  (202) They could,
indeed, remove a tyrant; but there were reasons which prevented
them from doing more than setting up, at great cost of civil
bloodshed, another tyrant in his stead.  (17:203) Of discords and
civil wars there was no end, for the causes for the violation
of Divine right remained always the same, and could only be
removed by a complete remodelling of the state.

(17:204) We have now seen how religion was introduced into the
Hebrew commonwealth, and how the dominion might have lasted for
ever, if the just wrath of the Lawgiver had allowed it.
(205) As this was impossible, it was bound in time to perish.
(206) I am now speaking only of the first commonwealth, for the
second was a mere shadow of the first, inasmuch as the people
were bound by the rights of the Persians to whom they were
subject.  (207) After the restoration of freedom, the high
priests usurped the rights of the secular chiefs, and thus
obtained absolute dominion.  (208) The priests were inflamed
with an intense desire to wield the powers of the sovereignty
and the high priesthood at the same time.  (209) I have,
therefore, no need to speak further of the second commonwealth.
(17:210) Whether the first, in so far as we deem it to have been
durable, is capable of imitation, and whether it would be pious
to copy it as far as possible, will appear from what follows.
(17:211) I wish only to draw attention, as a crowning conclusion,
to the principle indicated already - namely, that it is evident,
from what we have stated in this chapter, that the Divine right,
or the right of religion, originates in a compact: without such
compact, none but natural rights exist. (17:212) The Hebrews were
not bound by their religion to evince any pious care for other
nations not included in the compact, but only for their own
fellow-citizens.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

[18:0] CHAPTER XVIII - FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE HEBREWS AND 
       THEIR HISTORY CERTAIN POLITICAL DOCTRINES ARE DEDUCED. 

[18:1] (1) Although the commonwealth of the Hebrews, as we have
conceived it, might have lasted for ever, it would be impossible
to imitate it at the present day, nor would it be advisable so to
do.  (2) If a people wished to transfer their rights to God it
would be necessary to make an express covenant with Him, and for
this would be needed not only the consent of those transferring
their rights, but also the consent of God.  (3) God, however, has
revealed through his Apostles that the covenant of God is no
longer written in ink, or on tables of stone, but with the Spirit
of God in the fleshy tables of the heart.

(18:4) Furthermore, such a form of government would only be
available for those who desire to have no foreign relations,
but to shut themselves up within their own frontiers, and to
live apart from the rest of the world; it would be useless to
men who must have dealings with other nations; so that the
cases where it could be adopted are very few indeed.

(18:5) Nevertheless, though it could not be copied in its entirety,
it possessed many excellent features which might be brought to our
notice, and perhaps imitated with advantage.  (6) My intention,
however, is not to write a treatise on forms of government, so I
will pass over most of such points in silence, and will only touch
on those which bear upon my purpose.

(18:7) God's kingdom is not infringed upon by the choice of an
earthly ruler endowed with sovereign rights; for after the Hebrews
had transferred their rights to God, they conferred the sovereign
right of ruling on Moses, investing him with the sole power of
instituting and abrogating laws in the name of God, of choosing
priests, of judging, of teaching, of punishing - in fact, all the
prerogatives of an absolute monarch.

(18:8) Again, though the priests were the interpreters of the laws,
they had no power to judge the citizens, or to excommunicate anyone:
this could only be done by the judges and chiefs chosen from among
the people.  (9) A consideration of the successes and the histories
of the Hebrews will bring to light other considerations worthy of
note. To wit:

I.   (18:9) That there were no religious sects, till after the
     high priests, in the second commonwealth, possessed the
     authority to make decrees, and transact the business
     of government.  (10) In order that such authority might
     last for ever, the high priests usurped the rights of
     secular rulers, and at last wished to be styled kings.
     (11) The reason for this is ready to hand; in the first
     commonwealth no decrees could bear the name of the high
     priest, for he had no right to ordain laws, but only to
     give the answers of God to questions asked by the
     captains or the councils: he had, therefore, no motive
     for making changes in the law, but took care, on the
     contrary, to administer and guard what had already been
     received and accepted.  (18:12) His only means of
     preserving his freedom in safety against the will of
     the captains lay in cherishing the law intact.
     (18:13) After the high priests had assumed the power of
     carrying on the government, and added the rights of
     secular rulers to those they already possessed, each one
     began both in things religious and in things secular,
     to seek for the glorification of his own name, settling
     everything by sacerdotal authority, and issuing every
     day, concerning ceremonies, faith, and all else, new
     decrees which he sought to make as sacred and
     authoritative as the laws of Moses.  (14) Religion thus
     sank into a degrading superstition, while the true
     interpretation of the laws became corrupted.
     (18:15) Furthermore, while the high priests were
     paving their way to the secular rule just after the
     restoration, they attempted to gain popular favour by
     assenting to every demand; approving whatever the people
     did, however impious, and accommodating Scripture to the
     very depraved current morals.  (16) Malachi bears witness
     to this in no measured terms: he chides the priests of
     his time as despisers of the name of God, and then goes
     on with his invective as follows (Mal ii:7, 8): "For the
     priest's lips should keep knowledge, and they should seek
     the law at his mouth: for he is the messenger of the Lord
     of hosts.  (18:17) But ye are departed out of the way;
     ye have caused many to stumble at the law, ye have
     corrupted the covenant of Levi, saith the Lord of hosts."
     (18:18) He further accuses them of interpreting the laws
     according to their own pleasure, and paying no respect to
     God but only to persons.  (19) It is certain that the high
     priests were never so cautious in their conduct as to
     escape the remark of the more shrewd among the people,
     for the latter were at length emboldened to assert that no
     laws ought to be kept save those that were written, and
     that the decrees which the Pharisees (consisting, as
     Josephus says in his "Antiquities," chiefly of the common
     people), were deceived into calling the traditions of the
     fathers, should not be observed at all.  (20) However this
     may be, we can in nowise doubt that flattery of the high
     priest, the corruption of religion and the laws, and the
     enormous increase of the extent of the last-named, gave
     very great and frequent occasion for disputes and
     altercations impossible to allay.  (21) When men begin
     to quarrel with all the ardour of superstition, and 
     magistracy to back up one side or the other, they can
     never come to a compromise, but are bound to split into
     sects.

II.  (18:22) It is worthy of remark that the prophets, who were
     in a private station of life, rather irritated than reformed
     mankind by their freedom of warning, rebuke, and censure;
     whereas the kings, by their reproofs and punishments,
     could always produce an effect.  (23) The prophets were
     often intolerable even to pious kings, on account of the
     authority they assumed for judging whether an action was
     right or wrong, or for reproving the kings themselves if
     they dared to transact any business, whether public or
     private, without prophetic sanction.  (24) King Asa who,
     according to the testimony of Scripture, reigned piously,
     put the prophet Hanani into a prison-house because he had
     ventured freely to chide and reprove him for entering into
     a covenant with the king of Armenia.
     (18:25) Other examples might be cited, tending to prove that
     religion gained more harm than good by such freedom, not
     to speak of the further consequence, that if the prophets
     had retained their rights, great civil wars would have
     resulted. 

III. (18:26) It is remarkable that during all the period, during
     which the people held the reins of power, there was only
     civil war, and that one was completely extinguished,
     the conquerors taking such pity on the conquered, that
     they endeavoured in every way to reinstate them in their
     former dignity and power.  (27) But after that the people,
     little accustomed to kings, changed its first form of
     government into a monarchy, civil war raged almost
     continuously; and battles were so fierce as to exceed all
     others recorded; in one engagement (taxing our faith to
     the utmost) five hundred thousand Israelites were
     slaughtered by the men of Judah, and in another the
     Israelites slew great numbers of the men of Judah (the
     figures are not given in Scripture), almost razed to the
     ground the walls of Jerusalem, and sacked the Temple in
     their unbridled fury.  (18:28) At length, laden with the spoils
     of their brethren, satiated with blood, they took hostages,
     and leaving the king in his well-nigh devastated kingdom,
     laid down their arms, relying on the weakness rather than
     the good faith of their foes. (29) A few years after, the men
     of Judah, with recruited strength, again took the field,
     but were a second time beaten by the Israelites, and slain
     to the number of a hundred and twenty thousand, two
     thousand of their wives and children were led into captivity,
     and a great booty again seized.  (30) Worn out with these and
     similar battles set forth at length in their histories,
     the Jews at length fell a prey to their enemies.

(18:31) Furthermore, if we reckon up the times during which peace
prevailed under each form of government, we shall find a great
discrepancy.  (32) Before the monarchy forty years and more often
passed, and once eighty years (an almost unparalleled period),
without any war, foreign or civil.  (33) After the kings acquired
sovereign power, the fighting was no longer for peace and liberty,
but for glory; accordingly we find that they all, with the
exception of Solomon (whose virtue and wisdom would be better
displayed in peace than in war) waged war, and finally a fatal
desire for power gained ground, which, in many cases, made the
path to the throne a bloody one.

(18:34) Lastly, the laws, during the rule of the people, remained
uncorrupted and were studiously observed.  (35) Before the monarchy
there were very few prophets to admonish the people, but after the
establishment of kings there were a great number at the same time.
(36) Obadiah saved a hundred from death and hid them away, lest
they should be slain with the rest.  (37) The people, so far as we
can see, were never deceived by false prophets till after the power
had been vested in kings, whose creatures many of the prophets were.
(18:38) Again, the people, whose heart was generally proud or humble
according to its circumstances, easily corrected it-self under
misfortune, turned again to God, restored His laws, and so freed
itself from all peril; but the kings, whose hearts were always
equally puffed up, and who could not be corrected without
humiliation, clung pertinaciously to their vices, even till the
last overthrow of the city.

[18:2] (18:39) We may now clearly see from what I have said:-
I.   (18:40) How hurtful to religion and the state is the concession
     to ministers of religion of any power of issuing decrees or
     transacting the business of government: how, on the contrary,
     far greater stability is afforded, if the said ministers are
     only allowed to give answers to questions duly put to them,
     and are, as a rule, obliged to preach and practise the
     received and accepted doctrines.

II.  (18:41)How dangerous it is to refer to Divine right matters
     merely speculative and subject or liable to dispute.  (42) The
     most tyrannical governments are those which make crimes of
     opinions, for everyone has an inalienable right over his
     thoughts - nay, such a state of things leads to the rule of
     popular passion.
     (18:43) Pontius Pilate made concession to the passion of the
     Pharisees in consenting to the crucifixion of Christ, whom
     he knew to be innocent.  (44) Again, the Pharisees, in order
     to shake the position of men richer than themselves, began
     to set on foot questions of religion, and accused the
     Sadducees of impiety, and, following their example, the
     vilest - hypocrites, stirred, as they pretended, by the
     same holy wrath which they called zeal for the Lord,
     persecuted men whose unblemished character and distinguished
     virtue had excited the popular hatred, publicly denounced
     their opinions, and inflamed the fierce passions of the
     people against them.
     (18:45) This wanton licence being cloaked with the specious
     garb of religion could not easily be repressed, especially when
     the sovereign authorities introduced a sect of which they were
     not the head; they were then regarded not as interpreters of
     Divine right, but as sectarians - that is, as persons
     recognizing the right of Divine interpretation assumed by the
     leaders of the sect.  (46) The authority of the magistrates
     thus became of little account in such matters in comparison
     with the authority of sectarian leaders before whose
     interpretations kings were obliged to bow.
     (18:47) To avoid such evils in a state, there is no safer way
     than to make piety and religion to consist in acts only - that
     is, in the practice of justice and charity, leaving everyone's
     judgment in other respects free.  (48) But I will speak of
     this more at length presently.
[18:3] 
III. (18:49) We see how necessary it is, both in the interests of
     the state and in the interests of religion, to confer on the
     sovereign power the right of deciding what is lawful or
     the reverse.  (50) If this right of judging actions could
     not be given to the very prophets of God without great
     injury to the state and religion, how much less should
     it be entrusted to those who can neither foretell 
     future nor work miracles!  (51) But this again I will
     treat of more fully hereafter.

IV.  (18:52) Lastly, we see how disastrous it is for a people
     unaccustomed to kings, and possessing a complete code of laws,
     to set up a monarchy.  (53) Neither can the subjects brook such
     a sway, nor the royal authority submit to laws and popular rights
     set up by anyone inferior to itself.  (54) Still less can a king
     be expected to defend such laws, for they were not framed to
     support his dominion, but the dominion of the people, or some
     council which formerly ruled, so that in guarding the popular
     rights the king would seem to be a slave rather than a master.
     (18:55) The representative of a new monarchy will employ all
     his zeal in attempting to frame new laws, so as to wrest the
     rights of dominion to his own use, and to reduce the people
     till they find it easier to increase than to curtail the royal
     prerogative.  (56) I must not, however, omit to state that it
     is no less dangerous to remove a monarch, though he is on all
     hands admitted to be a tyrant.  (18:57) For his people 
     accustomed to royal authority and will obey no other,
     despising and mocking at any less august control. 

(18:58) It is therefore necessary, as the prophets discovered of
old, if one king be removed, that he should be replaced by
another, who will be a tyrant from necessity rather than choice.
(59) For how will he be able to endure the sight of the hands
of the citizens reeking with royal blood, and to rejoice in their
regicide as a glorious exploit?  (60) Was not the deed
perpetrated as an example and warning for himself?

(18:61) If he really wishes to be king, and not to acknowledge
the people as the judge of kings and the master of himself, or to
wield a precarious sway, he must avenge the death of 
predecessor, making an example for his own sake, lest the
people should venture to repeat a similar crime.  (62) He will
not, however, be able easily to avenge the death of the tyrant
by the slaughter of citizens unless he defends the cause of
tyranny and approves the deeds of his predecessor, thus following
in his footsteps.

(18:63) Hence it comes to pass that peoples have often changed
their tyrants, but never removed them or changed the monarchical
form of government into any other.

[18:4] (64) The English people furnish us with a terrible example
of this fact. (65) They sought how to depose their monarch under
the forms of law, but when he had been removed, they were utterly
unable to change the form of government, and after much bloodshed
only brought it about, that a new monarch should be hailed under
a different name (as though it had been a mere question of names);
this new monarch could only consolidate his power by destroying
the royal stock, putting to death the king's friends, real or
supposed, and disturbing with war the peace which might encourage
discontent, in order that the populace might be engrossed with
novelties and divert its mind from brooding over the slaughter of
the king.  (66) At last, however, the people reflected that it had
accomplished nothing for the good of the country beyond violating
the rights of the lawful king and changing everything for the worse
(18:67) It therefore decided to retrace its steps as soon as
possible, and never rested till it had seen a complete restoration
of the original state of affairs. 

(18:68) It may perhaps be objected that the Roman people was easily
able to remove its tyrants, but I gather from its history a strong
confirmation of my contention.  (18:69) Though the Roman people was
much more than ordinarily capable of removing their tyrants and
changing their form of government, inasmuch as it held in its own
hands the power of electing its king and his successor, said being
composed of rebels and criminals had not long been used to the royal
yoke (out of its six kings it had put to death three), nevertheless
it could accomplish nothing beyond electing several tyrants in place
of one, who kept it groaning under a continual state of war, both
foreign and civil, till at last it changed its government again to
a form differing from monarchy, as in England, only in name.

[18:5] (70) As for the United States of the Netherlands, they have
never, as we know, had a king, but only counts, who never attained
the full rights of dominion.  (71) The States of the Netherlands
evidently acted as principals in the settlement made by them at the
time of the Earl of Leicester's mission: they always reserved for
themselves the authority to keep the counts up to their duties,
and the power to preserve this authority and the liberty of the
citizens.  (72) They had ample means of vindicating their rights
if their rulers should prove tyrannical, and could impose such
restraints that nothing could be done without their consent and
approval.

(18:73) Thus the rights of sovereign power have always been vested
in the States, though the last count endeavoured to usurp them.
(74) It is therefore little likely that the States should give
them up, especially as they have just restored their original
dominion, lately almost lost.

(18:75) These examples, then, confirm us in our belief, that every
dominion should retain its original form, and, indeed, cannot
change it without danger of the utter ruin of the whole state.
(76) Such are the points I have here thought worthy of remark.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

[19:0] CHAPTER XIX - IT IS SHOWN THAT THE RIGHT OVER MATTERS
       SPIRITUAL LIES WHOLLY WITH THE SOVEREIGN, AND THAT
       THE OUTWARD FORMS OF RELIGION SHOULD BE IN ACCORDANCE
       WITH PUBLIC PEACE, IF WE WOULD OBEY GOD ARIGHT.

(19:1) When I said that the possessors of sovereign power have rights
over everything, and that all rights are dependent on their decree,
I did not merely mean temporal rights, but also spiritual rights;
of the latter, no less than the former, they ought to be the
interpreters and the champions.  (2) I wish to draw special
attention to this point, and to discuss it fully in this chapter,
because many persons deny that the right of deciding religious
questions belongs to the sovereign power, and refuse to acknowledge
it as the interpreter of Divine right.  (3) They accordingly assume
full licence to accuse and arraign it, nay, even to excommunicate
it from the Church, as Ambrosius treated the Emperor Theodosius in
old time.  (19:4) However, I will show later on in this chapter that
they take this means of dividing the government, and paving the
way to their own ascendancy.  (5) I wish, however, first to point
out that religion acquires its force as law solely from the decrees
of the sovereign.  (6) God has no special kingdom among men except
in so far as He reigns through temporal rulers.  [19:1] (7) Moreover,
the rites of religion and the outward observances of piety should be
in accordance with the public peace and well-being, and should
therefore be determined by the sovereign power alone.  (8) I speak
here only of the outward observances of piety and the external
rites of religion, not of piety itself, nor of the inward worship
of God, nor the means by which the mind is inwardly led to do
homage to God in singleness of heart.

(19:9) Inward worship of God and piety in itself are within the
sphere of everyone's private rights, and cannot be alienated
(as I showed at the end of Chapter VII.). (10) What I here mean
by the kingdom of God is, I think, sufficiently clear from what
has been said in Chapter XIV.  (11) I there showed that a man
best fulfils Gods law who worships Him, according to His command,
through acts of justice and charity; it follows, therefore, that
wherever justice and charity have the force of law and ordinance,
there is God's kingdom. 

(19:12) I recognize no difference between the cases where God
teaches and commands the practice of justice and charity through
our natural faculties, and those where He makes special
revelations; nor is the form of the revelation of importance
so long as such practice is revealed and becomes a sovereign
and supreme law to men.  (19:13) If, therefore, I show that
justice and charity can only acquire the force of right and
law through the rights of rulers, I shall be able readily to
arrive at the conclusion (seeing that the rights of rulers are
in the possession of the sovereign), that religion can only
acquire the force of right by means of those who have the right
to command, and that God only rules among men through the
instrumentality of earthly potentates.  (19:14) It follows from
what has been said, that the practice of justice and charity
only acquires the force of law through the rights of the
sovereign authority; for we showed in Chapter XVI. that in the
state of nature reason has no more rights than desire, but that
men living either by the laws of the former or the laws of the
latter, possess rights co-extensive with their powers.

(19:15) For this reason we could not conceive sin to exist in
the state of nature, nor imagine God as a judge punishing man's
transgressions; but we supposed all things to happen according
to the general laws of universal nature, there being no
difference between pious and impious, between him that was pure
as Solomon says) and him that was impure, because there was
no possibility either of justice or charity.

[19:2] (16) In order that the true doctrines of reason, that is
(as we showed in Chapter IV.), the true Divine doctrines might
obtain absolutely the force of law and right, it was necessary
that each individual should cede his natural right, and transfer
it either to society as a whole, or to a certain body of men,
or to one man.  (17) Then, and not till then, does it first dawn
upon us what is justice and what is injustice, what is equity
and what is iniquity.

(19:18) Justice, therefore, and absolutely all the precepts of
reason, including love towards one's neighbour, receive the force
of laws and ordinances solely through the rights of dominion,
that is (as we showed in the same chapter) solely on the decree
of those who possess the right to rule.  (19) Inasmuch as the
kingdom of God consists entirely in rights applied to justice
and charity or to true religion, it follows that (as we
asserted) the kingdom of God can only exist among men through
the means of the sovereign powers; nor does it make any
difference whether religion be apprehended by our natural
faculties or by revelation: the argument is sound in both
cases, inasmuch as religion is one and the same, and is
equally revealed by God, whatever be the manner in which
it becomes known to men.

(19:20) Thus, in order that the religion revealed by the prophets
might have the force of law among the Jews, it was necessary that
every man of them should yield up his natural right, and that all
should, with one accord, agree that they would only obey such
commands as God should reveal to them through the prophets.
(19:21) Just as we have shown to take place in a democracy,
where men with one consent agree to live according to the
dictates of reason.  (22) Although the Hebrews furthermore 
transferred their right to God, they were able to do so rather
in theory than in practice, for, as a matter of fact (as we
pointed out above) they absolutely retained the right of dominion
till they transferred it to Moses, who in his turn became absolute
king, so that it was only through him that God reigned over the
Hebrews.  (19:23) For this reason (namely, that religion only
acquires the force of law by means of the sovereign power)
Moses was not able to punish those who, before the covenant,
and consequently while still in possession of their rights,
violated the Sabbath (Exod. xvi:27), but was able to do so
after the covenant (Numb. xv:36), because everyone had then
yielded up his natural rights, and the ordinance of the Sabbath
had received the force of law.

(19:24) Lastly, for the same reason, after the destruction of
the Hebrew dominion, revealed religion ceased to have the force
of law; for we cannot doubt that as soon as the Jews transferred
their right to the king of Babylon, the kingdom of God and the
Divine right forthwith ceased.  (25) For the covenant wherewith
they promised to obey all the utterances of God was abrogated;
God's kingdom, which was based thereupon, also ceased.
(19:26) The Hebrews could no longer abide thereby, inasmuch
as their rights no longer belonged to them but to the king of
Babylon, whom (as we showed in Chapter XVI.) they were bound to
obey in all things.  (27) Jeremiah (chap. xxix:7) expressly
admonishes them of this fact: "And seek the peace of the city,
whither I have caused you to be carried away captives, and pray
unto the Lord for it; for in the peace thereof shall ye have
peace."  (28) Now, they could not seek the peace of the City as
having a share in its government, but only as slaves, being,
as they were, captives; by obedience in all things, with a view
to avoiding seditions, and by observing all the laws of the
country, however different from their own.  (29) It is thus
abundantly evident that religion among the Hebrews only
acquired the form of law through the right of the sovereign
rule; when that rule was destroyed, it could no longer be
received as the law of a particular kingdom, but only as the
universal precept of reason. (30) I say of reason, for the
universal religion had not yet become known by revelation.
(19:31) We may therefore draw the general conclusion that
religion, whether revealed through our natural faculties or
through prophets, receives the force of a command through
the decrees of the holders of sovereign power; and, further,
that God has no special kingdom among men, except in so far
as He reigns through earthly potentates.

(19:32) We may now see in a clearer light what was stated in
Chapter IV., namely, that all the decrees of God involve eternal
truth and necessity, so that we cannot conceive God as a prince
or legislator giving laws to mankind. (33) For this reason the
Divine precepts, whether revealed through our natural faculties,
or through prophets, do not receive immediately from God the
force of a command, but only from those, or through the
mediation of those, who possess the right of ruling and
legislating. (34) It is only through these latter means that
God rules among men, and directs human affairs with justice and
equity.

(19:35) This conclusion is supported by experience, for we find
traces of Divine justice only in places where just men bear sway;
elsewhere the same lot (to repeat, again Solomon's words) befalls
the just and the unjust, the pure and the impure: a state of
things which causes Divine Providence to be doubted by many who
think that God immediately reigns among men, and directs all
nature for their benefit.

[19:3] (36) As, then, both reason and experience tell us that
the Divine right is entirely dependent on the decrees of secular
rulers, it follows that secular rulers are its proper
interpreters.  (37) How this is so we shall now see, for it
is time to show that the outward observances of religion,
and all the external practices of piety should be brought into
accordance with the public peace and well-being if we would
obey God rightly.  (38) When this has been shown we shall easily
understand how the sovereign rulers are the proper interpreters
of religion and piety.

(19:39) It is certain that duties towards one's country are the
highest that man can fulfil; for, if government be taken away,
no good thing can last, all falls into dispute, anger and anarchy
reign unchecked amid universal  fear.  (40) Consequently there can
be no duty towards our neighbour which would not become an
offence if it involved injury to the whole state, nor can there
be any offence against our duty towards our neighbour, or anything
but loyalty in what we do for the sake of preserving the state.
(19:41) For instance: it is in the abstract my duty when my
neighbour quarrels with me and wishes to take my cloak, to give
him my coat also; but if it be thought that such conduct is
hurtful to the maintenance of the state, I ought to bring him to
trial, even at the risk of his being condemned to death.

(19:42) For this reason Manlius Torquatus is held up to honour,
inasmuch as the public welfare outweighed with him his duty
towards his children.  (43) This being so, it follows that the
public welfare is the sovereign law to which all others, Divine
and human, should be made to conform.  (44) Now, it is the
function of the sovereign only to decide what is necessary for
the public welfare and the safety of the state, and to give
orders accordingly; therefore it is also the function of the
sovereign only to decide the limits of our duty towards our
neighbour - in other words, to determine how we should obey God.
(19:45) We can now clearly understand how the sovereign is the
interpreter of religion, and further, that no one can obey God
rightly, if the practices of his piety do not conform to the
public welfare; or, consequently, if he does not implicitly
obey all the commands of the sovereign.  (46) For as by God's
command we are bound to do our duty to all men without
exception, and to do no man an injury, we are also bound
not to help one man at another's loss, still less at a loss
to the whole state.  (47) Now, no private citizen can know
what is good for the state, except he learn it through the
sovereign power, who alone has the right to transact public
business: therefore no one can rightly practise piety or
obedience to God, unless he obey the sovereign power's
commands in all things.  (19:48) This proposition is confirmed
by the facts of experience.  (49) For if the sovereign adjudge
a man to be worthy of death or an enemy, whether he be a
citizen or a foreigner, a private individual or a separate
ruler, no subject is allowed to give him assistance.
(19:50) So also though the Jews were bidden to love their
fellow-citizens as themselves (Levit. xix:17, 18), they were
nevertheless bound, if a man offended against the law,
to point him out to the judge (Levit. v:1, and Deut. xiii:8, 9),
and, if he should be condemned to death, to slay him
(Deut. xvii:7).

(19:51) Further, in order that the Hebrews might preserve the
liberty they had gained, and might retain absolute sway over
the territory they had conquered, it was necessary, as we showed
in Chapter XVII., that their religion should be adapted to their
particular government, and that they should separate themselves
from the rest of the nations: wherefore it was commanded to them,
"Love thy neighbour and hate thine enemy" (Matt. v:43), but
after they had lost their dominion and had gone into captivity
in Babylon, Jeremiah bid them take thought for the safety of the
state into which they had been led captive; and Christ when He
saw that they would be spread over the whole world, told them to
do their duty by all men without exception; all of which
instances show that religion has always been made to conform to
the public welfare.  [19:4] (52) Perhaps someone will ask:
By what right, then, did the disciples of Christ, being private
citizens, preach a new religion?  (53) I answer that they did so
by the right of the power which they had received from Christ
against unclean spirits (see Matt. x:1). (54) I have already
stated in Chapter XVI. that all are bound to obey a tyrant,
unless they have received from God through undoubted revelation
a promise of aid against him; so let no one take example from
the Apostles unless he too has the power of working miracles.
(19:55) The point is brought out more clearly by Christ's
command to His disciples, "Fear not those who kill the body"
(Matt. x:28).  (19:56) If this command were imposed on everyone,
governments would be founded in vain, and Solomon's words
(Prov. xxiv:21), "My son, fear God and the king," would be
impious, which they certainly are not; we must therefore admit
that the authority which Christ gave to His disciples was given
to them only, and must not be taken as an example for others.

(19:57) I do not pause to consider the arguments of those who
wish to separate secular rights from spiritual rights, placing
the former under the control of the sovereign, and the latter
under the control of the universal Church; such pretensions
are too frivolous to merit refutation.  (58) I cannot however,
pass over in silence the fact that such persons are woefully
deceived when they seek to support their seditious opinions
(I ask pardon for the somewhat harsh epithet) by the example
of the Jewish high priest, who, in ancient times, had the right
of administering the sacred offices.  (19:59) Did not the high
priests receive their right by the decree of Moses (who, as I
have shown, retained the sole right to rule), and could they
not by the same means be deprived of it? (60) Moses himself
chose not only Aaron, but also his son Eleazar, and his
grandson Phineas, and bestowed on them the right of
administering the office of high priest.  (61) This right
was retained by the high priests afterwards, but none the less
were they delegates of Moses - that is, of the sovereign power.
(19:61a) Moses, as we have shown, left no successor to his
dominion, but so distributed his prerogatives, that those who
came after him seemed, as it were, regents who administer the
government when a king is absent but not dead.

(19:62) In the second commonwealth the high priests held their
right absolutely, after they had obtained the rights of
principality in addition.  (63) Wherefore the rights of the
high priesthood always depended on the edict of the sovereign,
and the high priests did not possess them till they became
sovereigns also. (64) Rights in matters spiritual always
remained under the control of the kings absolutely (as I will
show at the end of this chapter), except in the single
particular that they were not allowed to administer in person
the sacred duties in the Temple, inasmuch as they were not of
the family of Aaron, and were therefore considered unclean,
a reservation which would have no force in a Christian community.

(19:65) We cannot, therefore, doubt that the daily sacred rites
(whose performance does not require a particular genealogy but
only a special mode of life, and from which the holders of
sovereign power are not excluded as unclean) are under the sole
control of the sovereign power; no one, save by the authority or
concession of such sovereign, has the right or power of
administering them, of choosing others to administer them, of
defining or strengthening the foundations of the Church and her
doctrines; of judging on questions of morality or acts of piety;
of receiving anyone into the Church or excommunicating him
therefrom, or, lastly, of providing for the poor.

(19:66) These doctrines are proved to be not only true (as we
have already pointed out), but also of primary necessity for the
preservation of religion and the state.  (67) We all know what
weight spiritual right and authority carries in the popular mind:
how everyone hangs on the lips, as it were, of those who possess
it.  (19:68) We may even say that those who wield such authority
have the most complete sway over the popular mind.

(19:69) Whosoever, therefore, wishes to take this right away
from the sovereign power, is desirous of dividing the dominion;
from such division, contentions, and strife will necessarily
spring up, as they did of old between the Jewish kings and high
priests, and will defy all attempts to allay them.  (70) Nay,
further, he who strives to deprive the sovereign power of such
authority, is aiming (as we have said), at gaining dominion for
himself.  (71) What is left for the sovereign power to decide on,
if this right be denied him?  (72) Certainly nothing concerning
either war or peace, if he has to ask another man's opinion as
to whether what he believes to be beneficial would be pious or
impious.  (73) Everything would depend on the verdict of him who
had the right of deciding and judging what was pious or impious,
right or wrong.

(19:74) When such a right was bestowed on the Pope of Rome
absolutely, he gradually acquired complete control over the
kings, till at last he himself mounted to the summits of
dominion; however much monarchs, and especially the German
emperors, strove to curtail his authority, were it only by a
hairsbreadth, they effected nothing, but on the contrary by
their very endeavours largely increased it.  (19:75) That which
no monarch could accomplish with fire and sword, ecclesiastics
could bring about with a stroke of the pen; whereby we may
easily see the force and power at the command of the Church,
and also how necessary it is for sovereigns to reserve such
prerogatives for themselves.

(19:76) If we reflect on what was said in the last chapter we
shall see that such reservation conduced not a little to the
increase of religion and piety; for we observed that the prophets
themselves, though gifted with Divine efficacy, being merely
private citizens, rather irritated than reformed the people by
their freedom of warning, reproof, and denunciation, whereas
the kings by warnings and punishments easily bent men to their
will.  (77) Furthermore, the kings themselves, not possessing
the right in question absolutely, very often fell away from
religion and took with them nearly the whole people.  (78) The
same thing has often happened from the same cause in Christian
states.

(19:79) Perhaps I shall be asked, "But if the holders of
sovereign power choose to be wicked, who will be the rightful
champion of piety?  (80) Should the sovereigns still be its
interpreters?  (80a) "I meet them with the counter-question,
"But if ecclesiastics (who are also human, and private citizens,
and who ought to mind only their own affairs), or if others whom
it is proposed to entrust with spiritual authority, choose to
be wicked, should they still be considered as piety's rightful
interpreters?"  (81) It is quite certain that when sovereigns
wish to follow their own pleasure, whether they have control
over spiritual matters or not, the whole state, spiritual and
secular, will go to ruin, and it will go much faster if private
citizens seditiously assume the championship of the Divine
rights.

(19:82) Thus we see that not only is nothing gained by denying
such rights to sovereigns, but on the contrary, great evil ensues.
(83) For (as happened with the Jewish kings who did not possess
such rights absolutely) rulers are thus driven into wickedness,
and the injury and loss to the state become certain and
inevitable, instead of uncertain and possible.  (84) Whether we
look to the abstract truth, or the security of states, or the
increase of piety, we are compelled to maintain that the Divine
right, or the right of control over spiritual matters, depends
absolutely on the decree of the sovereign, who is its legitimate
interpreter and champion.  (85) Therefore the true ministers of
God's word are those who teach piety to the people in obedience
to the authority of the sovereign rulers by whose decree it has
been brought into conformity with the public welfare.

[19:5] (86) There remains for me to point out the cause for the
frequent disputes on the subject of these spiritual rights in
Christian states; whereas the Hebrews, so far as I know, never,
had any doubts about the matter. (87) It seems monstrous that
a question so plain and vitally important should thus have
remained undecided, and that the secular rulers could never
obtain the prerogative without controversy, nay, nor without
great danger of sedition and injury to religion.  (88) If no
cause for this state of things were forthcoming, I could easily
persuade myself that all I have said in this chapter is mere 
theorizing, or a kind of speculative reasoning which can never be
of any practical use.  (89) However, when we reflect on the
beginnings of Christianity the cause at once becomes manifest.
(19:90) The Christian religion was not taught at first by kings,
but by private persons, who, against the wishes of those in power,
whose subjects they were, were for a long time accustomed to hold
meetings in secret churches, to institute and perform sacred rites,
and on their own authority to settle and decide on their affairs
without regard to the state.  (91) When, after the lapse of many
years, the religion was taken up by the authorities, the
ecclesiastics were obliged to teach it to the emperors themselves
as they had defined it: wherefore they easily gained recognition
as its teachers and interpreters, and the church pastors were
looked upon as vicars of God.  (92) The ecclesiastics took good
care that the Christian kings should not assume their authority,
by prohibiting marriage to the chief ministers of religion and to
its highest interpreter.  (19:93) They furthermore elected their
purpose by multiplying the dogmas of religion to such an extent
and so blending them with philosophy that their chief interpreter
was bound to be a skilled philosopher and theologian, and to have
leisure for a host of idle speculations: conditions which could
only be fulfilled by a private individual with much time on his
hands.

(19:94) Among the Hebrews things were very differently arranged:
for their Church began at the same time as their dominion, and Moses,
their absolute ruler, taught religion to the people, arranged 
their spiritual ministers.  (95) Thus the royal authority carried
very great weight with the people, and the kings kept a firm hold
on their spiritual prerogatives.

(19:96) Although, after the death of Moses, no one held absolute
sway, yet the power of deciding both in matters spiritual and
matters temporal was in the hands of the secular chief, as I have
already pointed out.  (97) Further, in order that it might be
taught religion and piety, the people was bound to consult the
supreme judge no less than the high priest (Deut. xvii:9, 11).
(19:98) Lastly, though the kings had not as much power as Moses,
nearly the whole arrangement and choice of the sacred ministry
depended on their decision.  (19:99) Thus David arranged the whole
service of the Temple (see 1 Chron. xxviii:11, 12, &c.); from
all the Levites he chose twenty-four thousand for the sacred
psalms; six thousand of these formed the body from which were
chosen the judges and proctors, four thousand were porters,
and four thousand to play on instruments (see 1 Chron. xxiii:4, 5). 
(19:100) He further divided them into companies (of whom he
chose the chiefs), so that each in rotation, at the allotted
time, might perform the sacred rites.  (101) The priests he also
divided into as many companies; I will not go through the whole
catalogue, but refer the reader to 2 Chron. viii:13, where it
is stated, "Then Solomon offered burnt offerings to the Lord . . .
. . after a certain rate every day, offering according to the
commandments of Moses;" and in verse 14, "And he appointed,
according to the order of David his father, the courses of the
priests to their service . . . . for so had David the man of God
commanded."  (19:102) Lastly, the historian bears witness in verse 15:
"And they departed not from the commandment of the king unto the
priests and Levites concerning any matter, or concerning the treasuries."

[19:6] (103) From these and other histories of the kings it is
abundantly evident, that the whole practice of religion and the
sacred ministry depended entirely on the commands of the king.

(19:104) When I said above that the kings had not the same right
as Moses to elect the high priest, to consult God without
intermediaries, and to condemn the prophets who prophesied during
their reign; I said so simply because the prophets could, in virtue
of their mission, choose a new king and give absolution for
regicide, not because they could call a king who offended against
the law to judgment, or could rightly act against him. [Endnote 33]

(19:105) Wherefore if there had been no prophets who, in virtue
of a special revelation, could give absolution for regicide,
the kings would have possessed absolute rights over all matters
both spiritual and temporal.  (106) Consequently the rulers of
modern times, who have no prophets and would not rightly be bound
in any case to receive them (for they are not subject to Jewish
law), have absolute possession of the spiritual prerogative,
although they are not celibates, and they will always retain it,
if they will refuse to allow religious dogmas to be unduly
multiplied or confounded with philosophy.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

[20:0] CHAPTER XX - THAT IN A FREE STATE EVERY MAN MAY
       THINK WHAT HE LIKES, AND SAY WHAT HE THINKS. 

[20:1] (1) If men's minds were as easily controlled as their tongues,
every king would sit safely on his throne, and government by
compulsion would cease; for every subject would shape his life
according to the intentions of his rulers, and would esteem a thing
true or false, good or evil, just or unjust, in obedience to their
dictates.  (2) However, we have shown already (Chapter XVII.) that
no man's mind can possibly lie wholly at the disposition of another,
for no one can willingly transfer his natural right of free reason
and judgment, or be compelled so to do.  (20:3) For this reason
government which attempts to control minds is accounted tyrannical,
and it is considered an abuse of sovereignty and a usurpation of the
rights of subjects, to seek to prescribe what shall be accepted as
true, or rejected as false, or what opinions should actuate men in
their worship of God.  (4) All these questions fall within a man's
natural right, which he cannot abdicate even with his own consent.

(20:5) I admit that the judgment can be biassed in many ways, and
to an almost incredible degree, so that while exempt from direct
external control it may be so dependent on another man's words,
that it may fitly be said to be ruled by him; but although this
influence is carried to great lengths, it has never gone so far
as to invalidate the statement, that every man's understanding
is his own, and that brains are as diverse as palates.

(20:6) Moses, not by fraud, but by Divine virtue, gained such a
hold over the popular judgment that he was accounted superhuman,
and believed to speak and act through the inspiration of the Deity;
nevertheless, even he could not escape murmurs and evil
interpretations.  (7) How much less then can other monarchs avoid
them!  (8) Yet such unlimited power, if it exists at all, must
belong to a monarch, and least of all to a democracy, where the
whole or a great part of the people wield authority collectively.
(20:9) This is a fact which I think everyone can explain for himself.

(20:10) However unlimited, therefore, the power of a sovereign
may be, however implicitly it is trusted as the exponent of law
and religion, it can never prevent men from forming judgments
according to their intellect, or being influenced by any given
emotion.  (11) It is true that it has the right to treat as
enemies all men whose opinions do not, on all subjects, entirely
coincide with its own; but we are not discussing its strict
rights, but its proper course of action.  (20:12) I grant that it
has the right to rule in the most violent manner, and to put
citizens to death for very trivial causes, but no one supposes
it can do this with the approval of sound judgment.  (13) Nay,
inasmuch as such things cannot be done without extreme peril
to itself, we may even deny that it has the absolute power to
do them, or, consequently, the absolute right; for the rights
of the sovereign are limited by his power.

[20:2] (14) Since, therefore, no one can abdicate his freedom
of judgment and feeling; since every man is by indefeasible
natural right the master of his own thoughts, it follows that
men thinking in diverse and contradictory fashions, cannot,
without disastrous results, be compelled to speak only
according to the dictates of the supreme power.  (15) Not even
the most experienced, to say nothing of the multitude, know
how to keep silence.  (16) Men's common failing is to confide
their plans to others, though there be need for secrecy, so that
a government would be most harsh which deprived the individual
of his freedom of saying and teaching what he thought; and
would be moderate if such freedom were granted.  (20:17) Still we
cannot deny that authority may be as much injured by words as
by actions; hence, although the freedom we are discussing
cannot be entirely denied to subjects, its unlimited concession
would be most baneful; we must, therefore, now inquire, how far
such freedom can and ought to be conceded without danger to the
peace of the state, or the power of the rulers; and this, as I
aid at the beginning of Chapter XVI., is my principal object.

(20:18) It follows, plainly, from the explanation given above,
of the foundations of a state, that the ultimate aim of
government is not to rule, or restrain, by fear, nor to exact
obedience, but contrariwise, to free every man from fear, that
he may live in all possible security; in other words, to
strengthen his natural right to exist and work - without injury
to himself or others.

(20:19) No, the object of government is not to change men
from rational beings into beasts or puppets, but to enable
them to develope their minds and bodies in security, and to
employ their reason unshackled; neither showing hatred,
anger, or deceit, nor watched with the eyes of jealousy
and injustice.  (20) In fact, the true aim of government
is liberty.

(20:21) Now we have seen that in forming a state the power of
king laws must either be vested in the body of the citizens,
or in a portion of them, or in one man.  (22) For, although
mens free judgments are very diverse, each one thinking that
he alone knows everything, and although complete unanimity of
feeling and speech is out of the question, it is impossible
to preserve peace, unless individuals abdicate their right of
acting entirely on their own judgment.  [20:3] (23) Therefore,
the individual justly cedes the right of free action, though
not of free reason and judgment; no one can act against the
authorities without danger to the state, though his feelings
and judgment may be at variance therewith; he may even speak
against them, provided that he does so from rational conviction,
not from fraud, anger, or hatred, and provided that he does
not attempt to introduce any change on his private authority.

(20:24) For instance, supposing a man shows that a law is repugnant
to sound reason, and should therefore be repealed; if he submits
his opinion to the judgment of the authorities (who, alone, have
the right of making and repealing laws), and meanwhile acts in
nowise contrary to that law, he has deserved well of the state,
and has behaved as a good citizen should; but if he accuses the
authorities of injustice, and stirs up the people against them,
or if he seditiously strives to abrogate the law without their
consent, he is a mere agitator and rebel.

(20:25) Thus we see how an individual may declare and teach
what he believes, without injury to the authority of his rulers,
or to the public peace; namely, by leaving in their hands the
entire power of legislation as it affects action, and by doing
nothing against their laws, though he be compelled often to 
act in contradiction to what he believes, and openly feels,
to be best.

(20:26) Such a course can be taken without detriment to justice
and dutifulness, nay, it is the one which a just and dutiful man
would adopt.  (27) We have shown that justice is dependent on the
laws of the authorities, so that no one who contravenes their
accepted decrees can be just, while the highest regard for duty,
as we have pointed out in the preceding chapter, is exercised in
maintaining public peace and tranquillity; these could not be
preserved if every man were to live as he pleased; therefore it
is no less than undutiful for a man to act contrary to his
country's laws, for if the practice became universal the ruin
of states would necessarily follow.

(20:28) Hence, so long as a man acts in obedience to the laws
of his rulers, he in nowise contravenes his reason, for in
obedience to reason he transferred the right of controlling his
actions from his own hands to theirs.  (29) This doctrine we can
confirm from actual custom, for in a conference of great and
small powers, schemes are seldom carried unanimously, yet all
unite in carrying out what is decided on, whether they voted
for or against.  (30) But I return to my proposition.

(20:31) From the fundamental notions of a state, we have discovered
how a man may exercise free judgment without detriment to the
supreme power: from the same premises we can no less easily
determine what opinions would be seditious.  (32) Evidently those
which by their very nature nullify the compact by which the right
of free action was ceded.  (33) For instance, a man who holds that
the supreme power has no rights over him, or that promises ought
not to be kept, or that everyone should live as he pleases, or other
doctrines of this nature in direct opposition to the above-mentioned
contract, is seditious, not so much from his actual opinions and
judgment, as from the deeds which they involve; for he who maintains
such theories abrogates the contract which tacitly, or openly, he made
with his rulers.  (20:34) Other opinions which do not involve acts
violating the contract, such as revenge, anger, and t he like,
are not seditious, unless it be in some. corrupt state, where
superstitious and ambitious persons, unable to endure men of learning,
are so popular with the multitude that their word is more valued than
the law.

(20:35) However, I do not deny that there are some doctrines which,
while they are apparently only concerned with abstract truths and
falsehoods, are yet propounded and published with unworthy motives.
(36) This question we have discussed in Chapter XV., and shown that
reason should nevertheless remain unshackled.  (37) If we hold to the
principle that a man's loyalty to the state should be judged, like his
loyalty to God, from his actions only - namely, from his charity
towards his neighbours; we cannot doubt that the best government will
allow freedom of philosophical speculation no less than of belief.
(20:38) I confess that from such freedom inconveniences may sometimes
arise, but what question was ever settled so wisely that no abuses
could possibly spring therefrom?  (39) He who seeks to regulate
everything by law, is more likely to arouse vices than to reform
them.  (40) It is best to grant what cannot be abolished, even though
it be in itself harmful.  (41) How many evils spring from luxury, envy,
avarice, drunkenness, and the like, yet these are tolerated - vices
as they are - because they cannot be prevented by legal enactments.
(20:42) How much more then should free thought be granted, seeing that
it is in itself a virtue and that it cannot be crushed!  (43) Besides
the evil results can easily be checked, as I will show, by the secular
authorities, not to mention that such freedom is absolutely necessary
for progress in science and the liberal arts: for no man follows such
pursuits to advantage unless his judgment be entirely free and
unhampered.

(20:44) But let it be granted that freedom may be crushed, and men
be so bound down, that they do not dare to utter a whisper, save at
the bidding of their rulers; nevertheless this can never be carried
to the pitch of making them think according to authority, so that
the necessary consequences would be that men would daily be thinking
one thing and saying another, to the corruption of good faith,
that mainstay of government, and to the fostering of hateful
flattery and perfidy, whence spring stratagems, and the corruption
of every good art.

(20:45) It is far from possible to impose uniformity of speech,
for the more rulers strive to curtail freedom of speech, the more
obstinately are they resisted; not indeed by the avaricious, the
flatterers, and other numskulls, who think supreme salvation
consists in filling their stomachs and gloating over their
money-bags, but by those whom good education, sound morality,
and virtue have rendered more free.  (46) Men, as generally
constituted, are most prone to resent the branding as criminal
of opinions which they believe to be true, and the proscription
as wicked of that which inspires them with piety towards God
and man; hence they are ready to forswear the laws and conspire
against the authorities, thinking it not shameful but honourable
to stir up seditions and perpetuate any sort of crime with this
end in view.  (20:47) Such being the constitution of human nature,
we see that laws directed against opinions affect the generous
minded rather than the wicked, and are adapted less for coercing
criminals than for irritating the upright; so that they cannot
be maintained without great peril to the state.

(20:48) Moreover, such laws are almost always useless, for those
who hold that the opinions proscribed are sound, cannot possibly
obey the law; whereas those who already reject them as false,
accept the law as a kind of privilege, and make such boast of it,
that authority is powerless to repeal it, even if such a course
be subsequently desired.

(20:49) To these considerations may be added what we said in
Chapter XVIII. in treating of the history of the Hebrews.
(50) And, lastly, how many schisms have arisen in the Church
from the attempt of the authorities to decide by law the
intricacies of theological controversy!  (51) If men were not
allured by the hope of getting the law and the authorities on
their side, of triumphing over their adversaries in the sight
of an applauding multitude, and of acquiring honourable
distinctions, they would not strive so maliciously, nor would
such fury sway their minds.  (20:52) This is taught not only by
reason but by daily examples, for laws of this kind prescribing
what every man shall believe and forbidding anyone to speak or
write to the contrary, have often been passed, as sops or
concessions to the anger of those who cannot tolerate men of
enlightenment, and who, by such harsh and crooked enactments,
can easily turn the devotion of the masses into fury and direct
it against whom they will.

(20:53) How much better would it be to restrain popular anger
and fury, instead of passing useless laws, which can only be
broken by those who love virtue and the liberal arts, thus
paring down the state till it is too small to harbour men 
of talent.  (54) What greater misfortune for a state can be
conceived then that honourable men should be sent like criminals
into exile, because they hold diverse opinions which they cannot
disguise?  (20:55) What, I say, can be more hurtful than that men
who have committed no crime or wickedness should, simply because
they are enlightened, be treated as enemies and put to death, and
that the scaffold, the terror of evil-doers, should become the
arena where the highest examples of tolerance and virtue are
displayed to the people with all the marks of ignominy that
authority can devise?

(20:56) He that knows himself to be upright does not fear the
death of a criminal, and shrinks from no punishment; his mind
is not wrung with remorse for any disgraceful deed: he holds
that death in a good cause is no punishment, but an honour,
and that death for freedom is glory.

(20:57) What purpose then is served by the death of such men,
what example in proclaimed? the cause for which they die is
unknown to the idle and the foolish, hateful to the turbulent,
loved by the upright.  (57a) The only lesson we can draw from
such scenes is to flatter the persecutor, or else to imitate
the victim.

(20:58) If formal assent is not to be esteemed above conviction,
and if governments are to retain a firm hold of authority and not
be compelled to yield to agitators, it is imperative that freedom
of judgment should be granted, so that men may live together in
harmony, however diverse, or even openly contradictory their
opinions may be.  (20:59) We cannot doubt that such is the best
system of government and open to the fewest objections, since it
is the one most in harmony with human nature.  (60) In a democracy
(the most natural form of government, as we have shown in
Chapter XVI.) everyone submits to the control of authority over
his actions, but not over his judgment and reason; that is,
seeing that all cannot think alike, the voice of the majority
has the force of law, subject to repeal if circumstances bring
about a change of opinion.  (61) In proportion as the power of
free judgment is withheld we depart from the natural condition
of mankind, and consequently the government becomes more tyrannical.

[20:4] (62) In order to prove that from such freedom no
inconvenience arises, which cannot easily be checked by the
exercise of the sovereign power, and that men's actions can
easily be kept in bounds, though their opinions be at open
variance, it will be well to cite an example.  (63) Such an one
is not very far to seek.  (64) The city of Amsterdam reaps the
fruit of this freedom in its own great prosperity and in the
admiration of all other people.  (65) For in this most
flourishing state, and most splendid city, men of every
nation and religion live together in the greatest harmony,
and ask no questions before trusting their goods to a fellow-
citizen, save whether he be rich or poor, and whether he
generally acts honestly, or the reverse.  (20:66) His religion
and sect is considered of no importance: for it has no effect
before the judges in gaining or losing a cause, and there is no
sect so despised that its followers, provided that they harm no
one, pay every man his due, and live uprightly, are deprived of
the protection of the magisterial authority.

(20:67) On the other hand, when the religious controversy
between Remonstrants and Counter-Remonstrants began to be
taken up by politicians and the States, it grew into a schism,
and abundantly showed that laws dealing with religion and
seeking to settle its controversies are much more calculated
to irritate than to reform, and that they give rise to extreme
licence: further, it was seen that schisms do not originate
in a love of truth, which is a source of courtesy and
gentleness, but rather in an inordinate desire for supremacy.
(20:68) From all these considerations it is clearer than the sun
at noonday, that the true schismatics are those who condemn
other men's writings, and seditiously stir up the quarrelsome
masses against their authors, rather than those authors
themselves, who generally write only for the learned, and appeal
solely to reason.  (20:69) In fact, the real disturbers of the peace
are those who, in a free state, seek to curtail the liberty of
judgment which they are unable to tyrannize over.

(20:70) I have thus shown:-

I.    (20:71) That it is impossible to deprive men of the liberty
      of saying what they think. 
II.  (20:72) That such liberty can be conceded to every man without
     injury to the rights and authority of the sovereign power, and that
     every man may retain it without injury to such rights, provided
     that he does not presume upon it to the extent of introducing
     any new rights into the state, or acting in any way contrary,
     to the existing laws.
III. (20:73) That every man may enjoy this liberty without detriment
     to the public peace, and that no inconveniences arise therefrom
     which cannot easily be checked.
IV.  (20:74) That every man may enjoy it without injury to his
     allegiance.
V.   (20:75)That laws dealing with speculative problems are entirely      useless.
VI.  (20:76) Lastly, that not only may such liberty be granted
     without prejudice to the public peace, to loyalty, and to
     the rights of rulers, but that it is even necessary for their
     preservation.

(20:77) For when people try to take it away, and bring to trial,
not only the acts which alone are capable of offending, but also
the opinions of mankind, they only succeed in surrounding their
victims with an appearance of martyrdom, and raise feelings of
pity and revenge rather than of terror.  (78) Uprightness and
good faith are thus corrupted, flatterers and traitors are
encouraged, and sectarians triumph, inasmuch as concessions have
been made to their animosity, and they have gained the state
sanction for the doctrines of which they are the interpreters.
(20:79) Hence they arrogate to themselves the state authority
and rights, and do not scruple to assert that they have been
directly chosen by God, and that their laws are Divine, whereas
the laws of the state are human, and should therefore yield
obedience to the laws of God - in other words, to their own laws.
(20:80) Everyone must see that this is not a state of affairs
conducive to public welfare.  (81) Wherefore, as we have shown
in Chapter XVIII., the safest way for a state is to lay down
the rule that religion is comprised solely in the exercise of
charity and justice, and that the rights of rulers in sacred,
no less than in secular matters, should merely have to do with
actions, but that every man should think what he likes and say
what he thinks.

(20:82) I have thus fulfilled the task I set myself in this
treatise.  [20:5] (83) It remains only to call attention to the
fact that I have written nothing which I do not most willingly
submit to the examination and approval of my country's rulers;
and that I am willing to retract anything which they shall
decide to be repugnant to the laws, or prejudicial to the public
good.  (84) I know that I am a man, and as a man liable to error,
but against error I have taken scrupulous care, and have striven
to keep in entire accordance with the laws of my country, with
loyalty, and with morality. 

End of Part 4 of 4.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

[AUTHOR'S ENDNOTES] TO THE THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL TREATISE

CHAPTER XVI. 

[Endnote 26] (1) "No one can honestly promise to forego the right
which he has over all things."  (2) In the state of social life,
where general right determines what is good or evil, stratagem is
rightly distinguished as of two kinds, good and evil.  (3) But in
the state of Nature, where every man is his own judge, possessing
the absolute right to lay down laws for himself, to interpret them
as he pleases, or to abrogate them if he thinks it convenient,
it is not conceivable that stratagem should be evil.

[Endnote 27] (1) "Every member of it may, if he will, be free."
(2) Whatever be the social state a man finds; himself in, he may
be free.  (3) For certainly a man is free, in so far as he is led
by reason.  (4) Now reason (though Hobbes thinks otherwise) is
always on the side of peace, which cannot be attained unless the
(5) Therefore the more he is free, the more constantly will he
respect the laws of his country, and obey the commands of the
sovereign power to which he is subject.

[Endnote 28] (1) "No one knows by nature that he owes any
obedience to God."  (2) When Paul says that men have in
themselves no refuge, he speaks as a man: for in the ninth
chapter of the same epistle he expressly teaches that God has
mercy on whom He will, and that men are without excuse, only
because they are in God's power like clay in the hands of a
potter, who out of the same lump makes vessels, some for honour
and some for dishonour, not because they have been forewarned.
(3) As regards the Divine natural law whereof the chief
commandment is, as we have said, to love God, I have called
it a law in the same sense, as philosophers style laws those
general rules of nature, according to which everything happens.
(4) For the love of God is not a state of obedience: it is a
virtue which necessarily exists in a man who knows God rightly.
(5) Obedience has regard to the will of a ruler, not to necessity
and truth.  (6) Now as we are ignorant of the nature of God's
will, and on the other hand know that everything happens solely
by God's power, we cannot, except through revelation, know
whether God wishes in any way to be honoured as a sovereign.
    (7) Again; we have shown that the Divine rights appear to us in
the light of rights or commands, only so long as we are ignorant
of their cause: as soon as their cause is known, they cease to
be rights, and we embrace them no longer as rights but as eternal
truths; in other words, obedience passes into love of God, which
emanates from true knowledge as necessarily as light emanates
from the sun. (8) Reason then leads us to love God, but cannot
lead us to obey Him; for we cannot embrace the commands of God
as Divine, while we are in ignorance of their cause, neither
can we rationally conceive God as a sovereign laying down laws
as a sovereign. 

CHAPTER XVII.
[Endnote 29] (1) "If men could lose their natural rights so as to
be absolutely unable for the future to oppose the will of the
sovereign"  (2) Two common soldiers undertook to change the Roman
dominion, and did change it. (Tacitus, Hist. i:7.) 

[Endnote 30] (1) See Numbers xi. 28. In this passage it is written
that two men prophesied in the camp, and that Joshua wished to 
punish them.  (2) This he would not have done, if it had been
lawful for anyone to deliver the Divine oracles to the people
without the consent of Moses.  (3) But Moses thought good to pardon
the two men, and rebuked Joshua for exhorting him to use his royal
prerogative, at a time when he was so weary of reigning, that he
preferred death to holding undivided sway (Numb. xi:14).  (4) For he
made answer to Joshua, "Enviest thou for my sake? (5) Would God that
all the Lord's people were prophets, and that the Lord would put
His spirit upon them." (6) That is to say, would God that the right
of taking counsel of God were general, and the power were in the
hands of the people.  (7) Thus Joshua was not mistaken as to the
right, but only as to the time for using it, for which he was
rebuked by Moses, in the same way as Abishai was rebuked by David
for counselling that Shimei, who had undoubtedly been guilty of
treason, should be put to death.  (8) See 2 Sam. xix:22, 23.

[Endnote 31] (1) See Numbers xxvii:21.  (2) The translators of the
Bible have rendered incorrectly verses 19 and 23 of this chapter.
(3) The passage does not mean that Moses gave precepts or advice
to Joshua, but that he made or established him chief of the Hebrews.
(4) The phrase is very frequent in Scripture (see Exodus, xviii:23;
1 Sam. xiii:15; Joshua i:9; 1 Sam. xxv:80).

[Endnote 32] (1) "There was no judge over each of the captains save
God."  (2) The Rabbis and some Christians equally foolish pretend
that the Sanhedrin, called "the great" was instituted by Moses.
(3) As a matter of fact, Moses chose seventy colleagues to assist
him in governing, because he was not able to bear alone the burden
of the whole people; but he never passed any law for forming a
college of seventy members; on the contrary he ordered every tribe
to appoint for itself, in the cities which God had given it, judges
to settle disputes according to the laws which he himself had laid
down.  (4) In cases where the opinions of the judges differed as to
the interpretation of these laws, Moses bade them take counsel of
the High Priest (who was the chief interpreter of the law), or of
the chief judge, to whom they were then subordinate (who had the
right of consulting the High Priest), and to decide the dispute in
accordance with the answer obtained. (5) If any subordinate judge
should assert, that he was not bound by the decision of the High
Priest, received either directly or through the chief of his state,
such an one was to be put to death (Deut. xvii:9) by the chief judge,
whoever he might be, to whom he was a subordinate.  (6) This chief
judge would either be Joshua, the supreme captain of the whole people,
or one of the tribal chiefs who had been entrusted, after the
division of the tribes, with the right of consulting the high priest
concerning the affairs of his tribe, of deciding on peace or war, of
fortifying towns, of appointing inferior judges, &c.  (7) Or, again,
it might be the king, in whom all or some of the tribes had vested
their rights.  (8) I could cite many instances in confirmation of
what I here advance.  (9) I will confine myself to one, which appears
to me the most important of all.  (10) When the Shilomitish prophet
anointed Jeroboam king, he, in so doing, gave him the right of
consulting the high priest, of appointing judges, &c.  (11) In fact
he endowed him with all the rights over the ten tribes, which
Rehoboam retained over the two tribes.  (12) Consequently Jeroboam
could set up a supreme council in his court with as much right as
Jehoshaphat could at Jerusalem (2 Chron. xix:8).  (13) For it is
plain that neither Jeroboam, who was king by God's command, nor
Jeroboam's subjects, were bound by the Law of Moses to accept
the judgments of Rehoboam, who was not their king.  (14) Still less
were they under the jurisdiction of the judge, whom Rehoboam had
set up in Jerusalem as subordinate to himself.  (5) According,
therefore, as the Hebrew dominion was divided, so was a supreme
council setup in each division.  (16) Those who neglect the
variations in the constitution of the Hebrew States, and confuse
them all together in one, fall into numerous difficulties.

CHAPTER XIX.

[Endnote 33] (1) I must here bespeak special attention for what
was said in Chap. XVI. concerning rights.

End of Part 4 OF 4 Endnotes.

____________________________________________________________________________

                End of A Theologico-Political Treatise - Part 4

                  "Joseph B. Yesselman" <jyselman@erols.com>
                               August 26, 1997