1358 lines
87 KiB
Plaintext
1358 lines
87 KiB
Plaintext
philosophy
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Philosophy is the oldest form of systematic, scholarly inquiry. The name comes
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from the Greek philosophos, "lover of wisdom." The term, however, has acquired
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several related meanings: (1) the study of the truths or principles underlying
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all knowledge, being, and reality; (2) a particular system of philosophical
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doctrine; (3) the critical evaluation of such fundamental doctrines; (4) the
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study of the principles of a particular branch of knowledge; (5) a system of
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principles for guidance in practical affairs; and (6) a philosophical spirit or
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attitude.
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All of these meanings of philosophy are recognizable in the intellectual
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traditions of ancient Greece. The pre-Socratics (see PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY)
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sought to find fundamental, natural principles that could explain what
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individuals know and experience about the world around them. The pre-Socratics
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and, later, PLATO and ARISTOTLE tried to develop a comprehensive set of
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principles that would account for their knowledge of both the natural and the
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human world. In developing philosophies, these early thinkers saw that their
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reflections could be used as a means of criticizing and often refuting
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popularly accepted mythological views as well as the thoughts of their
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predecessors and contemporaries. SOCRATES, at his trial, proclaimed a basic
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philosophical premise, that "the unexamined life was not worth living." By this
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he meant that if people do not examine and critically evaluate the principles
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by which they live, they cannot be sure that worthwhile principles exist. As
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the Greek thinkers codified their pictures of the world, they saw that for each
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science or study of some aspect of the world there could be a corresponding
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philosophy of this science or study, such as the philosophies of science, art,
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history, and so on. Each of these involves examining the fundamental
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principles of a discipline to see if they are logical, consistent, and--most
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important--true. Because ancient philosophers questioned the various ways of
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life by which people live and sought the most satisfactory one, they developed
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their philosophical attitudes and theories as guides to practical living. From
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Socrates down to 20th-century thinkers like Bertrand RUSSELL and Jean Paul
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SARTRE, a major element of the philosophical enterprise has been devoted to
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trying to designate what constitutes the good life for humans both as
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individuals and as social and political beings.
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This kind of concern has contributed to the image of the philosopher as
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standing aside from and impervious to all the ups and downs of everyday
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existence. Michel de MONTAIGNE declared that "to philosophize is to learn to
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die," indicating that the philosopher can be philosophical even in the face of
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death. The Stoic thinkers (see STOICISM) are usually seen as the epitome of
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this sense of philosophy. They maintained their philosophical attitude of calm
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reflection in the face of all sorts of temporary disasters.
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philosophical questions
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Because the term philosophy has various meanings, the nature of the field can
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be most easily grasped by examining the kinds of problems and questions the
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field deals with. In the beginnings of Western philosophy, the pre-Socratic
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thinkers dealt primarily with a metaphysical question: What is the nature of
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ultimate reality as contrasted to the apparent reality of ordinary experience?
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They tried to determine whether some ultimate constituents of the world would
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be the real and basic elements, whereas everything else would be ephemeral and
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merely a surface appearance. If such a reality existed, would it be permanent
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and unalterable, or would it be subject to change or alteration like everything
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else? The pre-Socratics generated some of the basic problems involved in
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defining reality, that is, in finding something so basic that it cannot be
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explained by anything else. They found their attempts to present logical
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explanations of their metaphysical theories ran into paradoxical results.
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Could a permanent, unchanging reality account for a changing world? ZENO OF
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ELEA became famous for working out his paradoxes, which claimed nothing could
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really change or move. Some of his paradoxes and some of those connected with
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the Greek ATOMISM still play a role in modern theoretical physics.
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Over time, some aspects of the attempt to delineate reality became separated
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from the metaphysical quest and became the subject matter of the various
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natural sciences. This development has accelerated since the 17th century.
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The areas of study that have been peeled off from philosophy and assigned to
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the natural sciences include astronomy, physics, chemistry, geology, biology,
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psychology, and others. An example of this process may be seen in the
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consideration of a major metaphysical question, the relationship of mind and
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body. Originally, Platonic metaphysics claimed that the body and the mind were
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two separate and distinct entities. Plato, in fact, claimed the body was the
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prison house of the soul or mind. In the 17th century, Rene DESCARTES
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contended that mind and body were two separate and distinct substances that had
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nothing in common although they interact. Several Indian schools of philosophy
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hold a similar view. In the West this problem was gradually taken over by
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psychologists and neurophysiologists. The present tendency is to reduce mental
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phenomena to brain phenomena and thereby reduce the problem from a mind-body
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problem to a body problem.
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Another constant philosophical question, from Greek times up to the present,
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has been to try to establish the difference between appearance and reality.
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Once people learned about sense illusions, the question arose of how to tell
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what seems to be from what really is. Skeptical thinkers have pressed the
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claim that no satisfactory standard can be found that will actually work for
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distinguishing the real from the apparent in all cases. On the other hand,
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various philosophers have proposed many such criteria, none of which has been
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universally accepted. Another type of question raised by philosophers is:
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What is truth? Various statements about aspects of the world seem to be true,
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at least at certain times. Yet experience teaches that statements that have
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seemed to be true have later had to be qualified or denied. Skeptics have
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suggested that no evidence would be able to tell, beyond any show of doubt,
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that a given statement is in reality true. In the face of such a challenge,
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philosophers have sought to find a criterion of truth, especially a criterion
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of truth that would not be open to skeptical challenge.
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Philosophers have also traditionally raised questions about values: What is
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good? How can good be distinguished from bad or evil? What is justice? What
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would a just society be like? What is beauty? How can the beautiful be
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distinguished from the ugly? These questions all deal with matters of
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evaluation rather than fact. Scientific investigation is of only slight help
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in determining if abortion is bad or if Vermeer's Milkmaid is a beautiful
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picture. The values that are at issue are not perceived in the same way as
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facts. If they were, much more agreement would exist about the specific
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answers to value questions. The philosopher seeks to find some means of
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answering these sorts of questions, which are often the most important ones
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that a person can ask and which will exhibit the basis of a theory of values.
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Philosophical methods
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In view of the kinds of questions that philosophers deal with, what methods
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does the philosopher use to seek the answers? The philosopher's tools are
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basically logical and speculative reasoning. In the Western tradition the
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development of LOGIC is usually traced to Aristotle, who aimed at constructing
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valid arguments and also true arguments if true premises could be uncovered.
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Logic has played an important role in ancient and modern philosophy--that of
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providing a clarification of the reasoning process and standards by which valid
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reasoning can be recognized. It has also provided a means of analyzing basic
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concepts to determine if they are consistent or not.
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Logic alone, however, is not enough to answer philosophers' questions. It can
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show when philosophers are being consistent and when their concepts are clear
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and unambiguous, but it cannot ascertain if the first principles or the
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premises are correct. Here philosophers sometimes rely on what they call
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intuition and sometimes on a speculative reasoning process. From their initial
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premises, philosophers then try to work out a consistent development of their
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answers to basic philosophical questions, following the rules of logic.
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Irrationalist philosophers, however, such as the Danish thinker Soren
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KIERKEGAARD, have contended that the less logical the solution to philosophical
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problems, the better. Philosophers such as these sometimes argue that the most
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important elements of existence and experience cannot be contained by logic,
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which is, after all, an element of experience itself. The part, they argue,
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cannot explain the whole.
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Philosophy's relation to other disciplines
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Philosophy is both related to most disciplines and yet different from them.
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Almost from the beginning of both mathematics and philosophy in ancient Greece,
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relations were seen between them. On the one hand, the philosophers were
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strongly impressed by the degree of certainty and rigor that appeared to exist
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in mathematics as compared to any other subject. Some, like the
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philosopher-mathematician PYTHAGORAS OF SAMOS, felt that mathematics must be
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the key to understanding reality. Plato claimed that mathematics provided the
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forms out of which everything was made. Aristotle, on the other hand, held
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that mathematics was about ideal objects rather than real ones; he held that
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mathematics could be certain without telling us anything about reality. In
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more modern times, Descartes and Baruch SPINOZA used mathematics as their model
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and inspiration for formulating new methods to discover the truth about
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reality. The philosopher-mathematician Gottfried Wilhelm von LEIBNIZ, the
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co-discoverer (with Isaac Newton) of calculus, theorized about constructing an
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ideal mathematical language in which to state, and mathematically solve, all
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philosophical problems. Similar views have been advanced in the 20th century
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as ways of resolving age-old philosophical difficulties. Attempts to
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accomplish this have found far from unanimous approval, however.
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Philosophy has both influenced and been influenced by practically all of the
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sciences. The physical sciences have provided the accepted body of information
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about the world at any given time. Philosophers have then tried to arrange
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this information into a meaningful pattern and interpret it, describing what
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reality might be like. Western philosophers over much of the last 2,500 years
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have provided basic metaphysical theories for the scientists to fit their data
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into and as the data changed, their metaphysical interpretations have had to be
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adjusted. Thus the scientific revolution of the 17th century, encompassing the
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scientific work of Johannes Kepler, Galileo, and Newton, was accompanied by a
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metaphysical revolution led by such thinkers as Descartes, Spinoza, and
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Leibniz.
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In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the prevailing philosophers in
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England and France came to the conclusion that the sciences are, and ought to
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be, completely independent of traditional metaphysical interpretations.
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Instead, the sciences should just try to describe and codify observations and
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experiences. This approach has led in the last two centuries to a divorce of
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philosophy from the sciences. What has developed in response is a new branch
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of philosophy, the philosophy of science, which examines the methods of
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science, the types of scientific evidence, and the ways the sciences progress.
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A third intellectual area that has been intimately involved with philosophy is
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religion. In ancient Greece some philosophers like ANAXAGORAS and Socrates
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scandalized their contemporaries by criticizing aspects of Greek religion.
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Others offered more theoretical approaches about the evidence for the existence
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and nature of God or the gods. Some denied the existence of a deity. When
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Christianity entered the Greek world, attempts were made to develop a
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philosophical understanding of Christianity. Finally, toward the end of the
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4th and beginning of the 5th century, Saint AUGUSTINE achieved a synthesis of
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some of the elements of Platonic philosophy with the essentials of
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Christianity. Throughout the Middle Ages, philosopher-theologians among the
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Jews, Muslims, and Christians sought to explain their religions in rational
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terms. They were opposed by antirational theologians who insisted that
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religion is a matter of faith and belief and not of reasons and arguments.
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After the Reformation, philosophers like Spinoza and David HUME began
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criticizing the traditional philosophical arguments used by theologians. Hume
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and Immanuel KANT sought to show that all of the arguments purporting to prove
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the existence of God and the immortality of the soul were fallacious.
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Philosophers sought to explain why people were religious on nonrational
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grounds, such as psychological, economic, or cultural ones. The defenders of
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religion found themselves estranged from the philosophers, who kept using the
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latest results of science and historical research to criticize religion. Some,
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like Kierkegaard, made a virtue of this estrangement, insisting that religious
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belief is a matter of faith, and therefore not a matter of reason. More
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recently, since World War II, a group of theologians who are interested in
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recent philosophical developments and in the relationship between religion and
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contemporary culture have attempted to discover what religious statements can
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be intellectually meaningful. The history of the relation between philosophy
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and theology is thus a long and mixed affair, running the gamut from clarifying
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religion and providing a justification for it to tearing apart its intellectual
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underpinnings and trying to see what is left that a 20th-century scientifically
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oriented person can believe or take seriously.
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branches of philosophy
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The several different branches of philosophy correspond to the different
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problems being dealt with. One of the most basic is EPISTEMOLOGY, the theory
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of knowledge (episteme is Greek for knowledge). It deals with what can be
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known, how it can be known, and how certain the individual can be about it. It
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has special branches like the philosophy of science. The kinds of answers that
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emerge from a particular epistemology usually structure its METAPHYSICS.
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Metaphysics is the study of nature of reality, the study of what features of
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experience are real and which are apparent. Aristotle called metaphysics the
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study of being as such; the term ontology is often used to describe this branch
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of philosophy today. How a person gets to know about pure being (an
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epistemological problem) colors what it is that is known. The reverse is also
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the case. What the individual thinks the world is really like colors what he
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or she thinks can be known about it. How the individual reasons about the
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world and how he or she can certify knowledge belongs to the branch of
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philosophy called logic. Logic provides the rational framework for all
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philosophical discussion, but is also itself open to metaphysical
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interpretations about what sort of world it is explaining.
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Other branches of philosophy such as ETHICS, AESTHETICS, and political
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philosophy deal with evaluative aspects of the world such as what is good
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conduct, what is beautiful, and what is socially and politically just. The
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proposed answers to these questions are much involved with the philosopher's
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epistemological and metaphysical theories, and the values the philosopher
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espouses color his or her epistemology and metaphysics. Sometimes the pursuit
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of particular aspects of experience (such as sensations) or the use of
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particular tools (such as the analysis of language) will reorient philosophical
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inquiry or give birth to new branches of philosophy. Thus philosophy is never
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reasoned in a vacuum. It is concerned not only with abstract questions; it is
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also conditioned by history.
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history of western philosophy
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-----------------------------
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The Pre-Socratics.
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Western philosophy began in Greece, in the Greek settlement of Miletus in
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Anatolia. The first known philosophers were THALES OF MILETUS and his
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students, ANAXIMANDER and ANAXIMENES. Present-day knowledge of this MILESIAN
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SCHOOL is based on fragments attributed to them by later writers. These first
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philosophers were metaphysicians, seeking for an element or force behind
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appearance that explained everything. Thales said that all was ultimately
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water, Anaximander that it was boundless or the infinite, and Anaximenes that
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it was air. Subsequent Greek philosophers, such as HERACLITUS and PARMENIDES,
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argued about whether change or permanence was the basic feature of the world
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and about whether one or more than one element was the fundamental constituent
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of reality (see MONISM; PLURALISM). Greek philosophy before Socrates was
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principally concerned with these metaphysical questions.
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Socrates.
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Socrates, an Athenian, was primarily interested in value questions that
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affected what a person should do. At the time in Athens, the paid teachers,
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the SOPHISTS, taught people how to live successfully; they did not raise the
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Socratic question of what was the right way of life, however. Socrates did not
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write anything, but he is vividly portrayed by his pupil Plato in the Dialogues
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as being the "gadfly" of Athens, forever asking people why they are doing what
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they are doing and making people realize that general principles were necessary
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to justify their conduct. Socrates was finally arrested and accused of heresy
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and corrupting the young of Athens. Socrates used his trial, described in
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Plato's Apology, as a final opportunity to make his general point. His
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accusers, he showed, did not know what the charges actually meant and had no
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evidence for them. He reported that the Delphic oracle had said that he,
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Socrates, was the wisest of all of the Athenians. Socrates said he was the
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wisest because he alone knew nothing and knew that he knew nothing, whereas
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everybody else thought they knew something. In spite of his eloquence and
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wisdom, Socrates was convicted and sentenced to death.
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Plato.
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After Socrates' execution, his disciple Plato developed the first comprehensive
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philosophical system and founded the Academy, the first formal philosophical
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school. Plato contended that knowledge must be of universals (that is, of
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general types or kinds) and not of particulars. To know a particular cat,
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Miranda, the individual must first know what it is to be feline in general.
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Otherwise he or she will not be able to recognize the particular feline
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characteristics in Miranda. These universals, Plato claimed, were the basic
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elements from which the world was formed. They are called the Forms, or
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Platonic Ideas. Mathematics provides the most obvious cases of these Forms.
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They are known not by sense perception but by reasoning. They are known by the
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mind, not by the bodily organs. The world of Platonic Ideas is the unchanging
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Forms of things. The philosopher should turn away from this world of
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appearance and concentrate on the world of Forms. Plato, in his most famous
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work, The Republic, said that the world would be perfect when philosophers are
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kings and kings are philosophers. He believed that the philosopher-kings would
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know what justice really is, and, based on their knowledge of the Forms, they
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could then achieve justice in all societies.
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For Plato the ultimate Idea, which illuminated the rest of the pure ideas, was
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the Idea of the Good. As Plato grew older he became more mystical about this
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idea. The school of NEOPLATONISM, which began a few centuries after his death,
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stressed these otherworldly and mystical elements, identifying the idea of the
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Good with God.
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Aristotle.
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Plato's leading student, Aristotle, developed the most comprehensive
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philosophical system of ancient times. Aristotle broke with Plato, stressing
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the importance of explaining the changing world that humankind lives in as
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opposed to the Platonic Ideas. Aristotle spent years studying the natural
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sciences and collecting specimens, and about 90 percent of his writings are on
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scientific subjects, mostly on biological ones. Aristotle believed he could
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account for the changes and alterations in this world without either having to
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deny their reality or having to appeal to another world. For Aristotle all
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natural objects were composed of form and matter, and the changes that take
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place in matter are the substitution of one form for another. This
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substitution takes place because every natural object has a goal, or telos,
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which it is its nature to achieve. Thus stones, because they are essentially
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material, seek the lowest point, which is why they fall down. Each species is
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ultimately trying to achieve a state of perfection which for Aristotle was a
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state of perfect rest. The cosmos, as Aristotle saw it, is an ordered striving
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for this perfection. The pinnacle of the order is the Unmoved Mover, the
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ultimate cosmic agent, which fully and perfectly realizes its essence of
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eternal thought. The heavenly spheres imitate the Unmoved Mover and by so
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doing set the heavens in an eternal spherical motion; this process is repeated
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by individual souls, and so on. Aristotle's vision of the Cosmos remained
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central to Western thought until the time of Nicolaus Copernicus.
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Hellenistic and Roman Periods.
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In the period from about 300 BC to AD 200 the central philosophical concerns
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shifted to how an individual should conduct his or her life. The Stoics, the
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Skeptics (see SKEPTICISM), and the Epicureans (see EPICUREANISM), although they
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dealt with the classical epistemological and metaphysical issues, emphasized
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the question of how humans should conduct themselves in a miserable world. All
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these theories stressed withdrawal, whether physical, emotional, or
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intellectual, from the turmoils of the day.
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Medieval Period.
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Greek philosophy was the major formative influence on the later philosophical
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traditions of Judaism, Islam, and Christianity. In all three, the theories of
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the Greeks, particularly Plato and Aristotle, were employed to clarify and
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develop the basic beliefs of the religious traditions.
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PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA introduced Platonic ideas and methods into Jewish thought,
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particularly into the interpretation of Scripture about the beginning of the
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Christian era. He exerted little influence on later Jewish thought, however,
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and the Jewish philosophy of the Middle Ages seems to have developed as a
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movement parallel to those in Islam. Important figures in early medieval
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Jewish thought include Isaac Israeli, SAADIA BEN JOSEPH GAON, and the
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Neoplatonist Solomon IBN GABIROL. The most important Jewish thinker of the
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Middle Ages, however, was MAIMONIDES. Maimonides developed a comprehensive
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interpretation of religion and understanding based on Aristotelian principles
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that was influential in the Christian West as well as among Jewish thinkers.
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In Judaism, as in Islam and Christianity, religious speculation and philosophy
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developed in close connection. This development is particularly evident in the
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Jewish mystical tradition, the KABBALAH. The esoteric teachings of these
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schools have influenced much later Jewish thought, including that of Spinoza,
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the most important Jewish philosopher of the early modern period. Drawing both
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on his religious background and on the geometric method of Descartes, Spinoza
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developed a philosophical PANTHEISM of great depth.
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In the Islamic tradition as well the starting point was the work of Plato and
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Aristotle. The 9th-century Neoplatonist al-KINDI was followed by al-FARABI,
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who drew on both Plato and Aristotle to create a universal Islamic philosophy.
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The most important of the medieval Muslim philosophers, however, was Avicenna
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(ibn Sina). Starting from the distinction between essence and existence,
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Avicenna developed a metaphysics in which God, the necessary being, is the
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source of created nature through emanation. Both his metaphysics and his
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intuitionist theory of knowledge were influential in the later Middle Ages as
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well as in the later history of Islamic thought.
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The philosophical tradition did not go unchallenged, however. The 11th-century
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theologian and mystic al-GHAZALI mounted a critique of philosophy, specifically
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Avicenna's, that is rich in argument and insight. Al-Ghazali's Incoherence of
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the Philosophers provoked a response by AVERROES ibn Rushd entitled the
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Incoherence of the Incoherence, in which al-Ghazali's arguments are countered
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point for point. Averroes was best known, however, as an interpreter of
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Aristotle and excited great influence on all subsequent thinkers in the
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Aristotelian tradition. In the later Middle Ages the historian and philosopher
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IBN KHALDUN produced a trenchant critique of culture, and the elaboration of
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metaphysics and epistemology was carried on in the theosophical schools of
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Islamic mysticism.
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The first systematic Christian philosophy was that of ORIGEN, but for the
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European Middle Ages no authority could rival Saint Augustine. Augustine
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elaborated a Neoplatonist vision combining the metaphysics of PLOTINUS with an
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elaboration of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. To this he added an
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epistemology in which knowledge is achieved through illumination by grace. No
|
||
substantial movement arose beyond Augustine until the 12th century, when new
|
||
interest arose in logic and theory of knowledge. In this connection the most
|
||
important figures are Saint ANSELM and Peter ABELARD.
|
||
|
||
In the late 12th and early 13th centuries the writings of Aristotle were
|
||
reintroduced into the West, first in translations from the Arabic and later in
|
||
direct translation. After some initial resistance Aristotle became the
|
||
dominant philosophical authority and remained so until the Renaissance. First
|
||
Saint ALBERTUS MAGNUS and then Saint Thomas AQUINAS combined Aristotle's
|
||
philosophy with the tradition of Augustinian theology to produce a synthesis
|
||
holding that Aristotle was right about those things that are within the grasp
|
||
of reason, while what was beyond reason could only be known by faith. Thus
|
||
reason could prove that God exists, but his nature could be known only by
|
||
faith. More extreme Aristotelian schools developed and came into conflict with
|
||
the church, which, in 1277, issued condemnations of many positions held by
|
||
Aristotle and Aquinas, among others. In the 14th century two figures dominated
|
||
the scene: DUNS SCOTUS and WILLIAM OF OCCAM. Scotus developed an extemely
|
||
complex philosophy based on a number of earlier positions, and Occam's
|
||
critiques of metaphysics and epistemology remain paradigms of philosophical
|
||
argument.
|
||
|
||
Rationalism.
|
||
The synthesis of Christianity and Aristotelianism was a major form of
|
||
SCHOLASTICISM, which dominated European philosophy into the 17th century.
|
||
During the Renaissance other forms of ancient philosophy began to be revived
|
||
and used as ammunition against the scholastics. This involved the Renaissance
|
||
Platonists and the Skeptics, as well as others interested in esoteric doctrines
|
||
like that of the Kabbalah. In terms of the future development of philosophy,
|
||
the revival of ancient skepticism played the greatest role. This view,
|
||
popularized by Montaigne in the late 16th century, raised the fundamental
|
||
epistemological problem of what can be known. The methods of the new
|
||
scientific schools conflicted with, and thus brought into question, the
|
||
principles inherited from the Middle Ages. Rene Descartes proposed a method
|
||
for guaranteeing knowledge. He argued that in order to provide a secure
|
||
foundation for knowledge it was necessary to discover "clear and distinct
|
||
ideas" that could not be doubted and could serve as a basis for deriving
|
||
further truths. He found such an idea in the proposition "I think, therefore I
|
||
am." Using this as a paradigm, Descartes drew a distinction between thinking
|
||
substance and extended substance, or mind and matter. He went on to draw
|
||
conclusions about God, nature, and mind that continue to be influential. For
|
||
this reason Descartes is often considered the founder of modern philosophy.
|
||
|
||
A few years after Descartes's death, Baruch de Spinoza offered his theory to
|
||
improve on that of Descartes. Spinoza insisted that only one substance, God,
|
||
exists, and that two of his attributes are thought and extension. Everything
|
||
that is and that can be known about is an aspect of God. Spinoza's God,
|
||
however, was the antithesis of the God of traditional religion. God, or Nature
|
||
(as Spinoza put it), was the laws from which everything followed. In Spinoza's
|
||
pantheistic world everything had to be what it was, and everything was to be
|
||
understood rationally. The mind and body were two aspects of the same thing,
|
||
which was to be understood either logically or in terms of natural science. A
|
||
third great 17th-century rationalist was Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz. The
|
||
basic unit of his metaphysics, equivalent to a substance, was the monad, a
|
||
center of force or energy. Each monad was internally determined by its
|
||
definition. Monads could not interact, but, due to a "preestablished harmony,"
|
||
the action in one monad coincided with that in another. God chose the monads
|
||
in the world so that it would be the best of all possible worlds. (A world
|
||
with more or less or different monads would not be as good, or God would have
|
||
chosen it.) Leibniz believed that the truths about monads could be discovered
|
||
by rational analysis.
|
||
|
||
Empiricism.
|
||
Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz were all rationalists in their epistemologies;
|
||
they stressed a world of metaphysical truths that could be discovered by
|
||
reason. In contrast to this kind of philosophizing, a quite different approach
|
||
developed in Great Britain, stressing the importance of sense experience as the
|
||
basis of knowledge (see EMPIRICISM). Starting with Sir Francis BACON, the
|
||
empirical theory of knowledge was propounded both as a way of eliminating
|
||
various metaphysical and theological difficulties and as a way of genuinely
|
||
advancing knowledge. The most important statement of this theory was made by
|
||
John LOCKE. He claimed that all knowledge comes from sense experience.
|
||
Individuals are, however, forced to believe that underlying experience is some
|
||
indefinable kind of substance. No one can be completely certain of direct
|
||
intuitive inspections of his or her ideas, less certain of demonstrations from
|
||
them, and still less certain of what Locke called "sensative knowledge,"
|
||
knowledge of the reality of experience. In spite of the limitations on
|
||
knowledge, humans can know enough to function in this world.
|
||
|
||
Bishop George BERKELEY saw Locke's theory as having dangerous skeptical and
|
||
irreligious tendencies because of its reliance on a material substance for
|
||
ideas to belong to. Berkeley insisted that the only things truly known are
|
||
ideas and that ideas can only exist in the minds that perceive them. Matter is
|
||
simply complexes of sensations. Nothing really exists except perceiving and
|
||
being perceived (esse est percipere). What holds the world together is that
|
||
God perceives everything all of the time. Berkeley's IDEALISM gained few
|
||
adherents. If it is granted that all of our knowledge consists only of sense
|
||
experiences, no evidence exists that the world is any more than ideas and the
|
||
minds they are in. In philosophy this position is called SOLIPSISM, the view
|
||
that the only reality is the self.
|
||
|
||
Berkeley was followed by David Hume, who showed that a thoroughly consistent
|
||
empirical theory of knowledge leads to a complete skepticism. Hume's major
|
||
contribution was to show that an individual cannot gain any causal information
|
||
about experience, or about what is beyond immediate experience, from empirical
|
||
knowledge. He or she can neither deduce nor induce the cause or the effect of
|
||
experience (see CAUSALITY). Individuals thus have no basis for accepting that
|
||
the future must resemble the past. It is only habit or custom that leads them
|
||
to expect and believe that the items found constantly conjoined in experience
|
||
will remain so in the future. Hume also argued that from empirical data humans
|
||
could have no real knowledge of substance, mind, or even God. They are reduced
|
||
to complete skepticism except that habits or customs make them unjustified
|
||
believers.
|
||
|
||
Kant and Hegel.
|
||
The German philosopher Immanuel Kant claimed that reading Hume awoke him from
|
||
his dogmatic slumbers and made him realize the depths of the problem of
|
||
knowledge that cried out for a solution. Kant insisted that humans do possess
|
||
genuine knowledge. The problem was to show how, in the face of Hume's
|
||
critique, knowledge was possible. Kant first insisted that although all
|
||
knowledge begins in experience, this does not mean that all knowledge comes
|
||
from experience. The human mind provides the forms and the categories which
|
||
can be used to describe experience. Because these are the necessary conditions
|
||
of all possible human experience, experience will have certain characteristics.
|
||
But this knowledge cannot be extended to what is beyond all possible
|
||
experience--to real substances (things-in-themselves; see NOUMENON), to the
|
||
self, or to God.
|
||
|
||
After Kant a new metaphysical movement developed in Germany starting from
|
||
Kant's claim that the individual contributes the form of all possible
|
||
experience. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL advanced the idea that the basic
|
||
element of reality (The Real) is not a principle of organization interior to
|
||
the mind but a process that acts through individuals and unfolds itself in the
|
||
history of the world. This universal reason has expressed itself in the
|
||
various forms of the world's development--from a purely physical stage, to a
|
||
biological one, to a human one. In the human one, society is developing from
|
||
ancient tyranny toward freedom in a final rational state, in which all previous
|
||
contradictory developments will be resolved (see DIALECTIC). Hegel worked out
|
||
a metaphysics in which all of human history was rational. His ideas were
|
||
influential throughout Europe in the 19th century, particularly on the ideas of
|
||
Karl MARX. Hegel's ideas were soon taken up in the United States by Josiah
|
||
ROYCE and others and in England by idealistic philosophers such as F. H.
|
||
BRADLEY.
|
||
|
||
20th Century.
|
||
Twentieth-century philosophy has been characterized in part by its revolt
|
||
against Hegelianism. PRAGMATISM in the United States and the modern empiricism
|
||
of Bertrand Russell, LOGICAL POSITIVISM, and linguistic philosophy in both
|
||
Britain and America all rejected Hegelian metaphysics. The pragmatists wanted
|
||
an earthy theory--that the truth is that which works--as an expeditious way of
|
||
solving problems. From William JAMES to John DEWEY pragmatism dominated
|
||
American thought in the first half of this century. Logical positivism, based
|
||
on modern developments in logic and an empiricism like Hume's, was the joint
|
||
result of English thinkers like Russell and an Austrian group called the Vienna
|
||
circle, whose most influential member, Ludwig WITTGENSTEIN, had been a student
|
||
of Russell's at Cambridge. The English and Austrian positivists and linguistic
|
||
philosophers challenged any form of metaphysical thinking and insisted that
|
||
something could be said to be true if (and only if) it could be verified by
|
||
logical or scientific procedures. No metaphysical claim, they insisted, could
|
||
meet this test (see ANALYTIC AND LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY).
|
||
|
||
Quite different kinds of philosophy developed in France and Germany. One of
|
||
the most extreme reactions to Hegel came from the Danish thinker Soren
|
||
Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard believed that all metaphysical systems are
|
||
unsuccessful, but that to avoid despair an individual had to opt for some sort
|
||
of belief, by taking a "leap of faith." Kierkegaard's emphasis on subjectivity,
|
||
confrontation, and despair has greatly influenced the school of thought called
|
||
EXISTENTIALISM. Although Kierkegaard was a religious Christian, many of those
|
||
who have used his basic approach are irreligious.
|
||
|
||
Among several important reactions to Kant, the most notable is PHENOMENOLOGY,
|
||
developed by Edmund HUSSERL. Bracketing questions about the self and other
|
||
transcendental ideas, Husserl attempted to elaborate a method for the analysis
|
||
of experience as it presents itself. His most important student, Martin
|
||
HEIDEGGER, developed a philosophy of "being-in-the world," which has also
|
||
influenced Jean Paul Sartre and other existentialists. To tell in what
|
||
direction the mainstream of philosophy will move in the last quarter of the
|
||
20th century is impossible at this close range. RICHARD H. POPKIN
|
||
|
||
Eastern Philosophy
|
||
------------------
|
||
|
||
The Indian Tradition.
|
||
The philosophical traditions of India have their beginnings in reflection on the
|
||
VEDAS and specifically in attempts to interpret the UPANISHADS. A wide variety
|
||
of schools emerged including some that specifically reject the authority of the
|
||
Vedas. Thus the Indian philosophy is commonly divided in two traditions: the
|
||
orthodox schools of HINDUISM that accept Vedic authority, and the nonorthodox
|
||
schools that do not accept that authority. Within the first category are six
|
||
major schools: Samkhya, Yoga, Vaisheshika, Nyaya, Mimamsa, and Vedanta. The
|
||
second category consists of Charvaka, Jainism, and Buddhism.
|
||
|
||
Samkhya, one of the oldest and most influential of the schools, is
|
||
traditionally held to have been founded by Kapila, who may have lived as early
|
||
as the 7th century BC and to whom the Samkhya-sutra (Principles of Samkhya) is
|
||
attributed. Samkhya metaphysics is based on the distinction between prakriti
|
||
and purusha, which may be rendered as the objective, or nature, and the
|
||
subjective, or self. All objects in the world are essentially constituted by
|
||
the combination of atoms, which emerge from the eternal and uncaused prakriti.
|
||
Even the individual ego, or mind, is a result of the constant atomic flux of
|
||
prakriti. Purusha, on the other hand, is not to be identified with the ego, or
|
||
mind. It also is uncaused, eternal, and unchanging and underlies the perceived
|
||
ego. There is a plurality of such selves, which are the loci of consciousness
|
||
and in conjunction with which prakriti evolves. The bondage to suffering that
|
||
is the common starting point of all Indian philosophical thought arises from
|
||
the involvement of purusha with prakriti. Release comes when ignorance is
|
||
overcome; that the attachment of purusha to the changing empirical world is
|
||
illusory becomes apparent.
|
||
|
||
The means by which this ignorance is overcome are elaborated by the YOGA
|
||
school. While accepting much of the Samkhya position, Yoga, as developed by
|
||
Patanjali (2d century BC), believes in a supreme self or purusha, identified
|
||
with the god Isvara. The method of Yoga is to bring the self to understanding
|
||
by meditation designed to curb the constant changes brought on by involvement
|
||
in the perceived world. The knowledge acquired through meditation is an
|
||
intuitive, nonrational, and direct cognition of the nature of things. This
|
||
intuition is the cessation of individuality and the identity of the self with
|
||
the eternal purusha. Some form of Yoga is recognized as a practical method of
|
||
enlightenment by most of the other Indian schools.
|
||
|
||
The Vaisheshika system is thought to have been developed by Kanada in the 3d
|
||
century BC. The essential aspect of Vaisheshika is a complex pluralistic
|
||
metaphysics that recognizes nine substances: earth, water, fire, air, ether,
|
||
space, time, self, and mind. The first four material substances are atomic and
|
||
give rise to material composite objects. Mind is also atomic but does not give
|
||
rise to composite objects. Vaisheshika tends to be theistic and sees God as
|
||
guiding the world in accordance with the law of KARMA. Human action
|
||
perpetuates the workings of karma, and thus liberation is achieved through the
|
||
cessation of action, and achievement of a state beyond pleasure, pain, and
|
||
experience in general.
|
||
|
||
Nyaya is closely associated with Vaisheshika, and they are often grouped
|
||
together. The emphasis in Nyaya is on methods of argument, and particularly on
|
||
the elaboration of logical theory, which is used to justify Vaisheshika
|
||
metaphysics. Nyaya distinguishes various forms and origins of knowledge, as
|
||
originally put forward by the school's founder Gantama (2d century BC). In the
|
||
course of time Nyaya developed a variety of arguments for the existence of God,
|
||
as conceived by Vaisheshika, some of which parallel the classic arguments in
|
||
the Western traditions.
|
||
|
||
The Mimamsa is often divided into two main branches, the Purva Mimamsa and the
|
||
Uttara Mimamsa. The Mimamsa sutra of Jainini dates perhaps from the 4th
|
||
century BC and begins a tradition in which the two most important later figures
|
||
are Kumarila Bhatta and Prabhakara, both 7th century AD. The Mimamsa in
|
||
general is concerned with establishing the nature and demands of religious law
|
||
or duty (DHARMA) as it is found in the Vedas. As such it tends to emphasize
|
||
the practical, although Mimamsa thinkers have made important contributions to
|
||
logic and theory of knowledge.
|
||
|
||
The Mimamsa, particularly the Uttara Mimamsa, is closely associated with
|
||
VEDANTA and sometimes treated simply as a school within the Vedantic tradition.
|
||
Vedanta means "the end of the Vedas" and in general suggests analysis and
|
||
contemplation of the theory and vision of the Vedic material. The point of
|
||
departure for Vedanta is Badarayana's Brahma sutras, also known as the Vedanta
|
||
sutras. This represents the earliest attempt to organize and explicate the
|
||
Upanishads and is itself an extremely difficult text, which has served as the
|
||
object of commentaries by the major figures of later Vedanta schools. Central
|
||
to these schools is the interpretation of Brahman (see BRAHMA AND BRAHMAN) and
|
||
its relation to atman (self). The best known of the schools is the nondualist,
|
||
or advaita, Vedanta of Shankara (AD 788-820), for whom Brahman is
|
||
undifferentiated, eternal, and unchanging and the world is illusion, or maya.
|
||
The modified nondualism, or vishishtadvaita, of Ramanuja (1017-1137) argues for
|
||
the reality of individual self (atman) and the world but claims that they are
|
||
dependent on Brahman. The dualist, or dvaita, Vedanta of Madhva (1197-1276)
|
||
insists on a sharp distinction between Brahman and atman, as well as between
|
||
Brahman and the world.
|
||
|
||
Of the three nonorthodox schools, the first two can be dealt with briefly.
|
||
Charvaka is known only from fragments referred to in the works of its
|
||
opponents. It seems to have been an extreme materialist reaction to the Vedic
|
||
teachings and to have argued for the primacy of life in the world, the
|
||
extinction of the individual at death, and perhaps an ethic of personal
|
||
gratification. JAINISM, on the other hand, is an ethical religion that arose
|
||
in the 6th century BC. It insists on the distinction between matter and soul
|
||
and argues for a realistic atomism in the context of an atheistic universe.
|
||
Salvation is achieved through the three jewels of faith, knowledge, and
|
||
practice of the virtues, which are nonviolence, truth telling, not stealing,
|
||
chastity, and not being attached to worldly goods and concerns.
|
||
|
||
BUDDHISM originated as a sectarian movement in India in the 6th-5th century BC,
|
||
but it spread over much of China, Southeast Asia, and Japan. In the course of
|
||
its history Buddhism has developed diverse philosophical traditions. The
|
||
central teaching of Buddhism is the dharma. This term can mean a variety of
|
||
things, including "the nature of things," "the law," and "the true view of
|
||
reality." Dharmas, in the plural, are usually held to be the genuine
|
||
constituents of reality as opposed to the mere appearance. Common to almost
|
||
all schools of Buddhist philosophy is the view that all things in the world
|
||
have their origin in other things, a doctrine known as "dependent
|
||
coorigination." This doctrine leads in most cases to a metaphysics of flux,
|
||
usually joined to a pluralistic atomism. Another doctrine common to almost all
|
||
schools is that of anatta, the denial of a metaphysical self. The doctrine of
|
||
anatta is often seen as a consequence of dependent coorigination, and the
|
||
perceived self is analyzed as a bundle of skandhas, the five components of
|
||
personality.
|
||
|
||
The analysis of these doctrines differed from school to school, however, and
|
||
within a few centuries of the Buddha's death a variety of positions had
|
||
developed, traditionally held to have been 18. The two most important
|
||
divisions were the Mahasanghikas and the Sthaviras, the former identifying with
|
||
the larger community and the latter claiming to continue the tradition of the
|
||
elders. Out of these two groups developed Mahayana and Theravada Buddhism, a
|
||
division that continues to this day.
|
||
|
||
Among the philosophical schools of Theravada are the Pudgalavadins, the
|
||
Vaibhashika, and the Sautrantika. For the Pudgalavadins the doctrine of anatta
|
||
proved unacceptable. They themselves were divided into a number of sects but
|
||
were united in the view that some sort of unifying person (pudgala) must exist
|
||
as the subject of karmic rebirth and possible salvation. The pudgala served as
|
||
a principle of identity through time in the context of which the various
|
||
religious and intellectual doctrines of Buddhism could be said to make sense.
|
||
The Vaibhashikas (a branch of the Saravastivadin sect), on the other hand,
|
||
argued that the dharmas, the actual constituents of reality, were identical
|
||
with those of perceived reality if properly analyzed. The proposed analysis is
|
||
one of a plurality of events, coordinated by causal laws. Essences and general
|
||
concepts are merely abstractions, with only a conceptual as opposed to an
|
||
actual reality. Knowledge, on this view, is a direct perception of real events
|
||
and objects. The Sautrantikas have much in common with the Vaibhashikas, but
|
||
they distinguish between a phenomenal world and the world as it really is.
|
||
Thus the Sautrantikas deny the reality of perceived dharmas. This difference
|
||
is important in their respective theories of knowledge because, unlike the
|
||
Vaibhashikas, the Sautrantikas do not say that objects are directly perceived.
|
||
They are, rather, inferred from the representations of sense imprinted upon the
|
||
mind through contact with the world.
|
||
|
||
Among the Mahayana schools the Yogacara and the Madhyamika are the two most
|
||
important. The Yogacara differs markedly from the three schools noted above in
|
||
arguing that only consciousness is genuinely real and that perceived objects
|
||
are ultimately illusory. The claim is that, because objects are constituted by
|
||
instantaneous events, they have no duration and thus cannot be said to exist.
|
||
The unenlightened consciousness laboring under the law of karma does not
|
||
realize this, but through the practice of yoga and moral discipline liberation
|
||
can be achieved, and the identity of the perceived world with consciousness can
|
||
be grasped.
|
||
|
||
Many scholars hold the Madhyamika to be the central philosophy of Buddhism.
|
||
The name itself means "traveler on the middle way" and suggests a position that
|
||
attempts to mediate between the extremes of the other schools. The founder and
|
||
leading intellect of Madhyamika was Nagarjuna (2d century AD). Nagarjuna
|
||
mounted a detailed critique of the theory of knowledge that held knowledge to
|
||
be expressible only in terms of propositions. These propositions are derived
|
||
from individual concepts and from perceptions and are in some sense a
|
||
construction of the individual rather than a genuine representation of reality
|
||
in itself. Understanding is reached when the relativity of these conceptual
|
||
constructions is recognized and claims to absolute knowledge and truth are
|
||
given up. The highest wisdom is in seeing this ephemeral relativity and
|
||
acquiring direct awareness of reality itself, unconditioned by concepts. Many
|
||
later schools are related to the Madhyamika, including the Zen schools,
|
||
although the relations are difficult to uncover in many places.
|
||
|
||
The Chinese Tradition.
|
||
Philosophical thought in China has largely concerned itself with social and
|
||
political philosophy. This assertion is not to say that cosmological and
|
||
metaphysical speculation has been absent. The I CHING reflects a complicated
|
||
vision of the universe. The oracles of the I Ching began to assume their
|
||
present written form perhaps as early as the 7th century BC, and the book as a
|
||
whole played an important role throughout the subsequent development of Chinese
|
||
philosophy.
|
||
|
||
The first recognized philosopher in China, however, was CONFUCIUS (541-497 BC).
|
||
Confucius taught that the goal of the philosopher was to become learned, but
|
||
this concept means more than merely knowing a large number of facts. Rather,
|
||
on the basis of a broad learning in the classic texts, the canon of which he
|
||
essentially formulated, Confucius held that a person, regardless of his or her
|
||
social status, could become aware of the moral order of the cosmos and of his
|
||
or her proper place in it. He taught the primacy of the family, and the duties
|
||
incumbent upon its various members, stressing harmony and unity and the
|
||
self-evident goodness of the ethical life. This vision has in many ways
|
||
remained a dominant one in CONFUCIANISM.
|
||
|
||
The recorded sayings of Confucius do not present a systematic vision. The
|
||
first figure in the Confucian tradition to move toward a philosophical system
|
||
was MENCIUS (4th-3d century BC). Mencius argued for the essential goodness of
|
||
persons--that divergence in moral responsibility is a result of a bad
|
||
upbringing or environment. The results of a poor moral training can be
|
||
overcome by education, and society is, thus, essentially perfectable. The duty
|
||
of government is to foster the well-being of the people and bring society to
|
||
perfection, a goal with which the genuine ruler is in accord due to his inborn
|
||
goodness and moral sense.
|
||
|
||
A strain in Confucianism diametrically opposed to the idealism of Mencius arose
|
||
a generation later in the thought of Hsun-tzu (330-225 BC). Hsun-tzu argued
|
||
that, far from good, the inborn nature of persons is evil, or uncivil. Rather
|
||
than eliciting innate moral virtues through education, Hsun-tzu insists on the
|
||
need to impose them from without. This doctrine has been variously
|
||
interpreted; such a position leads to the nonabsoluteness of ethical norms and
|
||
hence leads as much in the direction of liberalism as authoritarianism. Yet
|
||
another facet of Hsun-tzu's thought is an acute logical sense, and he left a
|
||
penetrating essay on names and meaning. Until the advent of Neoconfucianism in
|
||
the medieval period, Hsun-tzu was usually considered a superior thinker to
|
||
Mencius. The Neoconfucians emphasized an essentialist moral striving based on
|
||
Confucius, Mencius, and two texts, the Great Learning and Doctrine of the Mean.
|
||
In its various forms, Neoconfucian thought dominated Chinese learning and
|
||
social life until the beginning of the 20th century.
|
||
|
||
The second important indigenous Chinese tradition is TAOISM. The teaching of
|
||
the Tao Te Ching, a work attributed to the semilegendary LAO-TZU (6th century
|
||
BC), is elusive and complex and can perhaps best be characterized as teaching
|
||
the eternal principle of reality and the way in which all things are governed
|
||
by and find their true natures in it. It implies a metaphysics of impermanence
|
||
and change, and the philosopher who attains a clear vision of the eternal Tao
|
||
(way) and its relation to this flux acquires happiness and peace. The most
|
||
important later Taoist philosopher was Chuang-tzu. In CHUANG-TZU the Taoist
|
||
divergence from, and rejection of, the Confucian ideals becomes pronounced.
|
||
Whereas the Confucian tradition believes in the molding of the person through
|
||
education, Chuang-tzu saw the classical teachings of the schools as tending to
|
||
lead the person away from an understanding of the nature of things, the Tao,
|
||
and thus away from a genuine awareness of his or her own nature and place in
|
||
the world. This outlook sometimes led to Taoism being seen as antisocial.
|
||
Nevertheless, both Chuang-tzu and Mencius, who was perhaps his contemporary,
|
||
saw the goal of philosophy as attaining an awareness of the essential harmony
|
||
of things, although they disagreed on the origin of this harmony and how
|
||
awareness is to be attained.
|
||
|
||
Only the two main strands in Chinese thought have been mentioned. The Moists,
|
||
who taught the existence of a Supreme Spirit that possessed equal and universal
|
||
love for all people; the Legalists, who advocated a practical philosophy of
|
||
political domination; and the Buddhists, who became important from the 4th
|
||
century AD on, also exercised wide influence in Chinese thought. Within the
|
||
Neoconfucian tradition a variety of positions emerged. In the last century
|
||
Western philosophical and political thought has entered the Chinese tradition,
|
||
most importantly Marxism. In Chinese philosophy, as in the other traditions
|
||
examined, drawing any firm conclusions about the future is impossible. G. S.
|
||
DAVIS
|
||
|
||
|
||
Bibliography
|
||
|
||
Bibliography:GENERAL: Edwards, Paul, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 8
|
||
vols. (1967).
|
||
|
||
WESTERN PHILOSOPHY: Armstrong, A. H., ed., The Cambridge History of Later
|
||
Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy (1967); Blau, J. L., The Story of Jewish
|
||
Philosophy (1962); Brumbaugh, R. S., The Philosophers of Greece (1964);
|
||
Copleston, F. C., A History of Philosophy, 9 vols. (1946-74); de Boer, T.
|
||
J., The History of Philosophy in Islam (1901; Eng. trans., 1903); Fakhry,
|
||
Majid, A History of Islamic Philosophy (1970); Flew, A. G. N., An
|
||
Introduction to Western Philosophy (1971); Gilson, Etienne, History of
|
||
Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (1955); Guthrie, W. K. C., A History
|
||
of Greek Philosophy, 5 vols. (1962-78); Jones, W. T., A History of Western
|
||
Philosophy, 2d ed. (1969); O'Connor, T. J., ed., A Critical History of
|
||
Western Philosophy (1964); Randall, J. H., The Career of Philosophy, 2 vols.
|
||
(1962-65); Russell, Bertrand, A History of Western Philosophy, rev. ed.
|
||
(1961); Windelband, Wilhelm, A History of Philosophy (Eng. trans., 1905; repr.
|
||
1968).
|
||
|
||
ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY: Conze, Edward, Buddhist Thought in India (1962); Creel,
|
||
H. G., Chinese Thought: From Confucius to Mao Tse-tung (1953); Dasgupta,
|
||
Surendranath, A History of Indian Philosophy, 5 vols. (1922-55); Fung, Yu-lau,
|
||
A History of Chinese Philosophy, 2 vols. (1948); Guenther, H. V., Buddhist
|
||
Philosophy in Theory and Practice (1972); Potter, K. H., Presuppositions of
|
||
lndia's Philosophies (1963); Raju, P. T., The Philosophical Traditions of
|
||
lndia (1971); Wright, A. F., ed., Studies in Chinese Thought (1953).
|
||
|
||
|
||
pragmatism
|
||
--------------------------------
|
||
(prag'-muh-tizm)
|
||
Pragmatism is a philosophical movement, developed in the United States, which
|
||
holds that both the meaning and the truth of any idea is a function of its
|
||
practical outcome. Fundamental to pragmatism is a strong antiabsolutism: the
|
||
conviction that all principles are to be regarded as working hypotheses rather
|
||
than as metaphysically binding axioms. A modern expression of EMPIRICISM,
|
||
pragmatism was highly influential in America in the first quarter of the 20th
|
||
century and assumed renewed importance in the 1970s.
|
||
|
||
Charles Sanders PEIRCE is considered the founder of pragmatism. He developed
|
||
it as a theory of meaning in the 1870s, holding that an intrinsic connection
|
||
exists between meaning and action--that the meaning of an idea is to be found
|
||
in its "conceivable sensible effects" and that humans generate belief through
|
||
their "habits of action." William JAMES gave a further direction to pragmatism,
|
||
developing it as a theory of truth. True ideas, according to James, are useful
|
||
"leadings"; they lead through experience in ways that provide consistency,
|
||
orderliness, and predictability. The classical American pragmatists are, in
|
||
addition to Peirce and James, John DEWEY, George Herbert MEAD, and Clarence
|
||
Irving LEWIS.
|
||
|
||
Pragmatism has tended to criticize traditional philosophical outlooks in the
|
||
light of scientific and social developments. The development in science most
|
||
influential on pragmatism is the theory of evolution. Its impact can be seen
|
||
in the pragmatic emphasis on action rather than entity, emergent effect rather
|
||
than cause, process and development rather than finality and permanence.
|
||
Focusing on the fullness of experience and the richness of nature, pragmatism
|
||
sees humankind not as a spectator separated from nature but as a constant
|
||
creative interactor with it. Pragmatism thus tends toward a NATURALISM in
|
||
which process plays an important role.
|
||
|
||
The influence of Darwinism on pragmatic thought is further seen in its
|
||
evolutionary approach, which holds that what is true for one time or place may
|
||
not be true for another--that reality, as well as human knowledge of it, is
|
||
constantly evolving, as is morality. What is good or evil, as well as what is
|
||
true or false, is dependent on its practical outcome--in the case of ethics,
|
||
its effects on human behavior. Pragmatists do not regard this relativism,
|
||
whether in epistemology, ethics, or metaphysics, as subjective. Real, true, or
|
||
good ideas, they maintain, have developed in the course of humanity's
|
||
interactions with the environment, emerging because they work to lead humans
|
||
successfully through their experiences. One major pragmatic criterion for
|
||
truth is agreement on the part of the community of investigators in the long
|
||
run. Truth tends to be that which gets accepted in the free competition of
|
||
ideas. Politically, pragmatists usually advocate democracy as the system best
|
||
suited to change with the needs of the majority. SANDRA B. ROSENTHAL
|
||
|
||
Bibliography: Ayer, A. J., The Origins of Pragmatism (1968); Edwards, Paul,
|
||
and Pap, Arthur, eds., A Modern Introduction to Philosophy, 3d ed. (1973);
|
||
James, William, Pragmatism and Other Essays, ed. by R. B. Perry (1965);
|
||
Morris, Charles W., The Pragmatic Movement in American Philosophy (1970);
|
||
Moore, Edward C., American Pragmatism: Peirce, James, Dewey (1961); Smith,
|
||
John E., Purpose and Thought (1978); Thayer, Horace S., Meaning and Action
|
||
(1968).
|
||
|
||
Origen
|
||
--------------------------------
|
||
(ohr'-i-jin)
|
||
Origen, c.185-c.254, is generally considered the greatest theologian and
|
||
biblical scholar of the early Eastern church. He was probably born in Egypt,
|
||
perhaps in Alexandria, to a Christian family. His father died in the
|
||
persecution of 202, and he himself narrowly escaped the same fate. At the age
|
||
of 18, Origen was appointed to succeed Clement of Alexandria as head of the
|
||
catechetical school of Alexandria, where he had been a student.
|
||
|
||
Between 203 and 231, Origen attracted large numbers of students through his
|
||
manner of life as much as through his teaching. According to Eusebius, he took
|
||
the command in Matt. 19:12 to mean that he should castrate himself. During
|
||
this period Origen traveled widely and while in Palestine (c.215) was invited
|
||
to preach by local bishops even though he was not ordained. Demetrius, bishop
|
||
of Alexandria, regarded this activity as a breach of custom and discipline and
|
||
ordered him to return to Alexandria. The period following, from 218 to 230,
|
||
was one of Origen's most productive as a writer.
|
||
|
||
In 230 he returned to Palestine, where he was ordained priest by the bishops of
|
||
Jerusalem and Caesarea. Demetrius then excommunicated Origen, deprived him of
|
||
his priesthood, and sent him into exile. Origen returned to the security of
|
||
Caesarea (231), and there established a school of theology, over which he
|
||
presided for 20 years. Among his students was Saint GREGORY THAUMATURGUS,
|
||
whose Panegyric to Origen is an important source for the period. Persecution
|
||
was renewed in 250, and Origen was severely tortured. He died of the effects a
|
||
few years later.
|
||
|
||
Although most of his writings have disappeared, Origen's literary productivity
|
||
was enormous. The Hexapla was the first attempt to establish a critical text
|
||
of the Old Testament; the commentaries on Matthew and John establish him as the
|
||
first major biblical scholar of the Christian church; the De Principiis (or
|
||
Peri Archon) is a dogmatic treatise on God and the world; and the Contra Celsum
|
||
is a refutation of paganism.
|
||
|
||
Origen attempted to synthesize Christian scriptural interpretation and belief
|
||
with Greek philosophy, especially Neoplatonism and Stoicism. His theology was
|
||
an expression of Alexandrian reflection on the Trinity, and, prior to Saint
|
||
Augustine, he was the most influential theologian of the church. Some of
|
||
Origen's ideas remained a source of controversy long after his death, and
|
||
"Origenism" was condemned at the fifth ecumenical council in 553 (see
|
||
CONSTANTINOPLE, COUNCILS OF). Origen is one of the best examples of early
|
||
Christian mysticism: the highest good is to become as like God as possible
|
||
through progressive illumination. Despite their sometimes controversial
|
||
character, his writings helped to create a Christian theology that blended
|
||
biblical and philosophical categories. ROSS MACKENZIE
|
||
|
||
Bibliography: Bigg, Charles, The Christian Platonists of Alexandria (1886;
|
||
repr. 1970); Chadwick, Henry, Early Christian Thought and the Classical
|
||
Tradition: Studies in Justin, Clement and Origen (1966); Danielou, Jean,
|
||
Origen, trans. by Walter Mitchell (1955); Hanson, R. P. C., Origen's
|
||
Doctrine of Tradition (1954).
|
||
|
||
|
||
Locke, John
|
||
--------------------------------
|
||
John Locke, b. Aug. 29, 1632, d. Oct. 28, 1704, was an English philosopher
|
||
and political theorist, the founder of British EMPIRICISM. He undertook his
|
||
university studies at Christ Church, Oxford. At first, he followed the
|
||
traditional classical curriculum but then turned to the study of medicine and
|
||
science. Although Locke did not actually earn a medical degree, he obtained a
|
||
medical license. He joined the household of Anthony Ashley Cooper, later 1st
|
||
earl of SHAFTESBURY, as a personal physician. He became Shaftesbury's advisor
|
||
and friend. Through him, Locke held minor government posts and became involved
|
||
in the turbulent politics of the period.
|
||
|
||
In 1675, Locke left England to live in France, where he became familiar with
|
||
the doctrines of Rene Descartes and his critics. He returned to England in
|
||
1679 while Shaftesbury was in power and pressing to secure the exclusion of
|
||
James, duke of York (the future King JAMES II) from the succession to the
|
||
throne. Shaftesbury was later tried for treason, and although he was
|
||
acquitted, he fled to Holland. Because he was closely allied with Shaftesbury,
|
||
Locke also fled to Holland in 1683; he lived there until the overthrow (1688)
|
||
of James II. In 1689, Locke returned to England in the party escorting the
|
||
princess of Orange, who was to be crowned Queen MARY II of England. In 1691,
|
||
Locke retired to Oates in Essex, the household of Sir Francis and Lady Masham.
|
||
During his years at Oates, Locke wrote and edited, and received many
|
||
influential visitors, including Sir Isaac Newton. He continued to exercise
|
||
political influence. His friendships with prominent government officers and
|
||
scholars made him one of the most influential men of the 17th century.
|
||
|
||
Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) is one of the classical
|
||
documents of British empirical philosophy. The essay had its origin in a
|
||
series of discussions with friends that led Locke to the conclusion that the
|
||
principal subject of philosophy had to be the extent of the mind's ability to
|
||
know (see EPISTEMOLOGY). He set out "to examine our abilities and to see what
|
||
objects our understandings were or were not fitted to deal with." The Essay is
|
||
a principal statement of empiricism, and, broadly speaking, was an effort to
|
||
formulate a view of knowledge consistent with the findings of Newtonian
|
||
science. Locke began the Essay with a critique of the rationalistic idea that
|
||
the mind is equipped with INNATE IDEAS, ideas that do not arise from
|
||
experience. He then turned to the elaboration of his own empiricism: "Let us
|
||
suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without
|
||
any ideas; how comes this to be furnished? . . . whence has it all the
|
||
materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in a word, from
|
||
experience." What experience provides is ideas, which Locke defined as "the
|
||
object of the understanding when a man thinks." He held that ideas come from
|
||
two sources: sensation, which provides ideas about the external world, and
|
||
reflection, or introspection, which provides the ideas of the internal workings
|
||
of the mind.
|
||
|
||
Locke's view that experience produces ideas, which are the immediate objects of
|
||
thought, led him to adopt a causal or representative view of human knowledge.
|
||
In perception, according to this view, people are not directly aware of
|
||
physical objects. Rather, they are directly aware of the ideas that objects
|
||
"cause" in them and that "represent" the objects in their consciousness. A
|
||
similar view of perception was presented by earlier thinkers such as Galileo
|
||
and Descartes. Locke's view raised the question of the extent to which ideas
|
||
are like the objects that cause them. His answer was that only some qualities
|
||
of objects are like ideas. He held that primary qualities of objects, or the
|
||
mathematically determinable qualities of an object, such as shape, motion,
|
||
weight, and number, exist in the world, and that ideas copy them. Secondary
|
||
qualities, those which arise from the senses, do not exist in objects as they
|
||
exist in ideas. According to Locke, secondary qualities, such as taste, "are
|
||
nothing in the objects themselves but powers to produce ideas in use by their
|
||
primary qualities." Thus, when an object is perceived, a person's ideas of its
|
||
shape and weight represent qualities to be found in the object itself. Color
|
||
and taste, however, are not copies of anything in the object.
|
||
|
||
One conclusion of Locke's theory is that genuine knowledge cannot be found in
|
||
natural science, because the real essences of physical objects that science
|
||
studies cannot be known. It would appear that genuine certainty can be
|
||
achieved only through mathematics. Locke's view of knowledge anticipated
|
||
developments by later philosophers and exercised an important influence on the
|
||
subsequent course of philosophical thought.
|
||
|
||
Locke's considerable importance in political thought is better known. As the
|
||
first systematic theorist of the philosophy of LIBERALISM, Locke exercised
|
||
enormous influence in both England and America. In his Two Treatises of
|
||
Government (1690), Locke set forth the view that the state exists to preserve
|
||
the natural rights of its citizens. When governments fail in that task,
|
||
citizens have the right--and sometimes the duty--to withdraw their support and
|
||
even to rebel. Locke opposed Thomas HOBBES's view that the original state of
|
||
nature was "nasty, brutish, and short," and that individuals through a SOCIAL
|
||
CONTRACT surrendered--for the sake of self-preservation--their rights to a
|
||
supreme sovereign who was the source of all morality and law. Locke maintained
|
||
that the state of nature was a happy and tolerant one, that the social contract
|
||
preserved the preexistent natural rights of the individual to life, liberty,
|
||
and property, and that the enjoyment of private rights--the pursuit of
|
||
happiness--led, in civil society, to the common good. Locke's notion of
|
||
government was a limited one: the checks and balances among branches of
|
||
government (later reflected in the U.S. Constitution) and true representation
|
||
in the legislature would maintain limited government and individual liberties.
|
||
|
||
A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689) expressed Locke's view that, within
|
||
certain limits, no one should dictate the form of another's religion. Other
|
||
important works include The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695), in which
|
||
Locke expressed his ideas on religion, and Some Thoughts Concerning Education
|
||
(1693). THOMAS K. HEARN, JR.
|
||
|
||
Bibliography: Aaron, Richard I., John Locke, 3d ed. (1971); Collins, James
|
||
D., The British Empiricists: Locke, Berkeley, Hume (1967); Cranston, Maurice,
|
||
John Locke: A Biography (1957); Dunn, John, Political Thought of John Locke
|
||
(1969); Gough, J. W., John Locke's Political Philosophy: Eight Studies, 2d
|
||
ed. (1973); Mabbott, J. D., John Locke (1973); Sahakian, Mabel L. and
|
||
William S., John Locke (1975); Yolton, John W., John Locke and the Way of Ideas
|
||
(1956) and, as ed., John Locke: Problems and Perspectives (1969).
|
||
|
||
|
||
social contract
|
||
--------------------------------
|
||
The social-contract theory concerns the origin of organized society, holding
|
||
that the state originally was created through a voluntary agreement entered
|
||
into among individuals living in an anarchical state of nature. This contract
|
||
defines and regulates the relations among the members of society and between
|
||
the individual and the governing authority. The social-contract theory
|
||
challenged the DIVINE RIGHT of kings as the basis for a state's legitimacy and
|
||
laid the foundation for theories of constitutional government.
|
||
|
||
The most influential proponents of social-contract theory were the English
|
||
philosophers Thomas HOBBES and John LOCKE and the French philosopher Jean
|
||
Jacques ROUSSEAU. According to Hobbes, the individual's natural right to
|
||
self-government was surrendered by means of the social contract to an absolute
|
||
ruler. Locke held that the state was brought into being to protect the
|
||
"natural rights" of the citizen to life, liberty, and property. These rights,
|
||
however, remain with the individual. According to Locke, citizens are entitled
|
||
to resist or rebel if the state abrogates the original contract by not
|
||
protecting these rights. Rousseau extended the concept of rights to encompass
|
||
all the people and not the narrow propertied class of citizens included by
|
||
Locke. In Rousseau's state, political authority reflects the "general will" of
|
||
the people. RITA J. IMMERMAN
|
||
|
||
Bibliography: Barker, Ernest, ed., Social Contract: Essays by Locke, Hume,
|
||
and Rousseau (1947; repr. 1960); Gough, John W., The Social Contract: A
|
||
Critical Study of Its Development, 2d ed. (1957; repr. 1978); Rousseau, Jean
|
||
Jacques, The Social Contract, trans. by Maurice Cranston (1968).
|
||
|
||
|
||
Hobbes, Thomas
|
||
--------------------------------
|
||
(hahbz)
|
||
Thomas Hobbes, b. Apr. 5, 1588, d. Dec. 4, 1679, was an English
|
||
philosopher, scientist, and political theorist. The son of an Anglican
|
||
clergyman, he entered Oxford University when he was 14 or 15 years old,
|
||
receiving a bachelor's degree in 1608. He then became a tutor to the Cavendish
|
||
family and traveled with them a number of times to the Continent. After 1621
|
||
he translated a few of Francis Bacon's essays into Latin, and in 1628 he
|
||
published an English version of Thucydides' works.
|
||
|
||
During his stay in France from 1629 to 1631, he studied Euclid and became
|
||
especially interested in mathematics. On his third continental trip
|
||
(1634-1637), he met and was influenced by Galileo, Marin Mersenne, and Rene
|
||
Descartes. In 1646 he became tutor to the prince of Wales, the future Charles
|
||
II, then exiled in Paris. There Hobbes wrote his main work, Leviathan; or the
|
||
Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil (1651), a
|
||
philosophical study of the political absolutism that replaced the supremacy of
|
||
the medieval church. Four years later he published his De Corpore (Concerning
|
||
Body), in which he restricted philosophy to a study of bodies in motion. In
|
||
his Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance (1656), he elaborated a
|
||
theory of psychological DETERMINISM. His writings provoked immediate
|
||
opposition. Hobbes considered philosophy a practical study of two kinds of
|
||
bodies: natural and civil. The latter, "made by the wills and agreement of
|
||
men," he called "the Commonwealth." He declared that natural bodies include
|
||
everything for which there is rational knowledge of causal processes. Hobbes
|
||
took a mechanistic view, explaining things in terms of the movement of bodies
|
||
through space. He also considered human thought as an action of bodies. Since
|
||
everyone is subject to physical and mathematical laws that allow no exceptions,
|
||
one's apparent freedom is simply the absence of external constraint.
|
||
|
||
Leviathan has been termed nominalist, materialist, absolutist, and
|
||
anticlerical. The work's NOMINALISM lies in Hobbes's rejection of any
|
||
universal reality corresponding to universal concepts and words. He considered
|
||
all reality as individual and all groupings as conventional. In Leviathan,
|
||
Hobbes held that the natural state of humans is constant war with each other;
|
||
their lives are "nasty, brutish, and short." Society arises only by convention.
|
||
From self-interest, people make peace and obtain security inasmuch as they
|
||
delegate total power to the state, that is, ultimately to the monarch. Once
|
||
that happens, the monarch's decrees are absolute in all areas of life,
|
||
including the family and religion.
|
||
|
||
Hobbes concluded that rebellion against the state breaks society's basic
|
||
contract (see SOCIAL CONTRACT) and is punishable by whatever penalty the
|
||
monarch may exact in order to protect his subjects from a return to the
|
||
original state of nature. The ideas of Thomas Hobbes were challenged by both
|
||
the parliamentarians and churchmen of his day; some considered trying him for
|
||
heresy. Nevertheless, he has been recognized as a great political theorist and
|
||
philosopher. JOHN P. DOYLE
|
||
|
||
Bibliography: Goldsmith, M. M., Hobbes's Science of Politics (1966);
|
||
Macpherson, C. B., The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, Hobbes to
|
||
Locke (1962); Oakeshott, M., Hobbes on Civil Association (1975); Watkins, J.
|
||
W. N., Hobbes's System of Ideas (1965; 2d ed. 1973).
|
||
|
||
|
||
liberalism
|
||
--------------------------------
|
||
Liberalism, a political philosophy that emphasizes individual freedom, arose in
|
||
Europe in the period between the Reformation and the French Revolution. During
|
||
the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries the medieval feudal order gradually gave way
|
||
as Protestantism, the nation-state, commerce, science, cities, and a middle
|
||
class of traders and industrialists developed. The new liberal order--drawing
|
||
on Enlightenment thought--began to place human beings rather than God at the
|
||
center of things. Humans, with their rational minds, could comprehend all
|
||
things and could improve themselves and society through systematic and rational
|
||
action. Liberal thinking was hostile to the prerogatives of kings,
|
||
aristocrats, and the church; it favored freedom--a natural right--from
|
||
traditional restraints. These notions did much to precipitate the American and
|
||
French revolutions and were important factors in various uprisings in the 19th
|
||
century. Liberalism sought to expand civil liberties and to limit political
|
||
authority in favor of constitutional representative government and promoted the
|
||
rights to property and religious toleration. In the economic sphere, classical
|
||
liberalism was opposed to direction by the state, arguing with Adam SMITH and
|
||
David RICARDO that the forces of the marketplace were the best guide for the
|
||
economy (see LAISSEZ-FAIRE).
|
||
|
||
One of the first thinkers to formulate a comprehensive liberal philosophy was
|
||
the Englishman John LOCKE. As a political philosopher, Locke was widely
|
||
influential. Thomas Jefferson drew upon his ideas in framing the Declaration
|
||
of Independence, and the French Enlightenment philosophers VOLTAIRE and
|
||
MONTESQUIEU were indebted to him. Leading liberal voices in the 19th century
|
||
included Jeremy BENTHAM, John Stuart MILL, Alexis de TOCQUEVILLE, and Thomas
|
||
Hill Green (1836-82).
|
||
|
||
In its full flower in the 19th century, liberalism stood for limited government
|
||
with a separation of powers among different branches such as the legislative,
|
||
executive, and judicial and for free enterprise in the economy. Because of the
|
||
reaction against the excesses of the French Revolution, however, liberalism
|
||
shed some of its reliance on rationalism and began to base itself on
|
||
utilitarianism. A link was thus forged between early revolutionary
|
||
individualism and a new idealistic concern for the interests of society.
|
||
|
||
In England the Liberal party, which espoused liberal doctrines, came into being
|
||
(1846) under the leadership of Lord John Russell (later Earl Russell) and
|
||
William E. GLADSTONE. In France, liberalism developed in opposition to the
|
||
policies of the restored Bourbon kings and became a major force in the Third
|
||
Republic; leading French liberals were Leon GAMBETTA and Georges CLEMENCEAU.
|
||
In the United States the most characteristic representative of liberalism was
|
||
Woodrow WILSON.
|
||
|
||
By the 20th century, political and economic thinking among liberals had begun
|
||
to shift in response to an expanding and complex economy. Liberals began to
|
||
support the idea that the government can best promote individual dignity and
|
||
freedom through intervention in the economy and by establishing a state
|
||
concerned about the welfare of its people. With the rise of the WELFARE STATE,
|
||
the new liberals also looked to government to correct some of the ills believed
|
||
to be caused by unregulated capitalism. They favored TAXATION, MINIMUM WAGE
|
||
legislation, SOCIAL SECURITY, ANTITRUST LAWS, public education, safety and
|
||
health laws, and other measures to protect consumers and preserve the
|
||
environment (see GOVERNMENT REGULATION). Some liberals became socialists,
|
||
although opposing doctrinaire Marxism and communism. The more traditional
|
||
liberals, who held to the ideas of Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill, found
|
||
themselves classed as conservatives. LENNART FRANTZELL
|
||
|
||
Bibliography: Bease, W. Lyon, A Short History of English Liberalism (1976);
|
||
De Ruggiero, Guido, The History of European Liberalism, trans. by R. C.
|
||
Collingwood (1927; repr. 1977); Gerber, William, American Liberalism (1975);
|
||
Mileur, Jerome, The Liberal Tradition in Crisis; American Politics in the
|
||
Sixties (1974); Strauss, Leo, Liberalism, Ancient and Modern (1968).
|
||
|
||
Jainism
|
||
--------------------------------
|
||
(jy'-nizm)
|
||
Jainism is a religious faith of India that is usually said to have originated
|
||
with Mahavira, a contemporary of the Buddha (6th century BC). Jains, however,
|
||
count Mahavira as the last of 24 founders, or Tirthamkaras, the first being
|
||
Rishabha. The 1971 census of India counts 2,600,000 Jains, mostly concentrated
|
||
in the western part of India. Jainism has been present in India since
|
||
Mahavira's time without interruption, and its influence has been significant.
|
||
The major distinction within Jainism is between the Digambara and Svetambara
|
||
sects, a schism that appears to date from about the 1st century AD. The major
|
||
difference between them is that whereas the Svetambaras wear white clothes, the
|
||
Digambaras traditionally go naked. Fundamentally, however, the views of both
|
||
sects on ethics and philosophy are identical.
|
||
|
||
The most notable feature of Jain ethics is its insistence on noninjury to all
|
||
forms of life. Jain philosophy finds that every kind of thing has a soul;
|
||
therefore strict observance of this precept of nonviolence (ahimsa) requires
|
||
extreme caution in all activity. Jain monks frequently wear cloths over their
|
||
mouths to avoid unwittingly killing anything by breathing it in, and Jain
|
||
floors are kept meticulously clean to avert the danger of stepping on a living
|
||
being. Jains regard the intentional taking of life, or even violent thoughts,
|
||
however, as much more serious. Jain philosophy posits a gradation of beings,
|
||
from those with five senses down to those with only one sense. Ordinary
|
||
householders cannot help harming the latter, although they should strive to
|
||
limit themselves in this regard by refraining from eating meat, certain fruits,
|
||
or honey or from drinking wine. In addition Jain householders are expected to
|
||
practice other virtues, similar to those in HINDUISM. The vows taken by the
|
||
Jain monks are more severe. They eventually involve elements of ASCETICISM:
|
||
fasting, peripatetic begging, learning to endure bodily discomfort, and various
|
||
internal austerities constituting a Jain variety of YOGA. Jainism is unique in
|
||
allowing the very spiritually advanced to hasten their own death by certain
|
||
practices (principally fasting) and under specified circumstances.
|
||
|
||
Jain philosophy is based on a fundamental distinction between living and
|
||
nonliving matter. Living souls are divided into bound and liberated; the
|
||
living souls are found in both mobile and immobile loci. Nonliving matter is
|
||
composed of karman or very fine particles that enter a soul and produce changes
|
||
in it, thus causing its bondage. This influx of karman is induced by activity
|
||
and has to be burned off by experience. Karmans are of infinitely numerous
|
||
varieties and account for all distinctions noted in the world. By
|
||
nonattachment, however, an individual can prevent influx of further karmans and
|
||
thus escape from the bonds of action. A soul, which is thought of as having
|
||
the same size as its body, at liberation has lost the matter that weights it
|
||
down and thus ascends to the top of the universe, where it remains forever.
|
||
|
||
Jainism recognizes no supreme deity; its ideal is the perfection attained by
|
||
the 24 Tirthamkaras. Numerous temples have been built celebrating the
|
||
perfected souls; a notable example is the temple at Mount Abu in Rajasthan.
|
||
KARL H. POTTER
|
||
|
||
Bibliography: Chatterjee, A. K., A Comprehensive History of Jainism (1978);
|
||
Gopalan, Subramania, Outlines of Jainism (1973); Jain, J. P., Religion and
|
||
Culture of the Jains (1976); Mehta, Mohan Lal, Outlines of Jaina Philosophy
|
||
(1954); Stevenson, S. T., The Heart of Jainism (1915; repr. 1970); Williams,
|
||
R. H. B., Jaina Yoga (1963).
|
||
|
||
|
||
Gladstone, William Ewart
|
||
--------------------------------
|
||
(glad'-stuhn)
|
||
William Ewart Gladstone, four times Liberal prime minister of Britain, was an
|
||
Olympian figure in 19th-century British politics. The son of a Liverpool
|
||
merchant, he was born on Dec. 29, 1809, and educated at Eton and Oxford. He
|
||
entered Parliament in 1832 as a Canningite Tory.
|
||
|
||
An erudite classicist and High Church Anglican given to soul-searching,
|
||
Gladstone always sought to apply morality to politics. He became (1843)
|
||
president of the Board of Trade under Sir Robert PEEL and with Peel began to
|
||
support more liberal positions, including repeal of the CORN LAWS in 1846.
|
||
After the ensuing split in the Tory party, Gladstone gradually moved into
|
||
Liberal circles, finding much in common with Richard COBDEN and John BRIGHT.
|
||
He served as chancellor of the exchequer in Lord ABERDEEN's coalition (1852-55)
|
||
and by 1859 was ready to assume the same office as a Liberal under Viscount
|
||
PALMERSTON, continuing tax reforms and securing a commercial treaty with
|
||
France. By 1865 he had developed liberal views on the rights of
|
||
nonconformists, disestablishment of the Church of Ireland, and electoral
|
||
reform. He was well on the way to becoming "the people's William" when the
|
||
death of Palmerston and resignation of Lord John RUSSELL gave him leadership of
|
||
the Liberals in 1866.
|
||
|
||
Gladstone's first and most successful government (1868-74) was marked by
|
||
disestablishment of the Irish church, the Irish Land Act (to protect the
|
||
peasants against abuses by their landlords), abolition of religious tests in
|
||
universities, open competition in the civil service, the Secret Ballot Act, and
|
||
other reforms. However, a pro-Anglican bias in the Education Act of 1870
|
||
contributed to his electoral defeat in 1874.
|
||
|
||
Gladstone resigned the Liberal leadership in 1875, but he reentered the
|
||
political arena to chastise (1876) his Conservative rival Benjamin DISRAELI for
|
||
indifference to Turkish atrocities in the Balkans. After vigorous
|
||
electioneering in the Midlothian campaign (1879-80)--the first such political
|
||
campaign in British history--Gladstone returned to power in 1880. His second
|
||
government carried (1884) the third REFORM ACT but was discredited by colonial
|
||
setbacks, especially the failure to relieve Charles George GORDON at Khartoum,
|
||
and fell in 1885.
|
||
|
||
In his third, short-lived ministry (1886) Gladstone attempted unsuccessfully to
|
||
give Ireland home rule (see HOME RULE BILLS). Not always adept in handling
|
||
colleagues and followers, he now split them on this issue; Joseph CHAMBERLAIN
|
||
led the defection of the Liberal Unionists, who favored the continuing union of
|
||
Britain and Ireland. The home rule issue also dominated Gladstone's fourth
|
||
ministry (1892-94)--a second Home Rule Bill was defeated in 1893--and diverted
|
||
the Liberals from constructive domestic policies. Gladstone finally resigned
|
||
in 1894, however, in a dispute over the naval budget, peace and retrenchment
|
||
remaining his strongest passions.
|
||
|
||
Gladstone died on May 19, 1898. Though he had failed in two
|
||
ambitions--abolition of the income tax and settlement of the Irish
|
||
question--and showed an uncertain touch in foreign and colonial affairs, the
|
||
"Grand Old Man" had shaped the LIBERAL PARTY of the Victorian era. DONALD
|
||
SOUTHGATE
|
||
|
||
Bibliography: Feuchtwanger, E. J., Gladstone (1975); Magnus, Sir Philip,
|
||
Gladstone (1954; repr. 1963); Morley, John, The Life of William Ewart
|
||
Gladstone, 3 vols. (1903; repr. 1972).
|
||
|
||
nominalism
|
||
--------------------------------
|
||
Nominalism is the designation usually applied to any philosophical system,
|
||
ancient or modern, that denies all objectivity, whether actual or potential, to
|
||
universals; in other words, nominalists grant no universality to mental
|
||
concepts outside the mind. In this sense, the philosophical systems of
|
||
EPICURUS, WILLIAM OF OCCAM, George BERKELEY, David HUME, John Stuart MILL, and
|
||
of contemporary linguistic analysis may be called nominalistic in that they
|
||
attribute universality only to words (nomina), mental habits, or concepts and
|
||
maintain the objective existence only of the concrete, individual thing.
|
||
Nominalism is simultaneously opposed to the philosophical IDEALISM of Plato and
|
||
to the moderate REALISM of Aristotle and Saint Thomas Aquinas. The principal
|
||
objection of nominalists is to the attribution of objective existence to ideas
|
||
formally as they exist in the mind and fundamentally (or potentially) as they
|
||
exist in particulars having some similarity to each other in any given class or
|
||
species. JAMES A. WEISHEIPL
|
||
|
||
Bibliography: Carre, Meyrick H., Realists and Nominalists (1961); Goodman,
|
||
Nelson, and Bochenski, Innocentius, eds., The Problem of Universals, A
|
||
Symposium (1956); Van Iten, R., ed., The Problem of Universals (1970); Veatch,
|
||
H., Realism and Nominalism Revisited (1954).
|
||
|
||
|
||
innate ideas
|
||
--------------------------------
|
||
Innate ideas are ideas or functions originating in the mind apart from sense
|
||
experience. Different theories of innate ideas have appeared over the
|
||
centuries. PLATO believed that people developed understanding in a previous
|
||
life but were born into their present life in a condition resembling
|
||
forgetfulness. All learning, according to this theory, is remembering what one
|
||
once knew explicitly and still somehow knows despite having forgotten it. For
|
||
the Stoics, all people have certain "common notions" that are the roots of
|
||
science and morality prior to any sense experience. Saint AUGUSTINE adapted
|
||
the Platonic remembrance theory and spoke of a nonsensory source of knowledge
|
||
in a divine illumination. Saint BONAVENTURE and his disciples repeated this
|
||
doctrine. In the 17th century, Rene DESCARTES taught that ideas such as God,
|
||
the soul, and even geometrical axioms, are innate, having been implanted by
|
||
God. Variations on this are found among Cartesian and rationalist thinkers in
|
||
the next century. What may be regarded an an innate-ideas doctrine is also
|
||
present in the writings of Immanuel KANT, for whom space and time, "the
|
||
categories" of understanding, and the "pure ideas" of God, the soul, and the
|
||
world, all derived from the structure of the knower prior to sensation. For
|
||
Kant, as for others accepting innate ideas, morality is not rooted so much in
|
||
experience as in common forms or rules possessed by everyone anterior to any
|
||
experience. JOHN P. DOYLE
|
||
|
||
Bibliography: Stich, Stephen P., ed., Innate Ideas (1975).
|
||
|
||
|