2014 lines
102 KiB
Plaintext
2014 lines
102 KiB
Plaintext
Combat Arms
|
||
2869 Grove Way
|
||
Castro Valley, California 94546-6709
|
||
Telephone (415) 538-6544
|
||
BBS: (415) 537-1777
|
||
|
||
|
||
---------------------------------------------------
|
||
º º
|
||
º PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN GUERRILLA WARFARE º
|
||
º º
|
||
º by º
|
||
º º
|
||
º Tayac n º
|
||
º º
|
||
º A tactical manual for the revolutionary that º
|
||
º was published by the Central Intelligence º
|
||
º Agency and distributed to the Contras in º
|
||
º Central America. º
|
||
º º
|
||
º Combat Arms urges gun owners in the United º
|
||
º States to become very familiar with the º
|
||
º contents of this manual and to discuss it º
|
||
º among your family and friends. Liberty knows º
|
||
º no peace. º
|
||
º º
|
||
---------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
PREFACE
|
||
|
||
Guerrilla warfare is essentially a political war. Therefore, its area
|
||
of operations exceeds the territorial limits of conventional warfare, to
|
||
penetrate the political entity itself: the "political animal" that
|
||
Aristotle defined.
|
||
|
||
In effect,the human being should be considered the priority objective
|
||
in a political war. And conceived as the military target of guerrilla war,
|
||
the human being has his most critical point in his mind. Once his mind has
|
||
been reached, the"political animal" has been defeated, without necessarily
|
||
receiving bullets.
|
||
|
||
Guerrilla warfare is born and grows in the political environment; in
|
||
the constant combat to dominate that area of political mentality that is
|
||
inherent to all human beings and which collectively constitutes the
|
||
"environment" in which guerrilla warfare moves, and which is where
|
||
precisely its victory or failure is defined.
|
||
|
||
This conception of guerrilla warfare as political war turns
|
||
Psychological Operations into the decisive factor of the results. The
|
||
target, then, is the minds of the population, all the population: our
|
||
troops, the enemy troops and the civilian population.
|
||
|
||
This book is a manual for the training of guerrillas in psychological
|
||
operations, and its application to the concrete case of the Christian and
|
||
democratic crusade being waged in Nicaragua by the Freedom Commandos.
|
||
|
||
Welcome!
|
||
|
||
|
||
INTRODUCTION
|
||
|
||
1. Generalities
|
||
|
||
The purpose of this book is to introduce the guerrilla student to the
|
||
psychological operations techniques that will be of immediate and practical
|
||
value to him in guerrilla warfare. This section is introductory and
|
||
general; subsequent sections will cover each point set forth here in more
|
||
detail.
|
||
|
||
The nature of the environment of guerrilla warfare does not permit
|
||
sophisticated psychological operations, and it becomes necessary for the
|
||
chiefs of groups, chiefs of detachments and squadron leaders to have the
|
||
ability to carry out, with minimal instructions from the higher levels,
|
||
psychological action operations with the contacts that are thoroughly aware
|
||
of the situation, i.e. the foundations.
|
||
|
||
2. Combatant-Propagandist Guerrillas
|
||
|
||
In order to obtain the maximum results from the psychological
|
||
operations in guerrilla warfare, every combatant should be as highly
|
||
motivated to carry out propaganda face to face as he is a combatant. This
|
||
means that the individual political awareness of the guerrilla of the
|
||
reason for his struggle will be as acute as his ability to fight.
|
||
|
||
Such a political awareness and motivation is obtained through the
|
||
dynamic of groups and self-criticism, as a standard method of instruction
|
||
for the guerrilla training and operations. Group discussions raise the
|
||
spirit and improve the unity of thought of the guerrilla training and
|
||
operations. Group discussions raise the spirit and improve the unity of
|
||
thought of the guerrilla squads and exercise social pressure on the weak
|
||
members to carry out a better role in future training or in combative
|
||
action. Self-criticism is in terms of one's contribution or defects in his
|
||
contribution to the cause, to the movement, the struggle, etc.; and gives a
|
||
positive individual commitment to the mission of the group.
|
||
|
||
The desired result is a guerrilla who can persuasively justify his
|
||
actions when he comes into contact with any member of the People of
|
||
Nicaragua, and especially with himself and his fellow guerrillas in dealing
|
||
with the vicissitudes of guerrilla warfare. This means that every guerrilla
|
||
will be persuasive in his face-to-face communication - propagandist-
|
||
combatant - ins his contact with the people; he should be able to give 5 or
|
||
10 logical reasons why, for example, a peasant should give him cloth,
|
||
needle and thread to mend his clothes. When the guerrilla behaves in this
|
||
manner, enemy propaganda will never succeed in making him an enemy in the
|
||
eyes of the people. It also means that hunger, cold, fatigue and insecurity
|
||
will have a meaning, psychologically, in the cause of the struggle due to
|
||
his constant orientation.
|
||
|
||
3. Armed Propaganda
|
||
|
||
Armed propaganda includes every act carried out, and the good
|
||
impression that this armed force causes will result in positive attitudes
|
||
in the population toward that force; ad it does not include forced
|
||
indoctrination. Armed propaganda improves the behavior of the population
|
||
toward them, and it is not achieved by force.
|
||
|
||
This means that a guerilla armed unit in a rural town will not give
|
||
the impression that arms are their strength over the peasants, but rather
|
||
that they are the strength of the peasants against the Sandinista
|
||
government of repression. This is achieved through a close identification
|
||
with the people, as follows: hanging up weapons and working together with
|
||
them on their crops, in construction, in the harvesting of grains, in
|
||
fishing, etc.; explanations to young men about basic weapons, e.g. giving
|
||
them an unloaded weapon and letting them touch it, see it, etc.; describing
|
||
in a rudimentary manner its operation; describing with simple slogans how
|
||
weapons will serve the people to win their freedom; demanding the requests
|
||
by the people for hospitals and education, reducing taxes, etc.
|
||
|
||
All these acts have as their goal the creation of an identification of
|
||
the people with the weapons and the guerrillas who carry them, so that the
|
||
population feels that the weapons are, indirectly, their weapon to protect
|
||
them and help them in the struggle against a regime of oppression. Implicit
|
||
terror always accompanies weapons, since the people are internally "aware"
|
||
that they can be used against them, but as long as explicit coercion is
|
||
avoided, positive attitudes can be achieved with respect to the presence of
|
||
armed guerrillas within the population.
|
||
|
||
4. Armed Propaganda Teams
|
||
|
||
Armed Propaganda Teams (EPA) are formed through a careful selection of
|
||
persuasive and highly motivated guerrillas who move about within the
|
||
population, encouraging the people to support the guerrillas and put up
|
||
resistance against the enemy. It combines a high degree of political
|
||
awareness and the "armed" propaganda ability of the guerrillas toward a
|
||
planned, programmed, and controlled effort.
|
||
|
||
The careful selection of the staff, based on their persuasiveness in
|
||
informal discussions and their ability in combat, is more important than
|
||
their degree of education or the training program. The tactics of the Armed
|
||
Propaganda Teams are carried out covertly, and should be parallel to the
|
||
tactical effort in guerrilla warfare. The knowledge of the psychology of
|
||
the population is primary for the Armed Propaganda Teams, but much more
|
||
intelligence data will be obtained from an EPA program in the area of
|
||
operations.
|
||
|
||
5. Development and Control of the "Front" Organizations
|
||
|
||
The development and control of "front" (or facade) organizations is
|
||
carried out through subjective internal control at group meetings of
|
||
"inside cadres," and the calculations of the time for the fusion of these
|
||
combined efforts to be applied to the masses.
|
||
|
||
Established citizens-doctors, lawyers, businessmen, teachers, etc.-
|
||
will be recruited initially as "Social Crusaders" in typically "innocuous"
|
||
movements in the area of operations. When their "involvement" with the
|
||
clandestine organization is revealed to them, this supplies the
|
||
psychological pressure to use them as "inside cadres" in groups to which
|
||
they already belong or of which they can be members.
|
||
|
||
Then they will receive instruction in techniques of persuasion over
|
||
control of target groups to support our democratic revolution, through a
|
||
gradual and skillful process. A cell control system isolates individuals
|
||
from one another, and at the appropriate moment, their influence is used
|
||
for the fusion of groups in a united national front.
|
||
|
||
6. Control of Meetings and Mass Assemblies
|
||
|
||
The control of mass meetings in support of guerrilla warfare is
|
||
carried out internally through a covert commando element, bodyguards,
|
||
messengers, shock forces (initiators of incidents), placard carriers (also
|
||
used for making signals), shouters of slogans, everything under the control
|
||
of the outside commando element.
|
||
|
||
When the cadres are placed or recruited in organizations such as labor
|
||
unions, youth groups agrarian organizations or professional associations,
|
||
they will begin to manipulate the objectives of the groups. The
|
||
psychological apparatus of our movement through inside cadres prepares a
|
||
mental attitude which at the crucial moment can be turned into a fury of
|
||
justified violence.
|
||
|
||
Through a small group of guerrillas infiltrated within the masses this
|
||
can be carried out; they will have the mission of agitating by giving the
|
||
impression that there are many of them and that they have a large popular
|
||
backing. Using the tactics of a force of 200-300 agitators, a demonstration
|
||
can be created in which 10,000-20,000 persons take part.
|
||
|
||
7. Support of Contacts with Their Roots in Reality
|
||
|
||
The support of local contacts who are familiar with the deep reality
|
||
is achieved through the exploitation of the social and political weaknesses
|
||
of the target society, with propagandist-combatant guerrillas, armed
|
||
propaganda, armed propaganda teams, cover organizations and mass meetings.
|
||
|
||
The combatant-propagandist guerrilla is the result of a continuous
|
||
program of indoctrination and motivation. They will have the mission of
|
||
showing the people how great and fair our movement is in the eyes of all
|
||
Nicaraguans and the world. Identifying themselves with our people, they
|
||
will increase the sympathy towards our movement, which will result in
|
||
greater support of the population for the freedom commandos, taking away
|
||
support for the regime in power.
|
||
|
||
Armed propaganda will extend this identification process of the people
|
||
with the Christian guerrillas, providing converging points against the
|
||
Sandinista regime.
|
||
|
||
The Armed Propaganda Teams provide a several-stage program of
|
||
persuasive planning in guerrilla warfare in all areas of the country. Also,
|
||
these teams are the "eyes and ears" of our movement.
|
||
|
||
The development and control of the cover organizations in guerrilla
|
||
warfare will give our movement the ability to create a "whiplash" effect
|
||
within the population when the order for fusion is given. When the
|
||
infiltration and internal subjective control have been developed in a
|
||
manner parallel to other guerrilla activities, a comandante of ours will
|
||
literally be able to shake up the Sandinista structure, and replace it.
|
||
|
||
The mass assemblies and meetings are the culmination of a wide base
|
||
support among the population, and it comes about in the later phases of the
|
||
operation. This is the moment in which the overthrow can be achieved and
|
||
our revolution can become an open one, requiring the close collaboration of
|
||
the entire population of the country, and of contacts with their roots in
|
||
reality.
|
||
|
||
The tactical effort in guerrilla warfare is directed at the weaknesses
|
||
of the enemy and at destroying their military resistance capacity, and
|
||
should be parallel to a psychological effort to weaken and destroy their
|
||
sociopolitical capacity at the same time. In guerrilla warfare, more than
|
||
in any other type of military effort, the psychological activities should
|
||
be simultaneous with the military ones, in order to achieve the objectives
|
||
desired.
|
||
|
||
COMBATANT-PROPAGANDIST GUERRILLA
|
||
|
||
1. Generalities
|
||
|
||
The objective of this section is to familiarize the guerrilla with the
|
||
techniques of psychological operations, which maximizes the social-
|
||
psychological effect of a guerrilla movement, converting the guerrilla into
|
||
a propagandist, in addition to being a combatant. The nature of the
|
||
environment in guerrilla warfare does not permit sophisticated facilities
|
||
for psychological operations, so that use should be made of the effective
|
||
face-to-face persuasion of each guerrilla.
|
||
|
||
2. Political Awareness
|
||
|
||
The individual political awareness of the guerrilla, the reason for
|
||
his struggle, will be as important as his ability in combat. This political
|
||
awareness and motivation will be achieved:
|
||
|
||
þ By improving the combat potential of the guerrilla by improving
|
||
his motivation for fighting.
|
||
|
||
þ By the guerrilla recognizing himself as a vital tie between the
|
||
democratic guerrillas and the people, whose support is essential
|
||
for the subsistence of both.
|
||
|
||
þ By fostering the support of the population for the national
|
||
insurgence through the support for the guerrillas of the locale,
|
||
which provides a psychological basis in the population for
|
||
politics after the victory has been achieved.
|
||
|
||
þ By developing trust in the guerrillas and in the population, for
|
||
the reconstruction of a local and national government.
|
||
|
||
þ By promoting the value of participation by the guerrillas and the
|
||
people in the civic affairs of the insurrection and in the
|
||
national programs.
|
||
|
||
þ By developing in each guerrilla the ability of persuasion face-
|
||
to-face, at the local level, to win the support of the
|
||
population, which is essential for success in guerrilla warfare.
|
||
|
||
3. Group Dynamics
|
||
|
||
This political awareness-building and motivation are attained by the
|
||
use of group dynamics at the level of small units. The group discussion
|
||
method and self-criticism are a general guerrilla training and operations
|
||
technique.
|
||
|
||
Group discussions raise the spirit and increase the unity of thought
|
||
in small guerrilla groups and exercise social pressure on the weakest
|
||
members to better carry out their mission in training and future combat
|
||
actions. These group discussions will give special emphasis to:
|
||
|
||
þ Creating a favorable opinion of our movement. Through local and
|
||
national history, make it clear that the Sandinista regime is
|
||
"foreignizing," "repressive" and "imperialistic," and that even
|
||
though there are some Nicaraguans within the government, point
|
||
out that they are "puppets" of the power of the Soviets and
|
||
Cubans, i.e. of foreign power.
|
||
|
||
þ Always a local focus. Matters of an international nature will be
|
||
explained only in support of local events in the guerrilla
|
||
warfare.
|
||
|
||
þ The unification of the nation is our goal. This means that the
|
||
defeat of the Sandinista armed forces is our priority. Our
|
||
insurrectional movement is a pluralistic political platform from
|
||
which we are determined to win freedom, equality, a better
|
||
economy with work facilities, a higher standard of living, a true
|
||
democracy for all Nicaraguans without exception.
|
||
|
||
þ Providing to each guerrilla clear understanding about the
|
||
struggle for national sovereignty against Soviet-Cuban
|
||
imperialism. Discussion guides will lead the guerrillas so that
|
||
they will see the injustices of the Sandinista system.
|
||
|
||
þ Showing each guerrilla the need for good behavior to win the
|
||
support of the population. Discussion guides should convince the
|
||
guerrillas that the attitude and opinion of the population play a
|
||
decisive role, because victory is impossible without popular
|
||
support.
|
||
|
||
þ Self-criticism will be in constructive terms that will contribute
|
||
to the mission of the movement, and which will provide the
|
||
guerrillas with the conviction that they have a constant and
|
||
positive individual responsibility in the mission of the group.
|
||
The method of instruction will be:
|
||
|
||
a) division of the guerrilla force into squads for group
|
||
discussions, including command and support elements,
|
||
whenever the tactical situation permits it. The makeup of
|
||
the small units should be maintained when these groups are
|
||
designated.
|
||
|
||
b) Assignment of a political cadre in the guerrilla force to
|
||
each group to guide the discussion. The squad leader should
|
||
help the cadre to foster study and the expression of
|
||
thoughts. If there are not enough political cadres for each
|
||
squad or post, leaders should guide the discussions, and the
|
||
available cadres visit alternate groups.
|
||
|
||
c) It is appropriate for the cadre (or the leader) to guide
|
||
the discussion of a group to cover a number of points and to
|
||
reach a correct conclusion. The guerrillas should feel that
|
||
it was their free and own decision. THe cadre should serve
|
||
as a private teacher. The cadre or leader will not act as a
|
||
lecturer, but will help the members of the group to study
|
||
and express their own opinions.
|
||
|
||
d) The political cadre will at the end of every discussion
|
||
make a summary of the principal points, leading them to the
|
||
correct conclusions. Any serious difference with the
|
||
objectives of the movement should be noted by the cadre and
|
||
reported to the comandante of the force. If necessary, a
|
||
combined group meeting will be held and the team of
|
||
political cadres will explain and rectify the
|
||
misunderstanding.
|
||
|
||
e) Democratic conduct by the political cadres: living,
|
||
eating and working with the guerrillas, and if possible,
|
||
fighting at their side, sharing their living conditions. All
|
||
of this will foster understanding and the spirit of
|
||
cooperation that will help in the discussion and exchange of
|
||
ideas.
|
||
|
||
f) Carry out group discussions in towns, and areas of
|
||
operations whenever possible with the civilian population,
|
||
and not limit them to camps or bases. This is done to
|
||
emphasize the revolutionary nature of the struggle and to
|
||
demonstrate that the guerrillas identified with the
|
||
objectives of the people move about within the population.
|
||
The guerrilla projects himself toward the people, as the
|
||
political cadre does toward the guerrilla, and they should
|
||
live, eat and work together to realize a unity of
|
||
revolutionary thought.
|
||
|
||
The principles for guerrilla and political-cadre group discussions
|
||
are:
|
||
|
||
þ Organize discussion groups at the post or squad level. A cadre
|
||
cannot be sure of the comprehension and acceptance of the
|
||
concepts and conclusions by guerrillas in large groups. In a
|
||
group of the size of a squad of 10 men, the judgement and control
|
||
of the situation is greater. In this way, all students will
|
||
participate in an exchange among them; the political leader, the
|
||
group leader, and also the political cadre. Special attention
|
||
will be given to the individual ability to discuss the objectives
|
||
of the insurrectional struggle. Whenever a guerrilla expresses
|
||
his opinion, he will be interested in listening to the opinions
|
||
of others, leading as a result to the unity of thought.
|
||
|
||
þ Combine the different points of view and reach an opinion or
|
||
common conclusion. This is the most difficult task of a political
|
||
guerrilla cadre. After the group discussions of the democratic
|
||
objectives of the movement, the chief of the team of political
|
||
cadres of the guerrilla force should combine the conclusions of
|
||
individual groups in a general summary. At a meeting with all the
|
||
discussion groups, the cadre shall provide the principal points,
|
||
and the guerrillas will have the opportunity to clarify or modify
|
||
their points of view. To carry this out, the conclusions will be
|
||
summarized in the form of slogans, wherever possible.
|
||
|
||
þ Face with honesty the national and local problems of our
|
||
struggle. THe political cadres should always be prepared to
|
||
discuss solutions to the problems observed by the guerrillas.
|
||
During the discussions, the guerrillas should be guided by the
|
||
following three principles:
|
||
|
||
þ Freedom of thought.
|
||
|
||
þ Freedom of expression.
|
||
|
||
þ Concentration of thoughts on the objectives of the democratic
|
||
struggle.
|
||
|
||
The result desired is a guerrilla who in a persuasive manner can
|
||
justify all of his acts whenever he is in contact with any member of the
|
||
town/people, and especially with himself and with his guerrilla companions
|
||
by facing the vicissitudes of guerrilla warfare.
|
||
|
||
This means that every guerrilla will come to have effective face-to-
|
||
face persuasion as a combatant-propagandist in his contact with the people,
|
||
to the point of giving 5-10 logical reasons why, e.g. a peasant should give
|
||
him a piece of cloth, or a needle and thread to mend his clothes. When
|
||
behaves in this manner, no type of propaganda of the enemy will be able to
|
||
make a "terrorist" of him in the eyes of the people.
|
||
|
||
In addition, hunger, cold, fatigue and insecurity in the existence of
|
||
the guerrilla acquire meaning in the cause of the struggle due to the
|
||
constant psychological orientation.
|
||
|
||
4. Camp Procedures
|
||
|
||
Encamping the guerrilla units gives greater motivation, in addition to
|
||
reducing distractions, and increases the spirit of cooperation of small
|
||
units, relating the physical environment to the psychological one. The
|
||
squad chief shall establish the regular camping procedure. Once thy have
|
||
divested themselves of their packs, the chief will choose the appropriate
|
||
ground for camping. He should select land that predominates over the zone
|
||
with two or three escape routes. He will choose among his men and give them
|
||
responsibilities such as:
|
||
|
||
þ Clean the camp area.
|
||
|
||
þ Provide adequate drainage in case of rain. Also build some
|
||
trenches or holes for marksmen in case of emergency. In addition,
|
||
he will build a stove, which will be done by making some small
|
||
trenches and placing three rocks in place; in case the stove is
|
||
built on a pedestal, it will be filled with clay and rocks.
|
||
|
||
þ Build a windbreaking wall, which will be covered on the sides and
|
||
on the top with branches and leaves of the same vegetation of the
|
||
zones. This will serve for camouflaging and protecting it from
|
||
aerial visibility or from enemy patrols around.
|
||
|
||
þ Construct a latrine and a hole where waste and garbage will be
|
||
buried, which should be covered over at the time of abandoning
|
||
the camp.
|
||
|
||
þ Once the camp has been set up, it is recommended that a watchman
|
||
be positioned in the places of access at a prudent distance,
|
||
where the shout of alarm can be heard. In the same moment the
|
||
password will be established, which should be changed every 24
|
||
hours. The commander should establish ahead of time an alternate
|
||
meeting point, in case of having to abandon the camp in a hurried
|
||
manner, and they will be able to meet in the other already
|
||
established point, and they should warn the patrol that if at a
|
||
particular time they cannot meet at the established point, the
|
||
should have a third meeting point.
|
||
|
||
These procedures contribute to the motivation of the guerrilla and
|
||
improve the spirit of cooperation in the unit. The danger, sense of
|
||
insecurity, anxiety and daily concern in the life of a guerrilla require
|
||
tangible evidence of belonging in an order for him to keep up his spirit
|
||
and morale.
|
||
|
||
In addition to the good physical conditions in which the guerrilla
|
||
should find himself, good psychological conditions are necessary, for which
|
||
group discussions and becoming a self=critic are recommended, which will
|
||
greatly benefit the spirit and morale of the same.
|
||
|
||
Having broken camp with the effort and cooperation of everyone
|
||
strengthens the spirit of the group. The guerrilla will be inclined then
|
||
towards the unity of thought in democratic objectives.
|
||
|
||
5. Interaction with the People
|
||
|
||
In order to ensure popular support, essential for the good development
|
||
of guerrilla warfare, the leaders should induce a positive interaction
|
||
between the civilians and the guerrillas, through the principle of "live,
|
||
eat , and work with the people," and maintain control of their activities.
|
||
In group discussions, the leaders and political cadres should give emphasis
|
||
to positively identifying themselves with the people.
|
||
|
||
It is not recommendable to speak of military tactical plans in
|
||
discussions with civilians. The Communist foe should be pointed out as the
|
||
number one enemy of the people, and as a secondary threat against our
|
||
guerrilla forces.
|
||
|
||
Whenever there is a chance, groups of members should be chosen who
|
||
have a high political awareness and high disciplinary conduct in the work
|
||
to be carried out, in order to be sent to the populous areas in order to
|
||
direct the armed propaganda, where they should persuade the people through
|
||
dialogue in face-to-face confrontations, where these principles should be
|
||
followed:
|
||
|
||
þ Respect for human rights and others' property.
|
||
|
||
þ Helping the people in community work.
|
||
|
||
þ Protecting the people from Communist aggressions.
|
||
|
||
þ Teaching the people environmental hygiene, to read, etc., in
|
||
order to win their trust, which will lead to a better democratic
|
||
ideological preparation.
|
||
|
||
This attitude will foster the sympathy of the peasants for our
|
||
movement, and they will immediately become one of us, through logistical
|
||
support, coverage and intelligence information on the enemy or
|
||
participation in combat. The guerrillas should be persuasive through the
|
||
word and not dictatorial with weapons. If they behave in this way, the
|
||
people will feel respected, will be more inclined to accept our message and
|
||
will consolidate into popular support.
|
||
|
||
In any place in which tactical guerrilla operations are carried out in
|
||
populous areas, the squad should undertake psychological actions parallel
|
||
to these, and should proceed, accompany and consolidate the common
|
||
objective and explain to all the people about our struggle, explaining that
|
||
our presence is to give peace, liberty and democracy to all Nicaraguans
|
||
without exception, and explaining that out struggle is not against the
|
||
nationals but rather against Russian imperialism. This will serve to ensure
|
||
greater Psychological achievements which will increase the operations of
|
||
the future.
|
||
|
||
6. Conclusions
|
||
|
||
The nature of the environment in guerrilla warfare does not permit
|
||
sophisticated facilities for psychological operations, and the face-to-face
|
||
persuasion of the guerrilla combatant-propagandists with the people is an
|
||
effective and available tool which we should use as much as possible during
|
||
the process of the struggle.
|
||
|
||
ARMED PROPAGANDA
|
||
|
||
1. Generalities
|
||
|
||
Frequently a misunderstanding exists on "armed propaganda," that this
|
||
tactic is a compulsion of the people with arms. In reality, it does not
|
||
include compulsion, but the guerrilla should know well the principles and
|
||
methods of this tactic. The objective of this section is to give the
|
||
guerrilla student an understanding of the armed propaganda that should be
|
||
used, and that will be able to be applied in guerrilla warfare.
|
||
|
||
2. Close Identification with the People
|
||
|
||
Armed propaganda includes all acts carried out by an armed force,
|
||
whose results improve the attitude of the people toward this force, and it
|
||
does not include forced indoctrination. This is carried out by a close
|
||
identification with the people on any occasion. For example:
|
||
|
||
þ Putting aside weapons and working side by side with the peasants
|
||
in the countryside: building, fishing, repairing roofs,
|
||
transporting water, etc.
|
||
|
||
þ When working with the people, the guerrillas can use slogans such
|
||
as "many hands doing small things, but doing them together."
|
||
|
||
þ Participating in the tasks of the people, they can establish a
|
||
strong tie between them and the guerrillas and at the same time a
|
||
popular support for our movement is generated.
|
||
|
||
During the patrols and other operations around or in the midst of
|
||
villages, each guerrilla should be respectful and courteous with the
|
||
people. In addition he should move with care and always be well prepared to
|
||
fight, if necessary. But he should not always see all the people as
|
||
enemies, with suspicions or hostility. Even in war, it is possible to
|
||
smile, laugh or greet people. Truly, the cause of our revolutionary base,
|
||
the reason why we are struggling, is our people. We must be respectful to
|
||
them on all occasions that present themselves.
|
||
|
||
In places and situations wherever possible, e.g. when they are resting
|
||
during the march, the guerrillas can explain the operation of weapons to
|
||
the youths and young men. They can show them an unloaded rifle so that they
|
||
will learn to load it and unload it; their use, and aiming at imaginary
|
||
targets they are potential recruits for our forces.
|
||
|
||
The guerrillas should always be prepared with simple slogans in order
|
||
to explain to the people, whether in an intentional form or by chance, the
|
||
reason for the weapons.
|
||
|
||
"The weapons will be for winning freedom; the are for you."
|
||
|
||
"With weapons we can impose demands such as hospitals, schools, better
|
||
roads, and social services for the people, for you."
|
||
|
||
"Our weapons are, in truth, the weapons of the people, yours."
|
||
|
||
"With weapons we can change the Sandino-Communist regime and return to
|
||
the people a true democracy so that we will all have economic
|
||
opportunities."
|
||
|
||
All of this should be designed to create an identification of the
|
||
people with the weapons and the guerrillas who carry them. Finally, we
|
||
should make the people feel that we are thinking of them and that the
|
||
weapons are the people's, in order to help them and protect them from a
|
||
Communist, totalitarian, imperialist regime, indifferent to the needs of
|
||
the population.
|
||
|
||
3. Implicit and Explicit Terror
|
||
|
||
A guerrilla armed force always involves implicit terror because the
|
||
population, without saying it aloud, feels terror that the weapons may be
|
||
used against them. However, if the terror does not become explicit,
|
||
positive results can be expected.
|
||
|
||
In a revolution, the individual lives under a constant threat of
|
||
physical damage. If the government police cannot put an end to the
|
||
guerrilla activities, the population will lose confidence in the
|
||
government, which has the inherent mission of guaranteeing the safety of
|
||
citizens. However, the guerrillas should be careful not to become an
|
||
explicit terror, because this would result in a loss of popular support.
|
||
|
||
In the words of a leader of the Huk guerrilla movement of the
|
||
Philippine Islands: "The population is always impressed by weapons, not by
|
||
the terror that they cause, but rather by a sensation of strength/force. We
|
||
must appear before the people, giving them the message of the struggle."
|
||
This is, then, in a few words, the essence of armed propaganda.
|
||
|
||
An armed guerrilla force can occupy an entire town or small city that
|
||
is neutral or relatively passive in the conflict. In order to conduct the
|
||
armed propaganda in an effective manner, the following should be carried
|
||
out simultaneously:
|
||
|
||
þ Destroy the military or police installations and remove the survivors to
|
||
a "public place."
|
||
|
||
þ Cut all the outside lines of communications: cables, radio, messengers.
|
||
|
||
þ Set up ambushes in order to delay the reinforcements in all the possible
|
||
entry routes.
|
||
|
||
þ Kidnap all officials or agents of the Sandinista government and replace
|
||
them in "public Places" with military or civilian persons of trust to our
|
||
movement; in addition, carry out the following:
|
||
|
||
þ Establish a public tribunal that depends on the guerrillas, and cover the
|
||
town or city in order to gather the population for this event.
|
||
|
||
þ Shame, ridicule and humiliate the "personal symbols" of the government of
|
||
repression in the presence of the people and foster popular participation
|
||
through guerrillas within the multitude, shouting slogans and jeers.
|
||
|
||
þ Reduce the influence of individuals in tune with the regime, pointing out
|
||
their weaknesses and taking them out of the town, without damaging them
|
||
publicly.
|
||
|
||
þ Mix the guerrillas within the population and show very good conduct by
|
||
all members of the column, practicing the following:
|
||
|
||
Any article taken will be paid for with cash.
|
||
|
||
The hospitality offered by the people will be accepted and this
|
||
opportunity will be exploited in order to carry out face-to-face
|
||
persuasion about the struggle.
|
||
|
||
Courtesy visits should be made to the prominent persons and those with
|
||
prestige in the place, such as doctors, priests, teachers, etc.
|
||
|
||
The guerrillas should instruct the population that with the end of the
|
||
operative, and when the Sandinista repressive forces interrogate them,
|
||
they may reveal EVERYTHING about the military operation carried out.
|
||
For example, the type of weapons they use, ho many men arrived, from
|
||
what direction they came and in what direction they left, in short,
|
||
EVERYTHING.
|
||
|
||
In addition, indicate to the population that at meetings or in private
|
||
discussion they can give the names of the Sandinista informants, who
|
||
will be removed together with the other officials of the government of
|
||
repression.
|
||
|
||
When a meeting is held, conclude it with a speech by one of the
|
||
leaders of guerrilla political cadres (the most dynamic), which includes
|
||
explicit references to:
|
||
|
||
The fact that the "enemies of the people" -- the officials or
|
||
Sandinista agents -- must not be mistreated in spite of their criminal
|
||
acts, although the guerrilla force may have suffered casualties, and that
|
||
this is done due to the generosity of the Christian guerrillas.
|
||
|
||
Give a declaration of gratitude for the "hospitality" of the
|
||
population, as well as let them know that the risks that they will run when
|
||
the Sandinistas return are greatly appreciated.
|
||
|
||
The fact that the Sandinista regime, although it exploits the people
|
||
with taxes, control of money, grains and all aspects of public life through
|
||
associations, which they are forced to become part of, will not be able to
|
||
resist the attacks of our guerrilla forces.
|
||
|
||
Make the promise to the people that you will return to ensure that the
|
||
"leeches" of the Sandinista regime of repression will not be able to hinder
|
||
our guerrillas from integrating with the population.
|
||
|
||
A statement repeated to the population to the effect that they can
|
||
reveal everything about this visit of our commandos, because we are not
|
||
afraid of anything or anyone, neither the Soviets nor the Cubans. Emphasize
|
||
that we are Nicaraguans, that we are fighting for the freedom of Nicaragua
|
||
and to establish a very Nicaraguan government.
|
||
|
||
4. Guerrilla Weapons Are The Strength of the People over an Illegal
|
||
Government
|
||
|
||
The armed propaganda in populated areas does not give the impression
|
||
that weapons are the power of the guerrillas over the people, but rather
|
||
that the weapons are the strength of the people against a regime of
|
||
repression. Whenever it is necessary to use armed force in an occupation or
|
||
visit to a town or village, guerrillas should emphasize making sure that
|
||
they:
|
||
|
||
þ Explain to the population that in the first place this is being done to
|
||
protect them, the people, and not themselves.
|
||
|
||
þ Admit frankly and publicly that this is an "act of the democratic
|
||
guerrilla movement," with appropriate explanations.
|
||
|
||
þ That this action, although it is not desirable, is necessary because the
|
||
final objective of the insurrection is a free and democratic society, where
|
||
acts of force are not necessary.
|
||
|
||
þ The force of weapons is a necessity caused by the oppressive system, and
|
||
will cease to exist when the "forces of justice" of our movement assume
|
||
control.
|
||
|
||
If, for example, it should be necessary for one of the advanced posts
|
||
to have to fire on a citizen who was trying to leave the town or city in
|
||
which the guerrillas are carrying out armed propaganda or political
|
||
proselytism, the following is recommended:
|
||
|
||
þ Explain that if that citizen had managed to escape, he would have alerted
|
||
the enemy that is near the town or city, and they could carry out acts of
|
||
reprisal such as rapes, pillage, destruction, captures, etc., it this way
|
||
terrorizing the inhabitants of the place for having given attention and
|
||
hospitalities to the guerrillas of the town.
|
||
|
||
þ If a guerrilla fires at an individual, make the town see that he was an
|
||
enemy of the people, and that they shot him because the guerrilla
|
||
recognized as their first duty the protection of citizens.
|
||
|
||
þ The command tried to detain the informant without firing because he, like
|
||
all Christian guerrillas, espouses nonviolence. Firing at the Sandinista
|
||
informant, although it is against his own will, was necessary to prevent
|
||
the repression of the Sandinista government against innocent people.
|
||
|
||
þ Make the population see that it was the repressive system of the regime
|
||
that was the cause of this situation, what really killed the informer, and
|
||
that the weapon fired was one recovered in combat against the Sandinista
|
||
regime.
|
||
|
||
þ Make the population see that if the Sandinista regime had ended the
|
||
repression, the corruption backed by foreign powers, etc., the freedom
|
||
commandos would not have had to brandish arms against brother Nicaraguans,
|
||
which goes against our Christian sentiments. If the informant hadn't tried
|
||
to escape he would be enjoying life together with the rest of the
|
||
population, because not have tried to inform the enemy. This death would
|
||
have been avoided if justice and freedom existed in Nicaragua, which is
|
||
exactly the objective of the democratic guerrilla.
|
||
|
||
5. Selective Use of Violence for Propagandistic Effects
|
||
|
||
It is possible to neutralize carefully selected and planned targets,
|
||
such as court judges, mesta judges, police and State Security officials,
|
||
CDS chiefs, etc. For psychological purposes it is necessary to gather
|
||
together the population affected, so that they will be present, take part
|
||
in the act, and formulate accusations against the oppressor.
|
||
|
||
The target or person should be chosen on the basis of:
|
||
|
||
þ The spontaneous hostility that the majority of the population feels
|
||
toward the target.
|
||
|
||
þ Use rejection or potential hatred by the majority of the population
|
||
affected toward the target, stirring up the population and making them see
|
||
all the negative and hostile actions of the individual against the people.
|
||
|
||
þ If the majority of the people give their support or backing to the target
|
||
or subject, do not try to change these sentiments through provocation.
|
||
|
||
þ Relative difficulty of controlling the person who will replace the
|
||
target.
|
||
|
||
The person who will replace the target should be chosen carefully,
|
||
based on:
|
||
|
||
þ Degree of violence necessary to carry out the change.
|
||
|
||
þ Degree of violence acceptable to the population affected.
|
||
|
||
þ Degree of predictable reprisal by the enemy on the population affected or
|
||
other individuals in the area of the target.
|
||
|
||
The mission to replace the individual should be followed by:
|
||
|
||
þ Extensive explanation within the population affected of the reason why it
|
||
was necessary for the good of the people.
|
||
|
||
þ Explain that Sandinista retaliation is unjust, indiscriminate, and above
|
||
all, a justification for the execution of this mission.
|
||
|
||
þ Carefully test the reaction of the people toward the mission, as well as
|
||
control this reaction, making sure that the populations reaction is
|
||
beneficial towards the Freedom Commandos.
|
||
|
||
6. Conclusions
|
||
|
||
Armed propaganda includes all acts executed and the impact achieved by
|
||
an armed force, which as a result produces positive attitudes in the
|
||
population toward this force, and it does not include forced
|
||
indoctrination. However, armed propaganda is the most effective available
|
||
instrument of a guerrilla force.
|
||
|
||
ARMED PROPAGANDA TEAMS (APTs)
|
||
|
||
1. Generalities
|
||
|
||
In contact with the very reality of their roots, in a psychological
|
||
operation campaign in guerrilla warfare, the comandantes will be able to
|
||
obtain maximum psychological results from an Armed Propaganda program. This
|
||
section is to inform the guerrilla student as to what Armed Propaganda
|
||
Teams are in the environment of guerrilla warfare.
|
||
|
||
2. Combination: Political Awareness and Armed Propaganda
|
||
|
||
The Armed Propaganda Teams combine political awareness-building with
|
||
armed propaganda, which will be carried out by carefully selected
|
||
guerrillas (preferably with experience in combat), for personal persuasion
|
||
within the population.
|
||
|
||
The selection of the staff is more important than the training,
|
||
because we cannot train guerrilla cadres just to show the sensations of
|
||
ardor and fervor, which are essential for person-to-person persuasion. More
|
||
important is the training of persons who are intellectually agile and
|
||
developed.
|
||
|
||
An Armed Propaganda Team includes from 6 to 10 members; this number or
|
||
a smaller number is ideal, since there is more camaraderie, solidarity and
|
||
group spirit. The themes to deal with are assimilated more rapidly and the
|
||
members react more rapidly to unforeseen situations.
|
||
|
||
In addition to the combination as armed propagandist-combatant each
|
||
member of the team should be well prepared to carry out permanent person-
|
||
to-person communication, face-to-face.
|
||
|
||
The leader of the group should be the commando who is the most highly
|
||
motivated politically and the most effective in face-to-face persuasion.
|
||
The position, hierarchy or range will not be decisive for carrying out that
|
||
function, but rather who is best qualified for communication with the
|
||
people.
|
||
|
||
The source of basic recruitment for guerrilla cadres will be the same
|
||
social groups of Nicaraguans to whom the psychological campaign is
|
||
directed, such as peasants, students, professionals, housewives, etc. The
|
||
campesinos (peasants) should be made to see that they do not have lands;
|
||
the workers that the State is putting an end to factories and industries;
|
||
the doctors, that they are being replaced by Cuban paramedics, and that as
|
||
doctors they cannot practice their profession due to lack of medicines. A
|
||
requirement for recruiting them will be their ability to express themselves
|
||
in public.
|
||
|
||
The selection of the personnel is more important than the training.
|
||
The political awareness-building and the individual capabilities of
|
||
persuasion will be shown in the group discussions for motivation of the
|
||
guerrilla as a propagandist-combatant chosen as cadres to organize them in
|
||
teams, that is, those who have the greatest capacity for this work.
|
||
|
||
The training of guerrillas for Armed Propaganda Teams emphasizes the
|
||
method and not the content. A two-week training period is sufficient if the
|
||
recruitment is done in the form indicated. If a mistaken process of
|
||
recruitment has been followed, however good the training provided, the
|
||
individual chosen will not yield a very good result.
|
||
|
||
The training should be intensive for 14 days, through team
|
||
discussions, alternating the person who leads the discussion among the
|
||
members of the group.
|
||
|
||
The subjects to be dealt with will be the same, each day a different
|
||
theme being presented, for a varied practice.
|
||
|
||
The themes should refer to the conditions of the place and the meaning
|
||
that they have for the inhabitants of the locality, such as talking of
|
||
crops, fertilizers, seeds, irrigation of crops, etc. They can also include
|
||
the following topics:
|
||
|
||
þ Sawed wood, carpenters' tools for houses or other buildings.
|
||
|
||
þ Boats, roads, horses, oxen for transportation, fishing,
|
||
agriculture.
|
||
|
||
þ Problems that they may have in the place with residents, offices
|
||
of the regime, imposed visitors, etc.
|
||
|
||
þ Force labor, service in the militia.
|
||
|
||
þ Forced membership in Sandinista groups, such as women's clubs,
|
||
youth associations, workers' groups, etc.
|
||
|
||
þ Availability and prices of consumer articles and of basic needs
|
||
in the grocery stores and shops of the place.
|
||
|
||
þ Characteristics of education in the public schools.
|
||
|
||
þ Anxiety of the people over the presence of Cuban teachers in the
|
||
schools and the intrusion of politics, i.e. using them for
|
||
political ends and not educational ones as should be.
|
||
|
||
þ Indignation over the lack of freedom of worship, and persecution,
|
||
of which priests are victims; and over the participation of
|
||
priests such as Escoto and Cardenal in the Sandinista government,
|
||
against the explicit orders of his Holiness, the Pope.
|
||
|
||
NOTE: Members of the team can develop other themes.
|
||
|
||
The target groups for the Armed Propaganda Teams are not the persons
|
||
with sophisticated political knowledge, but rather those whose opinion are
|
||
formed from what they see and hear. The cadres should use persuasion to
|
||
carry out their mission. Some of the persuasive methods that they can use
|
||
are the following:
|
||
|
||
Interior Group/Exterior Group. It is a principle of psychology that we
|
||
humans have the tendency to form personal associations from "we" and "the
|
||
others," or "we" and "they", "friends" and "enemies," "fellow countrymen"
|
||
and "foreigners," "mestizos" and "gringos."
|
||
|
||
The Armed Propaganda Team can use this principle in its activities, so
|
||
that it is obvious that the "exterior" groups ("false" groups) are those of
|
||
the Sandinista regime, and that the "interior" groups ("true" groups) that
|
||
fight for the people are the Freedom Commandos.
|
||
|
||
We should inculcate this in the people in a subtle manner so that
|
||
these feelings seem to be born of themselves, spontaneously.
|
||
|
||
"Against" is much easier that "for." It is a principle of political
|
||
science that it is easier to persuade the people to vote against something
|
||
or someone than to persuade them to vote in favor of something or someone.
|
||
Although currently the regime has not given the Nicaraguan people the
|
||
opportunity to vote, it is known that the people will vote in opposition,
|
||
so that the Armed Propaganda Teams can use this principle in favor of our
|
||
insurrectional struggle. They should ensure that this campaign is directed
|
||
specifically against the government or its sympathizers, since the people
|
||
should have specific targets for their frustrations.
|
||
|
||
Primary Groups and Secondary Groups. Another principle of sociology is
|
||
that we humans forge or change our opinions from two sources: primarily,
|
||
through our association with our family, comrades, or intimate friends; and
|
||
secondarily, through distant associations such as acquaintances in
|
||
churches, clubs or committees, labor unions or governmental organizations.
|
||
The Armed Propaganda Team cadres should join the first groups in order to
|
||
persuade them to follow the policies of our movement, because it is from
|
||
this type of group that the opinions or changes of opinion come.
|
||
|
||
Techniques of Persuasion in Talks or Speeches:
|
||
|
||
Be Simple and Concise. You should avoid the use of difficult words or
|
||
expressions and prefer popular words and expressions, i.e. the language of
|
||
the people. In dealing with a person you should make use of concise
|
||
language, avoiding complicated words. It is important to remember that we
|
||
use oratory to make our people understand the reason for our struggle, and
|
||
not to show off our knowledge.
|
||
|
||
Use Lively and Realistic Examples. Avoid abstract concepts, such as
|
||
are used in universities in the advanced years, and in place of them, give
|
||
concrete examples such as children playing, horses galloping, birds in
|
||
flight, etc.
|
||
|
||
Use Gestures to Communicate. Communication, in addition to being
|
||
verbal, can be through gestures, such as using our hands expressively, back
|
||
movements, facial expressions, focusing of our look and other aspects of
|
||
"body language," projecting the individual personality in the message.
|
||
|
||
Use the Appropriate Tone of Voice. If, on addressing the people, you
|
||
talk about happiness, a happy tone should be used. If you talk of something
|
||
sad, the tone of the voice should be one of sadness; on talking of a heroic
|
||
or brave act, the voice should be animated, etc.
|
||
|
||
Above All, Be Natural, Imitation of others should be avoided, since
|
||
the people, especially simple people, easily distinguish a fake. The
|
||
individual personality should be projected when addressing the population.
|
||
|
||
3. "Eyes and Ears" Within the Population
|
||
|
||
The amount of information for intelligence that will be generated by
|
||
the deployment of the Armed Propaganda Teams will allow us to cover a large
|
||
area with out commandos, who will become the eyes and ears of our movement
|
||
within the population:
|
||
|
||
The combined reports of an Armed Propaganda Team will provide us with
|
||
exact details on the enemy activities.
|
||
|
||
The intelligence information obtained by the Armed Propaganda Teams
|
||
should be reported to the chiefs. However, it is necessary to emphasize
|
||
that the first mission of the Armed Propaganda Teams is to carry out
|
||
psychological operations, not to obtain data for intelligence.
|
||
|
||
Any intelligence report will be made through the outside contact of
|
||
the Armed Propaganda Team, in order not to compromise the population.
|
||
|
||
The Armed Propaganda cadres are able to do what others in a guerrilla
|
||
campaign cannot do: determine personally the development or deterioration
|
||
of the popular support and the sympathy or hostility that the people feel
|
||
toward our movement.
|
||
|
||
The Armed Propaganda Team program, in addition to being very effective
|
||
psychologically, increases the guerrilla capacity in obtaining and using
|
||
information.
|
||
|
||
In addition, the Armed Propaganda cadre will report to his superior
|
||
the reaction of the people to the radio broadcasts, the insurrectional
|
||
flyers, or any other means of propaganda of ours.
|
||
|
||
Expressions or gestures of the eyes, or face, the tone and strength of
|
||
the voice, and the use of the appropriate words greatly affect the face-to-
|
||
face persuasion of the people.
|
||
|
||
With the intelligence reports supplied by the Armed Propaganda Teams,
|
||
the comandantes will be able to have exact knowledge of the popular
|
||
support, which they will make use of in their operations.
|
||
|
||
4. Psychological Tactics, Maximum Flexibility
|
||
|
||
Psychological tactics will have the greatest flexibility within a
|
||
general plan, permitting a continuous and immediate adjustment of the
|
||
message, and ensuring that an impact is caused on the indicated target
|
||
group at the moment in which it is the most susceptible.
|
||
|
||
Tactically, an Armed Propaganda Equipment program should cover the
|
||
majority and if possible all of the operational area. The communities in
|
||
which this propaganda is carried out should not necessarily form political
|
||
units with an official nature. A complete understanding of their structure
|
||
or organization is not necessary because the cadres will work by applying
|
||
socio-political action and not academic theory.
|
||
|
||
The target populations of the Armed Propaganda Teams will be chosen
|
||
for being part of the operational area, and not for their size or amount of
|
||
land.
|
||
|
||
The objective should be the people and not the territorial area.
|
||
|
||
In this respect, each work team will be able to cover some six towns
|
||
approximately, in order to develop popular support for our movement.
|
||
|
||
The Team should always move in a covert manner within the towns of
|
||
their area.
|
||
|
||
They should vary their route radically, but not their itinerary,. This
|
||
is so that the inhabitants who are cooperating will be dependent on their
|
||
itinerary, i.e., the hour in which they can frequently contact them to give
|
||
them the information.
|
||
|
||
The danger of betrayal or an ambush can be neutralized by varying the
|
||
itinerary a little, using different routes, as well as arriving or leaving
|
||
without previous warning.
|
||
|
||
Whenever the surprise factor is used, vigilance should be kept in
|
||
order to detect the possible presence of hostile elements.
|
||
|
||
No more than three consecutive days should be spent in a town.
|
||
|
||
The limit of three days has obvious tactical advantages, but it also
|
||
has a psychological effect on the people, on seeing the team as a source of
|
||
current and up-to-date information. Also, it can overexpose the target
|
||
audience and cause a negative reaction.
|
||
|
||
Basic tactical precautions should be taken. This is necessary for
|
||
greater effectiveness, as was indicated in dealing with the subject of
|
||
"Armed Propaganda," and when it is carried out discreetly, it increases the
|
||
respect of the people for the team and increases their credibility.
|
||
|
||
The basic procedures are: covert elements that carry out vigilance
|
||
before and after the departure and in intervals. There should be two at
|
||
least, and they should meet at a predetermined point upon a signal, or in
|
||
view of any hostile action.
|
||
|
||
The team's goal is to motivate the entire population of a place, but
|
||
to constantly remain aware that defined target groups exist within this
|
||
general configuration of the public.
|
||
|
||
Although meetings may be held in the population, the cadres should
|
||
recognize and keep in contact with the target groups, mixing with them
|
||
before, during and after the meeting. The method for holding this type of
|
||
meeting was included in the topic "Armed Propaganda," and will be covered
|
||
in greater detail under the title "Control of Mass Meetings and
|
||
Demonstrations."
|
||
|
||
The basic focus of the Armed Propaganda cadres should be on the
|
||
residents of the town,where their knowledge as formers of opinion can be
|
||
applied.
|
||
|
||
In the first visits of identification with the inhabitants, the
|
||
guerrilla cadres will be courteous and humble. They can work in the fields
|
||
or in any other form in which their abilities can contribute to the
|
||
improvement of the living style of the inhabitants of the place, winning
|
||
their trust and talking with them; helping to repair the fences of their
|
||
cattle; the cleaning of the same, collaborating in the vaccination of their
|
||
animals; teaching them to read, i.e., closely together in all the tasks of
|
||
the peasant or the community.
|
||
|
||
In his free time, our guerrilla should mix in with the community
|
||
groups and participate with them in pastoral activities, parties,
|
||
birthdays, and even in wakes or burials of the members of said community;
|
||
he will try to converse with both adults and adolescents. |He will try to
|
||
penetrate to the heart of the family, in order to win the acceptance and
|
||
trust of all of the residents of that sector.
|
||
|
||
The Armed Propaganda Team cadres will give ideological training,
|
||
mixing these instructions with folkloric songs, and at the same time he
|
||
will tell stories that have some attraction, making an effort to make them
|
||
refer to heroic acts of our ancestors. He will also try to tell stories of
|
||
heroism of our combatants in the present struggle so that listeners try to
|
||
imitate them. It is important to let them know that there are other
|
||
countries in the world where freedom and democracy cause those governing to
|
||
be concerned over the well-being of their people, so that the children have
|
||
medical care and free education; where also they are concerned that
|
||
everyone have work and food, and all freedoms such as those of religion,
|
||
association and expression; where the greatest objective of the government
|
||
is to keep its people happy.
|
||
|
||
The cadres should not make mention of their political ideology during
|
||
the first phase of identification with the people, and they should orient
|
||
their talks to things that are pleasing to the peasants or the listeners,
|
||
trying to be as simple as possible in order to be understood.
|
||
|
||
The tactical objectives for identification with the people are the
|
||
following:
|
||
|
||
To establish tight relations through identification with the people,
|
||
through their very customs.
|
||
|
||
To determine the basic needs and desires of the different target
|
||
groups.
|
||
|
||
To discover the weaknesses of the governmental control.
|
||
|
||
Little by little, to sow the seed of democratic revolution, in order
|
||
to change the vices of the regime towards a new order of justice and
|
||
collective well-being.
|
||
|
||
In the motivation of the target groups, by the Armed Propaganda Teams,
|
||
the cadre should apply themes of "true~ groups and themes of "false"
|
||
groups. The true group will correspond to the target group and the false
|
||
one to the Sandinista regime.
|
||
|
||
For the economic interest groups, such as small businessmen and
|
||
farmers, it should be emphasized that their potential progress is "limited"
|
||
by the Sandinista government, that resources are scarcer and scarcer, the
|
||
earnings/profits minimal, taxes high, etc. This can be applied to
|
||
entrepreneurs of transportation and others.
|
||
|
||
For the elements ambitious for power and social positions, it will be
|
||
emphasized that they will never be able to belong to the governmental
|
||
social class, since they are hermetic in their circle of command. Example,
|
||
the nine Sandinista leaders do not allow other persons to participate in
|
||
the government, and they hinder the development of the economic and social
|
||
potential of those like him, who have desires of overcoming this, which is
|
||
unjust and arbitrary.
|
||
|
||
Social and intellectual criticisms. They should be directed at the
|
||
professionals, professors, teachers, priests, missionaries, students and
|
||
others. Make them see that their writings, commentaries or conversations
|
||
are censored, which does not make it possible to correct these problems.
|
||
|
||
Once the needs and frustrations of the target groups have been
|
||
determined, the hostility of the people to the "false" groups will become
|
||
more direct, against the current regime and its system of repression. The
|
||
people will be made to see that once this system or structure has been
|
||
eliminated, the cause of their frustration s would be eliminated and they
|
||
would be able to fulfill their desires. It should be shown to the
|
||
population that supporting the insurrection is really supporting their own
|
||
desires, since the democratic movement is aimed at the elimination of these
|
||
specific problems.
|
||
|
||
As a general rule, the Armed Propaganda teams should avoid
|
||
participating in combat. However, if this is not possible, they should
|
||
react as a guerrilla unit with tactics of "hit and run," causing the enemy
|
||
the greatest amount of casualties with aggressive assault fire, recovering
|
||
enemy weapons and withdrawing rapidly.
|
||
|
||
One exception to the rule to avoid combat will be when in the town
|
||
they are challenged by hostile actions, whether by an individual or whether
|
||
by a number of men of an enemy team.
|
||
|
||
The hostility of one or two men can be overcome by eliminating the
|
||
enemy in a rapid and effective manner. This is the most common danger.
|
||
|
||
When the enemy is equal in the number of its forces, there should be
|
||
an immediate retreat, and then the enemy should be ambushed or eliminated
|
||
by means of sharp-shooters.
|
||
|
||
In any of the cases, the Armed Propaganda Team cadres should not turn
|
||
the town into a battleground. Generally, our guerrilla will be better
|
||
armed, so that they will obtain greater respect from the population if they
|
||
carry out appropriate maneuvers instead of endangering their lives, or even
|
||
destroying their houses in an encounter with the enemy within the town.
|
||
|
||
5. A Comprehensive Team Program - Mobile Infrastructure
|
||
|
||
The psychological operations through the Armed Propaganda Teams
|
||
include the infiltration of key guerrilla communicators (i.e., Armed
|
||
Propaganda Team cadres) into the population of the country, instead of
|
||
sending messages to them through outside sources, thus creating our "mobile
|
||
infrastructure."
|
||
|
||
A "mobile infrastructure" is a cadre of our Armed Propaganda Team
|
||
moving about, i.e., keeping in touch with six or more populations, from
|
||
which his source of information will come; and at the same time it will
|
||
serve so that at the appropriate time they will become integrated in the
|
||
complete guerrilla movement.
|
||
|
||
In this way, an Armed Propaganda Team program in the operational area
|
||
builds for our comandantes in the countryside constant source of data
|
||
gathering (infrastructure) in all the area. It is also a means for
|
||
developing or increasing popular support, for recruiting new members and
|
||
for obtaining provisions.
|
||
|
||
In addition, an Armed Propaganda Team program allows the expansion of
|
||
the guerrilla movement, since they can penetrate areas that are not under
|
||
the control of the combat units. In this way, through an exact evaluation
|
||
of the combat units they will be able to plan their operations more
|
||
precisely, since they will have certain knowledge of the existing
|
||
conditions.
|
||
|
||
The comandantes will remember that this type of operation is similar
|
||
to the Fifth Column, which was used in the first part of the Second World
|
||
War, and which through infiltration and subversion tactics allowed the
|
||
Germans to penetrate the target countries before the invasions. They
|
||
managed to enter Poland, Belgium, Holland and France in a month, and Norway
|
||
in a week. The effectiveness of this tactic has been clearly demonstrated
|
||
in several wars and can be used effectively by the Freedom Commandos.
|
||
|
||
The activities of the Armed Propaganda Teams run some risks, but no
|
||
more than any other guerrilla activity. However, the Armed Propaganda Teams
|
||
are essential for the success of the struggle.
|
||
|
||
6. Conclusions
|
||
|
||
In the same way that the explorers are the "eyes and "ears" of a
|
||
patrol, or of a column on the march, the Armed Propaganda Teams are also
|
||
the source of information, the "antennas" of our movement, because they
|
||
find and exploit the sociopolitical weaknesses in the target society,
|
||
making possible a successful operation.
|
||
|
||
DEVELOPMENT AND CONTROL OF FRONT ORGANIZATIONS
|
||
|
||
1. Generalities
|
||
|
||
The development and control of front organizations (or "facade"
|
||
organizations) is an essential process in the guerrilla effort to carry out
|
||
the insurrection. That is, in truth, an aspect of urban guerrilla warfare,
|
||
but it should advance parallel to the campaign in the rural area. This
|
||
section has as its objective to give the guerrilla student an understanding
|
||
of the development and control of front organizations in guerrilla warfare.
|
||
|
||
2. Initial Recruitment
|
||
|
||
The initial recruitment to the movement, if it is involuntary, will be
|
||
carried out through several "private" consultations with a cadre (without
|
||
his knowing that he is talking to a member of ours). Then, the recruit will
|
||
be informed that he or she is already inside the movement, and he will be
|
||
exposed to the police of the regime if he or she does not cooperate.
|
||
|
||
When the guerrillas carry out missions of armed propaganda and a
|
||
program of regular visits to the towns by the Armed Propaganda Teams, these
|
||
contacts will provide the commandos with the names and places of persons
|
||
who can be recruited. The recruitment, which will be voluntary, is done
|
||
through visits by guerrilla leaders or political cadres.
|
||
|
||
After a chain of voluntary recruitments has been developed, and the
|
||
trustworthiness of the recruits has been established by their carrying out
|
||
small missions, they will be instructed about increasing/widening the chain
|
||
by recruiting in specific target groups, in accordance with the following
|
||
procedure:
|
||
|
||
From among their acquaintances or through observation of the target
|
||
groups - political parties, workers' unions, youth groups, agrarian
|
||
associations, etc. - finding out the personal habits, preferences and
|
||
biases, as well as the weaknesses of the "recruitable" individuals.
|
||
|
||
Make an approach through an acquaintance, and if possible, develop a
|
||
friendship, attracting him through his preferences or weaknesses: it might
|
||
be inviting him for lunch in the restaurant of his choice or having a drink
|
||
in his favorite cantina or an invitation to dinner in the place he prefers.
|
||
|
||
Recruitment should follow one of the following guidelines:
|
||
|
||
þ If in an informal conversation the target seems susceptible to
|
||
voluntary recruitment based on his beliefs and personal values, etc.,
|
||
the political cadre assigned to carry out the recruitments will be
|
||
notified of this. The original contact will indicate to the cadre
|
||
assigned, in detail, all he knows of the prospective recruit, and the
|
||
style of persuasion to be used, introducing the two.
|
||
|
||
þ If the target does not seem to be susceptible to voluntary
|
||
recruitment, meetings can be arranged which seem casual with the
|
||
guerrilla leaders or with the political cadres (unknown by the target
|
||
until that moment). The meetings will be held so that "other persons"
|
||
know that the target is attending them, whether they see him arrive at
|
||
a particular house, seated at the table in a particular bar or even
|
||
seated on a park bench. The target, then, is faced with the fact of
|
||
his participation in the insurrectional struggle and it will be
|
||
indicated to him also that if he fails to cooperate or to carry out
|
||
future orders, he will be subjected to reprisals by the police or
|
||
soldiers of the regime.
|
||
|
||
þ The notification of the police, denouncing a target who does not
|
||
want to join the guerrillas, can be carried out easily, when it
|
||
becomes necessary, through a letter with false statements of citizens
|
||
who are not implicated in the movement. Care should be taken that the
|
||
person who recruited him covertly is not discovered.
|
||
|
||
þ With the carrying out of clandestine missions for the movement, the
|
||
involvement and handing over of every recruit is done gradually on a
|
||
wider and wider scale, and confidence increases. This should be a
|
||
gradual process, in order to prevent confessions from fearful
|
||
individuals who have been assigned very difficult or dangerous
|
||
missions too early.
|
||
|
||
Using this recruitment technique, our guerrillas will be able to
|
||
successfully infiltrate any key target group in the regime, in order to
|
||
improve the internal control of the enemy structure.
|
||
|
||
3. Established Citizens, Subjective Internal Control
|
||
|
||
Established citizens, such as doctors, lawyers, businessmen,
|
||
landholders, minor state officials, etc., will be recruited to the movement
|
||
and used for subjective internal control of groups and associations to
|
||
which they belong or may belong.
|
||
|
||
Once the recruitment/involvement has been brought about, and has
|
||
progressed to the point that allows that specific instructions be given to
|
||
internal cadres to begin to influence their groups, instructions will be
|
||
given to them to carry out the following:
|
||
|
||
þ The process is simple and only requires a basic knowledge of the
|
||
Socrates dialectic: that is the knowledge that is inherent to another
|
||
person or the established position of a group, some theme, some word
|
||
or some thought related to the objective of persuasion of the person
|
||
in charge of our recruitment.
|
||
|
||
þ The cadre then must emphasize this theme, word or thought in the
|
||
discussions or meetings of the target group, through a casual
|
||
commentary, which improves the focus of other members of the group in
|
||
relation to this. Specific examples are:
|
||
|
||
Economic interest groups are motivated by profit and generally feel
|
||
that the system hinders the use of their capability in this effort in some
|
||
way, taxes, import-export tariffs, transportation costs, etc. The cadre in
|
||
charge will increase this feeling of frustration in later conversations.
|
||
|
||
Political aspirants, particularly if the are not successful, feel that
|
||
the system discriminates against them unfairly, limiting their
|
||
capabilities, because the Sandinista regime does not allow elections. The
|
||
cadres should focus political discussions towards this frustration.
|
||
|
||
Intellectual social critics (such as professors, teachers, priests,
|
||
missionaries, etc.), generally feel that the government ignores their valid
|
||
criticism or censors their comments unjustly, especially in a situation of
|
||
revolution. This can easily be shown by the guerrilla cadre at meetings and
|
||
discussions, to be an injustice of the system.
|
||
|
||
For all the target groups, after they have established frustrations,
|
||
the hostility towards the obstacles to their aspirations will gradually
|
||
become transferred to the current regime and its system of repression.
|
||
|
||
The guerrilla cadre moving among the target groups should always
|
||
maintain a low profile, so that the development of hostile feelings towards
|
||
the false Sandinista regime seems to come spontaneously from the members of
|
||
the group and not from suggestions of the cadres. This is internal
|
||
subjective control.
|
||
|
||
Antigovernmental hostility should be generalized, and not necessarily
|
||
in our favor. If a group develops a feeling in our favor, it can be
|
||
utilized. But the main objective is to precondition the target groups for
|
||
the fusion in mass organizations later in the operation, when other
|
||
activities have been successfully undertaken.
|
||
|
||
4. Organizations of Cells for Security
|
||
|
||
Internal cadres of our movement should organize into cells of three
|
||
persons, only one of them maintaining outside contact.
|
||
|
||
The cell of three persons is the basic element of the movement, with
|
||
frequent meetings to receive orders and pass information to the cell
|
||
leader. These meetings are also very important for mutually reinforcing the
|
||
members of the cell, as well as their morale. They should exercise
|
||
criticism of themselves on the realization or failures in carrying out
|
||
individual subjective control missions.
|
||
|
||
The coordination of the three-member cell provides a security net for
|
||
reciprocal communication, each member having contact with only an
|
||
operational cell. The members will not reveal at the cell coordination
|
||
meetings the identity of their contact in an operational cell; they will
|
||
reveal only the nature of the activity in which the cell is involved, e.g.,
|
||
political party work, medical association work, etc.
|
||
|
||
There is no hierarchy in cells outside of an element of coordination,
|
||
who is the leader, who will have direct but covert contact with our
|
||
guerrilla comandante in the zone or operational area. The previous diagram
|
||
does not indicate which new operational cell is the limit, but it indicates
|
||
that for every three operational cells, we need a coordination cell.
|
||
|
||
5. Fusion in a "Cover" Organization
|
||
|
||
The fusion of organizations recognized by the Sandinista government,
|
||
such as associations and other groups, through internal subjective control,
|
||
occurs in the final stages of the operation, in a tight connection with
|
||
mass meetings.
|
||
|
||
When the guerrilla armed action has expanded sufficiently, armed
|
||
propaganda missions will be carried out on a large scale: propaganda teams
|
||
will have clearly developed open support of the institutions; the enemy
|
||
system of target groups will be well infiltrated and preconditioned. At the
|
||
point at which mass meetings are held, the internal cadres should begin
|
||
discussions for the "fusion" of forces into an organization - this
|
||
organization will be a "cover" source of our movement.
|
||
|
||
Any other target group will be aware that other groups are developing
|
||
greater hostility to the government., the police and the traditional legal
|
||
bases of authority. The guerrilla cadres tn that group - for example,
|
||
teachers - will cultivate this awareness-building, making comments such as
|
||
"So-and-so, who is a farmer, said that the members of his cooperative
|
||
believe that the new economic policy is absurd, poorly planned and unfair
|
||
to the farmers."
|
||
|
||
When the awareness-building is increased, in the sense that other
|
||
groups feel hostility towards the regime, the group discussions are held
|
||
openly and our movement will be able to receive reports that the majority
|
||
of their operatives are united in common, greater hostility against the
|
||
regime. This will be developed and the order to fuse/join will come about.
|
||
The fusion into a "cover" front is carried out thusly:
|
||
|
||
þ Internal cadres of our movement will meet with people such as
|
||
presidents, leaders, and others, at organized meetings chaired by the
|
||
group chief of our movement. Two or three escorts can assist the
|
||
guerrilla cadre if it becomes necessary.
|
||
|
||
þ Publish a joint communique on this meeting, announcing the creation
|
||
of the "cover" front, including names and signatures of the
|
||
participants, and names of the organizations that they represent.
|
||
|
||
After releasing this communique, mass meetings should be initiated,
|
||
which should have as a goal the destruction of the Sandinista control.
|
||
|
||
6. Conclusions
|
||
|
||
The development and control of the "cover" organizations in a
|
||
guerrilla war will give our movement the ability to create the "whiplash"
|
||
effect within the population, when the order for fusion is gives. When the
|
||
infiltration and internal subjective control have been developed parallel
|
||
with other guerrilla activities, a democratic guerrilla commander will
|
||
literally be able to shake up the Sandinista structure and replace it.
|
||
|
||
CONTROL OF MASS CONCENTRATIONS AND MEETINGS
|
||
|
||
1. Generalities
|
||
|
||
In the last stages of a guerrilla war, mass concentrations and
|
||
meetings are a powerful psychological tool for carrying out the mission.
|
||
This section has as its objective giving the guerrilla student training on
|
||
techniques for controlling mass concentrations and meetings in guerrilla
|
||
warfare.
|
||
|
||
2. Infiltration of Guerrilla Cadres
|
||
|
||
Infiltration of guerrilla cadres (whether a member of our movement or
|
||
outside element) in workers' unions, student groups, peasant organizations,
|
||
etc., preconditioning these groups for behavior within the masses, where
|
||
they will have to carry proselytism for the instructional struggle in a
|
||
clandestine manner.
|
||
|
||
þ Our psychological war team should prepare in advance a hostile
|
||
mental attitude among the target groups so that at the decisive moment
|
||
they can turn their furor into violence, demanding their rights that
|
||
have been trampled upon by the regime.
|
||
|
||
þ These preconditioning campaigns must be aimed at the political
|
||
parties, professional organizations, students, laborers, the masses of
|
||
the unemployed, the ethnic minorities and any other sector of society
|
||
that is vulnerable or recruitable; this also includes the popular
|
||
masses and sympathizers of our movement.
|
||
|
||
þ The basic objective of a preconditioning campaign is to create a
|
||
negative "image" of the common enemy, e.g.:
|
||
|
||
Describe the managers of collective government entities as trying
|
||
to treat the staff the way "slave foremen" do.
|
||
|
||
The police mistreat the people like the Communist "Gestapo" does.
|
||
|
||
The government officials of National Reconstruction are puppets
|
||
of Russian-Cuban imperialism.
|
||
|
||
Our psychological war cadres will create compulsive obsessions of
|
||
a temporary nature in places of public concentrations, constantly
|
||
hammering away at the themes pointed out or desired, the same as
|
||
in group gatherings; in informal conversations expressing
|
||
discontent; in addition passing out brochures and flyers, and
|
||
writing editorial articles both on the radio and in newspapers,
|
||
focused on the intention of preparing the mind of the people of
|
||
the decisive moment, which will erupt in general violence.
|
||
|
||
In order to facilitate the preconditioning of the masses, we
|
||
should often use phrases to make the people see, such as:
|
||
|
||
The taxes that they pay the government do not benefit the people
|
||
at all, but rather are uses as a form of exploitation in order to
|
||
enrich those governing.
|
||
|
||
Make it plain to the people that they have become slaves, that
|
||
they are being exploited by privileged military and political
|
||
groups.
|
||
|
||
þ The foreign advisers and their counseling programs are in reality
|
||
"interveners" in our homeland, who direct the exploitation of the
|
||
nation in accordance with the objectives of the Russian and Cuban
|
||
imperialists, in order to turn our people into slaves of the hammer
|
||
and sickle.
|
||
|
||
3. Selection of Appropriate Slogans
|
||
|
||
The leaders of the guerrilla warfare classify their slogans in
|
||
accordance with the circumstances with the aim of mobilizing the masses in
|
||
a wide scale of activities and at the highest emotional level.
|
||
|
||
When the mass uprising is being developed, our covert cadres should
|
||
make partial demands, initially demanding, e.g. "We want food," "We want
|
||
freedom of worship," "We want union freedom" - steps that will lead us
|
||
toward the realization of the goals of our movement, which are: GOD,
|
||
HOMELAND and DEMOCRACY.
|
||
|
||
If a lack of organization and command is noted in the enemy authority,
|
||
and the people find themselves in a state of exaltation, advantage can be
|
||
taken of this circumstance so that our agitators will raise the tone of the
|
||
rallying slogans, taking them to the most strident point.
|
||
|
||
If the masses are not emotionally exalted, our agitators will continue
|
||
with the "partial" slogans, and the demands will be based on daily needs,
|
||
chaining them to the goals of our movement.
|
||
|
||
An example of the need to give simple slogans is that few people think
|
||
in terms of millions of cordobas, but any citizen, however humble he may
|
||
be, understands that a pair of shoes is necessary. The goals of the
|
||
movement are of an ideological nature, but our agitators must realize that
|
||
food - "bread and butter," "the tortilla and red beans" - pull along the
|
||
people, and it should be understood that this is their main mission.
|
||
|
||
4. Creation of Nuclei
|
||
|
||
This involves the mobilization of a specific number of agitators of
|
||
the guerrilla organization of the place. This group will inevitably attract
|
||
an equal number of curious persons who seek adventures and emotions, as
|
||
well as those unhappy with the system of government. The guerrillas will
|
||
attract sympathizers, discontented citizens as a consequence of the
|
||
repression of the system. Each guerrilla subunit will be assigned specific
|
||
tasks and missions that they should carry out.
|
||
|
||
Our cadres will be mobilized in the largest number possible, together
|
||
with persons who have been affected by the Communist dictatorship, whether
|
||
their possessions have been stolen from them, they have been incarcerated,
|
||
or tortured, or suffered from any other type of aggression against them.
|
||
They will be mobilized toward the areas where the hostile and criminal
|
||
elements of the FSLN, CDS and others live, with an effort for them to be
|
||
armed with clubs, iron rods, placards and if possible, small firearms,
|
||
which they will carry hidden.
|
||
|
||
If possible, professional criminals will be hired to carry out
|
||
specific selected "jobs."
|
||
|
||
Our agitators will visit the places where the unemployed meet, as well
|
||
as the unemployment offices, in order to hire them for unspecified "jobs."
|
||
The recruitment of these wage earners is necessary because a nucleus is
|
||
created under absolute orders.
|
||
|
||
The designated cadres will arrange ahead of time the transportation of
|
||
the participants, in order to take them to meeting places in private or
|
||
public vehicles, boats or any other type of transportation.
|
||
|
||
Other cadres will be designated to design placards, flags and banners
|
||
with different slogans or key words, whether they be partial, temporary or
|
||
of the most radical type.
|
||
|
||
Other cadres will be designated to prepare flyers, posters, signs and
|
||
pamphlets to make the concentration more noticeable. This material will
|
||
contain instructions for the participants and will also serve against the
|
||
regime.
|
||
|
||
Specific tasks will be assigned to others, in order to create a
|
||
"martyr" for the cause, taking the demonstrators to a confrontation with
|
||
the authorities, in order to bring about uprisings or shootings, which will
|
||
cause the death of one or more persons, who would become the martyrs, a
|
||
situation that should be made use of immediately against the regime, in
|
||
order to create greater conflicts.
|
||
|
||
5. Ways to Lead an Uprising at Mass Meetings
|
||
|
||
It can be carried out by means of a small group of guerrillas
|
||
infiltrated within the masses, who will have the mission of agitating,
|
||
giving the impression that there are many of them and that they have
|
||
popular backing. Using the tactics of a force of 200-300 agitators, a
|
||
demonstration can be created in which 10,00-20,00 persons take part.
|
||
|
||
The agitation of the masses in a demonstration is carried out by means
|
||
of sociopolitical objectives. In this action one or several people of our
|
||
convert movement should take part, highly trained as mass agitators,
|
||
involving innocent persons, in order to bring about an apparent spontaneous
|
||
protest demonstration. They will lead all of the concentration to the end
|
||
of it.
|
||
|
||
Outside Commando. This element stays out of all activity, located so
|
||
that they can observe from where they are the development of the planned
|
||
events. As a point of observation, they should look for the tower of a
|
||
church, a high building, a high tree, the highest level of the stadium or
|
||
an auditorium, or any other high place.
|
||
|
||
Inside Commando. This element will remain within the multitude. Great
|
||
importance should be given to the protection of the leaders of these
|
||
elements. Some placards or large allusive signs should be used to designate
|
||
the Commando Posts and to provide signals to the subunits. This element
|
||
will avoid placing itself in places where fights or incidents come about
|
||
after the beginning of the demonstration.
|
||
|
||
These key agitators of ours will remain within the multitude. The one
|
||
responsible for this mission will assign ahead of time the agitators to
|
||
remain near the placard that he will indicate to them, in order to give
|
||
protection to the placard from any contrary element. In that way the
|
||
commander will know where our agitators are, and will be able to send
|
||
orders to change passwords or slogans, or any other unforeseen thing, and
|
||
even eventually to incite violence if he desires it.
|
||
|
||
At this stage, once the key cadres have been dispersed, they should
|
||
place themselves in visible places such as by signs, lampposts, and other
|
||
places which stand out.
|
||
|
||
Our key agitators should avoid places of disturbances, once they have
|
||
taken care of the beginning of the same.
|
||
|
||
Defense Posts. These elements will act as bodyguards in movement,
|
||
forming a ring of protection for the chief, protecting him from the police
|
||
and the army, or helping him to escape if it should be necessary. They
|
||
should be highly disciplined and will react only upon a verbal order from
|
||
the chief.
|
||
|
||
In case the chief participates in a religious concentration, a funeral
|
||
or any other type of activity in which they have to behave in an organized
|
||
fashion, the bodyguards will remain in the ranks very close to the chief or
|
||
to the placard or banner carriers in order to give them full protection.
|
||
|
||
The participants in this mission should be guerrilla combatants in
|
||
civilian clothes, or hired recruits who are sympathizers in our struggle
|
||
and who are against the oppressive regime.
|
||
|
||
These members must have a high discipline and will use violence only
|
||
on the verbal orders of the one in charge of them.
|
||
|
||
Messengers. They should remain near the leaders, transmitting orders
|
||
between the inside and outside commandos. They will use communication
|
||
radios, telephones, bicycles, motorcycles, cars, or move on foot or
|
||
horseback, taking paths or trails to shorten distances. Adolescents (male
|
||
and female) are ideal for this mission.
|
||
|
||
Shock Troops. These men should be equipped with weapons (Knives,
|
||
razors, chains, clubs, bludgeons) and should march slightly behind the
|
||
innocent and gullible participants. They should carry their weapons hidden.
|
||
They will enter into action only as "reinforcements" if the guerrilla
|
||
agitators are attacked by the police. They will enter the scene quickly,
|
||
violently and by surprise, in order to distract the authorities, in this
|
||
way making possible the withdrawal or rapid escape of the inside commando.
|
||
|
||
Carriers of Banners and Placards. The banners and placards used in
|
||
demonstrations or concentrations will express the protests of the
|
||
population, but when the concentration reaches its highest level of
|
||
euphoria or popular discontent, our infiltrated persons will make use of
|
||
the placards against the regime, which we manage to infiltrate in a hidden
|
||
fashion, an don them slogans or key words will be expressed to the benefit
|
||
of our cause. The one responsible for this mission will assign the
|
||
agitators ahead of time to keep near the placard of any contrary element.
|
||
In that way, the comandante will know where the agitators are, and will be
|
||
able to send orders to change slogans and eventually to incite violence if
|
||
he wishes.
|
||
|
||
Agitators of Rallying Cries and Applause. They will be trained with
|
||
specific instructions to use tried rallying cries. They will be able to use
|
||
phrase such as "WE ARE HUNGRY, WE WAND BREAD," and "WE DON'T WANT
|
||
COMMUNISM." There work and their technique for agitating the masses is
|
||
quite similar to those of the leaders of applause and slogans at the high
|
||
school football or baseball games. The objective is to become more adept
|
||
and not just to shout rallying cries.
|
||
|
||
6. Conclusions
|
||
|
||
In a revolutionary movement of guerrilla warfare, the mass
|
||
concentrations and protest demonstrations are the principle essential for
|
||
the destruction of the enemy structures.
|
||
|
||
MASSIVE IN-DEPTH SUPPORT THROUGH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
|
||
|
||
1. Generalities
|
||
|
||
The separate coverage in these sections could leave the student with
|
||
some doubts. Therefore, all sections are summarized here, in order to give
|
||
a clearer picture of this book.
|
||
|
||
2. Motivation as Combatant-Propagandist
|
||
|
||
Every member of the struggle should know that his political mission is
|
||
as important as, if not more important than, his tactical mission.
|
||
|
||
3. Armed Propaganda
|
||
|
||
Armed propaganda in small towns, rural villages, and city residential
|
||
districts should give the impression that our weapons are not for
|
||
exercising power over the people, but rather that the weapons are for
|
||
protecting the people; that they are the power of the people against the
|
||
FSLN government of oppression.
|
||
|
||
4. Armed Propaganda Teams
|
||
|
||
Armed Propaganda Teams will combine political awareness building and
|
||
the ability to conduct propaganda for ends of personal persuasion, which
|
||
will be carried out within the population.
|
||
|
||
5. Cover ("Facade") Organizations
|
||
|
||
The fusion of several organizations and associations recognized by the
|
||
government, through internal subjective control, occurs in the final stages
|
||
of the operation, in close cooperation with mass meetings.
|
||
|
||
6. Control of Mass Demonstrations
|
||
|
||
The mixture of elements of the struggle with participants in the
|
||
demonstration will give the appearance of a spontaneous demonstration,
|
||
lacking direction,which will be used by the agitators of the struggle to
|
||
control the behavior of the masses.
|
||
|
||
7. Conclusion
|
||
|
||
Too often we see guerrilla warfare only from the point of view of
|
||
combat actions. This view is erroneous and extremely dangerous. Combat
|
||
actions are not the key to victory in guerrilla warfare but rather form
|
||
part of one of the six basic efforts. There is no priority in any of the
|
||
efforts, but rather they should progress in a parallel manner. The emphasis
|
||
or exclusion of any of these efforts could bring about serious
|
||
difficulties, and in the worst of cases, even failure. The history of
|
||
revolutionary wars has shown this reality.
|
||
|
||
APPENDIX
|
||
|
||
The purpose of this appendix is to complement the guidelines and
|
||
recommendations to the propagandist-guerrillas expressed under the topic of
|
||
"Techniques of Persuasion in Talks and Speeches," to improve the ability to
|
||
organize and express thoughts for those who wish to perfect their
|
||
oratorical abilities. After all, oratory is one of the most valuable
|
||
resources for exercising leadership. Oratory can be used, then, as an
|
||
extraordinary political tool.
|
||
|
||
2. The Audience
|
||
|
||
Oratory is simultaneous communication par excellence, i.e., the orator
|
||
and his audience share the same time and space. Therefore, every speech
|
||
should be a different experience at "that" moment or particular situation
|
||
which the audience is experiencing and which influences them. So the
|
||
audience must be considered as "a state of mind." Happiness, sadness,
|
||
anger, fear, etc., are states of mind that we must consider to exist in our
|
||
audience, and it is the atmosphere that affects the target public.
|
||
|
||
The human being is made up of a mind and soul; he acts in accordance
|
||
with his thoughts and sentiments and responds to stimuli of ideas and
|
||
emotions. In that way there exist only two possible focuses in any plan,
|
||
including speeches: the concrete, based on rational appeals, i.e., to
|
||
thinking; and the idealized, with emotional appeals, i.e., to sentiment.
|
||
|
||
For his part the orator, although he must be sensitive to the existing
|
||
mass sentiment, he must at the same time keep his cold judgment to be able
|
||
to lead and control effectively the feelings of an audience. When in the
|
||
oratorical momentum the antithesis between heart and brain comes about,
|
||
judgment should always prevail, characteristic of a leader.
|
||
|
||
3. Political Oratory
|
||
|
||
Political oratory is one of the various forms of oratory, and it
|
||
usually fulfills one of three objectives: to instruct, persuade, or move;
|
||
and its method is reduced to urging (asking), ordering, questioning and
|
||
responding.
|
||
|
||
Oratory is a quality so tied to political leadership that it can be
|
||
said that the history of political orators is the political history of
|
||
humanity, an affirmation upheld by names such as Cicero, Demosthenes,
|
||
Danton, Mirabeau, Robespierre, Clemenceau, Lenin, Trotsky, Mussolini,
|
||
Hitler, Roosevelt, etc.
|
||
|
||
4. Qualities in a Speech
|
||
|
||
In general terms, the most appreciated qualities of a speech, and
|
||
specifically a political speech in the context of the psychological action
|
||
of the armed struggle, are the following:
|
||
|
||
þ Be brief and concise
|
||
A length of five minutes [line missing in Spanish text]...that of
|
||
the orator who said: "If you want a two-hour speech, I'll start
|
||
right now; if you want a two-minute one, let me think awhile."
|
||
|
||
þ Centered on the theme
|
||
The speech should be structured by a set of organized ideas that
|
||
converge on the theme. A good speech is expressed by concepts and
|
||
not only with words.
|
||
|
||
þ Logic
|
||
The ideas presented should be logical and easily acceptable.
|
||
never challenge logic in the mind of the audience, since
|
||
immediately the main thing is lost - credibility. As far as
|
||
possible, it is recommended that all speeches be based on a
|
||
syllogism, which the orator should adjust in his exposition. For
|
||
example: "Those governing get rich and are thieves; the
|
||
Sandinistas have enriched themselves governing; then, the
|
||
Sandinistats are thieves." This could be the point of a speech on
|
||
the administrative corruption of the regime. When an idea or a
|
||
set of guiding ideas do not exist in a speech, confusion and
|
||
dispersion easily arise.
|
||
|
||
5. Structure of a Speech
|
||
|
||
Absolute improvisation does not exist in oratory. All orators have a
|
||
"mental plan" that allows them to organize their ideas and concepts
|
||
rapidly; with practice it is possible to come to do this in a few seconds,
|
||
almost simultaneously with the expression of the word.
|
||
|
||
The elements that make up a speech are given below, in a structure
|
||
that we recommend always putting into practice, to those who wish to more
|
||
and more improve their oratorical abilities:
|
||
|
||
þ Introduction or Preamble
|
||
One enters into contact with the public, a personal introduction
|
||
can be made or one of the movement to which we belong, the reason
|
||
for our presence, etc. In these first seconds it is important to
|
||
make an impact, attracting attention and provoking interest among
|
||
the audience. For that purpose, there are resources such as
|
||
beginning with a famous phrase or a previously prepared slogan,
|
||
telling a dramatic or humorous story, etc.
|
||
|
||
þ Purpose or Enunciation
|
||
The subject to be dealt with is defined, explained as a whole or
|
||
by parts.
|
||
|
||
þ Appraisal or Argumentation
|
||
Arguments are presented, EXACTLY IN THIS ORDER: First, the
|
||
negative arguments, or against the thesis that is going to be
|
||
upheld, and then the positive arguments, or favorable ones to our
|
||
thesis, immediately adding proof or facts that sustain such
|
||
arguments.
|
||
|
||
þ Recapitulation or Conclusion
|
||
A short summary is made and the conclusions of the speech are
|
||
spelled out.
|
||
|
||
þ Exhortation
|
||
Action by the public is called for, i.e., they are asked in and
|
||
almost energetic manner to do or not to do something.
|
||
|
||
6. Some Literary Resources
|
||
|
||
Although there exist typically oratorical devices of diction, in
|
||
truth, oratory has taken from other literary genres a large number of
|
||
devices, several of which often, in an unconscious manner, we use in our
|
||
daily expressions and even in our speeches.
|
||
|
||
Below we enunciate many of their literary devices in frequent use in
|
||
oratory, recommending to those interested moderate use of them, since an
|
||
orator who over-uses the literary device loses authenticity and sounds
|
||
untrue.
|
||
|
||
The devices that are used the most in oratory are those obtained
|
||
through the repetition of words in particular periods of the speech, such
|
||
as:
|
||
|
||
Anaphora, or repetition of a word at the beginning of each sentence,
|
||
e.g., "Freedom for the poor, freedom for the rich, freedom for all." In the
|
||
reiteration, repetition is of a complete sentence (slogan) insistently
|
||
through the speech, e.g., "With God and patriotism we will overcome
|
||
Communism because...:
|
||
|
||
Conversion is the repetition at the end of every phrase, e.g.:
|
||
"Sandinismo tries to be about everyone, dominate everyone, command
|
||
everyone, and as an absolute tyranny, do away with everyone."
|
||
|
||
In the emphasis, repetition is used at the beginning and at the end of
|
||
the clause, e.g., "Who brought the Russian-Cuban intervention? The
|
||
Sandinistas. And who is engaged in arms trafficking with the neighboring
|
||
countries? The Sandinistas. And who is proclaiming to be in favor of
|
||
nonintervention? The Sandinistas."
|
||
|
||
Reduplication, when the phrase begins with the same word that ends the
|
||
previous one. For example: "We struggle for democracy, democracy and social
|
||
justice." The concatenation is a chain made up of duplications. For
|
||
example: "Communism transmits the deception of the child to the young man,
|
||
of the young man to the adult, and of the adult to the old man."
|
||
|
||
In the antithesis or word play, the same words are used with a
|
||
different meaning to give an ingenious effect: e.g., "The greatest wealth
|
||
of every human being is his own freedom, because slaves will always be poor
|
||
but we poor can have the wealth of our freedom."
|
||
|
||
Similar cadences, through the use of verbs of the same tense and
|
||
person, or nouns of the same number and case. For example: "Those of us who
|
||
are struggling we will be marching because he who perseveres achieves, and
|
||
he who gives up remains."
|
||
|
||
Use of synonyms, repetition of words with a similar meaning. For
|
||
example: "We demand a Nicaragua for all, without exceptions, without
|
||
omissions."
|
||
|
||
Among the figures of speech most used in oratory are:
|
||
|
||
Comparison or simile, which sets the relationship of similarity
|
||
between two or more beings or things. For example: "Because we love Christ,
|
||
we love his bishops and pastors," and "Free as a bird."
|
||
|
||
Antithesis, or the counterposition of words, ideas, or phrases of an
|
||
opposite meaning. For example: "They promised freedom and gave slavery;
|
||
that they would distribute the wealth and they have distributed poverty;
|
||
that they would bring peace, and they have brought about war."
|
||
|
||
Among the logic figures are the following:
|
||
|
||
Concession, which is a skillful way to concede something to the
|
||
adversary in order to better emphasize the inappropriate aspects, through
|
||
the use of expressions such as: but, however, although, nevertheless, in
|
||
spite of the fact that, etc. For example: "The mayor here has been honest,
|
||
but he is not the one controlling all the money of the nation." It is an
|
||
effective form of rebuttal when the opinion of the audience is not entirely
|
||
ours.
|
||
|
||
Permission, in which one apparently accedes to something, when in
|
||
reality it is rejected. For example: "Do not protest, but sabotage them."
|
||
"Talk quietly, but tell it to everyone."
|
||
|
||
Prolepsis is an anticipated refutation. For example: "Some will think
|
||
that they are only promises; they will say, others said the same thing, but
|
||
no. We are different, we are Christians, we consider God a witness to our
|
||
words."
|
||
|
||
Preterition is an artifice, pretending discretion when something is
|
||
said with total clarity and indiscretion. For example: "If I were not
|
||
obligated to keep military secrets, I would tell all of you of the large
|
||
amount of armaments that we have so that you would feel even more
|
||
confidence that our victory is assured."
|
||
|
||
Communication is a way to ask and give the answer to the same
|
||
question. For example: "If they show disrespect for the ministers of God,
|
||
will they respect us, simple citizens? Never."
|
||
|
||
Rhetorical questions are a way in which one shows perplexity or
|
||
inability to say something, only as an oratorical recourse. For example: "I
|
||
am only a peasant and can tell you little. I know little and I will not be
|
||
able to explain to you the complicated things of politics. Therefore, I
|
||
talk to you with my heart, with my simple peasant's heart, as we all are."
|
||
|
||
Litotes is a form of meaning a lot by saying little. For example: "The
|
||
nine commanders have stolen little, just the whole country."
|
||
|
||
Irony consists of getting across exactly the opposite of what one is
|
||
saying. For example: "The divine mobs that threaten and kill, they are
|
||
indeed Christians."
|
||
|
||
Amplification is presenting an idea from several angles. For example:
|
||
"Political votes are the power of the people in a democracy. And economic
|
||
votes are their power in the economy. Buying or not buying something, the
|
||
majorities decide what should be produced. For something to be produced or
|
||
to disappear. That is part of economic democracy."
|
||
|
||
The most usual plaintive figures of speech are:
|
||
|
||
Deprecation or entreaty to obtain something. For example: "Lord, free
|
||
us from the yoke. Give us freedom."
|
||
|
||
Imprecation or threat, expressing a sentiment in view of the unjust or
|
||
hopeless. For example: "Let there be a Homeland for all or let there be a
|
||
Homeland for no one."
|
||
|
||
Conmination, similar to the previous one, presents a bad wish for the
|
||
rest. For example, "Let them drown in the abyss of their own corruption."
|
||
|
||
The apostrophe consists of addressing oneself towards something
|
||
supernatural or inanimate as if it were a living being. For example:
|
||
"Mountains of Nicaragua, make the seed of freedom grow."
|
||
|
||
Interrogation consists of asking a question of oneself, to give
|
||
greater emphasis to what is expressed. It is different from communication,
|
||
since it gives the answer and is of a logical and not a plaintive nature.
|
||
For example: "If they have already injured the members of my family, my
|
||
friends, my peasant brothers, do I have any path other than brandishing a
|
||
weapon?"
|
||
|
||
Reticence consists of leaving a thought incomplete, intentionally, so
|
||
that mentally the audience completes it. For example, "They promised
|
||
political pluralism and gave totalitarianism. They promised political
|
||
pluralism and gave totalitarianism. They promised social justice, and they
|
||
have increased poverty. They offered freedom of thought, and they have
|
||
given censorship. Now, what they promise the world are free elections..."
|
||
|
||
=================================
|
||
|
||
This completes the text of the CIA's manual and you are encouraged to
|
||
upload other materials similar to this.
|
||
.
|