238 lines
13 KiB
Plaintext
238 lines
13 KiB
Plaintext
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: 23 Jan 89 11:54:29 GMT (Mon)
|
||
From: Alan Jay <alanj@ibmpcug.co.uk>
|
||
Subject: Known PC Viruses in the UK and their effects
|
||
|
||
The article below summarises the viruses which have been known to
|
||
affect IBM PCs and compatibles in the United Kingdom. It is written
|
||
by Dr. Alan Solomon (drsolly@ibmpcug.CO.UK), the chairman of the IBM
|
||
PC User Group in the UK and appears in the February 1989 issue of
|
||
Connectivity, the newsletter of the User Group.
|
||
|
||
This article is (C) Copyright 1989 The IBM PC User Group (UK).
|
||
Permission is hereby granted to reproduce this article for non-profit
|
||
purposes, provided this notice is retained.
|
||
|
||
The Information Centre - PC Security by Dr Alan Solomon
|
||
- -------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
PCs are intrinsically very insecure. For many PCs, this might not
|
||
matter; who cares if someone finds out that the menu for tomorrow is
|
||
scrambled eggs? But increasingly, PCs are being used for critical
|
||
applications, and either there is extremely important data on them, or
|
||
else it is very important that they continue to run. Scrambled eggs
|
||
are fine - scrambled FAT is not.
|
||
|
||
Many people take backup for granted. Obviously, backups are done on a
|
||
regular basis, but how do you know that you have something that is
|
||
restorable? I'll be coming back to this in a subsequent article. For
|
||
now, I want to update members on the virus front, because quite a lot
|
||
has happened, and much of what you read in the press is distorted by the
|
||
Chinese Whispers treatment.
|
||
|
||
Virus facts and fiction
|
||
- -----------------------
|
||
|
||
First, I have to say that the problems are very real. You have probably
|
||
read in Computing that IBM has been infected by 1704 virus. Secondly, I
|
||
must emphasise that viruses are still very, very rare on PCs, and many
|
||
problems reported as viruses, are t he same old problems we always had.
|
||
But they are getting commoner, and I am getting busier and busier in
|
||
dealing with outbreaks.
|
||
|
||
First, let me define some terms. A virus is a self-replicating program,
|
||
that copies itself without the user realising that this is happening. A
|
||
virus does not necessarily intend malicious damage.
|
||
|
||
The main damage is always, always done by people's reactions, not by the
|
||
viruses themselves. There is one virus around that has code in it for
|
||
deleting files, and other viruses have unfortunate side-effects. But
|
||
the main damage is usually done by someone panicking, and doing
|
||
something extremely silly, because they don't know what is the correct
|
||
procedure.
|
||
|
||
Viruses - what's out there?
|
||
===========================
|
||
|
||
Next - a list of the viruses that I know of so far, plus how to
|
||
recognise them, and the intentional and unintentional damage done.
|
||
Please remember, though, that most of these viruses have more than one
|
||
variant, and it would be possible to write a virus that mimicked the
|
||
action of an existing virus. So you mustn't assume that just because
|
||
your symptoms match those given below, that you have the exact same
|
||
virus. Also, the information given below is only a summary of all the
|
||
information available, so please don't treat it as a full manual.
|
||
|
||
Stoned. Every 32nd boot-up, you see ``Your computer is now stoned.''
|
||
The boot sectors of infected diskettes are obviously abnormal, and
|
||
include that message. No intentional damage. Unintentional damage -
|
||
trashes 1.2 Mb floppies if they have more than 32 files, trashes about
|
||
5% of hard disks.
|
||
|
||
Brain. You see (c) Brain as a volume label on diskettes, and diskettes
|
||
have 3k of bad sectors (the normal numbers are none at all, or 5k, or
|
||
sometimes more). No known intentional damage. Unintentional damage -
|
||
it slows down diskette accesses and causes time-outs, which can make
|
||
some diskette drives unusable.
|
||
|
||
Italian. Once every half hour, if you are accessing the disk, the
|
||
bouncing dot is triggered. The dot bounces off the edges of the screen,
|
||
and passes through any text, with replacement after it. Sometime, this
|
||
doesn't work properly, and screen displays are messed up. Infected
|
||
diskettes have 1k in bad sectors, infected hard disks have 2k (and other
|
||
numbers of bad sectors are possible). No known intentional damage.
|
||
Unintentional damage - the two copies of the FAT are left different; DOS
|
||
might not like this. Attempts to infect diskettes slows them down, and
|
||
some computers won't read floppies, due to time-outs.
|
||
|
||
1813 virus. Files grow by 1813 bytes (sometimes 1808), without changing
|
||
their date and time or read/write/ hidden attributes. COMMAND.COM does
|
||
not grow, to help it avoid detection. Many anti-virus products do
|
||
little more than watch COMMAND.COM. Intentional damage - there is code
|
||
in the virus for deleting each program that you run on every Friday
|
||
13th. Half an hour after the virus installs into memory, the computers
|
||
slows down - a 4.77Mhz PC runs at about 1/5 normal speed. A small black
|
||
window opens temporarily in the bottom left hand corner. Unintentional
|
||
damage - .COM files grow once, taking up slightly more space.
|
||
Also, .EXE files grow each time they are infected, and eventually will
|
||
not load.
|
||
|
||
648 virus. .COM files grow by 648 bytes, without changing date/time or
|
||
attributes. Intentional damage - one infected file in eight (at random)
|
||
is changed in such a way that the program will not run. No known
|
||
unintentional damage.
|
||
|
||
1701 virus. Files grow by 1701 bytes. This is a third generation virus
|
||
- - the code is encrypted, to fool programs that search for viruses
|
||
automatically, looking for code that is characteristic of viruses. This
|
||
also meant that disassembling it took a bit longer than usual, but I've
|
||
now finished the disassembly. Occasionally, 1701 triggers a
|
||
``hailstorm''. The characters on the screen behave as if the were
|
||
pinned to the screen, and someone is removing the pins one at a time -
|
||
it looks a bit like a hailstorm, and has suitable sound effects. In
|
||
fact, it is a purely audio-visual effect - nothing is happening to your
|
||
data. But most people seeing it, would be so alarmed that they would
|
||
reach for the off switch, and switching a computer off in the middle of
|
||
processing a database can cause big problems. IBM got infected recently
|
||
by 1704 virus, which I believe is a slightly different version of 1701.
|
||
They sent a letter to all customers that could conceivably have been
|
||
infected - a very responsible thing to do.
|
||
|
||
As you can see, there are an increasing number of viruses, and an
|
||
increasing number of people affected.
|
||
|
||
If you see any of these symptoms, you should do three things.
|
||
|
||
1. DON'T PANIC. That does more damage than anything else. Don't just
|
||
start deleting and formatting - at least keep a specimen so that I can
|
||
disassemble it. The flame thrower approach tends to destroy the
|
||
evidence of how it got in (which could help the unfortunate person that
|
||
inadvertently gave it to you) and without even fixing the problem.
|
||
Don't let anyone else panic, either.
|
||
|
||
2. Make sure that everyone who knows about it, is told to keep their
|
||
mouths shut. The press are desperately keen to find a big company that
|
||
has been struck, and will have a field day. An immense amount of damage
|
||
could be done to the company's name . If the company decides to tell the
|
||
world, that's fine and noble, but the decision must be made at the
|
||
highest possible level.
|
||
|
||
3. Seek expert advice. Do not attempt to deal with it yourself -
|
||
unless you have already dealt with several cases before, a virus is
|
||
outside your experience. In particular, the virus MUST be disassembled
|
||
- - otherwise it could have many surprises.
|
||
|
||
One of the biggest problems is in dealing with the diskettes. Every PC
|
||
is accompanied by a vast cloud of diskettes, and at least some of these
|
||
must be infected. Usually, less than 1% are infected (although in the
|
||
case of a boot sector virus such as Brain, Italian or Stoned, anything
|
||
up to 5% of diskettes could be infected before the virus is spotted),
|
||
but the problem is to find them. If you leave even one infected
|
||
diskette - well, it was almost certainly just one diskette that brought
|
||
the problem in. My approach is to use a hopper-fed machine that can
|
||
check 700 floppy diskettes per hour; the main alternative is to train
|
||
sufficient operators to do it manually.
|
||
|
||
How you treat infected disks and diskettes depends on the virus, and its
|
||
modus operandi. I haven't yet seen a situation where it was necessary
|
||
for anyone to lose any data, although the flame- thrower approach
|
||
certainly can do damage.
|
||
|
||
As if this wasn't bad enough, there are now a few more problems that I'm
|
||
trying to fight. The first is too late - one magazine has published
|
||
about 55% of the Italian virus, together with a useful plethora of
|
||
technical information about how it works. I won't tell you which
|
||
magazine, as I don't want things to get any worse, but many members will
|
||
have seen the article, and I would suggest that you write to the editor
|
||
to express your own opinions on the subject.
|
||
|
||
The next problem is that a magazine has quoted someone as saying that he
|
||
could write a virus that ``could put a software house out of business
|
||
overnight''. I don't think that the magazine should have used that
|
||
quote, and I hope that it doesn't give people ideas.
|
||
|
||
But the third problem is the worst. I have a firm rule about never
|
||
giving copies of a virus ``for experimental and research purposes'' to
|
||
anyone (except, of course, if a company already has the virus then it
|
||
doesn't matter). One could argue that this is tantamount to
|
||
suppression of useful information (and this has been suggested to me).
|
||
But obviously one should only give a virus to a responsible, technically
|
||
capable person, and I'm frankly not very good at assessing this over the
|
||
phone - I get many calls asking for viruses. So, since I can't be sure
|
||
that the person asking is a suitable candidate, I have so far always
|
||
refused. If a bona fide government department were to approach me, I
|
||
would probably feel different, but that hasn't happened.
|
||
|
||
One of the people who felt differently on this point, has obtained
|
||
copies of Brain and Italian. He has said that he will give copies to
|
||
anyone responsible person who asks him, for research purposes. I don't
|
||
know how he will decide, but I hope and pray that he is better at
|
||
judging character that I believe possible, and able to detect a
|
||
plausible liar. He says that he is acting from the highest, noblest
|
||
motive - freedom of information. I used to believe in freedom of
|
||
information myself, so I can almost understand him. But I profoundly
|
||
disagree with what he's doing, as the easiest way to write a virus, is
|
||
to disassemble someone else's, and change it to do what you want.
|
||
|
||
How to learn more
|
||
- -----------------
|
||
|
||
The best way to keep up to date with virus developments is on Connect
|
||
(01-863 6646 - 1200, N, 8, 1). There are a number of conferences
|
||
devoted to viruses. This article was posted to Connect in conference
|
||
connect.virus on January 10th and I will be posting further updates to
|
||
this list of known viruses with their symptoms and effects as soon as I
|
||
have details.
|
||
|
||
One thing I have done is write a program for testing anti-virus
|
||
products. This uses a few different methods for writing to the boot
|
||
sector of floppy diskettes - TESTVACC is quite harmless, of course, but
|
||
it is doing something that many viruses do. Many anti-virus products
|
||
claim to be able to detect and/or prevent this sort of thing, so you
|
||
install your anti-virus program, and then run TESTVACC. TESTVACC tries
|
||
to write a simple message to the boot sector of the floppy disk, using
|
||
four different methods, any of which could be used by a virus.
|
||
|
||
I've tried several well-known anti-virus products, and although it
|
||
detected the first two methods of writing to the boot sector, it didn't
|
||
notice the third or fourth method. You can inspect the boot sector
|
||
afterwards, using whatever disk sector editor you like, and draw your
|
||
own conclusions. I'm making TESTVACC shareware, so it is available from
|
||
the User Group Library.
|
||
|
||
Also we hope to run a special series of workshops on viruses in the near
|
||
future. If you would like to take part then please write to me at the
|
||
User Group. This workshop will look at ways of reducing the risk of
|
||
infection, what to do if you think you are infected and in the event of
|
||
infection how to disinfect your systems.
|
||
|
||
Submitted by: Alan Jay (alanj@ibmpcug.CO.UK), Editor, Connectivity,
|
||
the newsletter of The IBM PC User Group, UK.
|
||
- --
|
||
Alan Jay @ The IBM PC User Group, PO Box 360, Harrow HA1 4LQ ENGLAND
|
||
Phone: +44 -1- 863 1191 Email: alanj@ibmpcug.CO.UK
|
||
Path: ...!ukc!pyrltd!slxsys!ibmpcug!alanj Fax: +44 -1- 863 6095
|
||
Disclaimer: All statements made in good faith for information only.
|
||
|
||
------------------------------ |