12867 lines
593 KiB
Plaintext
12867 lines
593 KiB
Plaintext
|
||
VIRUS INFORMATION SUMMARY LIST
|
||
April 20, 1991
|
||
|
||
Copyright (C) 1990-1991 by Patricia M. Hoffman. All Rights Reserved.
|
||
|
||
This document contains the compiled information from a continuing
|
||
research effort by the author into the identification, detection and
|
||
removal of MS-DOS Computer Viruses. Hopefully, this listing will
|
||
provide some assistance to those who wish to know more about a particular
|
||
computer virus. It is not intended to provide a very detailed technical
|
||
description, but to allow the reader to understand what a virus
|
||
generally does, how it activates, what it is doing to their system, and
|
||
most importantly, how to get rid of it.
|
||
|
||
The user of this listing needs to keep in mind that the
|
||
information provided is up-to-date only to the date of the listing
|
||
itself. If the listing is one month old, some items may not be
|
||
accurate. Also, with the wide dispersion of researchers and the
|
||
various names that the same virus may be known by, some of the
|
||
information may not be entirely accurate. Lastly, as new variants
|
||
of known viruses are isolated, some of the characteristics of the
|
||
variant may be different.
|
||
|
||
There are five sections to the listing. The first section is
|
||
an introduction which explains the format of the information in
|
||
the listing and includes the code information used in some fields.
|
||
The second section is the actual virus information listing.
|
||
The third section is a cross-reference of common names for MS-DOS
|
||
computer viruses and indicates what name to use for the virus in the
|
||
second section. The fourth section, added with the July 1990 release
|
||
and in the works for many months, is a chart showing relationships
|
||
between various viruses and variants. Lastly, there is a fifth section
|
||
which is a revision history of the listing.
|
||
|
||
Anti-Viral products mentioned in the listing are either commonly
|
||
available shareware or public domain programs, or they are commercial
|
||
products which have been submitted for evaluation and review by the product's
|
||
author with "no strings attached". All Anti-Viral products are reviewed at
|
||
the most recent release level available to the author. In some cases, this
|
||
may not be the most recent release. All testing is done against the author's
|
||
virus collection, results using a different collection of viruses and
|
||
variants may differ.
|
||
|
||
Special thanks go to John McAfee for reviewing the listing before
|
||
it is distributed, and to numerous others who have sent their comments,
|
||
suggestions, and encouraging support.
|
||
|
||
The Virus Information Summary List may not be used in a business,
|
||
corporation, organization, government, or agency environment without
|
||
a negotiated site license. While this document may be referenced in the
|
||
documentation for some anti-viral products, the document is not to be
|
||
construed as being included in any site license not negotiated with
|
||
the author, Patricia M. Hoffman, or an authorized agent of the author.
|
||
|
||
Licensing information for the Virus Information Summary List can be
|
||
requested from the author via US Mail from the address, or by voice or FAX
|
||
at the phone numbers below:
|
||
|
||
Patricia M. Hoffman
|
||
1556 Halford Avenue, #127
|
||
Santa Clara, CA 95051
|
||
Voice: 1-408-246-3915
|
||
FAX : 1-408-246-3915
|
||
|
||
The VSUMAGTS.TXT file included with the Virus Information Summary List
|
||
contains a complete listing of domestic and international agents whom have
|
||
been authorized to provide sales, service, and support of this listing.
|
||
|
||
I can also be reached through my Bulletin Board System, Excalibur! BBS,
|
||
at 1-408-244-0813. Future versions of this listing may also be obtained
|
||
through Excalibur!.
|
||
|
||
Patricia M. Hoffman
|
||
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
Virus Information Summary List
|
||
Introduction & Entry Format
|
||
|
||
Each of the entries in the list consists of several fields.
|
||
Below is a brief description of what is indicated in each of the
|
||
fields. For fields where codes may appear, the meaning of each
|
||
code in indicated.
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Field contains one of the more common names for the
|
||
virus. The listing is alphabetized based on this
|
||
field.
|
||
Aliases: Other names that the same virus may be referred to by.
|
||
These names are aliases or A.K.A.'s.
|
||
V Status: This field contains one of the following values which indicate
|
||
how common the virus is in the public domain.
|
||
Common: The virus is one of the most common viruses reported to
|
||
various groups which gather virus infection statistics.
|
||
Most of these groups are in the United States. Where a
|
||
virus has had many reports from a specific geographic area,
|
||
the V Status field will contain "Common - xxxxxxxxx" where
|
||
xxxxxxxxx is an indicator of geographic location.
|
||
Endangered: The "Endangered" classification of viruses are
|
||
viruses that are very uncommon and were fairly recently
|
||
discovered or isolated. Due to some characteristics of
|
||
these viruses, it is highly unlikely that they will ever
|
||
become a widespread problem. It doesn't mean that they
|
||
don't exist, just that the probability of someone getting
|
||
these viruses is fairly low.
|
||
Extinct: The "Extinct" classification is for viruses which at
|
||
one time may have been widespread (ie. they are not a
|
||
research virus which was never released into the public
|
||
domain), but have not had a reported infection in at least
|
||
one year. "Extinct" viruses will also include "viruses"
|
||
which were submitted which actually don't replicate due to
|
||
a flaw in their viral code, but if the flaw were corrected
|
||
they might be successful. It is still possible that someone
|
||
could become infected with one of these viruses, but the
|
||
probability is extremely low.
|
||
Myth: "Myth" viruses are viruses which have been discussed among
|
||
various groups for some time (in excess of one year), but are
|
||
not known to actually exist as either a public domain or
|
||
research virus. Probably the best case of a "Myth" virus
|
||
is the Nichols Virus.
|
||
Rare: "Rare" viruses are viruses which were recently (within the
|
||
last year) isolated but which do not appear to be widespread.
|
||
These viruses, as a general rule, will be viruses which
|
||
have characteristics that would make them a possible
|
||
future problem. "Rare" viruses have a higher probability
|
||
of someone becoming infected than Endangered or Extinct
|
||
viruses, but are much less likely to be found than a
|
||
"Common" virus.
|
||
Research: A "Research" virus is a virus which was originally
|
||
received by at least one anti-viral researcher directly
|
||
from its source or author. These viruses are not known
|
||
to have been released into the public domain, so they are
|
||
highly unlikely to be detected on computer systems other
|
||
than researchers.
|
||
Rumored: The "Rumored" virus classification are for viruses
|
||
which the author has received information about, but that
|
||
no sample of the virus has been made available for analysis.
|
||
Any viruses in this classification should be considered with
|
||
a grain of salt, they may not actually exist.
|
||
Unknown: The "Unknown" classification is for those viruses where
|
||
the original submission of the virus to anti-viral researchers
|
||
is suspect for any number of reasons, or that there is
|
||
very little information known about the origin of the
|
||
virus.
|
||
New: The "New" category is for viruses which were recently
|
||
received by the author but cannot at the present time be
|
||
researched in depth. Instead of leaving these viruses out
|
||
of the listing all together, they will be listed but with
|
||
a "New" status.
|
||
Discovery: First recorded discovery date.
|
||
Origin: Author/country of origin
|
||
Symptoms: Changes to system that may be noticed by users: messages,
|
||
growth in files, TSRs/ Resident TOM (change in CHKDSK
|
||
return), BSC - boot sector change (may require cold boot
|
||
from known-good protected floppy to find), corruption of
|
||
system or files, frequent re-boots, slowdowns.
|
||
Origin: Either credited or assumed to be in country of discovery.
|
||
Eff Length: The length of the viral code after it has infected
|
||
a program or system component. For boot-sector infectors,
|
||
the length is indicated as N/A, for not applicable.
|
||
Type Code: The type codes indicated for a virus indicate general
|
||
behavior characteristics. Following the type code(s) is
|
||
a brief text description. The type codes used are:
|
||
A = Infects all program files (COM & EXE)
|
||
B = Boot virus
|
||
C = Infects COM files only
|
||
D = Infects DOS boot sector on hard disk
|
||
E = Infects EXE files only
|
||
F = Floppy (360K) only
|
||
K = Infects COMMAND.COM
|
||
M = Infects Master boot sector on hard disk
|
||
N = Non-resident (in memory)
|
||
O = Overwriting virus
|
||
P = Parasitic virus
|
||
R = Resident (in memory)
|
||
(below 640k - segment A000)
|
||
a - in unused portion of allocated memory
|
||
(does not change free memory, such as virus resident
|
||
in CLI stack space or unused system memory)
|
||
Example: LeHigh
|
||
f - in free (user) memory below TOM
|
||
(does not prevent overwriting)
|
||
Example: Icelandic
|
||
h - in high memory but below TOM
|
||
(Resides in high system memory, right below TOM.
|
||
Memory is allocated so it won't be accidently
|
||
overwritten.)
|
||
Example: Flash
|
||
s - in low (system/TSR) memory
|
||
(reduces free memory, typically uses a normal
|
||
Int 21/Int 28 TSR)
|
||
Example: Jerusalem
|
||
t - above TOM but below 640k (moves Int 12 return)
|
||
(Reduces total memory size and free memory)
|
||
Example: Pakistani Brain
|
||
(above 640k)
|
||
b - in BIOS/Video/Shadow RAM area (segment A000 - FFFF)
|
||
e - in extended/expanded memory (above 1 Meg)
|
||
S = Spawning or companion file virus
|
||
(This type of virus creates another file on the disk which
|
||
contains the actual viral code. Example: Aids II)
|
||
T = Manipulation of the File Allocation Table (FAT)
|
||
X = Manipulation/Infection of the Partition Table
|
||
Detection Method:
|
||
This entry indicates how to determine if a program or
|
||
system has been infected by the virus. Where the virus
|
||
can be detected with a shareware, public domain, or
|
||
readily available commercial program, it is indicated.
|
||
Note that a "+" after the anti-viral product's version number
|
||
indicates that versions of the product from the indicated version
|
||
forward are applicable.
|
||
Programs referenced in the listing are:
|
||
AVTK - Dr. Solomon's Anti-Virus Toolkit <commercial>
|
||
F-PROT - Fridrik Skulason's F-Prot detector/disinfector
|
||
IBM Scan - IBM's Virus Scanning Program <commercial>
|
||
NAV - Norton AntiVirus <commercial>
|
||
Pro-Scan - McAfee Associates' Pro-Scan Program <commercial>
|
||
VirexPC - MicroCom's VirexPC Program <commercial>
|
||
VirHunt - Digital Dispatch Inc's VirHunt Program <commercial>
|
||
ViruScan - McAfee Associates' ViruScan Program
|
||
ViruScan/X- McAfee Associates' ViruScan Program with /X switch
|
||
Removal Instructions:
|
||
Brief instructions on how to remove the virus. Where
|
||
a shareware, public domain, or readily available
|
||
commercial program is available which will remove the
|
||
virus, it is indicated. Programs referenced in the
|
||
listing are:
|
||
AntiCrim - Jan Terpstra's AntiCrime program
|
||
CleanUp - John McAfee's CleanUp universal virus
|
||
disinfector.
|
||
Note: CleanUp is only indicated for a virus
|
||
if it will disinfect the file, rather than
|
||
delete the infected file.
|
||
DOS COPY - Use the DOS COPY command to copy files from
|
||
infected non-bootable disks to newly formatted,
|
||
uninfected disks. Note: do NOT use the
|
||
DOS DISKCOPY command on boot sector infected
|
||
disks, or the new disk will also be infected!
|
||
DOS SYS - Use the DOS SYS command to overwrite the boot
|
||
sector on infected hard disks or diskettes.
|
||
Be sure you power down the system first, and
|
||
boot from a write protected master diskette,
|
||
or the SYS command will copy the infected
|
||
boot sector.
|
||
F-PROT - Fridrik Skulason's F-Prot detector/disinfector,
|
||
Version 1.07.
|
||
M-3066 - Traceback virus disinfector.
|
||
MDisk - MD Boot Virus Disinfector. Be sure to use the
|
||
program which corresponds to your DOS release.
|
||
NAV - Norton AntiVirus
|
||
Pro-Scan - Pro-Scan Virus Identifier/Disinfector.
|
||
Saturday - European generic Jerusalem virus disinfector.
|
||
Scan/D - ViruScan run with the /D option.
|
||
Scan/D/A - ViruScan run with the /D /A options.
|
||
Scan/D/X - ViruScan run with the /D /X options.
|
||
UnVirus - Yuval Rakavy's disinfector for Brain, Jerusalem,
|
||
Ping Pong, Ping Pong-B, Typo Boot, Suriv 1.01,
|
||
Suriv 2.01, and Suriv 3.00 viruses.
|
||
VirexPC - MicroCom's VirexPC Detector/Disinfector
|
||
Note: VirexPC is only indicated if it will actually
|
||
disinfect the virus, not just delete the infected
|
||
file.
|
||
VirHunt - Digital Dispatch Inc's VirHunt Detector/Disinfector
|
||
Note: VirHunt is only indicated if it will actually
|
||
disinfect the virus on all major variants.
|
||
Virus Buster - Yuval Tal's Virus Buster Detector/Disinfector
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
This field includes other information about the virus,
|
||
including but not limited to: historical information,
|
||
possible origin, possible damage the virus may cause,
|
||
and activation criteria.
|
||
|
||
|
||
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Virus Information Summary List
|
||
MS-DOS Virus Information
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: 382 Recovery Virus
|
||
Aliases: 382
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: July, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: first 382 bytes of .COM files overwritten, system hangs,
|
||
spurious characters on system display, disk drive spinning
|
||
Origin: Taiwan
|
||
Eff Length: N/A
|
||
Type Code: ONAK - Overwriting Non-Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V66+, Pro-Scan 2.01+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The 382 Recovery Virus was isolated in July 1990 in Taiwan. It is
|
||
a non-resident generic infector of .COM and .EXE files, including
|
||
COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
Each time a program infected with the 382 Recovery Virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will check the current directory for a .COM files that has
|
||
not been infected with the virus. If it finds an uninfected .COM
|
||
file, it will infect it. If the original file was less than 382 bytes
|
||
in length, the infected file will now be 382 bytes in length. Files
|
||
which were originally greater than 382 bytes in length will not show
|
||
any increase in length. Infected files always have the first 382
|
||
bytes of the file overwritten to contain the virus's code.
|
||
|
||
Once all .COM files in the current directory are infected, the next
|
||
time an infected .COM file is executed the virus will rename all .EXE
|
||
files to .COM files. These renamed files, however, may or may not
|
||
later become infected.
|
||
|
||
Symptoms of the 382 Recovery Virus being present on a file are that
|
||
the program will not execute properly. In some cases, the program will
|
||
hang upon execution requiring the system to be rebooted. In other
|
||
cases, spurious characters will appear on the system display and the
|
||
program will not run. Lastly, the system may do nothing but leave the
|
||
disk drive spinning, requiring the system to be powered off and
|
||
rebooted.
|
||
|
||
Since the first 382 bytes of infected files have been overwritten,
|
||
the infected files cannot be recovered. The original 382 bytes of
|
||
the file are permanently lost. Infected files should be deleted or
|
||
erased and replaced with backup copies known to be free of infection.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: 405
|
||
Aliases: Hammelburg
|
||
V Status: Extinct
|
||
Discovery: 1987
|
||
Symptoms: .COM files fail to run, first 405 bytes of .COM files
|
||
overwritten
|
||
Origin: Austria or Germany
|
||
Eff Length: N/A
|
||
Type Code: ONC - Overwriting Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan/X V67+, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan 1.4+,
|
||
VirexPC 1.1+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D/X, F-Prot, NAV, or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The 405 virus is an overwriting virus which infects only .COM
|
||
files in the current directory. If the length of the .COM file
|
||
was originally less than 405 bytes, the resulting infected file
|
||
will have a length of 405 bytes. This virus currently cannot
|
||
recognize .COM files that are already infected, so it will
|
||
attempt to infect them again.
|
||
|
||
The 405 Virus doesn't carry an activation date, and doesn't do
|
||
anything but replicate in the current directory. However, since
|
||
it overwrites the first 405 bytes of .COM files, infected files
|
||
are not recoverable except by replacing them from uninfected
|
||
backups or master distribution disks.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: 512
|
||
Aliases: 512-A, Number of the Beast Virus, Stealth Virus
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: November, 1989
|
||
Origin: Bulgaria
|
||
Symptoms: Program crashes, system hangs, TSR.
|
||
Eff Length: 512 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRCK - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V58+, VirexPC 1.1+
|
||
Removal Instructions: CleanUp V58+
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The 512 virus is not the same as the Original Friday The 13th COM
|
||
virus. The 512 virus was originally isolated in Bulgaria in
|
||
November, 1989, by Vesselin Bontchev. It infects .COM files,
|
||
including COMMAND.COM, installing itself memory resident when the
|
||
first infected program is run. After becoming memory resident, any
|
||
.COM file openned for any reason will become infected if its
|
||
uninfected length is at least 512 bytes.
|
||
|
||
Systems infected with the 512 virus may experience program crashes
|
||
due to unexpected errors, as well as system hangs. Damage may occur
|
||
to infected files if the system user runs CHKDSK with the /F
|
||
parameter as the length of the program in the directory entry will not
|
||
match the actual disk space used. CHKDSK will then adjust the file
|
||
allocation resulting in damaged files.
|
||
|
||
The virus's alias of "Number of the Beast" Virus is because the
|
||
author of the virus used a signature of text 666 near the end of the
|
||
virus to determine if the file is already infected. Since 512 adds
|
||
its viral code to the end of infected files, it is easy to verify
|
||
that a file is infected by the 512 virus by checking for this
|
||
signature.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of the 512 Virus are:
|
||
512-B : Similar to the 512 Variant, except that the DOS version check
|
||
in the original virus has been omitted. The author's
|
||
signature of '666' has been omitted.
|
||
512-C : Similar to the 512-B Variant, minor code changes.
|
||
512-D : Similar to the 512-C Variant, except that the virus no longer
|
||
checks to see if a file has the System Attribute on it before
|
||
infecting it.
|
||
512-E : Similar to the other 512 viruses, this variant will use some
|
||
memory about 640K, such as memory on video cards. Infected
|
||
systems will have a 55,104 byte decrease in total system and
|
||
available free memory as indicated by the DOS ChkDsk program.
|
||
This variant does not use the text 666 signature to designate
|
||
infected files.
|
||
512-F : Similar to other variants, the DOS ChkDsk program will not show
|
||
any decrease in system or available memory when the virus is
|
||
resident. The "666" text signature can be found in infected
|
||
files as offset 1FD.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: 646
|
||
Aliases: Vienna C
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: October, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: COMMAND.COM & .COM growth
|
||
Origin: Unknown
|
||
Eff Length: 646 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCK - Parasitic Non-Resident COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V71+, Pro-Scan 2.01+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Pro-Scan 2.01+, Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The 646 Virus was discovered in October, 1990. Its origin is unknown.
|
||
This virus is a non-resident infector of .COM files, including
|
||
COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a file infected with the 646 Virus is executed, the virus will
|
||
infect one other .COM file in the current directory. Infected files
|
||
will increase in size by 646 bytes, with the virus being located at
|
||
the end of the infected file.
|
||
|
||
Infected files can be easily identified as they will always end with
|
||
the hex string: "EAF0FFFFFF".
|
||
|
||
This virus appears to do nothing except replicate.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: 834 Virus
|
||
Aliases: Arab
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: February, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM file growth; TSR; Partition Table altered;
|
||
Unexpected disk accesses to hard disk;
|
||
Attempts to boot system from hard disk may hang
|
||
Origin: Unknown
|
||
Eff Length: 834 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsC - Parasitic Resident COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V76+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The 834 Virus was received in February, 1991. Its origin is unknown.
|
||
This virus is a memory resident infector of .COM files, but not
|
||
COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the 834 Virus is executed, the
|
||
virus will install itself memory resident as a low system memory TSR
|
||
of 1,808 bytes. Interrupt 21 will be hooked by the virus as well. At
|
||
this time, the virus will access the hard disk partition table, altering
|
||
it.
|
||
|
||
After the 834 Virus is memory resident, it will infect .COM files of
|
||
a length greater than 4K in length as they are executed. COMMAND.COM,
|
||
however, will not be infected. Infected files will increase in length
|
||
by 834 bytes, the virus will be located at the end of the infected
|
||
program. The file date and time in the disk directory is not altered
|
||
by the virus.
|
||
|
||
Systems infected with the 834 Virus may notice unexpected accesses to
|
||
the system hard disk when executing programs from a diskette. These
|
||
accesses are the virus accessing the hard disk partition table each
|
||
time an infected program is executed, or a program is infected by the
|
||
virus. The system's hard disk partition table does not contain an
|
||
infectious copy of the virus, but has been altered so that later
|
||
attempts to boot the system from the system hard disk may result in a
|
||
system hang occurring during the boot process.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of 834 include:
|
||
834-B/Arab: Similar to the original virus, this variant will infect
|
||
.COM files other than COMMAND.COM which are greater than 1K in
|
||
length before infection. Two text strings occur within this
|
||
variant's code: "nsed Materi" and "COMMAND.COM". Low system
|
||
memory TSR is 1,792 bytes in length.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: 903
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: January, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM file growth; TSR; System hangs
|
||
Origin: France
|
||
Eff Length: 903 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsCK - Parasitic Resident COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The 903 Virus was discovered France in January, 1991. This virus is
|
||
not a particularly viable virus since replicated samples will not
|
||
further replicate. It is possible that the original sample is
|
||
corrupted. This virus infects .COM program, including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When the original sample of 903 is executed, this virus will install
|
||
itself memory resident as a 1,216 byte low system memory TSR. It will
|
||
hook interrupt 21. At that time, it will infect COMMAND.COM, adding
|
||
903 bytes to the beginning of the program. The following message is
|
||
then displayed:
|
||
|
||
"Fichier introuvable"
|
||
|
||
Once memory resident, this virus will infect up to three .COM programs
|
||
in the current directory if the original sample is again executed.
|
||
Later execution of infected files (other than the original) will not
|
||
result in the virus spreading to other files. The virus will also
|
||
infect files when the DOS Copy command is used, but only if the source
|
||
and target files are in the current directory.
|
||
|
||
Infected .COM programs will have a file size increase of 903 bytes,
|
||
the virus will be located at the beginning of the infected program.
|
||
The file date and time in the disk directory will not be altered by
|
||
the virus.
|
||
|
||
If 903 becomes memory resident from other than the original sample, it
|
||
will not replicate to other .COM programs. The "Fichier introuvable"
|
||
message is not displayed with other than the original sample.
|
||
|
||
Some programs may hang when they are executed on infected systems.
|
||
|
||
It is unknown if 903 does anything destructive.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: 1008
|
||
Aliases: Suomi, Oulu
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: June, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: COMMAND.COM growth, Internal Stack Errors,
|
||
System Halt on Boot
|
||
Origin: Helsinki, Finland
|
||
Eff Length: 1,008 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRCK - Parasitic Resident COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V64+, F-Prot 1.12+, Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, F-Prot 1.12+, Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV,
|
||
or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The 1008 Virus was discovered in June, 1990 by Petteri Jarvinen of
|
||
Helsinki, Finland. It is a memory resident .COM infector, and will
|
||
infect COMMAND.COM. This virus is also sometimes referred to as
|
||
the Suomi Virus.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the 1008 virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will install itself memory resident. COMMAND.COM is also
|
||
infected at this time, resulting in its length increasing by 1,008
|
||
Bytes. The increase in file size of COMMAND.COM cannot be seen by
|
||
doing a directory listing if the virus is present in memory.
|
||
|
||
Booting a system with an infected copy of COMMAND.COM may result in
|
||
an internal stack error, and the system being halted. This effect
|
||
was noted on the author's test machine which is a 640K XT-clone
|
||
running Microsoft MS-DOS Version 3.30.
|
||
|
||
After the virus is memory resident, it will infect any .COM file which
|
||
is executed, adding 1,008 bytes to the file length. The file length
|
||
increase cannot be seen by doing a directory listing if the virus is
|
||
present in memory.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: 1210
|
||
Aliases: Prudents Virus
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: December, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: .EXE growth, disk write failure, TSR
|
||
Origin: Spain
|
||
Eff Length: 1,210 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRE - Parasitic Resident .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V61+, Pro-Scan 1.4+, F-Prot 1.12+, VirHunt 2.0+,
|
||
NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, F-Prot 1.12+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV,
|
||
or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The 1210, or Prudents Virus, was first isolated in Barcelona, Spain,
|
||
in December 1989. The 1210 is a memory resident virus, infecting
|
||
.EXE files when they are executed.
|
||
|
||
This virus activates between May 1st and May 4th of any year,
|
||
causing disk writes to be changed to disk verifies, so writes to
|
||
the disk never occur between these dates.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: 1226
|
||
Aliases: V1226
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: July 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth, decrease in system and free memory, system hangs,
|
||
spurious characters displayed in place of program executing,
|
||
disk drive spinning
|
||
Origin: Bulgaria
|
||
Eff Length: 1,226 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRhC - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V66+, Pro-Scan 2.01+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The 1226 Virus was isolated in Bulgaria in July 1990 by Vesselin
|
||
Bontchev. This virus is a memory resident generic .COM infector,
|
||
though it does not infect COMMAND.COM. The 1226 Virus is a self-
|
||
encrypting virus, and simple search string algorithms will not work
|
||
to detect its presence on a system.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the 1226 virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will install itself memory resident, reserving 8,192 bytes
|
||
of memory at the top of free memory. Interrupt 2A will be hooked.
|
||
|
||
Once 1226 is memory resident, the virus will attempt to infect any
|
||
.COM file that is executed that is at least 1,226 bytes in length
|
||
before infection. The virus is rather "buggy" and the infection
|
||
process is not always entirely successful. Successfully infected
|
||
files will increase in length by 1,226 bytes.
|
||
|
||
This virus will infect .COM files multiple times, it is unable to
|
||
determine that the file is already infected. Each time the file
|
||
is infected it will grow in length by another 1,226 bytes. Eventually,
|
||
the .COM files will grow too large to fit into memory.
|
||
|
||
Systems infected with the 1226 virus may experience unexpected system
|
||
hangs when attempting to execute programs. Another affect is that
|
||
instead of a program executing, a line or two of spurious characters
|
||
will appear on the system display. Lastly, infected systems will always
|
||
indicate that they have 8,192 less bytes of total system and free
|
||
memory available than is actually on the machine.
|
||
|
||
There are two later versions of this virus, 1226D and 1226M, which are
|
||
much better replicators than the original 1226 virus. These two
|
||
variants are documented as 1226D in this document due to their
|
||
different characteristics.
|
||
|
||
Also see: 1226D
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: 1226D
|
||
Aliases: V1226D
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: July 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth, decrease in system and free memory
|
||
Origin: Bulgaria
|
||
Eff Length: 1,226 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRhC - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V66+, Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The 1226D Virus was isolated in Bulgaria in July 1990 by Vesselin
|
||
Bontchev. This virus is a memory resident generic .COM infector,
|
||
though it does not infect COMMAND.COM. The 1226D Virus is a self-
|
||
encrypting virus, and simple search string algorithms will not work
|
||
to detect its presence on a system.
|
||
|
||
The 1226D Virus is based on the 1226 Virus, in fact it is a decrypted
|
||
version of the 1226 Virus. It is a better replicator, infecting
|
||
successfully on file opens as well as when .COM files are executed.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the 1226 virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will install itself memory resident, reserving 8,192 bytes
|
||
of memory at the top of free memory. Total system and free memory
|
||
are decreased by 8,192 bytes. Interrupt 2A will be hooked.
|
||
|
||
Once 1226 is memory resident, the virus will attempt to infect any
|
||
.COM file that is executed that is at least 1,226 bytes in length
|
||
before infection. Infected files will increase in length by 1,226
|
||
bytes. As with the original 1226 Virus, a .COM file may be infected
|
||
multiple times by the 1226D Virus as the virus is unable to determine
|
||
that the file was previously infected. Each infection will result in
|
||
another 1,226 bytes being added to the infected file's length.
|
||
Eventually, the .COM files will grow too large to fit into memory.
|
||
|
||
In addition to infecting .COM files when they are executed, the 1226D
|
||
Virus will infect .COM files with a length of at least 1,226 bytes
|
||
when they are openned for any reason. The simple act of copying a
|
||
.COM file with the virus memory resident will result in both the
|
||
source and target files being infected.
|
||
|
||
Unlike the 1226 Virus, systems infected with the 1226D virus will not
|
||
experience the system hangs or spurious characters symptomatic of the
|
||
1226 virus. Infected system will still indicate that they have 8,192
|
||
bytes less of total system memory than is installed on the machine.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of 1226D are:
|
||
1226M/V1226M : Similar to the 1226D virus, except that files are not
|
||
infected on file open, only when they are executed.
|
||
|
||
Also see: 1226
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: 1253
|
||
Aliases: AntiCad, V-1
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: August, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: TSR; BSC; COMMAND.COM & .COM file growth; partition table change
|
||
Origin: Austria
|
||
Eff Length: 1,253 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsBCKX - Parasitic Resident .COM & Partition Table Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V66+, Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV, Scan/D plus MDisk/P
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The 1253 Virus was submitted in August 1990. It is believed to have
|
||
originated in (or at least to have been first isolated in) Austria.
|
||
1253 is a generic infector of .COM files, including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
It also infects the boot sector of diskettes and the partition table
|
||
of hard disks.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the 1253 Virus is executed, the
|
||
virus will install itself memory resident as a low system memory TSR.
|
||
The TSR will be 2,128 bytes in length, hooking interrupts 08, 13, 21,
|
||
and 60. Total system memory will remain unchanged, and free memory
|
||
will decrease by 2,128 bytes. At this time, the partition table of
|
||
the system's hard disk is infected with the 1253 virus. If the
|
||
infected program was executed from a diskette, the diskette's boot
|
||
sector will also be infected.
|
||
|
||
Each time a .COM file is executed with the virus resident in memory,
|
||
the .COM file will be infected if it hasn't previously been infected.
|
||
The 1253 Virus appends its viral code to the end of the .COM file, and
|
||
then changes the first few bytes of the program to be a jump to the
|
||
appended code. Infected files increase in length by 1,253 bytes, and
|
||
the virus makes no attempt to hide the increase when the directory
|
||
is displayed. Infected files will also have their fourth thru sixth
|
||
bytes set to "V-1" (hex 562D31).
|
||
|
||
Any diskettes which are accessed while the virus is present in memory
|
||
will have their boot sector infected with this virus. Newly formatted
|
||
diskettes, likewise, will be infected immediately.
|
||
|
||
The 1253 virus is destructive when it activates. The author of this
|
||
listing was able to get it to activate by setting the system date to
|
||
December 24 and then executing an infected program on drive A:. The
|
||
virus promptly went and overwrote the entire diskette in drive
|
||
A: with a pattern of 9 sectors of what appears to be a program
|
||
fragment. Once the virus has started to overwrite a diskette, the
|
||
only way to stop the disk activity is to power off the system.
|
||
|
||
The virus in the partition table and/or diskette boot sector is of
|
||
special note. When the system is booted from the hard disk or diskette
|
||
with the virus in the partition table or boot sector, the virus will
|
||
install itself memory resident. At this time, the virus resides above
|
||
the top of system memory but below the 640K DOS boundary. The change
|
||
in total system memory and available free memory will be 77,840 bytes.
|
||
It can be seen with the CHKDSK command. At this time, any .COM program
|
||
executed will be infected with the 1253 virus, even though no programs
|
||
on the hard disk may contain this virus before the system boot occurred.
|
||
|
||
One effect of this virus, once the system has been booted from an
|
||
infected hard drive or floppy is that the FORMAT command may result
|
||
in unexpected disk activity to inactive drives. For example, on the
|
||
author's system, when formatting a diskette in drive A: with the
|
||
current drive being drive C:, there was always disk activity to drive
|
||
B:.
|
||
|
||
Disinfecting the 1253 virus required that besides disinfecting or
|
||
deleting infected .COM programs, the hard disks partition table and the
|
||
boot sector of any diskettes exposed to the infected system must be
|
||
disinfected. The virus can be removed safely from the partition table
|
||
and diskette boot sectors by using MDisk with the /P option after
|
||
powering off the system and rebooting from a write-protected uninfected
|
||
boot diskette. If the partition table and diskette boot sectors are
|
||
not disinfected, the system will promptly experience reinfection of
|
||
.COM files with the virus following a system boot from the hard disk
|
||
or diskette. Disinfecting the partition table and boot sectors, when
|
||
done properly, will also result in the system's full memory again being
|
||
available.
|
||
|
||
It is unknown if there are other activation dates for this virus, or
|
||
if it will overwrite the hard disk if an infected program is executed
|
||
on December 24 from the hard disk.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: 1260
|
||
Aliases: V2P1
|
||
V Status: Research
|
||
Discovery: January, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM file growth
|
||
Origin: Minnesota, USA
|
||
Eff Length: 1,260 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNC - Parasitic Encrypting Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V57+, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan 1.4+, F-Prot 1.12+,
|
||
AVTK 3.5+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: CleanUp V57+, Pro-Scan 1.4+, F-Prot 1.12+, VirHunt 2.0+
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The 1260 virus was first isolated in January, 1990. This
|
||
virus does not install itself resident in memory, but is it
|
||
extremely virulent at infecting .COM files. Infected files
|
||
will have their length increased by 1,260 bytes, and the
|
||
resulting file will be encrypted. The encryption key changes
|
||
with each infection which occurs.
|
||
|
||
The 1260 virus is derived from the original Vienna Virus, though
|
||
it is highly modified.
|
||
|
||
This virus was developed as a research virus by Mark Washburn, who
|
||
wished to show the anti-viral community why identification string
|
||
scanners do not work in all cases. The encryption used in 1260 is
|
||
one of many possible cases of the encryption which may occur with
|
||
Washburn's later research virus, V2P2.
|
||
|
||
Also see: V2P2, V2P6, V2P6Z
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: 1381 Virus
|
||
Aliases: Internal
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: June, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .EXE growth
|
||
Origin:
|
||
Eff Length: 1,381 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNE - Parasitic Non-Resident .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V64+, Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The 1381 Virus was isolated in June, 1990. It is a non-resident
|
||
generic .EXE infector.
|
||
|
||
Each time a program infected with the 1381 Virus is executed, the
|
||
virus will attempt to infect one other .EXE file on the current
|
||
drive. An .EXE file will only be infected if it is greater than
|
||
1,300 bytes in length before infection. After infection, files
|
||
will have increased in length by between 1,381 and 1,389 bytes.
|
||
|
||
The virus can be found at the end of infected files. Infected
|
||
files will also contain the following text strings:
|
||
|
||
"INTERNAL ERROR 02CH.
|
||
PLEASE CONTACT YOUR HARDWARE MANUFACTURER IMMEDIATELY !
|
||
DO NOT FORGET TO REPORT THE ERROR CODE !"
|
||
|
||
It is currently unknown what the 1381 Virus does, or what prompts
|
||
it to display the above message.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of 1381 include:
|
||
1381-B/Internal: Similar to the original 1381 virus, this variant is
|
||
very similar. The major change is that it does not always
|
||
infect a .EXE file each time an infected program is executed.
|
||
The increase in file length on infected files will 1,381 to
|
||
1,395 bytes, and the virus will be located at the end of the
|
||
infected file. The message text indicated above for the
|
||
original virus will be displayed if the year is 1991 or greater.
|
||
When the message is displayed, the program that was being
|
||
executed will be disinfected by the virus.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: 1392
|
||
Aliases: Amoeba Virus
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: March, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: TSR, .COM & .EXE growth, dates modified
|
||
Origin: Indonesia
|
||
Eff Length: 1,392 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V61+, VirexPC 1.1+, F-Prot 1.12+, VirHunt 2.0+,
|
||
NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, F-Prot 1.12+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV,
|
||
or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The 1392, or Amoeba, Virus was first isolated in Indonesia in
|
||
March 1990. The 1392 virus is a memory resident virus that infects
|
||
.COM and .EXE files, including COMMAND.COM. As files are infected,
|
||
their creation/modification date is changed to the date the files
|
||
were infected.
|
||
|
||
This virus does not appear to cause any destructive damage.
|
||
|
||
The following message appears in the virus, which is where its
|
||
alias of Amoeba was derived from:
|
||
|
||
"SMA KHETAPUNK - Nouvel Band A.M.O.E.B.A"
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: 1554
|
||
Aliases: Ten Bytes, 9800:0000 Virus, V-Alert, 1559
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: February, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth, TSR, linkage corruption, system hang
|
||
Origin:
|
||
Eff Length: 1,554 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRfAK - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V58+, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirexPC 1.1+,
|
||
AVTK 3.5+, F-Prot 1.12+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, F-Prot 1.12+, VirHunt 2.0+, Pro-Scan 2.01+
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The 1554 virus was accidently sent out over the VALERT-L network
|
||
on February 13, 1990 to approximately 600 subscribers. When a
|
||
program is executed that is infected with the 1554 virus, the
|
||
virus installs itself memory resident. It will then proceed to
|
||
infect .COM over 1000 bytes in length and .EXE files over 1024 bytes
|
||
in length, including COMMAND.COM, increasing their length after
|
||
infection by 1,554 to 1,569 bytes.
|
||
|
||
The 1554 virus activates in September, October, November, or
|
||
December of any year. Upon activation, any files which are written
|
||
will be missing the first ten bytes. At the end of these files,
|
||
ten bytes of miscellaneous characters will appear. In effect, both
|
||
programs and data files will be corrupted.
|
||
|
||
If the 1554 Virus is executed on a system with less than 640K of
|
||
system memory, the virus will hang the system.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: 1575
|
||
Aliases: 1577, 1591
|
||
V Status: Common
|
||
Discovery: January, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth; decrease in total system & available memory;
|
||
Sluggishness of DIR commands; file date/time changes
|
||
Origin: Taiwan
|
||
Isolated: Ontario, Canada
|
||
Eff Length: 1,575 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRfAk - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, Clean-Up V74+, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The 1575 virus was first isolated in Ontario, Canada, in January, 1991.
|
||
This virus has been widely reported, and is believed to be from the Far
|
||
East, probably Taiwan. It is a memory resident infector of .COM and
|
||
.EXE files, and will infect COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When the first program infected with the 1575 Virus is executed, the
|
||
virus will install itself memory resident in 1,760 to 1,840 bytes at
|
||
the top of system memory, but below the 640K DOS boundary. This
|
||
memory is not reserved, and may be overwritten later by another
|
||
program. Interrupt 21 will be hooked by the virus. COMMAND.COM on
|
||
the system C: drive root directory will also be infected at this
|
||
time.
|
||
|
||
Once the 1575 Virus is memory resident, it will infect one .COM and
|
||
one .EXE program on the current drive whenever a DOS Dir or Copy
|
||
command is executed. This virus does not spread when programs are
|
||
executed.
|
||
|
||
Infected files will have their file date and time in the DOS directory
|
||
updated to the system date and time when the infection occurred.
|
||
Their file lengths will also show an increase of between 1,577 and
|
||
1,591 bytes. This virus will be located at the end of infected files.
|
||
|
||
It is not know if 1575 does anything besides replicate.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of the 1575 Virus are:
|
||
1575-B : This variant is functionally similar to the 1575 Virus
|
||
described above. The major difference is that this variant
|
||
reserves the memory it occupies at the top of system memory,
|
||
though the interrupt 12 return is not moved.
|
||
1575-C : Similar to the 1575-B, this variant will infect files as they
|
||
are executed in addition to when a DOS Dir or Copy command
|
||
is issued. System may hang when this variant infects
|
||
COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: 1605
|
||
Aliases: 1605-B, Solomon, Tel Aviv
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: September, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth; TSR; system slowdown
|
||
Origin: Unknown
|
||
Eff Length: 1,605 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V67+, Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: NAV, Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The 1605 Virus was uploaded to John McAfee's Homebase BBS by an
|
||
anonymous user in September, 1990. The origin of this virus is
|
||
unknown. The 1605 Virus is a memory resident infector of .COM
|
||
and .EXE files, and it does not infect COMMAND.COM. It is based
|
||
roughly on the Jerusalem B Virus.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the 1605 Virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will install itself memory resident as a low system memory
|
||
TSR of 1,728 bytes. Interrupts 13 and 21 will be hooked by the
|
||
virus. At this time, the system will slowdown by approximately
|
||
15-20%.
|
||
|
||
After becoming memory resident, any .COM or .EXE file executed will
|
||
be infected by the virus. .COM files will increase in size by
|
||
1,605 bytes in all cases with the virus's code being located at the
|
||
beginning of the file. .EXE files will increase in size by between
|
||
1,601 and 1,610 bytes with the virus's code being located at the
|
||
end of the infected file.
|
||
|
||
Other than replicating, it is unknown if this virus carries any
|
||
damage potential.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of the 1605 Virus are:
|
||
1605-B : This variant was received by MicroCom in London, England in
|
||
March 1991 in a plain envelope with a London postmark. The
|
||
label on the diskette read "Solomon Virus", though the virus
|
||
is not related in any way to Dr. Solomon. This variant is
|
||
very similar to the 1605 virus described above, the major
|
||
difference is that infected .EXE files will increase in size
|
||
by 1,605 to 1,619 bytes.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: 1704 Format
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: January, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: TSR, Falling letters, .COM growth, formatted disk
|
||
Origin:
|
||
Eff Length: 1,704 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRC - Parasitic Encrypting Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, VirexPC,
|
||
AVKT 3.5+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: CleanUp, Scan/D, F-Prot, Pro-Scan, VirexPC, VirHunt 2.0+
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
Like the Cascade Virus, but the disk is formatted when the
|
||
virus activates. Activation occurs during the months of
|
||
October, November, and December of any year except 1993.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: 1720
|
||
Aliases: PSQR Virus
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: March, 1990
|
||
Symptoms : TSR, .COM & .EXE growth, partition table damage on activation,
|
||
programs on diskette deleted on Friday The 13ths
|
||
Origin: Spain
|
||
Eff Length: 1,720 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V61+, VirexPC 1.1+, F-Prot 1.12+, VirHunt 2.0+,
|
||
Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: NAV, Scan /D, VirHunt 2.0+, or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The 1720, or PSQR Virus, is a variant of the Jerusalem Virus which
|
||
was first isolated in Barcelona, Spain, in March 1990. This virus,
|
||
infects .COM and .EXE files, though unlike Jerusalem, it does not
|
||
infect Overlay files. COMMAND.COM will also not be infected.
|
||
|
||
The first time an infected file is executed, the virus will install
|
||
itself memory resident, and then infect each executable file as it
|
||
is run.
|
||
|
||
On Friday The 13ths, the 1720 Virus will activate the first time an
|
||
infected program is executed. When the program is executed, it will
|
||
be deleted from disk. More damaging, however, is that the 1720 virus
|
||
will check to see if the system has a hard disk drive. If a hard
|
||
disk drive is present, the virus will overwrite the boot sector and
|
||
partition table resulting in all data on the hard disk becoming
|
||
unavailable. The system will also appear to hang.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: 4096
|
||
Aliases: Century Virus, FroDo, IDF Virus, Stealth Virus, 100 Years Virus
|
||
V Status: Common
|
||
Discovery: January, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM, .EXE, & overlay file growth; TSR hides growth; crosslinks;
|
||
corruption of data files
|
||
Origin: Israel
|
||
Eff Length: 4,096 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V53+, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, VirexPC 1.1+,
|
||
AVTK 3.5+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: CleanUp V62+, Pro-Scan 1.4+, F-Prot, VirHunt 2.0+,
|
||
NAV, or see note below
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The 4096 virus was first isolated in January, 1990. This virus
|
||
is considered a Stealth virus in that it is almost invisible
|
||
to the system user.
|
||
|
||
The 4096 virus infects .COM, .EXE, and Overlay files, adding
|
||
4,096 bytes to their length. Once the virus is resident in
|
||
system memory, the increase in length will not appear in a
|
||
directory listing. Once this virus has installed itself into
|
||
memory, it will infect any executable file that is opened,
|
||
including if it is opened with the COPY or XCOPY command.
|
||
|
||
This virus is destructive to both data files and executable
|
||
files, as it very slowly crosslinks files on the system's
|
||
disk. The crosslinking occurs so slowly that it appears there
|
||
is a hardware problem, the virus being almost invisible. The
|
||
crosslinking of files is the result of the virus manipulating
|
||
the FATs, changing the number of available sectors, as well as
|
||
the user issuing CHKDSK/F commands which will think that the
|
||
files have lost sectors or crosslinking if the virus is in
|
||
memory.
|
||
|
||
As a side note, if the virus is present in memory and you
|
||
attempt to copy infected files, the new copy of the file will
|
||
not be infected with the virus if the new copy does not have
|
||
an executable file extension. Thus, one way to disinfect
|
||
a system is to copy off all the infected files to diskettes with a
|
||
non-executable file extension (ie. don't use .EXE, .COM, .SYS, etc)
|
||
while the virus is active in memory, then power off the system
|
||
and reboot from a write protected (uninfected) system disk.
|
||
Once rebooted and the virus is not in memory, delete the
|
||
infected files and copy back the files from the diskettes to the
|
||
original executable file names and extensions.
|
||
|
||
The above will disinfect the system, if done correctly, but
|
||
will still leave the problem of cross-linked files which are
|
||
permanently damaged.
|
||
|
||
On or after September 22 of any year, the 4096 virus will hang
|
||
infected systems. This appears to be a "bug" in the virus in that
|
||
it goes into a time consuming loop.
|
||
|
||
The 4096 virus also contains a boot-sector within its code, however,
|
||
it is never written out to the disk's boot sector. Moving this
|
||
boot sector to the boot sector of a diskette and rebooting the
|
||
system will result in the message "FRODO LIVES" being displayed.
|
||
September 22 is Bilbo and Frodo Baggin's birthday in the Lord Of
|
||
The Rings trilogy.
|
||
|
||
An important note on the 4096 virus: this virus will also infect some
|
||
data files. When this occurs, the data files will appear to be fine
|
||
on infected systems. However, after the system is later disinfected,
|
||
these files will now be corrupted and unpredictable results may occur.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of the 4096 virus include:
|
||
4096-B : Similar to the 4096 virus, the main change is that the
|
||
encryption mechanism has been changed in order to avoid
|
||
detection.
|
||
4096-C : Isolated in January, 1991, this variant of 4096 is similar
|
||
to the original virus. The major difference is that the
|
||
DOS ChkDsk command will not show any cross-linking of files
|
||
or lost clusters. A symptom of infection by this variant
|
||
is that the disk space available according to a DIR command
|
||
will be more than the disk space available according to the
|
||
DOS ChkDsk program.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: 4870 Overwriting
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: February, 1991
|
||
Origin: Unknown
|
||
Symptoms: Programs fail to execute; Program corruption
|
||
Eff Length: 4,870 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: ONAK - Overwriting Non-Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method:
|
||
Removal Instructions: Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The 4870 Overwriting Virus was isolated in February, 1991. It's origin
|
||
or isolation point is not known. This virus is a non-resident direct
|
||
action virus that infects .COM and .EXE programs, including
|
||
COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the 4870 Overwriting Virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will search the current directory for an uninfected .COM or
|
||
.EXE file. The first such uninfected file located will be infected
|
||
by the virus. Infected programs will have the first 4,870 bytes of
|
||
the candidate program overwritten by the virus. If the program's
|
||
original length was 4,870 bytes or more, there will be no increase in
|
||
the file length in the DOS directory. If the program's original
|
||
length was less than 4,870 bytes, then the program's length in the DOS
|
||
directory will now be 4,870 bytes. The file's date and time in the
|
||
directory will not be altered.
|
||
|
||
Programs infected with the 4870 Overwriting Virus will not execute
|
||
properly. Once the virus checked for a program to infect, and infected
|
||
the candidate program if one was found, the virus will terminate and
|
||
return the user to a DOS prompt.
|
||
|
||
A side note on this virus: the virus itself is compressed with the
|
||
LZEXE utility, which accounts for much of the 4,870 bytes of viral code.
|
||
Programs infected with this virus will have the markers of LZEXE version
|
||
.91 found in the first 4,870 bytes of the infected program.
|
||
|
||
It is not possible to disinfect programs infected with the 4870
|
||
Overwriting Virus as the first 4,870 bytes of the original program
|
||
are lost. Infected programs must be deleted or erased, then replaced
|
||
with clean copies.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: 5120
|
||
Aliases: VBasic Virus, Basic Virus
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: May, 1990
|
||
Origin: West Germany
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth, file corruption, unexpected disk activity
|
||
Eff Length: 5,120 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNAK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan/X V67+, Pro-Scan 1.4+, F-Prot 1.12+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D/X, Pro-Scan 1.4+, F-Prot 1.12+, Pro-Scan 2.01+,
|
||
or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The 5120 Virus was first isolated in May, 1990. It is a non-
|
||
resident generic file infector, infecting .COM and .EXE files,
|
||
including COMMAND.COM. This virus is was written in compiled Turbo
|
||
Basic with some assembly language.
|
||
|
||
When an infected file is executed, the 5120 virus will infect one
|
||
.COM and one .EXE file on the current drive and directory, followed
|
||
by attempting to infect one randomly selected .COM or .EXE file in
|
||
each directory on the system's C: drive. Infected .COM files increase
|
||
in length by 5,120 bytes. .EXE files infected by the 5120 Virus will
|
||
increase in length by between 5,120 and 5,135 bytes.
|
||
|
||
Unlike most of the MS-DOS viruses, the 5120 Virus does not intercept
|
||
disk write errors when attempting to infect programs. Thus, infected
|
||
systems may notice disk write error messages when no access should be
|
||
occurring for a drive, such as the C: hard disk partition.
|
||
|
||
Data files may become corrupted on infected systems, as well as
|
||
crosslinking of files may occur.
|
||
|
||
The following text strings can be found in files infected with the
|
||
5120 virus. These strings will appear near the end of the file:
|
||
|
||
"BASRUN"
|
||
"BRUN"
|
||
"IBMBIO.COM"
|
||
"IBMDOS.COM"
|
||
"COMMAND.COM"
|
||
"Access denied"
|
||
|
||
There is one variant of the 5120 Virus which does not contain the
|
||
above strings, but behaves in a very similar manner. This second
|
||
variant is not indicated here as the author does not have a copy.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: AIDS
|
||
Aliases: Hahaha, Taunt, VGA2CGA
|
||
V Status: Endangered
|
||
Discovery: 1989
|
||
Symptoms: Message, .COM file corruption
|
||
Origin:
|
||
Eff Length: N/A
|
||
Type Code: ONC - Overwriting Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan/X V67+, Pro-Scan, VirexPC 1.1+, AVTK 3.5+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D/X, or delete infected .COM files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The AIDS virus, also known as the Hahaha virus in Europe and
|
||
referred to as the Taunt virus by IBM, is a generic .COM and
|
||
.EXE file infector. When the virus activates, it displays the
|
||
message "Your computer now has AIDS", with AIDS covering
|
||
about half of the screen. The system is then halted, and
|
||
must be powered down and rebooted to restart it. Since this
|
||
virus overwrites the first 13,952 bytes of the executable program, the
|
||
files must be deleted and replaced with clean copies in order
|
||
to remove the virus. It is not possible to recover the
|
||
overwritten portion of the program.
|
||
|
||
Note: this is NOT the Aids Info Disk/PC Cyborg Trojan.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of Aids are:
|
||
Aids B : Very similar to the original Aids Virus, this variant is also
|
||
13,952 bytes in length. Unlike the original virus, it will
|
||
only infect .COM files, as well as COMMAND.COM, and does not
|
||
activate as the original virus did. Instead, this variant
|
||
will occasionally issue the following error message:
|
||
"I/O error 99, PC=2EFD
|
||
Program aborted".
|
||
This variant was received in January, 1991, origin unknown.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Aids II Virus
|
||
Aliases: Companion Virus
|
||
V Status: Endangered
|
||
Discovery: April, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: Creates .COM files, melody, message
|
||
Origin:
|
||
Eff Length: 8,064 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: SNA - Spawning Non-Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan/X V67+, Pro-Scan 1.4+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D/X, or delete corresponding .COM files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Aids II Virus, or Companion Virus, was isolated for the first
|
||
time in April 1990. Unlike other generic file infectors, the
|
||
Aids II Virus is the first known virus to employ what could be
|
||
termed a "corresponding file technique" of infection so that the
|
||
original target .EXE file is never changed. The virus takes
|
||
advantage of the DOS feature where if a program exists in both
|
||
.COM and .EXE form, the .COM file will be executed.
|
||
|
||
The Aids II Virus does not directly infect .EXE files, instead it
|
||
stores a copy of the virus in a corresponding .COM file which will
|
||
be executed when the user tries to execute one of his .COM files.
|
||
The .EXE file, and the .COM file containing the viral code will
|
||
both have the same base file name.
|
||
|
||
The method of infection is as follows: when an "infected"
|
||
program is executed, since a corresponding .COM file exists, the
|
||
.COM file containing the viral code is executed. The virus
|
||
first locates an uninfected .EXE file in the current directory and
|
||
creates a corresponding (or companion) .COM file with the viral
|
||
code. These .COM files will always be 8,064 Bytes in length with
|
||
a file date/time of the date/time of infection. The .EXE file is
|
||
not altered at all. After creating the new .COM file, the virus
|
||
then plays a melody and displays the following message, the "*"
|
||
indicated below actually being ansi heart characters:
|
||
|
||
"Your computer is infected with ...
|
||
|
||
* Aids Virus II *
|
||
|
||
- Signed WOP & PGT of DutchCrack -"
|
||
|
||
The Aids II Virus then spawns to the .EXE file that was attempting
|
||
to be executed, and the program runs without problem. After
|
||
completion of the program, control returns to the Aids II Virus.
|
||
The melody is played again with the following message displayed:
|
||
|
||
"Getting used to me?
|
||
|
||
Next time, use a Condom ....."
|
||
|
||
Since the original .EXE file remains unaltered, CRC checking
|
||
programs cannot detect this virus having infected a system.
|
||
|
||
One way to manually remove the Aids II Virus is to check the
|
||
disk for programs which have both a .EXE and a .COM file, with
|
||
the .COM file having a length of 8,064 bytes. The .COM files
|
||
thus identified should be erased.
|
||
|
||
The displayed text strings do not appear in the viral code.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: AirCop
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: July, 1990
|
||
Isolated: Washington, USA
|
||
Symptoms: BSC; System Halt; Message; decrease in system and free memory
|
||
Origin: Taiwan
|
||
Eff Length: N/A
|
||
Type Code: FR - Resident Floppy Boot Sector Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V66+, Pro-Scan 2.01+
|
||
Removal Instructions: MDisk or DOS SYS command
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The AirCop Virus was discovered in the State of Washington in the
|
||
United States in July, 1990. Some early infections of this virus,
|
||
however, have been traced back to Taiwan, and Taiwan is probably where
|
||
it originated. AirCop is a boot sector infector, and it will only
|
||
infect 360K 5.25" floppy diskettes.
|
||
|
||
When a system is booted from a diskette which is infected with the
|
||
AirCop virus, the virus will install itself memory resident. The
|
||
AirCop Virus installs itself memory resident at the top of high system
|
||
memory. The system memory size and available free memory will
|
||
decrease by 1,024 bytes when the AirCop virus is memory resident.
|
||
AirCop hooks interrupt 13.
|
||
|
||
Once AirCop is memory resident, any non-write protected diskettes
|
||
which are then accessed will have their boot sector infected with
|
||
the AirCop virus. AirCop will copy the original disk boot sector
|
||
to sector 719 (Side 1, Cyl 39, Sector 9 on a normal 360K 5.25"
|
||
diskette) and then replace the boot sector at sector 0 with a copy
|
||
of the virus. If a boot sector of a diskette infected with the
|
||
AirCop virus is viewed, it will be missing almost all of the messages
|
||
which normally appear in a normal boot sector. The only message
|
||
remaining will be:
|
||
|
||
"Non-system..."
|
||
|
||
This will be located just before the end of the boot sector.
|
||
|
||
The AirCop Virus will do one of two things on infected systems,
|
||
depending on how compatible the system's software and hardware is
|
||
with the virus. On most systems, the virus will display the following
|
||
message at random intervals:
|
||
|
||
"Red State, Germ Offensive.
|
||
AIRCOP."
|
||
|
||
On other systems, the virus being present will result in the system
|
||
receiving a Stack Overflow Error and the system being halted. In this
|
||
case, you must power off the system in order to be able to reboot.
|
||
|
||
AirCop currently does not infect hard disk boot sectors or partition
|
||
tables.
|
||
|
||
AirCop can be removed from infected diskettes by first powering
|
||
off the system and rebooting from a known clean write protected
|
||
DOS master diskette. The DOS SYS command should then be used to
|
||
replace the infected diskette's boot sector. Alternately, MDisk
|
||
can be used following the power-down and reboot.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Akuku
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: January, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth; "Error in EXE file" message;
|
||
Unexpected drive accesses
|
||
Origin: USSR
|
||
Eff Length: 891 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNAK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Akuku Virus was isolated in January, 1991, and comes from the
|
||
USSR. This virus is a non-resident direct action infector of .COM and
|
||
.EXE files, including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with Akuku is executed, the virus will infect
|
||
three programs in the current directory. If three uninfected programs
|
||
cannot be found in the current directory, the virus will search the
|
||
disk directory of the current drive, as well as of the C: drive.
|
||
Both .COM and .EXE programs may become infected, as well as COMMAND.COM.
|
||
Programs smaller than 1K will not be infected by this virus. Infected
|
||
programs will increase in length by 891 to 907 bytes, the virus will be
|
||
located at the end of the infected file. The file date and time in the
|
||
disk directory will not be altered by the virus.
|
||
|
||
The following text string is contained within the virus's code, and
|
||
can be found in all infected programs:
|
||
|
||
"A kuku, Nastepny komornik !!!"
|
||
|
||
Some .EXE programs will fail to execute properly after infection by the
|
||
Akuku Virus. These programs may display an "Error in EXE file"
|
||
message and terminate when the user attempts to execute them.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Alabama
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Endangered
|
||
Discovery: October, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: .EXE growth, Resident (see text), message, FAT corruption
|
||
Origin: Israel
|
||
Eff Length: 1,560 bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRfET - Parasitic Resident .EXE infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan/X V67+, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, AVTK 3.5+,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: CleanUp, F-Prot, Pro-Scan 1.4+, Scan/D/X, VirHunt 2.0+,
|
||
or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Alabama virus was first isolated at Hebrew University in
|
||
Israel by Ysrael Radai in October, 1989. Its first known
|
||
activation was on October 13, 1989. The Alabama virus will
|
||
infect .EXE files, increasing their size by 1,560 bytes. It
|
||
installs itself memory resident when the first program infected
|
||
with the virus is executed, however it doesn't use the normal
|
||
TSR function. Instead, this virus hooks Int 9 as well as making
|
||
use of IN and OUT commands. When a CTL-ALT-DEL combination is
|
||
detected, the virus causes an apparent boot but remains in RAM.
|
||
The virus loads itself 30K under the highest memory location
|
||
reported by DOS, and does not lower the amount of memory
|
||
reported by BIOS or DOS.
|
||
|
||
After the virus has been memory resident for one hour, the
|
||
following message will appear in a flashing box:
|
||
|
||
"SOFTWARE COPIES PROHIBITED BY INTERNATIONAL LAW..............
|
||
Box 1055 Tuscambia ALABAMA USA."
|
||
|
||
The Alabama virus uses a complex mechanism to determine whether
|
||
or not to infect the current file. First, it checks to see if
|
||
there is an uninfected file in the current directory, if there
|
||
is one it infects it. Only if there are no uninfected files
|
||
in the current directory is the program being executed
|
||
infected. However, sometimes instead of infecting the
|
||
uninfected candidate file, it will instead manipulate the FATs
|
||
to exchange the uninfected candidate file with the currently
|
||
executed file without renaming it, so the user ends up thinking
|
||
he is executing one file when in effect he is actually
|
||
executing another one. The end result is that files are
|
||
slowly lost on infected systems. This file swapping occurs
|
||
when the virus activates on ANY Friday.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Alameda
|
||
Aliases: Merritt, Peking, Seoul, Yale
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: 1987
|
||
Symptoms: Floppy boot failures, Resident-TOM, BSC
|
||
Origin: California, USA
|
||
Eff Length: N/A
|
||
Type Code: RtF - Resident Floppy Boot Sector Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan, F-Prot, IBM Scan, AVTK 3.5+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: MDisk, CleanUp, F-Prot, NAV, or DOS SYS
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Alameda virus was first discovered at Merritt college in
|
||
Alameda, California in 1987. The original version of this virus
|
||
caused no intentional damage, though there is now at least 1
|
||
variant of this virus that now causes floppy disks to become
|
||
unbootable after a counter has reached its limit (Alameda-C
|
||
virus).
|
||
|
||
The Alameda virus, and its variants, all replicate when the
|
||
system is booted with a CTL-ALT-DEL and infect only 5 1/4"
|
||
360K diskettes. These viruses do stay in memory thru a warm
|
||
reboot, and will infect both system and non-system disks.
|
||
System memory can be infected on a warm boot even if Basic is
|
||
loaded instead of DOS.
|
||
|
||
The virus saves the real boot sector at track 39, sector 8,
|
||
head 0. The original version of the Alameda virus would only
|
||
run on a 8086/8088 machine, though later versions can now run
|
||
on 80286 systems.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Golden Gate, SF Virus
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Ambulance Car Virus
|
||
Aliases: RedX
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: June, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth, graphic display & sound
|
||
Origin: West Germany
|
||
Eff Length: 796 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNC - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V64+, F-Prot 1.12+, Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Ambulance Car Virus was isolated in West Germany in June, 1990.
|
||
This virus is a non-resident .COM infector.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the Ambulance Car Virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will attempt to infect one .COM file. The .COM file to
|
||
be infected will be located on the C: drive. This virus only infects
|
||
one .COM file in any directory, and never the first .COM file in
|
||
the directory. It avoids infecting COMMAND.COM as that file is
|
||
normally the first .COM file in the root directory.
|
||
|
||
On a random basis, when an infected file is executed it will
|
||
have the affect of a graphics display of an ASCII block drawing of
|
||
an ambulance moving across the bottom of the system display. This
|
||
graphics display will be accompanied with the sound of a siren
|
||
played on the system's speaker. Both of these effects only occur
|
||
on systems with a graphics capable display adapter.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Amstrad
|
||
Aliases: Amstrad 2, S-847, Pixel, Pixel 2
|
||
V Status: Endangered
|
||
Discovery: November, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth, message
|
||
Origin: Portugal
|
||
Eff Length: 847 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNC - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan/X V67+, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, VirexPC 1.1+,
|
||
AVTK 3.5+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D/X, F-Prot, Pro-Scan 1.4+, or
|
||
delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Amstrad virus was first reported in November, 1989, by
|
||
Jean Luz of Portugal, however it has been known of in Spain
|
||
and Portugal for a year prior to that. The virus is a generic
|
||
.COM infector, but is not memory resident nor does it infect
|
||
COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The virus carries a fake advertisement for the Amstrad computer.
|
||
|
||
The Amstrad virus appears to cause no other damage to the
|
||
system other than replicating and infecting files.
|
||
|
||
Known variants of the Amstrad Virus are:
|
||
Pixel/V-345 - Similar to the Amstrad virus described above, except
|
||
that the virus is 345 Bytes in length, can now infect
|
||
COMMAND.COM, and contains the message:
|
||
"=!= Program sick error:Call doctor or by PIXEL for
|
||
cure description". This message is not displayed.
|
||
The Pixel virus was originally distributed in Greece
|
||
by Pixel magazine. The Pixel Virus can only infect
|
||
programs in the current directory. This variant may
|
||
in fact be the original virus in this family, it is
|
||
rumored that it was released one year before the
|
||
appearance of the virus in Portugal.
|
||
Origin: Greece
|
||
Pixel 2 - Similar to other members of this family, this variant was
|
||
submitted in March 1991 from Europe. Infected files will
|
||
increase in size by 850 bytes, with the virus being
|
||
located at the beginning of the infected program. This
|
||
variant contains the same message as Pixel indicated
|
||
above.
|
||
S-847 - S-847 is the original "dropper" file of the Pixel 2 virus.
|
||
This program is 384 bytes in length, and when executed
|
||
will infect all .COM files in the current directory with
|
||
Pixel 2.
|
||
V-277 - Similar to the Pixel/V-345 virus described above, except
|
||
that the virus is now 277 Bytes in length, and does not
|
||
contain any message text. The original message text
|
||
has been replaced with code to produce a parity error
|
||
approximately 50% of the time when an infected program
|
||
is executed.
|
||
Origin: Bulgaria
|
||
V-299 - Similar to Pixel, except that the length of the virus
|
||
is 299 Bytes.
|
||
Origin: Bulgaria
|
||
V-847 - Similar to Pixel, except that the length of the virus
|
||
is 847 Bytes.
|
||
Origin: Bulgaria
|
||
V-847B - Similar to V-847, except that the message in the virus
|
||
is now in Spanish and is:
|
||
"=!= En tu PC hay un virus RV1, y esta es su quinta
|
||
generacion".
|
||
This variant was originally distributed by a magazine
|
||
in Spain in file NOCARGAR.COM.
|
||
Origin: Spain
|
||
V-852 - Similar to the V-847 variant, this variant does not
|
||
contain any message. It infects all .COM files in the
|
||
current directory whenever an infected program is
|
||
executed. If the current directory contains COMMAND.COM,
|
||
it will be infected as well. The original sample of this
|
||
variant received by the author did not contain any text,
|
||
however after replicating on a test system, all infected
|
||
files then contained text from the video buffer, which
|
||
implies the submitted sample was the original distribution
|
||
of the virus. This variant checks byte 4 of .COM files
|
||
to determine if the file was previously infected, if
|
||
bytes 4-5 are 'SS', the virus assumes the file is already
|
||
infected. All infected programs will start with the
|
||
following hex string, with the nn indicated being a
|
||
generation number:
|
||
"EB14905353nn2A2E434F4D004F040000"
|
||
Origin: Bulgaria
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Anthrax
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: July, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth
|
||
Origin: Bulgaria
|
||
Isolated: Netherlands
|
||
Eff Length: 1040 - 1279 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRAKX - Parasitic Resident .COM, .EXE, & Partition Table Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V66+, Pro-Scan 2.01+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D + MDisk/P, Pro-Scan 2.01+
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Anthrax Virus was isolated in July 1990 in the Netherlands after
|
||
it was uploaded onto several BBSes in a trojan anti-viral program,
|
||
USCAN.ZIP. It is the second virus to be found in a copy of UScan
|
||
during July 1990, the first virus being V2100. Anthrax is a memory
|
||
resident generic infector of .COM and .EXE files, including
|
||
COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Anthrax virus is executed
|
||
on the system's hard disk, the virus will infect the hard disk's
|
||
partition table. At this point, the virus is not memory resident. It
|
||
will also write a copy of itself on the last few sectors of the
|
||
system's hard disk. If data existed on those last few sectors of the
|
||
hard disk, it will be destroyed.
|
||
|
||
When the system is booted from the hard disk, the Anthrax virus
|
||
will install itself memory resident. It will remain memory resident
|
||
until the first program is executed. At that time, it will deinstall
|
||
itself from being resident and infect one .COM or .EXE file. This
|
||
virus does not infect files in the current directory first, but
|
||
instead starts to infect files at the lowest level of the disk's
|
||
directory tree.
|
||
|
||
Later, when an infected program is executed, Anthrax will infect one
|
||
.COM or .EXE file, searching the directory structure from the lowest
|
||
level of the directory tree. If the executed infected program
|
||
was located on the floppy drive, a .COM or .EXE file may or may not
|
||
be infected.
|
||
|
||
The Anthrax Virus's code is 1,024 bytes long, but infected programs
|
||
will increase in length by 1,040 to 1,279 bytes. On the author's test
|
||
system, the largest increase in length experienced was 1,232 bytes.
|
||
Infected files will always have an infected file length that is a
|
||
multiple of 16.
|
||
|
||
The following text strings can be found in files infected with the
|
||
Anthrax virus:
|
||
|
||
"(c)Damage, Inc."
|
||
"ANTHRAX"
|
||
|
||
A third text string occurs in the viral code, but it is in Cyrillics.
|
||
Per Vesselin Bontchev, this third string translates to: "Sofia 1990".
|
||
|
||
Since Anthrax infects the hard disk partition tables, infected systems
|
||
must have the partition table disinfected or rebuilt in order to
|
||
remove the virus. This disinfection can be done with either a low-
|
||
level format or use of the MDisk/P program for the correct DOS
|
||
version after powering off and rebooting from a write-protected boot
|
||
diskette for the system. Any .COM or .EXE files infected with
|
||
Anthrax must also be disinfected or erased. Since a copy of the virus
|
||
will exist on the last few sectors of the drive, these must also be
|
||
located and overwritten.
|
||
|
||
Anthrax interacts with another virus: V2100. If a system which was
|
||
previously infected with Anthrax should become infected with the V2100
|
||
virus, the V2100 virus will check the last few sectors of the hard
|
||
disk for the spare copy of Anthrax. If the spare copy is found, then
|
||
Anthrax will be copied to the hard disk's partition table.
|
||
|
||
It is not known if Anthrax carries any destructive capabilities or
|
||
trigger/activation dates.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Anti-Pascal
|
||
Aliases: Anti-Pascal 605 Virus, AP-605, C-605, V605
|
||
V Status: Research
|
||
Discovery: June, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth, .BAK and .PAS file corruption
|
||
Origin: Bulgaria
|
||
Isolated: Sofia, Bulgaria
|
||
Eff Length: 605 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan/X V67+, Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Pro-Scan 2.01+, Scan/D/X, NAV, or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Anti-Pascal Virus, V605 or C-605, was isolated in Sofia,
|
||
Bulgaria in June 1990 by Vesselin Bontchev. Originally, it was
|
||
thought that the Anti-Pascal virus was from the USSR or Poland,
|
||
but it has since been determined to have been a research virus
|
||
written in Bulgaria over one year before it was isolated. The
|
||
author was not aware that it had "escaped" until July, 1990.
|
||
|
||
The Anti-Pascal Virus is a generic .COM file infector, including
|
||
COMMAND.COM. While this virus is not memory resident, when it is
|
||
in the process of infecting files, interrupt 24 will be hooked.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the Anti-Pascal virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will attempt to infect two other .COM files on the
|
||
current drive or on drive D: which are between 605 and 64,930
|
||
bytes in length. These files must not have the read only
|
||
attribute set. If an uninfected .COM file meeting the virus's
|
||
selection criteria is found, the first 605 bytes of the program
|
||
is overwritten with the viral code. The original 605 bytes of
|
||
the program is then appended to the end of the infected file.
|
||
Infected files will have increased in length by 605 bytes, and
|
||
they will also begin with the text string "PQVWS" as well as
|
||
contain the string "combakpas???exe" at offset 0x17. Infected
|
||
files will also have had their file date/time stamps in the
|
||
directory updated to the date/time that the infection occurred.
|
||
|
||
If the Anti-Pascal Virus cannot find two .COM files to infect,
|
||
it will check the current drive and directory for .BAK and .PAS
|
||
files. If these files exist, they will be overwritten with the
|
||
virus's code. If the overwritten files were .PAS files, the
|
||
system's user has now lost some of their Pascal source code.
|
||
After overwriting .BAK and .PAS files, the virus will attempt to
|
||
rename them to .COM files, or .EXE files if a .COM file already
|
||
exists. This rename does not work due to a bug in the virus.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of the Anti-Pascal Virus are:
|
||
AP-529 : Similar to the 605 byte Anti-Pascal Virus, the major
|
||
differences are that AP-529 will only infect .COM files
|
||
over 2,048 bytes in length. Infected files increase in
|
||
length by 529 bytes. Additionally, instead of overwriting
|
||
the .BAK and .PAS files, one .BAK and .PAS file will be
|
||
deleted if there are no uninfected .COM files with a
|
||
length of at least 2,048 bytes on the current drive.
|
||
.COM files on the C: drive root directory may also be
|
||
infected by AP-529 when it is executed from the A: or B:
|
||
drive. This variant should be considered a "Research
|
||
Virus", it is not believed to have been publicly
|
||
released.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Anti-Pascal II
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Anti-Pascal II
|
||
Aliases: Anti-Pascal 400, AP-400
|
||
V Status: Research
|
||
Discovery: June, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth; .BAK, .BAT and .PAS file deletion, boot sector
|
||
alteration on hard disk
|
||
Origin: Bulgaria
|
||
Isolated: Sofia, Bulgaria
|
||
Eff Length: 400 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan/X V67+, Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Pro-Scan 2.01+, Scan/D/X, or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Anti-Pascal II Virus, or AP-400, was isolated in Sofia,
|
||
Bulgaria in June 1990 by Vesselin Bontchev. It is one of five
|
||
viruses/variants in the Anti-Pascal family. Two of the earlier
|
||
variants, Anti-Pascal/AP-605 and AP-529, are documented under
|
||
the name "Anti-Pascal". The variants listed under Anti-Pascal II
|
||
have been separated due to some of their characteristics differing
|
||
from the 605 byte and 529 byte viruses.
|
||
|
||
The Anti-Pascal II Virus is a generic .COM file infector, including
|
||
COMMAND.COM. While this virus is not memory resident, when it is
|
||
in the process of infecting files, interrupt 21 will be hooked.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Anti-Pascal II virus is
|
||
executed on a system, the virus will attempt to infect one (1)
|
||
.COM file in the root directory of each drive accessible on the
|
||
system. Files are only infected if their length is at least 2,048
|
||
bytes, and the resulting infected file will be less than 64K in
|
||
length. Since COMMAND.COM is usually the first .COM file on a
|
||
drive, it will immediately become infected. One additional .COM
|
||
file will also be infected on the current drive. The mechanism used
|
||
to infect the file is to write the virus's code to the end of the
|
||
file. A jump is used to execute the virus's code before the original
|
||
program is executed. Infected files do not have their date/time
|
||
stamps in the directory updated to the system date and time when the
|
||
infection occurred.
|
||
|
||
If the Anti-Pascal Virus cannot find a .COM file to infect on a
|
||
given drive, or two .COM files to infect on the current drive,
|
||
it will check for the existence of .BAK, .PAS, or .BAT files. If
|
||
found, these files will be deleted. These deletions only occur in
|
||
root directories and on the current drive's current directory. Since
|
||
each root directory (as well as the current directory) will typically
|
||
not have all of its .COM files infected at the same time, the deletes
|
||
will occur on different drives and directories at different times.
|
||
|
||
Symptoms of infection of the Anti-Pascal II Virus include file length
|
||
increases of 400 bytes, unexpected disk access to drives other than
|
||
the current drive, and disappearing .BAK, .PAS, and .BAT files. One
|
||
other symptom of an Anti-Pascal II infection is that the hard disk's
|
||
boot sector will be slightly altered by the virus. Anti-viral programs
|
||
which CRC-check the boot sector will indicate that a boot sector
|
||
infection may have occurred. The boot sector alteration does not
|
||
contain a live virus, but will throw the system user off into thinking
|
||
their problem is from a boot sector virus instead of a file infector,
|
||
and if the disk as a bootable disk, it will not be unbootable.
|
||
|
||
The Anti-Pascal II Virus and its variants indicated below are not
|
||
believed to have been publicly released. As such, they have been
|
||
classified as "Research Viruses".
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of the Anti-Pascal II Virus are:
|
||
AP-440 : Very similar to the 400 byte version of the Anti-Pascal II
|
||
Virus, the major characteristic change is that this
|
||
variant has a length of 440 bytes. The boot sector is no
|
||
longer altered by the virus. This variant is an
|
||
intermediary between AP-480 and the 400 byte version
|
||
documented above.
|
||
AP-480 : Similar to the Anti-Pascal II virus, this variant is the
|
||
version which is 480 bytes in length. It does not
|
||
delete .BAT files, but only .BAK and .PAS. This variant
|
||
is the latest variant of the Anti-Pascal II grouping.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Anti-Pascal
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: AntiChrist
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: New
|
||
Discovery: March, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .EXE growth; decrease in total system and available free memory
|
||
Origin: USA
|
||
Eff Length: 1,008 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRhE - Parasitic Resident .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V76+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete Infected Files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The AntiChrist Virus was submitted in March, 1991, by David Grant of the
|
||
United States. This virus is a memory resident infector of .EXE files,
|
||
and is related to the Murphy Virus from Bulgaria.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with AntiChrist is executed, the
|
||
virus will install itself memory resident at the top of system memory
|
||
but below the 640K DOS boundary. Interrupt 12's return is not moved.
|
||
Total system memory, and available free memory, as indicated by the
|
||
DOS ChkDsk program will decrease by 1,040 bytes. Interrupt 21 is
|
||
hooked by the virus.
|
||
|
||
After AntiChrist is memory resident, it will infect .EXE programs
|
||
greater than 1K in length when they are executed or openned for any
|
||
reason. Infected programs will have a file length increase of 1,008
|
||
bytes, the virus will be located at the end of the infected file. The
|
||
disk directory date and time will not be altered.
|
||
|
||
Of the two samples submitted, one was not a natural infection of
|
||
AntiChrist as it was on a .COM program. This virus may be a research
|
||
virus and not in the public domain at the time it was submitted.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Murphy
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Arf
|
||
Aliases: Rigor Mortis, Thor
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: March, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth; Messages
|
||
Origin: United States
|
||
Eff Length: 1,000 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: Scan V75+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Arf, Thor, or Rigor Mortis Virus was submitted in March, 1991 from
|
||
the United States. This virus is a non-resident infector of .COM
|
||
files, including COMMAND.COM. Arf is based on the Vienna Virus, and
|
||
some anti-viral programs may identify it as Vienna.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with Arf is executed, the virus will check to
|
||
see if COMMAND.COM has been previously infected. If it is not infected,
|
||
the virus will infect it and display the message:
|
||
|
||
"Rigor Mortis !!!
|
||
I am Hi.pas"
|
||
|
||
After checking (and possibly infecting) COMMAND.COM, the virus will
|
||
search the current directory for one .COM program to infect. If an
|
||
uninfected .COM program is found, it will be infected with the following
|
||
message being displayed:
|
||
|
||
"Arf krad krad krad
|
||
krad krad kr"
|
||
|
||
The virus will then proceed to check the B: drive for a file to infect.
|
||
|
||
Files infected with the Arf virus will have a file length increase of
|
||
1,000 bytes. The virus will be located at the end of the infected
|
||
program. The above text messages can be found within the infected
|
||
files.
|
||
|
||
The Arf Virus may not be in the public domain, the original sample
|
||
submitted is not a natural infection of the virus. Its name is due to
|
||
the "Arf" string displayed when files other than COMMAND.COM are
|
||
infected. Its alias of Thor is because it is believed to have been
|
||
written by a group calling itself Thor.
|
||
|
||
Note: the original sample of this virus was on an .EXE file, and is
|
||
not a natural infection. This virus may be a research virus and not
|
||
in the public domain.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Armagedon
|
||
Aliases: Armagedon The First, Armagedon The Greek
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: June, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: text string intermittently sent to COM ports
|
||
Origin: Athens, Greece
|
||
Eff Length: 1,079 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRC - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V64+, F-Prot 1.12+, Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, F-Prot 1.12+, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Armagedon virus was isolated on June 2, 1990, by George
|
||
Spiliotis of Athens, Greece. Armagedon is a memory resident
|
||
virus which infects .COM files, increasing their length by 1,079
|
||
bytes.
|
||
|
||
The first time an infected program is executed on a system, the
|
||
virus installs itself memory resident, hooking interrupts 8 and 21.
|
||
Any .COM files which are later executed are then infected by the
|
||
resident virus.
|
||
|
||
Infected systems will experience the text string "Armagedon the GREEK"
|
||
being sent to COM ports 1 - 4 at time intervals. Between 5:00 and
|
||
7:00, the virus will attempt to use the system's COM ports to make
|
||
a phone call to Local Time Information in Crete, Greece. If a
|
||
connection is made, the phone line will remain open until the user
|
||
notices that the phone line is in use. (Needless to say, this
|
||
doesn't work if the system is located outside of Greece as dialing
|
||
codes are considerably different between countries.)
|
||
|
||
This virus otherwise is not destructive.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Ashar
|
||
Aliases: Shoe_Virus, UIUC Virus
|
||
V Status: Common
|
||
Discovery:
|
||
Symptoms: BSC, Resident TOM
|
||
Origin:
|
||
Eff Length: N/A
|
||
Type Code: BRt - Resident Boot Sector Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V41+, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan 1.4+, AVTK 3.5+,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: MDisk, CleanUp, Pro-Scan 1.4+, F-Prot, NAV, or
|
||
DOS SYS command
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Ashar virus is a resident boot sector infector which is
|
||
a variant of the Brain virus. It differs from the Brain
|
||
virus in that it can infect both floppies and hard disk, and
|
||
the message in the virus has been modified to be:
|
||
|
||
"VIRUS_SHOE RECORD, v9.0. Dedicated to the dynamic
|
||
memories of millions of virus who are no longer with us
|
||
today".
|
||
|
||
However, the above message is never displayed. The
|
||
identification string "ashar" is normally found at offset
|
||
04a6 hex in the virus.
|
||
|
||
A variant of the Ashar virus exists, Ashar-B or Shoe_Virus-B,
|
||
which has been modified so that it can no longer infect hard
|
||
drives. The v9.0 in the message has also been altered to v9.1.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Brain
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Attention!
|
||
Aliases: USSR 394
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: December, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM file growth; decrease in system and available memory;
|
||
clicking emitted from system speaker on keypress; file date/time
|
||
changes
|
||
Origin: USSR
|
||
Eff Length: 394 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRhCK - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Attention! Virus was submitted in December, 1990 and was originally
|
||
isolated in the USSR. This virus is a memory resident infector of COM
|
||
files, including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Attention! Virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will reserve 416 bytes at the top of system memory but below
|
||
the 640K DOS boundary. The virus becomes memory resident in this area,
|
||
and hooks interrupt 21. Total system memory and available free memory
|
||
returned by the DOS ChkDsk command will decrease by 416 bytes. The
|
||
interrupt 12 return is not moved.
|
||
|
||
After the virus is memory resident, a clicking sound will be emitted
|
||
by the system speaker each time a key is pressed on the keyboard. Some
|
||
programs, such as the Edlin program supplied with MS-DOS, will receive
|
||
an "Invalid drive or file name" message when they are attempted to be
|
||
executed.
|
||
|
||
Attention! will infect COM files, including COMMAND.COM, when they are
|
||
executed. The exception is that very small COM files will not become
|
||
infected. Infected files will increase in length by 394 bytes with the
|
||
virus being located at the end of the file. Infected programs will also
|
||
contain the text string: "ATTENTION !" near the beginning of the
|
||
program.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Australian 403
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: February, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM files become 403 bytes in length; TSR;
|
||
File date/time changes; .COM files do not function properly
|
||
Origin: Australia
|
||
Eff Length: 403 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsCK - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method:
|
||
Removal Instructions: Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Australian 403 Virus was submitted in February, 1991 by Colin Keeble
|
||
of Australia. This virus is a memory resident infector of .COM files,
|
||
including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Australian 403 Virus is
|
||
executed, the virus will install itself memory resident as a low system
|
||
memory TSR of 720 bytes. The virus will hook interrupt 21.
|
||
|
||
Once the virus is memory resident, the virus will replace two .COM
|
||
programs in the current directory with a copy of the virus each time
|
||
any program is executed. The replaced programs will have a file length
|
||
of 403 bytes, and their date and time in the disk directory will have
|
||
been altered to the system date and time when infection occurred.
|
||
Needless to say, the replaced programs will not execute properly since
|
||
they now only contain the virus's code.
|
||
|
||
This virus does not do anything besides replicate.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Azusa
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: February, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: BSR; Decrease in total system and available free memory;
|
||
LPT1 & COM1 ports may be disabled
|
||
Origin: USA
|
||
Eff Length: N/A
|
||
Type Code: BRtX - Resident Boot Sector & Partition Table Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V75+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Clean-Up V75+
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Azusa Virus was received in February, 1991. Its origin is unknown.
|
||
This virus is a memory resident infector of diskette boot sectors and
|
||
the hard disk partition table.
|
||
|
||
The first time the system is booted from a diskette infected with the
|
||
Azusa Virus, the virus will become memory resident at the top of
|
||
system memory, but below the 640K DOS boundary. The virus moves the
|
||
Interrupt 12 return so that the system will report 1,024 Bytes less
|
||
memory than is installed on the system. At this time, the virus will
|
||
infect the system's hard disk partition table, overwriting the
|
||
partition table with a copy of the Azusa virus. A copy of the original
|
||
partition table is not stored by the virus.
|
||
|
||
Once Azusa is memory resident, it will infect diskettes when they are
|
||
accessed on the system with write intent (ie: a file is openned as
|
||
output, or with read/write intent) or when attempting to reboot the
|
||
system from a diskette via CTL-ALT-DEL. Diskettes are infected by
|
||
copying the original diskette boot sector to track 40 sector 8, and
|
||
then writing a copy of itself to the diskette's boot sector. On
|
||
diskettes other than 360K 5.25" diskettes, the original boot sector
|
||
will end up in the middle of the disk, possibly corrupting files.
|
||
|
||
The Azusa Virus keeps track of how many times the system has been
|
||
booted from an infected diskette. After 32 boots, the virus will
|
||
disable the COM1 and LPT1 ports on the system, and reset its counter.
|
||
A later boot will result in the ports functioning properly again.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Best Wishes
|
||
Aliases: Best Wish
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: December, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM file growth; decrease in system and available free memory;
|
||
system hangs; file date/time changes; file not found errors;
|
||
boot sector modification
|
||
Origin: USSR
|
||
Eff Length: 970 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRtCK - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Best Wishes Virus was submitted in December, 1990 and is believed
|
||
to be from the USSR. Best Wishes is a memory resident infector of
|
||
COM files, including COMMAND.COM. There is a variant of this virus,
|
||
Best Wishes B, which is 1,024 bytes in length.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Best Wishes Virus is
|
||
executed, the virus will install itself memory resident in system high
|
||
memory, but below the 640K DOS boundary. The interrupt 12 return will
|
||
be moved. Total system memory will decrease by 61,440 bytes, available
|
||
free memory will decrease by 61,360 bytes. COMMAND.COM will become
|
||
infected at this time, and the disk's boot sector will also be modified.
|
||
Disks with the boot sector modification and infected COMMAND.COM will
|
||
still boot properly.
|
||
|
||
After Best Wishes is resident, the virus will infect COM files as they
|
||
are executed with a probability of 50%. Infected COM files will
|
||
increase in length by 970 bytes with the virus being located at the
|
||
end of the infected file. Infected programs will also have the following
|
||
text string located near the end of the file:
|
||
|
||
"This programm ... With Best Wishes!"
|
||
|
||
Best Wishes does not restore the original file date and time in the
|
||
directory when it infects programs, so all infected programs will have
|
||
their date/time stamps set to the system date and time when infection
|
||
occurred.
|
||
|
||
Two additional symptoms of a Best Wishes infection are that the user
|
||
may experience "File not found" errors when the file is actually on
|
||
disk, as well as system hangs on every fourth program execution.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of Best Wishes are:
|
||
Best Wishes B - An earlier version of Best Wishes, this variant is
|
||
1,024 bytes in length. The major differences are that infected
|
||
disks will not boot if COMMAND.COM has been modified. Execution
|
||
of a COM program once the virus is memory resident will result in
|
||
the program most likely being infected, but the system will also
|
||
become hung.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Black Monday
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: September, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE file growth; TSR; file timestamp changes
|
||
Origin: Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
|
||
Eff Length: 1,055 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsAK - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V67+, Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Pro-Scan 2.01+, Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Black Monday Virus was isolated in Fiji in September, 1990. It
|
||
is reported to be widespread in Fiji and other locations in the Far
|
||
East and Asia. This virus is a memory resident generic infector of
|
||
.COM and .EXE files, including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Black Monday Virus is
|
||
executed, the virus will install itself memory resident as a low
|
||
system memory TSR of 2,048 bytes. Interrupt 21 will be hooked by
|
||
the virus.
|
||
|
||
Once the virus is memory resident, any program which is executed
|
||
will become infected with the Black Monday Virus. .COM files will
|
||
increase in length by 1,055 bytes with the virus's code located at
|
||
the end of the infected files. .EXE files will also increase in
|
||
length by 1,055 bytes with the virus's code added to the end of
|
||
the file. This virus does not infect .EXE files multiple times.
|
||
|
||
The virus does not hide the change in file length when the directory
|
||
is displayed, though a directory display will indicated that the
|
||
infected file's date/timestamp have been updated to the system date
|
||
and time when the file was infected.
|
||
|
||
The following text string can be found in all infected files near
|
||
the beginning of the virus's code:
|
||
|
||
"Black Monday 2/3/90 KV KL MAL"
|
||
|
||
It is unknown when Black Monday activates, or what it does at
|
||
activation.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Blood
|
||
Aliases: Blood2
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: August, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM file length increase, system reboots and/or hangs,
|
||
cascading screen effect
|
||
Origin: Natal, Republic of South Africa
|
||
Eff Length: 418 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: Pro-Scan 2.0+, ViruScan V75+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Blood Virus was submitted by Fridrik Skulason in August, 1990.
|
||
It was originally isolated in Natal, Republic of South Africa. There
|
||
are two variants of this virus, Blood and Blood2. This virus is a
|
||
non-resident infector of .COM files, including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the Blood virus is executed, it will
|
||
infect one .COM file located in the C: drive root directory. The
|
||
newly infected file will have increased in length by 418 bytes. If
|
||
the program just infected is COMMAND.COM, a system reboot will
|
||
occur. Following the system reboot, executing an infected program
|
||
will result in a cascading effect of the cursor down the screen. The
|
||
next .COM file executed will then result in the hard disk being
|
||
accessed followed by the system hanging. Spurious characters from
|
||
memory may also appear on the screen on the line below the command
|
||
line.
|
||
|
||
After August 15, execution of an infected program will result in a
|
||
system hang.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of Blood are:
|
||
Blood2 : Similar to Blood, with the major difference being that
|
||
system reboots, system hangs, and the cascading cursor
|
||
effect no longer occur. This variant also does not hang
|
||
the system after August 15.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Bloody!
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: December, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: Extended boot time; decrease in system & available memory;
|
||
message on boot; boot sector & partition table changes
|
||
Origin: Taiwan
|
||
Eff Length: N/A
|
||
Type Code: BRtX - Resident Boot Sector & Partition Table Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V72+
|
||
Removal Instructions: See below
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Bloody! Virus was submitted in December 1990, and infection
|
||
reports were received from Europe, Taiwan, and the United States. This
|
||
virus is a memory resident infector of floppy diskette boot sectors as
|
||
well as the hard disk partition table.
|
||
|
||
When a system is booted from a floppy or hard disk infected with the
|
||
Bloody! Virus, the virus will install itself memory resident at the
|
||
top of system memory but below the 640K DOS boundary. Total system
|
||
memory and available free memory will decrease by 2,048 bytes. The
|
||
interrupt 12 return will be moved. The system boot will also take
|
||
much longer than expected. The system's hard disk's partition table
|
||
will become infected immediately if it was not the source of the
|
||
system boot.
|
||
|
||
At the time of system boot, the virus also maintains a counter of how
|
||
many times the infected diskette or hard drive has been booted. Once
|
||
128 boots have occurred, the virus will display the following message
|
||
during the boot:
|
||
|
||
"Bloody! Jun. 4, 1989"
|
||
|
||
June 4, 1989 is the date of the the confrontation in Beijing, China
|
||
between Chinese students and the Chinese Army in which many students
|
||
were killed.
|
||
|
||
This message will later be displayed on every sixth boot once the
|
||
128 boot limit has been reached. The text message is encrypted within
|
||
the viral code, so it is not visible in the boot sector.
|
||
|
||
Once Bloody! is memory resident, the virus will infect any diskette
|
||
or hard disk when a file or program is accessed. Listing a disk
|
||
directory will not be enough to cause the virus to infect the disk.
|
||
|
||
Infected diskette boot sectors will be missing all of the normal
|
||
DOS error messages which are normally found in the boot sector. The
|
||
original boot sector will have been moved to sector 11 on 360K diskettes,
|
||
a part of the root directory. If there were previously root directory
|
||
entries in that sector, those files will be lost.
|
||
|
||
On the hard disk, the original partition table will have been moved
|
||
to side 0, cylinder 0, sector 6.
|
||
|
||
For floppies of other sizes then 360K, they may become unusable or
|
||
corrupted as the virus does not take into account the existence of these
|
||
disk types.
|
||
|
||
For diskettes, Bloody! can be removed by powering the system off and
|
||
then booting from a known-clean, write protected original DOS diskette.
|
||
The DOS SYS command should then be executed on each of the infected
|
||
diskettes.
|
||
|
||
To remove the Bloody! Virus from the hard disk's partition table, the
|
||
original partition table should be located and then copied back to
|
||
its original position. The other option is to backup the files on
|
||
the hard disk and low level format the drive.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Brain
|
||
Aliases: Pakistani, Pakistani Brain
|
||
V Status: Common
|
||
Discovery: 1986
|
||
Symptoms: Extended boot time, Volume label change, Resident TOM,
|
||
Three contiguous bad sectors (floppy only), BSC
|
||
Origin: Pakistan
|
||
Eff Length: N/A
|
||
Type Code: BRt - Resident Boot Sector Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, AVTK 3.5+,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: MDisk, CleanUp, F-Prot, Pro-Scan, NAV, or
|
||
DOS SYS command
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Pakistani Brain virus originated in Lahore, Pakistan and
|
||
infects disk boot sectors by moving the original contents of the
|
||
boot sector to another location on the disk, marking those 3
|
||
clusters (6 sectors) bad in the FAT, and then writing the virus
|
||
code in the disk boot sector.
|
||
|
||
One sign of a disk having been infected, at least with the
|
||
original virus, is that the volume label will be changed
|
||
to "(c) Brain". Another sign is that the label "(c) Brain" can
|
||
be found in sector 0 (the boot sector) on an infected disk.
|
||
|
||
This virus does install itself resident on infected systems,
|
||
taking up between 3K and 7K of RAM. The Brain virus is able to
|
||
hide from detection by intercepting any interrupt that might
|
||
interrogate the boot sector and redirecting the read to the
|
||
original boot sector located elsewhere on the disk, thus some
|
||
programs will be unable to see the virus.
|
||
|
||
The original Brain virus only infected floppies, however variants
|
||
to the virus can now infect hard disks. Also, some variants
|
||
have had the "(c) Brain" label removed to make them harder to
|
||
detect.
|
||
|
||
Known variants of the Brain virus include:
|
||
Brain-B/Hard Disk Brain/Houston Virus - hard disk version.
|
||
Brain-C - Brain-B with the "(c) Brain" label removed.
|
||
Clone Virus - Brain-C but restores original boot copyright label.
|
||
Clone-B - Clone Virus modified to destroy the FAT after 5/5/92.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Ashar
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Burger
|
||
Aliases: 541, 909090h, CIA
|
||
V Status: Extinct
|
||
Discovery: 1986
|
||
Symptoms: Programs will not run after infection
|
||
Origin: West Germany
|
||
Eff Length: 560 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: ONAK - Overwriting Non-Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V67+, Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan /D, or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Burger, or 909090h, Virus was written and copyrighted in 1986 by
|
||
Ralf Burger of West Germany. This virus is extinct in the "public
|
||
domain". This virus is a non-resident overwriting virus, infecting
|
||
.COM and .EXE files, including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the Burger Virus is executed, the virus
|
||
will attempt to infect one previously uninfected .COM file located in
|
||
the C: drive root directory. To determine if the program was previously
|
||
infected, the virus checks to see if the first three bytes of the .COM
|
||
file are three NOP instructions (909090h). If the first three bytes are
|
||
the NOP instructions, the virus goes on checking until it finds an
|
||
uninfected .COM file. If no uninfected .COM file exists, the virus
|
||
then renames all the .EXE files in the root directory to .COM files and
|
||
checks those files. Once it finds a .COM file to infect, it overwrites
|
||
the first 560 bytes of the uninfected program with the virus code. At
|
||
this point, the program the user was attempting to run will either
|
||
end or hang the system. Infected programs will never execute properly
|
||
as the first portion of the program has been destroyed.
|
||
|
||
Systems which have been infected with the Burger Virus will fail to
|
||
boot once the virus has infected the hard disk boot partition's
|
||
COMMAND.COM, or the copy of COMMAND.COM on their boot diskette.
|
||
|
||
Infected files can be easily identified by the "909090B8000026A245"
|
||
hex sequence located in the first nine bytes of all infected files.
|
||
Infected files cannot be disinfected, they must be replaced from a
|
||
clean source.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of the Burger virus include:
|
||
CIA : Discovered in the United States in October, 1990, this virus
|
||
is similar to the Burger Virus described above. The first
|
||
nine bytes of all infected files in hex will be:
|
||
"909090B8000026A3A5". The actual length of this variant
|
||
is 541 bytes, though the first 560 bytes of infected programs
|
||
are overwritten.
|
||
505 : Similar to the Burger virus, this variant's actual code length
|
||
is 505 bytes, though the first 560 bytes of infected files
|
||
will be overwritten. Infected files will have their first
|
||
nine bytes contain the hex string: "909090B8000026A3A0".
|
||
509 : Similar to the Burger virus, this variant's actual code length
|
||
is 509 bytes, though the first 560 bytes of infected files
|
||
will be overwritten. Infected files will have their first
|
||
nine bytes contain the hex string: "909090B8000026A3A4".
|
||
541 : Similar to the Burger virus, this variant overwrites the
|
||
first 560 bytes of infected programs, though the virus's
|
||
length is actually 541 bytes. Infected programs will start
|
||
with the hex sequence: "909090B8000026A3A4".
|
||
|
||
Also see: VirDem
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Carioca
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: November, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: TSR; .COM growth
|
||
Origin:
|
||
Eff Length: 951 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsC - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V71+, Pro-Scan 2.01+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, Pro-Scan 2.01+, or Delete Infected Files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Carioca Virus was submitted in November, 1990. This virus is a
|
||
memory resident infector of .COM files, it does not infect COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Carioca Virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will install itself memory resident as a 1,280 byte low
|
||
system memory TSR. Interrupt 21 will be hooked by the virus. The
|
||
system's available free memory will decrease by 1,312 bytes.
|
||
|
||
After the virus is memory resident, any .COM file executed (with the
|
||
exception of COMMAND.COM) will become infected with the Carioca
|
||
Virus. Infected .COM files will show an increase in size of 951 bytes
|
||
with the virus being located at the end of the infected file. Infected
|
||
files will have the following hex character string located at the
|
||
very end of the file: "2EFF1E1A010203CD21".
|
||
|
||
It is unknown if Carioca contains any damage potential.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Cascade
|
||
Aliases: Fall, Falling Letters, 1701, 1704
|
||
V Status: Common
|
||
Discovery: October, 1987
|
||
Symptoms: TSR, Falling letters, .COM file growth
|
||
Origin: Germany
|
||
Eff Length: 1,701 or 1,704 bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsC - Parasitic Resident Encrypting .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, VirexPC, AVTK 3.5+,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: CleanUp, F-Prot, VirexPC, VirHunt 2.0+, Pro-Scan 2.01+
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
Originally, this virus was a trojan horse which was disguised
|
||
as a program which was supposed to turn off the number-lock
|
||
light when the system was booted. The trojan horse instead
|
||
caused all the characters on the screen to fall into a pile
|
||
at the bottom of the screen. In late 1987, the trojan horse
|
||
was changed by someone into a memory resident .COM virus.
|
||
|
||
While the original virus had a length of 1,701 bytes and would
|
||
infect both true IBM PCs and clones, a variation exists of
|
||
this virus which is 3 bytes longer than the original virus
|
||
and does not infect true IBM PCs. Both viruses are
|
||
functionally identical in all other respects.
|
||
|
||
Both of the viruses have some fairly unique qualities: Both
|
||
use an encryption algorithm to avoid detection and complicate
|
||
any attempted analysis of them. The activation mechanisms
|
||
are based on a sophisticated randomization algorithm
|
||
incorporating machine checks, monitor types, presence or
|
||
absence of a clock card, and the time or season of the year.
|
||
|
||
The viruses will activate on any machine with a CGA or VGA
|
||
monitor in the months of September, October, November, or
|
||
December in the years 1980 and 1988.
|
||
|
||
Known variants of the Cascade virus are:
|
||
1701-B : Same as 1701, except that it can activate in the
|
||
fall of any year.
|
||
1704-D : Same as the 1704, except that the IBM selection
|
||
has been disabled so that it can infect true IBM
|
||
PCs.
|
||
17Y4 : Similar to the Cascade 1704 virus, the only difference is
|
||
one byte in the virus which has been altered.
|
||
Cunning: Based on the Cascade virus, a major change to the virus
|
||
is that it now plays music.
|
||
|
||
Also see: 1704 Format
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Cascade-B
|
||
Aliases: Blackjack, 1704-B
|
||
V Status: Common
|
||
Discovery:
|
||
Symptoms: .COM file growth, TSR, random reboots
|
||
Origin: Germany
|
||
Eff Length: 1,704 bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsC - Parasitic Resident Encrypting .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan, F-Prot, IBM Scan, VirexPC, AVTK 3.5+, Pro-Scan,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: CleanUp, F-Prot, VirexPC, VirHunt 2.0+
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Cascade-B virus is similar to the Cascade virus, except
|
||
that the cascading display has been replaced with a system
|
||
reboot which will occur at random time intervals after the
|
||
virus activates.
|
||
|
||
Other variation(s) which have been documented are:
|
||
1704-C : Same as 1704-B except that the virus can activate in
|
||
December of any year.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Casino
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: New
|
||
Discovery: April, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth; decrease in total system & available free memory;
|
||
File allocation errors
|
||
Origin: Unknown
|
||
Eff Length: 2,330 bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRhCK - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method:
|
||
Removal Instructions: Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Casino Virus was submitted in April, 1991 by David Chess of IBM.
|
||
This virus is a memory resident infector of .COM files, including
|
||
COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with Casino is executed, Casino will
|
||
install itself memory resident at the top of system memory. Total
|
||
system and available free memory, as indicated by the DOS ChkDsk
|
||
program will decrease by 37,568 to 37,632 bytes. 3,152 bytes in low
|
||
system memory will also be used by the virus, and interrupts 00, 23,
|
||
and 30 will point to this area. After Casino is resident, it will
|
||
then immediately infect COMMAND.COM located in the C: drive root
|
||
directory.
|
||
|
||
After Casino is memory resident, it will infect .COM programs when
|
||
any of three events occur. If the system user issues a DIR command,
|
||
or a program does an internal DIR command, one .COM file in the
|
||
current directory will be infected. Additionally, if the system user
|
||
executes an infected program, a .COM program will become infected.
|
||
Lastly, Casino will infect .COM programs that are openned by another
|
||
program for any reason.
|
||
|
||
Programs infected with Casino will have a file length increase of
|
||
2,332 to 2,346 bytes. The file length increase, however, is mostly
|
||
hidden if the virus is memory resident. With the virus memory resident,
|
||
infected files will have a file length increase of 1 to 16 bytes, but
|
||
occasionally one may show a file length increase of up to 48 bytes.
|
||
The virus does not alter the file date and time in the disk directory.
|
||
|
||
If Casino is memory resident and the DOS ChkDsk program is executed,
|
||
file allocation errors will be returned for each infected program. If
|
||
the ChkDsk /F option is used, program corruption will occur.
|
||
|
||
It is unknown if Casino does anything besides replicate.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Casper
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: August, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM file growth, April 1st disk corruption (see below)
|
||
Origin:
|
||
Eff Length: 1,200 bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCK - Parasitic Non-Resident Encrypting .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V67+, Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, NAV, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Casper Virus was isolated in August, 1990 by Fridrik Skulason of
|
||
Iceland. The origin of this virus is unknown at this time. Casper
|
||
is a non-resident generic infector of .COM files, including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the Casper Virus is executed, the virus
|
||
will attempt to infect one .COM program located in the current drive
|
||
and directory. Infected files will increase in length by 1,200 bytes,
|
||
with the virus's code being located at the end of the .COM file.
|
||
|
||
The Casper Virus contains the following message, though this message
|
||
cannot be seen in infected program as Casper uses a complex self-
|
||
encryption mechanism:
|
||
|
||
"Hi! I'm Casper The Virus, And On April 1st I'm Gonna
|
||
Fuck Up Your Hard Disk REAL BAD! In Fact It Might Just
|
||
Be Impossible To Recover! How's That Grab Ya! <GRIN>"
|
||
|
||
On April 1st, when an infected program is executed, this virus will
|
||
overwrite the first track of the drive where the infected program was
|
||
executed from. Later attempts to access the drive will result in
|
||
"Sector not found" errors occurring.
|
||
|
||
The Casper Virus is based on the Vienna virus. Unlike Vienna, it is
|
||
self-encrypting. The self-encryption mechanism employed is similar
|
||
to the encryption mechanism used in the V2P6 virus, and requires an
|
||
algorithmic approach in order to identify it as there are not any
|
||
identifying strings located in the encrypted virus.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Chaos
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: December, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: Message, TSR, Bad sectors, BSC
|
||
Origin: England
|
||
Eff Length: N/A
|
||
Type Code: BR - Resident Boot Sector Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V53+
|
||
Removal Instructions: MDisk, CleanUp, or DOS SYS Command
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
First reported in December, 1989 by James Berry of Kent,
|
||
England, the Chaos virus is a memory resident boot sector
|
||
infector of floppy and hard disks.
|
||
|
||
When the Chaos virus infects a boot sector, it overwrites the
|
||
original boot sector without copying it to another location
|
||
on the disk. Infected boot sectors will contain the
|
||
following messages:
|
||
|
||
"Welcome to the New Dungeon"
|
||
"Chaos"
|
||
"Letz be cool guys"
|
||
|
||
The Chaos virus will flag the disk as being full of bad
|
||
sectors upon activation, though most of the supposed bad
|
||
sectors are still readable. It is unknown what the
|
||
activation criteria is.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Christmas In Japan
|
||
Aliases: Xmas In Japan
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: September, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM file growth; Message
|
||
Origin: Taiwan
|
||
Eff Length: 600 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCK - Resident Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V67+, Pro-Scan 2.01+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, Pro-Scan 2.01+, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Christmas In Japan Virus was isolated in Taiwan in late September,
|
||
1990. As of early October, it is reported to be widespread in Japan.
|
||
This virus is a 600 byte non-resident generic infector of .COM files.
|
||
It will infect COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the Christmas In Japan Virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will infect zero to one other .COM file in the current
|
||
directory. If a file is infected, it will increase in length by
|
||
600 bytes, with the virus being located at the end of the infected
|
||
file.
|
||
|
||
On December 25, if an infected file is executed, the following message
|
||
will be displayed in the center of the screen:
|
||
|
||
"A merry christmas to you"
|
||
|
||
The message will flash and will be underlined for approximately half
|
||
the time it is displayed. If left alone, the message will go away
|
||
after a little while and the program will execute normally, but the
|
||
message will return when another infected .COM file is executed.
|
||
|
||
This virus does not appear to do any malicious damage.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Christmas Virus
|
||
Aliases: Tannenbaum, XA1, 1539
|
||
V Status: Endangered
|
||
Discovery: March, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM file growth, display, Partition table destruction
|
||
Origin: Germany
|
||
Eff Length: 1,539 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCX - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V61+, VirexPC, VirHunt 2.0+, Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, VirHunt 2.0+, Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV,
|
||
or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Christmas Tree, or XA1, Virus was first isolated in March 1990
|
||
by Christoff Fischer of West Germany. This virus is an encrypting
|
||
virus which will only infect .COM files.
|
||
|
||
On April 1st of any year, the Christmas Tree virus will activate,
|
||
destroying the partition table of infected hard disks the first
|
||
time an infected program is executed. During the period from
|
||
December 24 until January 1st of any year, when an infected
|
||
program is executed, the virus will display a full screen picture
|
||
of a christmas tree.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Cookie
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: January, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth; system hangs
|
||
Origin: Unknown/Europe
|
||
Eff Length: 2,232 bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNAK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan, F-Prot, VirexPC, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Cookie Virus was received in January, 1991, it is believed to have
|
||
originated in Europe. This virus is based on the SysLock Virus, though
|
||
it is considerably shorted in length. Some anti-viral utilities will
|
||
identify this virus as SysLock, though it is listed here separately
|
||
due to its differences in characteristics. It is a non-resident direct
|
||
action virus which infects .COM and .EXE files, including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the Cookie Virus is executed, the virus
|
||
will search the current drive and directory for a file to infect. The
|
||
virus first looks for a .COM file to infect. If an uninfected .COM
|
||
file is located, it will become infected. If an uninfected .COM file
|
||
is not found, the virus will then look for an uninfected .EXE file to
|
||
infect. In other words, all the .COM files in the directory will become
|
||
infected before any of the .EXE files in that directory are infected.
|
||
Infected files will show a file length increase of between 2,232 and
|
||
2,251 bytes in length. The virus will be located at the end of the
|
||
infected file. Infected files will not have their date and time in
|
||
the disk directory altered.
|
||
|
||
Systems infected with the Cookie Virus may experience system hangs
|
||
when some infected programs are executed. In some cases, the
|
||
infected program will stop functioning properly after a number of
|
||
executions, though this does not always occur.
|
||
|
||
This virus has also been reported to possibly display the message
|
||
"I want a COOKIE!", though the sample received doesn't exhibit this
|
||
behavior.
|
||
|
||
Also see: SysLock
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Crash
|
||
Aliases: 1075
|
||
V Status: Rumored
|
||
Discovery: December, 1991
|
||
Symptoms:
|
||
Origin: USSR
|
||
Eff Length: 1,075 bytes
|
||
Type Code:
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V76+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Crash or 1075 Virus has had many samples submitted over the last
|
||
few months. The original samples were from the USSR in December, 1990.
|
||
All submitted samples of this "virus" do not replicate on an XT or 386
|
||
based personal computer. Instead, the system crashes when the sample
|
||
file is executed. It may replicate under some other system
|
||
configurations.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Crew-2480
|
||
Aliases: 2480
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: February, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth; File date/time changes; System hangs; System reboots
|
||
Origin: Unknown
|
||
Eff Length: 2,480 bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method:
|
||
Removal Instructions: Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Crew-2480 Virus was submitted in February, 1991. Its origin, or
|
||
isolation point is unknown. This virus is a non-memory resident
|
||
infector of .COM programs over 10K in size. It will infect COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the Crew-2480 Virus is executed, the virus
|
||
may infect one .COM file over 10K in size. When COMMAND.COM is infected
|
||
by the virus, the system will reboot. Infected .COM programs will
|
||
increase in size by 2,480 bytes with the virus being located at the
|
||
end of the infected program. The file's date and time in the disk
|
||
directory will have been updated to the system date and time when
|
||
infection occurred.
|
||
|
||
Besides the symptoms indicated above which occur when files are infected,
|
||
systems with a Crew-2480 infection may also experience system hangs
|
||
when the user attempts to execute infected programs. Later execution
|
||
of the same program may be successful. This virus may also display
|
||
a formatted message on some systems in place of the system hang which
|
||
occurs on monochrome systems.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Dark Avenger
|
||
Aliases: Black Avenger, Eddie, Diana
|
||
V Status: Common
|
||
Discovery: September, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: TSR; .COM, .EXE, .SYS file growth; File/Disk Corruption
|
||
Origin: Bulgaria
|
||
Isolated: Davis, California, USA
|
||
Eff Length: 1,800 bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsAK - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V36+, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, AVTK 3.5+,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: CleanUp, Pro-Scan 1.4+, F-Prot, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
Dark Avenger was first isolated in the United States at the University
|
||
of California at Davis. It infects .COM, .EXE, and overlay files,
|
||
including COMMAND.COM. The virus will install itself into system
|
||
memory, becoming resident, and is extremely prolific at infecting
|
||
any executable files that are openned for any reason. This includes
|
||
using the DOS COPY and XCOPY commands to copy uninfected files, both
|
||
the source and the target files will end up being infected. Infected
|
||
files will have their lengths increased by 1,800 bytes.
|
||
|
||
The Dark Avenger Virus does perform malicious damage. The virus
|
||
maintains a counter in the disk's boot sector. After each sixteenth
|
||
file is infected, the virus will randomly overwrite a sector on the
|
||
disk with a copy of the disk's boot sector. If the randomly
|
||
selected sector is a portion of a program or data file, the program
|
||
or data file will be corrupted. Programs and data files which have
|
||
been corrupted by a sector being overwritten are permanently
|
||
damaged and cannot be repaired since the original sector is lost.
|
||
|
||
If you are infected with Dark Avenger, shutdown your computer
|
||
and reboot from a Write Protected boot diskette for the system,
|
||
then carefully use a disinfector, following all instructions.
|
||
Be sure to re-scan the system for infection once you have finished
|
||
disinfecting it.
|
||
|
||
The Dark Avenger virus contains the words: "The Dark Avenger,
|
||
copyright 1988, 1989", as well as the message: "This program
|
||
was written in the city of Sofia. Eddie lives.... Somewhere in
|
||
Time!".
|
||
|
||
This virus bears no resemblance or similarity to the Jerusalem
|
||
viruses, even though they are similar in size.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of Dark Avenger are:
|
||
Dark Avenger-B : Very similar to the Dark Avenger virus, the major
|
||
difference is that .COM files will be reinfected, adding
|
||
1,800 bytes to the file length with each infection. This
|
||
variant also becomes memory resident in high system memory
|
||
instead of being a low system memory TSR. Text strings
|
||
found in the virus's code include:
|
||
"Eddie lives...somewhere in time!"
|
||
"Diana P."
|
||
"This program was written in the city of Sofia"
|
||
"(C)1988-1989 Dark Avenger"
|
||
|
||
Also see: V2000, V1024, V651
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Datacrime
|
||
Aliases: 1168, Columbus Day
|
||
V Status: Extinct
|
||
Discovery: April, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: .COM file growth, floppy disk access; formats
|
||
hard disk, message any day from Oct 13 to Dec 31.
|
||
Origin: Holland
|
||
Eff Length: 1,168 bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNC - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan/X V67+, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, VirexPC,
|
||
AVTK 3.5+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: AntiCrim, Scan/D/X, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirexPC, F-Prot,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Datacrime virus is a parasitic virus, and is also known as
|
||
the 1168 virus. The Datacrime virus is a non-resident
|
||
virus, infecting .COM files. The virus was originally
|
||
discovered in Europe shortly after its release in March, 1989.
|
||
|
||
The virus will attach itself to the end of a .COM file, increasing
|
||
the file's length by 1168 bytes. The first 5 bytes of the host
|
||
program are stored off in the virus's code and then replaced by
|
||
a branch instruction so that the virus code will be executed
|
||
before the host program. In order to propagate, the virus
|
||
searches thru directories for .COM files, other than
|
||
COMMAND.COM and attaches to any found .COM files (except for
|
||
where the 7th letter is a D). Hard drive partitions are
|
||
searched before the floppy drives are checked. The virus will
|
||
continue to propagate until the date is after October 12 of any
|
||
year, then when it is executed it will display a message. The
|
||
decrypted message is something like:
|
||
|
||
"DATACRIME VIRUS"
|
||
"RELEASED: 1 MARCH 1989".
|
||
|
||
Note: only this ASCII message is encrypted in this version.
|
||
|
||
A low-level format of the hard disk is then done.
|
||
|
||
Errors in the code will make .COM file infection appear random
|
||
and will often make the system crash following infection.
|
||
|
||
Unlike the other variants of Datacrime, the original Datacrime
|
||
virus does not replicate, or infect files, until after April 1
|
||
of any year.
|
||
|
||
Lastly, if the computer system is using an RLL, SCSI, or PC/AT
|
||
type hard disk controller, all variants of the Datacrime virus
|
||
are not able to successfully format the hard disk, according
|
||
to Jan Terpstra of the Netherlands.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Datacrime II, Datacrime IIB, Datacrime-B
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Datacrime II
|
||
Aliases: 1514, Columbus Day
|
||
V Status: Endangered
|
||
Discovered: September, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: .EXE & .COM file growth, formats disk
|
||
Origin: Netherlands
|
||
Eff Length: 1,514 bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNAK - Non-Resident Encrypting .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan/X V67+, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, VirexPC,
|
||
AVTK 3.5+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: AntiCrim, Scan/D/X, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirexPC, F-Prot,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Datacrime II virus is a variant of the Datacrime virus, the
|
||
major characteristic changes are that the effective length of
|
||
the virus is 1,514 bytes, and that it can now infect both
|
||
.COM and .EXE files, including COMMAND.COM. There is also an
|
||
encryption mechanism in the Datacrime II virus.
|
||
|
||
The Datacrime II virus will not format disks on Mondays.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Datacrime, Datacrime IIB, Datacrime-B
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Datacrime IIB
|
||
Aliases: 1917, Columbus Day
|
||
V Status: Endangered
|
||
Discovered: November, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: .EXE & .COM growth, formats disk, floppy disk access.
|
||
Origin: Netherlands
|
||
Eff Length: 1,917 bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNAK - Non-Resident Encrypting .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan/X V67+, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, VirexPC,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: AntiCrim, Scan/D/X, F-Prot, VirexPC, VirHunt 2.0
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Datacrime IIB virus is a variant of the Datacrime II virus,
|
||
and was isolated by Jan Terpstra of the Netherlands in
|
||
November, 1989. This virus, as with Datacrime II, infects
|
||
generic .COM & .EXE files, including COMMAND.COM, adding 1,917
|
||
bytes to the file length. The virus differs from Datacrime II
|
||
in that the encryption method used by the virus to avoid
|
||
detection has been changed.
|
||
|
||
The Datacrime IIB virus will not format disks on Mondays.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Datacrime, Datacrime II, Datacrime-B
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Datacrime-B
|
||
Aliases: 1280, Columbus Day
|
||
V Status: Extinct
|
||
Discovered: April, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: .EXE file growth, formats MFM/RLL hard drives, odd
|
||
floppy disk access.
|
||
Origin: Netherlands
|
||
Eff Length: 1,280 bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNE - Parasitic Non-Resident Generic .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan/X V67+, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, VirexPC,
|
||
AVTK 3.5+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: AntiCrim, Scan/D/X, VirexPC, Pro-Scan 1.4+, F-Prot,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0, NAV
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Datacrime-B virus is a variant of the Datacrime virus, the
|
||
differences being that the effective length of the virus is
|
||
1,280 bytes, and instead of infecting .COM files, .EXE files
|
||
are infected.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Datacrime, Datacrime II, Datacrime II-B
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: DataLock
|
||
Aliases: DataLock 1.00, V920
|
||
V Status: Common
|
||
Discovered: November, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .EXE & COMMAND.COM file growth; decrease in system and available
|
||
memory; file date/time changes
|
||
Origin: USA
|
||
Eff Length: 920 bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRtEK - Parasitic Resident .EXE and COMMAND.COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V71+, Pro-Scan 2.01+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Clean-Up V71+, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The DataLock, or V920, Virus was isolated in many locations in the
|
||
United States starting on November 1, 1990. This virus is a generic
|
||
memory resident infector of .EXE files, but it will also infect
|
||
COMMAND.COM if it is executed.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the DataLock Virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will install itself memory resident at the top of free memory,
|
||
but below the 640K DOS boundary. Infected systems will find that total
|
||
system memory and available free memory will be 2,048 bytes less than
|
||
is expected. Interrupt 21 will be hooked by the virus.
|
||
|
||
After the virus is memory resident, any .EXE file that is executed will
|
||
be infected by the virus. Infected files will have a file length
|
||
increase of 920 bytes, and their date/time indicated in the disk
|
||
directory will have been changed to the system date and time when the
|
||
infection occurred. The virus is located at the end of infected files.
|
||
The following text, indicating the virus's name, can be found at the
|
||
end of all infected files:
|
||
|
||
"DataLock version 1.00"
|
||
|
||
It is unknown if DataLock carries an activation date, or its potential
|
||
for damage.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: dBASE
|
||
Aliases: DBF Virus
|
||
V Status: Extinct
|
||
Discovered: September, 1988
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .OVL file growth, corrupt .DBF files, TSR, FAT and root
|
||
directory overwritten
|
||
Origin: New York, USA
|
||
Eff Length: 1,864 bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRC - Parasitic Resident .COM and Overlay Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan/X V67+, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, VirexPC,
|
||
AVTK 3.5+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D/X, Pro-Scan 1.4+, F-Prot, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The dBASE virus was discovered by Ross Greenberg of New York.
|
||
This virus infects .COM & .OVL files, and will corrupt data in
|
||
.DBF files by randomly transposing bytes in any open .DBF file.
|
||
It keeps track of which files and bytes were transposed in a
|
||
hidden file (BUG.DAT) in the same directory as the .DBF file(s).
|
||
The virus restores these bytes if the file is read, so it
|
||
appears that nothing is wrong. Once the BUG.DAT file is 90
|
||
days old or more, the virus will overwrite the FAT and root
|
||
directory on the disk.
|
||
|
||
After this virus has been detected, if you remove the infected
|
||
dBASE program and replace it with a clean copy, your DBF files
|
||
that were openned during the period that you were infected
|
||
will be useless since they are garbled on the disk even
|
||
though they would be displayed as expected by the infected
|
||
dBASE program.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Deicide
|
||
Aliases: Glenn
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: February, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM files overwritten; Message; FAT Corruption; System hang
|
||
Origin: Netherlands
|
||
Eff Length: 666 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: ONC - Overwriting Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method:
|
||
Removal Instructions: Delete Infected Programs
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Deicide Virus was received in February, 1991 from the Netherlands.
|
||
This virus is a non-resident overwriting virus which infects .COM files,
|
||
but not COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with Deicide is executed, the virus will
|
||
search the current directory for an uninfected .COM program. If an
|
||
uninfected .COM program is found, the virus will infect it, overwriting
|
||
the first 666 bytes of the program with the virus. If the newly
|
||
infected program's original file length was 666 bytes or more, then no
|
||
file length change will show in the disk directory. If originally the
|
||
program was smaller than 666 bytes, its length will now be 666 bytes.
|
||
The following message may be displayed by the virus after infecting
|
||
a file:
|
||
|
||
"File corruption error."
|
||
|
||
If the virus does not find an uninfected .COM program in the current
|
||
directory, it will display the following message double spaced, and
|
||
overwrite the first 80 sectors of the system hard disk:
|
||
|
||
"DEICIDE!
|
||
Glenn (666) says : BYE BYE HARDDISK!!
|
||
Next time be carufull with illegal stuff"
|
||
|
||
The above messages can be found in all infected files, along with the
|
||
following message which is not displayed:
|
||
|
||
"This experimental virus was written by Glenn Benton
|
||
to see if I can make a virus while learning machinecode
|
||
for 2,5 months. (C) 10-23-1990 by Glenn.
|
||
I keep on going making virusses."
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Den Zuk
|
||
Aliases: Search, Venezuelan
|
||
V Status: Common
|
||
Discovered: September, 1988
|
||
Symptoms: Message, floppy format, TSR, BSC
|
||
Origin: Indonesia
|
||
Eff Length: N/A
|
||
Type Code: RtF - Resident Floppy Boot Sector Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, VirexPC, AVTK 3.5+,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: MDisk, CleanUp, F-Prot, Pro-Scan 1.4+, NAV,
|
||
or DOS SYS command
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Den Zuk virus is a memory-resident, boot sector infector of
|
||
360K 5 1/4" diskettes. The virus can infect any diskette
|
||
in a floppy drive that is accessed, even if the diskette is
|
||
not bootable. If an attempt is made to boot the system with an
|
||
infected non-system disk, Den Zuk will install itself into
|
||
memory even though the boot failed. After the system is booted
|
||
with an infected diskette, a purple "DEN ZUK" graphic will appear
|
||
after a CTL-ALT-DEL is performed if the system has a CGA, EGA, or
|
||
VGA monitor. While the original Den Zuk virus did not cause any
|
||
damage to the system, some variants maintain a counter of how
|
||
many times the system has been rebooted, and after the counter
|
||
reaches its limit, the floppy in the disk drive is reformatted.
|
||
The counter in these variants of the virus is usually in the
|
||
range of 5 to 10.
|
||
|
||
The following text strings can be found in the viral code on
|
||
diskettes which have been infected with the Den Zuk virus:
|
||
|
||
"Welcome to the
|
||
C l u b
|
||
--The HackerS--
|
||
Hackin'
|
||
All The Time
|
||
|
||
The HackerS"
|
||
|
||
The diskette volume label of infected diskettes may be changed
|
||
to Y.C.1.E.R.P., though this change only occurs if the Den Zuk
|
||
virus removed a Pakistani Brain infection before infecting the
|
||
diskette with Den Zuk. The Den Zuk virus will also remove
|
||
an Ohio virus infection before infecting the diskette with
|
||
Den Zuk.
|
||
|
||
The Den Zuk virus is thought to be written by the same person
|
||
or persons as the Ohio virus. The "Y.C.1.E.R.P." string is
|
||
found in the Ohio virus, and the viral code is similar in
|
||
many respects.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Ohio
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Destructor V4.00
|
||
Aliases: Destructor
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: December, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth; decrease in system and available free memory
|
||
Origin: Bulgaria
|
||
Eff Length: 1,150 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRtAK - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Destructor V4.00 Virus was received in December, 1990. This virus
|
||
is from Bulgaria, and is a memory resident infector of .COM and .EXE
|
||
files, including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When the first program infected with the Destructor V4.00 Virus is
|
||
executed, the virus will install itself memory resident at the top of
|
||
system memory but below the 640K DOS boundary. Interrupt 12's return
|
||
is moved. Total system memory and available free memory will be
|
||
1,216 bytes less than what is expected on the infected system. At this
|
||
time, the virus will also infect COMMAND.COM if it is not already
|
||
infected.
|
||
|
||
Once Destructor V4.00 is memory resident, it will infect programs as
|
||
they are openned or executed.
|
||
Infected .COM programs will have increased in size by 1,150 bytes.
|
||
.EXE programs will have increased in size by 1,154 to 1,162 bytes.
|
||
In both cases, the virus will be located at the end of the infected
|
||
file. This virus does not alter the file's date/time in the disk
|
||
directory, and it also makes no attempt to hide the file length increase
|
||
on infected programs.
|
||
|
||
The following text string can be found in files infected with this
|
||
virus:
|
||
|
||
"DESTRUCTOR V4.00 (c) 1990 by ATA
|
||
|
||
It is unknown what Destructor V4.00 does, if anything, besides
|
||
replicate.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Devil's Dance
|
||
Aliases: Mexican
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: December, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: Message, .COM growth, FAT corruption, TSR
|
||
Origin: Mexico
|
||
Eff Length: 941 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRCT - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V52+, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, VirexPC, AVTK 3.5+,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV,
|
||
or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Devil's Dance virus was first isolated in December, 1989,
|
||
by Mao Fragoso of Mexico City. The Devil's Dance virus
|
||
increases the size of infected .COM files by 941 bytes, and
|
||
will infect a file multiple times until the file becomes too
|
||
large to fit in available system memory.
|
||
|
||
Once an infected program has been run, any subsequent warm-
|
||
reboot (CTL-ALT-DEL) will result in the following message
|
||
being displayed:
|
||
|
||
"DID YOU EVER DANCE WITH THE DEVIL IN THE WEAK MOONLIGHT?
|
||
PRAY FOR YOUR DISKS!!
|
||
The Joker"
|
||
|
||
The Devil's Dance virus is destructive. After the first 2,000
|
||
keystrokes, the virus starts changing the colors of any text
|
||
displayed on the system monitor. After the first 5,000
|
||
keystrokes, the virus erases the first copy of the FAT. At
|
||
this point, when the system is rebooted, it will display the
|
||
message above and again destroy the first copy of the FAT, then
|
||
allow the boot to proceed.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Dir Virus
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: January, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth; TSR; Sluggishness of DIR commands;
|
||
File allocation errors
|
||
Origin: USSR
|
||
Eff Length: 691 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsCK - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Dir Virus was submitted in January, 1991. It originated in the
|
||
USSR. The Dir Virus is a memory resident infector of .COM programs,
|
||
including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Dir Virus is executed, the
|
||
virus will install itself memory resident as a low system memory TSR
|
||
of 1,008 bytes. Interrupt 21 will be hooked by the virus. If
|
||
COMMAND.COM is not already infected, it will become infected at this
|
||
time.
|
||
|
||
After the Dir Virus is memory resident, it will only infect .COM
|
||
programs when a DOS Dir command is performed. It does not infect
|
||
programs on execution, or when .COM files are openned. When a Dir
|
||
command is performed, the first uninfected .COM program that is found
|
||
in the directory will become infected. When the virus infects a .COM
|
||
file, there will be a pause in the output of the dir command while the
|
||
program is being infected, then the output will continue.
|
||
|
||
Infected programs will increase in size by 691 bytes, though the file
|
||
length increase cannot be seen when a directory command is performed if
|
||
the virus is memory resident. The virus will be located at the end of
|
||
infected programs. Infected programs will not have their date and time
|
||
altered by the virus.
|
||
|
||
Systems infected with the Dir Virus will receive file allocation errors
|
||
when the DOS ChkDsk program is executed on a drive containing infected
|
||
programs. If the virus is not memory resident, these errors will not
|
||
be found. Execution of the DOS ChkDsk program with the /F option when
|
||
the virus is memory resident will result in corruption of the infected
|
||
programs.
|
||
|
||
This virus does not appear to contain any activation mechanism.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Discom
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: November, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: TSR; .COM & .EXE growth
|
||
Origin: Unknown
|
||
Eff Length: 2,053 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V76+
|
||
Removal Instructions: CleanUp V75+, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Discom Virus was submitted in November, 1990. The location where
|
||
the sample was isolated is unknown. Discom is a memory resident
|
||
infector of .COM and .EXE files, and will not infect COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
This virus is based on the Jerusalem Virus, and also contains some code
|
||
from the Sunday Virus. As such, some anti-viral utilities may identify
|
||
files infected with this virus as containing both Jerusalem and Sunday.
|
||
This virus does not exhibit symptoms or the activation of either the
|
||
Jerusalem or Sunday viruses.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Discom Virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will install itself memory resident as a 2,304 byte low
|
||
system memory TSR. Interrupts 08 and 21 will be hooked by the virus.
|
||
|
||
Once memory resident, the virus will infect .COM and .EXE files when
|
||
they are executed. Infected .COM files will increase in length by
|
||
2,053 bytes and have the virus located at the beginning of the infected
|
||
file. Infected .EXE files will increase in length by 2,059 to 2,068
|
||
bytes with the virus being located at the end of the file. All infected
|
||
files will end with the following hex character string: 11121704D0.
|
||
|
||
Unlike many Jerusalem Variants, this virus does not exhibit a system
|
||
slowdown after being memory resident for 30 minutes, and no "black
|
||
window" appears.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Disk Killer
|
||
Aliases: Computer Ogre, Disk Ogre, Ogre
|
||
V Status: Common
|
||
Discovered: April, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: Bad blocks, message, BSC, TSR, encryption of disk
|
||
Origin: Taiwan
|
||
Isolated: Milpitas, California, USA
|
||
Eff Length: N/A
|
||
Type Code: BRtT - Resident Boot Sector Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V39+, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, VirexPC,
|
||
AVTK 3.5+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: MDisk, CleanUp, Pro-Scan 1.4+, F-Prot, NAV, or
|
||
DOS COPY & SYS
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Disk Killer virus is a boot sector infector that spreads by
|
||
writing copies of itself to 3 blocks on either a floppy or
|
||
hard disk. The virus does not care if these blocks are in use
|
||
by another program or are part of a file. These blocks will then
|
||
be marked as bad in the FAT so that they cannot be overwritten.
|
||
The boot sector is patched so that when the system is booted, the
|
||
virus code will be executed and it can attempt to infect any new
|
||
disks exposed to the system.
|
||
|
||
The virus keeps track of the elapsed disk usage time since initial
|
||
infection, and does no harm until it has reached a predetermined
|
||
limit. The predetermined limit is approximately 48 hours. (On
|
||
most systems, Disk Killer will reach its limit within 1 - 6
|
||
weeks of its initial hard disk infection.)
|
||
|
||
When the limit is reached or exceeded and the system is rebooted,
|
||
a message is displayed identifying COMPUTER OGRE and a date of
|
||
April 1. It then says to leave alone and proceeds to encrypt the
|
||
disk by alternately XORing sectors with 0AAAAh and 05555h,
|
||
effectively destroying the information on the disk. The only recourse
|
||
after Disk Killer has activated and encrypted the entire disk is to
|
||
reformat.
|
||
|
||
The message text that is displayed upon activation, and can be found
|
||
in the viral code is:
|
||
|
||
"Disk Killer -- Version 1.00 by COMPUTER OGRE 04/01/89
|
||
|
||
Warning!!
|
||
|
||
Don't turn off the power or remove the diskette while Disk Killer is
|
||
Processing!
|
||
|
||
PROCESSING
|
||
|
||
Now you can turn off the power. I wish you Luck!"
|
||
|
||
It is important to note that when the message is displayed, if the
|
||
system is turned off immediately it may be possible to salvage
|
||
some files on the disk using various utility programs as this
|
||
virus first destroys the boot, FAT, and directory blocks.
|
||
|
||
Disk Killer can be removed by using McAfee Associate's MDisk or
|
||
CleanUp utility, or the DOS SYS command, to overwrite the boot
|
||
sector on hard disks or bootable floppies. On non-system floppies,
|
||
files can be copied to non-infected floppies, followed by reformatting
|
||
the infected floppies. Be sure to reboot the system from a
|
||
write protected master diskette before attempting to remove the
|
||
virus first or you will be reinfected by the virus in memory.
|
||
|
||
Note: Disk Killer may have damaged one or more files on the disk
|
||
when it wrote a portion of its viral code to 3 blocks on the disk.
|
||
Once the boot sector has been disinfected as indicated above, these
|
||
corrupted files cannot reinfect the system, however they should be
|
||
replaced with backup copies since the 3 blocks were overwritten.
|
||
|
||
Note: Do not use the DOS DiskCopy program to backup infected
|
||
diskettes as the new backup diskettes will contain the virus
|
||
as well.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Do-Nothing Virus
|
||
Aliases: The Stupid Virus
|
||
V Status: Extinct
|
||
Discovered: October, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: .COM file growth, TSR (see text)
|
||
Origin: Israel
|
||
Eff Length: 608 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRfC - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan/X V67+, F-Prot, Pro-Scan, VirexPC, AVTK 3.5+,
|
||
NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D/X, Pro-Scan 1.4+, F-Prot, or NAV
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
This virus was first reported by Yuval Tal of Israel in
|
||
October, 1989. The virus will infect .COM files, but only the
|
||
first one in the current directory, whether it was previously
|
||
infected or not. The Do-Nothing virus is also memory
|
||
resident, always installing itself to memory address
|
||
9800:100h, and can only infect systems with 640K of memory.
|
||
The virus does not protect this area of memory in any way,
|
||
and other programs which use this area will overwrite it in
|
||
memory, removing the program from being memory resident.
|
||
|
||
The Do-Nothing virus does no apparent damage, nor does it
|
||
affect operation of the system in any observable way, thus
|
||
its name.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Saddam
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Dot Killer
|
||
Aliases: 944, Point Killer
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: October, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth; removal of all dots (.) from display
|
||
Origin: Koszalin, Poland
|
||
Eff Length: 944
|
||
Type Code: PNCK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V72+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Dot Killer Virus was isolated in Koszalin, Poland in October, 1990.
|
||
It is a non-resident infector of .COM files, including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the Dot Killer Virus is executed, the
|
||
virus will infect one other .COM file in the current directory.
|
||
Infected .COM files will increase in length by 944 bytes. The virus
|
||
will be located at the end of infected files.
|
||
|
||
While the Dot Killer Virus contains code to attempt to avoid infecting
|
||
the program pointed to by the COMSPEC environmental parameter, this
|
||
logic contains a bug and does not function properly. If COMMAND.COM,
|
||
or the program pointed to by COMSPEC, is located in the current
|
||
directory it will become infected just like any other .COM program.
|
||
|
||
When the Dot Killer Virus activates, it will remove all dots (.) from
|
||
the system display.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Dutch 555
|
||
Aliases: 555
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: November, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth; Decrease in system and available memory
|
||
Origin: Netherlands
|
||
Eff Length: 555 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRhAK - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V75+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete Infected Files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Dutch 555 Virus was received in February 1991 from Righard
|
||
Zwienenberg of the Netherlands. This virus was accidently released
|
||
into the public domain by its author in November, 1990. It is a
|
||
memory resident infector of .COM and .EXE files, including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Dutch 555 Virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will install itself memory resident at the top of system
|
||
memory, but below the 640K DOS boundary. The interrupt 12 return is
|
||
not moved, though the DOS ChkDsk program will show a decrease in total
|
||
system and available free memory of 560 bytes. Interrupt 21 will be
|
||
hooked by the virus.
|
||
|
||
Once the Dutch 555 Virus is memory resident, it will infect .COM and
|
||
.EXE files, including COMMAND.COM, as they are executed. Infected files
|
||
will increase in size by 555 bytes, with the virus being located at the
|
||
end of the infected file.
|
||
|
||
This virus does not do anything besides replicate.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: EDV
|
||
Aliases: Cursy, Stealth Virus
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: 1988
|
||
Symptoms: BSC; partition table corruption; unusual system crashes
|
||
Origin: France
|
||
Eff Length: N/A
|
||
Type Code: BRX - Resident Boot Sector/Partition Table Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V58+, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: MDisk/P, CleanUp V67+, Pro-Scan 1.4+, or NAV
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The EDV, or Cursy, Virus was first discovered in Le Havre, France in
|
||
1988 by Jean-Luc Nail. At that time, it was named the Cursy Virus.
|
||
Later, in January 1990, it was isolated separately and named the
|
||
EDV virus. This virus is a memory resident infector of floppy
|
||
diskette boot sectors and hard disk partition tables.
|
||
|
||
When a system is booted from a diskette infected with the EDV virus,
|
||
the virus will install itself memory resident at the top of high
|
||
system memory. The value returned by interrupt 12 will be decreased.
|
||
|
||
Once the virus is memory resident, and disk accessed by the system
|
||
will become infected. When the virus infects a diskette, it moves
|
||
the original boot sector to side 1, track 39, sector 8. After
|
||
moving the original boot sector, it then copies the virus's code
|
||
to absolute sector 0, the boot sector of the diskette.
|
||
|
||
EDV will also infect hard disk drives when they are accessed. In the
|
||
case of hard disks, the virus will move absolute sector 0 (the
|
||
partition table) to side 1, track 39, sector 8 as though it were a
|
||
360K 5.25" floppy diskette. After moving the partition table, it will
|
||
then overwrite the partition table with the viral code.
|
||
|
||
Once the virus has infected six disks with the virus in memory, the
|
||
EDV virus will activate. Upon activation, the virus access the
|
||
keyboard interrupt to disable the keyboard and then will overwrite
|
||
the first 3 tracks of each disk on the system, starting with the
|
||
hard disks. After overwriting the disks, it will then display the
|
||
following message:
|
||
|
||
"That rings a bell, no? From Cursy"
|
||
|
||
Upon activation, the user must power off the machine and reboot from
|
||
a system diskette in order to regain any control over the machine.
|
||
|
||
The following identification string appears at the very end of the
|
||
boot sector on infected floppy disks and the partition table of
|
||
infected hard drives, though it cannot be seen if the virus is
|
||
in memory:
|
||
|
||
"MSDOS Vers. E.D.V."
|
||
|
||
Jean-Luc Nail has indicated that the EDV or Cursy virus is quiet
|
||
common in the Le Havre area of France, although it is rare outside
|
||
of France.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Eight Tunes
|
||
Aliases: 1971
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: April, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: file growth, music, decrease in available memory
|
||
Origin: West Germany
|
||
Eff Length: 1,971 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V62+, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirexPC, AVTK 3.5+,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV, or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Eight Tunes, or 1971, Virus was originally isolated in April
|
||
1990 by Fridrik Skulason of Iceland. This virus is a memory resident
|
||
generic file infector of .COM, .EXE, and overlay files. The virus will
|
||
not infect COMMAND.COM, or .COM files which are smaller than 8K.
|
||
After the virus is memory resident, programs are infected as they
|
||
are executed. Infected files will increase in length by between
|
||
1,971 - 1,985 bytes.
|
||
|
||
Available memory will decrease by 1,984 bytes when the virus is
|
||
present.
|
||
|
||
This virus does not cause system damage, however it is disruptive.
|
||
When the virus is memory resident, it will play 8 German folk songs
|
||
at random intervals thirty minutes after the virus becomes memory
|
||
resident.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Enigma
|
||
Aliases: Cracker Jack
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: February, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .EXE growth
|
||
Origin: Italy
|
||
Eff Length: 1,755 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNE - Parasitic Non-Resident .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V76+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Enigma Virus was submitted in February, 1991, by Alberto Colusa of
|
||
Italy. This virus is a non-resident infector of .EXE files. The
|
||
original submitted sample of this virus was not a natural infection of
|
||
the virus, being on a .COM file, so the virus may actually be a
|
||
research virus.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with Enigma is executed, one .EXE program in
|
||
the current directory will be infected by the virus. Infected .EXE
|
||
programs will increase in length by 1,755 bytes. The virus will be
|
||
located at the end of infected programs. Infected programs will also
|
||
contain the following text strings:
|
||
|
||
"This is the voice of the Enigma virus......
|
||
the spirits of the hell are coming back!"
|
||
"(C) 1991 by Cracker Jack * Italy * *.exe"
|
||
"newenigmavir"
|
||
|
||
It is not known if Enigma does anything besides replicate.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Yankee 2
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Evil
|
||
Aliases: P1, V1701New
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: July, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth, system reboots, CHKDSK program failure,
|
||
COMMAND.COM header change
|
||
Origin: Bulgaria
|
||
Eff Length: 1,701 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRhCK - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V66+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, NAV, or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Evil Virus is of Bulgarian origin, and was submitted to
|
||
the author of this document in July, 1990 by Vesselin Bontchev.
|
||
This virus is one of a family of three (3) viruses which may be
|
||
referred to as the P1 or Phoenix Family. Each of these viruses is
|
||
being documented separately due to their varying characteristics.
|
||
The Evil virus is a memory resident, generic infector of .COM
|
||
files, and will infect COMMAND.COM. It is the most advanced of the
|
||
three viruses in the Phoenix Family.
|
||
|
||
The Evil, or V1701New, Virus is a later version of the PhoenixD virus.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Evil virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will install itself memory resident in free high memory,
|
||
reserving 8,192 bytes. Interrupt 2A will be hooked by the virus.
|
||
System total memory and free memory will decrease by 8,192 bytes.
|
||
Evil will then check to see if the current drive's root directory
|
||
contains a copy of COMMAND.COM. If a copy of COMMAND.COM is found,
|
||
it will be infected by Evil by overwriting part of the binary zero
|
||
portion of the program, and changing the program's header information.
|
||
COMMAND.COM will not change in file length. The virus will then
|
||
similarly infect COMMAND.COM residing in the C: drive root directory.
|
||
|
||
After becoming memory resident, the virus will attempt to infect any
|
||
.COM file executed. Evil is a better replicator than either the
|
||
original Phoenix Virus or PhoenixD, and was successful in infecting
|
||
.COM files in all cases on the author's system. Infected files will
|
||
increase in size by 1,701 bytes.
|
||
|
||
Evil is not able to recognize when it has previously infected a
|
||
file, so it may reinfect .COM files several times. Each infection will
|
||
result in another 1,701 bytes of viral code being appended to the
|
||
file.
|
||
|
||
Like PhoenixD, Evil will infect files when they are openned for
|
||
any reason in addition to when they are executed. The simple act of
|
||
copying a .COM file will result in both the source and target .COM
|
||
files being infected.
|
||
|
||
Systems infected with the Evil virus will experience problems with
|
||
executing CHKDSK.COM. Attempts to execute this program with Evil
|
||
memory resident will result in a warm reboot of the system occurring.
|
||
The system, however, will not perform either a RAM memory check or
|
||
request Date and Time if an autoexec.bat file is not present.
|
||
|
||
This virus is not related to the Cascade (1701/1704) virus.
|
||
|
||
The Evil Virus employs a complex encryption mechanism, and virus
|
||
scanners which are only able to look for simple hex strings will not
|
||
be able to detect it. There is no simple hex string in this virus
|
||
that is common to all infected samples.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of Evil are:
|
||
Evil-B : This is a earlier version of Evil, and is a rather
|
||
poor replicator. It also has not to viable as infected
|
||
programs will hang when they are executed, with the
|
||
exception of the Runme.Exe file which the author
|
||
received. The Runme.Exe file was probably the original
|
||
release file distributed by the virus's author.
|
||
(Originally listed in VSUM9008 as V1701New-B)
|
||
|
||
Also see: Phoenix, PhoenixD
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: F-Word Virus
|
||
Aliases: Fuck You
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: December, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth; decrease in system and available free memory;
|
||
file date/time changes
|
||
Origin: USSR
|
||
Eff Length: 417 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRtCK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The F-Word, or Fuck You, Virus was submitted in December, 1990 and
|
||
is from the USSR. This virus is a memory resident infector of COM
|
||
files, including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the F-Word Virus is executed
|
||
the virus will install itself memory resident at the top of system
|
||
memory but below the 640K DOS boundary. Interrupt 12's return will
|
||
be moved. Total system memory and available free memory will decrease
|
||
by 1,024 bytes. Interrupts 08 and 21 will be hooked by the virus.
|
||
|
||
After F-Word is memory resident, it will infect COM files over
|
||
approximately 2K in length when they are executed. Infected files will
|
||
have a length increase of 417 bytes with the virus being located at the
|
||
end of the program. The file's date and time in the directory will also
|
||
have been changed to the system date and time when infection occurred.
|
||
|
||
Attempts to executed the DOS Edlin program will result in a
|
||
"Invalid drive of file name" message being displayed, and the program
|
||
terminated.
|
||
|
||
The text string "Fuck You!" can be found in all infected files.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Father Christmas
|
||
Aliases: Choinka
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: November, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth; lost cluster; cross-linking of files;
|
||
graphic and message displayed on activation
|
||
Origin: Poland
|
||
Eff Length: 1,881 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V71+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Father Christmas, or Choinka, Virus was discovered in Poland in
|
||
November, 1990. This virus is based on the Vienna Virus, and is a
|
||
non-resident infector of .COM files, including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the Father Christmas Virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will infect one other .COM file in the current directory.
|
||
If no uninfected .COM files exist in the current directory, the virus
|
||
will follow the system path to find an uninfected program. Infected
|
||
files will increase in length by 1,881 bytes with the virus being
|
||
located at the end of the infected program.
|
||
|
||
Systems infected with the Father Christmas Virus may notice crosslinking
|
||
of files and lost clusters.
|
||
|
||
During the period from December 19 - December 31 of any year, this
|
||
virus will activate. On these dates, when infected programs are
|
||
executed a christmas trees graphic is displayed on the system monitor
|
||
with the following message:
|
||
|
||
Merry Christmas
|
||
&
|
||
a Happy New Year
|
||
for all my lovely friends
|
||
from
|
||
FATHER CHRISTMAS
|
||
|
||
If the graphic is displayed, the user must strike a key in order to
|
||
have the program being executed finish running.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Fellowship
|
||
Aliases: 1022
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: July, 1990
|
||
Isolated: Australia
|
||
Symptoms: TSR, .COM & .EXE file growth
|
||
Origin: Malaysia
|
||
Eff Length: 1,022 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsE - Parasitic Resident .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V66+, F-Prot 1.12+, Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, F-Prot 1.12+, NAV, or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Fellowship or 1022 Virus was isolated in Australia in July 1990.
|
||
Fellowship is a memory resident generic infector of .EXE files. It
|
||
does not infect .COM or overlay files.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Fellowship Virus is
|
||
executed, the virus will install itself memory resident as a 2,048
|
||
byte TSR in low system memory. Available free memory will be decreased
|
||
by a corresponding 2,048 bytes. Interrupt 21 will also now be
|
||
controlled by the virus.
|
||
|
||
After the virus is memory resident, the virus will infect .EXE files
|
||
when they are executed. Infected .EXE files will increase in size
|
||
by between 1,019 and 1,027 bytes. The virus's code will be located
|
||
at the end of infected files.
|
||
|
||
Infected files will contain the following text strings very close to
|
||
the end of the file:
|
||
|
||
"This message is dedicated to
|
||
all fellow PC users on Earth
|
||
Toward A Better Tomorrow
|
||
And a better Place To Live In"
|
||
|
||
"03/03/90 KV KL MAL"
|
||
|
||
This virus is believed to have originated in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Fish Virus
|
||
Aliases: European Fish Viruses, Fish 6, Stealth Virus
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: May 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth, monitor/display flickering, system
|
||
memory decrease
|
||
Origin: West Germany
|
||
Eff Length: 3,584 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsAK - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V63+, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirexPC, F-Prot 1.12+,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, CleanUp V66+, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirHunt 2.0+,
|
||
NAV, or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Fish Virus was isolated in May 1990. At the time of isolation,
|
||
it was reported to be widespread in Europe, and it is thought to
|
||
have originated in West Germany. It is a generic resident .COM
|
||
and .EXE infector, and will infect COMMAND.COM. This virus will
|
||
remain memory resident thru a warm reboot, or Ctrl-Alt-Del. The
|
||
virus is encrypted, though infected programs can be found by
|
||
searching for the text string "FISH FI" appearing near the end of
|
||
the program. The "FISH FI" string may later disappear from the
|
||
program.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Fish Virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will go memory resident, installing itself into the low
|
||
available free memory. If interrupt 13 has not been hooked by
|
||
another program, it will hook interrupt 13. If it can hook
|
||
interrupt 13, it will take up 8,192 bytes in memory. If the virus
|
||
cannot hook interrupt 13 because another program is already using it,
|
||
it will be 4,096 bytes in memory.
|
||
|
||
When interrupt 13 is not hooked, and the virus is memory resident,
|
||
the virus will cause a random warm reboot, thus allowing it to
|
||
infect COMMAND.COM and hook interrupt 13. Warm reboots do not
|
||
appear to randomly occur after interrupt 13 has been hooked.
|
||
|
||
After the virus is memory resident, all .COM and .EXE programs which
|
||
are openned for any reason will be infected. Infected programs
|
||
increase in length by 3,584 bytes. The increase in program size
|
||
cannot be seen by listing the disk directory if the virus is in
|
||
memory. Also, if a CHKDSK command is run on an infected system,
|
||
it will detect file allocation errors on infected files. If CHKDSK
|
||
is run with the /F option, it will result in lost clusters and
|
||
cross-linking of files.
|
||
|
||
The virus slows down video writes, and flickering of the monitor
|
||
display can be noticed on an infected system.
|
||
|
||
Anti-viral programs which perform CRC checking cannot detect the
|
||
infection of the program by the Fish Virus if the virus is memory
|
||
resident. This virus can also bypass software write protect
|
||
mechanisms used to protect a hard drive.
|
||
|
||
The Fish Virus is a modified version of the 4096 Virus, though it is
|
||
more sophisticated in that it constantly re-encrypts itself in
|
||
system memory. Viewing system memory with the virus resident will
|
||
show that the names of several fish are present.
|
||
|
||
It is unknown what the Fish virus does when it activates, though it
|
||
does appear to check to determine if the year of the system time is
|
||
1991.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Flash
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: July 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth, decrease in available free memory,
|
||
video screen flicker
|
||
Origin: West Germany
|
||
Eff Length: 688 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRfA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V64+, Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Flash Virus was discovered in July 1990 in West Germany. Flash
|
||
is a memory resident generic file infector, and will infect .COM and
|
||
.EXE files, but not COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Flash Virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will install itself memory resident. 976 bytes will be
|
||
allocated in high memory, and available free memory will decrease by
|
||
a corresponding 976 bytes. A mapping of memory will also indicate
|
||
that when Flash is resident in memory, interrupts 00, 23, 24, 30,
|
||
ED, F5, and FB are now in free memory. Total system memory reported
|
||
by DOS, as well as low memory used by the operating system and TSRs
|
||
will not have changed.
|
||
|
||
Once Flash is memory resident, each time a .COM or .EXE program is
|
||
executed it is a candidate for infection. An uninfected .EXE program
|
||
will always be infected upon execution. Uninfected .COM files are
|
||
only infected if they are greater than approximately 500 bytes in
|
||
length. Infected files will always increase in length by 688 bytes.
|
||
|
||
After June of 1990, systems with a graphics capable monitor may notice
|
||
a screen flicker occurring at approximately seven minute intervals.
|
||
The virus causes this effect by manipulating some screen blanking bits
|
||
every seven minutes.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Flip
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: July 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth; decrease in system and free memory;
|
||
boot sector and partition table altered; file allocation errors
|
||
Origin: West Germany
|
||
Eff Length: 2,343 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRhABKX - Parasitic Resident .COM, .EXE, Partition Table Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V66+, F-Prot 1.12+, Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Clean-Up V71+, Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Flip Virus was discovered in West Germany in July 1990. It is
|
||
a generic file infector, and will infect .COM, .EXE, and overlay files.
|
||
This virus will also infect COMMAND.COM, as well as alter the partition
|
||
table and boot sector of hard disks. It is important to note that the
|
||
Flip virus is not infective from .COM files or boot sectors.
|
||
|
||
The first time an EXE program infected with the Flip Virus is executed,
|
||
it installs itself memory resident in high memory. System memory as
|
||
reported by the CHKDSK command as well as free memory will have
|
||
decreased by 3,064 bytes. At this time, the copy of COMMAND.COM
|
||
located in the C: drive root directory will be infected, though no
|
||
file length change will be apparent with the virus in memory. The
|
||
system's hard disk partition table and boot sector will also be
|
||
slightly modified. If the infected program was executed from a
|
||
floppy, COMMAND.COM on the floppy will be infected, though the size
|
||
change will be noticeable.
|
||
|
||
After Flip becomes memory resident, any .COM or .EXE files executed
|
||
will become infected. Infected programs will show a file length
|
||
increase of 2,343 bytes. If a program is executed which uses an
|
||
overlay file, the overlay file will also become infected.
|
||
|
||
Systems infected Flip may experience file allocation errors resulting
|
||
in file linkage errors. Some data files may become corrupted.
|
||
|
||
On the second of any month, systems which were booted from an infected
|
||
hard disk and have an EGA or VGA capable display adapter may experience
|
||
the display on the system monitor being horizontally "flipped" between
|
||
16:00 and 16:59.
|
||
|
||
Flip can only be passed between systems on infected .EXE files.
|
||
Infected .COM files, and altered floppy boot sectors do not transfer
|
||
the virus.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of Flip include:
|
||
Flip B : Similar to the original Flip Virus, this variant has an
|
||
effective length of 2,153 bytes. Its memory resident portion
|
||
at the top of system memory is 2,672 bytes. The major
|
||
difference between this variant and the original virus is
|
||
that Flip B can infect programs from the hard disk partition
|
||
table infection.
|
||
Isolated: January, 1991. Origin: Unknown.
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: FORM-Virus
|
||
Aliases: Form, Form Boot
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: June 1990
|
||
Symptoms: BSC, clicking noise from system speaker
|
||
Origin: Switzerland
|
||
Eff Length: N/A
|
||
Type Code: BR - Resident Boot Sector Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V64+, F-Prot 1.12+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: MDisk, NAV, or DOS SYS command
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Form, or Form Boot, Virus is a memory resident infector of
|
||
floppy and hard disk boot sectors. It was originally isolated in
|
||
Switzerland.
|
||
|
||
When a system is first booted with a diskette infected with the
|
||
Form Boot virus, the virus will infect system memory as well as
|
||
seek out and infect the system's hard disk. The floppy boot may
|
||
or may not be successful, on the author's test system, a boot
|
||
from floppy diskette infected with Form Boot never succeeded,
|
||
instead the system would hang. It should be noted that the virus
|
||
was received by the author of this document as a binary file, and
|
||
it may have been damaged in some way.
|
||
|
||
The following text message is contained in the Form Boot virus binary
|
||
code as received by the author of this document:
|
||
|
||
"The FORM-Virus sends greetings to everyone who's reading
|
||
this text.FORM doesn't destroy data! Don't panic! Fuckings
|
||
go to Corinne."
|
||
|
||
These messages, however, may not appear in all cases. For example,
|
||
I did not find these messages anywhere on a hard disk infected with
|
||
Form Boot.
|
||
|
||
Systems infected with the FORM-Virus in memory may notice that a
|
||
clicking noise may be emitted from the system speaker on the 24th
|
||
day of any month.
|
||
|
||
This virus can be removed with the same technique as used with many
|
||
boot sector infectors. First, power off the system and then boot
|
||
from a known clean write-protected boot diskette. The DOS SYS
|
||
command can then be used to recreate the boot sector. Alternately,
|
||
MDisk from McAfee Associates may be used to recreate the boot
|
||
sector.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Frere Jacques
|
||
Aliases: Frere Virus
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: May 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth, available memory decreases, system hangs,
|
||
music (Frere Jacques) on Fridays
|
||
Origin: California, USA
|
||
Eff Length: 1,808 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V63+, Pro-Scan 1.4+, F-Prot 1.12+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, Pro-Scan 1.4+, NAV, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Frere Jacques Virus was isolated in May, 1990. It is a memory
|
||
resident generic file infector, infecting .COM, .EXE, and Overlay
|
||
files. It does not infect COMMAND.COM. This virus is based on
|
||
the Jerusalem B Virus.
|
||
|
||
The first time an infected program is executed, the virus will
|
||
install itself memory resident in low available free memory.
|
||
The memory resident virus occupies 2,064 bytes, and attaches itself
|
||
to interrupt 21. After becoming memory resident, Frere Jacques will
|
||
infect any program which is then executed. Infected programs will
|
||
increase in size by between 1,808 bytes and 1,819 bytes, though
|
||
.COM files always increase in size by 1,813 bytes.
|
||
|
||
Systems infected with Frere Jacques will experience a decrease in
|
||
available free memory, as well as executable files increasing in
|
||
size. System hangs will also intermittently occur when the virus
|
||
attempts to infect programs, thus resulting in the possible loss
|
||
of system data.
|
||
|
||
On Fridays, the Frere Jacques virus activates, and will play the
|
||
tune Frere Jacques on the system speaker.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Jerusalem B
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Friday The 13th COM Virus
|
||
Aliases: COM Virus, Miami, Munich, South African, 512 Virus, Virus B
|
||
V Status: Extinct
|
||
Discovered: November, 1987
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth, floppy disk access, file deletion
|
||
Origin: Republic of South Africa
|
||
Eff Length: 512 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNC - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan/X V67+, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, AVTK 3.5+,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D/X, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirHunt 2.0+, F-Prot, or NAV
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The original Friday The 13th COM virus first appeared in
|
||
South Africa in 1987. Unlike the Jerusalem (Friday The 13th)
|
||
viruses, it is not memory resident, nor does it hook any
|
||
interrupts. This virus only infects .COM files, but not
|
||
COMMAND.COM. On each execution of an infected file, the
|
||
virus looks for two other .COM files on the C drive and 1
|
||
on the A drive, if found they are infected. This virus is
|
||
extremely fast, and the only indication of propagation occurring
|
||
is the access light being on for the A drive, if the current
|
||
default drive is C. The virus will only infect a .COM file
|
||
once. The files, after infection, must be less than 64K in
|
||
length.
|
||
|
||
On every Friday the 13th, if the host program is executed, it
|
||
is deleted.
|
||
|
||
Known variants of the Friday The 13th COM virus are:
|
||
Friday The 13th-B: same, except that it will infect every
|
||
file in the current subdirectory or in the system path if
|
||
the infected .COM program is in the system path.
|
||
Friday The 13th-C: same as Friday The 13th-B, except that the
|
||
message "We hope we haven't inconvenienced you" is
|
||
displayed whenever the virus activates.
|
||
|
||
Author's note: All samples of this virus that are available were
|
||
created by reassembling a disassembly of this virus. These viruses
|
||
may not actually exist "in the wild".
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Frog's Alley
|
||
Aliases: Frog
|
||
V Status: New
|
||
Discovered: March, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth; Message; FAT & Directory damage; programs disappear;
|
||
Disk Volume Label change; long disk access times
|
||
Origin: USA
|
||
Eff Length: 1,500 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRCK - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V76+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Frog's Alley Virus was submitted in March, 1991 by David Grant of
|
||
the United States. This virus is a memory resident infector of .COM
|
||
files, including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When the first program infected with Frog's Alley is executed, this
|
||
virus will install itself memory resident in low, unreserved system
|
||
memory. Interrupts 09, 20, 21, and 2F will be hooked by the virus.
|
||
At this time, Frog's Alley will also infect COMMAND.COM and one other
|
||
.COM file in the current directory.
|
||
|
||
After becoming memory resident, Frog's Alley will infect 1 .COM file
|
||
each time an infected program is executed or a DIR command is
|
||
performed. In either case, long disk accesses will be noticable either
|
||
when an infected .COM program is executed, or as the DIR command
|
||
completes. .COM files are only infected if their original file length
|
||
was 1,500 or more bytes.
|
||
|
||
Programs infected with Frog's Alley will have a file size increase of
|
||
1,500 bytes, and the file's date and time in the disk directory will
|
||
have been updated to the system date and time when the infection
|
||
occurred. The virus will be located at the beginning of infected
|
||
programs.
|
||
|
||
Frog's Alley activates on the 5th day of any month. When an infected
|
||
program is executed on the 5th, the following message will be displayed:
|
||
|
||
(V) AIDS R.2A - Welcome to Frog's Alley !, (c) STPII Laboratory - Jan 1990
|
||
|
||
This message will again be displayed whenever a DIR command is
|
||
performed. The first time the message is displayed, the virus will
|
||
remove the system files and COMMAND.COM from the disk. Other programs
|
||
will still be accessible until they are also removed, or the virus is
|
||
no longer in memory. Once the virus is no longer in memory, the disk
|
||
will display the volume label "s Alley !" and have no files found when
|
||
a DIR command is performed. The disk's FAT and root directory will have
|
||
been overwritten with the above message multiple times.
|
||
|
||
Other symptom's of Frog's Alley are long disk access times when
|
||
executing programs or performing DIR commands, as well as occassional
|
||
unexpected accesses to the B: disk drive. Some memory intensive
|
||
applications will hang when Frog's Alley is active in memory.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Fu Manchu
|
||
Aliases: 2080, 2086
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: March, 1988
|
||
Symptoms: .SYS, .BIN, .COM & .EXE growth, messages
|
||
Origin:
|
||
Eff Length: 2,086 (COM files) & 2,080 (EXE files) bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, VirexPC, AVTK 3.5+,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, F-Prot, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirHunt 2.0+, VirexPC,
|
||
NAV
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Fu Manchu virus attaches itself to the beginning of .COM
|
||
files or the end of .EXE files. This virus will infect any
|
||
executable program, including overlay, .SYS, and .BIN files
|
||
as well. It appears to be a rewritten version of the Jerusalem
|
||
virus, with a possible creation date of 3/10/88.
|
||
|
||
A marker or id string usually found in this virus is
|
||
'sAXrEMHOr', though the virus only uses the 'rEMHOr' portion
|
||
of the string to identify infected files.
|
||
|
||
One out of sixteen infections will result in a timer being
|
||
installed, and after a random amount of time, the message
|
||
"The world will hear from me again!" is displayed and
|
||
the system reboots. This message will also be displayed on
|
||
an infected system after a warm reboot, though the virus doesn't
|
||
survive in memory.
|
||
|
||
After August 1, 1989, the virus will monitor the keyboard buffer,
|
||
and will add derogatory comments to the names of various
|
||
politicians. These comments go to the keyboard buffer, so
|
||
their effect is not limited to the display. The messages within
|
||
the virus are encrypted.
|
||
|
||
This virus is very rare in the United States.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Jerusalem B, Taiwan 3
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Ghostballs
|
||
Aliases: Ghost Boot, Ghost COM
|
||
V Status: Extinct
|
||
Discovered: October, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: moving graphic display, .COM file growth, file corruption, BSC.
|
||
Origin: Iceland
|
||
Eff Length: 2,351 bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCB - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM & Boot Sector Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan/X V67+, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, VirexPC,
|
||
AVTK 3.5+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: MDisk or DOS SYS and erase infected .COM files,
|
||
or CleanUp, F-Prot, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirexPC, Scan/D/X, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Ghostball virus (Ghost Boot and Ghost COM) were discovered in
|
||
October, 1989 by Fridrik Skulason of Iceland. The Ghostballs Virus
|
||
virus infects generic .COM files, increasing the file size by
|
||
2,351 bytes. It also alters the disk boot sector, replacing it
|
||
with viral code similar to the Ping Pong virus. This altered
|
||
boot sector, however, will not replicate.
|
||
|
||
Symptoms of this virus are very similar to the Ping Pong
|
||
virus, and random file corruption may occur on infected
|
||
systems.
|
||
|
||
The Ghostballs virus was the first known virus that could infect
|
||
both files (.COM files in this case) and disk boot sectors.
|
||
After the boot sector is infected, the system experiences the
|
||
bouncing ball effect of the Ping Pong virus. If the boot sector
|
||
is overwritten to remove the boot viral infection, it will again
|
||
become corrupted the next time an infected .COM file is executed.
|
||
|
||
The Ghostballs Virus is based on the code of two other viruses.
|
||
The .COM infector portion consists of a modified version of the
|
||
Vienna virus. The boot sector portion of the virus is based on
|
||
the Ping Pong virus.
|
||
|
||
To remove this virus, turn off the computer and reboot from
|
||
a write protected master diskette for the system. Then
|
||
use either MDisk or the DOS SYS command to replace the boot
|
||
sector on the infected disk. Any infected .COM files must
|
||
also be erased and deleted, then replaced with clean copies
|
||
from your original distribution diskettes.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Golden Gate
|
||
Aliases: Mazatlan, 500 Virus
|
||
V Status: Extinct
|
||
Discovered: 1988
|
||
Symptoms: BSC, disk format, Resident TOM
|
||
Origin: California, USA
|
||
Eff Length: N/A
|
||
Type Code: BRt - Resident Boot Sector Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan (identifies as Alameda)
|
||
Removal Instructions: MDisk, F-Prot, or DOS SYS command
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Golden Gate virus is a modified version of the Alameda virus
|
||
which activates when the counter in the virus has determined
|
||
that it is infected 500 diskettes. The virus replicates when
|
||
a CTL-ALT-DEL is performed, infecting any diskette in the floppy
|
||
drive. Upon activation, the C: drive is formatted. The
|
||
counter in the virus is reset on each new floppy or hard drive
|
||
infected.
|
||
|
||
Known Variants of this virus are:
|
||
Golden Gate-B: same as Golden Gate, except that the counter
|
||
has been changed from 500 to 30 infections before
|
||
activation, and only diskettes are infected.
|
||
Golden Gate-C: same as Golden Gate-B, except that the hard
|
||
drive can also be infected. This variant is also known
|
||
as the Mazatlan Virus, and is the most dangerous of the
|
||
Golden Gate viruses.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Alameda
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Grither
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: January, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth; C: & D: drive disk corruption
|
||
Origin: United States
|
||
Eff Length: 774 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V72+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Grither Virus was submitted in January, 1991, by Paul Ferguson
|
||
of the United States. This virus is a non-resident direct action
|
||
infector of .COM files, including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with Grither is executed, the virus will infect
|
||
one .COM file in the current directory. COMMAND.COM may become
|
||
infected if it exists in the current directory.
|
||
|
||
.COM programs infected with Grither will increase in length by 774
|
||
bytes, the virus will be located at the end of the infected file. The
|
||
file's date and time in the disk directory will not be altered by the
|
||
virus.
|
||
|
||
The Grither Virus can be extremely destructive. With a probability of
|
||
approximately one out of every eight times an infected program is
|
||
executed, the virus may activate. On activation, Grither will overwrite
|
||
the beginning of the C: and D: drives of the system's hard disk.
|
||
Effectively, this corrupts the disk's boot sector, file allocation
|
||
tables, and directory, as well as the system files.
|
||
|
||
Grither is roughly based on the Vienna and Violator viruses.
|
||
|
||
ViruScan V72 will identify Grither infected files as Vienna B, though
|
||
it may also identify them as Violator in rare circumstances.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Groen Links
|
||
Aliases: Green Left
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: March, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth; TSR; Music
|
||
Origin: Amsterdam, Holland
|
||
Eff Length: 1,888 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsA - Resident Parasitic .COM &.EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V67+, Pro-Scan 2.01+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, Pro-Scan 2.01+, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Groen Links Virus was originally reported in Amsterdam, Holland,
|
||
in March 1990. This virus is a memory resident infector of .COM and
|
||
.EXE files. It does not infect COMMAND.COM. It is a variant of the
|
||
Jerusalem B virus, though is listed separately here as it is a different
|
||
length and exhibits different characteristics.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Groen Links Virus is
|
||
executed, the virus will install itself memory resident as a low
|
||
system memory TSR of 1,872 bytes. Interrupts 21 and CE will be hooked
|
||
by the virus.
|
||
|
||
After the virus is memory resident, it will infect .COM and .EXE files
|
||
as they are executed. Infected .COM files will increase in length
|
||
by 1,893 bytes with the virus being located at the beginning of the
|
||
file. .EXE files will increase in length by 1,888 to 1,902 bytes with
|
||
the virus located at the end of infected files. As with many of the
|
||
Jerusalem variants, this virus will reinfect .EXE files. After the
|
||
first infection, .EXE files will increase by 1,888 bytes on subsequent
|
||
infections. Infected files will contain the text string: "GRLKDOS".
|
||
|
||
After the virus has been resident for 30 minutes, it may play
|
||
"Stem op Groen Links" every 30 minutes. The name of the tune translates
|
||
to "Vote Green Left", Green Left being a political party in Holland.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Guppy
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: October, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: TSR, .COM growth, error messages, disk boot failures
|
||
Origin: United States
|
||
Eff Length: 152 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsCK - Resident Parasitic .COM &.EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: Pro-Scan 2.01+, ViruScan V76+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Pro-Scan 2.01+, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Guppy Virus was submitted in late October, 1990 by Paul Ferguson
|
||
of Washington, DC. Guppy is a memory resident infector of .COM files,
|
||
including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Guppy Virus is executed, the
|
||
virus will install itself memory resident as a low system memory TSR
|
||
with interrupt 21 hooked. Available free memory will decrease by
|
||
720 bytes.
|
||
|
||
After the virus is memory resident, any .COM file with a file length of
|
||
at least 100 bytes (approximately) that is executed will become infected
|
||
with Guppy. Infected files will increase in length by 152 bytes, with
|
||
two bytes added to the beginning of the .COM file, and 150 bytes added
|
||
to the end of the file. Infected files will also have their date/time
|
||
stamps in the directory updated to the system date and time when the
|
||
infection occurred.
|
||
|
||
If COMMAND.COM is executed with Guppy memory resident, it will become
|
||
infected. If the system is later booted from a disk with a Guppy
|
||
infected COMMAND.COM, the boot will fail and a "Bad or Missing Command
|
||
Interpreter" message will be displayed.
|
||
|
||
Some programs will also fail to execute properly once infected with
|
||
Guppy. For example, attempts to execute EDLIN.COM after it was
|
||
executed on my system resulted in a consistent "Invalid drive or
|
||
file name" message, and EDLIN ending execution.
|
||
|
||
Infected files can be identified as they will end with the following
|
||
hex character string: 3ECD211F5A5B58EA
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of Guppy include:
|
||
Guppy-B: Almost identical to Guppy, there are a few bytes which have
|
||
been altered in this variant.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Halloechen
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: October, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: TSR, .COM & .EXE growth, garbled keyboard input.
|
||
Origin: West Germany
|
||
Eff Length: 2,011 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsA - Resident Parasitic .COM &.EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V57+, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirexPC, AVTK 3.5+,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: VirHunt 2.0+, Scan/D, NAV, or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Halloechen virus was reported by Christoff Fischer of
|
||
the University of Karlsruhe in West Germany. The virus is
|
||
a memory resident generic .COM & .EXE file infector which is
|
||
reported to be widespread in West Germany.
|
||
|
||
The Halloechen virus installs itself memory resident when the
|
||
first infected program is executed. Thereafter, the virus will
|
||
infect any .EXE or .COM file which is run unless the resulting
|
||
infected file would be greater than 64K in size, or the file's
|
||
date falls within the system date's current month and year.
|
||
Once a file has been determined to be a candidate for infection,
|
||
and is less than approximately 62K in size as well as having a
|
||
date outside of the current month and year, it is infected.
|
||
In the process of infecting the file, the files size is first
|
||
increased so that it is a multiple of 16 (ends on a paragraph
|
||
boundary), then the 2,011 bytes of viral code are added.
|
||
|
||
When infected files are run, input from the keyboard is garbled.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Happy New Year
|
||
Aliases: Happy N.Y., V1600
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: December, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: TSR; .COM & .EXE Growth; Floppy Boot Sector altered;
|
||
Boot failures; Bad or missing command interpretor message
|
||
Origin: Bulgaria
|
||
Eff Length: 1,600 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsAK - Resident Parasitic .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Happy New Year, or V1600, Virus was submitted in December, 1990.
|
||
This virus is originally from Bulgaria, and is a memory resident
|
||
infector of .COM and .EXE files. It will infect COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Happy New Year Virus is
|
||
executed, the virus will install itself memory resident as a 2,432
|
||
bytes low system memory TSR. Interrupt 21 will be hooked by the
|
||
virus. At this time, the virus will also make a slight alteration
|
||
to the floppy boot sector, and infect COMMAND.COM. Infected
|
||
COMMAND.COM files will not show a file length increase as the virus
|
||
will overwrite a portion of the hex 00 section of the file. The
|
||
altered floppy boot sector does not contain a copy of the virus, and
|
||
is not infectious.
|
||
|
||
Once Happy New Year is memory resident, it will infect .COM and .EXE
|
||
programs as they are executed. Infected programs will increase in
|
||
length by 1,600 bytes and have the virus located at the end of the
|
||
infected file.
|
||
|
||
The following text message can be found in infected programs:
|
||
|
||
"Dear Nina, you make me write this virus; Happy new year!"
|
||
"1989"
|
||
|
||
This message is not displayed by the virus.
|
||
|
||
Systems infected with the Happy New Year Virus may fail to boot,
|
||
receiving a "Bad or missing command interpretor" message if COMMAND.COM
|
||
is infected on the boot diskette or hard drive.
|
||
|
||
It is unknown if Happy New Year carries any destructive capabilities.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of Happy New Year are:
|
||
Happy New Year B : Similar to Happy New Year, this variant has five
|
||
bytes which differ from the original virus. Unlike Happy
|
||
New Year, COMMAND.COM will only be infected if it is executed
|
||
for some reason.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: HIV
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: New
|
||
Discovered: March, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth; decrease in total system & available memory
|
||
Origin: USA
|
||
Eff Length: 1,614 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRhAK - Resident Parasitic .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V76+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The HIV Virus was submitted in March, 1991, by David Grant of the
|
||
United States. This virus is based on the Murphy Virus, and is a
|
||
memory resident infector of .COM and .EXE files, as well as COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with HIV is executed, HIV will check to see if
|
||
it is already present in memory. If it is not already memory resident,
|
||
it will install itself at the top of system memory but below the 640K
|
||
DOS boundary. Interrupt 21 will be hooked by the virus, and total
|
||
system memory and available free memory as measured by the DOS ChkDsk
|
||
program will decrease by 1,632 bytes.
|
||
|
||
After becoming memory resident, HIV will infect .COM and .EXE files
|
||
when they are executed or openned for any reason. Infected programs
|
||
will increase in size by 1,614 bytes with the virus being located at
|
||
the end of infected files. The file date and time in the disk
|
||
directory will not be altered.
|
||
|
||
Programs infected with HIV will contain the following text strings:
|
||
|
||
"HIV Virus - Release 1.0
|
||
Created by Cracker Jack
|
||
(C) 1991 Italian Virus Laboratory"
|
||
|
||
It is not known what HIV does besides replicate. This virus may also
|
||
be a research virus and not in the public domain since the original
|
||
sample submitted is not a natural infection of the virus.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Murphy
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Holland Girl
|
||
Aliases: Sylvia
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: December, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth, TSR
|
||
Origin: Netherlands
|
||
Eff Length: 1,332 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsC - Resident Parasitic .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V50+, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, VirexPC,
|
||
AVTK 3.5+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: F-Prot, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirHunt 2.0+, or Scan/D
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Holland Girl or Sylvia Virus was first reported by Jan
|
||
Terpstra of the Netherlands. This virus is memory resident
|
||
and infects only .COM files, increasing their size by 1,332
|
||
bytes. The virus apparently does no other damage, and
|
||
does not infect COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The virus's name is due to the fact that the virus code
|
||
contains the name and phone number of a girl named Sylvia
|
||
in Holland, along with her address, requesting that post cards
|
||
be sent to her. The virus is believed to have been written
|
||
by her ex-boyfriend.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Holland Girl 2
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Holland Girl 2
|
||
Aliases: Sylvia 2
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: January, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth
|
||
Origin: New Brunswick, Canada
|
||
Eff Length: 1,332 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNC - Resident Parasitic .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V76+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Holland Girl 2, or Sylvia 2, Virus was discovered in New Brunswick,
|
||
Canada in January 1991. This virus is similar to the Holland Girl
|
||
Virus, though it has been altered significantly. This virus is a non-
|
||
resident infector of .COM files, including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the Holland Girl 2 Virus is executed, the
|
||
virus will infect up to four .COM files. It first checks the C: drive
|
||
root directory to look for candidate files, then the current drive and
|
||
current directory.
|
||
|
||
.COM Programs infected with the Holland Girl 2 Virus will increase in
|
||
length by 1,332 bytes with the virus being located at the beginning of
|
||
the infected program. Infected programs will also contain the following
|
||
text:
|
||
|
||
"This program is infected by a HARMLESS Text-Virus V2.1"
|
||
|
||
"Send a FUNNY postcard to : Sylvia"
|
||
|
||
"You might get an ANTIVIRUS program....."
|
||
|
||
Sylvia's last name, and full address are in the virus in plain text,
|
||
and are not repeated here for privacy reasons.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Holland Girl
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Holocaust
|
||
Aliases: Stealth, Holo
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: December, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: decrease in system & available memory; file allocation errors
|
||
Origin: Barcelona, Spain
|
||
Eff Length: 3,784 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRhCK - Resident Parasitic .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Holocaust Virus was submitted in December, 1990 by David Llamas of
|
||
Barcelona, Spain. Holocaust is a self-encrypting memory resident
|
||
infector of .COM files, including COMMAND.COM. This virus is qualifies
|
||
as a Stealth virus as it hides the file length increase on infected
|
||
files as well as infecting on file open and execution.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Holocaust Virus is
|
||
executed, the virus will install itself memory resident. It will
|
||
reserve 4,080 bytes of high system memory below the 640K DOS boundary.
|
||
This memory will be marked as Command Data, and interrupt 21 will be
|
||
hooked. Some memory mapping utilities will show the memory resident
|
||
command interpretor to have grown by the 4,080 bytes, though it is
|
||
actually in high memory instead of low memory.
|
||
|
||
Once Holocaust is memory resident, it will infect COM programs which
|
||
are executed or openned for any reason. This virus, however, will not
|
||
infect very small COM files of less than 1K in size. Infected COM
|
||
programs will increase in size by 3,784 bytes, though this file size
|
||
increase will not be seen in a directory listing if the virus is
|
||
memory resident. The viral code will be located at the end of
|
||
infected files.
|
||
|
||
If the Holocaust Virus is memory resident and the DOS ChkDsk command
|
||
is executed, infected files will be indicated as having a file
|
||
allocation error. Execution of the command with the /F parameter on
|
||
systems with the virus memory resident will result in the infected
|
||
files becoming damaged. The file allocation errors do not occur if
|
||
the virus is not in memory since at that time the directory size will
|
||
match the file allocation in the FAT.
|
||
|
||
The Holocaust Virus is a self-encrypting virus, and will occasionally
|
||
produce an infected file which is encrypted differently from its
|
||
original encryption mechanism. Some infected files will contain the
|
||
following text at the end of the program, while other samples will have
|
||
this text encrypted:
|
||
|
||
"Virus Anti - C.T.N.E. v2.10a. (c)1990 Grupo Holokausto.
|
||
Kampanya Anti-Telefonica. Menos tarifas y mas servicio.
|
||
Programmed in Barcelona (Spain). 23-8-90.
|
||
- 666 -"
|
||
|
||
Holocaust is reported by David Llamas to be widespread in Barcelona
|
||
as of December, 1990. It is not known if this virus activates, and
|
||
what it does on activation. It does not match a similar virus
|
||
reported by Jim Bates of the United Kingdom named Spanish Telecom.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Hybryd
|
||
Aliases: Hybrid
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: January, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth
|
||
Origin: Poland
|
||
Eff Length: 1,306 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRhA - Resident Parasitic .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Hybryd Virus was submitted in January, 1991, and is from Poland.
|
||
This virus is a non-resident direct action infector of .COM files,
|
||
including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with Hybryd is executed, the virus will
|
||
look for an uninfected .COM program in the current directory. If an
|
||
uninfected program is found, the virus will infect it. Infected
|
||
.COM programs will have a file length increase of 1,306 bytes, the
|
||
virus will be located at the end of the infected program. This virus
|
||
alters the file time so that the seconds field in the file time is 62,
|
||
the indicator that the file is infected. Just viewing the directory,
|
||
though, it appears that the file date and time has not been altered.
|
||
|
||
The following text strings are contained within the Hybryd Virus, though
|
||
they cannot be viewed in infected files as they are encrypted:
|
||
|
||
"(C) Hybryd Soft
|
||
Specjalne podziekowania dla
|
||
Andrzeja Kadlofa i Mariusza Deca
|
||
za artykuly w Komputerze 11/88"
|
||
|
||
In the submitted sample, the one text string that is not encrypted is
|
||
the following, which is also found in replicated samples:
|
||
|
||
"Copyright IBM Corp 1981,1987
|
||
Licensed Material - Program Property of IBM"
|
||
|
||
This string should not be taken to indicate that IBM necessarily had
|
||
anything to do with the creation of this virus.
|
||
|
||
On Friday The 13ths starting in 1992, this virus will overwrite the
|
||
current drive's boot sector when an infected program is executed. It
|
||
may also corrupt program files at that time when they are executed.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Hymn
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: December, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth; decrease in system and available free memory
|
||
Origin: USSR
|
||
Eff Length: 1,865 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRhA - Resident Parasitic .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Hymn Virus was submitted in December, 1990, and originated in the
|
||
USSR. This virus is a memory resident infector of .COM and .EXE files,
|
||
and will infect COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Hymn Virus is executed, the
|
||
virus will install itself memory resident at the top of system memory
|
||
but below the 640K DOS boundary. The DOS ChkDsk program will show that
|
||
total system memory and available free memory have decreased by 3,712
|
||
bytes. This virus does not move the interrupt 12 return. COMMAND.COM
|
||
will also become infected at this time.
|
||
|
||
Once Hymn is memory resident, it will infect .COM and .EXE files which
|
||
are over approximately 2K in length when they are executed or openned
|
||
for any reason. Infected .COM files will increase in length by
|
||
1,865 bytes. Infected .EXE files will have a file length increase of
|
||
1,869 to 1,883 bytes. In both cases the virus will be located at the
|
||
end of the infected file.
|
||
|
||
Infected programs will contain two text strings within the viral code:
|
||
"ibm@SNS"
|
||
"@ussr@"
|
||
|
||
It is not known what Hymn does when it activates, but it is assumed
|
||
from the name that under some conditions it may play music.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Icelandic
|
||
Aliases: 656, One In Ten, Disk Crunching Virus, Saratoga 2
|
||
V Status: Extinct
|
||
Discovered: June, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: .EXE growth, Resident TOM, bad sectors, FAT corruption
|
||
Origin: Iceland
|
||
Eff Length: 656 bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRfE - Resident Parasitic .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan/X V67+, F-Prot, Pro-Scan, VirexPC, AVTK 3.5+
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D/X, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirexPC 1.1B, F-Prot,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Icelandic, or "Disk Crunching Virus", was originally
|
||
isolated in Iceland in June 1989. This virus only infects
|
||
.EXE files, with infected files growing in length between
|
||
656 and 671 bytes. File lengths after infection will always
|
||
be a multiple of 16. The virus attaches itself to the end
|
||
of the programs it infects, and infected files will always
|
||
end with hex '4418,5F19'.
|
||
|
||
The Icelandic virus will copy itself to the top of free memory
|
||
the first time an infected program is executed. Once in high
|
||
memory, it hides from memory mapping programs. If a program
|
||
later tries to write to this area of memory, the computer will
|
||
crash. If the virus finds that some other program has "hooked"
|
||
Interrupt 13, it will not proceed to infect programs. If
|
||
Interrupt 13 has not been "hooked", it will attempt to infect
|
||
every 10th program executed.
|
||
|
||
On systems with only floppy drives, or 10 MB hard disks, the
|
||
virus will not cause any damage. However, on systems with
|
||
hard disks larger than 10 MB, the virus will select one unused
|
||
FAT entry and mark the entry as a bad sector each time it
|
||
infects a program.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Icelandic-II, Icelandic-III, Mix/1, Saratoga
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Icelandic-II
|
||
Aliases: System Virus, One In Ten
|
||
V Status: Extinct
|
||
Discovered: July, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: .EXE growth, Resident TOM, FAT corruption
|
||
date changes, loss of Read-Only
|
||
Origin: Iceland
|
||
Eff Length: 632 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRfE - Parasitic Resident .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan/X V67+, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, VirexPC,
|
||
AVTK 3.5+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D/X, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirexPC 1.1B, F-Prot,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Icelandic-II Virus is a modified version of the Icelandic
|
||
Virus, and was isolated for the first time in July 1989 in
|
||
Iceland. These two viruses are very similar, so only the
|
||
changes to this variant are indicated here, refer to Icelandic
|
||
for the base virus information.
|
||
|
||
Each time the Icelandic-II virus infects a program, it will
|
||
modify the file's date, thus making it fairly obvious that
|
||
the program has been changed. The virus will also remove
|
||
the read-only attribute from files, but does not restore it
|
||
after infecting the program.
|
||
|
||
The Icelandic-II virus can infect programs even if the system
|
||
is running an anti-viral TSR that monitors interrupt 21, such
|
||
as FluShot+.
|
||
|
||
On hard disks larger than 10 MB, there are no bad sectors
|
||
marked in the FAT as there is with the Icelandic virus.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Icelandic, Icelandic-III, Mix/1, Saratoga
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Icelandic-III
|
||
Aliases: December 24th
|
||
V Status: Endangered
|
||
Discovered: December, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: .EXE growth, Resident TOM, bad sectors, FAT corruption,
|
||
Dec 24 message.
|
||
Origin: Iceland
|
||
Eff Length: 853 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRfE - Parasitic Resident .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan/X V67+, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, VirexPC,
|
||
AVTK 3.5+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: F-Prot, Scan/D/X, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirexPC 1.1B,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV, or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Icelandic-III Virus is a modified version of the Icelandic
|
||
Virus, and was isolated for the first time in December 1989 in
|
||
Iceland. These two viruses are very similar, so only the
|
||
changes to this variant are indicated here, refer to Icelandic
|
||
for the base virus information.
|
||
|
||
The Icelandic-III virus's id string in the last 2 words of the
|
||
program is hex '1844,195F', the bytes in each word being
|
||
reversed from the id string ending the Icelandic and
|
||
Icelandic-II viruses. There are also other minor changes to
|
||
the virus from the previous Icelandic viruses, including the
|
||
addition of several NOP instructions.
|
||
|
||
Before the virus will infect a program, it checks to see if the
|
||
program has been previously infected with Icelandic or
|
||
Icelandic-II, if it has, it does not infect the program.
|
||
Files infected with the Icelandic-III virus will have their
|
||
length increased by between 848 and 863 bytes.
|
||
|
||
If an infected program is run on December 24th of any year,
|
||
programs subsequently run will be stopped, later displaying
|
||
the message "Gledileg jol" ("Merry Christmas" in Icelandic)
|
||
instead.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Icelandic, Icelandic-II, Mix/1, Saratoga
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: IKV 528
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: January, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth
|
||
Origin: Unknown
|
||
Eff Length: 528 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The IKV 528 Virus was submitted in January, 1991, its origin and
|
||
isolation point are unknown. This virus is a non-resident infector
|
||
of .COM files. It will infect COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with IKV 528 is executed, the virus will
|
||
infect two .COM programs in the current directory. .COM programs which
|
||
are smaller than 520 bytes will not be infected. Infected .COM
|
||
programs will increase in length by 528 bytes. The virus will be
|
||
located at the end of infected programs. The file date and time in the
|
||
disk directory will not be altered by the virus.
|
||
|
||
This virus does not do anything besides replicate.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Invader
|
||
Aliases: Plastique Boot
|
||
V Status: Common
|
||
Discovered: September, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: TSR; .COM & .EXE growth; BSC; music
|
||
Origin: Taiwan/China
|
||
Eff Length: 4,096 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsAB - Parasitic Resident .COM, .EXE, & Boot Sector Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V67+, Pro-Scan 2.01+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, CleanUp V67+, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Invader Virus was isolated in September, 1990 in China.
|
||
This virus is a later version of the Plastique-B or Plastique 5.21
|
||
Virus. It is a memory resident infector of .COM and .EXE files,
|
||
but not COMMAND.COM. It also infects boot sectors. In September
|
||
1990, many reports of infections of this virus have been received,
|
||
it appears to have spread very rapidly.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Invader virus is
|
||
executed, the virus will install itself memory resident as a low
|
||
system memory TSR. The TSR is 5,120 Bytes and interrupts 08, 09,
|
||
13, and 21 will be hooked.
|
||
|
||
At this time, the virus will also infect the boot sector of the drive
|
||
where the infected program was executed. The new boot sector is an
|
||
MSDOS 3.30 boot sector, and can be easily identified because the
|
||
normal DOS error messages found in the boot sector are now at the
|
||
beginning of the boot sector instead of the end.
|
||
|
||
After the virus has become memory resident, any .COM or .EXE file
|
||
(with the exception of COMMAND.COM) openned will be infected by the
|
||
virus. Infected .COM files will increase in length by 4,096 bytes
|
||
with the viral code being located at the beginning of the infected
|
||
file. .EXE files will increase in length between 4,096 and 4,110
|
||
bytes with the viral code being located at the end of the infected
|
||
file.
|
||
|
||
Additionally, any non-write protected diskettes which are exposed to
|
||
the infected system will have their boot sectors infected.
|
||
|
||
The Invader Virus activates after being memory resident for
|
||
30 minutes. At that time, a melody may be played on the system
|
||
speaker. On systems which play the melody, it will continue until
|
||
the system is rebooted. The melody isn't played on 286 based systems,
|
||
but is noticeable on the author's 386SX test machine.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Plastique, Plastique-B
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Iraqui Warrior
|
||
Aliases: Iraqui
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: January, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth; Closely spaced beeps from system speaker;
|
||
system hangs; boot failures
|
||
Origin: USA
|
||
Eff Length: 777 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Iraqui Warrior Virus was isolated on January 17, 1991 in the
|
||
United States. This virus is a non-memory resident infector of .COM
|
||
files, including COMMAND.COM. It is based on the Vienna Virus.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the Iraqui Warrior Virus is executed, the
|
||
virus will infect one of the first four .COM files located on the
|
||
current drive and current directory. Infected .COM files will have
|
||
a file length increase of 777 bytes with the virus being located at the
|
||
end of the file.
|
||
|
||
The following text strings can be found in infected files, the first
|
||
two occurring near the beginning of the virus, and the last being
|
||
located very near the end of the infected file:
|
||
|
||
"I come to you from The Ayatollah!"
|
||
"(c)1990, VirusMasters"
|
||
"An Iraqui Warrior is in your computer..."
|
||
|
||
None of these messages are displayed by the virus.
|
||
|
||
Systems infected with the Iraqui Warrior virus may occassionally
|
||
experience the system speaker issuing a series of closely spaced beeps
|
||
when an infected program is executed. When this occurs, the system
|
||
will hang and have to be rebooted. The beeps continue until the reboot
|
||
occurs.
|
||
|
||
Booting from a disk where COMMAND.COM has been infected will result in
|
||
a "Memory allocation error, Cannot start COMMAND, exiting" message
|
||
appearing.
|
||
|
||
The Iraqui Warrior does not appear to do anything else besides the
|
||
above.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Italian 803
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: New
|
||
Discovered: March, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth
|
||
Origin: Italy
|
||
Eff Length: 803 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNAK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method:
|
||
Removal Instructions: Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Italian 803 Virus was submitted in March, 1991. This virus is a
|
||
non-resident direct action infector of .COM and .EXE files. It will
|
||
infect COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with Italian 803 is executed, the virus will
|
||
look for an uninfected .EXE file in the current directory to infect.
|
||
If one is found, it will become infected. If an uninfected .EXE file
|
||
does not exist in the current directory, the virus will then look for
|
||
an uninfected .COM file in the current directory. If an uninfected
|
||
.COM file is found, it will then be infected.
|
||
|
||
Programs infected with Italian 803 will have a file length increase
|
||
of 803 to 817 bytes with the virus being located at the end of the
|
||
infected file. This virus does not alter the file date and time in the
|
||
disk directory.
|
||
|
||
The Italian 803 Virus may reinfect programs already infected with this
|
||
virus. The reinfection only occurs when an infected program is copied,
|
||
and then another infected program is executed. Reinfections of Italian
|
||
803 will result in an additional 816 bytes being added to the file.
|
||
|
||
Italian 803 does not do anything besides replicate.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of Italian 803 include:
|
||
Italian 803-B: Similar to Italian 803, this variant differs by only
|
||
1 byte.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Itavir
|
||
Aliases: 3880
|
||
V Status: Endangered
|
||
Discovered: March, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .EXE growth, COMMAND.COM file, Boot sector corruption
|
||
Origin: Italy
|
||
Eff Length: 3,880 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNE - Parasitic Non-Resident .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V60+, Pro-Scan 1.4+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Itavir virus was isolated in March 1990 by a group of
|
||
students at the Milan Politechnic in Milan, Italy. The Itavir
|
||
virus is a non-resident generic .EXE Infector. Infected files
|
||
will increase in length by 3,880 bytes. Infected systems,
|
||
besides having files which have increased in length, will
|
||
usually have a file with the name COMMAND.COM somewhere on
|
||
the disk. The first character of this file name is an
|
||
unprintable character. The COMMAND.COM file contains the
|
||
pure virus code and is used for appending to files as they
|
||
are infected.
|
||
|
||
The Itavir virus activates at some time period after the system
|
||
has been running for more than 24 hours. When it activates, the
|
||
boot sector is corrupted, rendering the system unbootable. The
|
||
virus also displays a message in Italian and writes ansi values
|
||
from 0 thru 255 to all available I/O ports, thus confusing any
|
||
attached peripheral devices. Some monitors may show a flickering
|
||
effect when this occurs, while some VGA monitors may actually
|
||
"hiss".
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Jeff
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: December, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth; overwritten sectors on hard disk
|
||
Origin: USA
|
||
Eff Length: 814 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V72+, Pro-Scan 2.01+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Jeff Virus was isolated in the United States in December, 1990.
|
||
This virus is a non-resident infector of .COM files, including
|
||
COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the Jeff Virus is executed, the virus
|
||
will attempt to infect one .COM file on the C: drive, starting in
|
||
the root directory. Infected .COM files will increase in size by
|
||
814 to 828 bytes, with the virus being located at the end of the
|
||
infected program.
|
||
|
||
The Jeff Virus received its name from the following text string which
|
||
is encrypted in the viral code:
|
||
|
||
"Jeff is visiting your hard disk"
|
||
|
||
While Jeff is visiting your hard disk, it will occasionally write
|
||
some sectors of random memory contents to the hard disk. If these
|
||
sectors are written to the boot sector, partition table, or FAT, the
|
||
contents of the disk may become inaccessible or produce unexpected
|
||
results.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Jerk
|
||
Aliases: Talentless Jerk, SuperHacker
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: March, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth; Message; Unexpected access to C: drive
|
||
Origin: Unknown
|
||
Eff Length: 1,077 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNAK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method:
|
||
Removal Instructions: Delete infected programs
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Jerk, Talentless Jerk, or SuperHacker Virus was submitted in
|
||
March, 1991. Its origin is unknown. This virus is a non-memory
|
||
resident infector of .COM and .EXE programs, and it will infect
|
||
COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program is executed which is infected with the Jerk Virus, it
|
||
will search the directory structure of the C: drive to find a program
|
||
to infect. If the user executed the infected program from a diskette,
|
||
an unexpected access to the system hard disk will occur. Once the
|
||
virus has selected a .COM or .EXE program to infect, it will alter the
|
||
first nine bytes of the candidate file, and then append the virus to the
|
||
end of the newly infected program. The following message may also be
|
||
displayed on the system monitor, though this does not always occur:
|
||
|
||
"Craig Murphy calls himself SUPERHACKER but he's just a talentless jerk!"
|
||
|
||
This message cannot be seen within infected programs as it is
|
||
encrypted within the virus.
|
||
|
||
Programs infected with the Jerk Virus will have a file length increase
|
||
of 1,077 bytes. The text string "MURPHY" will also be found starting
|
||
at the fourth byte of the infected file. The other text string which
|
||
can be found in infected files is:
|
||
|
||
"COMMAND.COM *.COM *.EXE Bad command or file name"
|
||
|
||
The Jerk Virus does not do anything besides replicate.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Jerusalem
|
||
Aliases: PLO, Israeli, Friday 13th, Russian, 1813(COM), 1808(EXE)
|
||
V Status: Common
|
||
Discovered: October, 1987
|
||
Symptoms: TSR, .EXE & .COM growth, system slowdown, deleted files
|
||
on Friday 13th, "Black WIndow"
|
||
Origin: Israel
|
||
Eff Length: 1,813 (COM files) & 1,808 (EXE files) bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, VirexPC 1.1+,
|
||
AVTK 3.5+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D/A, Saturday, CleanUp, UnVirus, F-Prot,
|
||
VirexPC 1.1+, Pro-Scan 1.4+, NAV
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Jerusalem Virus was originally isolated at Hebrew
|
||
University in Israel in the Fall of 1987. Jerusalem is a memory
|
||
resident infector of .COM and .EXE files, with .EXE file being
|
||
reinfected each time they are executed due to a bug in the
|
||
virus.
|
||
|
||
This virus redirects interrupt 8, and 1/2 hour after execution
|
||
of an infected program the system will slow down by a factor
|
||
of 10. Additionally, some Jerusalem Virus variants will have a
|
||
"Black Window" or "Black Box" appear on the lower left side of
|
||
the screen which will scroll up the screen as the screen scrolls.
|
||
|
||
On Friday The 13ths, after the virus is installed in memory,
|
||
every program executed will be deleted from disk.
|
||
|
||
The identifier for some strains is "sUMsDos", however,
|
||
this identifier is usually not found in the newer variants of
|
||
Jerusalem.
|
||
|
||
The Jerusalem Virus is thought to have been based on the Suriv 3.00
|
||
Virus, though the Suriv 3.00 Virus was isolated after the Jerusalem
|
||
Virus.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Jerusalem B, New Jerusalem, Payday, Suriv 3.00
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Jerusalem B
|
||
Aliases: Arab Star, Black Box, Black Window, Hebrew University
|
||
V Status: Common
|
||
Discovered: January, 1988
|
||
Symptoms: TSR, .EXE & .COM growth, system slowdown, deleted files
|
||
on Friday 13th, "Black WIndow"
|
||
Origin: Israel
|
||
Eff Length: 1,813 (.COM files) & 1,808 (.EXE files) bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, VirexPC 1.1+,
|
||
AVTK 3.5+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: F-Prot, Saturday, CleanUp, UnVirus, VirexPC 1.1+
|
||
Pro-Scan 1.4+, NAV
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
Identical to the Jerusalem virus, except that in some cases
|
||
it does not reinfect .EXE files. Jerusalem B is the most
|
||
common of all PC viruses, and can infect .SYS and program
|
||
overlay files in addition to .COM and .EXE files.
|
||
|
||
Not all variants of the Jerusalem B virus slow down the
|
||
system after an infection has occurred.
|
||
|
||
Also, it should be noted that Jerusalem viruses will only activate
|
||
if they actually become memory resident on their activation date. If
|
||
the system clock rolls over to the activation date and the virus is
|
||
already memory resident, they will not typically activate and perform
|
||
any destructive behavior they may be intended to perform.
|
||
|
||
Known variants of Jerusalem B are:
|
||
A-204 : Jerusalem B with the sUMsDos text string changed to
|
||
*A-204*, and a couple of instructions changed in order to
|
||
avoid detection. This variant will slow down the system
|
||
after being memory resident for 30 minutes, as well as having
|
||
a black box appear at that time.
|
||
Origin: Delft, The Netherlands
|
||
Anarkia : Jerusalem B with the timer delay set to slow
|
||
down the system to a greater degree, though this effect
|
||
doesn't show until a much longer time has elapsed. No
|
||
Black Box is never displayed. The sUMsDos id-string has
|
||
been changed to ANARKIA. Lastly, the virus's activation
|
||
date has been changed to Tuesday The 13ths, instead of
|
||
Friday The 13ths. Origin: Spain
|
||
Anarkia-B : Similar to Anarkia, with the exception that the
|
||
virus now activates on any October 12th instead of on
|
||
Tuesday The 13ths.
|
||
Jerusalem-C: Jerusalem B without the timer delay to slow
|
||
down the processor.
|
||
Jerusalem-D: Jerusalem C which will destroy both copies of
|
||
the FAT on any Friday The 13th after 1990.
|
||
Jerusalem-E: Jerusalem D but the activation is in 1992.
|
||
Mendoza : Based on the Jerusalem B virus, this variant does
|
||
not reinfect .EXE files. It is also missing the black box
|
||
effect. Mendoza activates in the second half of the year
|
||
(July - December), at which time any day will have a 10%
|
||
chance of having all programs executed deleted.
|
||
Origin: Argentina
|
||
Park ESS: Isolated in October, 1990 in Happy Camp, California, this
|
||
variant is very similar to other Jerusalem viruses. Infected
|
||
.COM files increase in length by 1,813 bytes, and infected .EXE
|
||
files will increase in length by 1,808 to 1,822 bytes with the
|
||
first infection, and 1,808 on later subsequent infections. This
|
||
variant will also infect COMMAND.COM. The other major difference
|
||
from the "normal" Jerusalem is that the sUMsDos string has been
|
||
replaced. The string PARK ESS can be found in the viral code
|
||
within all infected files. This variant slows down the system
|
||
by approximately 20 percent and a "black window" will appear after
|
||
the virus has been memory resident for 30 minutes.
|
||
Puerto : Isolated in June, 1990 in Puerto Rico, this variant is
|
||
very similar to the Mendoza variant, the virus contains the
|
||
sUMsDos id-string. .EXE files may be infected multiple times.
|
||
Skism-1 : Isolated in December, 1990 in New York State, this variant
|
||
is similar to many other Jerusalems except with regards to when
|
||
and what it does upon activation. Rather than activate on
|
||
Friday The 13ths and delete files, this variant activates in the
|
||
years 1991 and later on any Friday which occurs after the 15th of
|
||
the month. On activation, it truncates any file which is attempted
|
||
to be executed to zero bytes. COM files will increase in size
|
||
upon infection by 1,808 bytes, EXE files will increase by 1,808 to
|
||
1,822 bytes. EXE files will be reinfected by the virus. The
|
||
sUMsDos string in the virus is now SKISM-1. Like Jerusalem, this
|
||
variant produces a "black window" 30 minutes after becoming
|
||
memory resident, and also slows down the system.
|
||
Spanish JB : Similar to Jerusalem, it reinfects .EXE files.
|
||
The increased file size on .COM files is always 1,808
|
||
bytes. On .EXE files, the increased file size may be
|
||
either 1,808 or 1,813, with reinfections always adding
|
||
1,808 bytes to the already infected file. No "Black
|
||
Box" appears. The characteristic sUMsDos id-string does
|
||
not appear in the viral code. This variant is also sometimes
|
||
identified as Jerusalem E2. Origin: Spain
|
||
Jerusalem DC: Similar to Jerusalem B, this variant has the sUMsDos
|
||
text string changed to 00h characters. After being memory resident
|
||
for 30 minutes, the system will slow down by 30% and the common
|
||
"black window" will appear on the lower left side of the screen.
|
||
Like Jerusalem, it will infect .EXE files multiple times. This
|
||
variant does not carry an activation date when it will delete
|
||
files, it appears for all intents to be "defanged".
|
||
Origin: Washington, DC, USA
|
||
Captain Trips: The Captain Trips variant was submitted in March, 1991,
|
||
and is from the United States. Its name comes from the text string
|
||
"Captain Trips X." which occurs within the viral code. Unlike
|
||
most Jerusalem B variants, this variant does not display a black
|
||
window after being memory resident for 30 minutes, nor does it
|
||
slow down the system. On Friday The 13th, it does not delete
|
||
programs. The text string "MsDos" does not occur in infected
|
||
programs. .COM programs will increase in size by 1,813 bytes.
|
||
.EXE programs will increase in size by 1,808 to 1,822 bytes with
|
||
the first infection of the file, and then by 1,808 bytes with
|
||
subsequent infections.
|
||
Swiss 1813 : Submitted in February, 1991, from Switzerland, this
|
||
Jerusalem variant does not exihibit the "black window" after being
|
||
memory resident for 30 minutes, nor does it slow down the system.
|
||
It also does not delete programs on Friday The 13th, or any other
|
||
Friday. The sUMsDos text string has been changed to binary zeros.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Jerusalem, Frere Jacques, New Jerusalem, Payday,
|
||
Suriv 3.00, Westwood
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: JoJo
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: May, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth, system hangs
|
||
Origin: Israel
|
||
Eff Length: 1,701 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRaC - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V63+, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirexPC, F-Prot 1.12+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, F-Prot 1.12+, Pro-Scan 2.01+
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The JoJo virus was discovered in Israel in May, 1990. The virus'
|
||
name comes from a message within the viral code:
|
||
|
||
"Welcome to the JOJO Virus."
|
||
|
||
One other message appears within the virus, indicating that it was
|
||
written in 1990. This message is: "Fuck the system (c) - 1990".
|
||
Both messages within the viral code are never displayed.
|
||
|
||
When the first file infected with the JoJo Virus is executed on a
|
||
system, the virus will install itself memory resident. The
|
||
method used is to alter the Command Interpreter in memory,
|
||
expanding its size. As an example, on my test system, the
|
||
Command Interpreter in memory increased in size from 3,536 bytes
|
||
to 5,504 bytes. One block of 48 bytes is also reserved in
|
||
available free memory. The change in free memory will
|
||
be a net decrease of 2,048 bytes.
|
||
|
||
The JoJo Virus will not infect files if interrupt 13 is in use
|
||
by any other program. Instead the virus will clear the screen,
|
||
and the system will be hung. If the user performs a warm reboot
|
||
(Ctrl-Alt-Del), the virus will remain in memory.
|
||
|
||
Once the virus is able to become memory resident with interrupt 13
|
||
hooked, any .COM file executed will be infected by the virus.
|
||
Infected files will increase in length by 1,701 bytes.
|
||
|
||
While this virus has the same length as the Cascade/1701 Virus, it
|
||
is not a variant of Cascade.
|
||
|
||
Also see: JoJo 2
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: JoJo 2
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: January, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth; Message; "Not enough memory" errors; system hangs;
|
||
cursor position off 1 character
|
||
Origin: United States
|
||
Eff Length: 1,703 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRaCK - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method:
|
||
Removal Instructions: Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The JoJo 2 Virus was submitted in January, 1991, by David Grant of the
|
||
United States. This virus is based on the JoJo Virus as well as
|
||
containing part of the decryption string for the Cascade Virus. It is
|
||
a memory resident infector of .COM files, including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the JoJo 2 Virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will install itself memory resident by altering the command
|
||
interpretor in memory. The command interpretor in memory will have a
|
||
size increase of 1,904 bytes. There is an additional 48 bytes which is
|
||
reserved by the virus as well, similar to JoJo.
|
||
|
||
Once the virus is memory resident, it will infect .COM files as they
|
||
are executed. If COMMAND.COM is executed for any reason, it will become
|
||
infected. Infected .COM programs will have a file size increase of
|
||
1,703 bytes with the virus being located at the end of the infected
|
||
file.
|
||
|
||
Text strings which can be found in files infected with the JoJo 2 Virus
|
||
are:
|
||
|
||
"The JOJO virus strikes again.xxxxxxxxxxxx zzz"
|
||
"Fuck the system 1990 - (c)"
|
||
"141$FLu"
|
||
|
||
Systems infected with the JoJo 2 virus may experience system hangs
|
||
when some infected programs are executed. Infected programs may also
|
||
display the "Fuck the system 1990 - (c)" string, or a string of garbage
|
||
characters from memory. Attempts to execute some programs may also
|
||
fail due to "Not enough memory" errors. Lastly, after the virus has
|
||
been resident for awhile, the user may notice that the cursor on the
|
||
system monitor is off by one position to the right from where it should
|
||
be.
|
||
|
||
JoJo 2 may be detected by some anti-viral utilities as an infection
|
||
of JoJo and Cascade/1701/1704.
|
||
|
||
Also see: JoJo
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Joker
|
||
Aliases: Jocker
|
||
V Status: Extinct
|
||
Discovered: December, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: Messages, .EXE/.DBF growth
|
||
Origin: Poland
|
||
Eff Length: ??? Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNE - Parasitic Non-Resident .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan/X V67+, Pro-Scan, VirexPC
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D/X, or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Joker Virus was isolated in Poland in December, 1989.
|
||
This virus is a generic .EXE file infector, and is a poor
|
||
replicator (ie. it does not quickly infect other files).
|
||
|
||
Programs which are infected with the Joker virus will
|
||
display bogus error messages and comments. These messages
|
||
and comments can be found in the infected files at the
|
||
beginning of the viral code. Here are some of the
|
||
messages and comments that may be displayed:
|
||
|
||
"Incorrect DOS version"
|
||
"Invalid Volume ID Format failure"
|
||
"Please put a new disk into drive A:"
|
||
"End of input file"
|
||
"END OF WORKTIME. TURN SYSTEM OFF!"
|
||
"Divide Overflow"
|
||
"Water detect in Co-processor"
|
||
"I am hungry! Insert HAMBURGER into drive A:"
|
||
"NO SMOKING, PLEASE!"
|
||
" Thanks."
|
||
"Don't beat me !!"
|
||
"Don't drink and drive."
|
||
"Another cup of cofee ?"
|
||
" OH, YES!"
|
||
"Hard Disk head has been destroyed. Can you borow me your one?"
|
||
"Missing light magenta ribbon in printer!"
|
||
"In case mistake, call GHOST BUSTERS"
|
||
"Insert tractor toilet paper into printer."
|
||
|
||
This virus may also alter .DBF files, adding messages to
|
||
them.
|
||
|
||
The sample in the author of this listing possession does not
|
||
replicate on an 8088 based system. This entry has been included
|
||
since the sample may have been damaged before its receipt by
|
||
the author. At best, there is a serious bug in the replication
|
||
portion of this virus which prevents it from replicating.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Joshi
|
||
Aliases: Happy Birthday Joshi, Stealth Virus
|
||
V Status: Common
|
||
Discovered: June, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: BSC, machine hangs and message
|
||
Origin: India
|
||
Eff Length: N/A
|
||
Type Code: BRX - Resident Boot Sector/Partition Table Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V64+, Pro-Scan 1.4+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: CleanUp V66+, Pro-Scan 1.4+, RmJoshi, NAV
|
||
or Low-Level Format Harddisk and DOS SYS floppies
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Joshi Virus was isolated in India in June 1990. At the time it was
|
||
isolated, it was reported to be widespread in India as well as
|
||
portions of the continent of Africa. Joshi is a memory resident
|
||
boot sector infector of 5.25" diskettes. It will also infect
|
||
hard disks, though in the case of hard disks it infects the partition
|
||
table or master boot sector rather than the boot sector (sector 0).
|
||
|
||
After a system has been booted from a Joshi-infected diskette, the
|
||
virus will be resident in memory. Joshi takes up approximately
|
||
6K of system memory, and infected systems will show that total
|
||
system memory is 6K less than is installed if the DOS CHKDSK program
|
||
is run.
|
||
|
||
Joshi has some similarities to two other boot sector infectors.
|
||
Like the Stoned virus, it infects the partition table of hard disks.
|
||
Similar to the Brain virus's method of redirecting all attempts to
|
||
read the boot sector to the original boot sector, Joshi does this with
|
||
the partition table.
|
||
|
||
On January 5th of any year, the Joshi virus activates. At that
|
||
time, the virus will hang the system while displaying the message:
|
||
|
||
"type Happy Birthday Joshi"
|
||
|
||
If the system user then types "Happy Birthday Joshi", the system
|
||
will again be usable.
|
||
|
||
This virus may be recognized on infected systems by powering off
|
||
the system and then booting from a known-clean write-protected
|
||
DOS diskette. Using a sector editor or viewer to look at the
|
||
boot sector of suspect diskettes, if the first two bytes of the
|
||
boot sector are hex EB 1F, then the disk is infected. The EB 1F
|
||
is a jump instruction to the rest of the viral code. The remainder
|
||
of the virus is stored on track 41, sectors 1 thru 5 on 360K
|
||
5.25 inch Diskettes. For 1.2M 5.25 inch diskettes, the viral code
|
||
is located at track 81, sectors 1 thru 5.
|
||
|
||
To determine if a system's hard disk is infected, you must look at
|
||
the hard disk's partition table. If the first two bytes of the
|
||
partition table are EB 1F hex, then the hard disk is infected. The
|
||
remainder of the virus can be found at track 0, sectors 2 thru 6.
|
||
The original partition table will be a track 0, sector 9.
|
||
|
||
The Joshi virus can be removed from an infected system by first
|
||
powering off the system, and then booting from a known-clean, write-
|
||
protected master DOS diskette. If the system has a hard disk, the
|
||
hard disk should have data and program files backed up, and the
|
||
disk must be low-level formatted. As of July 15, 1990, there are
|
||
no known utilities which can disinfect the partition table of the
|
||
hard disk when it is infected with Joshi. Diskettes are easier to
|
||
remove Joshi from, the DOS SYS command can be used, or a program
|
||
such as MDisk from McAfee Associates, though this will leave the
|
||
viral code in an inexecutable state on track 41.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: July 13TH
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Endangered
|
||
Discovered: April, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .EXE file growth, screen effects on July 13
|
||
Origin: Madrid, Spain
|
||
Eff Length: 1,201 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNE - Parasitic Non-Resident .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V64+, VirexPC, F-Prot 1.12+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, F-Prot 1.12+, or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The July 13TH Virus was isolated in Madrid, Spain, in April 1990
|
||
by Guillermo Gonzalez Garcia. This virus is a generic .EXE file
|
||
infector, and is not memory resident.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the July 13TH Virus is executed, the
|
||
virus will attempt to infect a .EXE file. Files are only infected
|
||
if they are greater in length than 1,201 bytes. Infected files
|
||
increase in size by 1,201 to 1,209 bytes.
|
||
|
||
The July 13TH Virus activates on July 13th of any year. At that
|
||
time, a bouncing ball effect occurs on the system monitor's screen
|
||
similar to the bouncing ball effect of the Ping Pong virus. While
|
||
this virus is disruptive, it does not cause any overt damage to
|
||
files other than infecting them. The bouncing ball effect created
|
||
by this virus will occasionally leave dots on the screen where
|
||
it was passing if the screen has been scrolled for any reason.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: June 16TH
|
||
Aliases: Pretoria
|
||
V Status: Endangered
|
||
Discovered: April, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM file growth, long disk accesses, June 16th FAT alteration
|
||
Origin: Republic of South Africa
|
||
Eff Length: 879 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNC - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V62+, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirexPC, AVTK 3.5+,
|
||
F-Prot 1.12+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: VirHunt 2.0+, Scan/D, Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The June 16TH, or Pretoria, virus was discovered in April 1990.
|
||
This virus is a non-resident generic .COM file infector, and is
|
||
encrypted. The first time an infected file is executed, the virus
|
||
will search the current drive (all directories) and infect all
|
||
.COM files found. The search period can be quite long, and it is
|
||
very obvious on hard disk based systems that the program is taking
|
||
too long to load.
|
||
|
||
On June 16TH of any year, the first time an infected file is
|
||
executed the virus will activate. On activation, the virus will
|
||
change all entries in the root directory and the file allocation
|
||
table to "ZAPPED".
|
||
|
||
The June 16TH virus is thought to have originated in South
|
||
Africa.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Kamasya
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: New
|
||
Discovered: March, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .EXE growth; decrease in total system & available memory
|
||
Origin: USA
|
||
Eff Length: 1,098 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRE - Parasitic Resident .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V76+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Kamasya Virus was submitted by David Grant of the United States in
|
||
March, 1991. The Kamasya Virus is based on the Murphy Virus from
|
||
Bulgaria. It is a memory resident infector of .EXE files.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the Kamasya Virus is executed, the virus
|
||
will check if it is already memory resident. If it isn't already
|
||
memory resident, it will install itself memory resident at the top
|
||
of system memory but below the 640K DOS boundary. A portion of the
|
||
virus will also be in low system memory. Interrupt 21 will be hooked
|
||
by the virus in high system memory, and interrupt 00 in low system
|
||
memory. Total system and available free memory, as indicated by the
|
||
DOS ChkDsk program, will decrease by 1,120 bytes.
|
||
|
||
Once Kamasya is memory resident, it will infect .EXE programs over 1K
|
||
in length when they are executed or openned for any reason. Infected
|
||
programs will increase in size by 1,098 bytes with the virus being
|
||
located at the end of the infected program. The program's date and
|
||
time in the DOS disk directory will not be altered.
|
||
|
||
Programs infected with Kamasya will contain the following text strings:
|
||
|
||
"Kamasya nendriya pritir
|
||
labho jiveta yavata
|
||
jivasya tattva jijnasa
|
||
nartho ya ceha karmabhih"
|
||
|
||
It is unknown if Kamasya does anything besides replicate.
|
||
|
||
This virus may be a research virus and not in the public domain. The
|
||
original sample submitted is not a natural infection of the virus.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Murphy
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Kamikazi
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Endangered
|
||
Discovered: August, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: program corruption, system hangs, system reboots
|
||
Origin: Bulgaria
|
||
Eff Length: 4,031 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: ONE - Overwriting Non-Resident .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: Pro-Scan 2.01+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Kamikazi Virus was submitted by Vesselin Bontchev of Bulgaria in
|
||
August, 1990. This virus is a non-resident overwriting virus, and
|
||
infects .EXE files.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the Kamikazi virus is executed, the virus
|
||
will infect another .EXE file in the current directory if the .EXE
|
||
file's length is greater than 4,031 bytes. Kamikazi simply overwrites
|
||
the first 4,031 bytes of the candidate program with its viral code,
|
||
thus permanently damaging the candidate program being infected. The
|
||
original 4,031 bytes of code is not stored at any other location.
|
||
Infected files do not change in length.
|
||
|
||
After infecting another .EXE program, the virus will then change the
|
||
first 8 bytes of the infected program that was executed to
|
||
"kamikazi", thus the virus's name. At this point, one of several
|
||
symptoms may appear: the system may be rebooted by the virus, some
|
||
of the contents of memory may get displayed on the screen, or the
|
||
program may complete execution having appeared to have done nothing
|
||
at all. In any event, the original executed program will never run
|
||
successfully, doing what the user expects.
|
||
|
||
If the infected program is executed a second time, it will hang the
|
||
system since it is no longer an executable program. The .EXE header
|
||
has been permanently damaged due to the first 8 characters having been
|
||
changed to "kamikazi" by the virus when it was first executed.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Kemerovo
|
||
Aliases: USSR 257, Kemerovo-B
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: December, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth; ????????COM Path not found." message;
|
||
file date/time changes
|
||
Origin: USSR
|
||
Eff Length: 257 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Kemerovo Virus was submitted in December, 1990 and is from the
|
||
USSR. This virus is a non-resident direct action infector of .COM
|
||
files, including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the Kemerovo Virus is executed, the virus
|
||
will search the current drive and directory for a .COM program to
|
||
infect. If an uninfected COM program is found, the virus will infect
|
||
it, adding its viral code to the end of the original program. The
|
||
newly infected program's date and time in the disk directory will also
|
||
be updated to the current system date and time of infection. Infected
|
||
programs will increase in length by 257 bytes.
|
||
|
||
If an uninfected .COM file was not found in the current directory, the
|
||
message "????????COM Path not found" may be displayed and the program
|
||
the user is attempting to execute will be terminated.
|
||
|
||
Kemerovo does not do anything besides replicate.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of Kemerovo include:
|
||
Kemerovo-B : Similar to Kemerovo, this variant is from the United States
|
||
and has been altered to avoid detection by some anti-viral
|
||
programs. Its major distinction from the original virus is
|
||
that it will infect five .COM programs in the current directory.
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Kennedy
|
||
Aliases: Dead Kennedy, 333
|
||
V Status: Endangered
|
||
Discovered: April, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth, message on trigger dates (see text),
|
||
crosslinking of files, lost clusters, FAT corruption
|
||
Origin: Denmark
|
||
Eff Length: 333 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCKF - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V62+, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirexPC, F-Prot 1.12+,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, F-Prot 1.12+, VirHunt 2.0+,
|
||
or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Kennedy Virus was isolated in April 1990. It is a generic
|
||
infector of .COM files, including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
This virus has three activation dates: June 6 (assassination of
|
||
Robert Kennedy 1968), November 18 (death of Joseph Kennedy 1969),
|
||
and November 22 (assassination of John F. Kennedy 1963) of any
|
||
year. On activation, the virus will display a message the following
|
||
message:
|
||
|
||
"Kennedy is dead - long live 'The Dead Kennedys'"
|
||
|
||
The following text strings can be found in the viral code:
|
||
"\command.com"
|
||
"The Dead Kennedys"
|
||
|
||
Systems infected with the Kennedy Virus will experience
|
||
crosslinking of files, lost clusters, and file allocation table
|
||
errors (including messages that the file allocation table is
|
||
bad).
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Keypress
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Common
|
||
Discovered: October, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth; decrease in available free memory;
|
||
keystrokes repeated unexpectedly
|
||
Origin: USA
|
||
Eff Length: 1,232 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRhAK - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V71+, Pro-Scan 2.01+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Clean-Up V71+, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Keypress Virus was reported and isolated in many locations in the
|
||
United States in late October, 1990. This virus is a memory resident
|
||
infector of .COM and .EXE files, including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Keypress Virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will install itself memory resident at the top of free
|
||
available memory, but below the 640K DOS boundary. Interrupts 1C and
|
||
21 will be hooked by the virus. Available free memory on the system
|
||
will have decreased by 1,232 bytes.
|
||
|
||
After the virus is memory resident, any file executed may become
|
||
infected by the virus. In the case of .COM files, they are only
|
||
infected if their original file length was greater than 1,232 bytes.
|
||
.EXE files of any length will be infected, as will COMMAND.COM if it
|
||
is executed. Infected programs will have their directory date/time
|
||
changed to the system date and time when they were infected by this
|
||
virus. .COM files will increase in length by between 1,234 and
|
||
1,248 bytes upon infection. .EXE files will increase by 1,472 to
|
||
1,486 bytes upon infection. In either case, the virus will be located
|
||
at the end of the infected file.
|
||
|
||
The Keypress Virus activates after being memory resident for 30 minutes.
|
||
Upon activation, the virus may interfer with keyboard input by repeating
|
||
keystrokes. For example, if "a" is entered on the keyboard, it may be
|
||
changed to "aaaaaa" by the virus.
|
||
|
||
Infected files can be identified by containing the following hex string
|
||
near the end of the infected program: 4333C98E1E2901CD21.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Korea
|
||
Aliases: LBC Boot
|
||
V Status: Common - Korea
|
||
Discovered: March, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: BSC - 360k disks
|
||
Origin: Seoul, Korea
|
||
Eff Length: N/A
|
||
Type Code: RF - Resident Floppy Boot Sector Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V61+, VirHunt 2.0+
|
||
Removal Instructions: M-Disk, or DOS SYS Command
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Korea, or LBC Boot, Virus was isolated in March 1990 in
|
||
Seoul, Korea. This virus is a memory resident boot sector
|
||
infector for 5.25" 360K diskettes.
|
||
|
||
The Korea virus is not intentionally destructive, it does nothing
|
||
in its current form except for replicating. In some instances,
|
||
when Korea infects a diskette it will damage the root directory as
|
||
it moves the original boot sector to sector 11, the last sector of
|
||
the root directory. If sector 11 previously contained directory
|
||
entries, they will be lost.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Lazy
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: February, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth; System slowdown; Slow screen writes;
|
||
System hangs
|
||
Origin: Unknown
|
||
Eff Length: 720 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRxCK - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V75+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Lazy Virus was isolated in February, 1991, and its origin is
|
||
unknown. This virus is a memory resident infector of .COM files,
|
||
including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Lazy Virus is executed on
|
||
a system, the virus will install itself memory resident in unreserved
|
||
low system memory hooking interrupts 10 and 21. The system processor
|
||
will be significantly slowed down, resulting in very slow screen
|
||
writes occurring.
|
||
|
||
After Lazy is memory resident, it will infect .COM programs as they
|
||
are executed. Infected .COM programs will increase in size by 720
|
||
bytes with the virus being located at the end of the infected file.
|
||
The program's date and time in the disk directory will be updated to
|
||
the current system date and time when infection occurred. Infected
|
||
programs can be identified by the text string "lazy" which will occur
|
||
near the end of all infected programs.
|
||
|
||
Systems infected with the Lazy Virus may experience unexpected system
|
||
hangs. These hangs occur when some programs are executed which allocate
|
||
and overwrite the memory where the Lazy Virus resides in memory. For
|
||
example, ViruScan will hang when it checks memory if Lazy is currently
|
||
resident.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Lehigh
|
||
Aliases: Lehigh University
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: November, 1987
|
||
Symptoms: Corrupts boot sector & FAT
|
||
Origin: Pennsylvania, USA
|
||
Eff Length: N/A
|
||
Type Code: ORaKT - Overwriting Resident COMMAND.COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, VirexPC, AVTK 3.5+,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: MDisk & replace COMMAND.COM with clean copy, or
|
||
F-Prot, NAV
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Lehigh virus infects only the COMMAND.COM file on both
|
||
floppies and hard drives. The infection mechanism is to over-
|
||
write the stack space. When a disk which contains an
|
||
uninfected copy of COMMAND.COM is accessed, that disk is then
|
||
infected. A infection count is kept in each copy of the virus,
|
||
and after 4 infections, the virus overwrites the boot sector and
|
||
FATs.
|
||
|
||
A variation of the Lehigh virus, Lehigh-2, exists which
|
||
maintains its infection counter in RAM and corrupts the boot
|
||
sector and FATs after 10 infections.
|
||
|
||
Known variants of the Lehigh virus are:
|
||
Lehigh-2 : Similar to Lehigh, but the infection counter is maintained
|
||
in RAM, and the corruption of the boot sector and FATs
|
||
occurs after 10 infections.
|
||
Lehigh-B : Similar to Lehigh, the virus has been modified to
|
||
avoid detection.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Leprosy
|
||
Aliases: Leprosy 1.00, News Flash
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: August, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: unusual messages; program corruption
|
||
Origin: California, USA
|
||
Eff Length: 666 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: ONAK - Overwriting Non-Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan/X V67+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D/X, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Leprosy Virus was discovered in the San Francisco Bay Area of
|
||
California on August 1, 1990. This virus is a non-resident
|
||
overwriting virus infecting .COM and .EXE files, including
|
||
COMMAND.COM. Its original carrier file is suspected to be a file
|
||
called 486COMP.ZIP which was uploaded to several BBSes.
|
||
|
||
When you execute a program infected with the Leprosy virus, the virus
|
||
will overwrite the first 666 bytes of all .COM and .EXE files in
|
||
the directory one level up from the current directory. If the
|
||
current directory is the root directory, all programs in the root
|
||
directory will be infected. If COMMAND.COM is located in the directory
|
||
being infected, it will also be overwritten. Infected files will show
|
||
no file length increase unless they were originally less than 666
|
||
bytes in length, in which case their length will become 666 bytes.
|
||
|
||
After the virus has infected the .COM and .EXE files, it will display
|
||
a message. The message will be either:
|
||
|
||
"Program to big to fit in memory"
|
||
|
||
or:
|
||
|
||
"NEWS FLASH!! Your system has been infected with the
|
||
incurable decay of LEPROSY 1.00, a virus invented by
|
||
PCM2 in June of 1990. Good luck!"
|
||
|
||
The second message will only be displayed by one out of every seven
|
||
.COM and .EXE files that the program infects.
|
||
|
||
Since Leprosy is an overwriting virus, the programs which are
|
||
infected with it will not function properly. In fact, once they are
|
||
infected with this virus they will run for awhile (while the virus is
|
||
infecting other files) and then display one of the two messages. The
|
||
program execution will then end.
|
||
|
||
If the system is booted from a diskette or hard drive that has Leprosy
|
||
in its COMMAND.COM file, one of the above two messages will be
|
||
displayed followed by:
|
||
|
||
"Bad or missing Command Interpreter"
|
||
|
||
This boot problem occurs because COMMAND.COM is no longer really
|
||
COMMAND.COM. The boot will not proceed until a system boot diskette
|
||
is inserted into the system and another boot is attempted.
|
||
|
||
While Leprosy's messages are encrypted in the virus, infected files
|
||
can be found by checking for the following hex string near the
|
||
beginning of the file:
|
||
|
||
740AE8510046FE06F002EB08
|
||
|
||
Infected files must be deleted and replaced with clean, uninfected
|
||
copies. There is no way to disinfect this virus since the first 666
|
||
bytes of the file have been overwritten, the virus does not store
|
||
those bytes anywhere else.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of the Leprosy virus are:
|
||
Leprosy-B : The major differences between the Leprosy and Leprosy-B
|
||
virus are that Leprosy-B uses a slightly different encryption
|
||
method, thus allowing it to avoid detection once Leprosy was
|
||
isolated. Additionally, instead of infecting all programs in
|
||
the directory selected for infection, Leprosy-B will infect
|
||
four programs in the current directory each time an infected
|
||
program is executed. If four non-infected files do not exist
|
||
in the current directory, it will move up one level in the
|
||
directory structure and infect up to four files in that
|
||
directory. Like Leprosy, it overwrites the first 666 bytes
|
||
of infected files. The Leprosy message has been replaced
|
||
with the following message:
|
||
|
||
"ATTENTION! Your computer has been afflicted with
|
||
the incurable decay that is the fate wrought by
|
||
Leprosy Strain B, a virus employing Cybernetic
|
||
Mutation Technology (tm) and invented by PCM2 08/90."
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Liberty
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Common
|
||
Discovered: May, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM, .EXE, .OVL growth
|
||
Origin: Sydney, Australia
|
||
Eff Length: 2,862 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRfAK - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V63+, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirexPC, F-Prot 1.12+,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: VirHunt 2.0+, Clean-Up V72+, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Liberty Virus was isolated in Sydney, Australia in May, 1990.
|
||
Liberty is a memory resident generic file infector, infecting
|
||
.COM, .EXE, and overlay files. COMMAND.COM may also become
|
||
infected.
|
||
|
||
The Liberty Virus gets its name from the text string "Liberty"
|
||
which will appear in all infected files. In .EXE files, it will
|
||
be located in the last 3K of the file. In .COM files, it will
|
||
appear near the very beginning of the program, as well as within the
|
||
last 3K of the infected file.
|
||
|
||
The first time a file infected with the Liberty Virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will become memory resident. Liberty installs itself
|
||
resident in high free memory, resulting in a decrease of 8,496 bytes
|
||
of available free memory. It also directly changes the interrupt
|
||
map page in memory so that interrupts 21 and 24 will put the virus in
|
||
control. Total system memory does not change.
|
||
|
||
After becoming memory resident, programs which are executed may
|
||
be infected by the virus. All .EXE files will be infected, but
|
||
only .COM files over 2K in length will become infected. Overlay
|
||
files will also become infected. Infected files will increase
|
||
in size between 2,862 and 2,887 bytes, and will end with the hex
|
||
character string: 80722D80FA81772880. The main body of the virus will
|
||
be located at the end of all infected files.
|
||
|
||
Infected .COM files can also be identified by the following text
|
||
string which will appear near the beginning of the infected program:
|
||
|
||
"- M Y S T I C - COPYRIGHT (C) 1989-2000, by SsAsMsUsEsL"
|
||
|
||
This string does not appear in infected .EXE files, the area where
|
||
this string would have appeared in infected .EXE files will be 00h
|
||
characters.
|
||
|
||
Liberty is a self-encrypting virus. It is not yet known if it
|
||
is destructive.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of Liberty are:
|
||
Liberty-B : Isolated in November, 1990, this strain is functionally
|
||
similar to the original Liberty Virus. The string which
|
||
occurs at the end of all infected files has been changed
|
||
to: C8004C40464842020EB. The word "MAGIC" will also be found
|
||
repeated together many times in infected files.
|
||
Liberty-C : Isolated in January, 1991, this variant is very similar to
|
||
Liberty-B, there are 16 bytes which have been changed. Like
|
||
Liberty-B, the word "MAGIC" will be found repeated together
|
||
many times in infected files. The string which occurs at the
|
||
end of all infected files has been changed to:
|
||
C8004C404648422020E9.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Lisbon
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: November, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth, Unusable files (see text)
|
||
Origin: Lisbon, Portugal
|
||
Eff Length: 648 bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNC - Parasitic Non-Resident COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V49+, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, AVTK 3.5+,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirexPC, F-Prot, VirHunt 2.0+,
|
||
NAV
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Lisbon virus is a strain of the Vienna virus first
|
||
isolated by Jean Luz in Portugal in November, 1989. The virus
|
||
is very similar to Vienna, except that almost every word in
|
||
the virus has been shifted 1-2 bytes in order to avoid virus
|
||
identification/detection programs which could identify the
|
||
Vienna virus.
|
||
|
||
1 out of every 8 infected files will have the 1st 5 bytes of
|
||
the 1st sector changed to "@AIDS", thus rendering the
|
||
program unusable.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Vienna
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Little Pieces
|
||
Aliases: 1374
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: January, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth; decrease in available free memory; message;
|
||
system hangs; unexpected screen clears
|
||
Origin: Italy
|
||
Eff Length: 1,374 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRaE - Parasitic Resident .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected programs
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Little Pieces Virus was isolated in January, 1991, in Italy. This
|
||
virus is a 1,374 byte memory resident infector of .EXE files.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with Little Pieces is executed, the
|
||
virus will install itself memory resident. The area where it is memory
|
||
resident is 1,392 bytes long and labelled COMMAND Data in low system
|
||
memory. Some memory mapping utilities will combine this area with the
|
||
command interpretor, so the command interpretor will appear to be 1,392
|
||
bytes longer than expected. Interrupts 13, 16, and 21 are hooked by
|
||
the Little Pieces Virus.
|
||
|
||
Once Little Pieces is memory resident, it will infect .EXE programs
|
||
as they are executed. Infected .EXE programs will increase in size by
|
||
1,374 bytes and have the virus located at the end of the infected
|
||
file. Infected files will not have their date and time in the disk
|
||
directory altered.
|
||
|
||
Systems infected with the Little Pieces Virus may experience the system
|
||
display being cleared unexpectedly after a key is pressed on the
|
||
keyboard. The following message is usually displayed after the
|
||
screen is cleared, though not always:
|
||
|
||
"One of these days I'm going to cut you into little pieces"
|
||
|
||
This message cannot be viewed in infected files as it is encrypted
|
||
within the virus.
|
||
|
||
Infected system may also experience unexpected system hangs occurring,
|
||
requiring the system to be rebooted. These hangs sometimes occur after
|
||
the above message is displayed.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Lozinsky
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: December, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM file growth; file date/time changes;
|
||
decrease in total system and available free memory
|
||
Origin: USSR
|
||
Eff Length: 1,023 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRtCK - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected programs
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Lozinsky Virus was submitted in December, 1990 from the USSR.
|
||
Lozinsky is a memory resident infector of .COM files, including
|
||
COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When the first program infected with Lozinsky is executed, the virus
|
||
will install itself memory resident at the top of system memory but
|
||
below the 640K DOS boundary. Interrupt 12's return will be moved so
|
||
that the system will report 2,048 bytes of memory less than what is
|
||
actually installed. Interrupts 13 and 21 will be hooked by the virus.
|
||
COMMAND.COM will also become infected at this time.
|
||
|
||
After Lozinsky is memory resident, it will infect .COM files which are
|
||
executed or openned for any reason. Infected programs will show a file
|
||
length increase of 1,023 bytes and have the virus located at the end
|
||
of the program. Their date and time in the disk directory will also
|
||
have been updated to the system date and time when the program was
|
||
infected by Lozinsky.
|
||
|
||
It is unknown if Lozinsky does anything besides replicate.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Mardi Bros
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: July, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: BSC; volume label change; decrease in system and free memory
|
||
Origin: France
|
||
Eff Length: N/A
|
||
Type Code: FR - Floppy Boot Sector Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V66+
|
||
Removal Instructions: M-Disk, or DOS SYS Command
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Mardi Bros Virus was isolated in July 1990 in France. This virus
|
||
is a memory resident infector of floppy disk boot sectors. It does
|
||
not infect hard disk boot sectors or partition tables.
|
||
|
||
When a system is booted from a diskette infected with the Mardi Bros
|
||
Virus, the virus will install itself memory resident. It resides in
|
||
7,168 bytes above the top of memory, but below the 640K DOS Boundary.
|
||
The decrease in system and free memory can be seen using the DOS
|
||
CHKDSK command, or several other memory mapping utilities.
|
||
|
||
Mardi Bros will infect any non-write protected diskette which is
|
||
exposed to the system. Infected diskettes can be easily identified
|
||
as their volume label will be changed to "Mardi Bros". The CHKDSK
|
||
program will show the following for the diskette's Volume label
|
||
information:
|
||
|
||
"Volume Mardi Bros created ira 0, 1980 12:00a"
|
||
|
||
While the infected boot sector on the diskette will have the DOS
|
||
messages still remaining, it will also include the following phrase
|
||
near the end:
|
||
|
||
"Sudah ada vaksin"
|
||
|
||
It is unknown if Mardi Bros is destructive, it appears to do nothing
|
||
but spread.
|
||
|
||
Mardi Bros can be removed from infected diskettes by first powering
|
||
off the system and rebooting from a known clean write protected
|
||
DOS master diskette. The DOS SYS command should then be used to
|
||
replace the infected diskette's boot sector. Alternately, MDisk
|
||
can be used following the power-down and reboot.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: MG
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: September, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM file growth; DIR command may not function properly;
|
||
File allocation errors; System hangs
|
||
Origin: Bulgaria
|
||
Eff Length: 500 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRCK - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The MG Virus was submitted in January, 1991, though it has been
|
||
mentioned by Bulgarian researchers several times since September, 1990.
|
||
This virus is named MG as it was originally isolated at
|
||
Matematicheska Gimnazia, a school in Varna, Bulgaria. It is a memory
|
||
resident infector of .COM files, including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with MG is executed, the virus will
|
||
install itself memory resident in a portion of the interrupt table in
|
||
memory. Interrupt 24 is hooked by the virus, as are several other
|
||
interrupts.
|
||
|
||
After MG is memory resident, it will infect programs when one of two
|
||
things occurs: either the user attempts to execute any program, or a
|
||
Dir command is performed. In the case of a program being executed, the
|
||
virus will infect one program in the current directory, though not
|
||
necessarily the program being executed. When a Dir command is executed,
|
||
one program in the current directory will be infected as well.
|
||
|
||
.COM programs infected with MG will increase in length by 500 bytes,
|
||
though the file length increase will not be visible in a dir listing
|
||
if the virus is memory resident. File date and time in the disk
|
||
directory are also not altered. The virus will be located at the end
|
||
of infected programs.
|
||
|
||
Symptoms of a MG infection are that the DOS Chkdsk program will show
|
||
File allocation errors on all infected .COM programs if the virus is
|
||
present in memory. The DOS Dir command may also not function properly,
|
||
for example DIR A:*.COM will yield "File not found" even though .COM
|
||
files exist on the A: drive. At other times, pauses will occur in the
|
||
disk directory being displayed by the Dir command. Another symptom is
|
||
that unexpected system hangs may occur due to the interrupt table being
|
||
infected in memory.
|
||
|
||
Also see: MG-2
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: MG-2
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: December, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM file growth; File Allocation Errors;
|
||
Dir command may not function properly
|
||
Origin: Bulgaria
|
||
Eff Length: 500 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsCK - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The MG-2 Virus was received in December, 1990, and is believed to have
|
||
originated in Bulgaria. This virus is a direct action, memory resident
|
||
infector of .COM programs, including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the MG-2 Virus is first executed, the
|
||
virus will install itself memory resident. The DOS ChkDsk command,
|
||
when executed on an infected system, will indicate that total system
|
||
memory and available free memory have decreased by 55,104 bytes. This
|
||
virus remaps many interrupts, including interrupt 24. A portion of the
|
||
virus will also be resident above 640K if memory is available.
|
||
|
||
After the MG-2 Virus is memory resident, it will infect one .COM
|
||
program in the current directory each time an infected .COM program is
|
||
executed. Infected .COM programs will not show a file length increase
|
||
if the virus is memory resident. With the virus memory resident, the
|
||
DOS ChkDsk command will indicate a file allocation error for all
|
||
infected files. Infected files actually increase 500 bytes in length
|
||
and have the virus located at the end of the infected file.
|
||
|
||
Systems infected with the MG-2 Virus may notice that the DOS Dir
|
||
command does not always return the results expected. For example,
|
||
issuing a "DIR C:\DOS" command may result in the C: drive root directory
|
||
being displayed instead of the C:\DOS directory. Another case is that
|
||
issuing the command "DIR A:*.COM" will result in "File not found" though
|
||
.COM files exist on that drive.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of MG-2 are:
|
||
MG-3 : Functionally similar to MG-2, this variant has been altered
|
||
to avoid detection. It is also 500 bytes in length.
|
||
|
||
Also see: MG
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: MGTU
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: December, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM file growth; excessive disk activity; file date/time changes;
|
||
"????????COM Path not found." message
|
||
Origin: USSR
|
||
Eff Length: 273 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The MGTU Virus was submitted in December, 1990 and came from the USSR.
|
||
This virus is a non-resident direct action infector of .COM files,
|
||
including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the MGTU Virus is executed, the virus will
|
||
search the current drive and directory for uninfected .COM programs.
|
||
All uninfected .COM programs will become infected with the virus.
|
||
Infected .COM programs will have a file length increase of 273 bytes
|
||
with the virus being located at the end of the file. Their date and
|
||
time in the disk directory will also have been updated to the system
|
||
date and time when infection occurred.
|
||
|
||
Infected systems will display excessive disk activity each time an
|
||
infected program is executed. This activity occurs because the virus
|
||
is checking all of the .COM programs in the current directory to
|
||
determine if they are already infected, or if they need to be infected.
|
||
Infected systems may also experience the following message being
|
||
displayed for no apparent reason:
|
||
|
||
"????????COM Path not found."
|
||
|
||
MGTU does not do anything besides replicate.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Microbes
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Common - India
|
||
Discovered: June, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: BSR
|
||
Origin: Bombay, India
|
||
Eff Length: N/A
|
||
Type Code: BR - Floppy and Hard Disk Boot Sector Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V64+, Pro-Scan 1.4+
|
||
Removal Instructions: M-Disk, Pro-Scan 1.4+, or DOS SYS Command
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Microbes virus was isolated in June, 1990 in India. It is a
|
||
memory resident boot sector infector of both floppy diskettes and
|
||
hard disks.
|
||
|
||
The Microbes virus becomes memory resident when a system is booted
|
||
from a disk infected with the Microbes virus. The system may hang
|
||
on this boot, and inserted a diskette to boot from will result in
|
||
this new diskette becoming infected. At least on the author's XT
|
||
test system, the system could not successfully boot with the
|
||
Microbes virus present without powering off the system and rebooting
|
||
from a write protected master boot diskette.
|
||
|
||
As with other boot sector infectors, Microbes can be disinfected
|
||
from diskettes and hard drives by powering off the system and
|
||
booting from a known clean write protected master boot diskette
|
||
for the system. The DOS SYS command can then be used to recreate
|
||
the boot sector on the diskette.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Migram
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: New
|
||
Discovered: March, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .EXE growth; decrease in total system & available free memory
|
||
Origin: USA
|
||
Eff Length: 1,221 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRhE - Parasitic Resident .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V76+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Migram Virus was submitted in March, 1991, by David Grant of the
|
||
United States. This virus is a memory resident infector of .EXE files
|
||
and is based on the Murphy Virus from Bulgaria.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the Migram Virus is executed, the virus
|
||
will check to see if it is already memory resident. If the virus is
|
||
not resident, the virus will install itself resident at the top of
|
||
system memory, but below the 640K DOS boundary. The interrupt 12
|
||
return is not moved. Interrupt 21 is hooked by the virus. Total
|
||
system memory and available free memory, as indicated by the DOS ChkDsk
|
||
program, will decrease by 1,248 bytes.
|
||
|
||
Once Migram is memory resident, it will infect .EXE files over 1K in
|
||
length when they are executed or openned for any reason. Infected
|
||
programs will increase in length by 1,221 bytes with the virus being
|
||
located at the end of the infected file. The file's date and time in
|
||
the disk directory will not be altered.
|
||
|
||
Programs infected with Migram will contain the following text strings:
|
||
|
||
"MIGRAM VIRUS 1.0
|
||
(C) 1991 IVL"
|
||
|
||
It is unknown what Migram does besides replicate.
|
||
|
||
The original sample of this virus is not a natural infection of the
|
||
virus, so it is possible this virus is a research virus and not in the
|
||
public domain as of March, 1991.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Murphy
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Mirror
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: October, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .EXE growth; decrease in available free memory; mirror effect
|
||
of display on activation
|
||
Origin: Unknown
|
||
Eff Length: 927 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRhE - Parasitic Resident .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V67+, Pro-Scan 2.01+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Mirror Virus was discovered in October, 1990. This virus is a
|
||
memory resident direct action infector of .EXE files.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Mirror Virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will install itself memory resident at the top of free
|
||
available memory. Free available memory will decrease by 928 bytes,
|
||
and the virus will hook interrupt 21. At this time, the virus will
|
||
also infect all other .EXE programs located in the current directory.
|
||
Infected programs will increase in length by 927 to 940 bytes, with
|
||
the virus being located at the end of the infected file. Infected
|
||
programs will also always end with the two text characters "IH".
|
||
|
||
The Mirror Virus gets its name from its behavior. Every once in awhile
|
||
it will change the system's video display so that a mirror image of
|
||
what was previously on the display appears.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: MIX/1
|
||
Aliases: MIX1, Mix1
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: August, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: TSR, .EXE growth, location 0:33C = 77h, garbled output
|
||
Origin: Israel
|
||
Eff Length: 1,618 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsE - Parasitic Resident .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V37+, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, VirexPC,
|
||
AVTK 3.5+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, Virus Buster, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirexPC 1.1B+,
|
||
F-Prot, VirHunt 2.0+
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The MIX1 Virus was originally isolated on August 22, 1989, on
|
||
several BBSs in Israel. This virus is a parasitic memory-
|
||
resident .EXE file infector. Once an infected program has been
|
||
executed, the virus will take up 2,048 bytes in RAM. Each
|
||
.EXE file then executed will grow in length between 1,618 and
|
||
1,634 bytes, depending on the original file size. The virus
|
||
will not, however, infect files of less than 8K in size.
|
||
|
||
Infected files can be manually identified by a characteristic
|
||
"MIX1" always being the last 4 bytes of an infected file.
|
||
Using Debug, if byte 0:33C equals 77h, then the MIX1 virus is
|
||
in memory.
|
||
|
||
This virus will cause garbled output on both serial and
|
||
parallel devices, as well as the num-lock being constantly
|
||
on. After the 6th infection, booting the system will crash
|
||
the system due to a bug in the code, and a ball will start
|
||
bouncing on the system monitor.
|
||
|
||
There is a variant of this virus which does not have the
|
||
problem of system crashes occurring, and will only infect files
|
||
that are greater than 16K in length.
|
||
|
||
Mix/1 has several code similarities to Icelandic, which it may
|
||
have been derived from.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Icelandic, Mix2
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Mix2
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: New
|
||
Discovered: March, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth; system hangs;
|
||
Decrease in total system and available free memory
|
||
Origin: Europe
|
||
Eff Length: 2,287 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRhA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V76+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Mix2 Virus was submitted in March, 1991. Original reports of this
|
||
virus were received from Europe. Mix2 is based on the Mix1 virus, and
|
||
is a memory resident infector of .COM and .EXE files. It does not
|
||
infect COMMAND.COM
|
||
|
||
When the first program infected with Mix2 is executed, Mix2 will install
|
||
itself memory resident at the top of system memory, but below the 640K
|
||
DOS boundary. It will mark this area of reserved memory "COMMAND Data"
|
||
and will hook interrupt 21. Total system and available free memory, as
|
||
indicated by the DOS ChkDsk program, will decrease by 3,040 bytes.
|
||
Interrupt 12's return will not be moved.
|
||
|
||
Once Mix2 is memory resident, it will infect .COM and .EXE programs over
|
||
9K in length when they are executed. Infected programs will increase
|
||
in length by 2,287 to 2,294 bytes with the virus being located at the
|
||
end of the infected file. This virus does not alter the file date and
|
||
time in the disk directory.
|
||
|
||
Some programs which are memory intensive, or which allocate all
|
||
available memory will hang when executed with Mix2 memory resident.
|
||
|
||
It is unknown what Mix2 does besides replicate.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Mix1
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Monxla
|
||
Aliases: Time Virus
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: November, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth; system hangs and/or reboots; program execution
|
||
failures
|
||
Origin: Hungary
|
||
Eff Length: 939 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRfCK - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V71+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Monxla, or Time, Virus was discovered in November, 1990 in Hungary.
|
||
This virus is a memory resident direct action infector of .COM files,
|
||
including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the Monxla Virus is executed, the virus
|
||
will check the current system time. If the system time's current
|
||
seconds is greater than 32/100's of a second, the virus will install
|
||
a very small portion of itself memory resident at the top of free
|
||
memory but below the 640K DOS boundary. The virus allocates 80 bytes,
|
||
and will hook interrupts 20 and F2. The F2 interrupt is later used to
|
||
determine if the virus is in memory, thus avoiding multiple memory
|
||
allocations. The memory resident portion of the virus is not used to
|
||
infect files.
|
||
|
||
Each time a program infected with the Monxla Virus is executed, the
|
||
virus will search for one uninfected .COM file with a length between
|
||
3,840 and 64,000 bytes to infect. The current directory is searched
|
||
first, and then the directories along the system path. Once an
|
||
uninfected .COM file is found that satisfies the length requirement,
|
||
the virus will infect it. On other than the 13th day of any month,
|
||
the virus will add its viral code to the end of the candidate file,
|
||
increasing the file's length by 939 bytes.
|
||
|
||
On the 13th day of any month, the virus activates. The activation
|
||
involves damaging the files that it infects based on the current
|
||
seconds in the system time. At the time the virus attempts to infect
|
||
another .COM file, the virus will damage the file in one of three
|
||
ways. If the current seconds was greater than 60/100's, 4 HLTs followed
|
||
by a random interrupt will be placed at the beginning of the file
|
||
being infected. Later when the program is executed, it may perform
|
||
rather strangely be destructive. It depends on what the random interrupt
|
||
was. If the current seconds was greater than 30/100's, but less than
|
||
60/100's, two INT 19 calls are placed at the beginning of the file.
|
||
Later when the program is executed, it will attempt to perform a warm
|
||
reboot preserving the current interrupt vectors. This, however, will
|
||
result in a system hang if any interrupt between 00h and 1Ch was
|
||
previously hooked. If the current seconds was greater than 00/100's
|
||
but less than 30/100's, a INT 20 call is placed at the beginning of
|
||
the program being infected, thus resulting in it immediately terminating
|
||
when later executed.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Monxla B
|
||
Aliases: Time B
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: January, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth; File corruption
|
||
Origin: Hungary
|
||
Eff Length: 535 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Monxla B Virus was isolated in January, 1991 in Hungary. This virus
|
||
is a non-resident direct action infector of .COM files, including
|
||
COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with Monxla B is executed, the virus will check
|
||
the seconds portion of the system time. Depending on the value found,
|
||
either one .COM program in the current directory will be infected, or
|
||
one .COM program in the current directory will be corrupted.
|
||
|
||
If the seconds portion of the system time is equal 0 or a multiple of 8,
|
||
one .COM program in the current directory, or on the system path, will
|
||
be corrupted by the first five characters of the selected .COM program
|
||
being changed to the hex string: 004D004F4D, or " M OM" in text.
|
||
Corrupted programs will not have a file length increase. Later
|
||
execution of these corrupted programs will usually result in the
|
||
system being hung, requiring a reboot.
|
||
|
||
If the seconds portion of the system time was not 0 or a multiple of 8,
|
||
a .COM program in the current directory will be infected with Monxla B.
|
||
If no programs exist in the current directory which are neither
|
||
corrupted or infected, the virus will follow the system path to find a
|
||
candidate program to infect.
|
||
|
||
Infected .COM programs will increase in length by 535 bytes, the virus
|
||
will be located at the end of infected programs. The virus will also
|
||
have changed the seconds in the file time in the disk directory to 58
|
||
so that the virus can later tell that the file is infected.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Murphy
|
||
Aliases: Murphy-1, V1277, Stealth Virus
|
||
V Status: Common - Bulgaria
|
||
Discovered: April, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth, system hangs, speaker noise,
|
||
possible bouncing ball effect (see Murphy-2 below)
|
||
Origin: Sofia, Bulgaria
|
||
Eff Length: 1,277 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V63+, Pro-Scan 1.4+, F-Prot 1.12+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, Pro-Scan 1.4+, NAV, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Murphy Virus was isolated in Bulgaria in April, 1990. It is
|
||
a memory resident generic .COM & .EXE infector, and will infect
|
||
COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The first time an infected program is executed on a system, the
|
||
virus installs itself memory resident. After it is memory resident,
|
||
if a file is executed, or openned for any reason, it is infected by
|
||
the Murphy Virus. When the first non-infected program is executed
|
||
with the virus in memory, the virus will attempt to infect
|
||
COMMAND.COM. The program being executed will also be infected at
|
||
that time. Infected programs will increase in length by
|
||
1,277 Bytes. Programs which are less than 1,277 Bytes in length
|
||
will not be infected.
|
||
|
||
The Murphy Virus watches the system time. When the system time is
|
||
between 10AM and 11AM, the virus will turn on the system speaker
|
||
and send a 61h to it. At any other time, the virus will not
|
||
attempt to use the system speaker.
|
||
|
||
The following text message is contained within the Murphy Virus,
|
||
giving an idea of when it was written and by whom, though they are
|
||
not displayed:
|
||
|
||
"Hello, I'm Murphy. Nice to meet you friend.
|
||
I'm written since Nov/Dec.
|
||
Copywrite (c)1989 by Lubo & Ian, Sofia, USM Laboratory."
|
||
|
||
Systems infected by the Murphy Virus may also experience system
|
||
hangs when the virus attempts to infect .EXE files.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of the Murphy Virus are:
|
||
Murphy-2 or V1521 - Similar to the Murphy Virus, its length is 1,521
|
||
Bytes. The non-displayed messages in the virus are now:
|
||
|
||
"It's me - Murphy.
|
||
Copywrite (c)1990 by Lubo & Ian, Sofia, USM Laboratory."
|
||
|
||
The Murphy-2 will infect any .EXE file, as well as any .COM
|
||
file over 900 Bytes. Instead of turning the system speaker
|
||
on between 10AM and 11AM, this variant waits for the system
|
||
time to have the minutes set to 00, then it may have a
|
||
"bouncing ball" effect similar to several other viruses.
|
||
This effect does not, however, occur on all systems.
|
||
|
||
Also see: AntiChrist, HIV, Kamasya, Migram
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: MusicBug
|
||
Aliases: Music Boot, Music Bug
|
||
V Status: Common
|
||
Discovered: December, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: decrease in total system and available free memory; clicking;
|
||
music randomly played on system speaker; lost clusters
|
||
Origin: Taiwan
|
||
Eff Length: N/A
|
||
Type Code: BRtX - Resident Boot Sector & Partition Table Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V72+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Clean-Up V74+, or see below
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The MusicBug Virus is a memory resident boot sector and partition table
|
||
infector discovered in December, 1990. It originated in Taiwan.
|
||
|
||
When a system is booted from a diskette infected with the MusicBug
|
||
Virus, the virus will install itself memory resident at the top of
|
||
system memory but below the 640K DOS boundary. The interrupt 12 return
|
||
will be moved, so 640K systems will now report 638K of installed
|
||
system memory. Clicking may be heard for a short time from the system
|
||
speaker before the boot proceeds, but more likely a section of a tune
|
||
will be played. The boot will then proceed.
|
||
|
||
Once MusicBug is memory resident, it will periodically play another
|
||
portion of the same tune when disk accesses occur. It is thus rather
|
||
disruptive.
|
||
|
||
When MusicBug is memory resident, any disk accessed (including the
|
||
system hard disk) will become infected with the virus. In the case
|
||
of hard disks, MusicBug infects the hard disk partition table and boot
|
||
sector.
|
||
|
||
Infected disks will have 4K in lost clusters which will contain the
|
||
virus's code as well as a copy of the disk's original boot sector.
|
||
The following text strings can also be found in these lost clusters:
|
||
|
||
"MusicBug v1.06. MacroSoft Corp."
|
||
"Made in Taiwan"
|
||
|
||
Diskettes infected with the MusicBug Virus can be disinfected after
|
||
powering off the system and booting from a write protected system
|
||
diskette, then using the DOS SYS command. The lost clusters can then
|
||
be removed by using the ChkDsk command with the /F parameter.
|
||
|
||
Hard disks, however, cannot be disinfected in the same way. While
|
||
the DOS SYS command will remove the virus from the hard disk's boot
|
||
sector, and the lost clusters can be recovered, the hard disk will
|
||
remain an unbootable non-system disk until a low-level format is
|
||
performed.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: New Jerusalem
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: October, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: TSR; .EXE, .COM, etc. (see below) growth; system slowdown;
|
||
deleted files on Friday 13th
|
||
Origin: Holland
|
||
Eff Length: 1,813 Bytes (.COM) & 1,808 Bytes (.EXE)
|
||
Type Code: PRsA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V45+, F-Prot, Pro-Scan 1.4+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Saturday, CleanUp, F-Prot, Pro-Scan 1.4+
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
New Jerusalem is a variation of the original Jerusalem virus
|
||
which has been modified to be undetectable by ViruScan versions
|
||
prior to V45 as well as IBM's VIRSCAN product as of October 20,
|
||
1989. The virus was first detected when it was uploaded to
|
||
several BBSs in Holland beginning on October 14, 1989. It
|
||
infects both .EXE and .COM files and activates on any Friday The
|
||
13th, deleting infected programs when they are attempted to be
|
||
run.
|
||
|
||
This virus is memory resident, and as with other Jerusalem
|
||
viruses, may infect overlay, .SYS, .BIN, and .PIF files.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Jerusalem, Jerusalem B, Payday, Suriv 3.00
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Nina
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: December, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth; decrease in total system and available free memory;
|
||
Origin: Bulgaria
|
||
Eff Length: 256 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRhCK - Parasitic Resident .COM & Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Nina Virus was received in December, 1990, and is from Bulgaria.
|
||
This virus is a memory resident infector of .COM files, including
|
||
COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When the first program infected with the Nina Virus is executed, Nina
|
||
will install itself memory resident at the top of system memory but
|
||
below the 640K DOS boundary. Total system memory and available free
|
||
memory will decrease by 1,024 bytes as shown by the DOS ChkDsk command.
|
||
Interrupt 21 will be hooked by the virus.
|
||
|
||
After Nina is memory resident, it will infect .COM programs that are
|
||
greater than 256 bytes in length as they are executed. If COMMAND.COM
|
||
is executed, it will become infected. Infected .COM programs increase
|
||
in length by 256 bytes, and will have the virus located at the beginning
|
||
of the infected file.
|
||
|
||
The Nina Virus is named Nina because the virus contains the text
|
||
string "Nina" within the viral code.
|
||
|
||
This virus does not do anything besides replicate.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Nomenklatura
|
||
Aliases: Nomenclature, 1024-B
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: August, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .EXE, .COM growth; decrease in available free memory;
|
||
"sector not found" messages on diskettes;
|
||
Origin: Netherlands
|
||
Eff Length: 1,024 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRhAK - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V67+, Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Nomenklatura Virus was isolated in August, 1990 in the
|
||
Netherlands. This virus is a memory resident infector of .COM and
|
||
.EXE files, including COMMAND.COM. It is not related to the V1024
|
||
virus, though it is the same length.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Nomenklatura Virus is
|
||
executed on a system, the virus installs itself memory resident at
|
||
the top of available system memory, but below the 640K DOS boundary.
|
||
Available system memory will decrease by 1,024 bytes, and interrupt
|
||
21 will be hooked by the virus.
|
||
|
||
When the virus is memory resident, any .COM or .EXE program greater in
|
||
length then approximately 1,023 bytes that is executed or openned
|
||
for any reason will be infected by the Nomenklatura virus. Infected
|
||
files will have their file lengths increased by 1,024 bytes. The
|
||
virus does not hide the increase in file length when the disk directory
|
||
is displayed.
|
||
|
||
Attempts to execute uninfected programs from a write-protected diskette
|
||
with the virus in memory will result in a "Sector not found error"
|
||
message being displayed, and the program not being executed.
|
||
|
||
The Nomenklatura Virus is destructive to the contents of diskettes
|
||
exposed to infected systems. File corruption will randomly occur,
|
||
with the frequency increasing as the disk becomes more filled with data.
|
||
The file errors may occur on data files as well program files. This
|
||
file corruption occurs due to the virus occassionally swapping a pair of
|
||
words in the sector buffer. It may also do this to critical system
|
||
areas such as the FAT, boot sector, or directories since it may occur
|
||
to any clusters on the disk. If a file or critical system area was
|
||
residing in a corrupted cluster, it will be corrupted. As such, systems
|
||
which has been exposed to the Nomenklatura Virus must be carefully
|
||
checked as the integrity of non-infected programs and any datafiles
|
||
should be considered suspect.
|
||
|
||
The virus has been named Nomenklatura as this text string appears in
|
||
all programs infected with this virus.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Number One
|
||
Aliases: Number 1
|
||
V Status: Extinct
|
||
Discovered: 1987 (see below)
|
||
Symptoms: .COM files fail to function; <Smile> displayed
|
||
Origin: West Germany
|
||
Eff Length: 12,032 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: ONC - Overwriting Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method:
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Number One Virus was submitted for inclusion in this listing in
|
||
September, 1990. This virus, however, is not a new virus but is an
|
||
extinct rather "old" virus. The Number One Virus was written in
|
||
October, 1987, by M. Vallen using Turbo Pascal 3.01A. It is
|
||
documented, complete with source, in a book by Ralf Burger. This
|
||
virus is an non-resident overwriting virus which infects .COM files.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the Number One Virus is executed, the virus
|
||
will infect the first uninfected .COM file it finds in the current
|
||
directory. If the .COM file was originally less than 12,032 bytes in
|
||
length, it will now have a 12,032 bytes. Infected files will also have
|
||
their date/timestamps in the directory changed to reflect the time of
|
||
infection. After Number One has finished infecting a .COM file, it will
|
||
display the message:
|
||
|
||
"This File Has Been Infected by Number One!
|
||
XXXXXXXX.COMinfected."
|
||
|
||
The XXXXXXXX is the name of the .COM file that has just been infected
|
||
by the virus. When there are no more .COM files for Number One to
|
||
infect in the current directory, it will display the following
|
||
message:
|
||
|
||
"This File Has Been Infected by Number One!
|
||
<Smile>"
|
||
|
||
Number One will not infect any files which have the Read Only Attribute
|
||
set.
|
||
|
||
Since Number One is an overwriting virus, it is not possible to
|
||
remove the virus from infected files and repair the damage. Infected
|
||
files should be erased and replaced with clean copies.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Ohio
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Common
|
||
Discovered: June, 1988
|
||
Symptoms: BSC, Resident TOM
|
||
Origin: Indonesia
|
||
Eff Length: N/A
|
||
Type Code: RtF - Resident Floppy Boot Sector Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, VirexPC, AVTK 3.5+,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+
|
||
Removal Instructions: MDisk, F-Prot, VirexPC, Pro-Scan 1.4+,
|
||
or DOS SYS Command
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Ohio virus is a memory resident boot sector infector, only
|
||
infecting 360K floppy disks. The Ohio virus is similar in
|
||
many respects to the Den Zuk virus, and is believed to possibly
|
||
be the earlier version of Den Zuk. A diskette infected with
|
||
Ohio will be immune to infection by the Pakistani Brain virus.
|
||
|
||
The following text strings appear in the Ohio virus:
|
||
|
||
"V I R U S
|
||
b y
|
||
The Hackers
|
||
Y C 1 E R P
|
||
D E N Z U K 0
|
||
Bandung 40254
|
||
Indonesia
|
||
|
||
(C) 1988, The Hackers Team...."
|
||
|
||
Also see: Den Zuk
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Ontario
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: July, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth; decrease in system and free memory;
|
||
hard disk errors in the case of extreme infections
|
||
Origin: Ontario, Canada
|
||
Eff Length: 512 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRtAK - Parasitic Encrypted Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V66+, Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: SCAN /D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Ontario Virus was isolated by Mike Shields in Ontario, Canada
|
||
in July, 1990. The Ontario virus is a memory resident infector of
|
||
.COM, .EXE, and overlay files. It will infect COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Ontario Virus is executed,
|
||
it will install itself memory resident above the top of system memory
|
||
but below the 640K DOS boundary. Total system memory and free memory
|
||
will be decreased by 2,048 bytes. At this time, the virus will
|
||
infect COMMAND.COM on the C: drive, increasing its length by 512 bytes.
|
||
|
||
Each time an uninfected program is executed on the system with the
|
||
virus memory resident, the program will become infected with the viral
|
||
code located at the end of the file. For .COM files, they will
|
||
increase by 512 bytes in all cases. For .EXE and overlay files, the
|
||
file length increase will be 512 - 1023 bytes. The difference in
|
||
length for .EXE and overlay files is because the virus will fill out
|
||
the unused space at the end of the last sector of the uninfected file
|
||
with random data (usually a portion of the directory) and then append
|
||
itself to the end of the file at the next sector. Systems using
|
||
a sector size of more than 512 bytes may notice larger file increases
|
||
for infected files. Infected files will always have a file length
|
||
that is a multiple of the sector size on the disk.
|
||
|
||
In the case of extreme infections of the Ontario Virus, hard disk
|
||
errors may be noticed.
|
||
|
||
Ontario uses a complex encryption routine, and a simple identification
|
||
string will not identify this virus.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Oropax
|
||
Aliases: Music Virus, Musician
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: December, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth, tunes
|
||
Origin:
|
||
Eff Length: 2,756 - 2,806 bytes, but usually 2,773 bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRC - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V53+, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, VirexPC,
|
||
AVTK 3.5+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: SCAN /D, F-Prot, VirexPC, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirHunt 2.0+
|
||
or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Oropax virus has had several reports, but wasn't first isolated
|
||
until December 1989. It infects .COM files, increasing their length
|
||
by between 2,756 bytes and 2,806 bytes. Infected files will always
|
||
have a length divisible by 51. The virus may become active (on a
|
||
random basis) five minutes after infection of a file, playing three
|
||
different tunes with a seven minute interval in between.
|
||
|
||
One variant recently reported in Europe plays six different
|
||
tunes at seven minute intervals.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Paris
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: August, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE file growth; slow program loads upon execution;
|
||
Diskette corruption after diskette boot
|
||
Origin: Paris, France
|
||
Eff Length: 4,909 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNAK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V66+, Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Paris Virus was isolated in Paris, France, in early August, 1990.
|
||
This virus is a generic infector of .COM, .EXE and overlay files,
|
||
and will infect COMMAND.COM. It is not memory resident.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the Paris Virus is executed, the virus
|
||
will infect all .COM, .EXE and overlay files on the current drive
|
||
and directory, with the exception of very small .COM files. It will
|
||
also check to see if COMMAND.COM on the C: drive is uninfected, if it
|
||
has not previously been infected it will become infected. Infected
|
||
files will increase in length by between 4,909 - 4, 25 bytes, with the
|
||
virus located at the end of the infected file.
|
||
|
||
The Paris Virus can be destructive in some instances, resulting in
|
||
diskettes becoming corrupted if the system is booted from a diskette
|
||
with a Paris infected COMMAND.COM program.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Parity
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: December, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM file growth; long .COM program loads;
|
||
possibly intermittent parity errors
|
||
Origin: Bulgaria
|
||
Eff Length: 441 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Parity Virus was received in December, 1990, and originated in
|
||
Bulgaria. This virus is a non-memory resident infector of .COM files,
|
||
and will infect COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the Parity Virus is executed, the virus
|
||
will infect all .COM files in the current directory. If COMMAND.COM
|
||
is in the current directory, it will become infected.
|
||
|
||
Infected .COM programs will increase in length by 441 bytes, the virus
|
||
being located at the end of the infected program. The program's date
|
||
and time in the disk directory will not be altered by the virus.
|
||
|
||
The major symptom of a Parity Virus infection is that it will take
|
||
significantly longer to load and execute infected .COM files. The
|
||
increase in time is due to the virus searching the current drive for
|
||
.COM files to infect.
|
||
|
||
This virus may also display a message "PARITY CHECK 2" at times, and
|
||
halt the system.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Payday
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: November, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: TSR, .EXE & .COM growth, system slowdown, deleted files
|
||
on Friday EXCEPT 13th, "Black WIndow"
|
||
Origin: Netherlands
|
||
Eff Length: 1,808 Bytes (.EXE) & 1,813 Bytes (.COM)
|
||
Type Code: PRA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V51+, F-Prot, Pro-Scan 1.4+, AVTK 3.5+,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: UnVirus, Saturday, CleanUp, F-Prot, Pro-Scan 1.4+,
|
||
NAV
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Payday virus was isolated by Jan Terpstra of the Netherlands
|
||
in November, 1989. It is a variant of the Jerusalem B virus,
|
||
the major difference being that the activation criteria to
|
||
delete files has been changed from every Friday The 13th to
|
||
any Friday but Friday The 13ths.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Jerusalem, Jerusalem B, New Jerusalem, Suriv 3.00
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Pentagon
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Extinct
|
||
Discovered: January, 1988
|
||
Symptoms: TSR, BSC 360k floppies, file (see text)
|
||
Origin: USA
|
||
Eff Length: N/A
|
||
Type Code: RF - Resident Floppy Boot Sector Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan, F-Prot, VirexPC
|
||
Removal Instructions: MDisk, CleanUp, or DOS SYS Command
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Pentagon virus consists of a normal MS-DOS 3.20 boot
|
||
sector where the name 'IBM' has been replaced by 'HAL', along
|
||
with two files. The first file has a name of the hex
|
||
character 0F9H, and contains the portion of the virus code
|
||
which would not fit into the boot sector, as well as the
|
||
original boot sector of the infected disk. The second file
|
||
is named PENTAGON.TXT and does not appear to be used or contain
|
||
any data. The 0F9H file is accessed by its absolute storage
|
||
address. Portions of this virus are encrypted.
|
||
|
||
The Pentagon virus only infects 360K floppies, and will look
|
||
for and remove the Brain virus from any disk that it infects.
|
||
It is memory resident, occupying 5K of RAM, and can survive
|
||
a warm reboot or CTL-ALT-DEL.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Perfume
|
||
Aliases: 765, 4711
|
||
V Status: Endangered
|
||
Discovered: December, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth, messages
|
||
Origin: Germany
|
||
Eff Length: 765 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan/X V67+, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, VirexPC,
|
||
AVTK 3.5+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D/X, F-Prot, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV,
|
||
or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Perfume virus is of German origin, and has also been
|
||
isolated in Poland in December, 1989. This virus infects
|
||
.COM files, and will look for COMMAND.COM and infect it if
|
||
it isn't already infected. Infected files always grow in
|
||
length by 765 bytes.
|
||
|
||
The virus will sometimes ask the system user a question,
|
||
and then not run the infected program unless the system
|
||
user responds by typing 4711, the name of a German perfume.
|
||
|
||
In the most common variant of this virus, however, the
|
||
questions have been overwritten with miscellaneous
|
||
characters.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Sorry
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Phantom
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: January, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth; Message; Shift of System Display;
|
||
Decrease in total system and available memory
|
||
Origin: Hungary
|
||
Eff Length: 2,274 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRhC - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V75+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Phantom Virus was isolated in Hungary in January, 1991, by Dr.
|
||
Szegedi Imre. This virus is a memory resident infector of .COM files,
|
||
but not COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Phantom Virus is executed,
|
||
the Phantom Virus will install itself memory resident at the top of
|
||
system memory but below the 640K DOS boundary. Infected systems will
|
||
have interrupts 20 and 21 hooked by the virus, and the DOS ChkDsk
|
||
program will report total system and available memory as 2,704 bytes
|
||
less than expected.
|
||
|
||
After becoming memory resident, the Phantom Virus will infect .COM
|
||
programs as they are executed or openned if the original file length
|
||
is greater than 2K. Infected programs will increase in size by 2,274
|
||
bytes with the virus being located at the end of infected programs.
|
||
|
||
Systems infected with the Phantom Virus will experience the following
|
||
message being displayed intermittently when programs are executed:
|
||
|
||
"HI ROOKIE!
|
||
I`m a THESEASE! I live in YOUR computer - sorry...
|
||
Thanks to Brains in the Computer Siences!"
|
||
|
||
This message, as with the following text strings which also occur in
|
||
the virus's code, cannot be seen in infected programs as they are
|
||
encrypted. The other text strings which are encrypted in the viral
|
||
code are:
|
||
|
||
"The PHANTOM Was HERE - SORRY"
|
||
"(c) PHANTOM - This virus was designed in the HUNGARIAN
|
||
VIRUS DEVELOPING LABORATORY. (H.V.D.L.) v1.0"
|
||
|
||
Another symptom of the Phantom Virus is that it will occasionally
|
||
alter the system display so that what should start on the left side of
|
||
the screen starts in the middle (it is shifted 50% with wrap around on
|
||
the same line).
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Phoenix
|
||
Aliases: P1
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: July, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth, system reboots, CHKDSK program failure,
|
||
COMMAND.COM header change
|
||
Origin: Bulgaria
|
||
Eff Length: 1,704 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRhCK - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V66+, Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Phoenix virus is of Bulgarian origin, and was submitted to
|
||
the author of this document in July, 1990 by Vesselin Bontchev.
|
||
This virus is one of a family of three (3) viruses which may be
|
||
referred to as the P1 or Phoenix Family. Each of these viruses is
|
||
being documented separately due to their varying characteristics.
|
||
The Phoenix virus is a memory resident, generic infector of .COM
|
||
files, and will infect COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Phoenix virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will install itself memory resident in free high memory,
|
||
reserving 8,192 bytes. Interrupt 2A will be hooked by the virus.
|
||
System total memory and free memory will decrease by 8,192 bytes.
|
||
If the program was executed from a floppy drive, and COMMAND.COM was
|
||
not present on the diskette, the virus will request that a diskette
|
||
with \COMMAND.COM present be inserted in the drive. Phoenix will
|
||
immediately infect COMMAND.COM by overwriting part of the binary zero
|
||
portion of the program, and changing the program's header information.
|
||
COMMAND.COM will not change in file length. The virus will then
|
||
similarly infect COMMAND.COM residing in the C: drive root directory.
|
||
|
||
After becoming memory resident, the virus will attempt to infect any
|
||
.COM file executed. Most of its attempts, however, will not result in
|
||
a file being infected. Phoenix is a fairly poor replicator. If the
|
||
virus is successful in infecting the file, it will append its viral
|
||
code to the end of the file, increasing the file's length by 1,704
|
||
bytes.
|
||
|
||
Phoenix is not able to recognize when it has previously infected a file,
|
||
so it may reinfect .COM files several times. Each infection will
|
||
result in another 1,704 bytes of viral code being appended to the
|
||
file.
|
||
|
||
Systems infected with the Phoenix virus will experience problems with
|
||
executing CHKDSK.COM. Attempts to execute this program with Phoenix
|
||
memory resident will result in a warm reboot of the system occurring,
|
||
however the memory resident version of Phoenix will not survive the
|
||
reboot. If an autoexec.bat file is not present on the drive being
|
||
booted from, the system will prompt for the user to enter Date and
|
||
Time.
|
||
|
||
The Phoenix Virus employs a complex encryption mechanism, and virus
|
||
scanners which are only able to look for simple hex strings will not
|
||
be able to detect it. There is no simple hex string in this virus
|
||
that is common to all infected samples.
|
||
|
||
This virus is not related to the Cascade (1701/1704) Virus.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Evil, PhoenixD
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: PhoenixD
|
||
Aliases: P1
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: July, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth, system reboots, CHKDSK program failure,
|
||
COMMAND.COM header change
|
||
Origin: Bulgaria
|
||
Eff Length: 1,704 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRhCK - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V66+, Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The PhoenixD virus is of Bulgarian origin, and was submitted to
|
||
the author of this document in July, 1990 by Vesselin Bontchev.
|
||
This virus is one of a family of three (3) viruses which may be
|
||
referred to as the P1 or Phoenix Family. Each of these viruses is
|
||
being documented separately due to their varying characteristics.
|
||
The PhoenixD virus is a memory resident, generic infector of .COM
|
||
files, and will infect COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The PhoenixD Virus is a "bug fixed" version of the Phoenix virus.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the PhoenixD virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will install itself memory resident in free high memory,
|
||
reserving 8,192 bytes. Interrupt 2A will be hooked by the virus.
|
||
System total memory and free memory will decrease by 8,192 bytes.
|
||
PhoenixD will then check to see if the current drive's root directory
|
||
contains a copy of COMMAND.COM. If a copy of COMMAND.COM is found,
|
||
it will be infected by PhoenixD by overwriting part of the binary zero
|
||
portion of the program, and changing the program's header information.
|
||
COMMAND.COM will not change in file length. The virus will then
|
||
similarly infect COMMAND.COM residing in the C: drive root directory.
|
||
|
||
After becoming memory resident, the virus will attempt to infect any
|
||
.COM file executed. PhoenixD is a much better replicator than the
|
||
original Phoenix Virus, and is usually able to infect files. Infected
|
||
files will increase in length by 1,704 bytes.
|
||
|
||
PhoenixD is not able to recognize when it has previously infected a
|
||
file, so it may reinfect .COM files several times. Each infection will
|
||
result in another 1,704 bytes of viral code being appended to the
|
||
file.
|
||
|
||
A characteristic present in the PhoenixD Virus which is not found in
|
||
the original Phoenix Virus is that in addition to it infecting .COM
|
||
files as they are executed, .COM files will be infected when they
|
||
are opened for any reason. The simple act of copying a .COM file
|
||
with PhoenixD present in memory will result in both the source and
|
||
target files being infected.
|
||
|
||
Systems infected with the PhoenixD virus will experience problems with
|
||
executing CHKDSK.COM. Attempts to execute this program with Phoenix
|
||
memory resident will result in a warm reboot of the system occurring.
|
||
If an autoexec.bat file is not present on the drive being booted from,
|
||
the system will prompt for the user to enter Date and Time.
|
||
|
||
The PhoenixD Virus employs a complex encryption mechanism, and virus
|
||
scanners which are only able to look for simple hex strings will not
|
||
be able to detect it. There is no simple hex string in this virus
|
||
that is common to all infected samples.
|
||
|
||
This virus is not related to the Cascade (1701/1704) virus.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Evil, Phoenix
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Ping Pong
|
||
Aliases: Bouncing Ball, Bouncing Dot, Italian, Vera Cruz
|
||
V Status: Extinct
|
||
Discovered: March, 1988
|
||
Symptoms: Graphic display (see text), TSR, BSC
|
||
Origin:
|
||
Eff Length: N/A
|
||
Type Code: RsF - Resident Floppy Boot Sector Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan, F-Prot, IBM Scan, VirexPC, Pro-Scan,
|
||
AVTK 3.5+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: MDisk, CleanUp, F-Prot, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirexPC, NAV,
|
||
or DOS SYS command
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Ping Pong virus is a boot sector virus which was first
|
||
reported in March 1988. The original Ping Pong virus only
|
||
infects Floppy Disks.
|
||
|
||
When the virus activates, which is on a random basis, a
|
||
bouncing ball or dot appears on the screen. This display
|
||
can only be stopped thru a system reboot. No other damage
|
||
is apparently done.
|
||
|
||
The Ping Pong Virus is extinct, though the hard disk variant,
|
||
Ping Pong-B listed below, is one of the most common MS-DOS
|
||
viruses.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Ping Pong-B
|
||
Aliases: Bouncing Ball Boot, Italian-A
|
||
V Status: Common
|
||
Discovered: May, 1988
|
||
Symptoms: Graphic display (see text), TSR, BSC
|
||
Origin:
|
||
Eff Length: N/A
|
||
Type Code: BRs - Resident Boot Sector Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, VirexPC,
|
||
AVTK 3.5+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: CleanUp, MDisk, Pro-Scan 1.4+, F-Prot, VirexPC, NAV,
|
||
or DOS SYS Command
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Ping Pong-B virus is a variant of the Ping Pong virus. The
|
||
major difference is that Ping Pong-B can infect hard disks as
|
||
well as floppies.
|
||
|
||
Known variants of Ping Pong-B include:
|
||
Ping Pong-C : Similar to Ping Pong-B, though this variant does
|
||
not have the bouncing ball screen effect.
|
||
Origin: Argentina, June 1990.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Plastique
|
||
Aliases: Plastic Bomb, Plastique 3012, Plastique 1
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: July, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: TSR; .COM & .EXE growth; possible system slowdown or bomb
|
||
noises after September 20
|
||
Origin: Taiwan
|
||
Eff Length: 3,012 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V66+, Pro-Scan 2.01+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Clean-Up V72+, Pro-Scan 2.01+, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Plastique, or Plastic Bomb, Virus was submitted in July 1990, it
|
||
comes to us from Taiwan. Plastique is a memory resident generic
|
||
infector of .COM and .EXE files, though it does not infect
|
||
COMMAND.COM. Unlike the Plastique-B Virus listed below, this virus
|
||
does not infect floppy disk boot sectors.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with Plastique is executed, the
|
||
virus will install itself memory resident as a TSR in low system
|
||
memory. The TSR is 3,264 bytes in length, and hooks interrupt 21.
|
||
|
||
After the virus is memory resident, it will attempt to infect any
|
||
.COM or .EXE file which is executed. This virus is rather "buggy",
|
||
and it is not always successful in infecting files when they are
|
||
executed. When it is successful infecting the file, the file's
|
||
length will increase. For infected .COM files, the length will
|
||
increase by 3,012 bytes. For infected .EXE files, their length
|
||
will increase between 3,012 and 3,020 bytes.
|
||
|
||
Plastique will also attempt to infect files when they are opened for
|
||
any reason, though again, it is not always successful.
|
||
|
||
After September 20th of any year, the Plastique Virus activates. At
|
||
that time, it will do either of two things. It will either
|
||
progressively slowdown the system, or it will intermittently emit
|
||
"bomb" noises from the system speaker.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of Plastique are:
|
||
HM2 : The earliest known version of this virus, it does
|
||
not replicate. Executing an infected file results
|
||
in the system hanging requiring a reboot.
|
||
Origin: Taiwan, May 1990.
|
||
Plastique 4.51 : A variant of the Plastique virus described above,
|
||
the only real difference is that the encryption
|
||
of the virus is slightly different. Otherwise it
|
||
behaves exactly the same as Plastique.
|
||
Origin: Taiwan, July 1990.
|
||
Plastique COBOL: A variant of the Plastique virus described above, this
|
||
version is 3,004 bytes in length, and its memory
|
||
resident TSR is 3,248 bytes in length. The only text
|
||
character string which can be found in this variant is
|
||
"COBOL". This string does not occur in other variants
|
||
of the Plastique Virus, or related viruses. Infected
|
||
.COM programs will increase in size by 3,004 bytes,
|
||
.EXE files by 3,004 to 3,019 bytes. COMMAND.COM will
|
||
not become infected. Activation of the virus has also
|
||
been altered. Between January 1 and September 21, the
|
||
virus will progressively slowdown the system. After 20
|
||
minutes, the system will execute at approximately 50%
|
||
of its original speed. After 30 minutes, the virus
|
||
may lockout the system keyboard, as well as corrupt
|
||
the system's CMOS configuration. Between September 22
|
||
and December 31, the virus does not activate, and no
|
||
system slowdown or CMOS corruption will occur.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Invader, Plastique-B
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Plastique-B
|
||
Aliases: Plastic Bomb, Plastique 5.21, Plastique 2
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: July, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: TSR, .COM & .EXE file growth; BSC;
|
||
Origin: Taiwan
|
||
Eff Length: 4,096 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsAB - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE, & Boot Sector Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V66+, Pro-Scan 2.01+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Clean-Up V72+, Pro-Scan 2.01+, or Delete Infected Files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Plastique-B, or Plastique 5.21, virus is a later version of
|
||
the Plastique virus. Like Plastique, it is a memory resident
|
||
generic infector of .COM and .EXE files. This version will also
|
||
infect diskette boot sectors. It does not infect COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
If the system date is before September 20th, the first time a program
|
||
infected with Plastique-B is executed, the virus will install itself
|
||
memory resident as a TSR in low system memory. The TSR is 5,120 bytes
|
||
in length. Interrupts 08, 09, 13, 21, and ED are hooked by the virus.
|
||
|
||
If the system date is after September 20th, the virus will install
|
||
itself memory resident in high system memory but below the 640K DOS
|
||
boundary. The same interrupts will be hooked by the virus.
|
||
|
||
After the virus is memory resident, it will attempt to infect any
|
||
.COM or .EXE file which is executed or opened for any reason. It
|
||
has had many of the "bugs" fixed that were in Plastique, and is
|
||
usually successful in infecting files. Infected .COM and .EXE files
|
||
will increase in length by 4,096 bytes.
|
||
|
||
Plastique-B will also infect the boot sector of any diskettes accessed
|
||
on an infected system.
|
||
|
||
After September 20th, 1990, the Plastique-B virus activates. It
|
||
will either progressively slowdown the system or cause "bomb" noises
|
||
to be emitted periodically from the system speaker. It may also
|
||
overwrite the contents of all drives after this date, depending on if
|
||
a predetermined limit in the virus has been reached.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Plastique, Invader
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Polimer
|
||
Aliases: Polimer Tapeworm
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: November, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth; Message
|
||
Origin: Hungary
|
||
Eff Length: 512 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V71+, Pro-Scan 2.01+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Polimer Virus was discovered in Hungary in November, 1990. This
|
||
virus is a non-resident infector of .COM files, including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the Polimer Virus is executed, the
|
||
following message will be displayed:
|
||
|
||
"A le' jobb kazetta a POLIMER kazetta ! Vegye ezt !"
|
||
|
||
This message can be found near the beginning of all infected files.
|
||
|
||
After the message is displayed, the virus will attempt to infect one
|
||
.COM file on the current drive and directory, and one .COM file on the
|
||
C: drive's current directory. This virus will only infect .COM files
|
||
which are between 512 and 64,758 bytes in length. If the .COM file it
|
||
attempts to infect has the Read-Only attribute, it will not be infected,
|
||
and the message $ERROR will be displayed.
|
||
|
||
Although this virus is actually 456 bytes in length, infected .COM files
|
||
will increase in size by 512 bytes with the virus's code being located
|
||
at the beginning of the file.
|
||
|
||
This virus does not appear to do anything besides replicating.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Polish 217
|
||
Aliases: 217, Polish Stupid
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: October, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth; system reboot
|
||
Origin: Koszalin, Poland
|
||
Eff Length: 217 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V71+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Polish 217, or Polish Stupid, Virus was discovered in Koszalin,
|
||
Poland, in October, 1990. This virus is a non-resident infector of
|
||
.COM files, including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the Polish Stupid Virus is executed, the
|
||
virus will infect the first uninfected .COM file found in the current
|
||
directory. Infected .COM files will increase in length by 217 bytes
|
||
with the virus's code being located at the end of the file. Infected
|
||
files will also end with the hex string 5757h. The file's date and
|
||
time in the disk directory is not altered.
|
||
|
||
A side note on this virus: when the copy of COMMAND.COM pointed to by
|
||
the COMSPEC environmental variable is infected by the virus, the system
|
||
will experience a warm reboot.
|
||
|
||
This virus does nothing besides replicating in its current version.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of Polish 217 are:
|
||
Polish 217 B : The Polish 217 B variant's major difference is that
|
||
when COMMAND.COM is infected, a warm reboot does not occur.
|
||
Execution of COMMAND.COM will result in the error message:
|
||
"Specified COMMAND search directory bad". Execution of
|
||
infected programs may also result in the following message
|
||
being displayed and the program terminated:
|
||
"????????COM
|
||
Path not found."
|
||
Programs which can detect Polish 217 may not be able to detect
|
||
Polish 217 B as it has been altered. Scan V72 and below will
|
||
not detect it.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Polish 529
|
||
Aliases: 529
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: September, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth; TSR
|
||
Origin: Poland
|
||
Eff Length: 529 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsCK - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V71+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Polish 529 Virus was isolated in September, 1990 in Poland. This
|
||
virus is a memory resident infector of .COM files. It will infect
|
||
COMMAND.COM if it is executed with the virus in memory.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Polish 529 Virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will install itself memory resident as a low system memory
|
||
TSR of 1,664 bytes. Interrupt 21 will be hooked by the virus.
|
||
|
||
Once the virus is memory resident, any .COM file over approximately
|
||
1600 bytes in length will be infected by the virus. Infected .COM
|
||
files will show a file length increase of 529 bytes and have the
|
||
virus's code located at the beginning of the file.
|
||
|
||
This virus does not appear to do anything but replicate.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Polish 583
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: December, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM file growth
|
||
Origin: Poland
|
||
Eff Length: 583 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Polish 583 Virus originated in Poland and was submitted in
|
||
December, 1990. This virus is a non-resident, direct action infector
|
||
of .COM files, including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with Polish 583 is executed, the virus will
|
||
infect one other .COM file on the current drive and directory. The
|
||
newly infected program will increase in length by 583 bytes with the
|
||
virus's code being located at the end of the infected program. The
|
||
program's date and time in the disk directory is not altered.
|
||
|
||
This virus does not do anything besides replicate.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Print Screen
|
||
Aliases: EB 21, 8290, PRTSC Virus
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: November, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: BSC, hard disk access slowdown
|
||
Origin: Bombay, India
|
||
Eff Length: N/A
|
||
Type Code: BR - Resident Boot Sector Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V64+, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirexPC, F-Prot 1.12+,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: M-Disk, Pro-Scan 1.4+, NAV, or DOS SYS Command
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Print Screen Virus was isolated in Bombay, India in November, 1989
|
||
by Neville Bulsara. It is the first virus to have originated in
|
||
India. There are two versions of Print Screen, the later version
|
||
having had some bugs fixed.
|
||
|
||
When a system is booted from a Print Screen infected diskette or
|
||
hard drive, the virus will install itself memory resident in the
|
||
top of memory. The virus then adjusts the amount of memory DOS
|
||
thinks is installed. Infected systems will show that total system
|
||
memory is 2K less than is installed. On floppy disks, the original
|
||
boot sector of the diskette will be copied to sector 11.
|
||
|
||
After becoming memory resident, the virus will infect any hard
|
||
disk or floppy diskette which is accessed by the system.
|
||
|
||
Infected system users will notice that hard disk accesses done for
|
||
any reason will be much slower than expected. In some cases,
|
||
listing the root directory will show apparently garbage entries in
|
||
it. These entries are actually part of the virus's code.
|
||
|
||
The first version of the Print Screen virus is buggy, and as such
|
||
it doesn't actually accomplish anything having to do with printing
|
||
screens.
|
||
|
||
This virus appears to have been based on the Ping Pong Virus, and
|
||
some anti-viral programs will identify it as such.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of Print Screen are:
|
||
Print Screen-2: Print Screen-2 is the later, bug fixed version of
|
||
the Print Screen Virus. This version will attempt to perform
|
||
a screen print or dump to the system's printer after every
|
||
255 disk I/Os have occurred.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Proud
|
||
Aliases: V1302, P1 Related
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: August, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth; decrease in total system and available memory;
|
||
FAT entry corruption
|
||
Origin: Bulgaria
|
||
Eff Length: 1,302 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRtCK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V71+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Proud, or V1302, Virus was isolated in August of 1990 in Bulgaria
|
||
by Vesselin Bontchev. Proud is a memory resident infector of .COM
|
||
files, including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with Proud is executed, the virus
|
||
checks to determine if interrupt 13 is in use by another program, and
|
||
if it is, the virus will hang the system. If interrupt 13 is not in
|
||
use by another program, Proud will install itself memory resident at
|
||
the top of system memory, but below the 640K DOS boundary. Total
|
||
system memory and free available memory will decrease by 8,192 bytes.
|
||
Interrupt 2A will be replaced by the virus.
|
||
|
||
Once the virus is memory resident, it will infect .COM files within
|
||
certain candidate length ranges whend they are openned for any reason.
|
||
The candidate file length ranges are:
|
||
|
||
2,048 - 14,335 bytes
|
||
16,384 - 30,719 bytes
|
||
32,768 - 47,103 bytes
|
||
49,152 - 63,487 bytes
|
||
|
||
Proud is an encrypted virus, and is unusual in that it "splits"
|
||
the .COM file being infected into two parts, placing the viral code
|
||
between the two sections. Proud also is unable to distinguish when
|
||
a file has been previously infected, so .COM files can become infected
|
||
multiple times. Each infection, with the exception of COMMAND.COM,
|
||
will add 1,302 bytes to the file length. Infected COMMAND.COM files
|
||
generally don't increase in length on the first infection as the virus
|
||
will overwrite part of the 00h area of COMMAND.COM with the viral code.
|
||
|
||
Proud can be a damaging virus, with a probability of 1 out of 256, it
|
||
may swap entries in the file allocation table.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: RaubKopie
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: New
|
||
Discovery: March, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth; Messages
|
||
Origin: Germany
|
||
Eff Length: 2,219 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNAK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V76+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The RaubKopie Virus was submitted in March, 1991 by Jan Terpstra of
|
||
the Netherlands. It is originally from Germany. Raubkopie is a
|
||
non-resident direct action infector of .COM and .EXE files. It will
|
||
infect COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with RaubKopie is executed, the virus will
|
||
infect up to five .COM programs in the currect directory. If less than
|
||
five uninfected .COM programs existed in the current directory, it will
|
||
then infect .EXE files until the total number of programs it has
|
||
infected on this execution totals five.
|
||
|
||
.COM programs infected with Raubkopie will increase in size by 2,219
|
||
bytes with the virus being located at the beginning of the infected
|
||
file. The program's date and time in the disk directory will not be
|
||
altered.
|
||
|
||
.EXE programs infected with Raubkopie will increase in size by 2,475
|
||
to 2,491 bytes with the virus being located at the end of the file.
|
||
The larger file size increase with .EXE files is due to a different
|
||
mechanism being used to infect the programs. With .EXE files, the
|
||
virus will first add up to 16 bytes to the candidate .EXE file so that
|
||
the program's length is now divisible by 16. After adding the
|
||
additional bytes, it then adds 256 bytes of hex 00's and appends the
|
||
Raubkopie code to the end of the program. The program's date and
|
||
time in the disk directory will not be altered.
|
||
|
||
The RaubKopie Virus will occassionally display messages and require
|
||
a response when an infected program is invoked. The messages displayed
|
||
cannot be seen within infected programs, they are encrypted. The
|
||
first message displayed when the messages occur is:
|
||
|
||
" A C H T U N G
|
||
---------------------------
|
||
|
||
Die Benutzung einer RAUBKOPIE ist strafbar!
|
||
Nur wer Original-Disketten, Handbucher,
|
||
oder PD-Lizenzen besitzt, darf Kopien verwenden.
|
||
|
||
Programmierung is muhevolle Detailarbeit:
|
||
Wer Raubkopien verwendet, betrugt
|
||
Programmierer un den Lohn ihrer Arbeit.
|
||
|
||
--------------------------- "
|
||
|
||
A pause will then occur, and the following question will be displayed:
|
||
|
||
"Bist Du sauber ? (J/N) "
|
||
|
||
Entering "J" for yes will result in the following message being
|
||
displayed and the program which the user was attempting to execute
|
||
will proceed to execute:
|
||
|
||
"Ich will glauben, was Du sagst ..... "
|
||
|
||
Entering "N" for no will result in the following messages, the second
|
||
of which is garbled, and the program the user was attempting to execute
|
||
will be terminated:
|
||
|
||
"CPU-ID wird gespeichert...
|
||
|
||
**** LO<garbled> "
|
||
|
||
The last garbled message in original samples of this virus is:
|
||
|
||
"**** Losche dieses Programm ****".
|
||
|
||
There is also code within the RaubKopie virus to format the boot
|
||
sector of the system hard disk if the system date is greater than the
|
||
12th of the month, or the hour is above 17:00 (5:00 PM). This code,
|
||
however, does not function properly due to a bug within the RaubKopie
|
||
Virus.
|
||
|
||
Besides the messages and file growth, infected systems may have some
|
||
of the directories containing RaubKopie infected programs sorted so
|
||
that .COM files appear at the beginning of the directory listing.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Red Diavolyata
|
||
Aliases: USSR 830
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: December, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth; decrease in system and available memory;
|
||
file date/time changes
|
||
Origin: USSR
|
||
Eff Length: 830 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRhCK - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Red Diavolyata Virus is an 830 byte memory resident infector of
|
||
.COM files, including COMMAND.COM. It was submitted in December, 1990,
|
||
and originated in the USSR.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with Red Diavolyata is executed, the
|
||
virus will install itself memory resident at the top of system memory
|
||
but below the 640K DOS boundary. The interrupt 12 return is not moved.
|
||
The DOS ChkDsk command will indicate that total system memory and
|
||
available free memory have decreased by 960 bytes. Interrupt 21 will
|
||
be hooked by the virus.
|
||
|
||
Once Red Diavolyata is memory resident, any .COM program executed will
|
||
become infected by the virus. If COMMAND.COM is executed, it will be
|
||
infected.
|
||
|
||
Infected .COM programs will have their file length increased by 830
|
||
bytes, and their date and time in the disk directory will have been
|
||
altered to the system date and time when infection occurred. The virus
|
||
will be located at the end of the infected program.
|
||
|
||
The following text strings can be found at the end of infected
|
||
programs:
|
||
|
||
"Eddie die somewhere in time"
|
||
"This programm was written in the city of Prostokwashino"
|
||
"(C) 1990 RED DIAVOLYATA"
|
||
"Hello! MLTI!"
|
||
|
||
Additionally, the text string "MLTI!COMMAND" can be found within
|
||
infected files.
|
||
|
||
It is unknown if Red Diavolyata does anything besides replicate.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: RPVS
|
||
Aliases: 453
|
||
V Status: Endangered
|
||
Discovery: August, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth
|
||
Origin: West Germany
|
||
Eff Length: 453 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNC - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: Pro-Scan 2.01+, ViruScan V76+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Pro-Scan 2.01+, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The RPVS, or 453, Virus was discovered in West Germany in early
|
||
August, 1990. This virus is a non-resident infector of .COM files.
|
||
The RPVS is named for an unusual string that appears in a file
|
||
dump of the virus - "TUQ.RPVS" - this in not really a text string,
|
||
but a series of PUSH instructions.
|
||
|
||
The RPVS Virus is rather unsophisticated virus. Whenever a .COM
|
||
program infected with the RPVS or 453 virus is executed, the virus
|
||
will look for an uninfected .COM file in the current directory. The
|
||
virus determines if the .COM file has been previously infected by
|
||
checking to see if the last two bytes of the file are 9090h. If the
|
||
last two bytes are not 9090h, the file will be infected, appending
|
||
453 bytes of viral code to the end of the file. One .COM file is
|
||
infected each time an infected program is executed. COMMAND.COM
|
||
will not normally be infected.
|
||
|
||
This virus does not contain any logic to activate and cause damage
|
||
in its current state. It does contain many NOP instructions and odd
|
||
jumps which leave plenty of space for later additions.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of RPVS are:
|
||
RPVS-B : The RPVS virus after additional bytes have been added to the
|
||
end of an infected program. When this occurs, the virus
|
||
will act differently. It will not be able to determine that
|
||
it has already infected a .COM file, so it will reinfect
|
||
the first .COM file it finds in the current directory over
|
||
and over again.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Saddam
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: January, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth; Message; Disk boot failures; I/O error message;
|
||
"Insufficient memory" message when attempting to run .BAT files;
|
||
Dir command errors; System hangs
|
||
Origin: France (reported September, 1990)
|
||
Isolated: Israel
|
||
Eff Length: 919 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsCK - Resident Parasitic .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Saddam Virus was first reported in France in September, 1990. In
|
||
January, 1991, the first sample of this virus was actually received, its
|
||
isolation point was Israel. Saddam is a memory resident infector of
|
||
.COM files, including COMMAND.COM. It is based on the Do-Nothing virus.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Saddam Virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will install itself memory resident in low system memory,
|
||
though not as a TSR. Interrupts 21 and 22 will be hooked by the virus.
|
||
COMMAND.COM will be infected at this time if it has not previously
|
||
been infected.
|
||
|
||
Once Saddam is memory resident, it will infect .COM programs as they
|
||
are executed or openned. Infected .COM files will have a file length
|
||
increase of 919 bytes, the virus will be located at the end of
|
||
infected programs. Programs infected with this virus will not have
|
||
their file date and time altered upon infection.
|
||
|
||
There are several symptoms which may be experienced on systems infected
|
||
with the Saddam Virus. The most obvious symptom is that the following
|
||
message will occasionally be displayed:
|
||
|
||
"HEY SADAM
|
||
LEAVE QUEIT BEFORE I COME"
|
||
|
||
This message cannot be seen in infected files, it is encrypted.
|
||
|
||
Other symptoms are that attempts to execute .BAT files will result in
|
||
an insufficient memory message. Attempts to boot from a disk with a
|
||
Saddam infected COMMAND.COM will fail, the system will hang. Execution
|
||
of some infected programs will result in an I/O error and the program
|
||
aborting execution. The DOS Directory command may also not function
|
||
properly. Lastly, infected systems may experience frequent system
|
||
hangs requiring the user to reboot the system.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Do-Nothing
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Saratoga
|
||
Aliases: 642, One In Two
|
||
V Status: Extinct
|
||
Discovery: July, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: .EXE growth, Resident, bad sectors, FAT corruption
|
||
Origin: California, USA
|
||
Eff Length: 642 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsE - Resident Parasitic .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan/X V67+, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirexPC,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D/X, F-Prot, VirexPC, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirexPC 1.1B+,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV, or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Saratoga Virus was first isolated in California in July 1989.
|
||
This virus is very similar to the Icelandic and Icelandic-II
|
||
viruses, so only the differences from the Icelandic viruses
|
||
are indicated here. Please refer back to the description of
|
||
the Icelandic virus for the base information.
|
||
|
||
The Saratoga virus's main difference from the Icelandic virus
|
||
is that when it copies itself to memory, it modifies the memory
|
||
block so that it appears to belong to the operating system,
|
||
thus avoiding another program reusing the block.
|
||
|
||
Similar to the Icelandic-II virus, the Saratoga can infect
|
||
programs even if the system has installed an anti-viral TSR
|
||
which "hooks" interrupt 21, such as FluShot+. Also like
|
||
Icelandic-II is that this virus can infect programs which have
|
||
been marked Read-Only, though it does not restore the Read-Only
|
||
attribute to the file afterwards.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Icelandic, Icelandic-II
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Saturday The 14TH
|
||
Aliases: Durban
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: March, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: TSR;.COM, .EXE, .OV? growth; corrupts boot sector,
|
||
FAT. & partition table on Saturday 14th
|
||
Origin: Republic of South Africa
|
||
Eff Length: 685 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V61+, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirexPC, AVTK 3.5+,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, VirHunt 2.0+, Pro-Scan 2.01+
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The first reports of the Saturday The 14TH virus came from
|
||
South Africa in March 1990. The Saturday The 14TH, or Durban
|
||
Virus, is a memory resident generic file infector, infecting
|
||
.COM, .EXE, and overlay files, but not COMMAND.COM. Infected
|
||
files will increase in length by between 669 and 684 bytes.
|
||
|
||
The Saturday The 14TH virus activates on any Saturday that falls
|
||
on the 14TH of any month, at which time it will overwrite the
|
||
first 100 logical sectors of the C: drive, B: drive, and A:
|
||
drive. In effect, on drive C:, the virus destroys the hard
|
||
disk boot sector, partition table, and file allocation table (FAT).
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Scott's Valley
|
||
Aliases: 2131
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: September, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: TSR; .COM and .EXE growth
|
||
Origin: Scott's Valley, California, USA
|
||
Eff Length: 2,131 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V67+, Pro-Scan 2.01+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Scott's Valley Virus was discovered in September, 1990 in
|
||
Scott's Valley, California. This virus is a memory resident generic
|
||
infector of .COM and .EXE files, and does not infect COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Scott's Valley Virus is
|
||
executed, the virus installs itself memory resident as a low system
|
||
memory TSR of 2,384 bytes. Interrupt 21 is hooked by the virus.
|
||
|
||
After the virus is memory resident, any .COM or .EXE file executed
|
||
will be infected with the virus. .COM files will increase in length
|
||
by 2,131 bytes. .EXE files will increase in length between 2,131
|
||
and 2,140 bytes.
|
||
|
||
Infected programs will contain the following hex string in the virus's
|
||
code: 5E8BDE909081C63200B912082E.
|
||
|
||
It is unknown if this virus is malicious.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Sentinel
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: January, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth; decrease in available free memory
|
||
Origin: Bulgaria
|
||
Eff Length: 4,625 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRHAK - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Sentinel Virus was submitted in January, 1991, and is from
|
||
Bulgaria. This virus is a memory resident infector of .COM and .EXE
|
||
files, and will infect COMMAND.COM. Unlike most viruses, this virus
|
||
was received with its original Turbo Pascal source code. It may be
|
||
purely a research virus at this time.
|
||
|
||
When the first program infected with Sentinel is executed, the virus
|
||
will install itself memory resident at the top of system memory, but
|
||
below the 640K DOS boundary. Interrupt 12's return is not moved by
|
||
the virus. Interrupt 21 will be hooked by the virus in memory.
|
||
COMMAND.COM, if not previously infected, will be infected by Sentinel
|
||
at this time as well.
|
||
|
||
After Sentinel is memory resident, it will infect .COM and .EXE
|
||
programs larger than 1K as they are openned or executed. Infected
|
||
programs will have a file length increase of 4,625 bytes, the virus
|
||
will be located at the end of the file. This virus makes no attempt
|
||
to hide the file length increase. File date and time in the disk
|
||
directory is not altered by the virus.
|
||
|
||
The following text strings can be found at the very end of programs
|
||
infected with Sentinel:
|
||
|
||
"You won't hear me, but you'll feel me....
|
||
(c) 1990 by Sentinel.
|
||
With thanks to Borland."
|
||
|
||
Sentinel does not appear to do anything besides replicate.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: SF Virus
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Extinct
|
||
Discovered: December, 1987
|
||
Symptoms: BSC 360k floppies, Resident TOM, formatted disks
|
||
Origin: California, USA
|
||
Eff Length: N/A
|
||
Type Code: RtF - Resident Floppy Boot Sector Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan (identifies as Alameda)
|
||
Removal Instructions: MDisk, CleanUp, F-Prot, or DOS SYS command
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The SF Virus is a modified version of the Alameda virus
|
||
which activates when the counter in the virus has determined
|
||
that it is infected 100 diskettes. The virus replicates when
|
||
a CTL-ALT-DEL is performed, infecting the disk in the floppy
|
||
drive. Upon activation, the diskette in the floppy drive is
|
||
reformatted. The SF Virus only infects 5 1/4" 360K floppies.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Alameda
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Shake Virus
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: May, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth, message, change in COMMAND.COM memory allocation
|
||
Origin: Bulgaria
|
||
Eff Length: 476 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRCK - Resident Parasitic .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V63+, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirexPC, F-Prot 1.12+,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, Pro-Scan 2.01+, or Delete Infected Files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Shake Virus was first isolated in Bulgaria in May, 1990 by
|
||
Daniel Kalchev. It is a memory resident generic .COM infector, and
|
||
will infect COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The first time an infected program is executed, the Shake Virus will
|
||
install itself memory resident, altering the image of COMMAND.COM in
|
||
memory.
|
||
|
||
The Shake Virus infects .COM files, infecting them as they are
|
||
accessed. Infected files increase in size by 476 Bytes, though the
|
||
size increase cannot be seen using a DIR (list directory) command
|
||
if the virus is memory resident.
|
||
|
||
While the virus is not destructive, it will occasionally
|
||
display the message: "Shake well before use !" when an infected
|
||
file is attempted to be run. When this message is displayed, the
|
||
program terminates rather than executes. A second attempt to run
|
||
the same program result in it running successfully.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Slayer Family
|
||
Aliases: Brain Slayer, Slayer, Yankee Doodle Dropper
|
||
V Status: New
|
||
Discovered: March, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth; Long disk accesses; Disk directory altered;
|
||
Disk accesses to unexpected drives
|
||
Origin: USA
|
||
Eff Length: 5,120 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNA - Resident Non-Parasitic .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V76+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Slayer Family of Viruses was discovered in March, 1991. This
|
||
group of viruses currently consists of five known variants which were
|
||
submitted from different locations at approximately the same time. All
|
||
of the variants are non-resident direct action infectors of .COM and
|
||
.EXE files. They do not infect COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
Below is a generic description of the viruses in this family. Specifics
|
||
for each variant are listed under "Known variants" at the end of this
|
||
entry. In some cases, the only difference between the variants is a
|
||
few bytes.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with a Slayer Family virus is executed, it will
|
||
infect all .COM and .EXE programs in the current directory on the
|
||
current drive. Additionally, depending on the variant, it may infect
|
||
some programs on other drives as well.
|
||
|
||
Programs infected with a Slayer Family virus will increase in size
|
||
between 5,120 and 5,135 bytes with the virus being located at the end
|
||
of the infected file. The program's date and time in the disk directory
|
||
will not be altered.
|
||
|
||
Symptoms of Slayer Family viruses include long disk accesses when
|
||
attempting to execute an infected program, and possibly disk accesses
|
||
to unexpected drives. The order of the disk directory on infected
|
||
systems may also be altered so that .COM programs appear first in the
|
||
directory.
|
||
|
||
At least one member of this family, Slayer-E or Yankee Doodle Dropper,
|
||
carries the Yankee Doodle Virus which it will later release on infected
|
||
systems. This Yankee Doodle is the TP45VIR variant.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of Slayer include:
|
||
Slayer-A : Slayer-A will infect up to nine programs in a directory,
|
||
other than the root directory, on the system C: drive in
|
||
addition to programs on the current drive when an infected
|
||
program is executed.
|
||
Slayer-B : Similar to Slayer-A, this variant will infect programs
|
||
located in the C: drive root directory in addition to those
|
||
located on the current drive and directory.
|
||
Slayer-C : Similar to Slayer-A and Slayer-B, Slayer-C will infect all
|
||
programs located on the current drive and all programs
|
||
located on the C: drive. The following text strings can be
|
||
found in samples of Slayer-C:
|
||
"KEYB*.COM KEYB*.EXE BASRUN BRUN COBRUN NET$OS *.COM"
|
||
"IBMBIO.COM"
|
||
"IBMDOS.COM COMMAND.COM *.* .. \ .. *.EXE"
|
||
"Access denied."
|
||
Slayer-D : Slayer-D is similar to Slayer-C, the major difference being
|
||
that while it accesses the C: drive when an infected program
|
||
is executed, it will not infect any programs on the C: drive
|
||
unless the infected program was being executed from C:.
|
||
The text strings indicated for Slayer-C also occur for this
|
||
variant.
|
||
Slayer-E : Slayer-E is also known as the Yankee Doodle Dropper. When
|
||
an infected program is executed, it will infect all the
|
||
programs on the current drive and directory, and then infect
|
||
a few programs on the C: drive. After some period of time
|
||
has elasped since the original infection, this variant will
|
||
release the Yankee Doodle Virus onto the system, resulting
|
||
in an active Yankee Doodle infection. If the system user
|
||
successfully removes Yankee Doodle, but doesn't remove the
|
||
Slayer-E infection, Yankee Doodle will promptly reinfect the
|
||
system from the Slayer-E infected programs which remain.
|
||
This variant is known to be in the public domain.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Slow
|
||
Aliases: Slowdown
|
||
V Status: Common
|
||
Discovered: May, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth
|
||
Origin: Australia
|
||
Eff Length: 1,701 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsA - Resident Parasitic .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V63+, Pro-Scan 1.4+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: CleanUp V67+, Scan/D, Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Slow Virus was discovered in Australia in May 1990. It is
|
||
a memory resident generic file infector, infected .COM, .EXE, and
|
||
overlay files. COMMAND.COM is not infected by this virus.
|
||
|
||
The first time an infected file is executed on a system, the virus
|
||
installs itself memory resident as a low system memory TSR, taking up
|
||
1,984 bytes of free memory. Interrupt 21 will be hooked by the virus.
|
||
|
||
Later, as programs are executed, they will be infected by the Slow
|
||
Virus. While the Slow Virus's viral code is actually 1,701 bytes in
|
||
length, infected files will increase by more than this amount. Infected
|
||
.COM files will increase in length by 1,721 bytes with the virus
|
||
located at the beginning of the infected program. .EXE files will
|
||
increase in length by 1,716 to 1,728 bytes with the virus located at
|
||
the end of the infected program.
|
||
|
||
In the process of infecting some .EXE files, the virus may hang the
|
||
system, causing the user to have to reboot.
|
||
|
||
The Slow Virus is based on the Jerusalem B virus.
|
||
|
||
It is unknown what else the Slow virus does.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Solano 2000
|
||
Aliases: Dyslexia 2.01
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: March, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth, TSR, unusual file errors
|
||
Origin: California, USA
|
||
Eff Length: 2,000 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsC - Resident Parasitic .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V60+, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirexPC, F-Prot 1.12+,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, Pro-Scan 2.01+, or Delete Infected Files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Solano 2000 Virus was first isolated in Solano County,
|
||
California in mid-March 1990 by Edward Winters. The virus may
|
||
also be known by the name Dyslexia Virus V2.01, which can be
|
||
produced by negating some null terminated bytes within the
|
||
viral code. Using the same technique, what appears to be the
|
||
creation date of the virus, 08FEB90, can be produced. The
|
||
information regarding the information produced by negation of
|
||
bytes was determined by Jay Parangalan of Solano County.
|
||
|
||
The Solano 2000 Virus is a generic .COM file infector. The first
|
||
time an infected .COM file is executed on the system, the virus
|
||
installs itself memory resident, then proceeds to infect every
|
||
.COM file that is executed. Infected programs can be manually
|
||
identified by using a sector editor to view the file. Bytes
|
||
1168 thru 1952 will consist of '(' or 28h characters.
|
||
|
||
Some programs, such as DiskCopy.COM which is included on all
|
||
DOS diskettes, will not run after being infected with this virus,
|
||
instead an "invalid drive specification" message will be
|
||
displayed. This message is not in the viral code, but is due
|
||
to an error condition being induced due to the virus's presence.
|
||
The virus-induced error occurring with the DiskCopy program was how
|
||
the virus was first spotted and eventually isolated.
|
||
|
||
This particular virus, in its current state, does not survive a
|
||
system warm reboot (CTL-ALT-DEL). When it is memory resident, it
|
||
takes up 3K bytes of RAM.
|
||
|
||
The Solano 2000 Virus does no apparent system damage, however it
|
||
does check the video buffer occasionally, and may transpose
|
||
numbers if they are found in certain locations. This effect,
|
||
however, was not experienced on the author's system in researching
|
||
this virus. There have also been reports that instead of transposing
|
||
numeric characters, the Solano virus may change color attributes on
|
||
the display screen when it is active in memory.
|
||
|
||
Known variants of the Solano 2000 virus:
|
||
Solano 2000-B: same as Solano 2000, except the 28h characters
|
||
have been changed to DAh characters, and are located in
|
||
bytes 1168 thru 1912 in infected files.
|
||
Dyslexia 2.00: same as Solano 2000, except that the 28h characters
|
||
are now binary zeros. The attempted transposing of numeric
|
||
characters in video memory has also been slowed down. The
|
||
creation date appears to be 22JAN90 instead of 08FEB90.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Subliminal 1.10
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Sorry
|
||
Aliases: G-Virus V1.3
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: June, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth, decrease in system and free memory
|
||
Origin:
|
||
Eff Length: 731 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRNCK - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V64+, F-Prot, Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV, or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Sorry Virus was isolated in June, 1990. Its name comes from
|
||
a german phrase in the virus: "Tut mir Leid !". This
|
||
virus is based on the Perfume Virus from West Germany, and some
|
||
anti-viral programs will identify it as Perfume or 4711.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Sorry Virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will install itself memory resident in high memory. Total
|
||
system memory and free memory will both decrease by 1,024 bytes.
|
||
Interrupt 21 will be hooked by the virus. COMMAND.COM is immediately
|
||
infected by the virus, thus insuring on later system boots that the
|
||
virus becomes memory resident immediately.
|
||
|
||
After the virus is memory resident, it will infect any .COM file
|
||
which is executed, increasing the file's length by 731 bytes. The
|
||
viral code is located at the end of infected files.
|
||
|
||
The Sorry Virus contains the following text strings:
|
||
|
||
"G-VIRUS V1.3"
|
||
"Bitte gebe den G-Virus Code ein"
|
||
"Tut mir Leid !"
|
||
|
||
It is unknown what the Sorry Virus does when it activates.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Perfume
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Sparse
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: New
|
||
Discovered: April, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: TSR; .COM growth
|
||
Origin: Unknown
|
||
Eff Length: 3,840 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsCK - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method:
|
||
Removal Instructions: Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Sparse Virus was received in April, 1991. Sparse is a memory
|
||
resident infector of .COM files, including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with Sparse is executed, the virus
|
||
will install itself memory resident as a low system memory TSR of
|
||
3,872 bytes. Interrupts 21, D1 and D3 will be hooked by the virus.
|
||
|
||
Once Sparse is memory resident, it will infect .COM programs, including
|
||
COMMAND.COM, when they are executed. Infected .COM programs will
|
||
increase in size by 3,840 bytes with the virus being located at the
|
||
beginning of the infected file. The infected file's date and time in
|
||
the disk directory will also be updated to the system date and time
|
||
when infection occurred.
|
||
|
||
Programs infected with Sparse will have the ASCII characters "UK" as
|
||
the second and third bytes of the executable program. They will also
|
||
contain the text string SHELLC, and contain the name of the program
|
||
that originally resulted in the virus becoming memory resident. (If
|
||
the first infected program executed was "sparse.com", then "sparse.com"
|
||
will be found in all later infected programs as long as the virus was
|
||
memory resident.)
|
||
|
||
It is not known if Sparse does anything besides replicate.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Spyer
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: November, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: TSR; .COM & .EXE growth; system hangs
|
||
Origin: Taiwan
|
||
Eff Length: 1,181 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V71+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Spyer Virus was isolated in November, 1990 in Taiwan. This virus
|
||
is a memory resident infector of .COM and .EXE files. It does not
|
||
infect COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Spyer Virus is executed,
|
||
the Spyer Virus will install itself memory resident as a 1,760 byte
|
||
low system memory TSR. Interrupts 21 and 22 will be hooked by the
|
||
virus.
|
||
|
||
Once the virus is memory resident, the virus will attempt to infect
|
||
the next program that is executed. If the program is already infected
|
||
with the Spyer Virus, the system will become hung. If the program was
|
||
not already infected, Spyer will infect it and then hang the system.
|
||
|
||
Infected .COM files will always increase in length by 1,181 bytes.
|
||
.EXE files infected with Spyer will have a file length increase between
|
||
1,181 and 1,195 bytes. In both cases, the virus will be located at
|
||
the end of the infected file. Infected files will also always have the
|
||
following hex character sequence at the end of file: "CBDFD9DE848484".
|
||
|
||
The Spyer Virus, in its present form, is not expected to ever be a
|
||
serious problem. Since it always hangs the system when the next program
|
||
is executed after becoming memory resident, it is simply too obvious
|
||
that something is wrong.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Staf
|
||
Aliases: Staff
|
||
V Status: New
|
||
Discovered: April, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth; Messages; Programs may fail to execute
|
||
Origin: Unknown
|
||
Eff Length: 2,083 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V76+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Staf Virus was received in April, 1991. Its origin is unknown, but
|
||
first reports of it were out of Europe. This virus is a non-resident
|
||
direct action .COM file infector. It will infect COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the Staf Virus is executed, the virus will
|
||
display the following message:
|
||
|
||
"This program has been infected by:
|
||
|
||
Virus Demo Ver.: 1.1 - Handle with care!
|
||
By STAF (Tel.: (819) 595-0787)
|
||
Generation #n
|
||
|
||
Infecting: xxxxxxxx.COM
|
||
|
||
Press any key to execute original program..."
|
||
|
||
The "n" following the pound sign above will be replaced with the
|
||
generation number of the virus. The "xxxxxxxx.COM" will contain the
|
||
name of the .COM program in the current directory which the virus has
|
||
just infected. If no uninfected .COM file existed in the current
|
||
directory when an infected program is executed, the "Infecting:"
|
||
portion of the message will be replaced with:
|
||
|
||
"I have infected all your files in the current directory!
|
||
Have a nice day!"
|
||
|
||
Programs infected with Staf may also fail to execute, with the
|
||
following message being displayed:
|
||
|
||
"VIRUS ERROR #nn - Aborting process."
|
||
|
||
Programs infected with Staf have a file size increase of 2,083 bytes
|
||
with the virus being located at the beginning of the infected file.
|
||
The virus does not alter the file date and time in the disk directory
|
||
at the time a program is infected.
|
||
|
||
Staf does not do anything besides replicate.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: StarDot 600
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: New
|
||
Discovered: April, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .EXE growth
|
||
Origin: Unknown
|
||
Eff Length: 600 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNE - Parasitic Non-Resident .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method:
|
||
Removal Instructions: Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The StarDot 600 Virus was submitted in April, 1991. Its origin is
|
||
unknown. This virus is a non-resident infector of .EXE programs.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with StarDot 600 is executed, StarDot 600 will
|
||
infect one .EXE program in the current directory. Programs infected
|
||
with StarDot 600 will increase in length by 604 to 616 bytes with the
|
||
virus being located at the end of the newly infected file. The file's
|
||
date and time in the disk directory will not be altered.
|
||
|
||
StarDot 600 does not do anything besides replicate.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: StarDot 801
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: New
|
||
Discovered: April, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth; System hangs
|
||
Origin: Unknown
|
||
Eff Length: 801 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNAK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method:
|
||
Removal Instructions: Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The StarDot 801 Virus was submitted in April, 1991. Its origin is
|
||
unknown, though it is very similar to the Italian 803 virus, so it
|
||
may also be from Italy. StarDot 801 is a non-resident, direct action
|
||
infector of .COM and .EXE programs. It will infect COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with StarDot 801 is executed, the virus will
|
||
look for an uninfected .EXE program in the current directory to infect.
|
||
If an uninfected .EXE program does not exist in the current directory,
|
||
it will then look for an uninfected .COM program to infect. Once an
|
||
uninfected program is selected, the virus will infect it, adding the
|
||
viral code to the end of the program.
|
||
|
||
Programs infected with StarDot 801 will increase in size by 804 to
|
||
817 bytes. Their date and time in the disk directory will not be
|
||
altered.
|
||
|
||
StarDot 801 does not appear to do anything besides replicate. System
|
||
hangs, however, may occur when some infected programs are executed.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Stone`90
|
||
Aliases: Polish 961, Stone-90
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: December, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM file growth
|
||
Origin: Poland
|
||
Eff Length: 961 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Stone`90 Virus, or Polish 961, is a non-resident direct action
|
||
infector of .COM programs, including COMMAND.COM. It was submitted
|
||
in December, 1990, and is from Poland.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the Stone`90 Virus is executed, the virus
|
||
will look for one .COM program on the current drive and in the current
|
||
directory to infect. If one is found, the virus will infected it.
|
||
The newly infected .COM program will increase in length by 961 bytes,
|
||
and have the virus's code located at the end of the program.
|
||
|
||
The following text strings can be found in infected files:
|
||
|
||
"Sorry, I`m INFECTED!"
|
||
"I`m already NOT infected!"
|
||
"(C) Stone`90"
|
||
|
||
Stone`90 does not appear to do anything besides replicate.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Stoned
|
||
Aliases: Donald Duck, Hawaii, Marijuana, New Zealand, Rostov, San Diego,
|
||
Sex Revolution, Smithsonian, Stoned II
|
||
V Status: Common
|
||
Discovered: February, 1988
|
||
Symptoms: BSC, TSR, messages, RLL controller hangs
|
||
Origin: New Zealand
|
||
Eff Length: N/A
|
||
Type Code: BRtX - Resident Boot Sector & Partition Table Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan, CleanUp, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, VirexPC,
|
||
AVTK 3.5+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: CleanUp, MDisk, F-Prot, Pro-Scan 1.4+, NAV
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Stoned virus was first reported in Wellington, New Zealand in
|
||
early 1988. The original virus only infected 360KB 5 1/4" diskettes,
|
||
doing no overt damage. The original diskette-only infector is extinct,
|
||
however, and all known variants of this virus are capable of infecting
|
||
the hard disk partition table as well as may damage directory or FAT
|
||
information. Most variants of this virus have only minor modifications,
|
||
usually in what the message is that the virus may display on boot.
|
||
|
||
When a computer system is booted with a Stoned infected disk, this
|
||
virus will install itself memory resident at the top of system memory.
|
||
The interrupt 12 return will be moved, and ChkDsk will indicate that the
|
||
computer system as 2K less total memory than what is installed. If the
|
||
system boot was from a diskette, the virus will also attempt to infect
|
||
the hard disk partition table, if it was not previously infected.
|
||
|
||
During the boot process, the Stoned Virus may display a message. The
|
||
message is displayed more or less on a random basis. The most common
|
||
text for the message is:
|
||
|
||
"Your computer is now stoned."
|
||
|
||
Or:
|
||
|
||
"Your PC is now Stoned!"
|
||
|
||
After Stoned is memory resident, it will infect diskettes as they are
|
||
accessed on the system. When Stoned infects a diskette, it moves the
|
||
original boot sector (sector 0) to sector 11. The Stoned Virus then
|
||
copies itself into sector 0. Since sector 11 is normally part of the
|
||
diskette root directory on 360K 5.25" diskettes, any files which had
|
||
their directory entries located in this sector will be lost. Some
|
||
versions of DOS have sector 11 as part of the File Allocation Table,
|
||
which may also result in the disk's FAT being corrupted.
|
||
|
||
When Stoned infects that system hard disk, it copies the hard disk's
|
||
original partition table to side 0, cyl 0, sector 7. A copy of the
|
||
Stoned Virus is then placed at side 0, cyl 0, sector 1, the original
|
||
location of the hard disk partition table. If the hard disk was
|
||
formatted with software which starts the boot sector, file allocation
|
||
table, or disk directory on side 0, cyl 0 right after the partition
|
||
table, the hard disk may be corrupted as well.
|
||
|
||
In order to disinfect a system infected with the Stoned Virus, the
|
||
system must be powered off and booted with an uninfected, write-
|
||
protected boot diskette. If this is not done, the virus may reinfect
|
||
diskettes as soon as they are disinfected.
|
||
|
||
There are many programs which can disinfect Stoned infected diskettes
|
||
and hard disks. To successfully use one of these, follow the
|
||
instructions with the program.
|
||
|
||
To remove Stoned manually, the DOS SYS command can be used on 5.25"
|
||
360K diskettes. On the hard disk, the original partition table must
|
||
be copied back to side 0, cyl 0, sector 1. This can be performed with
|
||
Norton Utilities, or other sector editors.
|
||
|
||
Known variants of the Stoned Virus are:
|
||
Stoned-A : Same as Stoned above, but does not infect the system hard
|
||
disk. This is the original virus and is now extinct. The
|
||
text found in the boot sector of infected diskettes is:
|
||
"Your computer is now stoned. Legalize Marijuana".
|
||
The "Legalize Marijuana" portion of the text is not
|
||
displayed.
|
||
Stoned-B : Same as Stoned indicated above. Systems with RLL controllers
|
||
may experience frequent system hangs. Text typically found
|
||
in this variant is:
|
||
"Your computer is now stoned. Legalise Marijuana".
|
||
The "Legalise Marijuana" may also be in capital letters, or
|
||
may be partially overwritten. It is not displayed.
|
||
Stoned-C : same as Stoned, except that the message has been
|
||
removed.
|
||
Stoned-D : same as Stoned, with the exception that this variant
|
||
can infect high density 3.5" and 5.25" diskettes.
|
||
Stoned II: Based on Stoned-B, this variant has been modified to
|
||
avoid detection by anti-viral utilities. Since its
|
||
isolation in June, 1990, most utilities can now detect
|
||
this variant. Text in the virus has been changed to:
|
||
"Your PC is now Stoned! Version 2"
|
||
Or:
|
||
"Donald Duck is a lie."
|
||
The "Version 2" portion of the text may be corrupted as well.
|
||
|
||
Rostov : Similar to Stoned-B, this variant does not display any
|
||
message. It contains the text:
|
||
"Non-system disk" and "Replace and strike".
|
||
Submitted in December, 1990, origin unknown.
|
||
Sex Revolution V1.1 :
|
||
Submitted in December, 1990, this variant is similar to
|
||
Stoned-B. This variant may display the following message:
|
||
"EXPORT OF SEX REVOLUTION ver. 1.1"
|
||
Sex Revolution V2.0 :
|
||
Similar to Sex Revolution V1.1, the message has been changed
|
||
to:
|
||
"EXPORT OF SEX REVOLUTION ver. 2.0"
|
||
Stoned-E : Similar to Stoned-B, this variant now emits a "beep" thru
|
||
the system speaker when the following message is displayed:
|
||
"Your PC is now Stoned!"
|
||
The text "LEGALISE MARIJUANA!" can also be found in the
|
||
boot sector and system partition table.
|
||
Stoned-F : Similar to Stoned-E, this variant also emits a "beep" thru
|
||
the system speaker when its message is displayed. The
|
||
displayed message is:
|
||
"Twoj PC jest teraz be!"
|
||
The text "LEGALISE MARIJUANA?" can also be found in the
|
||
boot sector and system partition table.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Striker #1
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: March, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth
|
||
Origin: United States
|
||
Eff Length: 461 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNC - Non-Resident Parasitic .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V76+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Delete Infected Files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Striker #1 Virus was isolated in the Eastern United States in
|
||
March, 1991. This virus is a non-resident, direct action infector of
|
||
.COM programs, including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with Striker #1 is executed, the virus will
|
||
infect one .COM program. Infected .COM programs will have the first
|
||
thirteen bytes altered, and then the body of the virus appended to the
|
||
end of the program. Infected programs will show a file length increase
|
||
of 461 bytes in the disk directory, file date and times are not altered.
|
||
|
||
Infected programs can be easily identified as the text string
|
||
"Striker #1" will appear in the fourth thru thirteenth bytes of all
|
||
infected programs. This string also appears near the end of infected
|
||
programs.
|
||
|
||
Striker #1 does not appear to do anything besides replicate.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Subliminal 1.10
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: May, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth, TSR, unusual file errors, video display flicker
|
||
Origin: California, USA
|
||
Eff Length: 1,496 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsC - Resident Parasitic .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V64+, Pro-Scan 1.4+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, Pro-Scan 1.4+, or Delete Infected Files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Subliminal 1.10 Virus was first isolated in Solano County,
|
||
California in May 1990 by Jay Parangalan. The name of the
|
||
virus can be produced by negating (XORing with FF) some null
|
||
terminated bytes in the viral code. Using this technique, the
|
||
creation date of the virus appears to be 02OCT89. The
|
||
Subliminal 1.10 Virus appears to be a very early version of the
|
||
Solano 2000 Virus, and has only been reported at Solano
|
||
Community College.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Subliminal 1.10 Virus
|
||
is executed, the virus installs itself memory resident. Any
|
||
.COM files which are then executed are infected. Infected
|
||
programs will increase in length by 1,496 bytes.
|
||
|
||
With the virus memory resident, the system monitor will appear to
|
||
flicker. What is occurring is that the virus is attempting to
|
||
flash the message "LOVE, REMEMBER?" in the lower left portion of
|
||
the display for a subliminal duration. The actual amount of time
|
||
the message displays on the screen varies between systems due to
|
||
CPU speed.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Solano 2000
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Sunday
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Common
|
||
Discovered: November, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: TSR, executable file growth, messages, FAT corruption
|
||
Origin: Washington (state), USA
|
||
Eff Length: 1,636 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsAT - Parasitic Resident .COM, .EXE. & .OV? Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V49+, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, VirexPC 1.1+,
|
||
AVTK 3.5+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: CleanUp, Scan/D, F-Prot, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirexPC,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Sunday virus was discovered by many users in the Seattle,
|
||
Washington area in November, 1989. This virus activates on
|
||
any Sunday, displaying the message:
|
||
|
||
"Today is Sunday! Why do you work so hard?
|
||
All work and no play make you a dull boy!
|
||
Come on! Let's go out and have some fun!"
|
||
|
||
The Sunday virus appears to have been derived from the
|
||
Jerusalem virus, the viral code being similar in many
|
||
respects.
|
||
|
||
Damage to the file allocation table or FAT has been reported
|
||
from a number of infected users.
|
||
|
||
Known variants of the Sunday Virus are:
|
||
Sunday-B : Similar to the Sunday Virus, this variant does not activate
|
||
on any day of the week due to an error in the day of the
|
||
week checking routine. The message in the virus is never
|
||
displayed, and no damage is done to the file allocation
|
||
table.
|
||
Sunday-C : Similar to Sunday-B, this variant also never activates. It
|
||
has, however, been modified so that it differs from both
|
||
the Sunday and Sunday-B viruses. Functionally, it is the
|
||
same as Sunday-B.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Suriv 1.01
|
||
Aliases: April 1st, Israeli, Suriv01
|
||
V Status: Extinct
|
||
Discovered: April, 1987
|
||
Symptoms: TSR, .COM growth, messages, system lock April 1st
|
||
Origin: Israel
|
||
Eff Length: 897 bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsC - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan/X V67+, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, VirexPC,
|
||
AVTK 3.5+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D/X, F-Prot, VirHunt 2.0+, or UnVirus
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Suriv 1.01 virus is a memory resident .COM infector. It
|
||
will activate on April 1st after memory is infected by running
|
||
an infected file and then a uninfected .COM file is executed.
|
||
On activation, it will display the message:
|
||
|
||
"APRIL 1ST HA HA HA YOU HAVE A VIRUS".
|
||
|
||
The system will then lock up, requiring it to be powered off and
|
||
then back on.
|
||
|
||
The text "sURIV 1.01" can be found in the viral code.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Suriv 2.01
|
||
Aliases: April 1st-B, Israeli, Suriv02
|
||
V Status: Extinct
|
||
Discovered: 1987
|
||
Symptoms: TSR, .EXE growth, messages, system lock April 1st
|
||
Origin: Israel
|
||
Eff Length: 1,488 bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsE - Parasitic Resident .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan/X V67+, F-Prot, IBM Scan, VirexPC, Pro-Scan,
|
||
AVTK 3.5+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D/X, F-Prot, UnVirus, VirHunt 2.0+
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Suriv 2.01 virus is a memory resident .EXE infector. It
|
||
will activate on April 1st after memory is infected by running
|
||
an infected file, displaying the same message as Suriv 1.01
|
||
and locking up the system. The virus will cause a similar
|
||
lockup, though no message, 1 hour after an infected .EXE file
|
||
is executed on any day on which the system default date of
|
||
01-01-80 is used. The virus will only infect the file once.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Suriv 3.00
|
||
Aliases: Israeli, Suriv03
|
||
V Status: Extinct
|
||
Discovered: 1988
|
||
Symptoms: TSR, .COM, .EXE, & .SYS growth; Black Window; system slowdown
|
||
Origin: Israel
|
||
Eff Length: 1,813 (COM files) & 1,808 (EXE files) bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan/X V67+, F-Prot, Pro-Scan, VirexPC, AVTK 3.5+,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: CleanUp, Scan/D/X, F-Prot, Unvirus, VirHunt 2.0+
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
May be a variant of the Jerusalem virus. The string "sUMsDos"
|
||
has been changed to "sURIV 3.00". The Suriv 3.00 virus
|
||
activates on Friday The 13ths when an infected program is
|
||
run or if it is already present in system memory, however
|
||
files are not deleted due to a bug in the viral code.
|
||
|
||
Other than on Friday The 13ths, after the virus is memory
|
||
resident for 30 seconds, an area of the screen is turned into
|
||
a "black window" and a time wasting loop is executed with
|
||
each timer interrupt.
|
||
|
||
As with the Jerusalem B viruses, this virus can also infect
|
||
overlay, .SYS, and other executable files besides .EXE and
|
||
.COM files, though it does not infect COMMAND.COM itself.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Jerusalem, Jerusalem B
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Sverdlov
|
||
Aliases: Hymn-2
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: December, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth; decrease in total system and available memory
|
||
Origin: USSR
|
||
Eff Length: 1,962 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRhAK - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected programs
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Sverdlov Virus was submitted in December, 1990. This virus is
|
||
believed to have originated in the USSR. Sverdlov is a memory resident
|
||
infector of .COM and .EXE files, and will infect COMMAND.COM. This
|
||
virus is also encrypted.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Sverdlov Virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will install itself memory resident at the top of system
|
||
memory but below the DOS 640K boundary. 4,080 bytes of memory will
|
||
have been reserved, and the interrupt 12 return is not altered by the
|
||
virus. The DOS ChkDsk program will indicate that total system memory
|
||
and available free memory is 4,080 bytes less than expected.
|
||
COMMAND.COM will also be infected at this time if it was not already
|
||
infected.
|
||
|
||
Once Sverdlov is memory resident, any .COM or .EXE file over 2K in
|
||
length will become infected if it is executed or openned for any reason.
|
||
Infected .COM files have a file length increase of 1,962 bytes.
|
||
Infected .EXE files will have a file length increase of 1,962 to
|
||
1,977 bytes in length. In both cases, the virus will be located at the
|
||
end of infected programs.
|
||
|
||
It is unknown if Sverdlov does anything besides replicate.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of Sverdlov include:
|
||
Sverdlov-B : Very similar to the original Sverdlov Virus, this variant
|
||
has one basic change in behavior. It will only infect
|
||
.COM and .EXE files over 3K in length before infection.
|
||
Otherwise, the virus code is very similar. This variant
|
||
may have been altered to avoid detection, and some
|
||
anti-viral programs may identify it as Hymn-2.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: SVir
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Endangered
|
||
Discovered: 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .EXE growth; file date/time changes; system hangs
|
||
Origin: Poland
|
||
Eff Length: 512 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNE - Parasitic Non-Resident .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V76+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected programs
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The SVir Virus was originally isolated in Poland early in 1990. The
|
||
original virus which was isolated had a fatal flaw in its code which
|
||
prevented it from executing. In August, 1990, a sample was obtained
|
||
from Fridrik Skulason which now does replicate. This second sample,
|
||
identified as SVir-B, is a non-resident infector of .EXE files. A
|
||
third variant was received in April, 1991.
|
||
|
||
Each time a program infected with the SVir-B Virus is executed, the
|
||
virus will infect one .EXE file. Infected files will increase in
|
||
length between 516 and 526 bytes with the virus's code appended to the
|
||
end of the file. If the virus could not find an .EXE file to infect,
|
||
it will leave the drive "spinning" as it will be in an endless loop
|
||
looking for a file to infect.
|
||
|
||
Interestingly enough, this virus will only infect files located on the
|
||
A: drive.
|
||
|
||
Infected files will also have their date/time in the disk directory
|
||
changed to the date and time when the infection occurred.
|
||
|
||
SVir, at least in the three known variants, does not do anything
|
||
malicious, it simply replicates.
|
||
|
||
Known variants of SVir are:
|
||
SVir-A : The original "virus" from Poland in early 1990 which did not
|
||
replicate.
|
||
SVir-B : A variant isolated in August, 1990 which has the bug in SVir-A
|
||
fixed so that it will now replicate.
|
||
SVir-0 : A variant received in April, 1991, this variant is very
|
||
similar to SVir-B. When an infected program is executed, the
|
||
virus may infect either 1 or 2 previously uninfected .EXE
|
||
files in the current directory. Execution of some infected
|
||
programs may result in a system hang.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Swap
|
||
Aliases: Falling Letters Boot, Israeli Boot
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: August, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: Graphic display, BSC (floppy only), TSR, bad cluster,
|
||
Origin: Israel
|
||
Eff Length: N/A
|
||
Type Code: RsF - Resident Floppy Boot Sector Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan, F-Prot, IBM Scan, VirexPC, VirHunt 2.0+
|
||
Removal Instructions: MDisk, CleanUp, F-Prot, or DOS SYS Command
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Swap Virus, or Israeli Boot Virus, was first reported in
|
||
August 1989. This virus is a memory resident boot sector
|
||
infector that only infects floppies. The floppy's boot
|
||
sector is infected the first time it is accessed. One bad
|
||
cluster will be written on track 39, sectors 6 and 7 with the
|
||
head unspecified. If track 39, sectors 6 and 7, are not
|
||
empty, the virus will not infect the disk. Once the virus
|
||
is memory resident, it uses 2K or RAM. The actual length of
|
||
the viral code is 740 bytes.
|
||
|
||
The Swap virus activates after being memory resident for 10
|
||
minutes. A cascading effect of letters and characters on the
|
||
system monitor is then seen, similar to the cascading effect
|
||
of the Cascade and Traceback viruses.
|
||
|
||
The virus was named the Swap virus because the first isolated
|
||
case had the following phrase located at bytes 00B7-00E4 on
|
||
track 39, sector 7:
|
||
|
||
"The Swapping-Virus. (C) June, 1989 by the CIA"
|
||
|
||
However, this phrase is not found on diskettes which have been
|
||
freshly infected by the Swap virus.
|
||
|
||
A diskette infected with the Swap virus can be easily identified
|
||
by looking at the boot sector with a sector editor, such as
|
||
Norton Utilities. The error messages which normally occur at
|
||
the end of the boot sector will not be there, instead the start
|
||
of the virus code is present. The remainder of the viral code
|
||
is located on track 39, sectors 6 and 7.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Swedish Disaster
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: January, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: BSC; Partition Table Altered;
|
||
Decrease in system and available free memory
|
||
Origin: Sweden
|
||
Eff Length: N/A
|
||
Type Code: BRhX - Resident Boot Sector & Partition Table Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: MDisk/P
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Swedish Disaster was isolated in January, 1991. This virus appears
|
||
to be from Sweden. It is a memory resident infector of floppy boot
|
||
sectors and the hard disk partition table.
|
||
|
||
When the system is booted from a diskette whose boot sector is infected
|
||
with the Swedish Disaster Virus, the virus will infect the system
|
||
hard disk's partition table, with the original hard disk partition
|
||
table moved to side 0, cylinder 0, sector 6. The virus will also
|
||
install itself memory resident at the top of system memory but below
|
||
the 640K DOS boundary. Total system memory will decrease by 2,048
|
||
bytes, available free memory will be 6,944 bytes less than what is
|
||
expected by the user. Interrupt 12's return will have been moved by
|
||
the virus.
|
||
|
||
After Swedish Disaster is memory resident, the virus will infect all
|
||
non-write protected diskettes which are accessed on the system. On
|
||
360K 5.25" diskettes, the original boot sector will have been moved
|
||
to sector 11, which is normally a part of the root directory. This
|
||
means that if the disk originally had directory entries in that sector,
|
||
they will be lost.
|
||
|
||
The following text string can be found at the end of the boot sector
|
||
of infected diskettes, as well as within the partition table on infected
|
||
hard disks:
|
||
|
||
"The Swedish Disaster"
|
||
|
||
Diskettes infected with the Swedish Disaster can be disinfected by
|
||
powering off the system and rebooting from a write-protected original
|
||
DOS diskette. The DOS Sys command can then be used to replace the
|
||
boot sector on infected diskettes. For hard disks, the MDisk/P program
|
||
will remove this virus, though the above text string will remain in
|
||
the partition table.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Swiss 143
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: January, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth; File date/time changes
|
||
Origin: Switzerland
|
||
Eff Length: 143 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Swiss 143 Virus was submitted in January, 1991, by Dany Schoch of
|
||
Hagendern, Switzerland. This virus is a non-memory resident infector
|
||
of .COM files, including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with Swiss 143 is executed, the virus will
|
||
infect all .COM files in the current directory. Infected programs
|
||
will increase in length by 143 bytes, the virus will be located at the
|
||
end of the infected program. The disk directory date and time will also
|
||
be altered to the current system date and time when the programs were
|
||
infected.
|
||
|
||
This virus does not do anything besides replicate.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: SysLock
|
||
Aliases: 3551, 3555
|
||
V Status: Endangered
|
||
Discovered: November, 1988
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth, data file corruption
|
||
Origin:
|
||
Eff Length: 3,551 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNA - Encrypting Non-Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan, F-Prot, Pro-Scan, AVTK 3.5+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or F-Prot
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The SysLock virus is a parasitic encrypting virus which
|
||
infects both .COM and .EXE files, as well as damaging some
|
||
data files on infected systems. This virus does not install
|
||
itself memory resident, but instead searches through the
|
||
.COM and .EXE files and subdirectories on the current disk,
|
||
picking one executable file at random to infect. The
|
||
infected file will have its length increased by approximately
|
||
3,551 bytes, though it may vary slightly depending on file
|
||
infected.
|
||
|
||
The SysLock virus will damage files by searching for the word
|
||
"Microsoft" in any combination of upper and lower case
|
||
characters, and when found replace the word with "MACROSOFT".
|
||
|
||
If the SysLock virus finds that an environment variable
|
||
"SYSLOCK" exists in the system and has been set to "@" (hex 40),
|
||
the virus will not infect any programs or perform string
|
||
replacements, but will instead pass control to its host
|
||
immediately.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of SysLock are:
|
||
Advent : Reported to be a Syslock variant, the sample of this virus
|
||
received by the author does not replicate. All known
|
||
samples of this virus available from anti-viral researchers
|
||
also do not replicate. Fridrik Skulason of Iceland has
|
||
indicated that this virus will only replicate it is on an
|
||
infected .EXE file, and then it will only infect .COM
|
||
files. This variant is thought to be extinct.
|
||
Macho-A : same as the SysLock virus, except that "Microsoft"
|
||
is replaced with "MACHOSOFT".
|
||
|
||
Also see: Cookie
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Taiwan
|
||
Aliases: Taiwan 2, Taiwan-B
|
||
V Status: Endangered
|
||
Discovered: January, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth, 8th day any month corrupts BOOT, FAT,
|
||
& Partition tables.
|
||
Origin: Taiwan
|
||
Eff Length: 743 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V56+, F-Prot, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirexPC, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, F-Prot 1.12+, NAV, or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Taiwan virus was first isolated in January, 1990 in
|
||
Taiwan, R.O.C. This virus infects .COM files, including
|
||
COMMAND.COM, and does not install itself into system memory.
|
||
|
||
Each time a program infected with the Taiwan virus is executed, the
|
||
virus will attempt to infect up to 3 .COM files. The current
|
||
default directory is not first infected, instead the virus will
|
||
start its search for candidate files in the C: drive root directory.
|
||
Once an uninfected .COM file is located, the virus infects the file
|
||
by copying the viral code to the first 743 bytes of the file, the
|
||
original first 743 bytes of the file is relocated to the end of the
|
||
.COM file. A bug exists in this virus, if the uninfected .COM file
|
||
is less than 743 bytes in length, the resulting infected .COM file
|
||
will always be 1,486 bytes in length. This effect is due to the
|
||
virus not checking to see if it read less than 743 bytes of the
|
||
original file before infecting it.
|
||
|
||
The Taiwan virus is destructive. On the 8th day of any month, when
|
||
an infected program is run the virus will perform an absolute disk
|
||
write for 160 sectors starting at logical sector 0 on the C: and
|
||
D: drives. In effect, this logical write will result in the FATs
|
||
and root directory being overwritten.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of Taiwan include:
|
||
Taiwan-B : Apparently an earlier version of the Taiwan virus, this
|
||
variant will hang the system when infected files are
|
||
executed, but after it has infected another file using
|
||
the selection mechanism indicated for the Taiwan virus.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Taiwan 3
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: June, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth, decrease in available free memory,
|
||
system hangs
|
||
Origin: Taiwan
|
||
Eff Length: 2,900 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V64+, Pro-Scan 2.01+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Clean-Up V71+, Scan/D, or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Taiwan 3 Virus was isolated in June, 1990 in Taiwan, R.O.C. It
|
||
was dubbed the Taiwan 3 Virus by John McAfee because it is the third
|
||
virus from Taiwan, the other two are Taiwan and Disk Killer. This
|
||
virus is not related to either of these two viruses.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Taiwan 3 Virus is executed
|
||
on a system, the virus will install itself memory resident in low
|
||
system free memory. Available free memory will decrease by 3,152
|
||
bytes. The virus hooks interrupt 21.
|
||
|
||
After becoming memory resident, Taiwan 3 will infect any program
|
||
which is executed. .COM files will increase in length by 2,900
|
||
bytes, .EXE files will increase by between 2,900 and 2,908 bytes.
|
||
Overlay files may also become infected as well.
|
||
|
||
It is unknown what the activation criteria is for this virus, or
|
||
what it does besides spreading.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Fu Manchu
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Taiwan 4
|
||
Aliases: 2576
|
||
V Status: Common
|
||
Discovered: October, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: TSR; .COM & .EXE file growth; system slowdown
|
||
Isolated: USA and Thailand
|
||
Origin: Taiwan
|
||
Eff Length: 2,576 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V71+, Pro-Scan 2.01+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Clean-Up V71+, Pro-Scan 2.01+, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Taiwan 4, or 2576, Virus was isolated in October, 1990. While one
|
||
copy of this virus was submitted by a user of Excalibur! who indicated
|
||
that it had been received from a download of AutoCad from another BBS,
|
||
a second copy was submitted to John McAfee from Thailand on
|
||
approximately the same date. This virus appears to have originated in
|
||
Taiwan, and is based on the Taiwan 3 virus. It is a memory resident
|
||
infector of .COM and .EXE files, but will not infect COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the Taiwan 4 Virus is executed, the virus
|
||
will check to see if it is already memory resident. If the virus isn't
|
||
already in memory, the virus will install itself memory resident as a
|
||
low system memory TSR of 2,832 bytes. Interrupts 08 and 21 will be
|
||
hooked by the virus.
|
||
|
||
After the virus is resident, the virus will start to slow down the
|
||
system gradually. After approximately 30 minutes, it will have slowed
|
||
the system down by approximately 30 percent.
|
||
|
||
Any .COM or .EXE file executed with Taiwan 4 active in memory will
|
||
become infected. Infected programs will have their file length
|
||
increased by 2,576 bytes for .COM files, and 2,576 - 2,590 bytes for
|
||
.EXE files. The virus is located at the beginning of .COM files, and
|
||
the end of .EXE files. The following text message can be found in all
|
||
infected programs:
|
||
|
||
"To Whom see this: Shit! As you can see this document,
|
||
you may know what this program is. But I must tell you:
|
||
DO NOT TRY to WRITE ANY ANTI-PROGRAM to THIS VIRUS.
|
||
This is a test-program, the real dangerous code will
|
||
implement on November. I use MASM to generate varius
|
||
virus easily and you must use DEBUG against my virus
|
||
hardly, this is foolish. Save your time until next month.
|
||
OK? Your Sincerely, ABT Group., Oct 13th, 1989 at FCU."
|
||
|
||
Another text string that can be found in all infected programs is:
|
||
"ACAD.EXECOMMAND.COM".
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Tester
|
||
Aliases: TestVir
|
||
V Status: New
|
||
Discovered: April, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth; Messages
|
||
Origin: United States
|
||
Eff Length: 1,000 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V76+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Tester, or TestVir, Virus was received in April, 1991. Its origin
|
||
is unknown. This virus is a non-resident infector of .COM files. It
|
||
will infect COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with Tester is executed, the virus will display
|
||
the following messages, requiring a response by the system user:
|
||
|
||
"This is TESTVIRUS B V1.4 !
|
||
|
||
1 = infect COM-files of this directory + run orig. prog.
|
||
5 = run only orig. program
|
||
9 = abort"
|
||
|
||
If a "1" is entered by the system user, the virus will then infect all
|
||
of the .COM programs in the current directory, and then execute the
|
||
original program. When Tester infects .COM programs, it will display
|
||
one of the following two lines, indicating which .COM program it is
|
||
currently processing. The first line is displayed for the program if
|
||
it was previously infected, the second line only if it is currently
|
||
infecting the program:
|
||
|
||
"Already infected: xxxxxxxx.COM"
|
||
"INFECTED: ------> xxxxxxxx.COM"
|
||
|
||
Entering a "5" will result in no additional programs being infected, and
|
||
the original program is executed. Finally, entering a "9" will result
|
||
in the program terminating and the user being returned to a DOS prompt.
|
||
|
||
Programs infected with Tester will increase in size by 1,000 bytes, the
|
||
virus will be located at the beginning of the infected file. The
|
||
program's date and time in the DOS disk directory will have also been
|
||
updated to the date and time when infection occurred.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: The Plague
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: January, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: "Program too big to fit in memory" message;
|
||
Programs do not execute properly; Long disk accesses;
|
||
Message and disk overwrite
|
||
Origin: United States
|
||
Eff Length: 590 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: ONAK - Overwriting Non-Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method:
|
||
Removal Instructions: Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Plague Virus was isolated in January, 1991 in the United States.
|
||
This virus is a non-memory resident infector of .COM and .EXE files,
|
||
including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with The Plague is executed, the virus will
|
||
attempt to infect up to three programs on the current drive, starting
|
||
in the current directory. Infected programs can be either .COM or
|
||
.EXE files, and COMMAND.COM can become infected. This virus is an
|
||
overwriting virus. It replaces the first 590 bytes of the program
|
||
being infected with a copy of itself. The file date and time in the
|
||
disk directory are not altered.
|
||
|
||
Programs infected with The Plague will not function properly. For .EXE
|
||
files, the following message will usually be displayed upon program
|
||
execution:
|
||
|
||
"Program too big to fit in memory"
|
||
|
||
This message may also occur for some .COM programs, but not usually.
|
||
|
||
The Plague activates when an infected program is executed and it can
|
||
not find an uninfected program to infect, though there is some
|
||
randomness to whether or not the activation will actually occur.
|
||
When this virus activates, the following message is displayed:
|
||
|
||
"Autopsy indicates the cause of
|
||
death was THE PLAGUE
|
||
Dedicated to the dudes at SHHS
|
||
VIVE LE SHE-MAN!"
|
||
|
||
While the message is being displayed, the disk in the current drive
|
||
will be overwritten with garbage characters, rendering it unrecoverable.
|
||
|
||
Programs infected with The Plague cannot be disinfected since the
|
||
first 590 bytes of the program no longer exists. The programs must
|
||
be deleted and replaced with clean copies.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Tiny Family
|
||
Aliases: Tiny-133, Tiny-134, Tiny-138, Tiny-143, Tiny-154, Tiny-156,
|
||
Tiny-158, Tiny-159, Tiny-160, Tiny-167, Tiny-198
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: July, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM file growth
|
||
Origin: Bulgaria
|
||
Eff Length: 133 - 198 Bytes (see below)
|
||
Type Code: PRC - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V66+, Pro-Scan 2.01+ (larger variants only)
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Tiny Family of Viruses was received by the author in July 1990
|
||
from Vesselin Bontchev of Bulgaria. All the viruses in this grouping
|
||
share the same characteristics, with the only real difference is the
|
||
effective length of the viral code. There were five (5) viruses
|
||
included in the "family" as of July, 1990: Tiny-158, Tiny-159,
|
||
Tiny-160, Tiny-167, and Tiny-198. In October 1990, five (5)
|
||
additional viruses in this family were received from Vesselin
|
||
Bontchev: Tiny-134, Tiny-138, Tiny-143, Tiny-154, and Tiny-156.
|
||
In December 1990, an eleventh member was added to this family:
|
||
Tiny-133.
|
||
|
||
The first time a file infected with one of the Tiny Family viruses
|
||
is executed on a system, the virus will install itself memory resident
|
||
at memory segment 60h. This area of memory is normally only used by
|
||
DOS when the system is booted, after that it is never used or
|
||
referenced. Interrupt 21 will be hooked by the virus.
|
||
|
||
After the virus is memory resident, the virus will infect any .COM
|
||
program that is executed. Infected programs will have a file length
|
||
increase of between 134 - 198 bytes, depending on which variant is
|
||
present on the system. The file's date and time in the directory will
|
||
also have been updated to the system date and time when the infection
|
||
occurred.
|
||
|
||
The Tiny Family of Viruses currently does not do anything but
|
||
replicate.
|
||
|
||
The viruses in this "family" are not related to the Tiny Virus
|
||
documented below.
|
||
|
||
Known members of the Tiny Family are:
|
||
Tiny-133 : Similar to Tiny-134, this variant's effective length is
|
||
133 bytes. The bugs in Tiny-134 have been fixed, this
|
||
virus is an excellent replicator. This variant has also
|
||
been altered so that it cannot be detected by anti-viral
|
||
utilities which were aware of other members of this family.
|
||
Tiny-134 : This variant's effective length is 134 bytes. This
|
||
variant is the only member of this family which is not
|
||
a very viable virus, it will usually hang the system
|
||
when it attempts to infect .COM files.
|
||
Tiny-138 : Same as above, effective length is 138 bytes.
|
||
Tiny-143 : Same as above, effective length is 143 bytes.
|
||
Tiny-154 : Same as above, effective length is 154 bytes.
|
||
Tiny-156 : Same as above, effective length is 156 bytes.
|
||
Tiny-158 : Same as above, effective length is 158 bytes.
|
||
Tiny-159 : Same as above, effective length is 159 bytes.
|
||
Tiny-160 : Same as above, effective length is 160 bytes.
|
||
Tiny-167 : Same as above, effective length is 167 bytes.
|
||
Tiny-198 : Same as above, effective length is 198 bytes.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Tiny Virus
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Tiny Virus
|
||
Aliases: 163 COM Virus, Tiny 163 Virus
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovery: June, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: COMMAND.COM & .COM file growth
|
||
Origin: Denmark
|
||
Eff Length: 163 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V64+, VirexPC, F-Prot 1.12+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, F-Prot 1.12+, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The 163 COM Virus, or Tiny Virus, was isolated by Fridrik Skulason
|
||
of Iceland in June 1990. This virus is a non-resident generic
|
||
.COM file infector, and it will infect COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The first time a file infected with the 163 COM Virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will attempt to infect the first .COM file in the
|
||
current directory. On bootable diskettes, this file will normally
|
||
be COMMAND.COM. After the first .COM file is infected, each time
|
||
an infected program is executed another .COM file will attempt to
|
||
be infected. Files are infected only if their original length is
|
||
greater than approximately 1K bytes.
|
||
|
||
Infected .COM files will increase in length by 163 bytes, and have
|
||
date/time stamps in the directory changed to the date/time the
|
||
infection occurred. Infected files will also always end with this
|
||
hex string: '2A2E434F4D00'.
|
||
|
||
This virus currently does nothing but replicate, and is the
|
||
smallest MS-DOS virus known as of its isolation date.
|
||
|
||
The Tiny Virus may or may not be related to the Tiny Family documented
|
||
elsewhere in this listing.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Tiny Family
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Traceback
|
||
Aliases: 3066
|
||
V Status: Extinct
|
||
Discovered: October, 1988
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth, TSR, graphic display 1 hour after boot
|
||
Origin:
|
||
Eff Length: 3,066 bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan/X V67+, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, VirexPC,
|
||
AVTK 3.5+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: M-3066, VirClean, F-Prot, VirexPC, Pro-Scan 1.4+,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV, or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Traceback virus infects both .COM and .EXE files, adding
|
||
3,066 bytes to the length of the file. After an infected
|
||
program is executed, it will install itself memory resident
|
||
and infect other programs that are opened. Additionally, if
|
||
the system date is after December 5, 1988, it will attempt to
|
||
infect one additional .COM or .EXE file in the current
|
||
directory. If an uninfected file doesn't exist in the current
|
||
directory, it will search the entire disk, starting at the
|
||
root directory, looking for a candidate. This search
|
||
process terminates if it encounters an infected file before
|
||
finding a candidate non-infected file.
|
||
|
||
This virus derives its name from two characteristics. First,
|
||
infected files contain the directory path of the file causing
|
||
the infection within the viral code, thus is it possible
|
||
to "trace back" the infection through a number of files. Second,
|
||
when it succeeds in infected another file, the virus will
|
||
attempt to access the on-disk copy of the program that the
|
||
copy of the virus in memory was loaded from so that it can
|
||
update a counter in the virus. The virus takes over disk
|
||
error handling while trying to update the original infected
|
||
program, so if it can't infect it, the user will be unaware
|
||
that an error occurred.
|
||
|
||
The primary symptom of the Traceback virus having infected
|
||
the system is that if the system date is after December 28,
|
||
1988, the memory resident virus will produce a screen display
|
||
with a cascading effect similar to the Cascade/1701/1704
|
||
virus. The cascading display occurs one hour after system
|
||
memory is infected. If a keystroke is entered from the key-
|
||
board during this display, a system lockup will occur. After
|
||
one minute, the display will restore itself, with the characters
|
||
returning to their original positions. This cascade and
|
||
restore display are repeated by the virus at one hour
|
||
intervals.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of the Traceback virus are:
|
||
Traceback-B : Similar to the Traceback virus, the major differences
|
||
are that Traceback-B will infect COMMAND.COM and there
|
||
is no cascading display effect after the virus has
|
||
been resident for one (1) hour. Infected files will
|
||
also not contain the name of the file from which the
|
||
virus originally became memory resident, but instead
|
||
the name of the current file. A text string:
|
||
"MICRODIC MSG" can be found in files infected with
|
||
Traceback-B. If the system is booted from a diskette
|
||
whose copy of COMMAND.COM is infected, attempting to
|
||
execute any program will result in a memory allocation
|
||
error and the system being halted.
|
||
Origin: Spain, March 1990.
|
||
Traceback-B2: Similar to Traceback-B2, this variant has the cascading
|
||
display effect after the virus has been resident in
|
||
memory for one (1) hour. The text string " XPO DAD "
|
||
replaces the "MICRODIS MSG" text string in Traceback-B.
|
||
Origin: Spain, May 1990.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Traceback II
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Traceback II
|
||
Aliases: 2930
|
||
V Status: Extinct
|
||
Discovered: October, 1988
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth, TSR, graphic display 1 hour after boot
|
||
Origin:
|
||
Eff Length: 2,930 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan/X V67+, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, VirexPC,
|
||
AVTK 3.5+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D/X, F-Prot, VirexPC, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirHunt 2.0+,
|
||
NAV, or delete infected files.
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Traceback II virus is a variant of the Traceback (3066)
|
||
virus. It is believed that Traceback II predates the
|
||
Traceback virus, however the Traceback virus was isolated
|
||
and reported first. As with the Traceback virus, the
|
||
Traceback II virus is memory resident and infects both .COM
|
||
& .EXE files.
|
||
|
||
The comments indicated for the Traceback virus generally
|
||
apply to the Traceback II virus, with the exception that the
|
||
file length increase is 2,930 bytes instead of 3,066 bytes.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of the Traceback II Virus are:
|
||
Traceback II-B: Similar to Traceback II, this variant will infect
|
||
COMMAND.COM. When the cascading effect occurs, the
|
||
screen will not be restored, instead the system will
|
||
be hung requiring it to be powered off and rebooted.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Traceback
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Turbo 448
|
||
Aliases: @ Virus, Turbo @, Polish-2
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: November, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth; File not found errors with some utilities.
|
||
Origin: Hungary
|
||
Eff Length: 448 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRCK - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V71+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Turbo 448, or @ Virus, was discovered in Hungary in November, 1990.
|
||
This virus is a memory resident infector of .COM files, including
|
||
COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Turbo 448 Virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will install itself memory resident at the end of the
|
||
Command Interpretor in memory. Total system memory and available free
|
||
memory will not decrease. Interrupt 21 will be hooked by the virus.
|
||
|
||
The Turbo 448 Virus is unusual in that it does not infect programs when
|
||
they are executed. Instead, it infects .COM files when they are openned
|
||
for some other reason besides execution. For example, if the virus is
|
||
memory resident a program A.COM is copied to B.COM, both programs will
|
||
become infected by the virus.
|
||
|
||
Infected files will increase in length by 448 bytes, with the virus
|
||
being located at the end of the file. The program's date and time in
|
||
the disk directory will also have been updated to the system date and
|
||
time when the file was infected. The following text string can be
|
||
found at the end of all infected programs:
|
||
|
||
"Udv minden nagytudasunak! Turbo @"
|
||
|
||
Another interesting behavior of this virus is that when the virus is
|
||
memory resident, anti-viral products which are unaware of the Turbo 448's
|
||
presence in memory will not function properly. After the third file is
|
||
read, the program may fail due to a "file not found" error being received
|
||
when it attempts to open the fourth program.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Turbo Kukac 9.9
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Turbo Kukac
|
||
Aliases: Kukac, Turbo Kukac 9.9, Polish-2
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: November, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth; Decrease in total system and free available memory;
|
||
File not found errors with some utilities.
|
||
Origin: Hungary
|
||
Eff Length: 512 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRCK - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V71+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Turbo Kukac, or Kukac, Virus was discovered in Hungary in November,
|
||
1990. This virus is a memory resident infector of .COM files, including
|
||
COMMAND.COM. It is very similar to the Turbo 448 Virus.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Turbo Kukac Virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will install itself memory resident following the Command
|
||
Interpretor and any previously loaded TSRs. Total system memory and
|
||
available free memory will decrease by 1,040 bytes. Interrupts 05 and
|
||
21 will be hooked by the virus. Note that this virus does not use a low
|
||
system memory TSR, but instead creates a sort of "hole" in memory for
|
||
its usage.
|
||
|
||
Like the Turbo 448 Virus, this virus does not infect program when
|
||
they are executed. Instead, it infects .COM files when they are openned
|
||
for some other reason besides execution. For example, if the virus is
|
||
memory resident a program A.COM is copied to B.COM, both programs will
|
||
become infected by the virus.
|
||
|
||
Infected files will increase in length by 512 bytes with the virus being
|
||
located at the end of the file. The program's date and time in the
|
||
directory will also have been updated to the system date and time when
|
||
the file was infected. The following text string can be found at the
|
||
end of all infected programs:
|
||
|
||
"Turbo Kukac 9.9 $"
|
||
|
||
An interesting behavior of this virus is that when the virus is
|
||
memory resident, anti-viral products which are unaware of the Turbo
|
||
Kukac's presence in memory will not function properly. After the
|
||
fourth file is read, the program may fail due to a "file not found"
|
||
error being received when it attempts to open the fifth program.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Turbo 448
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Typo Boot
|
||
Aliases: Mistake
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: June, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: BSC, Resident TOM, garbled printout.
|
||
Origin: Israel
|
||
Eff Length: N/A
|
||
Type Code: BRt - Resident Boot Sector Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, AVTK 3.5+,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: MDisk, Pro-Scan 1.4+, F-Prot, NAV, or DOS SYS Command
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Typo Boot virus was first isolated in Israel by Y. Radai
|
||
in June, 1989. This virus is a memory resident boot sector
|
||
infector, taking up 2K at the upper end of system memory once
|
||
it has installed itself memory resident.
|
||
|
||
The major symptom that will be noticed on systems infected
|
||
with the Typo Boot virus is that certain characters in
|
||
printouts are always replaced with other phonetically
|
||
similar characters. Since the virus also substitutes hebrew
|
||
letters for other hebrew letters, the virus was most likely
|
||
written by someone in Israel. Digits in numbers may also
|
||
be transposed or replaced with other numbers. The substitutions
|
||
impact printouts only, the screen display and data in files are
|
||
not affected.
|
||
|
||
The Typo Boot virus is similar structurally to the Ping Pong
|
||
virus, and may be a variant of Ping Pong. It can be removed
|
||
from a disk by using MDisk, CleanUp, DOS SYS command, or
|
||
just about any Ping Pong disinfector.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Typo COM
|
||
Aliases: Fumble, 867
|
||
V Status: Extinct
|
||
Discovered: November, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth, Resident TOM, garbled printout (see text).
|
||
Origin: England
|
||
Eff Length: 867 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRtC - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan/X V67+, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, AVTK 3.5+,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D/X, F-Prot, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirHunt 2.0+,
|
||
or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Typo COM virus is similar to the Typo Boot virus in that
|
||
it will garble data that is sent to the parallel port once it
|
||
has activated. Unlike the Boot virus, the COM virus infects
|
||
generic .COM files. This virus was first reported by Joe
|
||
Hirst of Brighton, UK, in November, 1989.
|
||
|
||
The Typo COM virus only infects .COM files on even-numbered
|
||
days.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: USSR
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: October, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .EXE growth; hard disk boot sector and partition table damage;
|
||
system hangs; long program load times
|
||
Origin: USSR
|
||
Eff Length: 576 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNE - Parasitic Non-Resident .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V71+, Pro-Scan 2.01+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected Files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The USSR Virus was discovered in October, 1990 in the USSR. It is
|
||
an encrypted, non-resident generic infector of .EXE files.
|
||
|
||
Each time a program infected with the USSR Virus is executed, it will
|
||
search the currect directory for the first uninfected .EXE file. If
|
||
it finds one, it will attempt to infect it. Sometimes when the virus
|
||
attempts to infect a file, it will hang the system leaving the drive
|
||
light on, however most of the time the virus is successful. Infected
|
||
files will increase in length by 576 to 586 bytes, with the virus
|
||
located at the end of the file.
|
||
|
||
Systems infected with this virus may go to boot their system from its
|
||
hard disk only to find that the hard disk's boot sector has been
|
||
removed, and the partition table has been damaged, thus rendering the
|
||
hard disk inaccessible. This damage can be repaired using Norton
|
||
Disk Doctor, or MDisk with the /P option.
|
||
|
||
Infected systems will also experience longer than normal load times
|
||
when infected programs are executed. The longer than normal load time
|
||
is due to the virus searching for a file to infect, and then infecting
|
||
the candidate file if one was found.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: USSR 311
|
||
Aliases: V-311
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: January, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth; COMMAND.COM renamed to COMMAND.CON
|
||
Origin: USSR
|
||
Eff Length: 311 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The USSR 311, or V-311, Virus was submitted in January, 1991. It
|
||
originated in the USSR. This virus is a non-resident infector of .COM
|
||
programs, including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with USSR 311 is executed, the virus will check
|
||
the system time to see if the seconds value is equal to one of 16
|
||
values. If it was equal to one of those 16 values, COMMAND.COM will be
|
||
renamed to COMMAND.CON. Whether or not the rename of COMMAND.COM
|
||
occurred, the virus will then infect one .COM program in the current
|
||
directory.
|
||
|
||
Infected .COM programs will increase in length by 311 bytes, the virus
|
||
will be located at the end of the infected file. The file's time in
|
||
the disk directory will also be modified to be 11:19:32, the infection
|
||
marker for this virus. The file date in the directory is not altered.
|
||
|
||
USSR 3111 will also alter the file attributes for the file in the
|
||
directory. In particular, bits 8 thru 15 will be reset, which may
|
||
produce unexpected results in environments that make use of these
|
||
bits.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: USSR 492
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: December, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM file growth; File date/time changes
|
||
Origin: USSR
|
||
Eff Length: 495 - 508 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRfCK - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The USSR 492 Virus was submitted in December, 1990 and is from the
|
||
USSR. This virus is a memory resident .COM file infector, it will
|
||
infect COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When the first program infected with USSR 492 is executed, the virus
|
||
will install itself memory resident in high system memory, but below
|
||
the 640K DOS boundary. This memory is not reserved by the virus.
|
||
Interrupt 21 will be hooked by the virus. At the time of going memory
|
||
resident, the virus will check to determine if COMMAND.COM on the C:
|
||
drive is infected, if it isn't, then the virus will infect it.
|
||
|
||
Once USSR 492 is memory resident, it will infect any .COM program which
|
||
is executed. Execution of COMMAND.COM on the A: drive is the only way
|
||
to infect COMMAND.COM on A:.
|
||
|
||
Programs infected with USSR 492 will have a file length increase of
|
||
495 to 508 bytes. The virus will be located at the end of infected
|
||
programs. Infected programs will also have their date and time in the
|
||
disk directory changed to the system date and time when infection
|
||
occurred.
|
||
|
||
USSR 492 does not appear to do anything besides replicate.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: USSR 516
|
||
Aliases: Leapfrog
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: December, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM file growth
|
||
Origin: USSR
|
||
Eff Length: 516 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRCK - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The USSR 516 Virus was submitted in December, 1990. It is from the
|
||
USSR. This virus is a memory resident infector of .COM programs,
|
||
including COMMAND.COM. It infects on file execution.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the USSR 516 Virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will install itself memory resident in a "hole in memory"
|
||
between MSDOS and the DOS Stacks. This area will be labelled
|
||
DOS Data. Interrupt 21 will be hooked by the virus. There will be
|
||
no change in total system memory or available free memory.
|
||
|
||
After the virus is memory resident, it will infect .COM programs which
|
||
are executed that had an uninfected file length which was greater than
|
||
512 bytes. Infected .COM programs will have their length increased
|
||
by 516 bytes, the virus will be located at the end of the program.
|
||
|
||
USSR 516 does not appear to do anything besides replicate. The original
|
||
submitted sample was not a natural infection of this virus, so this may
|
||
be a research virus.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: USSR 600
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: December, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM file growth
|
||
Origin: USSR
|
||
Eff Length: 600 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRhCK - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The USSR 600 Virus was submitted in December, 1990, and is from the
|
||
USSR. This virus is a memory resident infector of .COM programs,
|
||
including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When the first program infected with USSR 600 is executed, the virus
|
||
will install itself memory resident at the top of system memory but
|
||
below the 640K DOS boundary. The DOS ChkDsk program will indicate
|
||
that total system memory and available free memory are 2,048 bytes
|
||
less than expected. This virus does not move the interrupt 12
|
||
return. USSR 600 uses interrupts 21 and 24.
|
||
|
||
Once USSR 600 is memory resident, it will infect .COM programs which
|
||
are executed if they have an original file length of at least 600
|
||
bytes. Infected files will increase in size by 600 bytes, and the
|
||
virus's code will be located at the beginning of the infected program.
|
||
|
||
It is unknown if this virus does anything besides replicate.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: USSR 707
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: December, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM file growth; decrease in total system and available memory
|
||
Origin: USSR
|
||
Eff Length: 707 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRtCK - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The USSR 707 Virus was submitted in December, 1990. It is from the
|
||
USSR. This virus is a memory resident infector of .COM programs,
|
||
including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When the first program infected with the USSR 707 Virus is executed,
|
||
this virus will install itself memory resident at the top of system
|
||
memory but below the 640K DOS boundary. It will move the interrupt 12
|
||
return so that the virus in memory cannot be overwritten. USSR 707
|
||
makes use of interrupt 21, which will now map to the virus in high
|
||
system memory. Total system memory and available free memory will
|
||
be 720 bytes less than expected.
|
||
|
||
After USSR 707 is memory resident, any .COM program executed will
|
||
become infected by the virus. Infected .COM programs will have a
|
||
file length increase of 707 bytes, the virus will be located at the
|
||
end of the file. If COMMAND.COM is executed, it will be infected.
|
||
|
||
It is unknown if USSR 707 does anything besides replicate.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: USSR 711
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: December, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM file growth; system hangs;
|
||
decrease in total system and available memory
|
||
Origin: USSR
|
||
Eff Length: 711 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRhC - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The USSR 711 Virus was submitted in December, 1990, and comes from the
|
||
USSR. This virus is a memory resident infector of .COM files. It does
|
||
not infect COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When the first program infected with USSR 711 is executed, the virus
|
||
will install itself memory resident at the top of system memory but
|
||
below the 640K DOS boundary. This memory is reserved. The virus also
|
||
hooks interrupts 08, 13, and 21. The DOS ChkDsk program will indicate
|
||
that total system memory and available free memory is 704 bytes less
|
||
than what the user expects. The interrupt 12 return is not altered
|
||
by this virus.
|
||
|
||
After USSR 711 is memory resident, any .COM file which is executed that
|
||
had an original file length of at least 1600 bytes will be infected by
|
||
the virus. Infected .COM files will increase in size by 705 to 717
|
||
bytes, and the virus will be located at the end of the infected file.
|
||
|
||
Systems infected with USSR 711 may notice occasional system hangs which
|
||
may occur when this virus attempts to infect .COM programs.
|
||
|
||
It is unknown if USSR 711 does anything besides replicate and
|
||
occasionally hang the system when infecting files.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: USSR 948
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: December, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth; decrease in total system and available memory
|
||
Origin: USSR
|
||
Eff Length: 948 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRhA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The USSR 948 Virus was received in December, 1990, and originated in
|
||
the USSR. This virus is a memory resident infector of .COM and .EXE
|
||
files, and will also infect COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When the first program infected with USSR 948 is executed, this virus
|
||
will install itself memory resident at the top of system memory but
|
||
below the 640K DOS boundary. The interrupt 12 return will not be
|
||
altered, although the memory in use by the virus is reserved.
|
||
Interrupts 1C and 21 will be hooked by the virus.
|
||
|
||
After USSR 948 is memory resident, and .COM or .EXE program which is
|
||
executed or openned for any reason will become infected by the virus.
|
||
Infected programs, with the exception of COMMAND.COM, will increase
|
||
in size by between 950 to 963 bytes. In the case of COMMAND.COM, the
|
||
virus will overwrite a portion of the stack space located in the file,
|
||
so the file will not have a length change. In all cases, the file
|
||
date and times in the disk directory are not altered. Infected
|
||
programs will have the virus located at the end of the file.
|
||
|
||
It is unknown if USSR 948 does anything besides replicate.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: USSR 1049
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: December, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth; system hangs;
|
||
decrease in total system and available free memory
|
||
Origin: USSR
|
||
Eff Length: 1,049 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRhA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The USSR 1049 virus was received in December, 1990. It originated in
|
||
the USSR. This virus is a memory resident infector of .COM and .EXE
|
||
files, and does not infect COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When the first program infected with USSR 1049 is executed, the virus
|
||
will install itself memory resident at the top of system memory but
|
||
below the 640K DOS boundary. This memory will be 1,056 bytes in
|
||
size and is reserved. The interrupt 12 return is not moved. Interrupt
|
||
21 will be hooked by the virus.
|
||
|
||
After USSR 1049 is memory resident, the virus will infect .COM and
|
||
.EXE files when they are executed. The virus, however, will not infect
|
||
very small .EXE files. Infected files will increase in size by
|
||
1,051 to 1,064 bytes, the virus will be located at the end of the
|
||
infected program.
|
||
|
||
Systems infected with the USSR 1049 Virus may experience system hangs
|
||
when attempting to execute .EXE programs. These hangs occassionally
|
||
occur when the virus infects .EXE program, though the program being
|
||
infected will actually be infected.
|
||
|
||
It is unknown if USSR 1049 does anything besides replicate.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: USSR 1689
|
||
Aliases: SVC V4.00
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: December, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth; system hangs
|
||
Origin: USSR
|
||
Eff Length: 1,689 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The USSR 1689 Virus was received in December, 1990. It is from the
|
||
USSR. This virus is not a very viable virus, though it does infect
|
||
both .COM and .EXE programs.
|
||
|
||
When the first program infected with USSR 1689 is executed, this virus
|
||
will install itself memory resident in the in-memory command
|
||
interpretor.
|
||
|
||
After the virus is memory resident, the virus will infect the next
|
||
.COM or .EXE program executed, though a system hang will also occur.
|
||
Infected programs will increase in size by 1,689 bytes, though on files
|
||
larger than 1,689 bytes, the virus will hide the file length increase
|
||
if the virus is already in memory. Files originally smaller than 1,689
|
||
bytes will indicate a file size increase in the DOS directory when the
|
||
virus is resident. In all cases, the virus will be located at the end
|
||
of infected programs.
|
||
|
||
With the system hang which occurs each time a program is infected by
|
||
this virus, it is not a very viable virus, and should not be considered
|
||
a threat in its current state.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: USSR 2144
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: December, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth; decrease in total system and available memory
|
||
Origin: USSR
|
||
Eff Length: 2,144 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRhAK - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The USSR 2144 Virus was submitted in December, 1990, and is from the
|
||
USSR. This virus is a memory resident infector of .COM and .EXE files,
|
||
including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When the first program infected with the USSR 2144 Virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will install itself memory resident at the top of system
|
||
memory but below the 640K DOS boundary. The DOS ChkDsk program will
|
||
indicate memory values that show 4,608 bytes less total system memory
|
||
and available free memory than expected. This virus does not move
|
||
the interrupt 12 return. The virus also directly alters the interrupt
|
||
page in memory so that some interrupts will now execute the virus's
|
||
code.
|
||
|
||
After USSR 2144 is memory resident, and program which was originally
|
||
greater in length than 2K that is executed or openned for reason will
|
||
become infected by the virus. Infected .COM programs will increase in
|
||
length by 2,144 bytes. .EXE programs will increase in length by 2,144
|
||
to 2,59 bytes. In both cases, the virus will be located at the end
|
||
of infected files. Infected files will not have their date and time in
|
||
the disk directory altered, and this virus does not hide the change in
|
||
file length of infected files.
|
||
|
||
It is unknown if USSR 2144 does anything besides replicate.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: V651
|
||
Aliases: Eddie 3, Stealth Virus
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: April, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth, decrease in system and free memory,
|
||
file allocation errors
|
||
Origin: Sofia, Bulgaria
|
||
Eff Length: 651 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRtA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V66+, VirHunt 2.0+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, VirHunt 2.0+, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The V651, or Eddie 3, Virus was isolated in Sofia, Bulgaria in
|
||
April 1990 by Vesselin Bontchev. V651 is believed to have been
|
||
written by the same author as Dark Avenger, V1024, and V2000.
|
||
This virus is a generic infector for .COM and .EXE files.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with V651 is executed, the virus
|
||
will install itself memory resident. Using the DOS CHKDSK program,
|
||
total system memory, as well as available free memory, will be
|
||
decreased by 688 bytes.
|
||
|
||
Later, as programs with a length of 651 bytes or greater are executed,
|
||
they will be infected by the virus. Infected files increase in length
|
||
by 651 bytes, though the increase in file length will not be seen by
|
||
performing a directory command with the virus present in memory. The
|
||
total available disk space will also be adjusted by the virus so that
|
||
the decrease in available disk space due to the virus's activities
|
||
cannot be seen. Powering off the system and booting from a known
|
||
clean boot diskette, followed by issuing a directory command will
|
||
result in the correct infected file lengths being displayed as well
|
||
as the actual available space on the disk.
|
||
|
||
Infected files can be easily identified as the text string "Eddie
|
||
Lives." appears near the end of the infected file. These files will
|
||
also be 651 bytes longer than expected when the virus is not
|
||
present in memory.
|
||
|
||
A side effect of the V651 virus is that lost clusters may occur on
|
||
infected systems if the CHKDSK /F command is used. While this does
|
||
not occur for all infected files, the number of errors reported by
|
||
CHKDSK will be much higher statistically when V651 is present.
|
||
|
||
Unlike Dark Avenger and V2000, this virus does not infect
|
||
files on any file open. It only infects when programs are executed.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Dark Avenger, V1024, V2000
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: V800
|
||
Aliases: Live after Death Virus, Stealth Virus
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: May, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth, decrease in total system and available memory
|
||
Origin: Bulgaria
|
||
Eff Length: 800 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRC - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V63+, Pro-Scan 1.4+, F-Prot 1.12+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: CleanUp V64+, Scan/D, F-Prot 1.12+, or
|
||
delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The V800, or Live after Death, Virus was isolated in Bulgaria by
|
||
Vesselin Bontchev in May, 1990. The V800 is a self-encrypting
|
||
memory resident .COM infector, and it does not infect COMMAND.COM.
|
||
This virus is thought to have been written by the same person as
|
||
the Dark Avenger virus since many of the same techniques are
|
||
used.
|
||
|
||
The virus has received an alias of the Live after Death Virus as
|
||
the virus contains the "Live after Death" string, though it
|
||
cannot be seen in infected files as the virus is encrypted.
|
||
|
||
The first time an infected program is run on a system, the V800
|
||
Virus will install itself memory resident. In the process of
|
||
installing itself resident, it will decrease available system
|
||
memory by 16K, using 8,192 Bytes for itself in the top of
|
||
available free memory. It will also hook interrupt 2A.
|
||
|
||
Once in memory, every time a .COM file is attempted to be
|
||
executed, the virus will check to see if it is a candidate for
|
||
infection. Whether the file will be infected depends on the
|
||
size of the .COM file when it is attempted to be executed. In
|
||
no event is a .COM file smaller than 1024 bytes infected, but
|
||
not all .COM files over 1024 bytes are infected either.
|
||
|
||
The V800 Virus will reinfect .COM files, with the file's size
|
||
increasing by 800 bytes with each infection. It does not,
|
||
however, infect .COM files more than eight times.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of the V800 Virus include:
|
||
V800M : Very similar to V800, the major difference is that V800M
|
||
will infect files on both file open and file execute,
|
||
putting this variant into the "Stealth" virus category.
|
||
When the virus becomes memory resident, total system and free
|
||
memory will decrease by only 8,192 bytes. This variant
|
||
does not have the "Live after Death" string in it.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: V801
|
||
Aliases: V791
|
||
V Status: New
|
||
Discovered: March, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth; System hangs
|
||
Origin: USA
|
||
Eff Length: 791 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNAK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V76+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D/A, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The V801 Virus was received in March, 1991 from the United States.
|
||
This virus is a non-resident, direct action infector of .COM and .EXE
|
||
programs. It will infect COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with V801 is executed, the virus will search
|
||
the current directory for an uninfected .EXE program. If one is found,
|
||
it will infect the program. If an uninfected .EXE program is not found,
|
||
the virus will then search for an uninfected .COM program in the
|
||
current directory, and infect it.
|
||
|
||
Programs infected with V801 will increase in size by 791 to 808 bytes.
|
||
.COM programs will have the virus located at their beginning. .EXE
|
||
programs will have the virus located at the end of the infected file.
|
||
The program's date and time in the disk directory will not be altered.
|
||
|
||
Some infected programs may cause a system hang when they are attempted
|
||
to be executed.
|
||
|
||
V801 doesn't appear to do anything besides replicate.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: V1024
|
||
Aliases: Dark Avenger III, Stealth Virus, Diamond
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: May, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: TSR; decrease in available free memory
|
||
Origin: Bulgaria
|
||
Eff Length: 1,024 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V64+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The V1024, or Dark Avenger III, Virus was discovered in Bulgaria in
|
||
April 1990 by Daniel Kalchev. V1024 is a memory resident generic
|
||
infector of .COM and .EXE files. It is believed to have been written
|
||
by the same person that wrote Dark Avenger and V2000. This virus may
|
||
actually be an earlier version of the Dark Avenger virus, it has many
|
||
of the same characteristics, though it does not infect all files when
|
||
they are opened for any reason.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with V1024 is executed, the virus
|
||
will install itself memory resident. At this time, it checks to see
|
||
if several interrupts are being monitored, including interrupts 1
|
||
and 3. If interrupts 1 and 3 are monitored, V1024 allow the current
|
||
program to run, but any subsequent program executed will hang the
|
||
system and V1024 will not replicate. When V1024 is memory resident,
|
||
infected systems will experience a decrease in free memory by 1,072
|
||
bytes. Total system memory will not have changed. The virus will
|
||
have remapped several interrupts by altering their location in the
|
||
interrupt map page in memory. These interrupts will now be controlled
|
||
by V1024.
|
||
|
||
After V1024 becomes memory resident, the virus will infect any
|
||
program executed which is greater in length than 1,024 bytes. Both
|
||
.COM and .EXE files are infected, COMMAND.COM is not infected.
|
||
Infected files increase in length by 1,024 bytes, though this increase
|
||
will not appear if the virus is present in memory and a DIR listing
|
||
is done.
|
||
|
||
V1024 infected files can be identified by a text string which
|
||
appears very close to the end of infected files. The text string is:
|
||
'7106286813'.
|
||
|
||
V1024 does not appear contain any activation date.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of V1024 include:
|
||
Diamond : Similar to V1024, Diamond's main difference is that it
|
||
becomes memory resident at the top of system memory but
|
||
below the 640K DOS boundary. Total system memory, and
|
||
available free memory, as measured by the DOS ChkDsk
|
||
program will decrease by 1,072 bytes. Interrupts 08 and
|
||
21 will be hooked by the virus.
|
||
Diamond-B : Similar to Diamond, this variant has been slightly altered
|
||
to avoid detection by some anti-viral programs.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Dark Avenger, V2000, V651
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: V2000
|
||
Aliases: Dark Avenger II, Stealth Virus, Travel Virus
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: 1989
|
||
Symptoms: TSR; .COM, .EXE, .OV? growth (see text); crashes;
|
||
crosslinked files following CHKDSK.
|
||
Origin: Bulgaria
|
||
Eff Length: 2,000 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V59+, Pro-Scan 1.4+, AVTK 3.5+, VirHunt 2.0+,
|
||
NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, Pro-Scan 1.4+, NAV, or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The V2000, or Dark Avenger II, virus is a memory resident generic
|
||
file infector. The first isolated samples of this virus were
|
||
received from Bulgaria, where it was isolated by Daniel Kalchev
|
||
and Niki Spahiev.
|
||
|
||
V2000 will infect .COM, .EXE, and Overlay files, as well as
|
||
COMMAND.COM. When the first infected file is executed, the virus
|
||
installs itself memory resident, and then infected COMMAND.COM if
|
||
it has not already been infected. Then, when an executable file
|
||
is opened for any reason, it is infected if it hasn't been
|
||
previously infected.
|
||
|
||
Increased file lengths will not be shown if the V2000 virus is
|
||
present in memory when a DIR command is issued. Issuing a
|
||
CHKDSK /F command on infected systems may result in crosslinking
|
||
of files since the directory information may not appear to match
|
||
the entries in the file allocation table (FAT).
|
||
|
||
Systems infected with the V2000 virus will experience unexpected
|
||
system crashes, resulting in lost data. Some systems may also
|
||
become unbootable due to the modification of COMMAND.COM or the
|
||
hidden system files.
|
||
|
||
One of the following two text strings will appear in the viral code
|
||
in infected files, thus accounting for the alias of Travel Virus used in
|
||
Bulgaria:
|
||
|
||
"Zopy me - I want to travel"
|
||
"Copy me - I want to travel"
|
||
|
||
There are reports from Bulgaria that the V2000 virus looks for and
|
||
hangs the system if programs written by Vesselin Bontchev are
|
||
attempted to be executed. This would explain the presence of the
|
||
following copyright notice within the viral code:
|
||
|
||
"(c) 1989 by Vesselin Bontchev"
|
||
|
||
Known variants of the V2000 virus include:
|
||
V2000-B/Die Young : Similar to the V2000 virus, the main difference is
|
||
that the text string "Zopy me - I want to travel" is now
|
||
"Only the Good die young..." or "Mnly the Good die young..."
|
||
and the encryption used by the virus is different. This
|
||
variant is actually the original virus, predating V2000.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Dark Avenger, V1024, V651
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: V2100
|
||
Aliases: 2100, Stealth Virus, UScan Virus
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: July, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: file allocation errors, decrease in system and free memory
|
||
Origin: Bulgaria
|
||
Eff Length: 2,100 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRtA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V66+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, NAV, or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The V2100, or 2100, Virus was first isolated in Sofia, Bulgaria by
|
||
Vesselin Bontchev in July 1990. It is a resident generic infector
|
||
of .COM, .EXE, and overlay files. It will also infect COMMAND.COM.
|
||
This virus appears to have been originally released into the public
|
||
domain on an anti-viral program named UScan which was uploaded to
|
||
a BBS in Europe. While not all copies of UScan are carriers
|
||
of this virus, there was one version which exists that has the virus
|
||
embedded in its program code. The virus cannot be detected on this
|
||
trojan version using search algorithms for this virus. V2100 is
|
||
believed to have been written by the author of Dark Avenger.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with V2100 is executed, the virus
|
||
will install itself memory resident above top of memory but below
|
||
the 640K boundary. The top of memory returned by interrupt 12 will
|
||
be lower than expected by 4,288 bytes. Likewise, free memory will
|
||
have decreased by 4,288 bytes. At this same point, V2100 will infect
|
||
COMMAND.COM though the change in file length will be hidden by the
|
||
virus.
|
||
|
||
Once the virus is memory resident, it will infect any .COM, .EXE, or
|
||
overlay file with a file length of at least 2100 bytes that is
|
||
executed or opened for any reason. The simple act of copying an
|
||
executable file will result in both the source and target files
|
||
becoming infected. Infected files will be 2,100 bytes longer,
|
||
though the virus will hide the change in file length so that
|
||
it isn't noticeable when directories are listed. In some cases,
|
||
infected files will appear to be 2,100 bytes smaller than expected
|
||
if the virus is present in memory.
|
||
|
||
Systems infected with the V2100 virus will notice file allocation
|
||
errors occurring, along with crosslinking of files. Due to these
|
||
errors, some files may become corrupted. These file allocation
|
||
errors are truly errors, they exist whether or not the virus is
|
||
present in memory.
|
||
|
||
A side note on the V2100 Virus: if the system had previously been
|
||
infected with the Anthrax virus, V2100's introduction will result
|
||
in the Anthrax virus again being present in the hard disk partition
|
||
table. This effect occurs because Anthrax stores a copy of itself
|
||
on the last sectors of the hard disk. When V2100 becomes resident,
|
||
it searches the last 16 cylinders of the hard disk for a copy of
|
||
Anthrax. If V2100 finds the hidden copy of Anthrax, it copies it
|
||
into the hard disk's partition table. On the next system boot from
|
||
the hard disk, Anthrax will once again be active on the system.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: V2P2
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Research
|
||
Discovered: June, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM file growth
|
||
Origin: Minnesota, USA
|
||
Eff Length: 1,426 - 2,157 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan/X V67+, Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D/X, or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The V2P2 Virus is a research virus written by Mark Washburn and
|
||
distributed to some anti-viral program authors in June of 1990.
|
||
This virus, according to its author, has not been released. This
|
||
virus is a non-resident generic infector of .COM files.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the V2P2 virus is executed, it will
|
||
infect the first .COM file it finds in the current directory which
|
||
is not infected with the virus. The virus adds its code to the
|
||
end of the file, and the infected file's length will increase
|
||
between 1,426 and 2,157 bytes.
|
||
|
||
Like the 1260 virus, this virus uses a complex encryption method.
|
||
In fact, the encryption used with the 1260 virus is one of several
|
||
possible encryptions that V2P2 may produce. As a result, virus
|
||
scanning software will often identify the 1260 virus in a file as
|
||
being both 1260 and V2P2. This identification is entirely valid
|
||
as 1260 is a special case of V2P2.
|
||
|
||
Also see: 1260, V2P6, V2P6Z
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: V2P6
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Research
|
||
Discovered: July, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM file growth
|
||
Origin: Minnesota, USA
|
||
Eff Length: 1,946 - 2,111 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan/X V67+, Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D/X, NAV, or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The V2P6 Virus is a research virus written by Mark Washburn and
|
||
distributed to some anti-viral program authors in July of 1990.
|
||
This virus, according to its author, has not been released. This
|
||
virus is a non-resident generic infector of .COM files similar to
|
||
the 1260, V2P2, and V2P6Z viruses.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the V2P6 virus is executed, it will
|
||
infect the first .COM file it finds in the current directory which
|
||
is not infected with the virus. The virus adds its code to the
|
||
end of the file, and the infected file's length will increase
|
||
between 1,946 and 2,111 bytes.
|
||
|
||
Like the 1260 and other viruses by Mark Washburn, this virus uses
|
||
a complex encryption method. The encryption method used by V2P6 is
|
||
more complex than that used in V2P2, but less complex than that used
|
||
in the last known virus in this family, V2P6Z. Like V2P2, an
|
||
algorithmic approach must be used to identify this virus.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of V2P6 include:
|
||
V2P6-B : Similar to V2P6 in behavior, programs infected with this
|
||
variant will increase in size by 1,990 to 2,261 bytes.
|
||
|
||
Also see: 1260, V2P2, V2P6Z
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: V2P6Z
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Research
|
||
Discovered: August, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM file growth
|
||
Origin: Minnesota, USA
|
||
Eff Length: 2,076 - 2,364 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: NAV, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The V2P6Z Virus is a research virus written by Mark Washburn and
|
||
distributed to some anti-viral program authors in August, 1990.
|
||
This virus, according to its author, has not been released. This
|
||
virus is a non-resident generic infector of .COM files similar to
|
||
the 1260, V2P2, and V2P6 viruses.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the V2P6Z virus is executed, it will
|
||
infect the first .COM file it finds in the current directory which
|
||
is not infected with the virus. The virus adds its code to the
|
||
end of the file, and the infected file's length will increase
|
||
between 2,076 and 2,364 bytes.
|
||
|
||
Like the 1260 and other viruses by Mark Washburn, this virus uses
|
||
a complex encryption method. The encryption method used by V2P6Z is
|
||
the most complex of the encryption methods employed by the viruses in
|
||
this family of viruses. Like V2P2 and V2P6, an algorithmic approach
|
||
must be used to identify this virus as there is no possible
|
||
identification string within the encrypted viral code.
|
||
|
||
Also see: 1260, V2P2, V2P6
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Vacsina
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Endangered
|
||
Discovered: November, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: TSR; .COM, .EXE, .BIN, & .SYS growth; "beeps"
|
||
Origin: Bulgaria
|
||
Eff Length: 1,206 bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan, F-Prot, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirexPC, AVTK 3.5+,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: CleanUp V64+, Scan/D/A, F-Prot, VirHunt 2.0+,
|
||
or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Vacsina virus is approximately 1200 bytes in length and can
|
||
be found in memory on infected systems. There are at least 48
|
||
variants of the Vacsina virus, also known as the TP virus
|
||
family, though not all of them have been isolated. Later versions
|
||
of this virus are included in this listing under the name
|
||
"Yankee Doodle".
|
||
|
||
Generally, the Vacsina Virus infects both .COM and .EXE files,
|
||
as well as .SYS and .BIN files. This virus, when infecting a .EXE
|
||
file, will first convert it into .COM format by changing the MZ
|
||
or ZM identifier in the first two bytes of the file to a JMP
|
||
instruction and then adding a small piece of relocator code, so
|
||
that the .EXE file can be infected as though it were originally a
|
||
.COM file.
|
||
|
||
One sign of a Vacsina infection is that programs which have been
|
||
infected may "beep" when executed. Infected programs will also
|
||
have their date/time in the disk directory changed to the date and
|
||
time they were infected.
|
||
|
||
Known Vacsina Variants Include:
|
||
TP04VIR - Infects .EXE files, changing them internally into .COM
|
||
files. Infected programs may beep when executed, and
|
||
may be identified by searching for the text string
|
||
"VACSINA" along with the second byte from the end of
|
||
the file containing a 04h. This version of Vacsina is
|
||
a poor replicator, and while it will always convert a
|
||
.EXE file to .COM file format, adding 132 bytes, it does
|
||
not always infect executed files.
|
||
TP05VIR - Similar to TP04VIR, except that the second to the last
|
||
byte in the file is now a 05h. System hangs may also
|
||
be experienced.
|
||
TP06VIR - Similar to TP05VIR, except the second to the last byte in
|
||
the file is now a 06h.
|
||
TP16VIR - Similar to TP06VIR, the second to the last byte in the
|
||
infected file is now 10h.
|
||
TP23VIR - Similar to TP16VIR, the second to the last byte in the
|
||
infected file is now 17h. The text "VACSINA" no longer
|
||
appears in the virus.
|
||
TP24VIR - Similar to TP23VIR, the second to the last byte in the
|
||
infected file is now 18h.
|
||
TP25VIR - Similar to TP24VIR, the second to the last byte in the
|
||
infected file is now 19h.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Yankee Doodle
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: VComm
|
||
Aliases: 637
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: December, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: .EXE growth, TSR, write failures
|
||
Origin: Poland
|
||
Eff Length: 637 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRaE - Parasitic Resident .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: F-Prot, ViruScan V60+, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, VirexPC,
|
||
AVTK 3.5+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: F-Prot, Scan/D, VirexPC, or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Vcomm virus is of Polish origin, first isolated in
|
||
December, 1989. The virus is a .EXE file infector. When an
|
||
infected file is run, the virus will attempt to infect one
|
||
.EXE file in the current directory. It will also infect the
|
||
memory resident version of the system's command interpreter.
|
||
|
||
When Vcomm infects a file, it first pads the file so that the
|
||
files length is a multiple of 512 bytes, then it adds its
|
||
637 bytes of virus code to the end of the file.
|
||
|
||
The memory resident portion of the virus intercepts any
|
||
disk writes that are attempted, and changes them into disk
|
||
reads.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: VFSI
|
||
Aliases: 437, Happy Day
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: September, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth; message
|
||
Origin: Bulgaria
|
||
Eff Length: 437 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V71+, Pro-Scan 2.01+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, Pro-Scan 2.01+, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The VFSI Virus was isolated in September, 1990 at VFSI (the Higher
|
||
Institute of Financial Management) located in Svistov, a town on the
|
||
Danube. VFSI is a non-resident, direct action, infector of .COM files,
|
||
including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the VFSI virus is executed, it will infect
|
||
one other .COM file located in the current directory. Candidate files
|
||
to be infected are first aligned to be a multiple of 16, and then the
|
||
viral code is added. Infected files will increase in length by between
|
||
437 and 452 bytes, with the viral code being located at the end of
|
||
infected files.
|
||
|
||
Infected files can be easily identified as they will always contain the
|
||
following hex string: 3A483F244B6F636E706C74.
|
||
|
||
On approximately one out of five executions of an infected program, the
|
||
program will flash the following message on the screen:
|
||
|
||
"HELLO!!! HAPPY DAY and SUCCESS
|
||
from virus 1.1 VFSI-Svistov"
|
||
|
||
This message is encrypted in the viral code, so it is not visible in
|
||
infected files.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: VHP
|
||
Aliases: VHP-348, VHP-353, VHP-367, VHP-435
|
||
V Status: Research
|
||
Discovered: July 1989
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth, system hangs
|
||
Origin: Bulgaria
|
||
Eff Length: 348 - 435 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNC - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V64+, AVTK 3.5+, F-Prot 1.12+, Pro-Scan 2.01+,
|
||
NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, F-Prot 1.12+, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The VHP Virus is actually a small group or "family" of viruses that
|
||
was discovered in Bulgaria in early 1990. There are currently four
|
||
identified variants to the VHP Virus, with the VHP-435 variant being
|
||
the one with the most potential for spreading. These viruses were
|
||
originally based on the Vienna virus. The progression of the
|
||
variants shows each variant to be a slightly better replicator.
|
||
|
||
The VHP Viruses are:
|
||
VHP-348 : This variant does not replicate due to bugs in the
|
||
virus code. If it did replicate, it would infect
|
||
.COM files. The virus's effective length is 348 bytes.
|
||
VHP-353 : VHP-348 fixed so that it will infected COMMAND.COM,
|
||
increasing its size by 353 bytes. It does not infect
|
||
other .COM files. This variant is still buggy, and it
|
||
will occasionally hang systems when attempting to find
|
||
a .COM file to infect.
|
||
VHP-367 : VHP-353 which will now infect .COM files besides
|
||
COMMAND.COM. Infected files increase in size by 367
|
||
bytes. Very rarely, this virus will reinfect an infected
|
||
.COM file. VHP-353 does not always infect a .COM file
|
||
when an infected program is executed, it will sometimes
|
||
not infect any .COM file, though it has in effect
|
||
immunized the file from infection. This effect is
|
||
probably a bug in this variant.
|
||
VHP-435 : Isolated in July, 1989, this variant is 435 bytes in
|
||
length and is not destructive, all it does is spread.
|
||
VHP-435 will attempt to infect 1 file each time an
|
||
infected program is executed. COMMAND.COM and .EXE
|
||
files are not infected. After infecting all of the
|
||
.COM files on the current drive and directory, it will
|
||
attempt to infect drive C:. VHP-435 is the VHP-367
|
||
virus with some modifications to make it less likely to
|
||
be noticed.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Vienna, VHP2
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: VHP2
|
||
Aliases: 623, VHP-623
|
||
V Status: Research
|
||
Discovered: March, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth, reboots or system hangs
|
||
Origin: Bulgaria
|
||
Eff Length: 623 bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNC - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V64+, Pro-Scan 1.4+, AVTK 3.5+, F-Prot 1.12+,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, Pro-Scan 1.4+, F-Prot 1.12+, or
|
||
Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The VHP2 Virus was isolated in Bulgaria in March, 1990. This virus
|
||
is based on the Vienna Virus, and has many of the same characteristics
|
||
of the VHP-435 variant of the VHP virus. It's major difference is that
|
||
of effective length, and that 1 of every 8 infected programs will
|
||
perform a system warm reboot.
|
||
|
||
VHP2 is 623 bytes long, infecting only .COM files but not COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
Known variants of the Vienna Virus include:
|
||
VHP-627 : Similar to VHP-623, except that its length is 627 bytes.
|
||
|
||
Also see: VHP, Vienna
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Victor
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: May, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM &.EXE growth, data file corruption, file linkage errors,
|
||
and unexpected system reboots
|
||
Origin: USSR
|
||
Eff Length: 2,458 bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRAK - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V63+, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirexPC, F-Prot 1.12+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, Pro-Scan 1.4+, F-Prot 1.12+, NAV, or
|
||
Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Victor Virus was first isolated in May, 1990. It is believed
|
||
to have originated in the USSR due to messages which appear within
|
||
the viral code:
|
||
|
||
"Victor V1.0 The Incredible High Performance Virus
|
||
Enhanced versions available soon.
|
||
This program was imported from USSR.
|
||
Thanks to Ivan."
|
||
|
||
The above message can be found at the end of infected files, but
|
||
does not appear to ever be displayed.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Victor Virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will install itself memory resident, occupying 3,072 bytes
|
||
at the top of free memory. Interrupt 21 will be intercepted by
|
||
the virus. After becoming memory resident, Victor will then
|
||
seek out and infect COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
Victor is a very slow file infector, only infected approximately
|
||
1 in every 10 programs executed after it becomes memory resident.
|
||
Infected programs will increase in length by between 2,443 and
|
||
2,458 bytes. The increase in file size is not hidden by the
|
||
virus.
|
||
|
||
Occasionally in the process of infecting a file, the virus will
|
||
hang the system, which may result in data file corruption.
|
||
Overlay files may also be infected, resulting in file linkage
|
||
errors.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Vienna
|
||
Aliases: Austrian, Unesco, DOS-62, DOS-68, 1-in-8, 648
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: April, 1988
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth; System reboots; System hangs
|
||
Origin: Austria
|
||
Eff Length: 648 bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNC - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, VirexPC, AVTK 3.5+,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: CleanUp V66+, VirClean, F-Prot, VirHunt 2.0+,
|
||
Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirexPC, or NAV
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Vienna virus was first isolated in April, 1988, in Moscow at
|
||
a UNESCO children's computer summer camp. The Vienna virus is a
|
||
non-resident, direct action infector of .COM programs, including
|
||
COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the Vienna Virus is executed, the virus
|
||
will select a .COM program in the current directory which as previously
|
||
not been modified by the virus. Usually, the Vienna Virus will infect
|
||
this file and set the seconds in the file's time in the disk directory
|
||
to 62. Infected programs will have a file length increase of 648
|
||
bytes with the virus being located at the end of the infected program.
|
||
|
||
One out of every six programs which Vienna selects will not be actively
|
||
infected by the virus. Instead, the first five bytes of the selected
|
||
.COM program will be changed to the hex character string "EAF0FF00F0",
|
||
and the seconds field in the file time will be set to 62. When these
|
||
programs are later executed, a system warm boot may occur. Since these
|
||
corrupted programs do not actually contain the Vienna Virus, and most
|
||
anti-viral programs cannot detect them, systems which have been infected
|
||
by Vienna will continue to experience unexpected reboots until all of
|
||
the corrupted .COM programs have been replaced with clean copies.
|
||
|
||
Some programs will hang upon execution after they have been infected
|
||
by the Vienna virus.
|
||
|
||
The Vienna virus was written by a high school student in Vienna
|
||
Austria as an experiment. Its large number of variants, as well as
|
||
other viruses which are in part based on Vienna code, can be
|
||
accounted for as its source code has been published many times.
|
||
|
||
Due to the large number of variants, Vienna infections may not exhibit
|
||
exactly the symptoms indicated above.
|
||
|
||
Known variants of the Vienna Virus include:
|
||
Vienna-B : Similar to Vienna, except that instead of a warm reboot,
|
||
the program being executed will be deleted.
|
||
Vienna-B 645 : Similar to the Vienna-B variant, this variant's
|
||
effective length is 645 bytes. It does not perform either
|
||
a warm reboot or delete executed programs. It does,
|
||
however, infect COMMAND.COM
|
||
Origin: United States
|
||
Vien6 : Similar to Vienna, except that the warm reboot has been
|
||
removed. Effective length of the virus is still 648 bytes.
|
||
After 7 files have become infected on the current drive,
|
||
the virus will then start infecting .COM files on drive C:.
|
||
|
||
Also see: 1260, Arf, Ghostballs, Grither, Lisbon, W13, VHP, VHP-2,
|
||
Violator
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Violator
|
||
Aliases: Violator Strain B
|
||
V Status: Endangered
|
||
Discovered: August, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth, Sector not found error on drive B:
|
||
Origin: USA
|
||
Eff Length: 1,055 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V67+, Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Clean-Up V71+, Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Violator Virus was submitted in August, 1990 by an anonymous
|
||
user of Homebase BBS. This virus is a non-resident parasitic
|
||
virus which infects .COM files, including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the Violator Virus is executed, what
|
||
happens depends on what the system date is set to. If the date is
|
||
prior to August 15, 1990, the virus will infect 1 .COM file located
|
||
in the current directory, adding 1,055 bytes to the program. If the
|
||
date is August 15, 1990 or after, the virus will not infect any files.
|
||
|
||
Symptoms of an infection of the Violator Virus include unexpected
|
||
attempts to access drive B:. If there is no diskette in drive B:,
|
||
or the diskette in drive B: is write-protected, a Sector not found
|
||
error will result.
|
||
|
||
The following message appears in the viral code located in infected
|
||
programs:
|
||
|
||
"TransMogrified (TM) 1990 by
|
||
RABID N'tnl Development Corp
|
||
Copyright (c) 1990 RABID!
|
||
Activation Date: 08/15/90
|
||
- Violator Strain B -
|
||
! (Field Demo Test Version) !
|
||
! * NOT TO BE DISTRIBUTED * !"
|
||
|
||
Also see: Vienna, Violator B4
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Violator B4
|
||
Aliases: Christmas Violator, Violator Strain B4
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: December, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth on 8088 based system;
|
||
Hard Disk Corruption on 80286 & 80386 based systems
|
||
Origin: United States
|
||
Eff Length: 5,302 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Violator B4 Virus was isolated in December, 1990 in the United
|
||
States. This virus was originally released into the public domain
|
||
on a trojan version of DSZ (DSZ1203). It is a non-resident infector
|
||
of .COM files, including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
What Violator B4 does depends on what processor is in the personal
|
||
computer it is being executed on. On 80286 and above processors, the
|
||
virus will activate immediately, overwriting the beginning portion of
|
||
the system hard disk. It will also attempt to display a Christmas
|
||
greeting at that time, but the greeting display will be garbled if
|
||
Ansi.Sys is not loaded. Damage caused by Violator B4 at activation
|
||
can be repaired using Norton Disk Doctor.
|
||
|
||
On an 8088 based system, Violator B4 will do nothing but replicate.
|
||
Each time an infected program is executed, the virus will infect one
|
||
other .COM program in the current directory. Violator B4 infected
|
||
files will have a file length increase of 5,302 bytes. The file's
|
||
date and time in the disk directory will not be altered. The virus
|
||
will be located at the end of the infected file.
|
||
|
||
The following text message is contained within the Violator B4 virus,
|
||
though it is never displayed:
|
||
|
||
"Violator Strain B4 - Written by RABID Nat'nl Development Corp.
|
||
RABID would like to take this opportunity to extend it's sincerest
|
||
holiday wishes to all Pir8 lamers around the world! If you are
|
||
reading this, then you are lame!!!
|
||
Anyway, to John McAffe! Have a Merry Christmas and a virus filled
|
||
new year. Go ahead! Make our day!
|
||
Remember! In the festive season, Say No to drugs!!! They suck shit!
|
||
(Bah! We make a virus this large, might as well have
|
||
something positive!)"
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: VirDem
|
||
Aliases: VirDem 2
|
||
V Status: Endangered
|
||
Discovered: 1986-1987
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth, Messages
|
||
Origin: Germany
|
||
Eff Length: 1,236 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNC - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: VirexPC, AVTK 3.5+, F-Prot 1.12+, ViruScan V71+,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: F-Prot 1.12+, Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The VirDem Virus was written in 1986-1987 by Ralf Burger of Germany.
|
||
The virus was originally distributed in Europe as a demonstration
|
||
virus, to assist computer users in understanding how a computer
|
||
virus operates.
|
||
|
||
The VirDem virus is not memory resident, and only infects .COM files
|
||
on the A: drive. It will always skip the first .COM file in the
|
||
root directory, so normally it will not infect COMMAND.COM. It will
|
||
also not infect .COM files past the second subdirectory on the disk.
|
||
|
||
Infected files that were originally less than approximately 1,500
|
||
bytes will be 2,616 bytes after infection. .COM files which were
|
||
greater than 1,500 bytes will increase in size by approximately
|
||
1,236 bytes.
|
||
|
||
When an infected program is executed, VirDem will infect the next
|
||
candidate .COM file. Infected files will contain the viral code,
|
||
followed by the original program. After infecting the .COM file,
|
||
the virus will play a "game" with you, starting with the following
|
||
text being displayed:
|
||
|
||
" VirDem Ver.: 1.06 (Generation #) aktive.
|
||
Copyright by R.Burger 1986,1987
|
||
Phone.: D - xxxxx/xxxx
|
||
|
||
This is a demoprogram for
|
||
computerviruses. Please put in a
|
||
number now.
|
||
If you're right, you'll be
|
||
able to continue.
|
||
The number is between
|
||
0 and # "
|
||
|
||
(Note: I have removed the phone number here, but it
|
||
appears where xxxxx/xxxx is above. Where # is, the
|
||
virus's generation number appears.)
|
||
|
||
At this point, you must guess the correct number and enter it. If
|
||
you put in the wrong number, you get the following message and
|
||
your program is not run:
|
||
|
||
" Sorry, you're wrong
|
||
|
||
More luck at next try .... "
|
||
|
||
If you guess the correct number, you receive the following message
|
||
and your program then executes:
|
||
|
||
" Famous. You're right.
|
||
You'll be able to continue. "
|
||
|
||
Finally, after all the candidate .COM files on the A: drive are
|
||
infected, the following message is displayed:
|
||
|
||
" All your programs are
|
||
struck by VIRDEM.COM now."
|
||
|
||
VIRDEM.COM was the original distribution file containing the virus,
|
||
and had a VIRDEM.DOC file included with it. VirDem is not widespread,
|
||
and is not destructive.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of VirDem include:
|
||
VirDem 2 : Similar to the virus described above, the major difference
|
||
is that the text messages have been translated to German.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Burger
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Virus-90
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Research
|
||
Discovered: December, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth, TSR
|
||
Origin: District of Columbia, USA
|
||
Eff Length: 857 bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRC - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan/X V67+, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirexPC,
|
||
AVTK 3.5+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D/X, F-Prot, Pro-Scan 1.4+,
|
||
or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Virus-90 virus was originally distributed in December, 1989
|
||
by Patrick Toulme as an "educational tool", with the virus
|
||
source also available for sale. In January, 1990, the
|
||
author contacted the sites where he had uploaded the virus
|
||
requesting that they remove it from their systems, his having
|
||
decided a live virus was not a "good idea" for an educational
|
||
tool after being contacted by several viral authorities.
|
||
|
||
The following description was submitted by Patrick Toulme in
|
||
November 1990 for inclusion in this listing:
|
||
|
||
"This educational, research virus was written by Patrick Toulme
|
||
to aid developers in understanding direct-virus action and in
|
||
creating virus-resistant software. This virus is a simple COM
|
||
infector that will not infect a hard drive and advises the user
|
||
when a file on a floppy disk is to be infected. Of course, no
|
||
damage occurs from the virus and all infected files advise the
|
||
user of the infection upon execution. The safeguards provided by
|
||
the author prevent accidental infection and the dis-assembly of the
|
||
code is extremely difficult. Upon request from the anti-viral
|
||
community, Virus-90 is now only available to approved anti-virus
|
||
researchers."
|
||
|
||
Also see: Virus101
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Virus101
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Research
|
||
Discovered: January, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: TSR, BSC, .COM growth (floppy only)
|
||
Origin: District of Columbia, USA
|
||
Eff Length: 2,560 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRAFK - Parasitic Resident Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan/X V67+, Pro-Scan 1.4+, F-Prot 1.12+, VirHunt 2.0+,
|
||
NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D/X or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Virus101 is the "big brother" of Virus-90, also written by
|
||
Patrick Toulme as an "educational tool" in January 1990.
|
||
This virus is memory resident, and employs an encryption scheme
|
||
to avoid detection on files. It infects COMMAND.COM, and all
|
||
other executable file types. Once it has infected all the
|
||
files on a diskette, it will infect the diskette's boot
|
||
sector. It only infects floppy diskettes in its current
|
||
version.
|
||
|
||
The following description was submitted by Patrick Toulme for
|
||
inclusion in this listing in November 1990:
|
||
|
||
"Virus-101 is a sophisticated, continually encrypting, research
|
||
virus written by Patrick Toulme, author of Virus-90. Virus-101
|
||
infects both COM and EXE files and will evade most anti-virus
|
||
software and will continually encrypt itself to prevent
|
||
non-algorithmic search scans. This virus is not available to the
|
||
general public and is presently used by government agencies and
|
||
corporate security departments to test anti-virus software and
|
||
hardware devices."
|
||
|
||
Also see: Virus-90
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Voronezh
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: December 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth; decrease in total system and available memory
|
||
Origin: USSR
|
||
Eff Length: 1,600 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRhA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V74+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Voronezh Virus was received in December, 1990. It is originally
|
||
from the USSR. Voronezh is a memory resident infector of .COM and
|
||
.EXE files, and does not infect COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with Voronezh is executed the virus
|
||
will install itself memory resident. This virus will be resident at
|
||
the top of system memory but below the 640K DOS boundary. While the
|
||
virus reserves 3,744 bytes of memory for itself, it does not move the
|
||
interrupt 12 return. Interrupt 21 will be hooked by the virus. This
|
||
virus may also reserve 24 bytes of display memory on the display
|
||
adapter card.
|
||
|
||
After Voronezh is memory resident, .COM and .EXE files will be
|
||
infected when they are executed. Infected files will increase in
|
||
length by 1,600 bytes, the virus will be located at the end of
|
||
infected programs. Infected programs will also contain the
|
||
text string:
|
||
|
||
"Voronezh,1990 2.01".
|
||
|
||
It is unknown if this virus does anything besides replicate.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of Voronezh are:
|
||
Voronezh B: Similar to the Voronezh Virus described above, the major
|
||
difference with Voronezh B is that Voronezh B will infect files
|
||
when they are executed or openned for any reason. The original
|
||
virus did not infect on file open. The text string indicated
|
||
for Voronezh is also found in this variant.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: VP
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: May 1990
|
||
Symptoms: COMMAND.COM & .COM file growth, system slowdown
|
||
Origin: England
|
||
Eff Length: 913 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNCK - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V64+, Pro-Scan 1.4+, AVTK 3.5+, F-Prot 1.12+,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, Pro-Scan 1.4+, F-Prot 1.12+, VirHunt 2.0+, or
|
||
Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The VP Virus was first isolated in May, 1990. It is a non-resident
|
||
generic .COM infector, and will infect COMMAND.COM. When an
|
||
infected program is run, the virus will attempt to locate and
|
||
infect another .COM file. In some cases, such as COMMAND.COM, the
|
||
virus will display the contents of the program being infected. In
|
||
other cases, the virus may attempt to execute the program being
|
||
infected. Infected files increase in length by 913 bytes, and
|
||
can be identified as the following hex string will appear near both
|
||
the beginning and the end of an infected program: '4503EB1808655650'.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: W13
|
||
Aliases: Toothless Virus, W13-A
|
||
V Status: Endangered
|
||
Discovered: December, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth
|
||
Origin: Poland
|
||
Eff Length: 534 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNC - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V63+, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirexPC,
|
||
AVTK 3.5+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, F-Prot, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV,
|
||
or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The W13 virus is a .COM file infector that doesn't do much
|
||
except for infect files. The virus was isolated in December
|
||
1989 in Poland.
|
||
|
||
While W13 is based on the Vienna virus, it does not damage files
|
||
or have some of the other side effects of the Vienna virus. It
|
||
contains a number of bugs which prevent it from being a good
|
||
replicator.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of W13 include:
|
||
W13-B : The original W13 Virus with several bugs fixed. This
|
||
variants length is 507 bytes instead of 534 bytes.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Westwood
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: August, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth; TSR; system slowdown; black window;
|
||
file deletion on Friday The 13ths
|
||
Origin: Westwood, California, USA
|
||
Eff Length: 1,819 - 1,829 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V67+, F-Prot 1.12+, Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, CleanUp, NAV, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Westwood Virus was isolated in August, 1990 in Westwood, California.
|
||
This virus is a substantially altered variant of the Jerusalem B virus,
|
||
enough so that all anti-virals tested which could detect Jerusalem B
|
||
were unable to identify it. Like Jerusalem, it infects .COM, .EXE, and
|
||
overlay files, but not COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Westwood virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will install itself memory resident as a low system memory
|
||
TSR of 1,808 bytes. Interrupts 8 and 21 will be hooked. If the
|
||
system date happens to be a Friday The 13th, interrupt 22 will also
|
||
be hooked.
|
||
|
||
After the virus is memory resident, any program which is executed
|
||
will become infected with the Westwood virus. .COM files will
|
||
increase by 1,829 bytes with the virus's code located at the beginning
|
||
of the infected program. .EXE files and overlay files are infected
|
||
with the virus's code added to the end of the program. .EXE files
|
||
increase in length by between 1,819 and 1,829 bytes. Unlike most
|
||
variants of the Jerusalem virus, Westwood does not reinfect .EXE files.
|
||
|
||
Infected systems will experience a system slowdown occurring after
|
||
the virus has been memory resident for 30 minutes. At this time, the
|
||
"black window" or "black box" common to the Jerusalem virus will
|
||
appear on the lower left hand side of the system display. Screen
|
||
contain around the area of the "box" may be corrupted if screen writes
|
||
happened to be occurring when the box appeared.
|
||
|
||
On Friday The 13ths, the Westwood Virus will delete any programs that
|
||
are executed once the virus becomes memory resident.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Jerusalem B
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Whale
|
||
Aliases: Mother Fish, Stealth Virus, Z The Whale
|
||
V Status: Research
|
||
Discovered: August, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth; decrease in available memory;
|
||
system slowdown; video flicker; slow screen writes;
|
||
file allocation errors; simulated system reboot
|
||
Origin: Hamburg, West Germany
|
||
Eff Length: 9,216 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRhA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V67+, Pro-Scan 2.01+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, CleanUp V67+, Pro-Scan 2.01+,
|
||
or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Whale Virus was submitted in early September, 1990. This virus
|
||
had been rumored to exist since the isolation of the Fish 6 Virus in
|
||
June, 1990. It has been referred to by several names besides Whale,
|
||
including Mother Fish and Z The Whale. The origin of this virus is
|
||
subject to some speculation, though it is probably from Hamburg,
|
||
West Germany due to a reference within the viral code once it is
|
||
decrypted.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Whale Virus is executed,
|
||
the Whale will install itself memory resident in high system memory
|
||
but below the 640K DOS boundary. On the author's XT clone, the
|
||
virus always starts at address 9D90. Available free memory will
|
||
be decreased by 9,984 bytes. Most utilities which display memory
|
||
usage will also indicate a value for total system memory which is
|
||
9,984 bytes less than what is actually installed.
|
||
|
||
The following text string can be found in memory on systems
|
||
infected with the Whale virus:
|
||
|
||
"Z THE WHALE".
|
||
|
||
Immediately upon becoming memory resident, the system user will
|
||
experience the system slowing down. Noticeable effects of the
|
||
system slowdown include video flicker to extremely slow screen
|
||
writes. Some programs may appear to "hang", though they will
|
||
eventually execute properly in most cases since the "hang" is due
|
||
to the slowing of the system.
|
||
|
||
When a program is executed with the Whale memory resident, the virus
|
||
will infect the program. Infected programs increase in length, the
|
||
actual change in length is usually 9,216 bytes. Note the "usually":
|
||
this virus does occasionally infect a program with a "mutant" which
|
||
will be a different length. If the file length increase is exactly
|
||
9,216 bytes, the Whale will hide the change in file length when a
|
||
disk directory command is executed. If the file length of the viral
|
||
code added to the program is other than 9,216 bytes, the file length
|
||
displayed with the directory command will either the actual infected
|
||
file length, or the actual infected file length minus 9,216 bytes.
|
||
|
||
Executing the DOS CHKDSK program on infected systems will result in
|
||
file allocation errors being reported. If CHKDSK /F is executed,
|
||
file damage will result.
|
||
|
||
The Whale also alters the program's date/time in the directory when
|
||
the file is executed, though it is not set to the system date/time
|
||
of infection. Occasionally, Whale will alter the directory entry
|
||
for the program it is infecting improperly, resulting in the directory
|
||
entry becoming invalid. These programs with invalid directory
|
||
entries will appear when the directory is listed, but some disk
|
||
utilities will not allow access to the program. In these cases, the
|
||
directory entry can be fixed with Norton Utilities FD command to
|
||
reset the file date.
|
||
|
||
The Whale occasionally will change its behavior while it is memory
|
||
resident. While most of the time it only infects files when
|
||
executed, there are periods of time when it will infect any file
|
||
opened for any reason. It will also, at times, disinfect files
|
||
when they are copied with the DOS copy command, at other times it
|
||
will not "disinfect on the fly".
|
||
|
||
Occasionally, the Whale Virus will simulate what appears to be a
|
||
system reboot. While this doesn't always occur, when it does occur
|
||
the Break key is disabled so that the user cannot exit unexpectedly
|
||
from the execution of the system's AutoExec.Bat file. If the
|
||
AutoExec.Bat file contained any software which does file opens of
|
||
other executable programs, those opened executable programs will
|
||
be infected at that time if they were not previously infected.
|
||
Typically, files infected in this manner will increase by 9,216
|
||
bytes though it will not be shown in a directory listing.
|
||
|
||
A hidden file may be found in the root directory of drive C: on
|
||
infected files. This file is not always present, the virus will
|
||
sometimes remove it, only to recreate it again at a later time.
|
||
The name of this hidden file is FISH-#9.TBL, it contains an
|
||
image of the hard disk's partition table along with the following
|
||
message:
|
||
|
||
"Fish Virus #9
|
||
A Whale is no Fish!
|
||
Mind her Mutant Fish
|
||
and the hidden Fish Eggs
|
||
for they are damaging.
|
||
The sixth Fish mutates
|
||
only if the Whale is in
|
||
her Cave."
|
||
|
||
After the discovery of this hidden file, the author of this
|
||
document made several attempt to have the Fish 6 Virus mutate
|
||
by introducing it and Whale into a system. Under no circumstances
|
||
did a mutation of either virus result, the resultant files were
|
||
infected with both an identifiable Fish 6 infection and a Whale
|
||
infection.
|
||
|
||
Whale is hostile to debuggers and contains many traps to prevent
|
||
successful decryption of the virus. One of its "traps" is to lock
|
||
out the keyboard if it determines a debugger is in use.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Wisconsin
|
||
Aliases: Death To Pascal
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: September, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth; Message; Write Protect Errors; .PAS files
|
||
disappear; file date/time changes
|
||
Origin: Wisconsin, USA
|
||
Eff Length: 825 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNC - Parasitic Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V67+, Pro-Scan 2.01+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Wisconsin Virus was received in September, 1990. The origin of
|
||
the sample was Wisconsin, which is where its name came from. It is
|
||
also reported to have been isolated at about this same time in
|
||
California. Wisconsin is a non-resident infector of .COM files, but
|
||
it does not infect COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the Wisconsin Virus is executed, the virus
|
||
will alter the date and time of the program being executed to the
|
||
current system date and time. The Wisconsin Virus will then infect
|
||
one other .COM file in the current directory. Infected files will
|
||
increase in length by 825 bytes, with the viral code located at the
|
||
beginning of the file.
|
||
|
||
If an attempt is made to execute a program infected with the Wisconsin
|
||
virus from a write-protected diskette, a write protect error will
|
||
occur. This virus does not intercept this error.
|
||
|
||
Infected programs may display the following message:
|
||
|
||
"Death to Pascal."
|
||
|
||
When this message is displayed, any .PAS files located in the
|
||
current directory will be deleted. This message cannot be seen in
|
||
infected files as it is encrypted.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Wolfman
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: July, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: TSR; .COM & .EXE growth
|
||
Origin: Taiwan
|
||
Eff Length: 2,064 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V66+, Pro-Scan 2.01+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Wolfman Virus was discovered in Taiwan in July, 1990. It is a
|
||
memory resident generic infector of .COM and .EXE files, but not
|
||
COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Wolfman Virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will install itself memory resident as a TSR with 2 blocks
|
||
of memory reserved. The first block of memory reserved is 68,032
|
||
bytes in length, the second block of reserved memory is 4,544 bytes
|
||
in length. The total 72,640 bytes of memory is in low system memory,
|
||
and available free memory is decreased by a corresponding amount.
|
||
The virus hooks interrupts 09, 10, 16, 21, 2F, ED, and F5.
|
||
|
||
Once the virus is memory resident, the virus will infect any .COM or
|
||
.EXE file which is executed if the pre-infection file length is
|
||
greater than or equal to 2,064 bytes. Infected files increase in
|
||
length by 2,064 bytes. .COM files which are infected will have the
|
||
virus's code located at the beginning of the .COM file, .EXE files
|
||
will have the virus located at the end. Infected files will have
|
||
their date and time in the disk directory altered to the system
|
||
date and time when infection occurred.
|
||
|
||
It is unknown when Wolfman activates, or if it is destructive.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of Wolfman include:
|
||
Wolfman 2: This variant is fairly similar to the Wolfman Virus. Its
|
||
memory resident TSR is 67,984 bytes, and it hooks interrupts
|
||
09, 10, 16, 21, CF, D1, D3, and several others. Files
|
||
smaller than 5,120 bytes will not be infected by the virus.
|
||
Infected .EXE files will contain the text string "WOlf_mAN",
|
||
though this string cannot be found in infected .COM programs
|
||
as it will be encrypted.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Yankee Doodle
|
||
Aliases: TP44VIR, Five O'clock Virus
|
||
V Status: Common - Europe
|
||
Discovered: September, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth, melody @ 5 p.m.
|
||
Origin: Austria or Bulgaria
|
||
Eff Length: 2,885 or 2,899 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsA - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V42+, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan, VirexPC,
|
||
AVTK 3.5+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: CleanUp V64+, Scan/D, VirClean, F-Prot, NAV, or
|
||
delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Yankee Doodle virus was isolated by Alexander Holy of
|
||
the North Atlantic Project in Vienna, Austria, on
|
||
September 30, 1989. It was also isolated in Bulgaria shortly
|
||
thereafter, where it is known as TP44VIR.
|
||
|
||
This virus is a parasitic virus which infects both .COM and .EXE
|
||
files, and installs itself memory resident. After installing itself
|
||
memory resident, it will play Yankee Doodle on the system speaker at
|
||
17:00. Infected programs will be increased in length by 2,899 bytes.
|
||
|
||
Other than being disruptive by playing Yankee Doodle, this
|
||
virus currently does nothing else harmful besides infecting
|
||
files.
|
||
|
||
As a side note, some variants of the Yankee Doodle Virus will seek
|
||
out and modify Ping Pong viruses, changing them so that they self-
|
||
destruct after 100 infections.
|
||
|
||
Known variants of the Yankee Doodle Virus are:
|
||
TP33VIR - This variant disables interrupts 1 and 3, thus interfering
|
||
with using debuggers to isolate it. The behavior of the
|
||
virus also has been changed so that it infected programs
|
||
will play Yankee Doodle at 5PM. The second to the last
|
||
byte in infected files is the virus's "version number",
|
||
in the case of TP33VIR, it is 21h (33 in hex).
|
||
TP34VIR - Similar to TP33VIR, except that this variant is memory
|
||
resident, and infects programs as they are executed.
|
||
The second to the last byte in infected files is 22h.
|
||
TP38VIR - Similar to TP34VIR, except that .COM and .EXE files are
|
||
handled in a different way, and this variant will
|
||
disinfect itself if it is loaded with CodeView active in
|
||
memory. The second to the last byte in infected files
|
||
is 26h. TP38VIR was first isolated in Bulgaria in
|
||
July 1988, and is the oldest virus known in Bulgaria.
|
||
TP41VIR - Similar to TP38VIR, except the second to the last byte
|
||
in infected files is 29h.
|
||
TP42VIR - This variant of Vacsina tests to determine if the system
|
||
is infected with the Ping Pong virus, and if it is, will
|
||
attempt to disable the Ping Pong virus by modifying it.
|
||
The second to the last byte in infected files is now 2Ah.
|
||
TP44VIR - Similar to TP42VIR, the second to the last byte of infected
|
||
files is 2Ch.
|
||
TP45VIR - Similar to TP44VIR, the second to the last byte of infected
|
||
files is 2Dh.
|
||
TP46VIR - Similar to TP45VIR, except that this variant can detect
|
||
and kill the Cascade (1701) Virus. The second to the last
|
||
byte of infected files is now 2Eh.
|
||
Yankee Doodle-B: Very similar to the Yankee Doodle virus, except
|
||
the length of the viral code is 2,772 bytes.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Vacsina
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Yankee 2
|
||
Aliases: Yankee Virus, Yankee-go-Home, 1961
|
||
V Status: Endangered
|
||
Discovered: September, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: .EXE growth, Yankee Doodle
|
||
Origin: Bulgaria
|
||
Eff Length: 1,961 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PNE - Parasitic Non-Resident .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V62+, Virex PC, AVTK 3.5+, VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Yankee 2, or Yankee Virus, was isolated in Bulgaria
|
||
in 1989. Unlike the Yankee Doodle Virus, the Yankee 2
|
||
Virus is not memory resident. It also only infects .EXE files,
|
||
adding 1,961 bytes to their length. The virus will attempt to
|
||
infect an .EXE file in the current directory whenever an
|
||
infected program is executed. If it is successful in locating
|
||
an uninfected .EXE file, and infects it, Yankee Doodle will be
|
||
played on the system speaker. Infected files will have the
|
||
hex string '6D6F746865726675636B6572' at the end.
|
||
|
||
The Yankee 2 Virus will not infect CodeView.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of the Yankee 2 virus are:
|
||
1624 - This variant is similar to Yankee 2 in function, the major
|
||
change is that its effective length is 1,624 bytes.
|
||
|
||
Also see: Enigma
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Yap Virus
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: New
|
||
Discovered: March, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth; TSR; "Bugs" may appear in screen;
|
||
Decrease in available free memory
|
||
Origin: USA
|
||
Eff Length: 6,258 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsCK - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: ViruScan V75+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Yap Virus was discovered in March, 1991, in the United States.
|
||
Yap is a memory resident .COM file infector. It will infect
|
||
COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with the Yap Virus is executed, the
|
||
virus will install itself memory resident as a low system memory TSR
|
||
of 11,344 bytes. Interrupts 09 and 21 will be hooked by the virus.
|
||
|
||
After Yap is memory resident, it will infect .COM programs as they
|
||
are executed. If COMMAND.COM is executed, it will become infected.
|
||
.COM Programs infected with Yap will increase in size by 6,258 bytes.
|
||
The virus will be located at the end of infected programs. The file's
|
||
date and time in the disk directory will not be altered.
|
||
|
||
With the Yap Virus memory resident, if the system user holds down the
|
||
ALT key, or presses the ALT key and another key in combination,
|
||
numerous graphic "bugs" will appear on the screen which will eat the
|
||
contents of the system display. Pressing the ALT key, or ALT key
|
||
combination, again will result in the system's display being restored.
|
||
|
||
Yap is an encrypted virus, using encryption very similar to that
|
||
employed by the Cascade Virus and its variants.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Yukon Overwriting
|
||
Aliases:
|
||
V Status: Rare
|
||
Discovered: January, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: Divide Overflow errors; Beginning of Programs Overwritten
|
||
Origin: Canada
|
||
Eff Length: 151 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: ONCK - Overwriting Non-Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method:
|
||
Removal Instructions: Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Yukon Overwriting Virus was isolated in January, 1991 in Canada.
|
||
This virus is a non-resident overwriting virus that infects .COM files,
|
||
including COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
When a program infected with the Yukon Overwriting Virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will infect all .COM programs in the current directory.
|
||
Infected programs will have the first 151 bytes of the program
|
||
overwritten with the virus. Their date and time in the disk directory
|
||
will not be altered in the process of infection.
|
||
|
||
After infecting all of the .COM files in the current directory, the
|
||
program the user was attempting to execute will fail with a Divide
|
||
Overflow error.
|
||
|
||
Infected programs can be easily identified because the text string
|
||
Divide Overflow$ will be located beginning at offset 87h within the
|
||
infected program.
|
||
|
||
Programs infected with the Yukon Overwriting Virus cannot be
|
||
disinfected as the portion overwritten by the virus is not stored.
|
||
Infected programs must be deleted and replaced with uninfected copies.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: Zero Bug
|
||
Aliases: Palette, 1536
|
||
V Status: Endangered
|
||
Discovered: September, 1989
|
||
Symptoms: .COM growth (see text), TSR, graphics display
|
||
Origin: Netherlands
|
||
Eff Length: 1,536 bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRsC - Parasitic Resident .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: Viruscan/X V67+, F-Prot, Pro-Scan 1.4+, VirexPC, AVTK 3.5+,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, NAV
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D/X, CleanUp V66+, F-Prot, Pro-Scan 1.4+,
|
||
VirHunt 2.0+, or delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The Zero Bug virus was first isolated in the Netherlands by
|
||
Jan Terpstra in September, 1989. This virus is a memory
|
||
resident .COM file infector. Infected .COM files will
|
||
increase in size by 1,536 bytes, however the increase in file
|
||
length will not show up when the disk directory is displayed.
|
||
|
||
The virus's main objective is to infect the copy of
|
||
COMMAND.COM indicated by the environment variable COMSPEC.
|
||
If COMSPEC doesn't point to anything, the Zero Bug virus will
|
||
install itself memory resident using INT 21h.
|
||
|
||
After the virus has either infected COMMAND.COM or become
|
||
memory resident, it will infect all .COM files that are
|
||
accessed, including those accessed by actions such as COPY or
|
||
XCOPY. Any .COM file created on an infected system will also
|
||
be infected.
|
||
|
||
If the currently loaded COMMAND.COM is infected, the virus
|
||
will hook into the timer interrupt 1Ch, and after a certain
|
||
amount of time has past, a smiley face character (ASCII 01)
|
||
will appear and eat all the zeros it can find on the screen.
|
||
The virus does not delete files or format disks in its present
|
||
form.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: ZeroHunt
|
||
Aliases: Minnow, Stealth
|
||
V Status: Research
|
||
Discovered: December, 1990
|
||
Symptoms: Internal changes to COM files
|
||
Origin: USA
|
||
Eff Length: 416 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRCK - Parasitic Overwriting .COM Infector
|
||
Detection Method: Viruscan V72+, Pro-Scan 2.01+
|
||
Removal Instructions: Scan/D, Pro-Scan 2.01+, or Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The ZeroHunt, or Minnow, Virus was submitted in December, 1990 by
|
||
Paul Ferguson of Washington, DC. ZeroHunt is a memory resident
|
||
overwriting infector of COM files, including COMMAND.COM. This virus
|
||
is classified as a Stealth Virus.
|
||
|
||
When the first program infected with the ZeroHunt Virus is executed,
|
||
the virus will install itself memory resident in the command environment
|
||
area. It occupies approximately 200 bytes of memory and hooks a number
|
||
of interrupts, including interrupt 21 by remapping.
|
||
|
||
Once ZeroHunt is memory resident, it waits for a COM file to be openned
|
||
or executed which contains 416 or more bytes of 00h characters. These
|
||
characters usually are stack space in the file, and most commonly occur
|
||
in EXE files which have been converted to COM files. If the candidate
|
||
COM file contains enough 00h characters, ZeroHunt will infect the file
|
||
by writing its viral code over the first 416 bytes of the 00h characters.
|
||
ZeroHunt then alters the first four bytes of the newly infected file so
|
||
that upon execution its viral code will execute first.
|
||
|
||
Like other Stealth class viruses, ZeroHunt will disinfect the file on
|
||
the fly, so that the virus cannot be detected in files if it is memory
|
||
resident. Since infected files have been infected internally by over-
|
||
writing stack space, there will be no change in infected file length.
|
||
|
||
ZeroHunt carries no activation criteria at the present time, it just
|
||
replicates.
|
||
|
||
Known variant(s) of ZeroHunt include:
|
||
ZeroHunt B: Based on the ZeroHunt virus, this variant becomes memory
|
||
resident in 1,408 bytes of reserved low system memory. It
|
||
hooks interrupts 21, 25, 26, and several others. It
|
||
infects .COM programs when they are executed provided that
|
||
a block of at least 411 bytes of binary zeros can be found
|
||
within the candidate program. If the block is found, then
|
||
the virus will overwrite the last 411 bytes of binary
|
||
zeros in the block, and alter the first four characters of
|
||
the program so that the viral code will be executed first.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Virus Name: ZK900
|
||
Aliases: Pray
|
||
V Status: New
|
||
Discovered: April, 1991
|
||
Symptoms: .COM & .EXE growth; Decrease in total system & available memory;
|
||
Music
|
||
Origin: USA
|
||
Eff Length: 900 Bytes
|
||
Type Code: PRhAK - Parasitic Resident .COM & .EXE Infector
|
||
Detection Method:
|
||
Removal Instructions: Delete infected files
|
||
General Comments:
|
||
The ZK900 Virus was received in April, 1991, from David Chess of IBM.
|
||
ZK900 is a memory resident .COM and .EXE infector, and will infect
|
||
COMMAND.COM.
|
||
|
||
The first time a program infected with ZK900 is executed, the virus
|
||
will install itself memory resident at the top of system memory but
|
||
below the 640K DOS boundary. Interrupts 1C and 21 will be hooked by
|
||
the virus.
|
||
|
||
After becoming memory resident, ZK900 will infect .COM and .EXE
|
||
programs as they are executed. If COMMAND.COM is executed, it will
|
||
become infected. Infected programs will increase in size by 900 bytes
|
||
with the virus being located at the end of the file. The program's
|
||
date and time in the disk directory will not be altered by the virus.
|
||
Infected programs will end with the text characters "zx".
|
||
|
||
Systems infected with ZK900 may experience a tune being played every
|
||
three to five minutes on the system speaker. The tune is the children's
|
||
rhyme "Pray for the dead, and the dead will pray for you".
|
||
|
||
|
||
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Virus Information Summary List
|
||
Virus Common Name Cross-Reference
|
||
|
||
The following is a cross-reference of common virus names back to
|
||
the name they are listed by in the virus information section.
|
||
Hopefully, this cross-reference will alleviate some confusion when
|
||
different anti-viral software packages refer to different names for
|
||
the same virus.
|
||
|
||
Virus Name Refer To Virus(es) In VirusSum.Doc:
|
||
---------------------- -----------------------------------------------
|
||
@ Virus Turbo 448
|
||
62-B Vienna
|
||
100 Years Virus 4096
|
||
163 COM Virus Tiny Virus
|
||
217 Polish 217
|
||
333 Kennedy
|
||
382 382 Recovery Virus
|
||
382 Recovery Virus 382 Recovery Virus
|
||
405 405
|
||
437 VFSI
|
||
453 RPVS
|
||
500 Virus Golden Gate
|
||
505 Burger
|
||
509 Burger
|
||
512 512
|
||
512-A 512
|
||
512-B 512
|
||
512-C 512
|
||
512-D 512
|
||
512-E 512
|
||
512-F 512
|
||
512 Virus Friday The 13th COM Virus
|
||
529 Polish 529
|
||
541 Burger
|
||
555 Dutch 555
|
||
623 VHP2
|
||
632 Saratoga
|
||
637 Vcomm
|
||
642 Icelandic
|
||
646 646
|
||
648 Vienna
|
||
765 Perfume
|
||
834 Virus 834 Virus
|
||
834-B 834 Virus
|
||
867 Typo COM
|
||
903 903
|
||
944 Dot Killer
|
||
1008 1008
|
||
1022 Fellowship
|
||
1024-B Nomenklatura
|
||
1075 Crash
|
||
1168 Datacrime-B
|
||
1210 1210
|
||
1226 1226
|
||
1226D 1226D
|
||
1226M 1226D
|
||
1253 1253
|
||
1260 1260
|
||
1280 Datacrime
|
||
1374 Little Pieces
|
||
1381 Virus 1381 Virus
|
||
1381-B 1381 Virus
|
||
1392 1392
|
||
1514 Datacrime II
|
||
1536 Zero Bug
|
||
1539 Christmas Virus
|
||
1554 1554
|
||
1559 1554
|
||
1575 1575
|
||
1575-B 1575
|
||
1575-C 1575
|
||
1577 1575
|
||
1591 1575
|
||
1605 1605
|
||
1605-B 1605
|
||
1624 Yankee 2
|
||
1701 Cascade
|
||
1704 Cascade, Cascade-B
|
||
1704 Format 1704 Format
|
||
1704-B Cascade B
|
||
1720 1720
|
||
17Y4 Cascade
|
||
1808 Jerusalem
|
||
1813 Jerusalem
|
||
1917 Datacrime IIB
|
||
1961 Yankee 2
|
||
1971 Eight Tunes
|
||
2080 Fu Manchu
|
||
2086 Fu Manchu
|
||
2100 V2100
|
||
2131 2131
|
||
2480 Crew-2480
|
||
2576 Taiwan 4
|
||
2930 Traceback II
|
||
2930-B Traceback II
|
||
3012 Plastique
|
||
3066 Traceback
|
||
3066-B Traceback
|
||
3066-B2 Traceback
|
||
3551 SysLock
|
||
3555 SysLock
|
||
3880 Itavir
|
||
4096 4096
|
||
4096-B 4096
|
||
4096-C 4096
|
||
4711 Perfume
|
||
4870 Overwriting 4870 Overwriting
|
||
5120 5120
|
||
8920 Print Screen
|
||
909090h Virus Burger
|
||
9800:0000 Virus 1554
|
||
A-204 Jerusalem B
|
||
Advent Syslock
|
||
Arf Arf
|
||
AIDS AIDS
|
||
AIDS II AIDS II
|
||
AirCop AirCop
|
||
Akuku Akuku
|
||
Alabama Alabama
|
||
Alameda Alameda
|
||
Ambulance Car Ambulance Car
|
||
Amoeba Virus 1392
|
||
Amstrad Amstrad
|
||
Anarkia Jerusalem B
|
||
Anarkia-B Jerusalem B
|
||
Anthrax Anthrax
|
||
AntiCad 1253
|
||
Anti-Pascal Anti-Pascal
|
||
Anti-Pascal 400 Anti-Pascal II
|
||
Anti-Pascal 440 Anti-Pascal II
|
||
Anti-Pascal 480 Anti-Pascal II
|
||
Anti-Pascal 529 Anti-Pascal
|
||
Anti-Pascal 605 Anti-Pascal
|
||
Anti-Pascal II Anti-Pascal II
|
||
AntiChrist AntiChrist
|
||
AP-400 Anti-Pascal II
|
||
AP-440 Anti-Pascal II
|
||
AP-480 Anti-Pascal II
|
||
AP-529 Anti-Pascal
|
||
AP-605 Anti-Pascal
|
||
April 1st Suriv 1.01
|
||
April 1st-B Suriv 2.01
|
||
Arab 834 Virus
|
||
Arab Star Jerusalem B
|
||
Armagedon Armagedon
|
||
Armagedon The First Armagedon
|
||
Armagedon The Greek Armagedon
|
||
Ashar Ashar
|
||
Attention! Attention!
|
||
Australian 403 Australian 403
|
||
Austrian Vienna
|
||
Azusa Azusa
|
||
Basic Virus 5120
|
||
Best Wish Best Wishes
|
||
Best Wishes Best Wishes
|
||
Best Wishes B Best Wishes
|
||
Black Avenger Dark Avenger
|
||
Black Friday Jerusalem
|
||
Black Monday Black Monday
|
||
Blackjack Cascade-B
|
||
Blood Blood
|
||
Blood 2 Blood
|
||
Bloody! Bloody!
|
||
Boot Ping Pong-B
|
||
Bouncing Ball Ping Pong
|
||
Bouncing Dot Ping Pong
|
||
Brain Brain
|
||
Brain Slayer Slayer Family
|
||
Burger Burger
|
||
C-605 Anti-Pascal
|
||
Captain Trips Jerusalem B
|
||
Carioca Carioca
|
||
Cascade Cascade
|
||
Cascade-B Cascade-B
|
||
Casino Casino
|
||
Casper Casper
|
||
Century Virus 4096
|
||
Chaos Chaos
|
||
Choinka Father Christmas
|
||
Christmas In Japan Christmas In Japan
|
||
Christmas Violator Violator B4
|
||
Christmas Virus Christmas Virus
|
||
CIA Burger
|
||
Columbus Day Datacrime, Datacrime II, Datacrime IIB, Datacrime-B
|
||
COM Virus Friday The 13th COM Virus
|
||
Computer Ogre Disk Killer
|
||
Cookie Cookie
|
||
Cracker Jack Enigma
|
||
Crash Crash
|
||
Crew-2480 Crew-2480
|
||
Cunning Cascade
|
||
Cursy Cursy
|
||
Dark Avenger Dark Avenger
|
||
Dark Avenger-B Dark Avenger
|
||
Dark Avenger II V2000
|
||
Dark Avenger III V1024
|
||
Datacrime Datacrime
|
||
Datacrime II Datacrime II
|
||
Datacrime IIB Datacrime IIB
|
||
Datacrime-B Datacrime-B
|
||
DataLock DataLock
|
||
DataLock 1.00 DataLock
|
||
DBase DBase
|
||
DBF Virus DBase
|
||
Dead Kennedy Kennedy
|
||
Death To Pascal Wisconsin
|
||
December 24th Icelandic-III
|
||
Deicide Deicide
|
||
Den Zuk Den Zuk
|
||
Destructor Destructor V4.00
|
||
Destructor V4.00 Destructor V4.00
|
||
Devil's Dance Devil's Dance
|
||
Diamond V1024
|
||
Diamond-B V1024
|
||
Diana Dark Avenger
|
||
Die Young Virus V2000
|
||
Dir Virus Dir Virus
|
||
Discom Discom
|
||
Disk Crunching Virus Icelandic, Saratoga
|
||
Disk Killer Disk Killer
|
||
Disk Ogre Disk Killer
|
||
Do-Nothing Virus Do-Nothing Virus
|
||
Donald Duck Stoned
|
||
DOS-62 Vienna
|
||
DOS-68 Vienna
|
||
Durban Saturday The 14TH
|
||
Dutch 555 Dutch 555
|
||
Dyslexia Solano 2000
|
||
Dyslexia 2.00 Solano 2000
|
||
Dyslexia 2.01 Solano 2000
|
||
EB 21 Print Screen
|
||
Eddie Dark Avenger
|
||
Eddie Virus Dark Avenger
|
||
Eddie 3 V651
|
||
EDV EDV
|
||
Eight Tunes Eight Tunes
|
||
Enigma Enigma
|
||
European Fish Viruses Fish Virus
|
||
Evil Evil
|
||
Evil-B Evil
|
||
F-Word Virus F-Word Virus
|
||
Fall Cascade
|
||
Falling Letters Cascade, Ping Pong-B
|
||
Falling Letters Boot Swap Boot
|
||
Father Christmas Father Christmas
|
||
Fellowship Fellowship
|
||
Fish 6 Fish Virus
|
||
Fish Virus Fish Virus
|
||
Five O'Clock Virus Yankee Doodle
|
||
Flash Flash
|
||
Flip Flip
|
||
Flip B Flip
|
||
Form FORM-Virus
|
||
Form Boot FORM-Virus
|
||
FORM-Virus FORM-Virus
|
||
Frere Virus Frere Jacques
|
||
Frere Jacques Frere Jacques
|
||
Friday 13th Jerusalem
|
||
Friday 13th COM Virus Friday The 13th COM Virus
|
||
Friday 13th-B Friday The 13th COM Virus
|
||
Friday 13th-C Friday The 13th COM Virus
|
||
FroDo 4096
|
||
Frog Frog's Alley
|
||
Frog's Alley Frog's Alley
|
||
Fu Manchu Fu Manchu
|
||
Fuck You F-Word
|
||
Fumble Typo COM
|
||
G-Virus V1.3 Sorry
|
||
Ghost Boot Ghostballs
|
||
Ghost COM Ghostballs
|
||
Ghostballs Ghostballs
|
||
Glenn Deicide
|
||
Golden Gate Golden Gate
|
||
Grither Grither
|
||
Green Left Virus Groen Links
|
||
Groen Links Groen Links
|
||
Guppy Guppy
|
||
Guppy-B Guppy
|
||
Hahaha AIDS
|
||
Halloechen Halloechen
|
||
Hammelburg 405
|
||
Happy Birthday Joshi Joshi
|
||
Happy N.Y. Happy New Year, Happy New Year B
|
||
Happy New Year Happy New Year
|
||
Happy New Year Happy New Year B
|
||
Hawaii Stoned
|
||
Hebrew University Jerusalem B
|
||
Hemp Virus Stoned
|
||
HIV HIV
|
||
HM2 Plastique
|
||
Holland Girl Holland Girl
|
||
Holland Girl 2 Holland Girl 2
|
||
Holo Holocaust
|
||
Holocaust Holocaust
|
||
Hybrid Hybryd
|
||
Hybryd Hybryd
|
||
Hymn Hymn
|
||
Hymn-2 Sverdlov
|
||
Icelandic Icelandic
|
||
Icelandic-II Icelandic-II
|
||
Icelandic-III Icelandic-III
|
||
Ick IKV 528
|
||
IDF Virus 4096
|
||
IKV 528 IKV 528
|
||
Internal 1381 Virus
|
||
Invader Invader
|
||
Iraqui Iraqui Warrior
|
||
Iraqui Warrior Iraqui Warrior
|
||
Israeli Jerusalem, Suriv 1.01, Suriv 2.01, Suriv 3.00
|
||
Israeli Boot Swap
|
||
Italian Ping Pong
|
||
Italian 803 Italian 803
|
||
Italian 803-B Italian 803
|
||
Italian-A Ping Pong, Ping Pong B
|
||
Itavir Itavir
|
||
Jeff Jeff
|
||
Jerk Jerk
|
||
Jerusalem Jerusalem
|
||
Jerusalem A Jerusalem
|
||
Jerusalem B Jerusalem B
|
||
Jerusalem C Jerusalem B
|
||
Jerusalem D Jerusalem B
|
||
Jerusalem DC Jerusalem B
|
||
Jerusalem E Jerusalem B
|
||
Jerusalem E2 Jerusalem B
|
||
Jocker Joker
|
||
JoJo JoJo
|
||
JoJo 2 JoJo 2
|
||
Joker Joker
|
||
Joshi Joshi
|
||
July 13TH July 13TH
|
||
June 16TH June 16TH
|
||
Kamasya Kamasya
|
||
Kamikazi Kamikazi
|
||
Kemerovo Kemerovo
|
||
Kemerovo Kemerovo-B
|
||
Kennedy Kennedy
|
||
Keypress Keypress
|
||
Korea Korea
|
||
Kukac Turbo Kukac
|
||
Lazy Lazy
|
||
LBC Boot Korea
|
||
Leapfrog USSR 516
|
||
Lehigh Lehigh
|
||
Lehigh University Lehigh
|
||
Lehigh-2 Lehigh
|
||
Lehigh-B Lehigh
|
||
Leprosy Leprosy
|
||
Leprosy 1.00 Leprosy
|
||
Leprosy-B Leprosy
|
||
Liberty Liberty
|
||
Liberty-B Liberty
|
||
Liberty-C Liberty
|
||
Lisbon Lisbon
|
||
Little Pieces Little Pieces
|
||
Live after Death Virus V800
|
||
Lozinsky Lozinsky
|
||
Mardi Bros Mardi Bros
|
||
Marijuana Stoned
|
||
Mazatlan Golden Gate
|
||
Merritt Alameda
|
||
Mendoza Jerusalem B
|
||
Mexican Devil's Dance
|
||
MG MG
|
||
MG-2 MG-2
|
||
MG-3 MG-2
|
||
MGTU MGTU
|
||
Miami Friday The 13th
|
||
Microbes Microbes
|
||
Migram Migram
|
||
Minnow ZeroHunt
|
||
Mirror Mirror
|
||
Mistake Typo Boot
|
||
MIX1 MIX1
|
||
MIX2 MIX2
|
||
MIX/1 MIX1
|
||
Mix1 MIX1
|
||
Mix2 MIX2
|
||
Monxla Monxla
|
||
Monxla B Monxla B
|
||
Mother Fish Whale
|
||
Munich Friday The 13th COM Virus
|
||
Murphy Murphy, AntiChrist, HIV, Kamaysa, Migram
|
||
Murphy-1 Murphy
|
||
Murphy-2 Murphy
|
||
Music Boot MusicBug
|
||
Music Bug MusicBug
|
||
Music Virus Oropax
|
||
MusicBug MusicBug
|
||
Musician Oropax
|
||
New Jerusalem New Jerusalem
|
||
New Zealand Stoned
|
||
News Flash Leprosy
|
||
Nina Nina
|
||
Nomenclature Nomenklatura
|
||
Nomenklatura Nomenklatura
|
||
Number 1 Number One
|
||
Number of the Beast 512 Virus
|
||
Number One Number One
|
||
Ogre Disk Killer
|
||
Ohio Ohio
|
||
One In Eight Vienna
|
||
One In Ten Icelandic, Icelandic-II
|
||
One In Two Saratoga
|
||
Ontario Ontario
|
||
Oropax Oropax
|
||
Oulu 1008
|
||
P1 Evil, Phoenix, PhoenixD, Proud
|
||
Pakistani Brain
|
||
Pakistani Brain Brain
|
||
Palette Zero Bug
|
||
Paris Paris
|
||
Parity Parity
|
||
Park ESS Jerusalem B
|
||
Payday Payday
|
||
Peking Alameda
|
||
Pentagon Pentagon
|
||
Perfume Perfume
|
||
Phantom Phantom
|
||
Phoenix Phoenix
|
||
PhoenixD PhoenixD
|
||
Ping Pong Ping Pong
|
||
Ping Pong-B Ping Pong-B
|
||
Ping Pong-C Ping Pong-C
|
||
Pixel Amstrad
|
||
Pixel 2 Amstrad
|
||
Plastique Plastique
|
||
Plastique 1 Plastique
|
||
Plastique 2 Plastique-B
|
||
Plastique 4.51 Plastique
|
||
Plastique 5.21 Plastique-B
|
||
Plastique Boot Invader
|
||
Plastique-B Plastique-B
|
||
PLO Jerusalem
|
||
Point Killer Dot Killer
|
||
Polimer Polimer
|
||
Polimer Tapeworm Polimer
|
||
Polish 217 Polish 217
|
||
Polish 217 B Polish 217
|
||
Polish 529 Polish 529
|
||
Polish 583 Polish 583
|
||
Polish 961 Stone`90
|
||
Polish Stupid Polish 217
|
||
Polish-2 Turbo 448, Turbo Kukac
|
||
Pray ZK900
|
||
Pretoria June 16TH
|
||
Print Screen Print Screen
|
||
Print Screen-2 Print Screen
|
||
Proud Proud
|
||
PRTSC Virus Print Screen
|
||
Prudents Virus 1210
|
||
PSQR Virus 1720
|
||
Puerto Jerusalem B
|
||
RaubKopie RaubKopie
|
||
Red Diavolyata Red Diavolyata
|
||
RedX Ambulance Car
|
||
Rigor Mortis Arf
|
||
Rostov Stoned
|
||
RPVS RPVS
|
||
RPVS-B RPVS
|
||
Russian Jerusalem
|
||
S-847 Amstrad
|
||
Saddam Saddam
|
||
San Diego Stoned
|
||
Saturday The 14th Saturday The 14th
|
||
Saratoga Saratoga
|
||
Saratoga 2 Icelandic
|
||
Scott's Valley Scott's Valley
|
||
Seoul Alameda
|
||
Sentinel Sentinel
|
||
Sex Revolution v1.1 Stoned
|
||
Sex Revolution v2.0 Stoned
|
||
SF Virus SF Virus
|
||
Shake Virus Shake Virus
|
||
Shoe_Virus Ashar
|
||
Shoe_Virus-B Ashar-B
|
||
Skism-1 Jerusalem B
|
||
Slayer Slayer Family
|
||
Slayer Family Slayer Family
|
||
Slayer-A Slayer Family
|
||
Slayer-B Slayer Family
|
||
Slayer-C Slayer Family
|
||
Slayer-D Slayer Family
|
||
Slayer-E Slayer Family
|
||
Slow Slow
|
||
Slowdown Slow
|
||
Smithsonian Stoned
|
||
Solano 2000 Solano 2000
|
||
Solomon 1605
|
||
Sorry Sorry
|
||
South African Friday The 13th COM Virus
|
||
Sparse Sparse
|
||
Spyer Spyer
|
||
Staf Staf
|
||
Staff Staf
|
||
StarDot StarDot 600, StarDot 801
|
||
StarDot 600 StarDot 600
|
||
StarDot 801 StarDot 801
|
||
Stealth Viruses EDV, Fish, Holocaust, Joshi, Murphy, V651, V800, V1024,
|
||
V2000, V2100, ZeroHunt, 512, 4096
|
||
|
||
Stone`90 Stone`90
|
||
Stone-90 Stone`90
|
||
Stoned Stoned
|
||
Stoned II Stoned
|
||
Stoned-B Stoned
|
||
Stoned-C Stoned
|
||
Stoned-D Stoned
|
||
Stoned-E Stoned
|
||
Stoned-F Stoned
|
||
Striker #1 Striker #1
|
||
Stupid Virus Do-Nothing
|
||
Subliminal 1.10 Subliminal 1.10
|
||
Sunday Sunday
|
||
Sunday-B Sunday
|
||
Sunday-C Sunday
|
||
Suomi 1008
|
||
SuperHacker Jerk
|
||
Suriv 1.01 Suriv 1.01
|
||
Suriv 2.01 Suriv 2.01
|
||
Suriv 3.00 Suriv 3.00
|
||
Suriv A Suriv 1.01, Suriv 2.01
|
||
Suriv B Suriv 3.00
|
||
Suriv01 Suriv 1.01
|
||
Suriv02 Suriv 2.01
|
||
Suriv03 Suriv 3.00
|
||
SVC V4.00 USSR 1689
|
||
Sverdlov Sverdlov
|
||
Sverdlov-B Sverdlov
|
||
SVir SVir
|
||
SVir_0 SVir
|
||
SVir-A SVir
|
||
SVir-B SVir
|
||
Swap Swap
|
||
Swedish Disaster Swedish Disaster
|
||
Swiss 143 Swiss 143
|
||
Swiss 1813 Jerusalem B
|
||
Sylvia Holland Girl
|
||
Sylvia 2 Holland Girl 2
|
||
SysLock Syslock
|
||
System Virus Icelandic-II
|
||
Taiwan Taiwan
|
||
Taiwan 2 Taiwan
|
||
Taiwan 3 Taiwan 3
|
||
Taiwan 4 Taiwan 4
|
||
Taiwan-B Taiwan
|
||
Talentless Jerk Jerk
|
||
Tannenbaum Christmas Virus
|
||
Taunt AIDS
|
||
Tel Aviv 1605
|
||
Ten Bytes 1554
|
||
Tester Tester
|
||
TestVir Tester
|
||
The Plague The Plague
|
||
Thor Arf
|
||
Time Monxla
|
||
Time B Monxla B
|
||
Tiny Family Tiny Family
|
||
Tiny Virus Tiny Virus
|
||
Tiny 134 Virus Tiny Family
|
||
Tiny 138 Virus Tiny Family
|
||
Tiny 143 Virus Tiny Family
|
||
Tiny 154 Virus Tiny Family
|
||
Tiny 156 Virus Tiny Family
|
||
Tiny 158 Virus Tiny Family
|
||
Tiny 159 Virus Tiny Family
|
||
Tiny 160 Virus Tiny Family
|
||
Tiny 163 Virus Tiny Virus
|
||
Tiny 169 Virus Tiny Family
|
||
Tiny 198 Virus Tiny Family
|
||
Toothless Virus W13
|
||
TP04VIR Virus Vacsina
|
||
TP05VIR Virus Vacsina
|
||
TP06VIR Virus Vacsina
|
||
TP16VIR Virus Vacsina
|
||
TP23VIR Virus Vacsina
|
||
TP24VIR Virus Vacsina
|
||
TP25VIR Virus Vacsina
|
||
TP33VIR Virus Yankee Doodle
|
||
TP34VIR Virus Yankee Doodle
|
||
TP38VIR Virus Yankee Doodle
|
||
TP41VIR Virus Yankee Doodle
|
||
TP42VIR Virus Yankee Doodle
|
||
TP44VIR Virus Yankee Doodle
|
||
TP45VIR Virus Yankee Doodle
|
||
TP46VIR Virus Yankee Doodle
|
||
Traceback Traceback
|
||
Traceback II Traceback II
|
||
Traceback II-B Traceback II
|
||
Traceback-B Traceback
|
||
Traceback-B2 Traceback
|
||
Travel Virus V2000
|
||
Turbo @ Turbo 448
|
||
Turbo 448 Turbo 448
|
||
Turbo Kukac Turbo Kukac
|
||
Turbo Kukac 9.9 Turbo Kukac
|
||
Typo Boot Typo Boot
|
||
Typo COM Typo COM
|
||
UIUC Virus Ashar
|
||
UIUC Virus-B Ashar
|
||
Unesco Vienna
|
||
UScan Virus V2100
|
||
USSR USSR
|
||
USSR 257 Kemerovo
|
||
USSR 311 USSR 311
|
||
USSR 394 Attention!
|
||
USSR 492 USSR 492
|
||
USSR 516 USSR 516
|
||
USSR 600 USSR 600
|
||
USSR 707 USSR 707
|
||
USSR 711 USSR 711
|
||
USSR 830 Red Diavolyata
|
||
USSR 948 USSR 948
|
||
USSR 1049 USSR 1049
|
||
USSR 1689 USSR 1689
|
||
USSR 2144 USSR 2144
|
||
V-1 1253
|
||
V-277 Amstrad
|
||
V-299 Amstrad
|
||
V-311 USSR 311
|
||
V-345 Amstrad
|
||
V-847 Amstrad
|
||
V-847B Amstrad
|
||
V-852 Amstrad
|
||
V-Alert 1554
|
||
V605 Anti-Pascal
|
||
V651 V651
|
||
V791 V801
|
||
V800 V800
|
||
V800M V800
|
||
V801 V801
|
||
V920 DataLock
|
||
V1024 V1024
|
||
V1226 1226
|
||
V1226D 1226D
|
||
V1226M 1226D
|
||
V1277 Murphy
|
||
V1302 Proud
|
||
V1521 Murphy
|
||
V1600 Happy New Year
|
||
V1701New Evil
|
||
V1701New-B Evil
|
||
V2000 V2000
|
||
V2000-B V2000
|
||
V2100 V2100
|
||
V2P1 1260
|
||
V2P2 V2P2
|
||
V2P6 V2P6
|
||
V2P6-B V2P6
|
||
V2P6Z V2P6Z
|
||
Vacsina Vacsina
|
||
VBasic Virus 5120
|
||
Vcomm Vcomm
|
||
Vera Cruz Ping Pong
|
||
VFSI VFSI
|
||
VGA2CGA AIDS
|
||
VHP VHP
|
||
VHP2 VHP2
|
||
VHP-348 VHP
|
||
VHP-353 VHP
|
||
VHP-367 VHP
|
||
VHP-435 VHP
|
||
VHP-623 VHP2
|
||
VHP-627 VHP2
|
||
Victor Victor
|
||
Vien6 Vienna
|
||
Vienna Vienna
|
||
Vienna C 646
|
||
Vienna-B Vienna
|
||
Vienna-B 645 Vienna
|
||
Violator Violator
|
||
Violator B4 Violator B4
|
||
Violator Strain B Violator
|
||
Violator Strain B4 Violator B4
|
||
VirDem VirDem
|
||
VirDem 2 VirDem
|
||
Virus-90 Virus-90
|
||
Virus-B Friday The 13th COM Virus
|
||
Virus101 Virus101
|
||
Voronezh Voronezh
|
||
Voronezh B Voronezh
|
||
VP VP
|
||
W13 W13
|
||
W13-A W13
|
||
W13-B W13
|
||
Westwood Westwood
|
||
Whale Whale
|
||
Wisconsin Wisconsin
|
||
Wolfman Wolfman
|
||
Wolfman 2 Wolfman
|
||
XA1 Christmas Tree
|
||
Xmas In Japan Christmas In Japan
|
||
Yale Alameda
|
||
Yankee 2 Yankee 2
|
||
Yankee Doodle Yankee Doodle
|
||
Yankee Doodle Dropper Slayer Family
|
||
Yankee Virus Yankee 2
|
||
Yankee-go-Home Yankee 2
|
||
Yap Yap
|
||
Yukon Overwriting Yukon Overwriting
|
||
Z The Whale Whale
|
||
Zero Bug Zero Bug
|
||
ZeroHunt ZeroHunt
|
||
ZeroHunt B ZeroHunt
|
||
ZK900 ZK900
|
||
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
Virus Information Summary List
|
||
Virus Relationship Chart
|
||
|
||
512 Virus --> 512-B --> 512-C --> 512-D
|
||
--> 512-E
|
||
--> 512-F
|
||
|
||
834 --> 834-B/Arab
|
||
|
||
1226 --> 1226M --> 1226D
|
||
|
||
4096 --> 4096-B --> 4096-C
|
||
--> Fish --> Whale
|
||
|
||
Alameda --> Alameda-2
|
||
--> Golden Gate --> Golden Gate-B --> Golden Gate-C
|
||
--> SF Virus
|
||
|
||
Anti-Pascal --> AP-529 --> AP-400 --> AP-440 --> AP-480
|
||
|
||
Note: AP-480, AP-440, and AP-400 are grouped together in the listing
|
||
as Anti-Pascal II
|
||
|
||
Blood --> Blood2
|
||
|
||
Brain --> Ashar
|
||
--> Clone
|
||
--> Chaos
|
||
--> EDV
|
||
|
||
Cascade/1701 --> 1701-B
|
||
--> 1704 --> 1704 Format
|
||
--> 1704-B
|
||
--> 17Y4
|
||
--> Cunning
|
||
|
||
Datacrime --> Datacrime-B
|
||
--> Datacrime II --> Datacrime IIB
|
||
|
||
Do-Nothing --> Saddam
|
||
|
||
Fri 13th COM --> Fri 13th-B --> Fri 13th-C
|
||
--> Virus-B
|
||
|
||
Happy New Year --> Happy New Year B
|
||
|
||
HM2 --: --> Plastique COBOL
|
||
--> Plastique --> Plastique 4.21 --> Plastique 5.21
|
||
Jerusalem B --: :
|
||
V
|
||
Invader
|
||
|
||
Holland Girl --> Holland Girl 2
|
||
|
||
Icelandic --> Saratoga
|
||
--> Iceland II --> Icelandic III
|
||
--> Dec 24th
|
||
--> Mix1 --> Mix1-B
|
||
--> Mix2
|
||
|
||
JoJo --> JoJo 2
|
||
|
||
Kemerovo --> Kemerovo-B
|
||
|
||
Kennedy --> Tiny 163
|
||
|
||
Leprosy --> Leprosy-B --> The Plague
|
||
|
||
MG --> MG-2 --> MG-3
|
||
|
||
Murphy-1 --> Murphy-2
|
||
--> AntiChrist
|
||
--> HIV
|
||
--> Kamasya
|
||
--> Migram
|
||
|
||
Ohio --> Den Zuk
|
||
|
||
Perfume --> Sorry
|
||
|
||
Phoenix --> PhoenixD
|
||
--> Evil-B --> Evil
|
||
|
||
Ping Pong --> Ping Pong-B --> Ping Pong-C
|
||
--> Big Italian
|
||
--> Typo
|
||
--> Print Screen --> Print Screen-2
|
||
--> Ghostballs
|
||
|
||
Pixel --> Amstrad --> V-847B
|
||
--> V-852
|
||
--> V-345 --> V-299 --> V-277
|
||
--> S-847 --> Pixel 2
|
||
|
||
Polish 217 --> Polish 217 B
|
||
|
||
Stoned --> Stoned-B --> Rostov
|
||
--> Sex Revolution v1.1 --> Sex Revolution v2.0
|
||
--> Stoned-C
|
||
--> Stoned-D
|
||
--> Stoned-E
|
||
--> Stoned-F
|
||
--> Stoned II
|
||
--> Swedish Disaster
|
||
|
||
Suriv 3.00 --> Jerusalem --> Fu Manchu --> Taiwan 3
|
||
--> Jerusalem B --> New Jerusalem
|
||
--> Payday
|
||
--> Sunday --> Sunday-B
|
||
--> Sunday-C
|
||
--> Jerusalem C
|
||
--> Jerusalem D
|
||
--> Jerusalem E
|
||
--> Jerusalem F (Spanish)
|
||
--> 1720/PSQR
|
||
--> 1210/Prudents
|
||
--> Frere Jacques
|
||
--> Anarkia --> Anarkia-B
|
||
--> Slow
|
||
--> Westwood
|
||
--> 1605 --> 1605-B
|
||
--> Park ESS
|
||
--> Skism-1
|
||
--> (also see HM2 above)
|
||
--> Discom
|
||
--> Captain Trips
|
||
--> Swiss 1813
|
||
|
||
Sverdlov --> Sverdlov-B
|
||
|
||
Syslock --> Macho --> Macho-B
|
||
--> Advent
|
||
--> Cookie
|
||
|
||
Tiny-198 --> Tiny-167
|
||
--> Tiny-160
|
||
--> Tiny-159
|
||
--> Tiny-158
|
||
--> Tiny-156
|
||
--> Tiny-154
|
||
--> Tiny-143
|
||
--> Tiny-138
|
||
--> Tiny-134
|
||
--> Tiny-133
|
||
|
||
Note: The Tiny-nnn Viruses indicated above are grouped together in
|
||
the listing as "Tiny Family". The Tiny-163 virus is not
|
||
related to the above group of viruses.
|
||
|
||
Traceback II --> Traceback --> Traceback-B --> Traceback-B2
|
||
--> Traceback II-B
|
||
|
||
V1024 --> Dark Avenger --> V651
|
||
--> V800 --> V800M
|
||
--> V2000 --> V2000-B
|
||
--> V2100
|
||
|
||
Vienna --> Father Christmas
|
||
--> Lisbon
|
||
--> Ghostballs
|
||
--> 1260 --> V2P2 --> Casper
|
||
--> V2P6 --> V2P6Z
|
||
--> W13/V-534 --> W13-B/V-507
|
||
--> Wien (Poland)
|
||
--> Vien6
|
||
--> Vienna-B --> Vienna-B 645
|
||
--> Violator --> Violator B4
|
||
--> Grither
|
||
--> VHP-348 --> VHP-353 --> VHP-367 --> VHP-435
|
||
--> VHP-623 --> VHP-627
|
||
--> Iraqui Warrior
|
||
--> Arf
|
||
|
||
Note: VHP-348, VHP-353, VHP-367, and VHP-435 are listed as VHP.
|
||
VHP-623 and VHP-627 are listed as VHP2.
|
||
|
||
Virus-90 --> Virus101
|
||
|
||
Wolfman --> Wolfman 2
|
||
|
||
Yankee 2 --> Enigma
|
||
|
||
ZeroHunt --> ZeroHunt B
|
||
|
||
|
||
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
Virus Information Summary List
|
||
Revision History
|
||
|
||
20 April, 1991 - VSUM9104.ZIP
|
||
The following virus descriptions have been updated, or new variants
|
||
added:
|
||
405 - Hammelburg Alias Added
|
||
512 - V512-E Variant
|
||
- V512-F Variant
|
||
834 - Arab Alias Added
|
||
- 834-B Variant
|
||
1381 - Internal Alias Added
|
||
- 1381-B Variant
|
||
1605 - Tel Aviv Alias Added
|
||
Amstrad - Pixel, Pixel 2, and S-847 Aliases Added
|
||
- Pixel 2 Variant
|
||
- S-847 Variant
|
||
Enigma - Reference to Yankee 2
|
||
Friday The 13th COM
|
||
- Virus B Alias Added
|
||
Guppy - Guppy-B Variant
|
||
Mix1 - Reference to Mix2
|
||
Murphy - References to AntiChrist, HIV, Kamasya, Migram
|
||
Ping Pong B - Italian-A Alias Added
|
||
Sverdlov - Hymn-2 Alias Added
|
||
- Sverdlov-B Variant
|
||
SVir - SVir_0 Variant
|
||
V1024 - Diamond Alias Added
|
||
- Diamond Variant
|
||
- Diamond-B Variant
|
||
V2P6 - V2P6-B Variant
|
||
Yankee 2 - Reference to Enigma
|
||
The following new viruses have been added to the listing:
|
||
AntiChrist
|
||
Casino
|
||
Crash/1075
|
||
Frog's Alley
|
||
HIV
|
||
Italian 803 - Italian 803
|
||
- Italian 803-B
|
||
Kamasya
|
||
Migram
|
||
Mix2
|
||
Raubkopie
|
||
Slayer Family - Slayer-A
|
||
- Slayer-B
|
||
- Slayer-C
|
||
- Slayer-D
|
||
- Slayer-E
|
||
Sparse
|
||
Staf
|
||
StarDot 600
|
||
StarDot 801
|
||
Tester/TestVir
|
||
V801/V791
|
||
Yap Virus
|
||
ZK900/Pray
|
||
Information for the following anti-viral products has been added or
|
||
updated:
|
||
NAV - Norton AntiVirus, Version 1.00
|
||
ViruScan - updated for version V76
|
||
|
||
17 March, 1991 - VSUM9103.ZIP
|
||
The following virus descriptions have been updated, or new variants
|
||
added:
|
||
1575 - 1575-C Variant
|
||
1605 - 1605-B/Solomon Variant
|
||
Jerusalem B - Captain Trips Variant
|
||
- Swiss 1813 Variant
|
||
Kemerovo - Kemerovo-B Variant
|
||
Vienna - Description Updated
|
||
Wolfman - Wolfman 2 Variant
|
||
ZeroHunt - ZeroHunt B Variant
|
||
The following new viruses have been added to the listing:
|
||
834 Virus
|
||
Arf Virus
|
||
Australian 403
|
||
Azusa
|
||
Crew-2480
|
||
Deicide
|
||
Dutch 555
|
||
Enigma
|
||
Jerk
|
||
Lazy
|
||
Phantom
|
||
Striker #1
|
||
Information for the following anti-viral products has been added or
|
||
updated:
|
||
Clean-Up - updated for version V75
|
||
ViruScan - updated for version V75
|
||
|
||
14 February, 1991 - VSUM9102.ZIP
|
||
The following virus descriptions have been updated, or new variants
|
||
added:
|
||
4096 - 4096-C Variant
|
||
Aids - Aids B Variant
|
||
Flip - Flip B Variant
|
||
Liberty - Clarificiation to entry, change to Liberty B
|
||
identification string for use with Scan.
|
||
- Liberty B Variant
|
||
Paris - Update to description
|
||
Plastique - Plastique COBOL Variant
|
||
Polish 217 - Polish 217 B Variant
|
||
Stoned - rewrote entry & merged in Stoned II entry
|
||
- Rostov Variant
|
||
- Sex Revolution v1.1 Variant
|
||
- Sex Revolution v2.0 Variant
|
||
- Stoned E Variant
|
||
- Stoned F Variant
|
||
USSR 1689 - Added SVC V4.00 alias
|
||
The following new viruses have been added to the listing:
|
||
903
|
||
1575 - 1575 Virus
|
||
- 1575-B Variant
|
||
4870 Overwriting
|
||
Akuku
|
||
Cookie
|
||
Destructor V4.00
|
||
Dir Virus
|
||
Discom
|
||
Grither
|
||
Happy New Year - Happy New Year
|
||
- Happy New Year B Variant
|
||
Holland Girl 2
|
||
Hybryd
|
||
IKV 528
|
||
Iraqui Warrior
|
||
JoJo 2
|
||
Little Pieces/1374
|
||
MG
|
||
MG-2 - MG-2
|
||
- MG-3 Variant
|
||
Monxla B
|
||
Nina
|
||
Parity
|
||
Saddam
|
||
Sentinel
|
||
Swedish Disaster
|
||
Swiss 143
|
||
The Plague
|
||
USSR 311
|
||
USSR 492
|
||
Violator B4
|
||
Yukon Overwriting
|
||
Information for the following anti-viral products has been added
|
||
or updated:
|
||
Pro-Scan - additional disinfection updates for version 2.01
|
||
Clean-Up - updated for version V74
|
||
ViruScan - updated for version V74
|
||
|
||
08 January, 1991 - VSUM9101.ZIP
|
||
The following virus descriptions have been updated, or new variants
|
||
added:
|
||
4096 - additional information added
|
||
Flip - additional information added
|
||
Invader - correction to Type Code
|
||
Jerusalem B - Skism-1 Variant
|
||
Nomenklatura - additional damage information added
|
||
Plastique - additional information, activation data
|
||
Plastique B - additional information, activation data
|
||
Tiny Family - Tiny 133 Variant
|
||
The following new viruses have been added to the listing:
|
||
Attention!
|
||
Best Wishes - Best Wishes
|
||
- Best Wishes B
|
||
Bloody!
|
||
F-Word Virus
|
||
Holocaust
|
||
Hymn
|
||
Jeff
|
||
Kemerovo
|
||
Lozinsky
|
||
MGTU
|
||
MusicBug
|
||
Polish 583
|
||
Red Diavolyata
|
||
Stone`90/Polish 961
|
||
Sverdlov
|
||
USSR 516
|
||
USSR 600
|
||
USSR 707
|
||
USSR 711
|
||
USSR 948
|
||
USSR 1049
|
||
USSR 1689
|
||
USSR 2144
|
||
Voronezh - Voronezh
|
||
- Voronezh B
|
||
ZeroHunt
|
||
Information for the following anti-viral products has been added or
|
||
updated:
|
||
Clean-Up - updated for version V72
|
||
Pro-Scan - updated for version 2.01
|
||
ViruScan - updated for version V72
|
||
|
||
03 December, 1990 - VSUM9013.ZIP (Not publicly distributed.)
|
||
Pro-Scan Version 2.0 has not been added to the listing.
|
||
|
||
02 December, 1990 - VSUM9012.ZIP
|
||
The following virus descriptions have been updated, or new variants
|
||
added:
|
||
Burger - 505 Variant
|
||
- 509 Variant
|
||
- 541 Variant
|
||
- CIA Variant
|
||
Christmas - Tannenbaum alias added
|
||
Kennedy - 333 alias added
|
||
Leprosy - News Flash alias added
|
||
Liberty - Liberty-B Variant
|
||
Slow - Updated for file length increases,
|
||
Slowdown alias added
|
||
Wisconsin - Updated for file date/time change
|
||
VirDem - VirDem 2 Variant
|
||
Virus-90 - Added description submitted by P. Toulme
|
||
Virus101 - Added description submitted by P. Toulme
|
||
Yankee 2 - Yankee-go-Home alias added
|
||
- 1624 variant added
|
||
The following new viruses have been added to the listing:
|
||
646
|
||
Carioca
|
||
DataLock
|
||
Dot Killer
|
||
Father Christmas
|
||
Groen Links
|
||
Keypress
|
||
Mirror
|
||
Monxla
|
||
Polimer
|
||
Polish 217
|
||
Polish 529
|
||
Spyer
|
||
Taiwan 4/2576
|
||
Turbo 448
|
||
Turbo Kukac
|
||
USSR
|
||
Information for the following anti-viral products/programs have been
|
||
added/updated with this release:
|
||
Clean-Up - McAfee Associates' Clean-Up Disinfector, Vers V71
|
||
Pro-Scan - McAfee Associates' Pro-Scan Anti-Viral, Vers. 2.0
|
||
VirHunt - Digital Dispatch, Inc.'s VirHunt Anti-Viral, Vers 2.0
|
||
Note: boot sector disinfection not tested
|
||
ViruScan - McAfee Associates' ViruScan Detector, Vers V71
|
||
Removed the following anti-viral products for the reason indicated:
|
||
M-1704 - replaced by McAfee Associates' Clean-Up
|
||
M-1704C - replaced by McAfee Associates' Clean-Up
|
||
M-DAV - replaced by McAfee Associates' Clean-Up
|
||
M-JRUSLM - replaced by McAfee Associates' Clean-Up
|
||
M-Vienna - replaced by McAfee Associates' Clean-Up
|
||
|
||
02 November, 1990 - VSUM9011.ZIP
|
||
The following virus descriptions have been updated, or new variants
|
||
added:
|
||
Amstrad - V852 Variant
|
||
Anthrax - Updated information
|
||
Jerusalem B - Park ESS Variant
|
||
Tiny Family - Tiny 134 Variant
|
||
- Tiny 138 Variant
|
||
- Tiny 143 Variant
|
||
- Tiny 154 Variant
|
||
- Tiny 156 Variant
|
||
V2100 - Updated information
|
||
The following new viruses have been added to the listing:
|
||
Guppy
|
||
Proud/V1302
|
||
VFSI
|
||
|
||
05 October, 1990 - VSUM9010.ZIP
|
||
[Note: There was no VSUM9009 release.]
|
||
The following virus descriptions have been updated, or new variants
|
||
added:
|
||
512 - Clarification of why file damage may occur
|
||
1008 - Origin information, Suomi alias
|
||
4096 - FroDo alias
|
||
Anti-Pascal - correction to indicated text string
|
||
Cascade - 17Y4 Variant
|
||
Dark Avenger- Dark Avenger-B Variant
|
||
EDV - Added Cursy alias and activation information
|
||
Evil - previously in VSUM9008 as V1701New and V1701New-B
|
||
Flash - Symptom and activation information
|
||
FORM-Virus - Activation information
|
||
Jerusalem B - Jerusalem DC Variant
|
||
Leprosy - Leprosy-B Variant
|
||
Paris - rename of virus listed as TCC in VSUM9008
|
||
Syslock - Advent Variant
|
||
Taiwan - Taiwan-B Variant
|
||
Tiny Virus - Origin information
|
||
The following new viruses have been added to the listing:
|
||
1605
|
||
Black Monday
|
||
Blood - Blood Variant
|
||
- Blood2 Variant
|
||
Burger
|
||
Casper
|
||
Christmas In Japan
|
||
Invader
|
||
Kamikazi
|
||
Nomenklatura
|
||
Number One
|
||
Scott's Valley
|
||
Stoned II
|
||
SVir - SVir-A Variant
|
||
- SVir-B Variant
|
||
Westwood
|
||
Whale
|
||
V2P2
|
||
V2P6
|
||
V2P6Z
|
||
Violator
|
||
Wisconsin
|
||
The following entries in the cross-reference have been corrected:
|
||
1226D - incorrectly pointed to V1226D instead of 1226D
|
||
1226M - incorrectly pointed to V1226D instead of 1226D
|
||
Brain - missing from VSUM9008 cross-reference
|
||
Information for the following anti-viral products/programs have been
|
||
added/updated with this release:
|
||
CleanUp - McAfee Associates' CleanUp Disinfector, Version V67
|
||
AVTK - Dr. Solomon's Anti-Viral Toolkit, Version 3.5
|
||
F-Prot - Fridrik Skulason's F-Prot, Version 1.12
|
||
VirexPC - MicroCom's Virex PC, Version 1.10B
|
||
ViruScan - McAfee Associates' ViruScan Detector, Version V67
|
||
[Note: For ViruScan, as of version V67, any viruses which now
|
||
require the /X command line parameter to be used have been
|
||
indicated under Detection Method.]
|
||
The following viruses have not been added to the listing at this time
|
||
for the reason indicated:
|
||
Big Italian - No Sample Available
|
||
TP43Vir - Sample does not replicate.
|
||
Doom2 - Unable to get samples to replicate.
|
||
|
||
10 August, 1990 - VSUM9008.ZIP
|
||
The following virus descriptions have been updated, or new variants
|
||
added:
|
||
1720 - Activation information added
|
||
Anti-Pascal - Anti-Pascal 529/AP-529 Variant
|
||
Sunday - Sunday-B Variant
|
||
- Sunday-C Variant
|
||
Tiny Virus - previously in VSUM9007 as 163 COM Virus
|
||
Traceback - Traceback-B Variant
|
||
- Traceback-B2 Variant
|
||
Traceback II
|
||
- Traceback II-B Variant
|
||
V800 - V800M Variant
|
||
Vienna - Vienna-B 645 Variant
|
||
The following new viruses have been added to the listing:
|
||
382 Recovery Virus
|
||
1226 - 1226 Virus
|
||
1226D - 1226D Variant
|
||
- 1226M Variant
|
||
1253/V-1
|
||
AirCop
|
||
Anthrax
|
||
Anti-Pascal II
|
||
- Anti-Pascal 400/AP-400
|
||
- Anti-Pascal 440/AP-440
|
||
- Anti-Pascal 480/AP-480
|
||
Fellowship
|
||
Flip
|
||
Leprosy
|
||
Mardi Bros
|
||
Ontario
|
||
Phoenix/P1
|
||
PhoenixD/P1
|
||
Plastique - HM2
|
||
- Plastique
|
||
- Plastique 4.51
|
||
Plastique-B - Plastique 5.21
|
||
RPVS/453 - RPVS
|
||
- RPVS-B Variant
|
||
TCC
|
||
Tiny Family - Tiny 158 Virus
|
||
- Tiny 159 Virus
|
||
- Tiny 160 Virus
|
||
- Tiny 167 Virus
|
||
- Tiny 198 Virus
|
||
V1701New/P1 - V1701New
|
||
- V1701New-B (earlier version)
|
||
V2100
|
||
Wolfman
|
||
Information on the following anti-viral products was updated or added
|
||
to this release:
|
||
CleanUp - Version V66
|
||
Pro-Scan - Version 1.4
|
||
VirexPC - Version 1.1
|
||
ViruScan - Version V66
|
||
The following viruses have not been included in the listing at this
|
||
time, for the reason indicated:
|
||
Advent - No Sample Available
|
||
Big Italian - No Sample Available
|
||
Stoned II - No Sample Available
|
||
|
||
15 July, 1990 - VSUM9007.ZIP
|
||
Added Virus Relationship Chart section to document, as well as new
|
||
data field "V Status" to all entries (see introduction and format
|
||
information for description).
|
||
The following viruses have been updated, or new variants added:
|
||
1554
|
||
Amstrad
|
||
Cascade - Cunning Variant
|
||
Disk Killer
|
||
Ghostballs - combined Ghost COM and Ghost Boot
|
||
Jerusalem B - Puerto Variant
|
||
Kennedy
|
||
Lehigh - Lehigh-B Variant
|
||
Vienna - VHP-627 Variant
|
||
- Vien6 Variant
|
||
W13
|
||
The following new viruses were added to the listing:
|
||
1008 Virus
|
||
1381 Virus
|
||
Ambulance Car
|
||
Anti-Pascal Virus
|
||
Armagedon
|
||
Flash
|
||
FORM-Virus
|
||
Joshi
|
||
July 13th
|
||
Microbes
|
||
Print Screen
|
||
Print Screen - Print Screen-2 Variant
|
||
Sorry
|
||
Taiwan 3
|
||
V651/Eddie 3
|
||
V1024/Dark Avenger 3
|
||
VHP - VHP-348 Variant
|
||
- VHP-353 Variant
|
||
- VHP-367 Variant
|
||
- VHP-435 Variant
|
||
VHP2 - VHP-623 Variant
|
||
- VHP-627 Variant
|
||
|
||
15 June, 1990 - VSUM9006.ZIP
|
||
Many viruses had their descriptions updated, the ones listed below
|
||
receiving updates for variants or major changes:
|
||
163 COM Virus
|
||
512 - 512-B Variant
|
||
- 512-C Variant
|
||
- 512-D Variant
|
||
1554 Virus
|
||
4096 - 4096-B Variant
|
||
Amstrad - Pixel/V-345 Variant
|
||
- V-277 Variant
|
||
- V-299 Variant
|
||
- V-847 Variant
|
||
- V-847B Variant
|
||
Jerusalem B - A-204 Variant
|
||
- Anarkia Variant
|
||
- Anarkia-B Variant
|
||
- Mendoza Variant
|
||
Ping Pong-B - Ping Pong-C Variant
|
||
Solano 2000 - Dyslexia 2.01 Variant
|
||
V2000 - V2000-B/Die Young Variant
|
||
Vacsina - TP04VIR Variant
|
||
- TP05VIR Variant
|
||
- TP06VIR Variant
|
||
- TP16VIR Variant
|
||
- TP23VIR Variant
|
||
- TP24VIR Variant
|
||
- TP25VIR Variant
|
||
Yankee Doodle
|
||
- TP33VIR Variant
|
||
- TP34VIR Variant
|
||
- TP38VIR Variant
|
||
- TP41VIR Variant
|
||
- TP42VIR Variant
|
||
- TP44VIR Variant
|
||
- TP45VIR Variant
|
||
- TP46VIR Variant
|
||
Vienna - VHP-435
|
||
- VHP-623
|
||
The Vienna-B variant has been moved under the Vienna entry.
|
||
The following new viruses were added to the listing:
|
||
5120
|
||
Eight Tunes
|
||
Fish Virus
|
||
Frere Jacques
|
||
JoJo
|
||
Liberty
|
||
Murphy - 2 variants (Murphy-1 and Murphy-2)
|
||
Shake Virus
|
||
Slow
|
||
Subliminal 1.10
|
||
V800
|
||
Victor
|
||
VirDem
|
||
VP
|
||
Yankee 2
|
||
|
||
4 May, 1990 - VSUM9005.ZIP (Not publicly distributed.)
|
||
Added listings for Discovered, Symptoms, Origin, Subdivided
|
||
memory-resident classes, Aligned data entry blocks, placed files
|
||
in ASCII order, placed revision history in descending order.
|
||
Information on the following virii was updated:
|
||
1168/Datacrime
|
||
1280/Datacrime
|
||
Kennedy
|
||
|
||
18 April, 1990 - VSUM9004.ZIP
|
||
Information on the following viruses was updated:
|
||
Friday The 13th Original COM Virus
|
||
Halloechen
|
||
Jerusalem
|
||
Jerusalem B
|
||
Stoned
|
||
Sunday
|
||
VComm
|
||
4096
|
||
The 1559 virus has been renamed to the 1554 virus in order to
|
||
accurately reflect the virus's effective length.
|
||
The following new viruses were added to the listing:
|
||
AIDS II
|
||
Anarkia (see Jerusalem B)
|
||
Christmas Virus
|
||
Itavir
|
||
June 16TH
|
||
Kennedy
|
||
Korea
|
||
Saturday The 14th
|
||
Solano 2000
|
||
Spanish Jerusalem B (see Jerusalem B)
|
||
V2000
|
||
1210
|
||
1392
|
||
1720
|
||
McAfee Associates' PRO-SCAN commercial anti-viral program, has
|
||
been added, as well as the information for IBM's VirScan program
|
||
updated to reflect IBM's March 1990 program release.
|
||
|
||
22 February, 1990 - Not publicly distributed.
|
||
Information on the following viruses was updated:
|
||
Disk Killer
|
||
The following new viruses were added to the listing:
|
||
EDV
|
||
512
|
||
1559
|
||
|
||
18 February, 1990 - VSUM9003.ZIP
|
||
Change to Copyright notice to reflect author's full name.
|
||
Information on the following viruses has been updated:
|
||
Taiwan
|
||
4096
|
||
|
||
04 February, 1990 - VSUM9002.ZIP
|
||
Second release of listing, which now includes updated information
|
||
for the following viruses:
|
||
Alabama
|
||
Chaos
|
||
Den Zuk
|
||
Datacrime II, Datacrime IIB
|
||
Do-Nothing
|
||
Icelandic, Icelandic-II
|
||
Ohio
|
||
Saratoga
|
||
Stoned
|
||
Swap
|
||
SysLock
|
||
Traceback, Traceback II (was 2930 in previous release)
|
||
Typo Boot
|
||
The following new Ms-Dos computer viruses were added to the
|
||
listing:
|
||
Halloechen
|
||
Icelandic-III
|
||
Joker
|
||
Perfume
|
||
Vcomm
|
||
Virus101
|
||
W13
|
||
1260
|
||
|
||
15 January, 1990 - VSUM9001.ZIP
|
||
First release of listing, which contained 52 of 61 known Ms-Dos
|
||
computer viruses. Of the 9 known viruses which were not
|
||
completed, they contained very basic information, though no
|
||
detailed description, those viruses were:
|
||
Chaos Swap
|
||
Icelandic Taiwan
|
||
Icelandic-II Typo Boot
|
||
Ohio 2930
|
||
Saratoga
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|