2152 lines
164 KiB
Plaintext
2152 lines
164 KiB
Plaintext
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350 BC
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ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS
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by Aristotle
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translated by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge
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Book I
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1
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LET us now discuss sophistic refutations, i.e. what appear to be
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refutations but are really fallacies instead. We will begin in the
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natural order with the first.
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That some reasonings are genuine, while others seem to be so but are
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not, is evident. This happens with arguments, as also elsewhere,
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through a certain likeness between the genuine and the sham. For
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physically some people are in a vigorous condition, while others
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merely seem to be so by blowing and rigging themselves out as the
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tribesmen do their victims for sacrifice; and some people are
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beautiful thanks to their beauty, while others seem to be so, by
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dint of embellishing themselves. So it is, too, with inanimate things;
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for of these, too, some are really silver and others gold, while
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others are not and merely seem to be such to our sense; e.g. things
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made of litharge and tin seem to be of silver, while those made of
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yellow metal look golden. In the same way both reasoning and
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refutation are sometimes genuine, sometimes not, though inexperience
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may make them appear so: for inexperienced people obtain only, as it
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were, a distant view of these things. For reasoning rests on certain
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statements such that they involve necessarily the assertion of
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something other than what has been stated, through what has been
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stated: refutation is reasoning involving the contradictory of the
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given conclusion. Now some of them do not really achieve this,
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though they seem to do so for a number of reasons; and of these the
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most prolific and usual domain is the argument that turns upon names
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only. It is impossible in a discussion to bring in the actual things
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discussed: we use their names as symbols instead of them; and
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therefore we suppose that what follows in the names, follows in the
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things as well, just as people who calculate suppose in regard to
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their counters. But the two cases (names and things) are not alike.
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For names are finite and so is the sum-total of formulae, while things
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are infinite in number. Inevitably, then, the same formulae, and a
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single name, have a number of meanings. Accordingly just as, in
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counting, those who are not clever in manipulating their counters
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are taken in by the experts, in the same way in arguments too those
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who are not well acquainted with the force of names misreason both
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in their own discussions and when they listen to others. For this
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reason, then, and for others to be mentioned later, there exists
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both reasoning and refutation that is apparent but not real. Now for
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some people it is better worth while to seem to be wise, than to be
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wise without seeming to be (for the art of the sophist is the
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semblance of wisdom without the reality, and the sophist is one who
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makes money from an apparent but unreal wisdom); for them, then, it is
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clearly essential also to seem to accomplish the task of a wise man
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rather than to accomplish it without seeming to do so. To reduce it to
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a single point of contrast it is the business of one who knows a
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thing, himself to avoid fallacies in the subjects which he knows and
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to be able to show up the man who makes them; and of these
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accomplishments the one depends on the faculty to render an answer,
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and the other upon the securing of one. Those, then, who would be
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sophists are bound to study the class of arguments aforesaid: for it
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is worth their while: for a faculty of this kind will make a man
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seem to be wise, and this is the purpose they happen to have in view.
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Clearly, then, there exists a class of arguments of this kind, and
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it is at this kind of ability that those aim whom we call sophists.
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Let us now go on to discuss how many kinds there are of sophistical
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arguments, and how many in number are the elements of which this
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faculty is composed, and how many branches there happen to be of
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this inquiry, and the other factors that contribute to this art.
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BOOK_1|CH_2
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2
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Of arguments in dialogue form there are four classes:
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Didactic, Dialectical, Examination-arguments, and Contentious
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arguments. Didactic arguments are those that reason from the
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principles appropriate to each subject and not from the opinions
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held by the answerer (for the learner should take things on trust):
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dialectical arguments are those that reason from premisses generally
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accepted, to the contradictory of a given thesis:
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examination-arguments are those that reason from premisses which are
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accepted by the answerer and which any one who pretends to possess
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knowledge of the subject is bound to know-in what manner, has been
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defined in another treatise: contentious arguments are those that
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reason or appear to reason to a conclusion from premisses that
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appear to be generally accepted but are not so. The subject, then,
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of demonstrative arguments has been discussed in the Analytics,
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while that of dialectic arguments and examination-arguments has been
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discussed elsewhere: let us now proceed to speak of the arguments used
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in competitions and contests.
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BOOK_1|CH_3
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3
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First we must grasp the number of aims entertained by those who
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argue as competitors and rivals to the death. These are five in
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number, refutation, fallacy, paradox, solecism, and fifthly to
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reduce the opponent in the discussion to babbling-i.e. to constrain
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him to repeat himself a number of times: or it is to produce the
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appearance of each of these things without the reality. For they
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choose if possible plainly to refute the other party, or as the second
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best to show that he is committing some fallacy, or as a third best to
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lead him into paradox, or fourthly to reduce him to solecism, i.e.
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to make the answerer, in consequence of the argument, to use an
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ungrammatical expression; or, as a last resort, to make him repeat
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himself.
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BOOK_1|CH_4
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4
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There are two styles of refutation: for some depend on the
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language used, while some are independent of language. Those ways of
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producing the false appearance of an argument which depend on language
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are six in number: they are ambiguity, amphiboly, combination,
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division of words, accent, form of expression. Of this we may assure
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ourselves both by induction, and by syllogistic proof based on
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this-and it may be on other assumptions as well-that this is the
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number of ways in which we might fall to mean the same thing by the
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same names or expressions. Arguments such as the following depend upon
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ambiguity. 'Those learn who know: for it is those who know their
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letters who learn the letters dictated to them'. For to 'learn' is
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ambiguous; it signifies both 'to understand' by the use of
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knowledge, and also 'to acquire knowledge'. Again, 'Evils are good:
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for what needs to be is good, and evils must needs be'. For 'what
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needs to be' has a double meaning: it means what is inevitable, as
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often is the case with evils, too (for evil of some kind is
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inevitable), while on the other hand we say of good things as well
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that they 'need to be'. Moreover, 'The same man is both seated and
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standing and he is both sick and in health: for it is he who stood
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up who is standing, and he who is recovering who is in health: but
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it is the seated man who stood up, and the sick man who was
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recovering'. For 'The sick man does so and so', or 'has so and so done
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to him' is not single in meaning: sometimes it means 'the man who is
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sick or is seated now', sometimes 'the man who was sick formerly'.
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Of course, the man who was recovering was the sick man, who really was
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sick at the time: but the man who is in health is not sick at the same
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time: he is 'the sick man' in the sense not that he is sick now, but
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that he was sick formerly. Examples such as the following depend
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upon amphiboly: 'I wish that you the enemy may capture'. Also the
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thesis, 'There must be knowledge of what one knows': for it is
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possible by this phrase to mean that knowledge belongs to both the
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knower and the known. Also, 'There must be sight of what one sees: one
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sees the pillar: ergo the pillar has sight'. Also, 'What you profess
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to-be, that you profess to-be: you profess a stone to-be: ergo you
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profess-to-be a stone'. Also, 'Speaking of the silent is possible':
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for 'speaking of the silent' also has a double meaning: it may mean
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that the speaker is silent or that the things of which he speaks are
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so. There are three varieties of these ambiguities and amphibolies:
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(1) When either the expression or the name has strictly more than
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one meaning, e.g. aetos and the 'dog'; (2) when by custom we use
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them so; (3) when words that have a simple sense taken alone have more
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than one meaning in combination; e.g. 'knowing letters'. For each
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word, both 'knowing' and 'letters', possibly has a single meaning: but
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both together have more than one-either that the letters themselves
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have knowledge or that someone else has it of them.
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Amphiboly and ambiguity, then, depend on these modes of speech. Upon
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the combination of words there depend instances such as the following:
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'A man can walk while sitting, and can write while not writing'. For
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the meaning is not the same if one divides the words and if one
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combines them in saying that 'it is possible to walk-while-sitting'
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and write while not writing]. The same applies to the latter phrase,
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too, if one combines the words 'to write-while-not-writing': for
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then it means that he has the power to write and not to write at once;
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whereas if one does not combine them, it means that when he is not
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writing he has the power to write. Also, 'He now if he has learnt
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his letters'. Moreover, there is the saying that 'One single thing
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if you can carry a crowd you can carry too'.
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Upon division depend the propositions that 5 is 2 and 3, and odd,
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and that the greater is equal: for it is that amount and more besides.
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For the same phrase would not be thought always to have the same
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meaning when divided and when combined, e.g. 'I made thee a slave once
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a free man', and 'God-like Achilles left fifty a hundred men'.
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An argument depending upon accent it is not easy to construct in
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unwritten discussion; in written discussions and in poetry it is
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easier. Thus (e.g.) some people emend Homer against those who
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criticize as unnatural his expression to men ou kataputhetai
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ombro. For they solve the difficulty by a change of accent,
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pronouncing the ou with an acuter accent. Also, in the passage
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about Agamemnon's dream, they say that Zeus did not himself say 'We
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grant him the fulfilment of his prayer', but that he bade the dream
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grant it. Instances such as these, then, turn upon the accentuation.
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Others come about owing to the form of expression used, when what is
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really different is expressed in the same form, e.g. a masculine thing
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by a feminine termination, or a feminine thing by a masculine, or a
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neuter by either a masculine or a feminine; or, again, when a
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quality is expressed by a termination proper to quantity or vice
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versa, or what is active by a passive word, or a state by an active
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word, and so forth with the other divisions previously' laid down. For
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it is possible to use an expression to denote what does not belong
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to the class of actions at all as though it did so belong. Thus (e.g.)
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'flourishing' is a word which in the form of its expression is like
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'cutting' or 'building': yet the one denotes a certain quality-i.e.
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a certain condition-while the other denotes a certain action. In the
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same manner also in the other instances.
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Refutations, then, that depend upon language are drawn from these
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common-place rules. Of fallacies, on the other hand, that are
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independent of language there are seven kinds:
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(1) that which depends upon Accident:
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(2) the use of an expression absolutely or not absolutely but with
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some qualification of respect or place, or time, or relation:
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(3) that which depends upon ignorance of what 'refutation' is:
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(4) that which depends upon the consequent:
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(5) that which depends upon assuming the original conclusion:
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(6) stating as cause what is not the cause:
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(7) the making of more than one question into one.
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BOOK_1|CH_5
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5
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Fallacies, then, that depend on Accident occur whenever any
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attribute is claimed to belong in like manner to a thing and to its
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accident. For since the same thing has many accidents there is no
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necessity that all the same attributes should belong to all of a
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thing's predicates and to their subject as well. Thus (e.g.), 'If
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Coriscus be different from "man", he is different from himself: for he
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is a man': or 'If he be different from Socrates, and Socrates be a
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man, then', they say, 'he has admitted that Coriscus is different from
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a man, because it so happens (accidit) that the person from whom he
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said that he (Coriscus) is different is a man'.
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Those that depend on whether an expression is used absolutely or
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in a certain respect and not strictly, occur whenever an expression
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used in a particular sense is taken as though it were used absolutely,
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e.g. in the argument 'If what is not is the object of an opinion, then
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what is not is': for it is not the same thing 'to be x' and 'to be'
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absolutely. Or again, 'What is, is not, if it is not a particular kind
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of being, e.g. if it is not a man.' For it is not the same thing
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'not to be x' and 'not to be' at all: it looks as if it were,
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because of the closeness of the expression, i.e. because 'to be x'
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is but little different from 'to be', and 'not to be x' from 'not to
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be'. Likewise also with any argument that turns upon the point whether
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an expression is used in a certain respect or used absolutely. Thus
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e.g. 'Suppose an Indian to be black all over, but white in respect
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of his teeth; then he is both white and not white.' Or if both
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characters belong in a particular respect, then, they say, 'contrary
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attributes belong at the same time'. This kind of thing is in some
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cases easily seen by any one, e.g. suppose a man were to secure the
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statement that the Ethiopian is black, and were then to ask whether he
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is white in respect of his teeth; and then, if he be white in that
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respect, were to suppose at the conclusion of his questions that
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therefore he had proved dialectically that he was both white and not
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white. But in some cases it often passes undetected, viz. in all cases
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where, whenever a statement is made of something in a certain respect,
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it would be generally thought that the absolute statement follows as
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well; and also in all cases where it is not easy to see which of the
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attributes ought to be rendered strictly. A situation of this kind
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arises, where both the opposite attributes belong alike: for then
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there is general support for the view that one must agree absolutely
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to the assertion of both, or of neither: e.g. if a thing is half white
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and half black, is it white or black?
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Other fallacies occur because the terms 'proof' or 'refutation' have
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not been defined, and because something is left out in their
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definition. For to refute is to contradict one and the same
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attribute-not merely the name, but the reality-and a name that is
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not merely synonymous but the same name-and to confute it from the
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propositions granted, necessarily, without including in the
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reckoning the original point to be proved, in the same respect and
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relation and manner and time in which it was asserted. A 'false
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assertion' about anything has to be defined in the same way. Some
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people, however, omit some one of the said conditions and give a
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merely apparent refutation, showing (e.g.) that the same thing is both
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double and not double: for two is double of one, but not double of
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three. Or, it may be, they show that it is both double and not
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double of the same thing, but not that it is so in the same respect:
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for it is double in length but not double in breadth. Or, it may be,
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they show it to be both double and not double of the same thing and in
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the same respect and manner, but not that it is so at the same time:
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and therefore their refutation is merely apparent. One might, with
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some violence, bring this fallacy into the group of fallacies
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dependent on language as well.
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Those that depend on the assumption of the original point to be
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proved, occur in the same way, and in as many ways, as it is
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possible to beg the original point; they appear to refute because
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men lack the power to keep their eyes at once upon what is the same
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and what is different.
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The refutation which depends upon the consequent arises because
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people suppose that the relation of consequence is convertible. For
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whenever, suppose A is, B necessarily is, they then suppose also
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that if B is, A necessarily is. This is also the source of the
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deceptions that attend opinions based on sense-perception. For
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people often suppose bile to be honey because honey is attended by a
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yellow colour: also, since after rain the ground is wet in
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consequence, we suppose that if the ground is wet, it has been
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raining; whereas that does not necessarily follow. In rhetoric
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proofs from signs are based on consequences. For when rhetoricians
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wish to show that a man is an adulterer, they take hold of some
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consequence of an adulterous life, viz. that the man is smartly
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dressed, or that he is observed to wander about at night. There are,
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however, many people of whom these things are true, while the charge
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in question is untrue. It happens like this also in real reasoning;
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e.g. Melissus' argument, that the universe is eternal, assumes that
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the universe has not come to be (for from what is not nothing could
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possibly come to be) and that what has come to be has done so from a
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first beginning. If, therefore, the universe has not come to be, it
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has no first beginning, and is therefore eternal. But this does not
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necessarily follow: for even if what has come to be always has a first
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beginning, it does not also follow that what has a first beginning has
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come to be; any more than it follows that if a man in a fever be
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hot, a man who is hot must be in a fever.
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The refutation which depends upon treating as cause what is not a
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cause, occurs whenever what is not a cause is inserted in the
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argument, as though the refutation depended upon it. This kind of
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thing happens in arguments that reason ad impossible: for in these
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we are bound to demolish one of the premisses. If, then, the false
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cause be reckoned in among the questions that are necessary to
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establish the resulting impossibility, it will often be thought that
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the refutation depends upon it, e.g. in the proof that the 'soul'
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and 'life' are not the same: for if coming-to-be be contrary to
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perishing, then a particular form of perishing will have a
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particular form of coming-to-be as its contrary: now death is a
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particular form of perishing and is contrary to life: life, therefore,
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is a coming to-be, and to live is to come-to-be. But this is
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impossible: accordingly, the 'soul' and 'life' are not the same. Now
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this is not proved: for the impossibility results all the same, even
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if one does not say that life is the same as the soul, but merely says
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that life is contrary to death, which is a form of perishing, and that
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perishing has 'coming-to-be' as its contrary. Arguments of that
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kind, then, though not inconclusive absolutely, are inconclusive in
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relation to the proposed conclusion. Also even the questioners
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themselves often fail quite as much to see a point of that kind.
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Such, then, are the arguments that depend upon the consequent and
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upon false cause. Those that depend upon the making of two questions
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into one occur whenever the plurality is undetected and a single
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answer is returned as if to a single question. Now, in some cases,
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it is easy to see that there is more than one, and that an answer is
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not to be given, e.g. 'Does the earth consist of sea, or the sky?' But
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in some cases it is less easy, and then people treat the question as
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one, and either confess their defeat by failing to answer the
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question, or are exposed to an apparent refutation. Thus 'Is A and
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is B a man?' 'Yes.' 'Then if any one hits A and B, he will strike a
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man' (singular),'not men' (plural). Or again, where part is good and
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part bad, 'is the whole good or bad?' For whichever he says, it is
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possible that he might be thought to expose himself to an apparent
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refutation or to make an apparently false statement: for to say that
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something is good which is not good, or not good which is good, is
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to make a false statement. Sometimes, however, additional premisses
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may actually give rise to a genuine refutation; e.g. suppose a man
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were to grant that the descriptions 'white' and 'naked' and 'blind'
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apply to one thing and to a number of things in a like sense. For if
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'blind' describes a thing that cannot see though nature designed it to
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see, it will also describe things that cannot see though nature
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designed them to do so. Whenever, then, one thing can see while
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another cannot, they will either both be able to see or else both be
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blind; which is impossible.
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BOOK_1|CH_6
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6
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The right way, then, is either to divide apparent proofs and
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refutations as above, or else to refer them all to ignorance of what
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'refutation' is, and make that our starting-point: for it is
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possible to analyse all the aforesaid modes of fallacy into breaches
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of the definition of a refutation. In the first place, we may see if
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they are inconclusive: for the conclusion ought to result from the
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premisses laid down, so as to compel us necessarily to state it and
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not merely to seem to compel us. Next we should also take the
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definition bit by bit, and try the fallacy thereby. For of the
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fallacies that consist in language, some depend upon a double meaning,
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e.g. ambiguity of words and of phrases, and the fallacy of like verbal
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forms (for we habitually speak of everything as though it were a
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particular substance)-while fallacies of combination and division
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and accent arise because the phrase in question or the term as altered
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is not the same as was intended. Even this, however, should be the
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same, just as the thing signified should be as well, if a refutation
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or proof is to be effected; e.g. if the point concerns a doublet, then
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you should draw the conclusion of a 'doublet', not of a 'cloak'. For
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the former conclusion also would be true, but it has not been
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proved; we need a further question to show that 'doublet' means the
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same thing, in order to satisfy any one who asks why you think your
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point proved.
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Fallacies that depend on Accident are clear cases of ignoratio
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elenchi when once 'proof' has been defined. For the same definition
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|
ought to hold good of 'refutation' too, except that a mention of
|
|
'the contradictory' is here added: for a refutation is a proof of
|
|
the contradictory. If, then, there is no proof as regards an
|
|
accident of anything, there is no refutation. For supposing, when A
|
|
and B are, C must necessarily be, and C is white, there is no
|
|
necessity for it to be white on account of the syllogism. So, if the
|
|
triangle has its angles equal to two right-angles, and it happens to
|
|
be a figure, or the simplest element or starting point, it is not
|
|
because it is a figure or a starting point or simplest element that it
|
|
has this character. For the demonstration proves the point about it
|
|
not qua figure or qua simplest element, but qua triangle. Likewise
|
|
also in other cases. If, then, refutation is a proof, an argument
|
|
which argued per accidens could not be a refutation. It is, however,
|
|
just in this that the experts and men of science generally suffer
|
|
refutation at the hand of the unscientific: for the latter meet the
|
|
scientists with reasonings constituted per accidens; and the
|
|
scientists for lack of the power to draw distinctions either say 'Yes'
|
|
to their questions, or else people suppose them to have said 'Yes',
|
|
although they have not.
|
|
Those that depend upon whether something is said in a certain
|
|
respect only or said absolutely, are clear cases of ignoratio
|
|
elenchi because the affirmation and the denial are not concerned
|
|
with the same point. For of 'white in a certain respect' the
|
|
negation is 'not white in a certain respect', while of 'white
|
|
absolutely' it is 'not white, absolutely'. If, then, a man treats
|
|
the admission that a thing is 'white in a certain respect' as though
|
|
it were said to be white absolutely, he does not effect a
|
|
refutation, but merely appears to do so owing to ignorance of what
|
|
refutation is.
|
|
The clearest cases of all, however, are those that were previously
|
|
described' as depending upon the definition of a 'refutation': and
|
|
this is also why they were called by that name. For the appearance
|
|
of a refutation is produced because of the omission in the definition,
|
|
and if we divide fallacies in the above manner, we ought to set
|
|
'Defective definition' as a common mark upon them all.
|
|
Those that depend upon the assumption of the original point and upon
|
|
stating as the cause what is not the cause, are clearly shown to be
|
|
cases of ignoratio elenchi through the definition thereof. For the
|
|
conclusion ought to come about 'because these things are so', and this
|
|
does not happen where the premisses are not causes of it: and again it
|
|
should come about without taking into account the original point,
|
|
and this is not the case with those arguments which depend upon
|
|
begging the original point.
|
|
Those that depend upon the assumption of the original point and upon
|
|
stating as the cause what is not the cause, are clearly shown to be
|
|
cases of ignoratio elenchi through the definition thereof. For the
|
|
conclusion ought to come about 'because these things are so', and this
|
|
does not happen where the premisses are not causes of it: and again it
|
|
should come about without taking into account the original point,
|
|
and this is not the case with those arguments which depend upon
|
|
begging the original point.
|
|
Those that depend upon the consequent are a branch of Accident:
|
|
for the consequent is an accident, only it differs from the accident
|
|
in this, that you may secure an admission of the accident in the
|
|
case of one thing only (e.g. the identity of a yellow thing and
|
|
honey and of a white thing and swan), whereas the consequent always
|
|
involves more than one thing: for we claim that things that are the
|
|
same as one and the same thing are also the same as one another, and
|
|
this is the ground of a refutation dependent on the consequent. It is,
|
|
however, not always true, e.g. suppose that and B are the same as C
|
|
per accidens; for both 'snow' and the 'swan' are the same as something
|
|
white'. Or again, as in Melissus' argument, a man assumes that to
|
|
'have been generated' and to 'have a beginning' are the same thing, or
|
|
to 'become equal' and to 'assume the same magnitude'. For because what
|
|
has been generated has a beginning, he claims also that what has a
|
|
beginning has been generated, and argues as though both what has
|
|
been generated and what is finite were the same because each has a
|
|
beginning. Likewise also in the case of things that are made equal
|
|
he assumes that if things that assume one and the same magnitude
|
|
become equal, then also things that become equal assume one magnitude:
|
|
i.e. he assumes the consequent. Inasmuch, then, as a refutation
|
|
depending on accident consists in ignorance of what a refutation is,
|
|
clearly so also does a refutation depending on the consequent. We
|
|
shall have further to examine this in another way as well.
|
|
Those fallacies that depend upon the making of several questions
|
|
into one consist in our failure to dissect the definition of
|
|
'proposition'. For a proposition is a single statement about a
|
|
single thing. For the same definition applies to 'one single thing
|
|
only' and to the 'thing', simply, e.g. to 'man' and to 'one single man
|
|
only' and likewise also in other cases. If, then, a 'single
|
|
proposition' be one which claims a single thing of a single thing, a
|
|
'proposition', simply, will also be the putting of a question of
|
|
that kind. Now since a proof starts from propositions and refutation
|
|
is a proof, refutation, too, will start from propositions. If, then, a
|
|
proposition is a single statement about a single thing, it is
|
|
obvious that this fallacy too consists in ignorance of what a
|
|
refutation is: for in it what is not a proposition appears to be
|
|
one. If, then, the answerer has returned an answer as though to a
|
|
single question, there will be a refutation; while if he has
|
|
returned one not really but apparently, there will be an apparent
|
|
refutation of his thesis. All the types of fallacy, then, fall under
|
|
ignorance of what a refutation is, some of them because the
|
|
contradiction, which is the distinctive mark of a refutation, is
|
|
merely apparent, and the rest failing to conform to the definition
|
|
of a proof.
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
BOOK_1|CH_7
|
|
7
|
|
-
|
|
The deception comes about in the case of arguments that depend on
|
|
ambiguity of words and of phrases because we are unable to divide
|
|
the ambiguous term (for some terms it is not easy to divide, e.g.
|
|
'unity', 'being', and 'sameness'), while in those that depend on
|
|
combination and division, it is because we suppose that it makes no
|
|
difference whether the phrase be combined or divided, as is indeed the
|
|
case with most phrases. Likewise also with those that depend on
|
|
accent: for the lowering or raising of the voice upon a phrase is
|
|
thought not to alter its meaning-with any phrase, or not with many.
|
|
With those that depend on the of expression it is because of the
|
|
likeness of expression. For it is hard to distinguish what kind of
|
|
things are signified by the same and what by different kinds of
|
|
expression: for a man who can do this is practically next door to
|
|
the understanding of the truth. A special reason why a man is liable
|
|
to be hurried into assent to the fallacy is that we suppose every
|
|
predicate of everything to be an individual thing, and we understand
|
|
it as being one with the thing: and we therefore treat it as a
|
|
substance: for it is to that which is one with a thing or substance,
|
|
as also to substance itself, that 'individually' and 'being' are
|
|
deemed to belong in the fullest sense. For this reason, too, this type
|
|
of fallacy is to be ranked among those that depend on language; in the
|
|
first place, because the deception is effected the more readily when
|
|
we are inquiring into a problem in company with others than when we do
|
|
so by ourselves (for an inquiry with another person is carried on by
|
|
means of speech, whereas an inquiry by oneself is carried on quite
|
|
as much by means of the object itself); secondly a man is liable to be
|
|
deceived, even when inquiring by himself, when he takes speech as
|
|
the basis of his inquiry: moreover the deception arises out of the
|
|
likeness (of two different things), and the likeness arises out of the
|
|
language. With those fallacies that depend upon Accident, deception
|
|
comes about because we cannot distinguish the sameness and otherness
|
|
of terms, i.e. their unity and multiplicity, or what kinds of
|
|
predicate have all the same accidents as their subject. Likewise
|
|
also with those that depend on the Consequent: for the consequent is a
|
|
branch of Accident. Moreover, in many cases appearances point to
|
|
this-and the claim is made that if is inseparable from B, so also is B
|
|
from With those that depend upon an imperfection in the definition
|
|
of a refutation, and with those that depend upon the difference
|
|
between a qualified and an absolute statement, the deception
|
|
consists in the smallness of the difference involved; for we treat the
|
|
limitation to the particular thing or respect or manner or time as
|
|
adding nothing to the meaning, and so grant the statement universally.
|
|
Likewise also in the case of those that assume the original point, and
|
|
those of false cause, and all that treat a number of questions as one:
|
|
for in all of them the deception lies in the smallness of the
|
|
difference: for our failure to be quite exact in our definition of
|
|
'premiss' and of 'proof' is due to the aforesaid reason.
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
BOOK_1|CH_8
|
|
8
|
|
-
|
|
Since we know on how many points apparent syllogisms depend, we know
|
|
also on how many sophistical syllogisms and refutations may depend. By
|
|
a sophistical refutation and syllogism I mean not only a syllogism
|
|
or refutation which appears to be valid but is not, but also one
|
|
which, though it is valid, only appears to be appropriate to the thing
|
|
in question. These are those which fail to refute and prove people
|
|
to be ignorant according to the nature of the thing in question, which
|
|
was the function of the art of examination. Now the art of examining
|
|
is a branch of dialectic: and this may prove a false conclusion
|
|
because of the ignorance of the answerer. Sophistic refutations on the
|
|
other hand, even though they prove the contradictory of his thesis, do
|
|
not make clear whether he is ignorant: for sophists entangle the
|
|
scientist as well with these arguments.
|
|
That we know them by the same line of inquiry is clear: for the same
|
|
considerations which make it appear to an audience that the points
|
|
required for the proof were asked in the questions and that the
|
|
conclusion was proved, would make the answerer think so as well, so
|
|
that false proof will occur through all or some of these means: for
|
|
what a man has not been asked but thinks he has granted, he would also
|
|
grant if he were asked. Of course, in some cases the moment we add the
|
|
missing question, we also show up its falsity, e.g. in fallacies
|
|
that depend on language and on solecism. If then, fallacious proofs of
|
|
the contradictory of a thesis depend on their appearing to refute,
|
|
it is clear that the considerations on which both proofs of false
|
|
conclusions and an apparent refutation depend must be the same in
|
|
number. Now an apparent refutation depends upon the elements
|
|
involved in a genuine one: for the failure of one or other of these
|
|
must make the refutation merely apparent, e.g. that which depends on
|
|
the failure of the conclusion to follow from the argument (the
|
|
argument ad impossible) and that which treats two questions as one and
|
|
so depends upon a flaw in the premiss, and that which depends on the
|
|
substitution of an accident for an essential attribute, and-a branch
|
|
of the last-that which depends upon the consequent: more over, the
|
|
conclusion may follow not in fact but only verbally: then, instead
|
|
of proving the contradictory universally and in the same respect and
|
|
relation and manner, the fallacy may be dependent on some limit of
|
|
extent or on one or other of these qualifications: moreover, there
|
|
is the assumption of the original point to be proved, in violation
|
|
of the clause 'without reckoning in the original point'. Thus we
|
|
should have the number of considerations on which the fallacious
|
|
proofs depend: for they could not depend on more, but all will
|
|
depend on the points aforesaid.
|
|
A sophistical refutation is a refutation not absolutely but
|
|
relatively to some one: and so is a proof, in the same way. For unless
|
|
that which depends upon ambiguity assumes that the ambiguous term
|
|
has a single meaning, and that which depends on like verbal forms
|
|
assumes that substance is the only category, and the rest in the
|
|
same way, there will be neither refutations nor proofs, either
|
|
absolutely or relatively to the answerer: whereas if they do assume
|
|
these things, they will stand, relatively to the answerer; but
|
|
absolutely they will not stand: for they have not secured a
|
|
statement that does have a single meaning, but only one that appears
|
|
to have, and that only from this particular man.
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
BOOK_1|CH_9
|
|
9
|
|
-
|
|
The number of considerations on which depend the refutations of
|
|
those who are refuted, we ought not to try to grasp without a
|
|
knowledge of everything that is. This, however, is not the province of
|
|
any special study: for possibly the sciences are infinite in number,
|
|
so that obviously demonstrations may be infinite too. Now
|
|
refutations may be true as well as false: for whenever it is
|
|
possible to demonstrate something, it is also possible to refute the
|
|
man who maintains the contradictory of the truth; e.g. if a man has
|
|
stated that the diagonal is commensurate with the side of the
|
|
square, one might refute him by demonstrating that it is
|
|
incommensurate. Accordingly, to exhaust all possible refutations we
|
|
shall have to have scientific knowledge of everything: for some
|
|
refutations depend upon the principles that rule in geometry and the
|
|
conclusions that follow from these, others upon those that rule in
|
|
medicine, and others upon those of the other sciences. For the
|
|
matter of that, the false refutations likewise belong to the number of
|
|
the infinite: for according to every art there is false proof, e.g.
|
|
according to geometry there is false geometrical proof, and
|
|
according to medicine there is false medical proof. By 'according to
|
|
the art', I mean 'according to the principles of it'. Clearly, then,
|
|
it is not of all refutations, but only of those that depend upon
|
|
dialectic that we need to grasp the common-place rules: for these
|
|
stand in a common relation to every art and faculty. And as regards
|
|
the refutation that is according to one or other of the particular
|
|
sciences it is the task of that particular scientist to examine
|
|
whether it is merely apparent without being real, and, if it be
|
|
real, what is the reason for it: whereas it is the business of
|
|
dialecticians so to examine the refutation that proceeds from the
|
|
common first principles that fall under no particular special study.
|
|
For if we grasp the startingpoints of the accepted proofs on any
|
|
subject whatever we grasp those of the refutations current on that
|
|
subject. For a refutation is the proof of the contradictory of a given
|
|
thesis, so that either one or two proofs of the contradictory
|
|
constitute a refutation. We grasp, then, the number of
|
|
considerations on which all such depend: if, however, we grasp this,
|
|
we also grasp their solutions as well; for the objections to these are
|
|
the solutions of them. We also grasp the number of considerations on
|
|
which those refutations depend, that are merely apparent-apparent, I
|
|
mean, not to everybody, but to people of a certain stamp; for it is an
|
|
indefinite task if one is to inquire how many are the considerations
|
|
that make them apparent to the man in the street. Accordingly it is
|
|
clear that the dialectician's business is to be able to grasp on how
|
|
many considerations depends the formation, through the common first
|
|
principles, of a refutation that is either real or apparent, i.e.
|
|
either dialectical or apparently dialectical, or suitable for an
|
|
examination.
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
BOOK_1|CH_10
|
|
10
|
|
-
|
|
It is no true distinction between arguments which some people draw
|
|
when they say that some arguments are directed against the expression,
|
|
and others against the thought expressed: for it is absurd to
|
|
suppose that some arguments are directed against the expression and
|
|
others against the thought, and that they are not the same. For what
|
|
is failure to direct an argument against the thought except what
|
|
occurs whenever a man does not in using the expression think it to
|
|
be used in his question in the same sense in which the person
|
|
questioned granted it? And this is the same thing as to direct the
|
|
argument against the expression. On the other hand, it is directed
|
|
against the thought whenever a man uses the expression in the same
|
|
sense which the answerer had in mind when he granted it. If now any
|
|
(i.e. both the questioner and the person questioned), in dealing
|
|
with an expression with more than one meaning, were to suppose it to
|
|
have one meaning-as e.g. it may be that 'Being' and 'One' have many
|
|
meanings, and yet both the answerer answers and the questioner puts
|
|
his question supposing it to be one, and the argument is to the effect
|
|
that 'All things are one'-will this discussion be directed any more
|
|
against the expression than against the thought of the person
|
|
questioned? If, on the other hand, one of them supposes the expression
|
|
to have many meanings, it is clear that such a discussion will not
|
|
be directed against the thought. Such being the meanings of the
|
|
phrases in question, they clearly cannot describe two separate classes
|
|
of argument. For, in the first place, it is possible for any such
|
|
argument as bears more than one meaning to be directed against the
|
|
expression and against the thought, and next it is possible for any
|
|
argument whatsoever; for the fact of being directed against the
|
|
thought consists not in the nature of the argument, but in the special
|
|
attitude of the answerer towards the points he concedes. Next, all
|
|
of them may be directed to the expression. For 'to be directed against
|
|
the expression' means in this doctrine 'not to be directed against the
|
|
thought'. For if not all are directed against either expression or
|
|
thought, there will be certain other arguments directed neither
|
|
against the expression nor against the thought, whereas they say
|
|
that all must be one or the other, and divide them all as directed
|
|
either against the expression or against the thought, while others
|
|
(they say) there are none. But in point of fact those that depend on
|
|
mere expression are only a branch of those syllogisms that depend on a
|
|
multiplicity of meanings. For the absurd statement has actually been
|
|
made that the description 'dependent on mere expression' describes all
|
|
the arguments that depend on language: whereas some of these are
|
|
fallacies not because the answerer adopts a particular attitude
|
|
towards them, but because the argument itself involves the asking of a
|
|
question such as bears more than one meaning.
|
|
It is, too, altogether absurd to discuss Refutation without first
|
|
discussing Proof: for a refutation is a proof, so that one ought to
|
|
discuss proof as well before describing false refutation: for a
|
|
refutation of that kind is a merely apparent proof of the
|
|
contradictory of a thesis. Accordingly, the reason of the falsity will
|
|
be either in the proof or in the contradiction (for mention of the
|
|
'contradiction' must be added), while sometimes it is in both, if
|
|
the refutation be merely apparent. In the argument that speaking of
|
|
the silent is possible it lies in the contradiction, not in the proof;
|
|
in the argument that one can give what one does not possess, it lies
|
|
in both; in the proof that Homer's poem is a figure through its
|
|
being a cycle it lies in the proof. An argument that does not fail
|
|
in either respect is a true proof.
|
|
But, to return to the point whence our argument digressed, are
|
|
mathematical reasonings directed against the thought, or not? And if
|
|
any one thinks 'triangle' to be a word with many meanings, and granted
|
|
it in some different sense from the figure which was proved to contain
|
|
two right angles, has the questioner here directed his argument
|
|
against the thought of the former or not?
|
|
Moreover, if the expression bears many senses, while the answerer
|
|
does not understand or suppose it to have them, surely the
|
|
questioner here has directed his argument against his thought! Or
|
|
how else ought he to put his question except by suggesting a
|
|
distinction-suppose one's question to be speaking of the silent
|
|
possible or not?'-as follows, 'Is the answer "No" in one sense, but
|
|
"Yes" in another?' If, then, any one were to answer that it was not
|
|
possible in any sense and the other were to argue that it was, has not
|
|
his argument been directed against the thought of the answerer? Yet
|
|
his argument is supposed to be one of those that depend on the
|
|
expression. There is not, then, any definite kind of arguments that is
|
|
directed against the thought. Some arguments are, indeed, directed
|
|
against the expression: but these are not all even apparent
|
|
refutations, let alone all refutations. For there are also apparent
|
|
refutations which do not depend upon language, e.g. those that
|
|
depend upon accident, and others.
|
|
If, however, any one claims that one should actually draw the
|
|
distinction, and say, 'By "speaking of the silent" I mean, in one
|
|
sense this and in the other sense that', surely to claim this is in
|
|
the first place absurd (for sometimes the questioner does not see
|
|
the ambiguity of his question, and he cannot possibly draw a
|
|
distinction which he does not think to be there): in the second place,
|
|
what else but this will didactic argument be? For it will make
|
|
manifest the state of the case to one who has never considered, and
|
|
does not know or suppose that there is any other meaning but one.
|
|
For what is there to prevent the same thing also happening to us in
|
|
cases where there is no double meaning? 'Are the units in four equal
|
|
to the twos? Observe that the twos are contained in four in one
|
|
sense in this way, in another sense in that'. Also, 'Is the
|
|
knowledge of contraries one or not? Observe that some contraries are
|
|
known, while others are unknown'. Thus the man who makes this claim
|
|
seems to be unaware of the difference between didactic and dialectical
|
|
argument, and of the fact that while he who argues didactically should
|
|
not ask questions but make things clear himself, the other should
|
|
merely ask questions.
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
BOOK_1|CH_11
|
|
11
|
|
-
|
|
Moreover, to claim a 'Yes' or 'No' answer is the business not of a
|
|
man who is showing something, but of one who is holding an
|
|
examination. For the art of examining is a branch of dialectic and has
|
|
in view not the man who has knowledge, but the ignorant pretender. He,
|
|
then, is a dialectician who regards the common principles with their
|
|
application to the particular matter in hand, while he who only
|
|
appears to do this is a sophist. Now for contentious and sophistical
|
|
reasoning: (1) one such is a merely apparent reasoning, on subjects on
|
|
which dialectical reasoning is the proper method of examination,
|
|
even though its conclusion be true: for it misleads us in regard to
|
|
the cause: also (2) there are those misreasonings which do not conform
|
|
to the line of inquiry proper to the particular subject, but are
|
|
generally thought to conform to the art in question. For false
|
|
diagrams of geometrical figures are not contentious (for the resulting
|
|
fallacies conform to the subject of the art)-any more than is any
|
|
false diagram that may be offered in proof of a truth-e.g.
|
|
Hippocrates' figure or the squaring of the circle by means of the
|
|
lunules. But Bryson's method of squaring the circle, even if the
|
|
circle is thereby squared, is still sophistical because it does not
|
|
conform to the subject in hand. So, then, any merely apparent
|
|
reasoning about these things is a contentious argument, and any
|
|
reasoning that merely appears to conform to the subject in hand,
|
|
even though it be genuine reasoning, is a contentious argument: for it
|
|
is merely apparent in its conformity to the subject-matter, so that it
|
|
is deceptive and plays foul. For just as a foul in a race is a
|
|
definite type of fault, and is a kind of foul fighting, so the art
|
|
of contentious reasoning is foul fighting in disputation: for in the
|
|
former case those who are resolved to win at all costs snatch at
|
|
everything, and so in the latter case do contentious reasoners. Those,
|
|
then, who do this in order to win the mere victory are generally
|
|
considered to be contentious and quarrelsome persons, while those
|
|
who do it to win a reputation with a view to making money are
|
|
sophistical. For the art of sophistry is, as we said,' a kind of art
|
|
of money-making from a merely apparent wisdom, and this is why they
|
|
aim at a merely apparent demonstration: and quarrelsome persons and
|
|
sophists both employ the same arguments, but not with the same
|
|
motives: and the same argument will be sophistical and contentious,
|
|
but not in the same respect; rather, it will be contentious in so
|
|
far as its aim is an apparent victory, while in so far as its aim is
|
|
an apparent wisdom, it will be sophistical: for the art of sophistry
|
|
is a certain appearance of wisdom without the reality. The contentious
|
|
argument stands in somewhat the same relation to the dialectical as
|
|
the drawer of false diagrams to the geometrician; for it beguiles by
|
|
misreasoning from the same principles as dialectic uses, just as the
|
|
drawer of a false diagram beguiles the geometrician. But whereas the
|
|
latter is not a contentious reasoner, because he bases his false
|
|
diagram on the principles and conclusions that fall under the art of
|
|
geometry, the argument which is subordinate to the principles of
|
|
dialectic will yet clearly be contentious as regards other subjects.
|
|
Thus, e.g. though the squaring of the circle by means of the lunules
|
|
is not contentious, Bryson's solution is contentious: and the former
|
|
argument cannot be adapted to any subject except geometry, because
|
|
it proceeds from principles that are peculiar to geometry, whereas the
|
|
latter can be adapted as an argument against all the number of
|
|
people who do not know what is or is not possible in each particular
|
|
context: for it will apply to them all. Or there is the method whereby
|
|
Antiphon squared the circle. Or again, an argument which denied that
|
|
it was better to take a walk after dinner, because of Zeno's argument,
|
|
would not be a proper argument for a doctor, because Zeno's argument
|
|
is of general application. If, then, the relation of the contentious
|
|
argument to the dialectical were exactly like that of the drawer of
|
|
false diagrams to the geometrician, a contentious argument upon the
|
|
aforesaid subjects could not have existed. But, as it is, the
|
|
dialectical argument is not concerned with any definite kind of being,
|
|
nor does it show anything, nor is it even an argument such as we
|
|
find in the general philosophy of being. For all beings are not
|
|
contained in any one kind, nor, if they were, could they possibly fall
|
|
under the same principles. Accordingly, no art that is a method of
|
|
showing the nature of anything proceeds by asking questions: for it
|
|
does not permit a man to grant whichever he likes of the two
|
|
alternatives in the question: for they will not both of them yield a
|
|
proof. Dialectic, on the other hand, does proceed by questioning,
|
|
whereas if it were concerned to show things, it would have refrained
|
|
from putting questions, even if not about everything, at least about
|
|
the first principles and the special principles that apply to the
|
|
particular subject in hand. For suppose the answerer not to grant
|
|
these, it would then no longer have had any grounds from which to
|
|
argue any longer against the objection. Dialectic is at the same
|
|
time a mode of examination as well. For neither is the art of
|
|
examination an accomplishment of the same kind as geometry, but one
|
|
which a man may possess, even though he has not knowledge. For it is
|
|
possible even for one without knowledge to hold an examination of
|
|
one who is without knowledge, if also the latter grants him points
|
|
taken not from thing that he knows or from the special principles of
|
|
the subject under discussion but from all that range of consequences
|
|
attaching to the subject which a man may indeed know without knowing
|
|
the theory of the subject, but which if he do not know, he is bound to
|
|
be ignorant of the theory. So then clearly the art of examining does
|
|
not consist in knowledge of any definite subject. For this reason,
|
|
too, it deals with everything: for every 'theory' of anything
|
|
employs also certain common principles. Hence everybody, including
|
|
even amateurs, makes use in a way of dialectic and the practice of
|
|
examining: for all undertake to some extent a rough trial of those who
|
|
profess to know things. What serves them here is the general
|
|
principles: for they know these of themselves just as well as the
|
|
scientist, even if in what they say they seem to the latter to go
|
|
wildly astray from them. All, then, are engaged in refutation; for
|
|
they take a hand as amateurs in the same task with which dialectic
|
|
is concerned professionally; and he is a dialectician who examines
|
|
by the help of a theory of reasoning. Now there are many identical
|
|
principles which are true of everything, though they are not such as
|
|
to constitute a particular nature, i.e. a particular kind of being,
|
|
but are like negative terms, while other principles are not of this
|
|
kind but are special to particular subjects; accordingly it is
|
|
possible from these general principles to hold an examination on
|
|
everything, and that there should be a definite art of so doing,
|
|
and, moreover, an art which is not of the same kind as those which
|
|
demonstrate. This is why the contentious reasoner does not stand in
|
|
the same condition in all respects as the drawer of a false diagram:
|
|
for the contentious reasoner will not be given to misreasoning from
|
|
any definite class of principles, but will deal with every class.
|
|
These, then, are the types of sophistical refutations: and that it
|
|
belongs to the dialectician to study these, and to be able to effect
|
|
them, is not difficult to see: for the investigation of premisses
|
|
comprises the whole of this study.
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
BOOK_1|CH_12
|
|
12
|
|
-
|
|
So much, then, for apparent refutations. As for showing that the
|
|
answerer is committing some fallacy, and drawing his argument into
|
|
paradox-for this was the second item of the sophist's programme-in the
|
|
first place, then, this is best brought about by a certain manner of
|
|
questioning and through the question. For to put the question
|
|
without framing it with reference to any definite subject is a good
|
|
bait for these purposes: for people are more inclined to make mistakes
|
|
when they talk at large, and they talk at large when they have no
|
|
definite subject before them. Also the putting of several questions,
|
|
even though the position against which one is arguing be quite
|
|
definite, and the claim that he shall say only what he thinks,
|
|
create abundant opportunity for drawing him into paradox or fallacy,
|
|
and also, whether to any of these questions he replies 'Yes' or
|
|
replies 'No', of leading him on to statements against which one is
|
|
well off for a line of attack. Nowadays, however, men are less able to
|
|
play foul by these means than they were formerly: for people rejoin
|
|
with the question, 'What has that to do with the original subject?' It
|
|
is, too, an elementary rule for eliciting some fallacy or paradox that
|
|
one should never put a controversial question straight away, but say
|
|
that one puts it from the wish for information: for the process of
|
|
inquiry thus invited gives room for an attack.
|
|
A rule specially appropriate for showing up a fallacy is the
|
|
sophistic rule, that one should draw the answerer on to the kind of
|
|
statements against which one is well supplied with arguments: this can
|
|
be done both properly and improperly, as was said before.' Again, to
|
|
draw a paradoxical statement, look and see to what school of
|
|
philosophers the person arguing with you belongs, and then question
|
|
him as to some point wherein their doctrine is paradoxical to most
|
|
people: for with every school there is some point of that kind. It
|
|
is an elementary rule in these matters to have a collection of the
|
|
special 'theses' of the various schools among your propositions. The
|
|
solution recommended as appropriate here, too, is to point out that
|
|
the paradox does not come about because of the argument: whereas
|
|
this is what his opponent always really wants.
|
|
Moreover, argue from men's wishes and their professed opinions.
|
|
For people do not wish the same things as they say they wish: they say
|
|
what will look best, whereas they wish what appears to be to their
|
|
interest: e.g. they say that a man ought to die nobly rather than to
|
|
live in pleasure, and to live in honest poverty rather than in
|
|
dishonourable riches; but they wish the opposite. Accordingly, a man
|
|
who speaks according to his wishes must be led into stating the
|
|
professed opinions of people, while he who speaks according to these
|
|
must be led into admitting those that people keep hidden away: for
|
|
in either case they are bound to introduce a paradox; for they will
|
|
speak contrary either to men's professed or to their hidden opinions.
|
|
The widest range of common-place argument for leading men into
|
|
paradoxical statement is that which depends on the standards of Nature
|
|
and of the Law: it is so that both Callicles is drawn as arguing in
|
|
the Gorgias, and that all the men of old supposed the result to come
|
|
about: for nature (they said) and law are opposites, and justice is
|
|
a fine thing by a legal standard, but not by that of nature.
|
|
Accordingly, they said, the man whose statement agrees with the
|
|
standard of nature you should meet by the standard of the law, but the
|
|
man who agrees with the law by leading him to the facts of nature: for
|
|
in both ways paradoxical statements may be committed. In their view
|
|
the standard of nature was the truth, while that of the law was the
|
|
opinion held by the majority. So that it is clear that they, too, used
|
|
to try either to refute the answerer or to make him make paradoxical
|
|
statements, just as the men of to-day do as well.
|
|
Some questions are such that in both forms the answer is
|
|
paradoxical; e.g. 'Ought one to obey the wise or one's father?' and
|
|
'Ought one to do what is expedient or what is just?' and 'Is it
|
|
preferable to suffer injustice or to do an injury?' You should lead
|
|
people, then, into views opposite to the majority and to the
|
|
philosophers; if any one speaks as do the expert reasoners, lead him
|
|
into opposition to the majority, while if he speaks as do the
|
|
majority, then into opposition to the reasoners. For some say that
|
|
of necessity the happy man is just, whereas it is paradoxical to the
|
|
many that a king should be happy. To lead a man into paradoxes of this
|
|
sort is the same as to lead him into the opposition of the standards
|
|
of nature and law: for the law represents the opinion of the majority,
|
|
whereas philosophers speak according to the standard of nature and the
|
|
truth.
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
BOOK_1|CH_13
|
|
13
|
|
-
|
|
Paradoxes, then, you should seek to elicit by means of these
|
|
common-place rules. Now as for making any one babble, we have
|
|
already said what we mean by 'to babble'. This is the object in view
|
|
in all arguments of the following kind: If it is all the same to state
|
|
a term and to state its definition, the 'double' and 'double of
|
|
half' are the same: if then 'double' be the 'double of half', it
|
|
will be the 'double of half of half'. And if, instead of 'double',
|
|
'double of half' be again put, then the same expression will be
|
|
repeated three times, 'double of half of half of half'. Also 'desire
|
|
is of the pleasant, isn't it?' desire is conation for the pleasant:
|
|
accordingly, 'desire' is 'conation for the pleasant for the pleasant'.
|
|
All arguments of this kind occur in dealing (1) with any relative
|
|
terms which not only have relative genera, but are also themselves
|
|
relative, and are rendered in relation to one and the same thing, as
|
|
e.g. conation is conation for something, and desire is desire of
|
|
something, and double is double of something, i.e. double of half:
|
|
also in dealing (2) with any terms which, though they be not
|
|
relative terms at all, yet have their substance, viz. the things of
|
|
which they are the states or affections or what not, indicated as well
|
|
in their definition, they being predicated of these things. Thus
|
|
e.g. 'odd' is a 'number containing a middle': but there is an 'odd
|
|
number': therefore there is a 'number-containing-a-middle number'.
|
|
Also, if snubness be a concavity of the nose, and there be a snub
|
|
nose, there is therefore a 'concave-nose nose'.
|
|
People sometimes appear to produce this result, without really
|
|
producing it, because they do not add the question whether the
|
|
expression 'double', just by itself, has any meaning or no, and if so,
|
|
whether it has the same meaning, or a different one; but they draw
|
|
their conclusion straight away. Still it seems, inasmuch as the word
|
|
is the same, to have the same meaning as well.
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
BOOK_1|CH_14
|
|
14
|
|
-
|
|
We have said before what kind of thing 'solecism' is.' It is
|
|
possible both to commit it, and to seem to do so without doing so, and
|
|
to do so without seeming to do so. Suppose, as Protagoras used to
|
|
say that menis ('wrath') and pelex ('helmet') are masculine:
|
|
according to him a man who calls wrath a 'destructress' (oulomenen)
|
|
commits a solecism, though he does not seem to do so to other
|
|
people, where he who calls it a 'destructor' (oulomenon) commits no
|
|
solecism though he seems to do so. It is clear, then, that any one
|
|
could produce this effect by art as well: and for this reason many
|
|
arguments seem to lead to solecism which do not really do so, as
|
|
happens in the case of refutations.
|
|
Almost all apparent solecisms depend upon the word 'this' (tode),
|
|
and upon occasions when the inflection denotes neither a masculine nor
|
|
a feminine object but a neuter. For 'he' (outos) signifies a
|
|
masculine, and 'she' (aute) feminine; but 'this' (touto), though
|
|
meant to signify a neuter, often also signifies one or other of the
|
|
former: e.g. 'What is this?' 'It is Calliope'; 'it is a log'; 'it is
|
|
Coriscus'. Now in the masculine and feminine the inflections are all
|
|
different, whereas in the neuter some are and some are not. Often,
|
|
then, when 'this' (touto) has been granted, people reason as if 'him'
|
|
(touton) had been said: and likewise also they substitute one
|
|
inflection for another. The fallacy comes about because 'this'
|
|
(touto) is a common form of several inflections: for 'this' signifies
|
|
sometimes 'he' (outos) and sometimes 'him' (touton). It should
|
|
signify them alternately; when combined with 'is' (esti) it should be
|
|
'he', while with 'being' it should be 'him': e.g. 'Coriscus
|
|
(Kopiskos) is', but 'being Coriscus' (Kopiskon). It happens in the
|
|
same way in the case of feminine nouns as well, and in the case of the
|
|
so-called 'chattels' that have feminine or masculine designations. For
|
|
only those names which end in o and n, have the designation proper
|
|
to a chattel, e.g. xulon ('log'), schoinion ('rope'); those which do
|
|
not end so have that of a masculine or feminine object, though some of
|
|
them we apply to chattels: e.g. askos ('wineskin') is a masculine
|
|
noun, and kline ('bed') a feminine. For this reason in cases of this
|
|
kind as well there will be a difference of the same sort between a
|
|
construction with 'is' (esti) or with 'being' (to einai). Also,
|
|
Solecism resembles in a certain way those refutations which are said
|
|
to depend on the like expression of unlike things. For, just as
|
|
there we come upon a material solecism, so here we come upon a verbal:
|
|
for 'man' is both a 'matter' for expression and also a 'word': and
|
|
so is white'.
|
|
It is clear, then, that for solecisms we must try to construct our
|
|
argument out of the aforesaid inflections.
|
|
These, then, are the types of contentious arguments, and the
|
|
subdivisions of those types, and the methods for conducting them
|
|
aforesaid. But it makes no little difference if the materials for
|
|
putting the question be arranged in a certain manner with a view to
|
|
concealment, as in the case of dialectics. Following then upon what we
|
|
have said, this must be discussed first.
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
BOOK_1|CH_15
|
|
15
|
|
-
|
|
With a view then to refutation, one resource is length-for it is
|
|
difficult to keep several things in view at once; and to secure length
|
|
the elementary rules that have been stated before' should be employed.
|
|
One resource, on the other hand, is speed; for when people are left
|
|
behind they look ahead less. Moreover, there is anger and
|
|
contentiousness, for when agitated everybody is less able to take care
|
|
of himself. Elementary rules for producing anger are to make a show of
|
|
the wish to play foul, and to be altogether shameless. Moreover, there
|
|
is the putting of one's questions alternately, whether one has more
|
|
than one argument leading to the same conclusion, or whether one has
|
|
arguments to show both that something is so, and that it is not so:
|
|
for the result is that he has to be on his guard at the same time
|
|
either against more than one line, or against contrary lines, of
|
|
argument. In general, all the methods described before of producing
|
|
concealment are useful also for purposes of contentious argument:
|
|
for the object of concealment is to avoid detection, and the object of
|
|
this is to deceive.
|
|
To counter those who refuse to grant whatever they suppose to help
|
|
one's argument, one should put the question negatively, as though
|
|
desirous of the opposite answer, or at any rate as though one put
|
|
the question without prejudice; for when it is obscure what answer one
|
|
wants to secure, people are less refractory. Also when, in dealing
|
|
with particulars, a man grants the individual case, when the induction
|
|
is done you should often not put the universal as a question, but take
|
|
it for granted and use it: for sometimes people themselves suppose
|
|
that they have granted it, and also appear to the audience to have
|
|
done so, for they remember the induction and assume that the questions
|
|
could not have been put for nothing. In cases where there is no term
|
|
to indicate the universal, still you should avail yourself of the
|
|
resemblance of the particulars to suit your purpose; for resemblance
|
|
often escapes detection. Also, with a view to obtaining your
|
|
premiss, you ought to put it in your question side by side with its
|
|
contrary. E.g. if it were necessary to secure the admission that 'A
|
|
man should obey his father in everything', ask 'Should a man obey
|
|
his parents in everything, or disobey them in everything?'; and to
|
|
secure that 'A number multiplied by a large number is a large number',
|
|
ask 'Should one agree that it is a large number or a small one?' For
|
|
then, if compelled to choose, one will be more inclined to think it
|
|
a large one: for the placing of their contraries close beside them
|
|
makes things look big to men, both relatively and absolutely, and
|
|
worse and better.
|
|
A strong appearance of having been refuted is often produced by
|
|
the most highly sophistical of all the unfair tricks of questioners,
|
|
when without proving anything, instead of putting their final
|
|
proposition as a question, they state it as a conclusion, as though
|
|
they had proved that 'Therefore so-and-so is not true'
|
|
It is also a sophistical trick, when a paradox has been laid down,
|
|
first to propose at the start some view that is generally accepted,
|
|
and then claim that the answerer shall answer what he thinks about it,
|
|
and to put one's question on matters of that kind in the form 'Do
|
|
you think that...?' For then, if the question be taken as one of the
|
|
premisses of one's argument, either a refutation or a paradox is bound
|
|
to result; if he grants the view, a refutation; if he refuses to grant
|
|
it or even to admit it as the received opinion, a paradox; if he
|
|
refuses to grant it, but admits that it is the received opinion,
|
|
something very like a refutation, results.
|
|
Moreover, just as in rhetorical discourses, so also in those aimed
|
|
at refutation, you should examine the discrepancies of the
|
|
answerer's position either with his own statements, or with those of
|
|
persons whom he admits to say and do aright, moreover with those of
|
|
people who are generally supposed to bear that kind of character, or
|
|
who are like them, or with those of the majority or of all men. Also
|
|
just as answerers, too, often, when they are in process of being
|
|
confuted, draw a distinction, if their confutation is just about to
|
|
take place, so questioners also should resort to this from time to
|
|
time to counter objectors, pointing out, supposing that against one
|
|
sense of the words the objection holds, but not against the other,
|
|
that they have taken it in the latter sense, as e.g. Cleophon does
|
|
in the Mandrobulus. They should also break off their argument and
|
|
cut down their other lines of attack, while in answering, if a man
|
|
perceives this being done beforehand, he should put in his objection
|
|
and have his say first. One should also lead attacks sometimes against
|
|
positions other than the one stated, on the understood condition
|
|
that one cannot find lines of attack against the view laid down, as
|
|
Lycophron did when ordered to deliver a eulogy upon the lyre. To
|
|
counter those who demand 'Against what are you directing your
|
|
effort?', since one is generally thought bound to state the charge
|
|
made, while, on the other hand, some ways of stating it make the
|
|
defence too easy, you should state as your aim only the general result
|
|
that always happens in refutations, namely the contradiction of his
|
|
thesis -viz. that your effort is to deny what he has affirmed, or to
|
|
affirm what he denied: don't say that you are trying to show that
|
|
the knowledge of contraries is, or is not, the same. One must not
|
|
ask one's conclusion in the form of a premiss, while some
|
|
conclusions should not even be put as questions at all; one should
|
|
take and use it as granted.
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
BOOK_1|CH_16
|
|
16
|
|
-
|
|
We have now therefore dealt with the sources of questions, and the
|
|
methods of questioning in contentious disputations: next we have to
|
|
speak of answering, and of how solutions should be made, and of what
|
|
requires them, and of what use is served by arguments of this kind.
|
|
The use of them, then, is, for philosophy, twofold. For in the first
|
|
place, since for the most part they depend upon the expression, they
|
|
put us in a better condition for seeing in how many senses any term is
|
|
used, and what kind of resemblances and what kind of differences occur
|
|
between things and between their names. In the second place they are
|
|
useful for one's own personal researches; for the man who is easily
|
|
committed to a fallacy by some one else, and does not perceive it,
|
|
is likely to incur this fate of himself also on many occasions.
|
|
Thirdly and lastly, they further contribute to one's reputation,
|
|
viz. the reputation of being well trained in everything, and not
|
|
inexperienced in anything: for that a party to arguments should find
|
|
fault with them, if he cannot definitely point out their weakness,
|
|
creates a suspicion, making it seem as though it were not the truth of
|
|
the matter but merely inexperience that put him out of temper.
|
|
Answerers may clearly see how to meet arguments of this kind, if our
|
|
previous account was right of the sources whence fallacies came, and
|
|
also our distinctions adequate of the forms of dishonesty in putting
|
|
questions. But it is not the same thing take an argument in one's hand
|
|
and then to see and solve its faults, as it is to be able to meet it
|
|
quickly while being subjected to questions: for what we know, we often
|
|
do not know in a different context. Moreover, just as in other
|
|
things speed is enhanced by training, so it is with arguments too,
|
|
so that supposing we are unpractised, even though a point be clear
|
|
to us, we are often too late for the right moment. Sometimes too it
|
|
happens as with diagrams; for there we can sometimes analyse the
|
|
figure, but not construct it again: so too in refutations, though we
|
|
know the thing on which the connexion of the argument depends, we
|
|
still are at a loss to split the argument apart.
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
BOOK_1|CH_17
|
|
17
|
|
-
|
|
First then, just as we say that we ought sometimes to choose to
|
|
prove something in the general estimation rather than in truth, so
|
|
also we have sometimes to solve arguments rather in the general
|
|
estimation than according to the truth. For it is a general rule in
|
|
fighting contentious persons, to treat them not as refuting, but as
|
|
merely appearing to refute: for we say that they don't really prove
|
|
their case, so that our object in correcting them must be to dispel
|
|
the appearance of it. For if refutation be an unambiguous
|
|
contradiction arrived at from certain views, there could be no need to
|
|
draw distinctions against amphiboly and ambiguity: they do not
|
|
effect a proof. The only motive for drawing further distinctions is
|
|
that the conclusion reached looks like a refutation. What, then, we
|
|
have to beware of, is not being refuted, but seeming to be, because of
|
|
course the asking of amphibolies and of questions that turn upon
|
|
ambiguity, and all the other tricks of that kind, conceal even a
|
|
genuine refutation, and make it uncertain who is refuted and who is
|
|
not. For since one has the right at the end, when the conclusion is
|
|
drawn, to say that the only denial made of One's statement is
|
|
ambiguous, no matter how precisely he may have addressed his
|
|
argument to the very same point as oneself, it is not clear whether
|
|
one has been refuted: for it is not clear whether at the moment one is
|
|
speaking the truth. If, on the other hand, one had drawn a
|
|
distinction, and questioned him on the ambiguous term or the
|
|
amphiboly, the refutation would not have been a matter of uncertainty.
|
|
Also what is incidentally the object of contentious arguers, though
|
|
less so nowadays than formerly, would have been fulfilled, namely that
|
|
the person questioned should answer either 'Yes' or 'No': whereas
|
|
nowadays the improper forms in which questioners put their questions
|
|
compel the party questioned to add something to his answer in
|
|
correction of the faultiness of the proposition as put: for certainly,
|
|
if the questioner distinguishes his meaning adequately, the answerer
|
|
is bound to reply either 'Yes' or 'No'.
|
|
If any one is going to suppose that an argument which turns upon
|
|
ambiguity is a refutation, it will be impossible for an answerer to
|
|
escape being refuted in a sense: for in the case of visible objects
|
|
one is bound of necessity to deny the term one has asserted, and to
|
|
assert what one has denied. For the remedy which some people have
|
|
for this is quite unavailing. They say, not that Coriscus is both
|
|
musical and unmusical, but that this Coriscus is musical and this
|
|
Coriscus unmusical. But this will not do, for to say 'this Coriscus is
|
|
unmusical', or 'musical', and to say 'this Coriscus' is so, is to
|
|
use the same expression: and this he is both affirming and denying
|
|
at once. 'But perhaps they do not mean the same.' Well, nor did the
|
|
simple name in the former case: so where is the difference? If,
|
|
however, he is to ascribe to the one person the simple title
|
|
'Coriscus', while to the other he is to add the prefix 'one' or
|
|
'this', he commits an absurdity: for the latter is no more
|
|
applicable to the one than to the other: for to whichever he adds
|
|
it, it makes no difference.
|
|
All the same, since if a man does not distinguish the senses of an
|
|
amphiboly, it is not clear whether he has been confuted or has not
|
|
been confuted, and since in arguments the right to distinguish them is
|
|
granted, it is evident that to grant the question simply without
|
|
drawing any distinction is a mistake, so that, even if not the man
|
|
himself, at any rate his argument looks as though it had been refuted.
|
|
It often happens, however, that, though they see the amphiboly, people
|
|
hesitate to draw such distinctions, because of the dense crowd of
|
|
persons who propose questions of the kind, in order that they may
|
|
not be thought to be obstructionists at every turn: then, though
|
|
they would never have supposed that that was the point on which the
|
|
argument turned, they often find themselves faced by a paradox.
|
|
Accordingly, since the right of drawing the distinction is granted,
|
|
one should not hesitate, as has been said before.
|
|
If people never made two questions into one question, the fallacy
|
|
that turns upon ambiguity and amphiboly would not have existed either,
|
|
but either genuine refutation or none. For what is the difference
|
|
between asking 'Are Callias and Themistocles musical?' and what one
|
|
might have asked if they, being different, had had one name? For if
|
|
the term applied means more than one thing, he has asked more than one
|
|
question. If then it be not right to demand simply to be given a
|
|
single answer to two questions, it is evident that it is not proper to
|
|
give a simple answer to any ambiguous question, not even if the
|
|
predicate be true of all the subjects, as some claim that one
|
|
should. For this is exactly as though he had asked 'Are Coriscus and
|
|
Callias at home or not at home?', supposing them to be both in or both
|
|
out: for in both cases there is a number of propositions: for though
|
|
the simple answer be true, that does not make the question one. For it
|
|
is possible for it to be true to answer even countless different
|
|
questions when put to one, all together with either a 'Yes' or a 'No':
|
|
but still one should not answer them with a single answer: for that is
|
|
the death of discussion. Rather, the case is like as though
|
|
different things has actually had the same name applied to them. If
|
|
then, one should not give a single answer to two questions, it is
|
|
evident that we should not say simply 'Yes' or 'No' in the case of
|
|
ambiguous terms either: for the remark is simply a remark, not an
|
|
answer at all, although among disputants such remarks are loosely
|
|
deemed to be answers, because they do not see what the consequence is.
|
|
As we said, then, inasmuch as certain refutations are generally
|
|
taken for such, though not such really, in the same way also certain
|
|
solutions will be generally taken for solutions, though not really
|
|
such. Now these, we say, must sometimes be advanced rather than the
|
|
true solutions in contentious reasonings and in the encounter with
|
|
ambiguity. The proper answer in saying what one thinks is to say
|
|
'Granted'; for in that way the likelihood of being refuted on a side
|
|
issue is minimized. If, on the other hand, one is compelled to say
|
|
something paradoxical, one should then be most careful to add that 'it
|
|
seems' so: for in that way one avoids the impression of being either
|
|
refuted or paradoxical. Since it is clear what is meant by 'begging
|
|
the original question', and people think that they must at all costs
|
|
overthrow the premisses that lie near the conclusion, and plead in
|
|
excuse for refusing to grant him some of them that he is begging the
|
|
original question, so whenever any one claims from us a point such
|
|
as is bound to follow as a consequence from our thesis, but is false
|
|
or paradoxical, we must plead the same: for the necessary consequences
|
|
are generally held to be a part of the thesis itself. Moreover,
|
|
whenever the universal has been secured not under a definite name, but
|
|
by a comparison of instances, one should say that the questioner
|
|
assumes it not in the sense in which it was granted nor in which he
|
|
proposed it in the premiss: for this too is a point upon which a
|
|
refutation often depends.
|
|
If one is debarred from these defences one must pass to the argument
|
|
that the conclusion has not been properly shown, approaching it in the
|
|
light of the aforesaid distinction between the different kinds of
|
|
fallacy.
|
|
In the case, then, of names that are used literally one is bound
|
|
to answer either simply or by drawing a distinction: the tacit
|
|
understandings implied in our statements, e.g. in answer to
|
|
questions that are not put clearly but elliptically-it is upon this
|
|
that the consequent refutation depends. For example, 'Is what
|
|
belongs to Athenians the property of Athenians?' Yes. 'And so it is
|
|
likewise in other cases. But observe; man belongs to the animal
|
|
kingdom, doesn't he?' Yes. 'Then man is the property of the animal
|
|
kingdom.' But this is a fallacy: for we say that man 'belongs to'
|
|
the animal kingdom because he is an animal, just as we say that
|
|
Lysander 'belongs to' the Spartans, because he is a Spartan. It is
|
|
evident, then, that where the premiss put forward is not clear, one
|
|
must not grant it simply.
|
|
Whenever of two things it is generally thought that if the one is
|
|
true the other is true of necessity, whereas, if the other is true,
|
|
the first is not true of necessity, one should, if asked which of them
|
|
is true, grant the smaller one: for the larger the number of
|
|
premisses, the harder it is to draw a conclusion from them. If, again,
|
|
the sophist tries to secure that has a contrary while B has not,
|
|
suppose what he says is true, you should say that each has a contrary,
|
|
only for the one there is no established name.
|
|
Since, again, in regard to some of the views they express, most
|
|
people would say that any one who did not admit them was telling a
|
|
falsehood, while they would not say this in regard to some, e.g. to
|
|
any matters whereon opinion is divided (for most people have no
|
|
distinct view whether the soul of animals is destructible or
|
|
immortal), accordingly (1) it is uncertain in which of two senses
|
|
the premiss proposed is usually meant-whether as maxims are (for
|
|
people call by the name of 'maxims' both true opinions and general
|
|
assertions) or like the doctrine 'the diagonal of a square is
|
|
incommensurate with its side': and moreover (2) whenever opinions
|
|
are divided as to the truth, we then have subjects of which it is very
|
|
easy to change the terminology undetected. For because of the
|
|
uncertainty in which of the two senses the premiss contains the truth,
|
|
one will not be thought to be playing any trick, while because of
|
|
the division of opinion, one will not be thought to be telling a
|
|
falsehood. Change the terminology therefore, for the change will
|
|
make the position irrefutable.
|
|
Moreover, whenever one foresees any question coming, one should
|
|
put in one's objection and have one's say beforehand: for by doing
|
|
so one is likely to embarrass the questioner most effectually.
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
BOOK_1|CH_18
|
|
18
|
|
-
|
|
Inasmuch as a proper solution is an exposure of false reasoning,
|
|
showing on what kind of question the falsity depends, and whereas
|
|
'false reasoning' has a double meaning-for it is used either if a
|
|
false conclusion has been proved, or if there is only an apparent
|
|
proof and no real one-there must be both the kind of solution just
|
|
described,' and also the correction of a merely apparent proof, so
|
|
as to show upon which of the questions the appearance depends. Thus it
|
|
comes about that one solves arguments that are properly reasoned by
|
|
demolishing them, whereas one solves merely apparent arguments by
|
|
drawing distinctions. Again, inasmuch as of arguments that are
|
|
properly reasoned some have a true and others a false conclusion,
|
|
those that are false in respect of their conclusion it is possible
|
|
to solve in two ways; for it is possible both by demolishing one of
|
|
the premisses asked, and by showing that the conclusion is not the
|
|
real state of the case: those, on the other hand, that are false in
|
|
respect of the premisses can be solved only by a demolition of one
|
|
of them; for the conclusion is true. So that those who wish to solve
|
|
an argument should in the first place look and see if it is properly
|
|
reasoned, or is unreasoned; and next, whether the conclusion be true
|
|
or false, in order that we may effect the solution either by drawing
|
|
some distinction or by demolishing something, and demolishing it
|
|
either in this way or in that, as was laid down before. There is a
|
|
very great deal of difference between solving an argument when being
|
|
subjected to questions and when not: for to foresee traps is
|
|
difficult, whereas to see them at one's leisure is easier.
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
BOOK_1|CH_19
|
|
19
|
|
-
|
|
Of the refutations, then, that depend upon ambiguity and amphiboly
|
|
some contain some question with more than one meaning, while others
|
|
contain a conclusion bearing a number of senses: e.g. in the proof
|
|
that 'speaking of the silent' is possible, the conclusion has a double
|
|
meaning, while in the proof that 'he who knows does not understand
|
|
what he knows' one of the questions contains an amphiboly. Also the
|
|
double-edged saying is true in one context but not in another: it
|
|
means something that is and something that is not.
|
|
Whenever, then, the many senses lie in the conclusion no
|
|
refutation takes place unless the sophist secures as well the
|
|
contradiction of the conclusion he means to prove; e.g. in the proof
|
|
that 'seeing of the blind' is possible: for without the
|
|
contradiction there was no refutation. Whenever, on the other hand,
|
|
the many senses lie in the questions, there is no necessity to begin
|
|
by denying the double-edged premiss: for this was not the goal of
|
|
the argument but only its support. At the start, then, one should
|
|
reply with regard to an ambiguity, whether of a term or of a phrase,
|
|
in this manner, that 'in one sense it is so, and in another not so',
|
|
as e.g. that 'speaking of the silent' is in one sense possible but
|
|
in another not possible: also that in one sense 'one should do what
|
|
must needs be done', but not in another: for 'what must needs be'
|
|
bears a number of senses. If, however, the ambiguity escapes one,
|
|
one should correct it at the end by making an addition to the
|
|
question: 'Is speaking of the silent possible?' 'No, but to speak of
|
|
while he is silent is possible.' Also, in cases which contain the
|
|
ambiguity in their premisses, one should reply in like manner: 'Do
|
|
people-then not understand what they know? "Yes, but not those who
|
|
know it in the manner described': for it is not the same thing to
|
|
say that 'those who know cannot understand what they know', and to say
|
|
that 'those who know something in this particular manner cannot do
|
|
so'. In general, too, even though he draws his conclusion in a quite
|
|
unambiguous manner, one should contend that what he has negated is not
|
|
the fact which one has asserted but only its name; and that
|
|
therefore there is no refutation.
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
BOOK_1|CH_20
|
|
20
|
|
-
|
|
It is evident also how one should solve those refutations that
|
|
depend upon the division and combination of words: for if the
|
|
expression means something different when divided and when combined,
|
|
as soon as one's opponent draws his conclusion one should take the
|
|
expression in the contrary way. All such expressions as the
|
|
following depend upon the combination or division of the words: 'Was X
|
|
being beaten with that with which you saw him being beaten?' and
|
|
'Did you see him being beaten with that with which he was being
|
|
beaten?' This fallacy has also in it an element of amphiboly in the
|
|
questions, but it really depends upon combination. For the meaning
|
|
that depends upon the division of the words is not really a double
|
|
meaning (for the expression when divided is not the same), unless also
|
|
the word that is pronounced, according to its breathing, as eros and
|
|
eros is a case of double meaning. (In writing, indeed, a word is the
|
|
same whenever it is written of the same letters and in the same
|
|
manner- and even there people nowadays put marks at the side to
|
|
show the pronunciation- but the spoken words are not the same.)
|
|
Accordingly an expression that depends upon division is not an
|
|
ambiguous one. It is evident also that not all refutations depend upon
|
|
ambiguity as some people say they do.
|
|
The answerer, then, must divide the expression: for
|
|
'I-saw-a-man-being-beaten with my eyes' is not the same as to say 'I
|
|
saw a man being-beaten-with-my-eyes'. Also there is the argument of
|
|
Euthydemus proving 'Then you know now in Sicily that there are
|
|
triremes in Piraeus': and again, 'Can a good man who is a cobbler be
|
|
bad?' 'No.' 'But a good man may be a bad cobbler: therefore a good
|
|
cobbler will be bad.' Again, 'Things the knowledge of which is good,
|
|
are good things to learn, aren't they?' 'Yes.' 'The knowledge,
|
|
however, of evil is good: therefore evil is a good thing to know.'
|
|
'Yes. But, you see, evil is both evil and a thing-to-learn, so that
|
|
evil is an evil-thing-to-learn, although the knowledge of evils is
|
|
good.' Again, 'Is it true to say in the present moment that you are
|
|
born?' 'Yes.' 'Then you are born in the present moment.' 'No; the
|
|
expression as divided has a different meaning: for it is true to
|
|
say-in-the-present-moment that "you are born", but not "You are
|
|
born-in-the-present-moment".' Again, 'Could you do what you can, and
|
|
as you can?' 'Yes.' 'But when not harping, you have the power to harp:
|
|
and therefore you could harp when not harping.' 'No: he has not the
|
|
power to harp-while-not-harping; merely, when he is not doing it, he
|
|
has the power to do it.' Some people solve this last refutation in
|
|
another way as well. For, they say, if he has granted that he can do
|
|
anything in the way he can, still it does not follow that he can
|
|
harp when not harping: for it has not been granted that he will do
|
|
anything in every way in which he can; and it is not the same thing'
|
|
to do a thing in the way he can' and 'to do it in every way in which
|
|
he can'. But evidently they do not solve it properly: for of arguments
|
|
that depend upon the same point the solution is the same, whereas this
|
|
will not fit all cases of the kind nor yet all ways of putting the
|
|
questions: it is valid against the questioner, but not against his
|
|
argument.
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
BOOK_1|CH_21
|
|
21
|
|
-
|
|
Accentuation gives rise to no fallacious arguments, either as
|
|
written or as spoken, except perhaps some few that might be made up;
|
|
e.g. the following argument. 'Is ou katalueis a house?' 'Yes.' 'Is
|
|
then ou katalueis the negation of katalueis?' 'Yes.' 'But you
|
|
said that ou katalueis is a house: therefore the house is a
|
|
negation.' How one should solve this, is clear: for the word does
|
|
not mean the same when spoken with an acuter and when spoken with a
|
|
graver accent.
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
BOOK_1|CH_22
|
|
22
|
|
-
|
|
It is clear also how one must meet those fallacies that depend on
|
|
the identical expressions of things that are not identical, seeing
|
|
that we are in possession of the kinds of predications. For the one
|
|
man, say, has granted, when asked, that a term denoting a substance
|
|
does not belong as an attribute, while the other has shown that some
|
|
attribute belongs which is in the Category of Relation or of Quantity,
|
|
but is usually thought to denote a substance because of its
|
|
expression; e.g. in the following argument: 'Is it possible to be
|
|
doing and to have done the same thing at the same time?' 'No.' 'But,
|
|
you see, it is surely possible to be seeing and to have seen the
|
|
same thing at the same time, and in the same aspect.' Again, 'Is any
|
|
mode of passivity a mode of activity?' 'No.' 'Then "he is cut", "he is
|
|
burnt", "he is struck by some sensible object" are alike in expression
|
|
and all denote some form of passivity, while again "to say", "to run",
|
|
"to see" are like one like one another in expression: but, you see,
|
|
"to see" is surely a form of being struck by a sensible object;
|
|
therefore it is at the same time a form of passivity and of activity.'
|
|
Suppose, however, that in that case any one, after granting that it is
|
|
not possible to do and to have done the same thing in the same time,
|
|
were to say that it is possible to see and to have seen it, still he
|
|
has not yet been refuted, suppose him to say that 'to see' is not a
|
|
form of 'doing' (activity) but of 'passivity': for this question is
|
|
required as well, though he is supposed by the listener to have
|
|
already granted it, when he granted that 'to cut' is a form of
|
|
present, and 'to have cut' a form of past, activity, and so on with
|
|
the other things that have a like expression. For the listener adds
|
|
the rest by himself, thinking the meaning to be alike: whereas
|
|
really the meaning is not alike, though it appears to be so because of
|
|
the expression. The same thing happens here as happens in cases of
|
|
ambiguity: for in dealing with ambiguous expressions the tyro in
|
|
argument supposes the sophist to have negated the fact which he (the
|
|
tyro) affirmed, and not merely the name: whereas there still wants the
|
|
question whether in using the ambiguous term he had a single meaning
|
|
in view: for if he grants that that was so, the refutation will be
|
|
effected.
|
|
Like the above are also the following arguments. It is asked if a
|
|
man has lost what he once had and afterwards has not: for a man will
|
|
no longer have ten dice even though he has only lost one die. No:
|
|
rather it is that he has lost what he had before and has not now;
|
|
but there is no necessity for him to have lost as much or as many
|
|
things as he has not now. So then, he asks the questions as to what he
|
|
has, and draws the conclusion as to the whole number that he has:
|
|
for ten is a number. If then he had asked to begin with, whether a man
|
|
no longer having the number of things he once had has lost the whole
|
|
number, no one would have granted it, but would have said 'Either
|
|
the whole number or one of them'. Also there is the argument that 'a
|
|
man may give what he has not got': for he has not got only one die.
|
|
No: rather it is that he has given not what he had not got, but in a
|
|
manner in which he had not got it, viz. just the one. For the word
|
|
'only' does not signify a particular substance or quality or number,
|
|
but a manner relation, e.g. that it is not coupled with any other.
|
|
It is therefore just as if he had asked 'Could a man give what he
|
|
has not got?' and, on being given the answer 'No', were to ask if a
|
|
man could give a thing quickly when he had not got it quickly, and, on
|
|
this being granted, were to conclude that 'a man could give what he
|
|
had not got'. It is quite evident that he has not proved his point:
|
|
for to 'give quickly' is not to give a thing, but to give in a certain
|
|
manner; and a man could certainly give a thing in a manner in which he
|
|
has not got it, e.g. he might have got it with pleasure and give it
|
|
with pain.
|
|
Like these are also all arguments of the following kind: 'Could a
|
|
man strike a blow with a hand which he has not got, or see with an eye
|
|
which he has not got?' For he has not got only one eye. Some people
|
|
solve this case, where a man has more than one eye, or more than one
|
|
of anything else, by saying also that he has only one. Others also
|
|
solve it as they solve the refutation of the view that 'what a man
|
|
has, he has received': for A gave only one vote; and certainly B, they
|
|
say, has only one vote from A. Others, again, proceed by demolishing
|
|
straight away the proposition asked, and admitting that it is quite
|
|
possible to have what one has not received; e.g. to have received
|
|
sweet wine, but then, owing to its going bad in the course of receipt,
|
|
to have it sour. But, as was said also above,' all these persons
|
|
direct their solutions against the man, not against his argument.
|
|
For if this were a genuine solution, then, suppose any one to grant
|
|
the opposite, he could find no solution, just as happens in other
|
|
cases; e.g. suppose the true solution to be 'So-and-so is partly
|
|
true and partly not', then, if the answerer grants the expression
|
|
without any qualification, the sophist's conclusion follows. If, on
|
|
the other hand, the conclusion does not follow, then that could not be
|
|
the true solution: and what we say in regard to the foregoing examples
|
|
is that, even if all the sophist's premisses be granted, still no
|
|
proof is effected.
|
|
Moreover, the following too belong to this group of arguments. 'If
|
|
something be in writing did some one write it?' 'Yes.' 'But it is
|
|
now in writing that you are seated-a false statement, though it was
|
|
true at the time when it was written: therefore the statement that was
|
|
written is at the same time false and true.' But this is fallacious,
|
|
for the falsity or truth of a statement or opinion indicates not a
|
|
substance but a quality: for the same account applies to the case of
|
|
an opinion as well. Again, 'Is what a learner learns what he
|
|
learns?' 'Yes.' 'But suppose some one learns "slow" quick'. Then his
|
|
(the sophist's) words denote not what the learner learns but how he
|
|
learns it. Also, 'Does a man tread upon what he walks through?
|
|
'Yes.' 'But X walks through a whole day.' No, rather the words
|
|
denote not what he walks through, but when he walks; just as when
|
|
any one uses the words 'to drink the cup' he denotes not what he
|
|
drinks, but the vessel out of which he drinks. Also, 'Is it either
|
|
by learning or by discovery that a man knows what he knows?' 'Yes.'
|
|
'But suppose that of a pair of things he has discovered one and
|
|
learned the other, the pair is not known to him by either method.' No:
|
|
'what' he knows, means' every single thing' he knows, individually;
|
|
but this does not mean 'all the things' he knows, collectively. Again,
|
|
there is the proof that there is a 'third man' distinct from Man and
|
|
from individual men. But that is a fallacy, for 'Man', and indeed
|
|
every general predicate, denotes not an individual substance, but a
|
|
particular quality, or the being related to something in a
|
|
particular manner, or something of that sort. Likewise also in the
|
|
case of 'Coriscus' and 'Coriscus the musician' there is the problem,
|
|
Are they the same or different?' For the one denotes an individual
|
|
substance and the other a quality, so that it cannot be isolated;
|
|
though it is not the isolation which creates the 'third man', but
|
|
the admission that it is an individual substance. For 'Man' cannot
|
|
be an individual substance, as Callias is. Nor is the case improved
|
|
one whit even if one were to call the clement he has isolated not an
|
|
individual substance but a quality: for there will still be the one
|
|
beside the many, just as 'Man' was. It is evident then that one must
|
|
not grant that what is a common predicate applying to a class
|
|
universally is an individual substance, but must say that denotes
|
|
either a quality, or a relation, or a quantity, or something of that
|
|
kind.
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
BOOK_1|CH_23
|
|
23
|
|
-
|
|
It is a general rule in dealing with arguments that depend on
|
|
language that the solution always follows the opposite of the point on
|
|
which the argument turns: e.g. if the argument depends upon
|
|
combination, then the solution consists in division; if upon division,
|
|
then in combination. Again, if it depends on an acute accent, the
|
|
solution is a grave accent; if on a grave accent, it is an acute. If
|
|
it depends on ambiguity, one can solve it by using the opposite
|
|
term; e.g. if you find yourself calling something inanimate, despite
|
|
your previous denial that it was so, show in what sense it is alive:
|
|
if, on the other hand, one has declared it to be inanimate and the
|
|
sophist has proved it to be animate, say how it is inanimate. Likewise
|
|
also in a case of amphiboly. If the argument depends on likeness of
|
|
expression, the opposite will be the solution. 'Could a man give
|
|
what he has not got? 'No, not what he has not got; but he could give
|
|
it in a way in which he has not got it, e.g. one die by itself.'
|
|
Does a man know either by learning or by discovery each thing that
|
|
he knows, singly? but not the things that he knows, collectively.'
|
|
Also a man treads, perhaps, on any thing he walks through, but not
|
|
on the time he walks through. Likewise also in the case of the other
|
|
examples.
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
1CH_24
|
|
24
|
|
-
|
|
In dealing with arguments that depend on Accident, one and the
|
|
same solution meets all cases. For since it is indeterminate when an
|
|
attribute should be ascribed to a thing, in cases where it belongs
|
|
to the accident of the thing, and since in some cases it is
|
|
generally agreed and people admit that it belongs, while in others
|
|
they deny that it need belong, we should therefore, as soon as the
|
|
conclusion has been drawn, say in answer to them all alike, that there
|
|
is no need for such an attribute to belong. One must, however, be
|
|
prepared to adduce an example of the kind of attribute meant. All
|
|
arguments such as the following depend upon Accident. 'Do you know
|
|
what I am going to ask you? you know the man who is approaching', or
|
|
'the man in the mask'? 'Is the statue your work of art?' or 'Is the
|
|
dog your father?' 'Is the product of a small number with a small
|
|
number a small number?' For it is evident in all these cases that
|
|
there is no necessity for the attribute which is true of the thing's
|
|
accident to be true of the thing as well. For only to things that
|
|
are indistinguishable and one in essence is it generally agreed that
|
|
all the same attributes belong; whereas in the case of a good thing,
|
|
to be good is not the same as to be going to be the subject of a
|
|
question; nor in the case of a man approaching, or wearing a mask,
|
|
is 'to be approaching' the same thing as 'to be Coriscus', so that
|
|
suppose I know Coriscus, but do not know the man who is approaching,
|
|
it still isn't the case that I both know and do not know the same man;
|
|
nor, again, if this is mine and is also a work of art, is it therefore
|
|
my work of art, but my property or thing or something else. (The
|
|
solution is after the same manner in the other cases as well.)
|
|
Some solve these refutations by demolishing the original proposition
|
|
asked: for they say that it is possible to know and not to know the
|
|
same thing, only not in the same respect: accordingly, when they don't
|
|
know the man who is coming towards them, but do know Corsicus, they
|
|
assert that they do know and don't know the same object, but not in
|
|
the same respect. Yet, as we have already remarked, the correction
|
|
of arguments that depend upon the same point ought to be the same,
|
|
whereas this one will not stand if one adopts the same principle in
|
|
regard not to knowing something, but to being, or to being is a in a
|
|
certain state, e.g. suppose that X is father, and is also yours: for
|
|
if in some cases this is true and it is possible to know and not to
|
|
know the same thing, yet with that case the solution stated has
|
|
nothing to do. Certainly there is nothing to prevent the same argument
|
|
from having a number of flaws; but it is not the exposition of any and
|
|
every fault that constitutes a solution: for it is possible for a
|
|
man to show that a false conclusion has been proved, but not to show
|
|
on what it depends, e.g. in the case of Zeno's argument to prove
|
|
that motion is impossible. So that even if any one were to try to
|
|
establish that this doctrine is an impossible one, he still is
|
|
mistaken, and even if he proved his case ten thousand times over,
|
|
still this is no solution of Zeno's argument: for the solution was all
|
|
along an exposition of false reasoning, showing on what its falsity
|
|
depends. If then he has not proved his case, or is trying to establish
|
|
even a true proposition, or a false one, in a false manner, to point
|
|
this out is a true solution. Possibly, indeed, the present
|
|
suggestion may very well apply in some cases: but in these cases, at
|
|
any rate, not even this would be generally agreed: for he knows both
|
|
that Coriscus is Coriscus and that the approaching figure is
|
|
approaching. To know and not to know the same thing is generally
|
|
thought to be possible, when e.g. one knows that X is white, but
|
|
does not realize that he is musical: for in that way he does know
|
|
and not know the same thing, though not in the same respect. But as to
|
|
the approaching figure and Coriscus he knows both that it is
|
|
approaching and that he is Coriscus.
|
|
A like mistake to that of those whom we have mentioned is that of
|
|
those who solve the proof that every number is a small number: for if,
|
|
when the conclusion is not proved, they pass this over and say that
|
|
a conclusion has been proved and is true, on the ground that every
|
|
number is both great and small, they make a mistake.
|
|
Some people also use the principle of ambiguity to solve the
|
|
aforesaid reasonings, e.g. the proof that 'X is your father', or
|
|
'son', or 'slave'. Yet it is evident that if the appearance a proof
|
|
depends upon a plurality of meanings, the term, or the expression in
|
|
question, ought to bear a number of literal senses, whereas no one
|
|
speaks of A as being 'B's child' in the literal sense, if B is the
|
|
child's master, but the combination depends upon Accident. 'Is A
|
|
yours?' 'Yes.' 'And is A a child?' 'Yes.' 'Then the child A is yours,'
|
|
because he happens to be both yours and a child; but he is not 'your
|
|
child'.
|
|
There is also the proof that 'something "of evils" is good'; for
|
|
wisdom is a 'knowledge "of evils"'. But the expression that this is
|
|
'of so and-so' (='so-and-so's') has not a number of meanings: it means
|
|
that it is 'so-and-so's property'. We may suppose of course, on the
|
|
other hand, that it has a number of meanings-for we also say that
|
|
man is 'of the animals', though not their property; and also that
|
|
any term related to 'evils' in a way expressed by a genitive case is
|
|
on that account a so-and-so 'of evils', though it is not one of the
|
|
evils-but in that case the apparently different meanings seem to
|
|
depend on whether the term is used relatively or absolutely. 'Yet it
|
|
is conceivably possible to find a real ambiguity in the phrase
|
|
"Something of evils is good".' Perhaps, but not with regard to the
|
|
phrase in question. It would occur more nearly, suppose that 'A
|
|
servant is good of the wicked'; though perhaps it is not quite found
|
|
even there: for a thing may be 'good' and be 'X's' without being at
|
|
the same time 'X's good'. Nor is the saying that 'Man is of the
|
|
animals' a phrase with a number of meanings: for a phrase does not
|
|
become possessed of a number of meanings merely suppose we express
|
|
it elliptically: for we express 'Give me the Iliad' by quoting half
|
|
a line of it, e.g. 'Give me "Sing, goddess, of the wrath..."'
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
BOOK_1|CH_25
|
|
25
|
|
-
|
|
Those arguments which depend upon an expression that is valid of a
|
|
particular thing, or in a particular respect, or place, or manner,
|
|
or relation, and not valid absolutely, should be solved by considering
|
|
the conclusion in relation to its contradictory, to see if any of
|
|
these things can possibly have happened to it. For it is impossible
|
|
for contraries and opposites and an affirmative and a negative to
|
|
belong to the same thing absolutely; there is, however, nothing to
|
|
prevent each from belonging in a particular respect or relation or
|
|
manner, or to prevent one of them from belonging in a particular
|
|
respect and the other absolutely. So that if this one belongs
|
|
absolutely and that one in a particular respect, there is as yet no
|
|
refutation. This is a feature one has to find in the conclusion by
|
|
examining it in comparison with its contradictory.
|
|
All arguments of the following kind have this feature: 'Is it
|
|
possible for what is-not to be? "No." But, you see, it is something,
|
|
despite its not being.' Likewise also, Being will not be; for it
|
|
will not he some particular form of being. Is it possible for the same
|
|
man at the same time to be a keeper and a breaker of his oath?' 'Can
|
|
the same man at the same time both obey and disobey the same man?'
|
|
Or isn't it the case that being something in particular and Being
|
|
are not the same? On the other hand, Not-being, even if it be
|
|
something, need not also have absolute 'being' as well. Nor if a man
|
|
keeps his oath in this particular instance or in this particular
|
|
respect, is he bound also to be a keeper of oaths absolutely, but he
|
|
who swears that he will break his oath, and then breaks it, keeps this
|
|
particular oath only; he is not a keeper of his oath: nor is the
|
|
disobedient man 'obedient', though he obeys one particular command.
|
|
The argument is similar, also, as regards the problem whether the same
|
|
man can at the same time say what is both false and true: but it
|
|
appears to be a troublesome question because it is not easy to see
|
|
in which of the two connexions the word 'absolutely' is to be
|
|
rendered-with 'true' or with 'false'. There is, however, nothing to
|
|
prevent it from being false absolutely, though true in some particular
|
|
respect or relation, i.e. being true in some things, though not 'true'
|
|
absolutely. Likewise also in cases of some particular relation and
|
|
place and time. For all arguments of the following kind depend upon
|
|
this.' Is health, or wealth, a good thing?' 'Yes.' 'But to the fool
|
|
who does not use it aright it is not a good thing: therefore it is
|
|
both good and not good.' 'Is health, or political power, a good
|
|
thing?' 'Yes. "But sometimes it is not particularly good: therefore
|
|
the same thing is both good and not good to the same man.' Or rather
|
|
there is nothing to prevent a thing, though good absolutely, being not
|
|
good to a particular man, or being good to a particular man, and yet
|
|
not good or here. 'Is that which the prudent man would not wish, an
|
|
evil?' 'Yes.' 'But to get rid of, he would not wish the good:
|
|
therefore the good is an evil.' But that is a mistake; for it is not
|
|
the same thing to say 'The good is an evil' and 'to get rid of the
|
|
good is an evil'. Likewise also the argument of the thief is mistaken.
|
|
For it is not the case that if the thief is an evil thing, acquiring
|
|
things is also evil: what he wishes, therefore, is not what is evil
|
|
but what is good; for to acquire something good is good. Also, disease
|
|
is an evil thing, but not to get rid of disease. 'Is the just
|
|
preferable to the unjust, and what takes place justly to what takes
|
|
place unjustly? 'Yes.' 'But to to be put to death unjustly is
|
|
preferable.' 'Is it just that each should have his own?' 'Yes.' 'But
|
|
whatever decisions a man comes to on the strength of his personal
|
|
opinion, even if it be a false opinion, are valid in law: therefore
|
|
the same result is both just and unjust.' Also, should one decide in
|
|
favour of him who says what is unjust?' 'The former.' 'But you see, it
|
|
is just for the injured party to say fully the things he has suffered;
|
|
and these are fallacies. For because to suffer a thing unjustly is
|
|
preferable, unjust ways are not therefore preferable, though in this
|
|
particular case the unjust may very well be better than the just.
|
|
Also, to have one's own is just, while to have what is another's is
|
|
not just: all the same, the decision in question may very well be a
|
|
just decision, whatever it be that the opinion of the man who gave the
|
|
decision supports: for because it is just in this particular case or
|
|
in this particular manner, it is not also just absolutely. Likewise
|
|
also, though things are unjust, there is nothing to prevent the
|
|
speaking of them being just: for because to speak of things is just,
|
|
there is no necessity that the things should be just, any more than
|
|
because to speak of things be of use, the things need be of use.
|
|
Likewise also in the case of what is just. So that it is not the
|
|
case that because the things spoken of are unjust, the victory goes to
|
|
him who speaks unjust things: for he speaks of things that are just to
|
|
speak of, though absolutely, i.e. to suffer, they are unjust.
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
BOOK_1|CH_26
|
|
26
|
|
-
|
|
Refutations that depend on the definition of a refutation must,
|
|
according to the plan sketched above, be met by comparing together the
|
|
conclusion with its contradictory, and seeing that it shall involve
|
|
the same attribute in the same respect and relation and manner and
|
|
time. If this additional question be put at the start, you should
|
|
not admit that it is impossible for the same thing to be both double
|
|
and not double, but grant that it is possible, only not in such a
|
|
way as was agreed to constitute a refutation of your case. All the
|
|
following arguments depend upon a point of that kind. 'Does a man
|
|
who knows A to be A, know the thing called A?' and in the same way,
|
|
'is one who is ignorant that A is A ignorant of the thing called A?'
|
|
'Yes.' 'But one who knows that Coriscus is Coriscus might be
|
|
ignorant of the fact that he is musical, so that he both knows and
|
|
is ignorant of the same thing.' Is a thing four cubits long greater
|
|
than a thing three cubits long?' 'Yes.' 'But a thing might grow from
|
|
three to four cubits in length; 'now what is 'greater' is greater than
|
|
a 'less': accordingly the thing in question will be both greater and
|
|
less than itself in the same respect.
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
BOOK_1|CH_27
|
|
27
|
|
-
|
|
As to refutations that depend on begging and assuming the original
|
|
point to be proved, suppose the nature of the question to be
|
|
obvious, one should not grant it, even though it be a view generally
|
|
held, but should tell him the truth. Suppose, however, that it escapes
|
|
one, then, thanks to the badness of arguments of that kind, one should
|
|
make one's error recoil upon the questioner, and say that he has
|
|
brought no argument: for a refutation must be proved independently
|
|
of the original point. Secondly, one should say that the point was
|
|
granted under the impression that he intended not to use it as a
|
|
premiss, but to reason against it, in the opposite way from that
|
|
adopted in refutations on side issues.
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
BOOK_1|CH_28
|
|
28
|
|
-
|
|
Also, those refutations that bring one to their conclusion through
|
|
the consequent you should show up in the course of the argument
|
|
itself. The mode in which consequences follow is twofold. For the
|
|
argument either is that as the universal follows on its
|
|
particular-as (e.g.) 'animal' follows from 'man'-so does the
|
|
particular on its universal: for the claim is made that if A is always
|
|
found with B, then B also is always found with A. Or else it
|
|
proceeds by way of the opposites of the terms involved: for if A
|
|
follows B, it is claimed that A's opposite will follow B's opposite.
|
|
On this latter claim the argument of Melissus also depends: for he
|
|
claims that because that which has come to be has a beginning, that
|
|
which has not come to be has none, so that if the heaven has not
|
|
come to be, it is also eternal. But that is not so; for the sequence
|
|
is vice versa.
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
BOOK_1|CH_29
|
|
29
|
|
-
|
|
In the case of any refutations whose reasoning depends on some
|
|
addition, look and see if upon its subtraction the absurdity follows
|
|
none the less: and then if so, the answerer should point this out, and
|
|
say that he granted the addition not because he really thought it, but
|
|
for the sake of the argument, whereas the questioner has not used it
|
|
for the purpose of his argument at all.
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
BOOK_1|CH_30
|
|
30
|
|
-
|
|
To meet those refutations which make several questions into one, one
|
|
should draw a distinction between them straight away at the start. For
|
|
a question must be single to which there is a single answer, so that
|
|
one must not affirm or deny several things of one thing, nor one thing
|
|
of many, but one of one. But just as in the case of ambiguous terms,
|
|
an attribute belongs to a term sometimes in both its senses, and
|
|
sometimes in neither, so that a simple answer does one, as it happens,
|
|
no harm despite the fact that the question is not simple, so it is
|
|
in these cases of double questions too. Whenever, then, the several
|
|
attributes belong to the one subject, or the one to the many, the
|
|
man who gives a simple answer encounters no obstacle even though he
|
|
has committed this mistake: but whenever an attribute belongs to one
|
|
subject but not to the other, or there is a question of a number of
|
|
attributes belonging to a number of subjects and in one sense both
|
|
belong to both, while in another sense, again, they do not, then there
|
|
is trouble, so that one must beware of this. Thus (e.g.) in the
|
|
following arguments: Supposing to be good and B evil, you will, if you
|
|
give a single answer about both, be compelled to say that it is true
|
|
to call these good, and that it is true to call them evil and likewise
|
|
to call them neither good nor evil (for each of them has not each
|
|
character), so that the same thing will be both good and evil and
|
|
neither good nor evil. Also, since everything is the same as itself
|
|
and different from anything else, inasmuch as the man who answers
|
|
double questions simply can be made to say that several things are
|
|
'the same' not as other things but 'as themselves', and also that they
|
|
are different from themselves, it follows that the same things must be
|
|
both the same as and different from themselves. Moreover, if what is
|
|
good becomes evil while what is evil is good, then they must both
|
|
become two. So of two unequal things each being equal to itself, it
|
|
will follow that they are both equal and unequal to themselves.
|
|
Now these refutations fall into the province of other solutions as
|
|
well: for 'both' and 'all' have more than one meaning, so that the
|
|
resulting affirmation and denial of the same thing does not occur,
|
|
except verbally: and this is not what we meant by a refutation. But it
|
|
is clear that if there be not put a single question on a number of
|
|
points, but the answerer has affirmed or denied one attribute only
|
|
of one subject only, the absurdity will not come to pass.
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
1CH_31
|
|
31
|
|
-
|
|
With regard to those who draw one into repeating the same thing a
|
|
number of times, it is clear that one must not grant that predications
|
|
of relative terms have any meaning in abstraction by themselves,
|
|
e.g. that 'double' is a significant term apart from the whole phrase
|
|
'double of half' merely on the ground that it figures in it. For ten
|
|
figures in 'ten minus one' and in 'not do', and generally the
|
|
affirmation in the negation; but for all that, suppose any one were to
|
|
say, 'This is not white', he does not say that it is white. The bare
|
|
word 'double', one may perhaps say, has not even any meaning at all,
|
|
any more than has 'the' in 'the half': and even if it has a meaning,
|
|
yet it has not the same meaning as in the combination. Nor is
|
|
'knowledge' the same thing in a specific branch of it (suppose it,
|
|
e.g. to be 'medical knowledge') as it is in general: for in general it
|
|
was the 'knowledge of the knowable'. In the case of terms that are
|
|
predicated of the terms through which they are defined, you should say
|
|
the same thing, that the term defined is not the same in abstraction
|
|
as it is in the whole phrase. For 'concave' has a general meaning
|
|
which is the same in the case of a snub nose, and of a bandy leg,
|
|
but when added to either substantive nothing prevents it from
|
|
differentiating its meaning; in fact it bears one sense as applied
|
|
to the nose, and another as applied to the leg: for in the former
|
|
connexion it means 'snub' and in the latter 'bandyshaped'; i.e. it
|
|
makes no difference whether you say 'a snub nose' or 'a concave nose'.
|
|
Moreover, the expression must not be granted in the nominative case:
|
|
for it is a falsehood. For snubness is not a concave nose but
|
|
something (e.g. an affection) belonging to a nose: hence, there is
|
|
no absurdity in supposing that the snub nose is a nose possessing
|
|
the concavity that belongs to a nose.
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
BOOK_1|CH_32
|
|
32
|
|
-
|
|
With regard to solecisms, we have previously said what it is that
|
|
appears to bring them about; the method of their solution will be
|
|
clear in the course of the arguments themselves. Solecism is the
|
|
result aimed at in all arguments of the following kind: 'Is a thing
|
|
truly that which you truly call it?' 'Yes'. 'But, speaking of a stone,
|
|
you call him real: therefore of a stone it follows that "him is
|
|
real".' No: rather, talking of a stone means not saying which' but
|
|
'whom', and not 'that' but 'him'. If, then, any one were to ask, 'Is a
|
|
stone him whom you truly call him?' he would be generally thought
|
|
not to be speaking good Greek, any more than if he were to ask, 'Is he
|
|
what you call her?' Speak in this way of a 'stick' or any neuter word,
|
|
and the difference does not break out. For this reason, also, no
|
|
solecism is incurred, suppose any one asks, 'Is a thing what you say
|
|
it to be?' 'Yes'. 'But, speaking of a stick, you call it real:
|
|
therefore, of a stick it follows that it is real.' 'Stone', however,
|
|
and 'he' have masculine designations. Now suppose some one were to
|
|
ask, 'Can "he" be a she" (a female)?', and then again, 'Well, but is
|
|
not he Coriscus?' and then were to say, 'Then he is a "she",' he has
|
|
not proved the solecism, even if the name 'Coriscus' does signify a
|
|
'she', if, on the other hand, the answerer does not grant this: this
|
|
point must be put as an additional question: while if neither is it
|
|
the fact nor does he grant it, then the sophist has not proved his
|
|
case either in fact or as against the person he has been
|
|
questioning. In like manner, then, in the above instance as well it
|
|
must be definitely put that 'he' means the stone. If, however, this
|
|
neither is so nor is granted, the conclusion must not be stated:
|
|
though it follows apparently, because the case (the accusative),
|
|
that is really unlike, appears to be like the nominative. 'Is it
|
|
true to say that this object is what you call it by name?' 'Yes'. 'But
|
|
you call it by the name of a shield: this object therefore is "of a
|
|
shield".' No: not necessarily, because the meaning of 'this object' is
|
|
not 'of a shield' but 'a shield': 'of a shield' would be the meaning
|
|
of 'this object's'. Nor again if 'He is what you call him by name',
|
|
while 'the name you call him by is Cleon's', is he therefore
|
|
'Cleon's': for he is not 'Cleon's', for what was said was that 'He,
|
|
not his, is what I call him by name'. For the question, if put in
|
|
the latter way, would not even be Greek. 'Do you know this?' 'Yes.'
|
|
'But this is he: therefore you know he'. No: rather 'this' has not the
|
|
same meaning in 'Do you know this?' as in 'This is a stone'; in the
|
|
first it stands for an accusative, in the second for a nominative
|
|
case. 'When you have understanding of anything, do you understand it?'
|
|
'Yes.' 'But you have understanding of a stone: therefore you
|
|
understand of a stone.' No: the one phrase is in the genitive, 'of a
|
|
stone', while the other is in the accusative, 'a stone': and what
|
|
was granted was that 'you understand that, not of that, of which you
|
|
have understanding', so that you understand not 'of a stone', but 'the
|
|
stone'.
|
|
Thus that arguments of this kind do not prove solecism but merely
|
|
appear to do so, and both why they so appear and how you should meet
|
|
them, is clear from what has been said.
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
BOOK_1|CH_33
|
|
33
|
|
-
|
|
We must also observe that of all the arguments aforesaid it is
|
|
easier with some to see why and where the reasoning leads the hearer
|
|
astray, while with others it is more difficult, though often they
|
|
are the same arguments as the former. For we must call an argument the
|
|
same if it depends upon the same point; but the same argument is apt
|
|
to be thought by some to depend on diction, by others on accident, and
|
|
by others on something else, because each of them, when worked with
|
|
different terms, is not so clear as it was. Accordingly, just as in
|
|
fallacies that depend on ambiguity, which are generally thought to
|
|
be the silliest form of fallacy, some are clear even to the man in the
|
|
street (for humorous phrases nearly all depend on diction; e.g. 'The
|
|
man got the cart down from the stand'; and 'Where are you bound?'
|
|
'To the yard arm'; and 'Which cow will calve afore?' 'Neither, but
|
|
both behind;' and 'Is the North wind clear?' 'No, indeed; for it has
|
|
murdered the beggar and the merchant." Is he a Good enough-King?' 'No,
|
|
indeed; a Rob-son': and so with the great majority of the rest as
|
|
well), while others appear to elude the most expert (and it is a
|
|
symptom of this that they often fight about their terms, e.g.
|
|
whether the meaning of 'Being' and 'One' is the same in all their
|
|
applications or different; for some think that 'Being' and 'One'
|
|
mean the same; while others solve the argument of Zeno and
|
|
Parmenides by asserting that 'One' and 'Being' are used in a number of
|
|
senses), likewise also as regards fallacies of Accident and each of
|
|
the other types, some of the arguments will be easier to see while
|
|
others are more difficult; also to grasp to which class a fallacy
|
|
belongs, and whether it is a refutation or not a refutation, is not
|
|
equally easy in all cases.
|
|
An incisive argument is one which produces the greatest
|
|
perplexity: for this is the one with the sharpest fang. Now perplexity
|
|
is twofold, one which occurs in reasoned arguments, respecting which
|
|
of the propositions asked one is to demolish, and the other in
|
|
contentious arguments, respecting the manner in which one is to assent
|
|
to what is propounded. Therefore it is in syllogistic arguments that
|
|
the more incisive ones produce the keenest heart-searching. Now a
|
|
syllogistic argument is most incisive if from premisses that are as
|
|
generally accepted as possible it demolishes a conclusion that is
|
|
accepted as generally as possible. For the one argument, if the
|
|
contradictory is changed about, makes all the resulting syllogisms
|
|
alike in character: for always from premisses that are generally
|
|
accepted it will prove a conclusion, negative or positive as the
|
|
case may be, that is just as generally accepted; and therefore one
|
|
is bound to feel perplexed. An argument, then, of this kind is the
|
|
most incisive, viz. the one that puts its conclusion on all fours with
|
|
the propositions asked; and second comes the one that argues from
|
|
premisses, all of which are equally convincing: for this will
|
|
produce an equal perplexity as to what kind of premiss, of those
|
|
asked, one should demolish. Herein is a difficulty: for one must
|
|
demolish something, but what one must demolish is uncertain. Of
|
|
contentious arguments, on the other hand, the most incisive is the one
|
|
which, in the first place, is characterized by an initial
|
|
uncertainty whether it has been properly reasoned or not; and also
|
|
whether the solution depends on a false premiss or on the drawing of a
|
|
distinction; while, of the rest, the second place is held by that
|
|
whose solution clearly depends upon a distinction or a demolition, and
|
|
yet it does not reveal clearly which it is of the premisses asked,
|
|
whose demolition, or the drawing of a distinction within it, will
|
|
bring the solution about, but even leaves it vague whether it is on
|
|
the conclusion or on one of the premisses that the deception depends.
|
|
Now sometimes an argument which has not been properly reasoned is
|
|
silly, supposing the assumptions required to be extremely contrary
|
|
to the general view or false; but sometimes it ought not to be held in
|
|
contempt. For whenever some question is left out, of the kind that
|
|
concerns both the subject and the nerve of the argument, the reasoning
|
|
that has both failed to secure this as well, and also failed to reason
|
|
properly, is silly; but when what is omitted is some extraneous
|
|
question, then it is by no means to be lightly despised, but the
|
|
argument is quite respectable, though the questioner has not put his
|
|
questions well.
|
|
Just as it is possible to bring a solution sometimes against the
|
|
argument, at others against the questioner and his mode of
|
|
questioning, and at others against neither of these, likewise also
|
|
it is possible to marshal one's questions and reasoning both against
|
|
the thesis, and against the answerer and against the time, whenever
|
|
the solution requires a longer time to examine than the period
|
|
available.
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
BOOK_1|CH_34
|
|
34
|
|
-
|
|
As to the number, then, and kind of sources whence fallacies arise
|
|
in discussion, and how we are to show that our opponent is
|
|
committing a fallacy and make him utter paradoxes; moreover, by the
|
|
use of what materials solescism is brought about, and how to
|
|
question and what is the way to arrange the questions; moreover, as to
|
|
the question what use is served by all arguments of this kind, and
|
|
concerning the answerer's part, both as a whole in general, and in
|
|
particular how to solve arguments and solecisms-on all these things
|
|
let the foregoing discussion suffice. It remains to recall our
|
|
original proposal and to bring our discussion to a close with a few
|
|
words upon it.
|
|
Our programme was, then, to discover some faculty of reasoning about
|
|
any theme put before us from the most generally accepted premisses
|
|
that there are. For that is the essential task of the art of
|
|
discussion (dialectic) and of examination (peirastic). Inasmuch,
|
|
however, as it is annexed to it, on account of the near presence of
|
|
the art of sophistry (sophistic), not only to be able to conduct an
|
|
examination dialectically but also with a show of knowledge, we
|
|
therefore proposed for our treatise not only the aforesaid aim of
|
|
being able to exact an account of any view, but also the aim of
|
|
ensuring that in standing up to an argument we shall defend our thesis
|
|
in the same manner by means of views as generally held as possible.
|
|
The reason of this we have explained; for this, too, was why
|
|
Socrates used to ask questions and not to answer them; for he used
|
|
to confess that he did not know. We have made clear, in the course
|
|
of what precedes, the number both of the points with reference to
|
|
which, and of the materials from which, this will be accomplished, and
|
|
also from what sources we can become well supplied with these: we have
|
|
shown, moreover, how to question or arrange the questioning as a
|
|
whole, and the problems concerning the answers and solutions to be
|
|
used against the reasonings of the questioner. We have also cleared up
|
|
the problems concerning all other matters that belong to the same
|
|
inquiry into arguments. In addition to this we have been through the
|
|
subject of Fallacies, as we have already stated above.
|
|
That our programme, then, has been adequately completed is clear.
|
|
But we must not omit to notice what has happened in regard to this
|
|
inquiry. For in the case of all discoveries the results of previous
|
|
labours that have been handed down from others have been advanced
|
|
bit by bit by those who have taken them on, whereas the original
|
|
discoveries generally make advance that is small at first though
|
|
much more useful than the development which later springs out of them.
|
|
For it may be that in everything, as the saying is, 'the first start
|
|
is the main part': and for this reason also it is the most
|
|
difficult; for in proportion as it is most potent in its influence, so
|
|
it is smallest in its compass and therefore most difficult to see:
|
|
whereas when this is once discovered, it is easier to add and
|
|
develop the remainder in connexion with it. This is in fact what has
|
|
happened in regard to rhetorical speeches and to practically all the
|
|
other arts: for those who discovered the beginnings of them advanced
|
|
them in all only a little way, whereas the celebrities of to-day are
|
|
the heirs (so to speak) of a long succession of men who have
|
|
advanced them bit by bit, and so have developed them to their
|
|
present form, Tisias coming next after the first founders, then
|
|
Thrasymachus after Tisias, and Theodorus next to him, while several
|
|
people have made their several contributions to it: and therefore it
|
|
is not to be wondered at that the art has attained considerable
|
|
dimensions. Of this inquiry, on the other hand, it was not the case
|
|
that part of the work had been thoroughly done before, while part
|
|
had not. Nothing existed at all. For the training given by the paid
|
|
professors of contentious arguments was like the treatment of the
|
|
matter by Gorgias. For they used to hand out speeches to be learned by
|
|
heart, some rhetorical, others in the form of question and answer,
|
|
each side supposing that their arguments on either side generally fall
|
|
among them. And therefore the teaching they gave their pupils was
|
|
ready but rough. For they used to suppose that they trained people
|
|
by imparting to them not the art but its products, as though any one
|
|
professing that he would impart a form of knowledge to obviate any
|
|
pain in the feet, were then not to teach a man the art of
|
|
shoe-making or the sources whence he can acquire anything of the kind,
|
|
but were to present him with several kinds of shoes of all sorts:
|
|
for he has helped him to meet his need, but has not imparted an art to
|
|
him. Moreover, on the subject of Rhetoric there exists much that has
|
|
been said long ago, whereas on the subject of reasoning we had nothing
|
|
else of an earlier date to speak of at all, but were kept at work
|
|
for a long time in experimental researches. If, then, it seems to
|
|
you after inspection that, such being the situation as it existed at
|
|
the start, our investigation is in a satisfactory condition compared
|
|
with the other inquiries that have been developed by tradition,
|
|
there must remain for all of you, or for our students, the task of
|
|
extending us your pardon for the shortcomings of the inquiry, and
|
|
for the discoveries thereof your warm thanks.
|
|
-
|
|
-
|
|
-THE END-
|