694 lines
32 KiB
Plaintext
694 lines
32 KiB
Plaintext
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THE INFECTION OF PC COMPATIBLE COMPUTERS
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Stephen E. Kiel
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Raymond K. Lee
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Georgia Institute of Technology
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Summer Quarter 1988
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INTRODUCTION
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The recent publicity over computer viruses has produced
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mixed reactions and much confusion inside, as well as outside, of
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the computing industry. The conflicting opinions are caused either
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by a misunderstanding of what viruses are or a lack of
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understanding of their potential problems. This paper answers
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those questions and in addition, gives a description of currently
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suggested methods for IBM PC's and compatibles for detecting,
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preventing, and eliminating viruses. A highly technical discussion
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is not the objective, but rather a broad overview is given along
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with sources of additional information and assistance.
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THE BEGINNING
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On November 3, 1983, an idea was conceived of by Fred
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Cohen as an experiment to be presented at a weekly seminar on
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computer security [1]. The idea was simple enough: design a
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computer program that could modify other programs to include a
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possibly evolved copy of itself. This evolved copy would then
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modify other programs and thus continue the propagation and
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evolution. The program could easily be spread by unknowing users
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throughout a computer system or network.
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It only took eight hours of expert work on a heavily
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loaded VAX 11/750 to complete the first of such programs and
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prepare it for demonstration. The program was inserted into the
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beginning of a new program on the system called 'vd,' which
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displayed Unix structures graphically. A new program was chosen so
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that details of its operation and its performance characteristics
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would be unknown. Users were introduced to vd via the system
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bulletin board.
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The program inside of vd used the authorizations of every
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user using it to infect their programs. In all of the experiments,
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the program that was initially inserted into vd was granted all
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system rights in under an hour. The shortest time was under five
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minutes, with the average time under 30 minutes. Even people who
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knew that the experiments were taking place were unable to defend
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themselves. Once the surprising results of the experiments were
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announced, the administrators of the VAX 11/750 decided that no
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further computer experiments would be performed on their system.
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Precautions were taken to keep the experiment under control. No
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damage was done and only reports were sent back on the program's
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progress. Also, traces were generated to insure that the program
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could not spread without detection. All files were purged of the
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program after the experiment was completed. It is unfortunate that
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an apparent fear reaction on the part of the system administrators
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prohibited any further testing.
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DEFINING A VIRUS
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A name for programs exhibiting the behavior described
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above was thought of by Len Adleman: 'viruses.' A computer virus
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can generally be defined as a program which hides in computer
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systems, usually in larger programs, whose mission is to replicate
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and spread until the occurrence of some designated event. When
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this event takes place, the program can then perform some action
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specified by its creator. The term 'virus' is very appropriate
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since computer viruses (here after referred to as simply 'viruses')
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behave much like their biological counterparts.
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Once in a computer system, a virus can remain quiet for an
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incubation and contagion period, during which it infects other
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files. After some prespecified event, such as a period of time or
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a number of infections, the virus can come to life and begin an
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attack. All the while, the offspring of the virus are infecting
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other files and systems, also waiting to be triggered to attack.
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The software that controls the computer and the devices
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connected to it is known as the DOS, an acronym for disk operating
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system. DOS commands are the core of the operating system and
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instruct the computer to start, stop, or continue an operation.
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The most popular DOS for IBM PC compatible computers is Microsoft
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Corporation's MS-DOS.
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Personal computer viruses typically infect three special
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MS-DOS files: IBMBIO.COM, IBMSYS.COM, and COMMAND.COM. These
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files are found on every system disk and become part of memory each
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time the operating system is loaded into the computer. The system
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files IBMBIO.COM and IBMSYS.COM are hidden and read-only and are
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not easily infected. The COMMAND.COM file, which is the default
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command processor of MS-DOS, is both visible and modifiable. A
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number of viruses have been discovered which infect this file.
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These three files are copied to other disks and run on other
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machines often enough that a virus in any of these files can spread
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very quickly.
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The action performed by viruses will vary. It could be
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simply the flashing of a harmless message on the screen. A virus
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in Aldus Publishing's FreeHand, a graphics program for the
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Macintosh, printed the message, "We would like to take this
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opportunity to convey our universal message of peace to all
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Macintosh users around the world" [2]. The company had to recall
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about 5,000 infected packages. Unfortunately, all viral behavior
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is not benign like this message printing or the simple infection
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tracing found in the experiment discussed in the opening paragraphs
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of this paper. There have even been reports of viruses which can
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slightly modify spreadsheets and other data [3].
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Viruses have been found which reformat hard disks and
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destroy data. The destructive behavior is only limited to the
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warped imagination of its creator. Because of the hidden dangers
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involved, apparently safe software packages carrying such viruses
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have become known as "Trojan Horses." A viral outbreak of this
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sort took place last fall in the microcomputer labs at Lehigh
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University in Bethlehem, Pa. [4]. This particular outbreak,
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described below, generated a lot of publicity and caused both
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corporations and colleges alike to become concerned about the
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potential damage that viruses can inflict.
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THE LEHIGH VIRUS
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The Lehigh virus was typical of many other viruses. It
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sat in the COMMAND.COM file and was thus loaded into the computer
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whenever it was booted. The virus hid inside this file in a
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temporary storage space called the stack space. After infecting
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the same file on a number of other disks, the virus would wipe out
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all data and program files on the disk it was on. Backup copies
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were similarly infected, some users were attacked more than once.
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Once the outbreak had come to light, work began
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immediately to identify what was happening and to find a cure.
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Fortunately, the virus' creator made a mistake: the date on the
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COMMAND.COM file was altered by the infection. (It is relatively
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simple to keep the date from changing, so the absence of a changed
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file date does not guarantee that a file is virus-free.)
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Upon examination of the file, the contaminated stack space
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was discovered. Since this space is normally all zeros, student
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lab consultants wrote a simple program that looked at the stack
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space and wrote zeros over any code that was present. The virus
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was then erased from approximately 600 disks.
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If it was not for the creator's date mistake, it would
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have taken much longer for the Lehigh Computing Center to kill its
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virus. It is doubtful that any new viruses that crop up will make
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a similar mistake. As everything else related to computers
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increases in complexity, so will viruses.
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SIZING UP THE PROBLEM
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It is unknown exactly how many disks and computer systems
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are infected in the world. Some experts and officials are trying
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to keep track of the world's viruses by documenting their
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characteristics and occurances.
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For example, four versions of the Israeli virus and seven
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versions of the Brain virus [5] have been found. The Israeli virus
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was supposed to do some kind of damage on May 13, 1988, the fortieth
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anniversary of the founding of Israel. The Brain virus was originally
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written to warn would-be software pirates of a software package for
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physicians written by Basit Farooq Alvi, a 19-year-old from Pakistan.
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The Brain has since evolved to data destruction.
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VIRUS HYPE
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Fueling the scare is indeed a problem and has led to what
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has become known as the "Virus Hype." The press and media has been
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notorious for spreading rumors and partial truths about viruses.
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Besides causing undue panic and fear amongst computer users, the
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virus writer is getting notoriety and fame. This is shown in a
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statement from Stephen D. Morrison, a student from the University
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of Manitoba. When asked about the future of viruses, he responded
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with the following: "The scenario could be a mad-hacker, plugging
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away at a keyboard in the back of a dimly lit office, creating a
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virus like no virus ever seen before." This view angers
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professionals in the computing field.
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Ivars Balkits, an official from Computing Services at the
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University of California - Davis, stated, "Depicting the virus
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writer as a gothic/romantic figure (like pirates have been, like
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gangsters have been, like gang members now are) contributes to the
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problem. Continuing to fictionalize the virus writer as a mad
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scientist, a Doctor Frankenstein whose genius gives us a secret
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thrill, whose lawlessness challenges us, is just the wrong way to
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go."
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Another approach to stopping the hype and actually
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tracking the viruses is "The Dirty Dozen" maintained by Eric
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Newhouse [6]. This is a file, originally started by Tom Neff,
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which lists unlawfully copied or modified programs that have
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appeared on various IBM bulletin boards across the country.
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Newhouse hopes that this list will act as a "clearing-house" for
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the latest examples of "bogusware," i.e. software that is damaging
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to one or more parties. Currently there are almost 50 destructive
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programs listed.
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In addition to the list of bad software, the Dirty Dozen
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contains definitions of viruses and other destructive programs,
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instructions on what to do if a virus causes damage to a system,
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and a glossary of many of the confusing acronyms and terms used in
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the computer field. A list of addresses to send additions and
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corrections to the Dirty Dozen, along with comments to Eric
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Newhouse, is included in APPENDIX 1. Copies of the Dirty Dozen
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can also be obtained from the bulletin boards in the list mentioned
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above, as well as from many different electronic bulletin boards
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across the country.
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DETECTION
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Fred Cohen, now a member of the Electrical Engineering
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faculty at the University of Cincinnati, stated in a lecture at the
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IBM Watson Research Laboratory in Hawthorne, NY, that there are
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three ways to detect a virus: by its appearance, by its behavior,
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or by the changes it causes. Detection by appearance is
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undecidable since all viruses do not "look" alike. It is extremely
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difficult to look at a good-sized program written in assembly
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language and tell what it does. With an executable program, it is
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nearly impossible.
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Detection by behavior involves examining programs as they
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are executing and is also not very promising. Besides being
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disruptive by slowing down execution times, it produces too many
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false positives and false negatives. Initially, viruses were
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caught by having a monitor program watch for certain internal MS-
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DOS and BIOS system calls which are normally used to access system
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hardware, but now that is no longer the case.
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BIOS is an acronym for basic input/output services. Since
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hardware varies from machine to machine, the BIOS is used to
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abstract the operating system from the specific hardware it's
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running on. The BIOS directly controls all of the input/output
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devices, such as the monitor and the disk drives, according to
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instructions received from MS-DOS or an executing program.
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Unfortunately, viruses can bypass MS-DOS and BIOS system
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calls. It is relatively simple to go to a computer store and
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purchase literature that describes where MS-DOS and the BIOS keep
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the information they need about a disk, and also tells what port
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addresses do what on a PC. In order to insure compatibility
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between different brands of PC's, every computer manufacturer has
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to use the same BIOS data areas and the same port addresses. It is
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no mystery to find out exactly what a program has to do to get its
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hands on the hardware.
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Detection by change is easy to forge and can be very
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costly. Early viruses were found to simply append themselves onto
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files and thus change the file size or possibly change the file
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date, as in the Lehigh virus, viruses have become much more
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elusive. Existing files can have viruses implanted inside without
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changing their file length or modification date. It is also not
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very beneficial to use an erased hard disk as an indicator of viral
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presence.
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PREVENTION STRATEGIES
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"Prevention is the best medicine" is a phrase heard many
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times before, but this small advice is very true in the case
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against viruses. The key is education. There must be an awareness
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among users from the hobbyist to system managers of the potential
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dangers of viruses. Obviously, paranoia is not the goal but a
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general understanding must be achieved.
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With today's ever growing dependence on computers,
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ignorance will cost a heavy price, if it has not already.
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Therefore, steps must be taken to curtail the likelihood of viral
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destruction. Governmental legislation needed is already in
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progress: a House bill, the Computer Virus Eradication Act of
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1988, was introduced in June that will make infesting computers
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with viruses a federal crime. A copy of this pending bill is in
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APPENDIX 2. Several other legislative acts have also been
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proposed. Currently, 48 states have computer crime laws.
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Fortunately, there are some guidelines that, if followed,
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will go a long way in keeping one's computer system virus-free. Of
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course, these guidelines are only as effective as the extent to
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which users are willing to implement them. These guidelines are
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divided into three areas - protection of diskettes, protection for
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the computer, and protection of systems interconnected by a local
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area network (LAN).
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DISK PROTECTION
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The first thing to do is not to use the original or master
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diskettes to execute the programs. Copies of all the original
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source disks should be made and used instead. The originals should
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then be stored in a safe place, out of sight. Although it is
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inconvenient, it is better to have the storage place far away from
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the computer or system itself. If there ever is any question as to
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the integrity of one of these copied files or disks, it can always
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be compared against the safely stored-away master copy.
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It is a very good idea to start using the write/protect
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tabs that so often get thrown away. These little stickers, usually
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black or aluminum colored gummed paper tags, can really save the
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day when it comes to inadvertent writes. Once a tab is in place,
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it is impossible for the computer to write on the disk.
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Besides being found on every system disk, the COMMAND.COM
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file is also a favorite hiding place for viruses. This file, as
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well as most others, can and should be made read-only without
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affecting its use. This can be easily done with the MS-DOS
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"ATTRIB.COM" program. Many other utility programs, such as those
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listed following the paper in APPENDIX 3, can also accomplish this
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task.
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COMPUTER PROTECTION
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The goal of virus protection can only be accomplished by
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limiting computer access. This strategy is simple: keep the
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computer "clean" by keeping the virus out. First and foremost,
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only tested software should be used. Also, a computer should never
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be booted up with an unfamiliar disk. This means that a user must
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be especially cautious and extremely careful with public-domain or
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shareware programs. Most viruses have a hibernation or incubation
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period, so even a seemingly good disk from a friend, co-worker, or
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other source can be infected.
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To protect a computer's existing files, it is advisable to
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establish a good method for backing up files on a regular basis.
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One strategy is to do incremental backups three times a week and
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perform a complete backup every two months. File attribute (FAT)
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tables can and should also be backed up. The intervals between
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backups should correspond to the amount of activity on the
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computer.
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When the computer is not in use, turn it off and lock it
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up. When a machine is left turned on and unattended, there is no
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way to know what has been installed or run on it while it was
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unsupervised. This implies that a computer should never be used
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unless the user personally boots it up. As far as locks are
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concerned, it is usually negligible to have a key lock installed.
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Software locks on PC's are easy to bypass and should not be
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trusted.
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LANS AND VIRUSES
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Beside interconnecting users, LAN's can provide a
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excellent route of propagation for viruses. In response to their
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initial virus attack, the computing center at Lehigh University has
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been taking many steps to reduce the possibilities of any new
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outbreaks. According to Kenneth van Wyk, a senior consultant at
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Lehigh, additional precautions to those mentioned above should be
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taken. The procedures in effect at Lehigh University's PC
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laboratories, which can also be applied to other distributed
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computing environments, are the following:
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1) All public microcomputers contain dual floppy drives
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and are connected to LANs (Novell on 3COM boards).
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The hard disks were removed.
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2) All boot disks are notchless and contain nothing
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other than the operating system boot files and the
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Novell software needed for the LAN.
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3) All Novell hard disks on the file servers are read-
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only, with the exception of a "scratch" area where
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users can place their temporary files.
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4) The "scratch" areas get erased periodically by
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Lehigh's student employees.
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5) Users logging into the LAN are not automatically
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placed in the scratch directory.
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VACCINES
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With the growing publicity and concern over viruses, there
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has been a sudden upspring of so called "vaccines". It may even
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seem that the number of these programs are quickly catching up to
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the number of known viruses. Keep in mind, however, that none of
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these programs are 100% cures, and that many take a different
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approach in trying to solve the same problem.
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Probably the best attitude to take regarding these
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"vaccines" is the that of the Paul Mace Software Company -
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"Understand, the people who make these (viruses) are clever and we
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haven't seen their worst. We're clever too, and will keep on
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improving the vaccine." Several of the software/hardware products
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of this nature that are designed for personal computer use at home
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and in industry are listed in APPENDIX 4.
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AFTER THE ATTACK
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Even though precautions are taken, the worst sometimes
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happens: a virus evades the lines of defense and wreaks havoc.
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Even if a hard disk does manage to crash, regardless of whether it
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was virus-induced or not, all is not necessarily lost. Some
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investment of time may be needed, but the data can usually be
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recovered.
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There is no better remedy for a crash of any kind than a
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recent backup. Unfortunately, if the virus was backed up along
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with the rest of the disk, restoring the backup contents may bring
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the virus back to life. If this happens and another crash occurs
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from the restoration, it is time to do either a lot of detective
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work or seek professional help.
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Once a crash has occurred, the first step is to remain
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calm. The strong urge to shout and destroy nearby office furniture
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has to be suppressed. After this is done, the damage must be
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surveyed. The crash is probably a result of the virus doing one of
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the following:
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1) Formatting the disk
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2) Scrambling the FAT (File Attribute) table
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3) Erasing files
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4) Corrupting the disk's boot sector
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The amount of data that can be recovered depends on the cause of
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the crash.
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At this point if you do not know what you are doing, it is
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well worth the time and money to find someone who does. Recovering
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data from a crashed disk is a highly technical matter. Further
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information on the above causes and their remedies are provided in
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APPENDIX 5. Any improper attempts by an inexperienced user can
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result in permanent data loss.
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FURTHER INFORMATION
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One of the best ways to learn more about viruses and
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related topics is through VIRUS-L, an electronic mail discussion
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forum for sharing information about computer viruses. The computer
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that handles this forum is located at Lehigh University and is a
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result of the need for more information about viruses after the
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Lehigh outbreak.
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There are currently several hundred subscribers to the
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list from academic and corporate institutions from all over the
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world. Discussions on the list include current events, virus
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"sightings," practical and theoretical virus prevention methods,
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and questions/answers about viruses. The discussions on this list
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are extremely informative and educational.
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The list is non-moderated and non-digested, which means
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that any message sent to the forum goes out immediately to all
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subscribers. All submissions to VIRUS-L are stored in weekly log
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files which can be down-loaded for later reference. Also, there is
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a small archive of some of the public anti-virus programs which are
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currently available.
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In order to get on the mailing list, a user must have
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access to the BITNET network, which is possible through ARPANET,
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Internet, and several other networks. If this is the case, than
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the user only has to send the message "SUB VIRUS-L <user name>" to
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<LISTSERV@LEHIIBM1.BITNET>. Questions and comments about VIRUS-L
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can sent to the list's moderator, Kenneth van Wyk, at the addresses
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listed in APPENDIX 6.
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SUMMARY
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Computer viruses, like their biological counterparts, are
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constantly changing. It is impossible to predict the course that
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future viruses will take. According to William H. Murray of Ernst
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& Whinney, "if you can conceive it, and if it could be done by any
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other program, then it can be done by a virus." The prevention and
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protection methods discussed here are not infallible since they
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will need to adapt to the dynamic nature of viruses. This paper is
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|
meant to serve as a useful introduction to the nature of viruses
|
|
and how they must be confronted. If this information is
|
|
understood, the warnings heeded, and the basic precautions taken,
|
|
the probability of a virus attack should be lessened.
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APPENDIX 1: The Dirty Dozen
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|
|
|
Eric Newhouse, the editor of the Dirty Dozen, can be
|
|
contacted for more information at the following addresses:
|
|
|
|
1) The Crest RBBS/CAMS (160/50 MB), 213-471-2518,
|
|
1200/2400. (This is Eric Newhouse's bulletin board)
|
|
|
|
2) The West LA PC-STORE (50 MB), 213-559-6954,
|
|
300/1200/2400.
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|
|
|
3) Camelot PC-Board (80 MB), 213-204-6158, 300/1200/2400
|
|
- leave E-mail to "NORMAN TEETER" and it will be
|
|
relayed.
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|
|
|
4) The Source - leave E-mail to "Doctor File Finder"
|
|
(Mike Callahan) in IBM SIG #4 and it will be relayed.
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|
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APPENDIX 2: The Computer Virus Eradication Act of 1988
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Whoever knowingly --
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|
|
(1) inserts into a program for a computer information or
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commands, knowing or having reason to believe that
|
|
such information or commands will cause loss to users
|
|
of a computer on which such program is run or to
|
|
those who rely on information processed on such
|
|
computer; and
|
|
|
|
(2) provides such program to others in circumstances in
|
|
which those others do not know of the insertion or
|
|
its effects;
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|
|
|
or attempts to do so, shall, if any of such conduct affects
|
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interstate or foreign commerce, be fined under this title or
|
|
imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
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|
|
|
Entered July 14th 1988 by Mr. Wally Herger (Congressman from CA)
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|
for himself and Mr. Bob Carr (Congressman from MI); referred to
|
|
Committee on the Judiciary.
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APPENDIX 3: Disk Utility Programs
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|
1) PC-Tools, Central Point Software. $80.
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|
|
2) Mace+ Utilities, Paul Mace. $100.
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|
3) Advanced Norton Utilities, Peter Norton. $150.
|
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|
APPENDIX 4: Vaccine Products
|
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|
|
1) Antidote by Quaid Software, Toronto, Canada. Detects
|
|
viruses but allows the user to correct the problem.
|
|
$60.
|
|
|
|
2) C-4(Cylene-4) by InterPath Corp., Santa Clara, CA. A
|
|
program that resides in ROM and looks out for
|
|
viruses. If found, computer activity halts and C-4
|
|
warns the user. $30.
|
|
|
|
3) Data Physician by Digital Dispatch Inc., Minneapolis,
|
|
MN. Protects and remove viruses from MS-DOS based
|
|
computers.
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|
|
|
4) Disk Defender by Director Technologies Inc.,
|
|
Evanston, IL. An add on board that will guard the
|
|
hard disk.
|
|
|
|
5) Disk Watcher by RG Software Systems, Willow Grove,
|
|
PA. A memory resident utility that "watches" the
|
|
disk drives to prevent accidental writes or formats.
|
|
$80.
|
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|
|
6) Dr. Panda Utilities by Panda Systems, Wilmington, DE.
|
|
A set of programs that checks files from BBS and
|
|
other software before letting them used. $80.
|
|
|
|
7) FluShot by Byte's BIX. A free utility. Contact BYTE
|
|
magazine or BIX for more information. FREE.
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|
|
|
8) Mace Vaccine by Paul Mace Software, Ashland, OR. It
|
|
provides write protection for system files. $20.
|
|
|
|
9) NTIVIRUS by Orion Microsystems, Quebec, Canada.
|
|
Monitors the system files for viruses. $30.
|
|
|
|
10) Passcode System by Dynamics Security Inc., Cambridge,
|
|
MA. Complete hardware software protection system.
|
|
$200-$2000 depending the size and components needed.
|
|
|
|
11) Syringe,Canary,Infect by Sophco, Boulder, CO. Three
|
|
programs that will "quarantine" a bad disk, test and
|
|
remove viruses. $30.
|
|
|
|
12) Vaccinate by Sophco. A "milder virus" that will warn
|
|
the user of other viruses. $195.
|
|
|
|
13) Virusafe by ComNetco Inc., Bernardsville, NJ. Checks
|
|
the system memory for viruses then prevents them from
|
|
being used. $250.
|
|
|
|
14) VirAlarm by Lasertrieve Inc., Metuchen, NJ. Stores
|
|
programs on CD-ROM after making sure they are virus-
|
|
free.
|
|
|
|
15) Virus Implant Protection by LeeMah DataCom Security
|
|
Corp., Hayward, CA. Uses a dedicated PC to "monitor
|
|
unauthorized activities" on other networked
|
|
computers.
|
|
|
|
16) Vaccine by FoundationWare, Cleveland, OH. "5 levels"
|
|
of protection from write-protect to checksums. $189.
|
|
|
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|
|
APPENDIX 5: Recovery from a Disk Crash
|
|
|
|
Recovering information on a formatted disk depends on the
|
|
method of formatting. If the disk was low-level formatted, then
|
|
the contents of the files and the directories referencing them have
|
|
been over-written. The only hope of recovery is a backup. If the
|
|
disk was high-level formatted, then the disk contents have not been
|
|
erased and are recoverable to some degree.
|
|
Unformatting programs have been written to reconstruct the
|
|
contents on the disk. Since MS-DOS breaks up or fragments large
|
|
files and stores the pieces wherever there is room on the disk,
|
|
complete recovery is only possible if the unformatting programs
|
|
have a "picture" of the disk before the crash. This picture is
|
|
generally taken by a utility accompanying the unformatting program.
|
|
Several of these programs are listed above in APPENDIX 3.
|
|
If the FAT table has been scrambled, it can be rebuilt.
|
|
Two of the three disk utility programs listed below, Norton
|
|
Utilities and PC-Tools, include editors that allow an experienced
|
|
user to piece together a FAT table. This is not easy and requires
|
|
a large amount of experience and a high degree of proficiency. The
|
|
other alternative involves finding a FAT backup program and making
|
|
periodic backups. A number of FAT backup programs are public
|
|
domain and can thus be obtained from a trusted friend or trusted
|
|
computer bulletin board.
|
|
If files were erased and the FAT tables are still intact,
|
|
then the files may simply have to be unerased. All three of the
|
|
disk utility programs listed in APPENDIX 3 can do this. When a
|
|
file is erased, the first character of its name is usually changed
|
|
to a non-printable character to indicate that it is no longer a
|
|
valid directory entry. Everything else is left intact. Since the
|
|
contents of erased programs are over-written by newer programs, it
|
|
is best to unerase the files the most recent files first. If this
|
|
is not done, a previously erased program may grab part of a newer
|
|
file.
|
|
The last cause of a disk crash is when the boot sector is
|
|
either erased or formatted. In this case, the data is still safe
|
|
on the disk, but the disk cannot be booted from. Another system
|
|
disk in a floppy drive can be used to boot the system. Before
|
|
proceeding any further, backup the hard disk in case any damage is
|
|
done trying to restore the disk to boot status.
|
|
The first thing to try is running the MS-DOS "SYS.COM"
|
|
program. This program will copy the system files from one disk to
|
|
another. After this is done, COMMAND.COM will have to be copied to
|
|
the crashed disk using a simple "COPY" command. Information on
|
|
this procedure is available in the MS-DOS manual. If this does not
|
|
work, Mace+ Utilities has a function called "restore boot sector"
|
|
which should be tried.
|
|
If all else fails, the disk should be first backed up and
|
|
then low-level reformatted. Instructions for this procedure should
|
|
either come with the computer or are available from a computer
|
|
store. After this is done, the MS-DOS program "FDISK.COM" be run
|
|
to prepare the disk for high-level formatting. This formatting is
|
|
done with the DOS "FORMAT.EXE" program. The DOS manual should be
|
|
consulted before running any of these MS-DOS commands or programs.
|
|
When everything is completed, the backup can be restored.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
APPENDIX 6: VIRUS-L
|
|
|
|
The moderator of VIRUS-L, Kenneth van Wyk, can be
|
|
contacted for more information at the following addresses:
|
|
|
|
1) <luken@Spot.CC.Lehigh.EDU> on Internet
|
|
|
|
2) <LUKEN@LEHIGH.BITNET> on BITNET
|
|
|
|
3) Kenneth van Wyk
|
|
User Services Senior Consultant
|
|
Lehigh University Computing Center
|
|
Bethlehem, PA 18015
|
|
(215) 758-3900
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
REFERENCES
|
|
|
|
[1] Fred Cohen, "Computer Viruses", PhD dissertation,
|
|
University of Southern California, 1985.
|
|
|
|
[2] P. Honan, "Beware: It's Virus Season", Personal Computing,
|
|
July 1988, p36.
|
|
|
|
[3] P. Karon, "The Hype Behind Computer Viruses", PC Week, May
|
|
31, 1988, p49.
|
|
|
|
[4] Fred Cohen, "On The Implications of Computer Viruses and
|
|
Methods of Defense", University of Cincinnati,
|
|
unpublished.
|
|
|
|
[5] J. Pournelle, "Computing at Chaos Manor", BYTE, July 1988,
|
|
pp198-200.
|
|
|
|
[6] E. Newhouse, "The Dirty Dozen", Issue #8a, February 21,
|
|
1988.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|