180 lines
12 KiB
Plaintext
180 lines
12 KiB
Plaintext
>>>>>>>>>>>> BEE-FECES THEORY STILL HAS NO STING <<<<<<<<<<<
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William Kucewicz 6/20/88
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The Wall Street Journal, 9/17/1987
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[BRIEF REVIEW OF PRECEDING CONTROVERSY by P.B.:
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Kucewicz is the WSJ's outstanding writer who revealed the extent
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of Soviet research on Soviet biochemical warfare in a brilliant series
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of articles in April-May 1984 [AtE Jun 84]. He also reported
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convincing evidence that the Soviets had supplied biochemical weapons
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to their surrogates in SE Asia, who used them on the recalcitrant
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Hmong people and elsewhere. The evidence was revealed in two
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outstanding WSJ articles (9/6/85 and 3/31/86), but disputed by the
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"liberal" science writers of the New York Times, Science, and others.
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A particularly vicious piece palmed off as scientific research was
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published in the Sept. Scientific American by Harvard biochemistry
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prof Matthew Meselson and two others. Meselson, whose trip to SE Asia
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had been financed by the leftist MacArthur Foundation, collected bees'
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feces (droppings) far away from any war zone, examined the material by
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electron microscopy and other methods, not surprisingly found some
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toxins in it, and not surprisingly found no man-made toxins
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attributable to Soviet weapons. His trivial and irrelevant
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experimental findings were never under dispute; his conclusion
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attributing all evidence of Soviet biochemical warfare to bee feces is
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little short of scientific fraud.
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In 1987 Meselson returned with more false and scandalously
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doctored whitewash of Soviet biochemical warfare in Foreign Affairs.
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The following article, apart from summarizing the whole issue, also
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throws light on Meselson's sleazy suppression of evidence.]
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Six years ago this week, the US government first revealed
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physical evidence that the "yellow rain" loosed by aircraft on
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villages in SE Asia was a toxin warfare agent, most probably being
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field-tested for the Soviet Union. The probable motive was hatred by
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the Communist governments of Laos and Vietnam for the anti-Communist
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Hmong people of Laotian villages and for Cambodians at war with
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Vietnam.
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Refugees arriving in Thailand had been reporting the attacks
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since 1975, and several hundred were interviewed by US doctors.
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State Department officials and journalists, including the Asian WSJ's
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Barry Wain. They told of planes and helicopters dropping a yellow
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powder. People and animals become violently -- sometimes fatally --
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ill.
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In 1981 and 1982, scientists involved in the investigations
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concluded from the symptoms, blood tests and autopsies that the
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poisons being used were trichothecene mycotoxins. Evidence of Soviet
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involvement was less strong, but included sightings of what looked
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like chemical weapons being unloaded from Soviet ships at a Vietnamese
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port. It was well known by then that the Soviets had developed
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chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents and equipped troops and
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military vehicles with anti-CBW devices. The Laotians or Vietnamese
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surely lacked the know-how to develop a poison gas of their own.
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Finally, trichithecenes were found on a Soviet gas mask recovered in
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Afghanistan where Afghan combatants had described poison-gas attacks
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by Soviet troops, in one case on an undefended village.
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After the findings and suspicions received international
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publicity from this newspaper, the Reader's Digest, ABC News, the
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State Department and others, the attacks in SE Asia began to peter
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out. But the debate in the US, so it seems, is still with us. The
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evidence of poison gas had been challenged by Harvard biochemist
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Matthew Meselson, one of the intellectual fathers of the Biological
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and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, requiring worldwide destruction
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of such weapons. Surely the Soviets wouldn't violate his treaty, he
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insisted, so there must be some other explanation. He proffered the
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the theory that yellow rain was in fact bee feces.
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That mainly drew laughter, but a few weeks ago, Prof. Meselson
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returned to the fray. In a Foreign Policy magazine article co-authored
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with Julian Robinson of the University of Sussex and Jeanne Guillemin
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of Boston College, he insisted that newly declassified US documents
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show that "the administration's claim of toxin warfare rests on
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evidence that, over the past several years, has been discredited."
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Mr Meselson, as in the past, focused on leaf samples collected to
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establish the presence of trichothecenes. These samples were only part
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of a larger body of evidence, but they interested Prof. Meselson. He
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asserted that once more that what was found on them was nothing but
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"innocuous excrement of honey bees."
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The latest Meselson piece would probably have gone unnoticed had
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not two reporters, Philip M. Boffey [a vicious antinuke of long
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standing, see AtE Dec 79, P.B.] of the New York Times and Philip J.
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Hilts of the Washington Post, renewed their support for his thesis.
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The Times backed its reporter with an editorial titled "Yellow Rain
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Falls." A separate attack on the yellow-rain evidence had been mounted
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earlier by Elisa D. Harris, also a Harvard researcher, in
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International Security magazine.
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Prof. Meselson's attack zeroed in on the investigative work of a
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three-man team of CBW experts from the State and Defense department
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stationed in Thailand from Nov. 1983 to Oct. 1985. This, of course,
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was after the attacks had largely ended. But Foreign Policy Editor
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Charles Wm. Maynes was impressed enough with the latest Meselson
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arguments to claim that they would "demolish definitively" the US
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government's case against the Soviet Union and its SE Asian allies.
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It's hard to know how an article mainly about bee feces would
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achieve such an astonishing result. Even the professor's handling of
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the declassified papers displays a certain selectivity. The Journal
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has obtained copies of these same papers, and they are not very
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interesting.
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One telegram from the US Embassy in Bangkok refers to nothing
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more exciting than a visit to the embassy by Prof. Meselson and two
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colleagues, who had been wandering around in the jungles of Thailand
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(not Laos or Cambodia) observing the habits of bees. The telegram,
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but not the Meselson article, makes clear that he and his Thai
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colleague did not entirely agree even on these observations. Prof.
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Meselson said that the bees' "cleansing" flight was too high to be
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seen, but the Thai told US officials that he actually saw an estimated
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10,000 bees in flight. If bees on cleansing flights can be low enough
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to be seen, why in none of the hundreds of yellow-rain reports has no
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one ever mentioned bees?
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The article focuses on the paucity of leaf samples that tested
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positive for trichothecene mycotoxins. Indeed, the only positive US
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tests of environmental samples from SE Asia were done in the
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laboratories of Chester Mirocha of the University of Minnesota and
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Joseph Rosen of Rutgers University (who also found man-made
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polyethylene glycol in a sample obtained by ABC news in 1981).
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By innuendo, Mr Meselson implies that the independent work of
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Profs. Mirocha and Rosen is faulty. But he never explains where they
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might have made mistakes. In fact, neither scientist has ever reported
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a false positive in any of the control samples [unknown to the
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resarchers, innocuous ones, P.B.] submitted to them by the US
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government to verify their testing techniques.
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The Meselson report fails to mention any of the numerous
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biological samples from SE Asia that tested positive for the toxins.
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In 1982, for instance, the US government tested 73 yellow-rain victims
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and got 24 positives for the toxins -- a rate of 32.9% and much too
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high to indicate a natural poisoning that had previously gone
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unnoticed. Indeed, epidemiologists from the US and Canada have never
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found any evidence of illness due to natural exposure to triothecene
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toxins in SE Asia.
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The Foreign Policy article falsely says: "At no time, then or
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now, was any case documented in which diagnostic examination or
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autopsy provided clear evidence of exposure to chemical warfare
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agents." In fact, a report by Secretary of State George Shultz in
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Nov. 1982 provided detailed autopsy results for a chemical warfare
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attack victim in Cambodia. The results include the precise levels of
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toxins found in the victim's heart, stomach, liver, kidney, lung and
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intestine. The tests were conducted separately by Profs. Mirocha and
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Rosen, and each found high levels of the toxins.
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Prof. Meselson makes a Point of extensively quoting the testimony
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of a resistance leader from the Phu Bia region of Laos contained in a
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May 1984 telegram to the State Department. In his eight years in the
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region, the Hmong leader said that he never saw a yellow-rain attack,
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adding that other Hmong often relate "what they hear and feel" and
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not what they actually see. He said that he "always speaks the truth."
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After this seeming rebuke to eyewitness testimony, Prof. Meselson
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chose not to quote the next telegram, referring to another witness.
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"[Name deleted] is a 40-year-old female who claimed to have lost
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six of her 10 children in a CBW attack from a rotary wing aircraft
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during the last harvest season (November-December 1983). The alleged
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attack took place in a rice field one hour walking distance from Phu
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Pad village ... in Vientiane Province [Laos] ... [She] stated that on
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a cloudy and windy morning a helicopter passed over 22 Hmong working
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in a rice field. One heard an explosion followed by a cream-colored
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rain. [Name deleted] stated that she immediately became dizzy and
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remained so for 10 days. Other symptoms were vomiting with blood and
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bloody diarrhea..."
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Prof. Meselson also selectively reports the data from one of the
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most well-documented yellow-rain attacks -- at the Thai village of Ban
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Sa Tong, near the Cambodian border, in February 1982. He asserts there
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was no "abnormal incidence of clinical illness" and the "yellow spots
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later were shown to consist almost entirely of pollen."
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The facts about the attack on Ban Sa Tong, related by a Canadian
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team of epidemiologists, are quite straightforward. A plane dropped a
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yellow substance over the village. Thai and Canadian experts saw the
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powder liberally covering houses and vegetation. Only those villagers
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in direct contact with the powder became ill, while none of the others
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were affected. Allergic reaction to pollen cannot account for the
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high incidence (one in three) of central nervous system disorders
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among those in the sprayed area. Two laboratories in Canada and one in
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the US found the trichothecene toxins in the yellow powder from Ban Sa
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Tong. Moreover, a plastic bag later collected from the site and said
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by villagers to be part of the weapon contained high levels of two
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trichothecenes and, the Canadians said, "almost no pollen."
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As opposed to confirming the bee-feces theory, the State
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Department telegrams actually bolster the US government's case that
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yellow rain was a man-made chemical weapon. The CBW team from late 1983
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to 1985 came across very few reports of yellow-rain attacks, and
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trichothecenes were no longer found. The worldwide publicity about
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yellow rain had apparently discouraged the further use of the weapons
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and doubtlessly saved lives. The bees, of course, were still there,
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defecating. But the yellow-rain attacks stopped.
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