414 lines
24 KiB
Plaintext
414 lines
24 KiB
Plaintext
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
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From: hanson@kronos.arc.nasa.gov (Robin Hanson)
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Subject: Can Wiretaps Remain Cost-Effective?
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Message-ID: <1993May13.020142.6486@kronos.arc.nasa.gov>
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Organization: NASA ARC/ Information Science Division
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Date: Thu, 13 May 1993 02:01:42 GMT
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Lines: 405
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I feel somewhat guilty for posting three different versions of this
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paper to this newsgroup, but I wanted to be both timely and thorough.
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Previous drafts were timely; this "final" version is more thorough. :-)
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CAN WIRETAPS REMAIN COST-EFFECTIVE?
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by Robin Hanson
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hanson@ptolemy.arc.nasa.gov 510-651-7483
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47164 Male Terrace, Fremont, CA 94539
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May 12, 1993
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Distribute Freely
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SUMMARY: Compared to an average monthly phone bill of seventy dollars,
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the option to wiretap the average phone line is probably worth less than
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twelve cents a month to police and spy agencies. Claims that this
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option is worth over a dollar a month ignore the basic economics of
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law enforcement. Thus recently proposed government policies to preserve
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wiretap abilities in the face of technological change must raise phone
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costs by less than one part in seven hundred to be cost-effective.
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Why not let a market decide if wiretaps make sense?
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BACKGROUND
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Until now, telephones have happened to allow the existence of "wiretaps",
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cheap detectors which can pick up conversations on a phone line without the
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consent of either party to the conversation. And since 1968, U.S. police
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have been allowed to request such wiretaps from judges, and must compensate
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phone companies for expenses to assist a tap. Since then, law enforcement
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agencies have come to rely on this capability to aid in criminal
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investigations.
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However, wiretaps have become more difficult as phone companies have
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switched to digital technologies. And powerful new encryption technologies
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threaten to make truly private communication possible; a small chip in each
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phone could soon make it virtually impossible to overhear a conversation
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without a physical microphone at either end. So the U.S. government has
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begun to actively respond to these threats to police wiretap abilities.
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Regarding digital phone issues, a "FBI Digital Telephone Bill" was
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circulated early in 1992 [1], proposing to require all communication
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services to support easy wiretaps, now without compensation from the
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police. Each tapped conversation would have to be followed smoothly as the
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parties used call-forwarding or moved around with cellular phones. The
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data for that conversation would have to be separated out from other
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conversations, translated to a "form representing the content of the
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communication", and sent without detection or degradation to a remote
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government monitoring facility, to be received as quickly as the parties to
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the conversation hear themselves talk. Congress has yet to pass this bill.
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Regarding encryption issues, the White House announced on April 16, 1993
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that 1) they had developed and begun manufacturing a special "wiretap" (or
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"Clipper") chip to be placed in future phones, instead of the total privacy
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chips which have been under private development, 2) they plan to require
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this chip in most phones the government buys, and 3) they will request all
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manufacturers of encrypted communications hardware to use this wiretap
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chip. The same day, AT&T announced it would use these chips "in all its
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secure telephone products".
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The plan seems to be to, at the very least, create a defacto standard for
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encryption chips, so that alternatives become prohibitively expensive for
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ordinary phone users, and to intimidate through the threat of further
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legislation. Such legislation would be required to stop privacy fans and
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dedicated criminals, who might be willing to pay much more to use an
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alternative total privacy standard.
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Both the specific wiretap chip design and the general algorithm are secret.
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Each chip would be created under strict government supervision, where it
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would be given a fixed indentifier and encryption key [2]. At some
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unspecified frequency during each conversation, the chip would broadcast
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its identifier and other info in a special "law enforcement field". Law
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enforcement officers with a court order could then obtain the key
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corresponding to this indentifier from certain unspecified agencies, and
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could thereby listen in on any future or previously recorded conversations
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on that phone.
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To date, most concerns voiced about the wiretap chip have been about its
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security. Encryption algorithms are usually published, to allow the
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absence of public demonstrations of how to break the code to testify to the
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strength of that code. And it is not clear what government agency could be
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trusted with the keys. Many suspect the government will not limit its
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access in the way it has claimed; the track records of previous
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administrations [3], and of foreign governments [4], do not inspire
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confidence on this point.
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This paper, however, will neglect these concerns, and ask instead whether
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this new wiretap chip, and other policies to preserve phone wiretaps, are
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cost-effective tools for police investigation. That is, which is a cheaper
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way for society to investigate crime: force phone communications to support
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wiretaps, or give police agencies more money to investigate crimes as they
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see fit? Or to put it another way, would police agencies still be willing
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to pay for each wiretap, if each wiretapping agency were charged its share
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of the full cost, to phone users, of forcing phones to support wiretaps?
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A recent U.S. General Accounting Office report on the FBI bill stated [1]:
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"[N]either the FBI nor the telecommunications industry has
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systematically identified the alternatives, or evaluated their costs,
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benefits, or feasibility."
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While this paper will not change this sad fact, it does aspire to improve
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on the current confusion. To begin to answer the above questions, we might
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compare the current benefits wiretaps provide to law enforcement agencies
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with projected costs of implementing the new wiretap chip and other wiretap
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policies.
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WIRETAP BENEFITS
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1990 is the latest year for which wiretap statistics are widely available
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[5], though wiretap activity has been rather steady in recent years.
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According to the Office of U.S. Courts, 872 wiretap installations were
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requested by local, state, and federal police in 1990, and no requests were
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denied. 2057 arrests resulted from wiretaps started the same year, 1486
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arrests came from wiretaps in the previous ten years, and 55% of arrests
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led to convictions. About 40% of wiretaps were requested by federal
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authorities, while several states, including California and Illinois, still
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do not allow wiretaps. About 60% of taps were regarding drug offenses, and
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14% for gambling offenses. Wiretaps are most useful for investigating
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"victimless" crimes, since victims will often give police permission to
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record their calls.
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Each wiretap installation heard an average of 1487 calls, 22% of them
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incriminating, among 131 people, and cost an average of $45,125, mostly for
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labor (extrapolating from the 91% of installations reporting costs). $1.6
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million was also spent following up on wiretaps from previous years. Thus
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a total of about $41 million was spent on wiretaps, to obtain about 4000
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arrests, at about $10,000 per arrest, or four times as much as the $2500
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per arrest figure one gets by dividing the $28 billion spent by all police
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nationally by the total 11 million non-traffic arrests [6]. Thus wiretaps
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are a relatively expensive form of investigations.
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76% of the wiretaps were for phone lines (vs pagers, email, etc.), and are
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the focus of this paper. The $31 million per year spent on phone taps
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represents only one thousandth of the total police expenditures, and if we
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divide this by the 138 million phone "access" lines in the country [6], we
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get about 23 cents spent per year per phone line, or about two cents a
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month. Since 1978, our foreign intelligence agencies have also been
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authorized to tap international phone calls. No statistics are published
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on these taps, so let us assume a similar number of "spy" wiretaps are
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done, giving a total of ~$60 million annually, or four cents per month
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spent on wiretaps per phone line.
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Of course the amount police spend on wiretaps is not the same as the
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benefits of wiretaps. How can we estimate benefits? Dorothy Denning, an
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advocate of both the FBI bill and the wiretap chip, claims that "the
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economic benefits [of wiretaps] alone are estimated to be billions of
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dollars per year" [7], and then refers to amounts fined, recovered, and "$2
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billion in prevented potential economic loss" by the FBI from 1985 to 1991.
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Denning further relays fascinating FBI claims that through wiretaps "the
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hierarchy of organized crime has been neutralized or destabilized", and
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that "the war on drugs ... would be substantially ... lost" without them.
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Two billion dollars per year of wiretap benefit would translate to a little
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over a dollar a month per phone line. Denning, however, offers no support
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for her claims, and appears to be relaying internal FBI figures, which the
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FBI itself has neither revealed nor explained to the public. And the FBI
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is hardly a neutral party on this subject.
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Estimating the benefits of police investigations is not a simple as it
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might seem, however, and certainly requires more than adding up amounts
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fined or recovered. Long and well-established results in the economics of
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law enforcement [8] tell us to reject the notion that we should be willing
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to spend up to one dollar on police, in order to collect another dollar in
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fines or to prevent another dollar of theft. So, for example, we rightly
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reject IRS pleas for increased budget based solely on estimates of how many
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more dollars can be collected in taxes for each dollar spent by the IRS.
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In fact, a main reason given for using public police to investigate crime,
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instead of private bounty hunters, is to avoid such police overspending.
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In general, we deter a given class of criminals through a combination of
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some perceived probability of being caught and convicted, and some expected
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punishment level if convicted. And some crime is directly prevented, rather
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than deterred, through some level of police monitoring. The optimum police
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budget is a complex tradeoff between social costs due to the crimes
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themselves, the punishment exacted, and police expenses.
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How then can we estimate wiretap benefits? Let us assume that about the
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right total amount is being spent on police, and that police have about the
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right incentives, to spend their budget to monitor where it would help the
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most, and to get as many as possible of the right kinds of convictions.
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(If police budgets are too low, then the answer is to increase them, rather
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than trying to crudely subsidize any one of their expenses.)
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In this case the social benefit of being able to wiretap is no more than
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about the additional amount police would be willing to pay, beyond what
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they now pay, to undertake the same wiretaps (assuming this remains a small
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fraction of total police budgets). The benefit of wiretaps is actually
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less than this value, because were wiretaps to become more expensive, we
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might prefer to get the same criminal deterrence by instead raising
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punishment and lowering the probability of conviction, or perhaps we might
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accept a lower deterrence level, or even decriminalize certain activities.
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Police monitoring might be similarly adjusted.
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How much police would be willing to pay for each wiretap would depend of
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course on how what alternatives are available. If unable to wiretap a
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particular suspect's phone line, police might instead use hidden
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microphones, informants, grant immunity to related suspects, or investigate
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a suspect in other ways.
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The law requires that police requesting a wiretap must convince a judge
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that other approaches "reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried
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or to be too dangerous". But in practice judges don't often question
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boilerplate claims to this effect in police requests [9], and
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investigations often continue even after a wiretap has failed to aid an
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investigation. Experienced investigators advise wiretaps as a last resort,
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but mainly because wiretaps are so expensive.
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More importantly, police can also choose to focus on similar suspects who
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are more easily investigated without wiretaps. Most police cases are near
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the borderline where it is not clear that they are worth pursuing, and will
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be simply dropped should a more pressing case suddenly arise. Many cases
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reach the point where a wiretap might help, but are dropped because a
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wiretap seems too costly. And most cases now using wiretaps would probably
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be abandoned if wiretaps became dramatically more expensive.
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No doubt a few wiretaps are so valuable that it would have cost ten times
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as much to obtain similar results through other means. But on average, it
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is hard to imagine that police would be willing to pay more than a few
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times what they now pay for each wiretap. If we assume that police would
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on average be willing to pay twice as much for each tap, then the social
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benefit of phone wiretaps is about equal to the current spending level of
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four cents a month per phone line. If we assume that police would on
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average be willing to pay four times as much per wiretap, the option to
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wiretap the average phone would be worth twelve cents a month.
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A better estimate of wiretap values might come from randomly asking recent
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wiretap requestors whether they would have still requested that wiretap had
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they expected it to take twice as much labor to get the results they had
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expected, or three times as much, etc. The FBI will not allow such a
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survey by ordinary citizens, but perhaps some state police would. But
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until such research is done, the twelve cent figure seems a reasonably
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generous estimate, and the four cent figure may be closer to reality,
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Of course the value of the option to tap any particular phone line
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presumably varies a great deal from the average value. But unless the
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police can somehow pay only for the option to wiretap particular phone
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lines of its choosing, it is the average value that matters for a
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cost/benefit analysis.
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WIRETAP COSTS
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Let us for the moment optimistically assume that the U.S. government
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encryption scheme used in the wiretap chip is as secure as whatever private
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enterprise would have offered instead, protecting our conversations from
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the spying ears of neighbors, corporations, and governments, both foreign
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and domestic. Even so, the use of this chip, and of other policies to
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support wiretaps, would create many additional costs to build and maintain
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our communication system.
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Some phone companies must have perceived a non-trivial cost in continuing
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to support wiretaps while moving to digital phone transmissions, even when
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compared to the widely recognized value of staying on the good side of the
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police. Otherwise the police would not have complained of "instances in
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which court orders authorizing the interception of communications have not
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been fulfilled because of technical limitations within particular
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telecommunications networks" [1].
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The wiretap chip requires extra law enforcement fields to be added to phone
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transmissions, increasing traffic by some unknown percentage. A special
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secure process must be used to add encryption keys to chips, while securely
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distributing these keys to special agencies, which must be funded and
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monitored. The chips themselves are manufactured through a special process
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so that the chip becomes nearly impossible to take apart, and the pool of
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those who can compete to design better implementations is severely limited.
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Private encryption systems not supporting wiretaps would require none of
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these extra costs.
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Perhaps most important, government decree would at least partially replace
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private marketplace evolution of standards for how voice is to be
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represented, encrypted, and exchanged in our future phones. It is widely
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believed that governments are less efficient than private enterprise in
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procuring products and standards, though they may perhaps perform a useful
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brokering role when we choose between competing private standards. How
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much less efficient is a matter of debate, some say they pay twice as much,
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while others might say they pay only 10% more.
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This type of wiretap support also raises costs by preventing full use of a
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global market for telephone systems. It pushes certain domestic phone
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standards, which foreign countries may not adopt, and requires the use of
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encryption methods known only to our government, which foreign countries
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are quite unlikely to adopt.
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In 1990, 53 U.S. phone companies had total revenues of $117.7 billion for
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domestic calls, $4.4 billion for overseas calls, and $4.5 billion for
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cellular calls [6], for a total cost of $126.6 billion dollars to run the
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phone system, and an average monthly phone bill of $76.45 per line. If we
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generously assume that police and spies would on average be willing to
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pay four times as much as the ~$60 million they now spent on wiretaps
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annually, we find that wiretaps are not cost effective if we must raise
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phone costs by as much as one part in 700 to preserve wiretap abilities in
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the face of technological change. The twelve cents per line wiretap option
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value must be compared with an average seventy dollar monthly phone bill.
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(If we assume that police would only pay twice as much on average, then
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this limit falls to one part in 2000!)
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Dorothy Denning relays FBI claims that $300 million is the maximum
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cumulative development cost "for a switch-based software solution" so that
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phone companies can continue to support wiretaps [7]. Denning does not,
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however, say how long this solution would be good for, nor what the
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software maintenance and extra operating costs would be. And again this is
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a figure which the FBI itself has neither revealed nor explained to the
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public. If we use a standard estimate that software maintenance typically
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costs twice as much as development [10], and accept this FBI estimate, then
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this extra software cost would be by itself five times the above generous
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estimate of annual wiretap benefits.
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The current government contractor claims it will offer the wiretap chips
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for about $26 each in lots of 10,000 [2], over twice the $10 each a
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competing private developer claims it would charge [11] for a chip with
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comparable functionality, minus wiretap support. And the wiretap chip
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price probably doesn't reflect the full cost of government funded NSA
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research to develop it. If only one phone (or answering machine) is
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replaced per phone line every five years, the extra cost for these chips
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alone comes out to over 27 cents extra a month per line, or by itself more
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than two times a twelve cent estimated wiretap option value. Of course
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most phones wouldn't have encryption chips for a while, but the wiretap
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benefit is per phone, so this argument still applies.
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COMPARING BENEFITS AND COSTS
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Given the dramatic difference between the total cost of running the phone
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system and an estimated social value of wiretaps, we can justify only the
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slightest modification of the phone system to accommodate wiretaps. When
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the only modification required was to allow investigators in to attach
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clips to phone wires, wiretap support may have been reasonable. But when
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considering more substantial modification, the burden of proof is clearly
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on those proposing such modification to show how the costs would really be
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less than the benefits. This is especially true if we consider the costs
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neglected above, of invasions of the privacy of innocents, and the risk
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that future administrations will not act in good faith [3].
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If consensus cannot be obtained on the relative costs and benefits of
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wiretaps, we might do better to focus on structuring incentives so that
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people will want to make the right choices, whatever those might be.
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Regarding phone company support for wiretaps, it seems clear that if
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wiretaps are in fact cost-effective, there must be some price per wiretap
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so that police would be willing to pay for wiretaps, and phone companies
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would be willing to support them. As long as the current law requiring
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police to pay phone company "expenses" is interpreted liberally enough, the
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market should provide wiretaps, if they are valuable.
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Monopoly market power of phone companies, or of police, might be an issue,
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but if we must legislate to deal with monopoly here, why not do so the same
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way we deal with monopoly elsewhere, such as through price regulation?
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Legislating the price to be zero, however, as the FBI bill seems to
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propose, seems hard to justify. And having each police agency pay for
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wiretaps, rather than all phone companies, seems fairer to states, such as
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California and Illinois, which do not allow wiretaps.
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Regarding encryption chips, recall that without legislation outlawing
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private encryption, serious criminals would not be affected. In this case,
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it does not seem unreasonable to allow phone companies to offer discounts
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to their customers who buy phones supporting wiretaps, and thereby help
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that phone company sell wiretaps to police. Each phone user could then
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decide if this discount was worth buying a more expensive phone chip, and
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risking possible unlawful invasions of their privacy. Adverse selection,
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however, might make privacy lovers pay more than they would in an ideal
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world.
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If outlawing private encryption is seriously considered, then we might do
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better to instead just declare an extra punishment for crimes committed
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with the aid of strong encryption, similar to current extra punishments for
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using a gun, crossing state lines, or conspiring with several other people.
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As in these other situations, a higher punishment compensates for lower
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probabilities of convicting such crimes, and for higher enforcement costs,
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while still allowing individual tradeoffs regarding wiretap support.
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If, as seems quite possible, the stringent cost requirements described here
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for preserving wiretap abilities cannot be met, then we should accept that
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history has passed the economical wiretap by. Police functioned before
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1968, and would function again after wiretaps.
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[1] ftp: ftp.eff.org /pub/EFF/legislation/new-fbi-wiretap-bill
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/pub/EFF/legal-issues/eff-fbi-analysis
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[2] Clipper Chip Technology, ftp: csrc.ncsl.nist.gov /pub/nistnews/clip.txt
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[3] Alexander Charns, Cloak and Gavel, FBI Wiretaps, Bugs, Informers, and
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the Supreme Court, Univ. Ill. Press, Chicago, 1992.
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[4] Headrick, The Invisible Weapon, Oxford Univ. Press, 1991.
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[5] Report on Applications for Orders Authorizing or Approving the
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Interception of Wire, Oral, or Electronic Communications, 1990,
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Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, Washington, DC 20544.
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[6] Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1992.
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[7] Dorothy Denning, "To Tap Or Not To Tap", Comm. of the ACM, March 1993.
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[8] Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 4th Ed., 1992, Chapter 22.
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[9] Report of the National Commission for the Review of Federal and State
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Laws Relating to Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance, Washington,
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1976.
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[10] Barry Boehm, Software Engineering Economics, Prentice Hall, 1981.
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[11] conversation with Steven Bryen, representative of Secure
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Communications Technology, 301-588-2200, April 25, 1993.
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--
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Robin Hanson hanson@ptolemy.arc.nasa.gov
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415-604-3361 MS-269-2, NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA 94035
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510-651-7483 47164 Male Terrace, Fremont, CA 94539-7921
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