278 lines
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278 lines
14 KiB
Plaintext
http://www.melissavirus.com/
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----------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 5
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Apr 1999 05:01:14 -0700 From: secedu@all.net Subject: Information Security
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Educators Mailing List 1999-03-30
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>From: "Rob Slade, doting grandpa of Ryan and Trevor"
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Date: Tue, 30 Mar 1999 16:51:23 -0800
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The Melissa macro virus
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A report prepared by Robert M. Slade
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The following is an attempt to bring together the information about
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the Melissa virus. It is taken from the most reliable available
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sources. Additional sites have been listed at the end of the article.
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I have not added a copyright line to this message in order to allow it
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to be used as needed. I will be posting the latest updated version of
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this article at http://sun.soci.niu.edu/~rslade/melissa.txt and
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http://victoria.tc.ca/techrev/melissa.txt.
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The virus, generally referred to as W97M.Melissa.A (with some
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variations: Symantec, in a rather strained effort to be cute, seems to
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be calling it "Mailissa"), is a MS Word macro virus. This means that,
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if you don't use Word, you are safe. Completely safe. (Except for
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being dependent upon other people who might slow their/your mail
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server down. More on that later.) If you need to look at MS Word
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documents, there is a document viewer available (free, as it happens)
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>from Microsoft. This viewer will not execute macros, so it is safe
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>from infection.
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In the messages about Melissa, there have been many references to the
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mythical and non-existent "Good Times" virus. Note that simply
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reading the text of a message still cannot infect you. However, note
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also that many mailers, in the name of convenience, are becoming more
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and more automated, and much of this automation concerns running
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attached files for you. As Padgett Peterson, author of one of the
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best macro virus protection tools, has stated, "For years we have been
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saying you could not get a virus just by "opening E-Mail. That bug is
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being fixed."
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Melissa does not carry any specifically damaging payload. If the
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message is triggered there will be text added to the active document.
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The mailout function can cause a large number of messages to be
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generated very quickly, and this has caused the shutdown of a number
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of corporate mail servers.
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If you have Word set with macros disabled, then the virus will not
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active. However, relying on this protection is a very dangerous
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proposition. Previous macro viruses have also killed macro protection
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in Word, and this one does as well.
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The name "Melissa" comes from the class module that contains the
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virus. The name is also used in the registry flag set by the virus.
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The virus is spread, of course, by infected Word documents. What has
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made it the "bug du jour" is that it spreads *itself* via email. We
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have known about viruses being spread as attachments to email for a
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long time, and have been warning people not to execute attachments (or
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read Word documents sent as attachments) if you don't know where they
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came from. Happy99 is a good example: it has spread very widely in
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the past month by sending itself out as an email attachment whenever
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it infects a system.
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Melissa was originally posted to the alt.sex newsgroup. At that time
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it was LIST.DOC, and purported to be a list of passwords for sex
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sites. I have seen at least one message theorizing that Melissa is
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someone's ill-conceived punishment for viewers of pornography. This
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hypothesis is extremely unlikely. Sending a virus to a sex related
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newsgroup seems to be a reliable way to ensure that a number of stupid
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people will read and/or execute your program, and start your new virus
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off with a bang. (No pun intended.)
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If you get a message with a Melissa infected document, and do whatever
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you need to do to "invoke" the attachment, and have Word on your
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system as the default program for .doc files, Word starts up, reads in
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the document, and the macro is ready to start. If you have Word's
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"macro security" enabled (which is not the default) it will tell you
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that there is a macro in the document. Few people understand the
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import of the warning, and there is no distinction between legitimate
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macros and macro viruses.
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Because of a technical different between normal macros and "VBA
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objects," if you ask for a list of the macros in the document, Melissa
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will not show up. It will be visible if you use the Visual Basic
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Editor, but only after you have loaded the infected file.
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Assuming that the macro starts executing, several things happen.
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The virus first checks to see if Word 97 (Word 8) or Word 2000 (Word
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9) is running. If so, it reduces the level of the security warnings
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on Word so that you will receive no future warnings. In Word97, the
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virus disables the Tools/Macro menu commands, the Confirm Conversions
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option, the MS Word macro virus protection, and the Save Normal
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Template prompt. It "upconverts" to Word 2000 quite nicely, and there
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disables the Tools/Macro/Security menu.
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Specifically, under Word 97 it blocks access to the Tools|Macro menu
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item, meaning you cannot check any macros. It also turns off the
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warnings for conversion, macro detection, and to save modifications to
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the NORMAL.DOT file. Under Word 2000 it blocks access to the menu
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item that allows you to raise your security level, and sets your macro
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virus detection to the lowest level, that is, none. (Since the access
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to the macro security menu item is blocked, I do not know how this
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feature can be reversed, other than programmatically or by
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reinstallation.)
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After this, the virus checks for the
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HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\Melissa?\ registry key
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with a value of "... by Kwyjibo". (The "kwyjibo" entry seems to be a
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reference to the "Bart the Genius" episode of the "Simpsons"
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television program where this word was used to win a Scrabble match.)
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If this is the first time you have been infected (and this "first
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time" business is slightly complicated), then the macro starts up
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Outlook, in the background, and sends itself as an attachment to the
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"top" 50 names in *each* of your address lists. (Melissa will *not*
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use Outlook Express.) Most people have only one (the default is
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"Contacts"), but if you have more than one then Outlook will send more
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than 50 copies of the message. Outlook also sorts address lists such
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that mailing lists are at the top of the list, so this can get a much
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wider dispersal than just fifty copies of the message/virus. There
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was also a mention on one message about MAPI and Exchange servers,
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which may give access to a very large number of mailing lists. From
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other reports, though, people who use Exchange mail server are being
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particularly hard hit. Then again, people who use Exchange are
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probably also standardized on Word and Outlook.
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Some have suggested setting this registry key as a preventative
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measure, but note that it only prevents the mailout. It does not
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prevent infection. If you are infected, and the registry key is
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removed at a later date, then a mailout will be triggered the next
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time an infected document is read.
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Once the messages have been sent, the virus sets the Melissa flag in
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the registry, and looks for it to check whether or not to send itself
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out on subsequent infections. If the flag does not persist, then
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there will be subsequent mass mailings. Because the key is set in
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HKEY_CURRENT_USER, system administrators may have set permissions such
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that changes made are not saved, and thus the key will not persist.
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In addition, multiple users on the same machine will likely each
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trigger a separate mailout, and the probability of cross infection on
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a common machine is very high.
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Since it is a macro virus, it will infect your NORMAL.DOT, and will
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infect all documents thereafter. The macro within NORMAL.DOT is
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"Document_Close()" so that any document that is worked on will be
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infected when it is closed. When a document is infected the macro
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inserted is "Document_Open()" so that the macro runs when the document
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is opened.
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Note that *not* using Outlook does not protect you from the virus, it
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only means that the 50 copies will not be automatically sent out. If
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you use Word but not Outlook, you will still be infected, and may
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still send out infected documents on your own. The virus also will
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not invoke the mailout on Mac systems, but definitely can be stored
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and resent from Macs. At this time I do not have reliable information
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about whether it can reproduce on Macs (there is one report that it
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does), but the likelihood is that it can.
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Vesselin Bontchev has noted that the virus never explicitly terminates
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the Outlook program. It is possible that multiple copies may be
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invoked, and may create memory problems. However, this has not been
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confirmed, and is not probable given the "first time" flag that is
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set.
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The message appears to come from the person just infected, of course,
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since it really is sent from that machine. This means that when you
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get an "infected" message it will probably appear to come from someone
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you know and deal with. The subject line is "Important Message From:
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[name of sender]" with the name taken from the registration settings
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in Word. The test of the body states "Here is that document you asked
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for ... don't show anyone else ;-)". Thus, the message is easily
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identifiable: that subject line, the very brief message, and an
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attached Word document (file with a .doc extension to the filename).
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If you receive a message of this form *DO NOT OPEN THE DOCUMENT WITH
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WORD!* If you do not have alternate means or competent virus
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assistance, the best recourse is to delete the message, and
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attachment, and to send a message to the sender alerting them to the
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fact that they are, very likely, infected. Please note all the
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specifics in this paragraph, and do not start a panic by sending
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warnings to everyone who sends you any message with an attachment.
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However, please also note that, as with any Word macro virus, the
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source code travels with the infection, and it will be very easy to
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create modifications to Melissa. (The source code has already been
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posted to one Web site.) We will, no doubt very soon, start seeing
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many Melissa variants with different subjects and messages. There is
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already one similar Excel macro virus, called "Papa." The virus
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contains the text "Fred Cohen" and "all.net," leading one rather
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ignorant reporter to assume that Fred was the author. Dr. Cohen was
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the first person to do formal research into viral programs.
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There is a message that is displayed approximately one time in sixty.
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The exact trigger is if the current system time minute field matches
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the current system time day of the month field when the virus is run.
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In that case, you will "Twenty-two points, plus triple-word-score,
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plus fifty points for using all my letters. Game's over. I'm outta
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here." typed into your document. (This is another reference to the
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"Simpsons" episode referred to earlier.)
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One rather important point: the document passed is the active
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document, not necessarily the original posted on alt.sex. So, for
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example, if I am infected, and prepare some confidential information
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for you in Word, and send you an attachment with the Word document,
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containing sensitive information that neither you nor I want made
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public (say, the fact that Bill Gates is a jerk for having designed
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the technology this way), and you read it in Word, and you have
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Outlook on your machine, then that document will be mailed out to the
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top 50 people in your address book.
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Rather ironically, a clue to the identity of the perpetrator may have
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come from the identification number embedding scheme recently admitted
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by Microsoft as having been included with Office and Windows 98.
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A number of fixes for mail servers and mail filtering systems have
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been devised very quickly. However, note that not all of these have
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fully tested or debugged. One version that I saw would trap most of
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the warning messages about Melissa.
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Note that any Word document can be infected, and that an infected user
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may unintentionally send you an infected document. All Word
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documents, and indeed all Office files, should be checked for
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infection before you load them.
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Information and antiviral updates (some URLs are wrapped):
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http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-99-04-Melissa-Macro-Virus.html
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http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/j-037.shtml
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ftp://ftp.complex.is/pub/macrdef2.zip
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http://www.complex.is/f-prot/f-prot.html
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http://chkpt.zdnet.com/chkpt/hud0007500a/www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/
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news/0,4586,2233030,00.html
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http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/special/melissavirus.html
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http://www.symantec.com/techsupp/mailissa.html
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http://www.antivirus.com/vinfo/security/sa032699.htm
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http://www.avp.com/melissa/melissa.html
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http://www.microsoft.com/security/bulletins/ms99-002.asp
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http://www.sendmail.com/blockmelissa.html
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ftp://ftp.rubyriver.com/pub/jhardin/antispam/procmail-security.html
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http://www.innosoft.com/iii/pmdf/virus-word-emergency.html
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http://www.sophos.com/downloads/ide/index.html#melissa
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http://www.avertlabs.com/public/datafiles/valerts/vinfo/melissa.asp
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http://www.pcworld.com/cgi-bin/pcwtoday?ID=10302
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http://www.internetnews.com/bus-news/article/0,1087,3_89011,00.html
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http://cnn.com/TECH/computing/9903/29/melissa.copycat.idg/
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http://www.pcworld.com/cgi-bin/pcwtoday?ID=10308
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====================== (quote inserted randomly by Pegasus Mailer)
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rslade@vcn.bc.ca rslade@sprint.ca robertslade@usa.net p1@canada.com
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AV tutorial : http://victoria.tc.ca/techrev/mnvrcv.htm
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http://victoria.tc.ca/techrev or http://sun.soci.niu.edu/~rslade
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---------------------------------------------
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