465 lines
26 KiB
Plaintext
465 lines
26 KiB
Plaintext
ELECTRO MAGNETIC PULSES
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------- -------- ------
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Imagine a very bright flash in the sky! No one is hurt. But, your transistor
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radio stops playing, your car won't start, the telephone doesn't ring,
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lights stay off, and we find ourselves in the stone age!
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THE developement of modern high-tech semiconductor devices have paralleled
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unsettled relations between the nations of the world with resulting technol-
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ogical advances affecting the lives of every citizen of North America. Com-
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munications have been made faster, automobiles more fuel-efficient and
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maintenance-free, TV sets, video-tape recorders, and virtually every other
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piece of electronics equipment have been improved by the advent of the
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semiconductor and its high-tech advancements. The relationship between
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nuclear weapons and the recent electronics advances may seem unclear, but
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a nuclear attack on the North American continent could make that relationship
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glaringly apparent.
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ALL nuclear explosions produce electromagnetic pulses (EMP's) and the ensuing
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induced voltages and currents produced in conductors ( wires and cables ) are
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comparable in strength to the strongest of lightning bolts. EMP's may reach 3
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million volts and 10,000 amperes for a total of 30-billion watts of energy.
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The largest commercial radio stations in the U.S. and Canada radiate 50,000
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watts, or approximately one-millionth that much power! The major difference
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between EMP's and lightning is that EMP's are induced simultaneously over
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an entire wide area, while lightning occurs at a single location.
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Significance of the Problem
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------------ -- --- -------
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THREE ten-megaton thermonuclear weapons detonated 250 miles ( 400 kilometers )
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above the United States or Canada would produce EMP's strong enough to knock
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out the entire electrical power grid of North America including the entire
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civilian-telephone network, and just about every broadcast station.
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Virtually every piece of unprotected electronic equipment in the country
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-- radios, TV sets, computers, electronic controls in homes, office build-
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ings, factories, cars, airplanes, and instruments in hospitals -- would be
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damaged, if not destroyed. The pulses would also damage or destroy large
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portions of the military command's control and communication (C3) system.
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A chain reaction could be set in motion at nuclear power plants, due to elec-
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tromagnetic pulses. Although it is a point that is frequently disputed, the
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possibility exists that reactor core meltdowns might occur as a result of
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EMP's. The meltdowns would be a by-product of electronic control system
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failure. The control systems are used to monitor and control the processes at
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the plants. The EMP's could cause the system to fail and result in partial or
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complete loss of control over vital functions, causing subsequent melt-
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downs. We know that those nuclear plants are designed to be fail safe,
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but has anyone considered the possibility of every circuit breaker in a
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plant failing at the same instant?
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Characteristics of EMP's
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--------------- -- -----
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AT an altitude of 250 miles, the gamma rays produced in the first few nano-
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seconds ( billionths-of-a-second ) of a nuclear explosion can travel hundreds
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of kilometers before colliding with electrons in atmospheric molecules.
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That kind of collision may take place in a region 2,000 miles in diameter and
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6-miles thick. Electrons are accelerated by those collisions, a phen-
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omenon referred to as the Compton effect; and upon reaching the earth's
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magnetic field, they set up electromagnetic pulses that radiate downward
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toward earth (Fig.1). Due to the extremely large area of collision, vast
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amounts of ground area are exposed to electromagnetic fields with strengths
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up to 50,000-volts per meter. The ground area exposed to electromagnetic
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pulses could cover the entire continental United States and most of
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Canada by one nuclear blast; if not, certainly large regions such as New
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England would be electrically and electronically devastated.
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FIG. 1 -- Electrons set into motion by gamma rays from a nuclear explosion in
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space will produce enormous electromotive pulses (EMP's) when the negative
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charges enter the Earth's magnetic-field. It is estimated that the ideal
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height for such an explosion should be 250 miles above the Earth's surface.
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:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
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: :
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: O - Nuclear Explosion :
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: :
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: / / :
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: / / - Gamma Rays :
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: --------------------------- :
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: < Earth's Magnetic Field > :
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: --------------------------- :
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: ******* ******* ******* :
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: ***** ***** ***** :
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: *** EMP *** EMP *** :
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: ***** ***** ***** :
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: ******* ******* ******* :
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: =============================== :
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: EARTH :
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: :
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:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
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Vulnerability
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-------------
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THE effects that electromagnetic pulses would have on a mass of circuitry are
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difficult to predict because the interactions are complex. But, the more
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complex the components, the easier they are to damage. Power lines are one
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avenue for EMP damage, and a company making a shielded tubing to go over
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power and signal carrying conductors obviously had EMP in mind when they
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invented their "Zippertubing". That covering acts as a partial shield
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to EMP's.
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FOR each component, damage would come from the internal pickup of the circuit
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itself, as well as surges fed to it by all other attached conductors (power
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lines, other circuits,and metal parts). ANOTHER concern is that generators and
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motors with their numerous internal windings of copper wire could be
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rendered useless in an EMP attack; and with subsequent inoperative water
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pumping stations, desert population-centers could persih. In the dead of
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winter, motors in heating units would be destroyed and the chilling freeze in
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the northern portions of the North American continent would bring those
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areas to a standstill. Food and fuel shipments would halt because fusible
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links and electronic ignitions would be destroyed in cars and trucks. It's
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difficult to conceive a family anywhere on the continent not suffering extreme
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hardships.
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THE more complex the electronics components, the more vulnerable they
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are to electromagnetic pulses. Hardness describes the vulnerability of an
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electrical device and it is best for old-style vacuum tubes, less for semi-
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conductors, and even less for microcircuitry. It would take 100 times
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more EMP energy to damage the tubes than integrated circuits. Computers
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may be upset through memory erasure with 100 times less energy than
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required to damage integrated circuits; refer to Fig. 3. Aircraft in the air
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and parked on open surfaces would be disabled, because electronics controls
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the crafts' flight instruments and control surfaces.
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:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
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:(-8)(-6)(-4)(-2) (1) (2) (4) (6) (8) :
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:::!:::!:::!:::!:::!:::!:::!:::!:::!:::
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: ###### :
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: :
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: $$$$$$$$ :
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: :
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: %%%%%%% :
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: :
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: &&&&&&& :
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: :
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:::!:::!:::!:::!:::!:::!:::!:::!:::!:::
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:(-8)(-6)(-4)(-2) (1) (2) (4) (6) (8) :
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:( Powers of TEN) <Fig. 3> :
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:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
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: RANGE OF THRESHOLD ENERGY, JOULES :
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:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
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: # = Motors and Transformers :
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: $ = Vacuum Tubes :
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: % = Low-Power Transistors :
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: & = Integrated Circuits :
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:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
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Hardening Communications Equipment
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--------- -------------- ---------
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HARDENING of electronics communications equipment is vital to the military,
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and, to a lesser extent, the civilian populace. The Department of Defense
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has established an Electromagnetic Compatibility Program (EMCP) to ensure
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that all military Communication-Electronic (CE) equipment subsystems, and
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systems are protected from electromagnetic interference of all kinds.
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That program was implemented to ensure that electromagnetic compatibility is
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maintained through design, acquistion, and operational phases. Numerous semi-
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conductor manufacturers now produce what are called "radiation-hardened"
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integrated circuits, just for that reason.
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THERE are three major design criteria which must be considered when hardening
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against EMP's. They are cost, the equipment's ability to survive EMP, and
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failure rates of the shielding components.
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COST includes both installation and maintenance. Some protection practices,
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such as shielding the entire communication site, may be attractive from a
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technical point of view, but are impractically expensive.
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THE electronic equipment's ability to survive an EMP attack must be measured
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in order to determine how much EMP protection is needed. A testing device
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for measuring the radiated electromagnetic susceptibility of an elect-
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ronic device is a Transverse Electromagnetic Mode (TEM) cell. A TEM cell
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consists of a group of electronic instruments and a special specimen holder
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that simulates an environment of free space. The TEM cell is used for per-
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forming electromagnetic interference/electromagnetic compatibility (EMI/EMC)
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measurements and evaluating protection devices.
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Shielding Methods
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--------- -------
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IN order to predict the effect of an electromagnetic pulse on electronic
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equipment, it is necessary to assess the enviroment. The structures housing
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the electronic equipment are made in various shapes and sizes, and are con-
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nected to the outside world by conductors such as utility lines and pipes,
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communication lines, and access and ventilation structures.(Refer to fig.5)
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That combination of criteria makes the exact determination of the interaction
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of an EMP with such a variety of structures extremely difficult. However,
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for complex systems, it is convenient to have several layers of shielding.
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(Refer to Fig. 6).
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:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
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: EMP Lightning :
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: //// V V V :
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: ------------------------------ :
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: !* Building ! :
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:P--+** ! :
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: !* ! :
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: ! EMP Penetration ! :
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: ! ! :
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: ! ! :
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: +-+ * ! :
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: ! ! *** ! :
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: ! -----!------------------------ :
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: ! ! :
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:=!======!========================== :
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:Gnd ! - Buried Cable :
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:--------+ :
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:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
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: P = Power Lines Fig. 5. -- :
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: -- A sealed metal box is an ideal :
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: structure for eliminating EMP pen- :
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: etration. However, power lines and :
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: signal cables require entry ports :
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: thus compromising the integrity of :
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: a shielded building. Obviously, it :
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: is apparent that doors and windows :
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: would have a greater leakage effect.:
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:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
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: Shield 1 :
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: ******************** :
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: * Zone 1 (internal) * :
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: * ============== * :
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: * = Zone 2 =----* :
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: * g = ########## = g * :
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: * r = ############ = r * :
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: * o =--###ZONE 3### = o * :
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: * u = ############--= u * :
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: * n = ########## = n * :
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: * d = (cabinet- = d * :
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: *---= environment) = * :
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: * ============== * :
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: * Shield 2 * :
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: ****************** :
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: !------! :
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: ! :
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: ! Zone 0 (External- :
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: ! Environment) :
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:----!--------------------------------:
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: = EARTH :
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: :
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:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
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: Fig. 6 -- More than one shield can :
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: be used to secure the environment of:
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: the machinery and electronic mat- :
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: erial contained within a building. :
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: The building can provide the initial:
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: shield. Shielded rooms or metal cab-:
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: inets may provide a second shield. :
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: A third shield (not diagrammed) :
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: would protect entry cables from :
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: violating the shielded area of :
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: zone 3. :
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:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
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Shield 1
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------ -
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A structure composed of a great deal of metal is well shielded against electro-
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magnetic pulses, while a building made primarily of wood is virtually un-
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shielded against EMP's. Continuous, closed sheet-metal shields are, by far,
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the most effective electromagnetic shields. It is imperative that the in-
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ternal environment of zone 1 be connected to the outside world. That fact
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makes a closed sheet-metal shield impossible. Aperatures in shield 1
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create a special problem in protecting communication sites from EMP penetra-
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tion.
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THE electromagnetic field penetration depends on the aperature size. If a
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given area of wall opening is subdivided into ten small openings having
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the same total area, the penetrating EMP fields at an interior point will be
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1/SQR(10) as large as for a single large opening of the same total area.
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(Refer to Fig. 7).
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Therefore, it is better for a structure to have more small openings than
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just a few larger openings.
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A common treatment for such openings is to cover them with a conducting
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screen or mesh so that the large opening is converted to a multitude of
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small openings, or use a glass impregnated with metal. That glass, despite
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having metal in it, offers approximately the same degree of visual att-
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enuation or lack of clarity as looking through a screen door from within the
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house.
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:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
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: !! !! :
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: ###### !! ######## !! :
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: # !! # !! :
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: EMP *==!! # !! :
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: # !! # !! :
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: # !! E *==!! :
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: EMP *==!! M **==!! :
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: # !! P **==!! :
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: # !! *==!! :
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: EMP *==!! # !! :
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: # !! # !! :
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: # !! # !! :
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: EMP *==!! # !! :
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: # !! # !! :
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: # # :
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: ###### ######## :
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: Shield Shield :
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:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
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: Fig. 7 -- The electromagnetic field :
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: penetration into a ported shield is :
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: minimized by reducing the size of :
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: the openings. In the diagram the :
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: open area of the port of the example:
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: on the right is equal to the sum of :
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: the areas in the example at left. :
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: The diagram clearly shows that the :
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: penetration of an EMP is less when :
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: equal areas are summed from several :
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: small ports. :
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:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
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Shields 2 and 3
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------- - --- -
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THE second-level shield seperates the internal environment from the sensitive
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small-signal circuits within the electronic equipment found within Zone 2.
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Shielding here may be accomplished by electrically grounding the metal cabin-
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ets and equipment.
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SHIELD 3 involves the shielding of the interconnection of the equipment. That
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could involve elaborate design of interconnecting signal transmission lines.
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Fiberoptic signal transmission shows great promise here because it is
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not effected by any type of electromagnetic interference.
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Hardening Aircraft and Missles
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--------- -------- --- -------
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GENERALLY, the EMP interaction with electrical systems inside structures such
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as aircraft and missles depends upon a multitude of factors. Aircraft and
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missles usually have a nearly complete metallic exterior covering that serves
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as a shield from electromagnetic fields. However, that shield alone is
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not enough protection against electromagnetic pulses.
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Missles and Aircraft are equipped with computers that cannot be upset even for
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an instant. They must be partically well hardened.
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AT the present time, there is no agreement on the most effective ways to
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harden aircraft and missles. Heavy shielding, like the type used at com-
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munication sites, is obviously impractical because of the added weight that
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the aircraft has to carry. Instead, EMP resistance is designed into the
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aircraft's equipment. One example of that would be in the area of circuit
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design. Small loops make better antennas for EMP's than short straight
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lines; therefore, circuits are designed in tree or branching layouts rather
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than in more conventional circuit loops.
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Is Shielding Help on the Way?
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-- --------- ---- -- --- ----
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IN the last decade, electronic devices have proliferated in all areas of our
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lives. That influx of products has caused a problem: Noise Pollution, or
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EMI/RFI ( electromagnetic/radio frequency interference). Over 80,000 cases
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of noise pollution were reported to the FCC (Federal Communications Commission)
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in 1982.
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STRANGE as it may sound, the plastics industry is coming to the rescue with
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plastic electronic-equipment enclosures specifically designed for both EMI con-
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tainment and shielding. Obviously, with EMP's as an external disturbance, the
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containment of a field is academic, but the shielding from an outside field is
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crucial. The parameter describing that is Shielding Effectiveness (SE) and the
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equation for shielding effectiveness is
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SE = A + R,
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or shielding effectiveness equals Absorbed plus Reflected energy.
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HIGHLY conductive materials such as pure metal shields reflect approximately 99
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percent of the energy and adsorb 1 percent. But plastics with metallic comp-
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osite fillers, metallic paints and sprays, or even impregnated wire meshes
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still reflect 80 percent of the energy and absorb 20 percent. If EMP's and the
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disturbing effects of electromagnetic fields still seem like an abstraction or
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a physicist's dream, consider that event.
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A manufacturer of buses designed for city use had just delivered a fleet when,
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during a test drive, a problem was discovered. After going over the top of a
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hill, the driver tried to brake, only to discover he had no brakes until he got
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to the bottom of the hill. Upon logical investigation of that problem, field-
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strength meters demonstrated that a local television station had a lobe-shaped
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radiation pattern that intersected the hill's apex. The microprocessor-
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controlled anti-skid braking system on the bus had sensitive circuitry that
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became inoperative because of the TV signal. The bus, though, was made safe
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by properly shielding the enclosure housing the electronics. Graphite,
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a moderately good conductor, is fabricated within large plastic sheets
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for applications such as that.
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IF a signal as small as that can effect circuitry that drastically, you can
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imagine what an EMP could do and likewise you can see how crucial EMI
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shielding is. But will EMI shielding be universally implemented into new
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equipment?
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The Military's Involvement
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--- ---------- -----------
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THE military is very concerned with EMP's. The Army has established its
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Aurora Tree test facility in Aldelphi, Maryland. The Navy has the Casino and
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Gamble-2 x-ray emitting facilities, but the Air Force probably has the most
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interesting project of all. It is the Trestle, after the railroad structure
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it resembles.
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THAT 12-story (118 feet) high, 58-meter (200-foot) square deck is flanked by a
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50-foot wide adjoining ramp upon which aircraft to be tested are rolled up.
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The Trestle can support aircraft weighing 550,000 pounds and is built
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with one-foot by one-foot wooden columns using no nails or metal of any
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kind. That largest glue-laminated structure in the world uses 250,000
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wooden bolts to hold its six-million board feet of lumber together ---
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enough for 4,000 frame houses. The structure at Kirtland Air Force Base,
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New Mexico cost approximately 58-million dollars.
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THE Trestle has two 5-million volt pulsers that discharge energy into
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wire transmission lines surrounding the aircraft under test. Sensors
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capture aircraft response signals and fiber-optic channels transmit
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that sensor data to computers for processing. The processing equip-
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ment, though, naturally resides inside a very well shielded structure.
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The B-52G's OAS (Offensive Avionics System) is one of numerous studies
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directed primarily at testing the electronic hardening of military
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systems.
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The Future
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--- ------
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THE effects of EMP on our lives is becoming known to many on the North
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American continent as it is being discovered by all the citizens of
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the free world. Its political implications are not the topic here,
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but rather the facts in this article reveal to what EMP is and what it
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can do to the technological devices we rely on every minute of the day.
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The next time a solar flare disrupts radio communications around the world
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for a few hours, or maybe a few days, recall that man with one nuclear
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device can outshine the damage old Sol creates by many fold.
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
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-----------------
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ElectroMagnetic Pulse (EMP): An electromagnetic field of high
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intensity and short duration that may be caused by a nuclear
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explosion.
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-----------------------------------
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Electromagnetic Field: A magnetic field produced by elect-
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ricity (the flow of current in a wire or electrons through a medium
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such as a vacuum). It is usually expressed in volts per meter.
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-----------------------------------
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ElectroMagnetic Compatibility (EMC): The ability of an electronic device
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to deal with electromagnetic interference and function properly.
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-----------------------------------
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ElectroMagnetic Interference (EMI): Any adverse effect on electronic
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equipment due to an electromagnetic field.
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-----------------------------------
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Shielding or Hardening: A method used to protect electronic devices
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from EMP interruption or damage.
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-----------------------------------
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Written: Art Reichert / March 21, 1988
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