733 lines
30 KiB
Plaintext
733 lines
30 KiB
Plaintext
From mcvax!cs.hw.ac.uk!davidf@uunet.UU.NET Sun May 7 14:33:38 1989
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Received: from surya.cs.hw.ac.uk (surya) by brahma.cs.hw.ac.uk; Sun, 7 May 89 20:05:07 BST
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From: "David.J.Ferbrache" <mcvax!cs.hw.ac.uk!davidf@uunet.UU.NET>
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Message-Id: <4405.8905071907@surya.cs.hw.ac.uk>
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Subject: Virus list (Homebase bulletin board and others)
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To: brunnstein@rz.informatik.uni-hamburg.dbp.de,
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OJA <nccibm1.bitnet!OJA@earn-relay.ac.uk>,
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RADAI1 <hbunos.bitnet!RADAI1@earn-relay.ac.uk>,
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luken <lehiibm1.bitnet!luken@earn-relay.ac.uk>,
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jwright@atanasoff.cs.iastate.edu, well!odawa@uunet.UU.NET
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Date: Sun, 7 May 89 20:07:33 BST
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Cc: rzotto <dknkurz1.bitnet!rzotto@earn-relay.ac.uk>,
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r746ll12 <cmccvb.bitnet!r746ll12@earn-relay.ac.uk>,
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chess@cs.heriot-watt.ac.uk, drsolly@ibmpcug.co.uk,
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utoday!greenber@uunet.UU.NET
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X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.2 PL0]
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Status: R
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Please find enclosed for your information and comment a listing of IBM PC
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viruses from Jim Goodwin's Homebase BBS which Jim Wright passed on to me.
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I have restructure the original document slightly to place each of his
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48 viruses under the original parent virus, so that strains of Brain are
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grouped together. I have also added a few comments of my own in brackets.
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Can I strongly suggest we pool our resources so that one comprehensive list
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can be produced. It would seem well worth contacting Jim to arrange for
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details of 1. the new viruses he describes, and 2. the modifications of
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well know viruses which he has observed.
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PC VIRUS LISTING
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by Jim Goodwin
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[edited without permission by Dave Ferbrache]
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It is difficult to name, identify and classify PC viruses.
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Everyone who first discovers a virus will name it and describe
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what they think of it. In most cases, the virus is not new and
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has been named and described dozens of times before. None of the
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names and few of the descriptions will match. While I'm writing
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this, for example, I feel certain that someone, somewhere has
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just been infected by the Jerusalem virus and they are telling
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their co-workers and friends about it as if it were newborn - and
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for them perhaps it is. It will be impossible to verify the
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strain and variety of the infection, however, unless we can get a
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living sample of the virus to analyze and compare with other
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strains of this same virus. So problem number one is filtering
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the reports of infection and collecting samples that can be
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placed under the knife.
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Problem number two is - where do you draw the line between
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an original virus and a true variation of the virus. The
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original Brain virus, for example, could only infect a floppy
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diskette. Do the varieties of the Brain that can infect hard
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disks (but in every other respect are identical) deserve to be
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called new viruses, or are they still the Brain? What about
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further modifications that destroy data? Is this now a new
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virus? What if nothing changes but the imbedded text data, so
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that the virus is in every way functionally identical, but the
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volume label changes to "SMURF" instead of BRAIN. All of these
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modifications to the Brain have been discovered and logged. How
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do we deal with them?
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I choose to deal with these modifications in the simplest
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way I know. If the virus differs in any way from the original
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(assuming that the "original" can in fact be identified), then I
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log it as a new virus. This relieves me from having to make
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decisions. Those of you who see the world differently can merely
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take this listing and lump together all of the different strains
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that you like. That way we'll all be happy.
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[have done Jim, it does seem simpler to me and allows tracing of the
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evolution of viruses. I personally think an edited text string does
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not constitute a new virus, although I agree the line is often hard to
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judge]
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This will be, by the way, my last virus document. I have
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worked double time for the past eighteen months helping John
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McAfee and his Homebase folks and, while I have thouroughly
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enjoyed myself, I have finally burned out. It has been great fun
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and I've learned a lot, and hopefully some of my works, like the
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product review with Sankary and Marsh, will end up being somehow
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useful to the world. But now I have the irresistible urge to go
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fishing, and, perhaps afterwards, to contemplate my navel for a
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few years. In-between times I intend to write a book on the
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craziness in this industry and about the unique personalities
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I've had the pleasure to work with in the Virus Marine Corps.
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It's been quite an adventure. Thank you all.
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Jim Goodwin
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THE VIRUSES
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I have arranged these viruses so that similar varieties are
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described in the sequence in which they appeared within the virus
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sub-group (to the best of my knowledge). Not everyone agrees
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with my groupings. Many people believe, for instance, that the
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Golden Gate-C (Mazatlan Virus) is a distinctly original virus and
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is not a variation of the Alameda. I think differently and have
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endeavored to show how the Golden Gate evolved from the Alameda,
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through each precursor virus. I cannot prove, of course, that
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the sequence of appearances is the correct sequence, and in many
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cases I have had to guess. If you anyone wishes to re-order
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these virus, I will not be offended.
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I have not included any of the specific application trojans
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in this list. There has been a lot of discussion about the Lotus
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123 and DBASE "viruses", for example. These are not replicating
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programs and I do not classify them as viruses. I had originally
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intended a separate list to include these non-replicating trojans
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but Time caught up with me.
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[BOOT SECTOR AND PARTITION RECORD VIRUSES]
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[----------------------------------------]
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[ALAMEDA VIRUS AND VARIANTS]
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(Also called: Yale; Merritt; Pecking; Seoul)
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First discovered at Merritt college in California (1987).
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Original version caused no intentional damage.
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replicates at boot time <ctrl>-<alt>-<del> and infects only
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5 1/4" 360KB floppies. It saves the real boot sector at track 39,
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sector 8, head 0. Contains a count of the number of times it has
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infected other diskettes, although it is referenced for write only and is
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not used as part of an activation algorithm. The virus
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remains resident at all times after it is booted, even if no
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floppy is booted and BASIC is loaded. Contains a rare POP
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CS instruction that makes it incapable of infecting 286
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systems.
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ALAMEDA-B (Also called Sacramento Virus)
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This is the original Alameda Virus that has the POP CS
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removed. Relocation is accomplished through a long jump
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instruction. All other characteristics are identical. This
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version runs OK on a 286.
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ALAMEDA-C
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This is the Alameda-B virus that has been modified to
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disable the boot function after 100 infections. The
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counter in the original Alameda virus has been re-activated
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and is interrogated at each bootup. When it reaches 100 the
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virus disconnects from the original boot sector (control is
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no longer passed) and the diskette will no longer boot. At
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infection time, the counter is zeroed on the host diskette.
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SF VIRUS
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This is the Alameda-C that has been modified to format the
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boot diskette when the counter runs out.
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GOLDEN GATE VIRUS (Also called The 500 Virus)
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This is the SF Virus that has been modified to format the C
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drive when the counter runs out. The activation occurs
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after 500 infections, instead of 100 infections. Note that
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in all three of these strains, the counter is zeroed on the
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host diskette at infection time. Thus, the activation
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period on this virus will on the average stretch into many
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years. No corruption will occur until 500 new diskettes
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have been infected from within a given machine. Since the
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infection can only occur when the system is booted with a
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new diskette, infection is not frequent with this virus. I
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expect that the overwhelming majority of infections will
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never activate. The IBM PC will have long since been
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supplanted by another architecture in most environments.
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GOLDEN GATE-B
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This virus is the Golden Gate virus that has had the
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activation delay reset to 30 infections. This virus should
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activate within a couple of years in most environments.
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GOLDEN GATE-C (Also called the Mazatlan Virus)
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This virus is the Golden Gate virus that is able to infect a
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hard disk. It is a nasty virus, since it has more of an
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opportunity to do damage than previous versions. Prior
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versions were limited since systems with hard disks are only
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infrequently booted from floppy and booting from hard disk
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overwrote earlier versions.
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GOLDEN GATE-D
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This virus is identical to number 7, except the counter has
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been disabled (similar to original Alameda).
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[BRAIN VIRUS AND VARIANTS]
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(Also called, Pakistani Brain; Basit Virus)
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This virus originated in January, 1986, in Lahore Pakistan.
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It is the only virus yet discovered that includes the valid
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names address and phone numbers of the original
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perpetrators. The Brain is a boot sector infector,
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approximately 3K in length, that infects 5 1/4" floppies.
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It cannot infect hard disks. It will infect a diskette
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whenever the diskette is referenced. For example, a
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Directory command, executing a program from the diskette,
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copying a file from or to the diskette or any other access
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will cause the infection to occur. The virus stores the
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original boot sector, and six extension sectors, containing
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the main body of the virus, in available sectors which are
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then flagged as bad sectors.
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The virus is able to hide from detection by intercepting any
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interrupt that might interrogate the boot sector and re-
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directing the read to the original boot sector. Thus,
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programs like the Norton Utilities will be unable to see the
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virus.
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Infected diskettes are noticeable by "@BRAIN" displayed in
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the volume label.
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BRAIN-B (Also called Brain-HD; the Hard Disk Brain; Houston Virus)
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This virus is identical in every respect to the original
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Brain, with the single exception that it can infect the C
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drive.
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BRAIN-C
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This virus is the Brain-B that has the volume label code
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removed. The volume label of infected diskettes does not
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change with this virus. This virus was difficult to detect
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since it does nothing overt in the system.
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CLONE VIRUS
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This virus is the Brain-C that saves the original boot
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copyright label and restores it to the infected boot. The
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Basit & [A]mjad original Brain messages have been replaced with
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non-printable garbage that looks like instructions if viewed
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through Norton or other utility. Even if the system is
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booted from a clean diskette, it is virtually impossible to
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tell, by visual inspection, whether the hard disk is
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infected.
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SHOE_VIRUS (Also called UIUC Virus)
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This virus is the Brain-B Virus that has been modified to
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include the message - "VIRUS_SHOE RECORD, v9.0. Dedicated
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to the dynamic memories of millions of virus who are no
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longer with us today". The message is never displayed.
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[I would also tentively identify this with the ashar virus as we
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have a VIRUS_SHOES RECORD v9.0 with the identifying string ashar at
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offset 04a6hex]
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SHOE_VIRUS-B
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This is the Shoe_Virus that has been modified to so that it
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can no longer infect hard disks. The v9.0 has been changed to
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v9.1.
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[Have to question this we have a version of Brain with VIRUS_SHOE
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RECORD v9.0 which is incapable of activating a virus stored on hard
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disk due to the drive number being hardwired into the read routine
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for loading the virus. I suspect v9.1 may be the hard disk variant.]
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ClONE-B
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This is the Clone virus that has been modified to corrupt
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the FAT when it is booted after May 5, 1992. There are no
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other apparent modifications.
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[JORK VIRUS]
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[This virus is the Shoe virus with the identifying text at
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offset 0010hex reduced to "Welcome to the Dungeon (c) 1986 Brain", with
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the text at 0202hex reading "(c) 1986 Jork & Amjads (pvt) Ltd".]
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[TERSE SHOE VIRUS]
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[A variant of Shoe virus with the initial text message truncated to
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a single line]
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[ITALIAN VIRUS AND VARIANTS]
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(Also Called Bouncing Ball; Vera cruz)
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This is a boot sector virus that was first reported in March
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1988. It is a floppy-only infector.
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When this virus activates (randomly) a bouncing dot appears
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on the screen and can only be removed through reboot. No
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other damage is done.
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ITALIAN-B
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This is a variation of Italian that is able to infect
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Hard disks.
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[Obviously they have been spared this virus which I find suprising, this
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does not seem to be based on first hand evidence]
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[NEW ZEALAND AND VARIANTS]
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(Also called Stoned Virus)
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This is a boot sector infector that infects 360 KB 5 1/4"
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floppies. It was first reported in Wellington, New Zealand
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in early 1988). It displays - "Your computer is now stoned.
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Legalize Marijuana" every 8th bootup. No overt damage.
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Unable to infect hard disk.
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NEW ZEALAND-B
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Variation of New Zealand. Has been changed to be able to infect
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hard disks. The hard disk is infected as soon as an
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infected floppy is booted. No intentional damage done,
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except systems with RLL controllers will frequently hang.
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NEW ZEALAND-C
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This is the Stoned-B virus that no longer displays the
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"Stoned" message. This virus is difficult to detect.
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[SEARCH AND VARIANTS]
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(Also called Den Zuk; Venezuelan)
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This is a boot sector infector that infects 360KB 5 1/4"
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floppies. It infects through any access to the host
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diskette. It can survive a warm reboot. It will infect
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data (non-system) diskettes, which in turn can pass on the
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infection if an accidental attempt to boot from the data
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disk occurs. It has a bug which causes it incorrectly
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attempt to infect 3.5" diskettes. This will overwrite the
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diskette's FAT and cause a read (or write) failure. It
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cannot infect a hard disk, and will not attempt to do so.
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If an infected system is rebooted from the hard disk, the
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virus will de-activate. This is not the case with rebooting
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from a clean floppy - which will become infected.
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The virus causes CGA, EGA and VGA screens to display a
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purple "DEN ZUK" graphic to appear after a <ctrl>-<alt>-
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<del>. It causes no damage.
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SEARCH-HD
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This virus is identical to the Search Virus, except it's
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able to infect hard disks.
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SEARCH-B
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This virus is identical to the Search virus, but
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unsuccessful modifications have been made to fix the 3.5"
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diskette problem. The 3.5" infection still fails, plus
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unsuccessful attempts to infect the hard disk will occur
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which result in system failure in some systems.
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SYS VIRUS
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This virus is really a modification of the Search-HD virus.
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The display code has been replaced (no display occurs on
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reboot) by code that disables the SYS program. The SYS
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program itself is not modified, but any attempt to execute
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SYS will result in the program not being loaded. Instead,
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multiple reads to the source and target drives will occur
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(to simulate the SYS activity). The normal SYS message
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output is displayed by the virus at the appropriate time.
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This virus will successfully avoid being removed by SYS.
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The virus does no damage.
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SYS-B
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This is similar to the SYS virus, but it performs a hard
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disk format on any Friday 13th after 1990. This virus, and
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its precursor virus both still contain the 3.5" bug, so that
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they are easily detected on systems using 3.5" drives. They
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are difficult to detect on other systems.
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SYS-C
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Similar to the SYS virus but performs random reboots
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beginning 2 hours after power-on or initial boot.
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[COMMAND.COM VIRUSES]
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[-------------------]
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LEHIGH
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This is a COMMAND.COM infector that first surfaced at Lehigh
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University in late 1987. It is the widest known virus, the
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most discussed and the most analyzed of all the viruses, so
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I won't waste any more time on it.
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[A pity since there is now a further variant]
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[LEHIGH-2]
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[A version of the Lehigh virus modified to retain its infection
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counter in RAM, and to only trigger the destructive phase when the
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counter reaches 10 infections the disk FAT table is nulled]
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[TRANSIENT OBJECT FILE VIRUSES]
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[-----------------------------]
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[DOS-62 AND VARIANTS]
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(Also called the UNESCO Virus)
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This virus is a COM infector. It was first discovered in
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Moscow in April, 1988. It was first publicized in August
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1988 when it cropped up at a children's computer Summer camp
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run by UNESCO. When a program infected by this virus is
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executed, it infects one other COM file in the system. On a
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random basis, infected programs will perform a system re-
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boot when they are executed.
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62-B
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This virus is similar to DOS-62 except the re-boot is
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replaced by deleting the executed program.
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[FRIDAY THE 13th]
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[Here lies a problem, this virus is totally different from the Israeli
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Friday 13th strain, for one thing it is transient in that it does not
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hook interrupts and remain active in memory]
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(Also called COM Virus; 512 virus)
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This virus is a non-resident COM infector that first
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appeared in South Africa in 1987. At each execution of an
|
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infected program the virus seeks out two other COM files on
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the C drive and one COM file on the A drive and infects
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them. The virus is extremely fast and the only indication
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of infection occurring is the access light on the A drive
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(if the current drive is C). The virus will only infect a
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file once.
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On every Friday 13 the virus deletes the host program if it
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is executed on that day (similar to the Jerusalem).
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Friday 13th-B
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This virus is identical to the original except that it
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infects every file in the current subdirectory. The only
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way this virus can spread beyond the current subdirectory is
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if an infected program ends up in the system PATH. Then
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every COM file in the currently selected subdirectory will
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get infected.
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Friday 13th-C
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This is the 13th-B except a message has been added that
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displays - "We hope we haven't inconvenienced you" appears
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whenever the virus activates.
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[AUSTRIAN VIRUS AND VARIANTS]
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(Also called the 648 Virus)
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This is a COM infector that increases the size of the
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infected file by 648 bytes. It was first reported in London
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|
in the fall of 1988. It is not a memory resident virus. It
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infects the next uninfected COM file in the current
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directory (similar to the original Friday 13th). It does no
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overt damage.
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AUSTRIAN-B
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This is similar to the original, but it causes infrequent errors
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in the infected COM file so that the file will not execute.
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|
Approximately one file in ten will be corrupted.
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[405 VIRUS]
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[A .COM infecting overwritting virus, similar to the Virus 1.1 published
|
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in Ralf Burger's book. Infected files are destroyed and replaced by the
|
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405 byte long virus code.]
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[RESIDENT OBJECT FILE VIRUSES]
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[----------------------------]
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[JERUSALEM VIRUS AND VARIANTS]
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|
(Also called Israeli; Friday the 13th; PLO)
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|
|
|
This virus is a memory resident COM and EXE infector. It
|
|
was first discovered at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem
|
|
in the fall of 1987. It contains a flaw which makes it re-
|
|
infect EXE files over and over until the files become too
|
|
big to fit into memory. The virus re-directs interrupt 8
|
|
(among others) and one-half hour after an infected program
|
|
loads, the new timer interrupt introduces a delay which
|
|
slows down the processor by a factor of about 10. On every
|
|
Friday the 13, the virus deletes every program executed
|
|
during the day.
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|
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|
[The sUMsDos variant I assume]
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|
JERUSALEM-B
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|
|
|
This virus is identical to the Jerusalem except it is able
|
|
to successfully identify pre-existing infections in EXE
|
|
files and will only infect them once.
|
|
|
|
JERUSALEM-C
|
|
(Also called the New Jerusalem)
|
|
|
|
This virus is identical to Jerusalem-B except that the timer
|
|
interrupt delay code has been bypassed. This virus is
|
|
virtually invisible until it activates.
|
|
|
|
BLACK HOLE
|
|
(Also called the Russian Virus)
|
|
|
|
This virus is the Jerusalem-C that has odd text and
|
|
additional code that is never referenced. A new interrupt
|
|
eight routine is added to the non referenced area and a
|
|
number of interrupt 21 calls which appear meaningless. The
|
|
additional text includes - "ANTIVIRUS". It appears that
|
|
this virus is a modified version of some previous variety of
|
|
the Jerusalem which we have not yet seen.
|
|
|
|
JERUSALEM-D
|
|
|
|
This is the Jerusalem-C that destroys both versions of the
|
|
FAT on any Friday the 13th after 1990. The code that
|
|
originally deleted executed programs has been overwritten
|
|
with the FAT destructive code.
|
|
|
|
JERUSALEM-E
|
|
|
|
This is identical to the D variety except the activation is
|
|
any Friday the 13th after 1992.
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|
|
|
CENTURY VIRUS (Also called the Oregon Virus)
|
|
|
|
This is similar to the Jerusalem-C except the activation
|
|
date is January 1, 2000. When the virus activates, it
|
|
erases both FATs on all connected drives and then begins
|
|
writing zeroes to every sector on every attached device. If
|
|
allowed to continue to completion, it displays the message -
|
|
" Welcome to the 21st Century".
|
|
|
|
CENTURY-B
|
|
|
|
This virus is similar to the original Century virus with the
|
|
following exception:
|
|
|
|
It waits for BACKUP.COM to be executed and then garbles all
|
|
program writes. After BACKUP terminates, the output
|
|
functions return to normal.
|
|
|
|
[No mention of the sURIV 3.00 variant here]
|
|
[Nor any of the April 1st sURIV 1.01 and sURIV 2.01 viruses]
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|
|
|
[APRIL 1ST AND VARIANTS]
|
|
|
|
[A memory resident .COM infecting virus which displays the message
|
|
"APRIL 1ST HA HA HA YOU HAVE A VIRUS" on April 1st after memory is infected by
|
|
execution of an infected .COM file and a further .COM file is executed.
|
|
|
|
The system locks up requiring a reboot. This virus has the identifying text
|
|
string sURIV 1.01.
|
|
|
|
APRIL 1st-B
|
|
|
|
A .EXE infecting version of .COM which will display the characteristic
|
|
message on execution of any infected .EXE file on April 1st, with
|
|
associated lockup. A similar lockup will occur 1 hour after infection
|
|
of memory on any day on which the default date 1-1-80 is used.]
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|
|
|
[CASCADE VIRUS AND VARIANTS]
|
|
|
|
(Also called 1701; Falling Tears; [Autumn Leaves])
|
|
|
|
This virus evolved from a trojan horse disguised as a
|
|
utility to automatically turn off the num-lock light at
|
|
system boot. The trojan horse caused the characters on the
|
|
screen to fall to the bottom of the screen in systems with
|
|
CGA monitors. In late 1977 this trojan horse was turned
|
|
into a memory resident COM virus. It gets it's name from
|
|
the size increase of infected COM files - 1701 bytes. The
|
|
virus has some unique qualities:
|
|
- It uses an encryption algorithm to avoid detection
|
|
and complicate any attempted analysis.
|
|
- It contains a sophisticated activation algorithm
|
|
that is based on randomizations, machine types,
|
|
monitor type, presence or absence of clock cards,
|
|
and time of year.
|
|
- It was designed to infect only IBM clones. True
|
|
IBM systems would be spared.
|
|
The virus has a bug that causes the machine selection
|
|
algorithm to fail. The virus activates on any machine with
|
|
a CGA or VGA monitor, in the months of September, October,
|
|
November or December in the year 1980 or 1988 (systems
|
|
without clock cards will often have a date set to 1980).
|
|
|
|
CASCADE-B
|
|
|
|
This virus is identical to the cascade except that it activates
|
|
in the fall of any year.
|
|
|
|
1704 [(Also called Blackjack)]
|
|
|
|
I would prefer to classify this virus as a variety of the
|
|
1701 but it has been universally referred to as a separate
|
|
virus, so I will go along with the crowd on this one. It is
|
|
|
|
[Nope I have compared the code, identical except for a single instruction,
|
|
in my book that counts as the same virus]
|
|
|
|
functionally identical to the 1701 except that the IBM
|
|
selection bug has been repaired. The new virus is three
|
|
bytes longer. In every other respect it is the same.
|
|
|
|
1704-B
|
|
|
|
This virus is identical to the 1704, except the cascade
|
|
display has been replaced with a system re-boot when the
|
|
virus activates. The activation uses the same interrupt 8
|
|
randomization algorithm, so the reboot will occur at a
|
|
random time interval after executing an infected program on
|
|
or after the activation date.
|
|
|
|
1704-C
|
|
|
|
This virus is the same as the 1704-B, except the activation
|
|
date has been changed to occur in December of any year.
|
|
|
|
1704-D
|
|
|
|
This virus is the same as the 1704, except the IBM selection
|
|
has been disabled (the virus infects true IBM PCs).
|
|
|
|
[No mention either of the Dbase virus Ross reported recently, of the Oropax
|
|
reported by Klaus Brunnstein, so]
|
|
|
|
[DBASE VIRUS]
|
|
|
|
A memory resident .COM/.EXE virus. When an infected application is executed
|
|
the virus will install in memory looking for an open operation on .DBF files,
|
|
any writes would thereafter have two bytes transposed at random, their
|
|
location being recorded in the file BUG.DAT in the .DBF directory. Reads of
|
|
data would be corrected by the resident portion of the virus, thus data
|
|
appeared correct. After 90 days the virus would null the root directory and
|
|
FAT structures.
|
|
|
|
[OROPAX VIRUS]
|
|
|
|
(alias music virus)
|
|
|
|
A memory resident .COM infecting virus. When an infected application is
|
|
executed the virus installs in memory trapping the DOS 21h interrupt. Thereafter
|
|
when a program attempts a create subdirectory, remove subdirectory, create
|
|
file, open file, delete file, get/set file attributes, rename file, delete file
|
|
(FCB), create file (FCB) or rename file (FCB) call one .COM file is infected
|
|
in the home directory. Command.com, com files with length divisible by 51,
|
|
com files with attribute other than normal or archive or com files with
|
|
length > 61980 bytes will not be infected. If based on a random number
|
|
the virus activates it will play 3 melodies repeatedly with a 7 minute
|
|
interval.
|
|
|
|
[In addition I have reports of a further transient object file virus]
|
|
[
|
|
In general the virus list seems very comprehensive listing as it does a
|
|
large number of variants of the more common viruses. It does seem to omit
|
|
detail on the Italian and Lehigh viruses in particular which any list
|
|
seeking to be comprehensive must include. I suggest that it would be
|
|
very useful to contact the author and arrange for a pooling of resources.
|
|
|
|
We now have 5 separate lists of IBM viruses in preparation. Klaus'
|
|
catalog is very detailed (from the sample entries I have examined) although
|
|
I doubt if it can achieve the coverage that Jim Goodwin's list has. As
|
|
always it comes down to arranging that we receive, disassemble and
|
|
detail new virus strains when they are discovered. Having a number of
|
|
centres world wide seems an unnecessary duplication of effort, made even
|
|
worse by the lack of sharing of information which occurs. We need a
|
|
standard format for virus reports, a list of contacts and the free
|
|
interchange of information between each of the existing sites (this should
|
|
include virus samples, disassemblies and analysis).
|
|
|
|
Comp.virus can (I think) prove useful as a contact point through which we
|
|
can track new infections, although this will be supplanted by the
|
|
establishment of national centres with a reputation (and/or government
|
|
recognition) for work in this field.
|
|
|
|
I am still collating information for an exhaustive catalog, although
|
|
indications are that with the explosion of the virus problem this is now
|
|
becoming a full time job. Co-operation is important. I entered the field
|
|
four months ago, and in that time I have seen how important the establishment
|
|
of these links is. Within the UK there are a number of isolated workers
|
|
in the virus field, this must change.
|
|
|
|
Within the Mac field there is a mailing list (Macmash) where discussion
|
|
and technical analysis of new strains takes place. I stand by my original
|
|
view that there is a place for such a list for IBM PC systems in addition
|
|
to virus-l. Many of the viruses described above have never come to light
|
|
in reports on virus-l, this should also change. There have been a number
|
|
of excellent virus reports on virus-l which have provided very useful
|
|
symptomatic analyses of viruses, without providing too much technical
|
|
detail.
|
|
|
|
Anyway, enough of the soapbox. Any comments on the above list, including
|
|
additions, omissions and corrections would be appreciated. The list seems
|
|
extensive, but lacks the detailed information required (for me at least)
|
|
to prepare user information and detection software for the above viruses.
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
Dave Ferbrache Internet <davidf@cs.hw.ac.uk>
|
|
Dept of computer science Janet <davidf@uk.ac.hw.cs>
|
|
Heriot-Watt University UUCP ..!mcvax!hwcs!davidf
|
|
79 Grassmarket Telephone +44 31-225-6465 ext 553
|
|
Edinburgh, United Kingdom Facsimile +44 31-220-4277
|
|
EH1 2HJ BIX/CIX dferbrache
|
|
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|