295 lines
14 KiB
Plaintext
295 lines
14 KiB
Plaintext
Xref: ncar talk.politics.crypto:554 comp.org.eff.talk:17477
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Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.politics.org.nsa
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Path: ncar!elroy.jpl.nasa.gov!sdd.hp.com!col.hp.com!csn!yuma!ld231782
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From: ld231782@LANCE.ColoState.Edu (L. Detweiler)
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Subject: ZIMMERMANN SPEAKS TO HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE
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Sender: news@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU (News Account)
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Message-ID: <Oct10.044212.45343@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU>
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Date: Sun, 10 Oct 1993 04:42:12 GMT
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Nntp-Posting-Host: turner.lance.colostate.edu
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Organization: Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO 80523
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Lines: 281
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Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 11:57:54 MDT
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From: Philip Zimmermann <prz@acm.org>
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Subject: Zimmerman testimony to House subcommittee
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Testimony of Philip Zimmermann to
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Subcommittee for Economic Policy, Trade, and the Environment
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US House of Representatives
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12 Oct 1993
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Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is Philip
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Zimmermann, and I am a software engineer who specializes in
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cryptography and data security. I'm here to talk to you today about
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the need to change US export control policy for cryptographic
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software. I want to thank you for the opportunity to be here and
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commend you for your attention to this important issue.
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I am the author of PGP (Pretty Good Privacy), a public-key encryption
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software package for the protection of electronic mail. Since PGP
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was published domestically as freeware in June of 1991, it has spread
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organically all over the world and has since become the de facto
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worldwide standard for encryption of E-mail. The US Customs Service
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is investigating how PGP spread outside the US. Because I am a
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target of this ongoing criminal investigation, my lawyer has advised
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me not to answer any questions related to the investigation.
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I. The information age is here.
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Computers were developed in secret back in World War II mainly to
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break codes. Ordinary people did not have access to computers,
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because they were few in number and too expensive. Some people
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postulated that there would never be a need for more than half a
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dozen computers in the country. Governments formed their attitudes
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toward cryptographic technology during this period. And these
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attitudes persist today. Why would ordinary people need to have
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access to good cryptography?
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Another problem with cryptography in those days was that
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cryptographic keys had to be distributed over secure channels so that
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both parties could send encrypted traffic over insecure channels.
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Governments solved that problem by dispatching key couriers with
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satchels handcuffed to their wrists. Governments could afford to
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send guys like these to their embassies overseas. But the great
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masses of ordinary people would never have access to practical
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cryptography if keys had to be distributed this way. No matter how
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cheap and powerful personal computers might someday become, you just
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can't send the keys electronically without the risk of interception.
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This widened the feasibility gap between Government and personal
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access to cryptography.
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Today, we live in a new world that has had two major breakthroughs
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that have an impact on this state of affairs. The first is the
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coming of the personal computer and the information age. The second
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breakthrough is public-key cryptography.
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With the first breakthrough comes cheap ubiquitous personal
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computers, modems, FAX machines, the Internet, E-mail, digital
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cellular phones, personal digital assistants (PDAs), wireless digital
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networks, ISDN, cable TV, and the data superhighway. This
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information revolution is catalyzing the emergence of a global
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economy.
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But this renaissance in electronic digital communication brings with
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it a disturbing erosion of our privacy. In the past, if the
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Government wanted to violate the privacy of ordinary citizens, it had
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to expend a certain amount of effort to intercept and steam open and
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read paper mail, and listen to and possibly transcribe spoken
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telephone conversation. This is analogous to catching fish with a
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hook and a line, one fish at a time. Fortunately for freedom and
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democracy, this kind of labor-intensive monitoring is not practical
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on a large scale.
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Today, electronic mail is gradually replacing conventional paper
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mail, and is soon to be the norm for everyone, not the novelty is is
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today. Unlike paper mail, E-mail messages are just too easy to
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intercept and scan for interesting keywords. This can be done
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easily, routinely, automatically, and undetectably on a grand scale.
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This is analogous to driftnet fishing-- making a quantitative and
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qualitative Orwellian difference to the health of democracy.
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The second breakthrough came in the late 1970s, with the mathematics
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of public key cryptography. This allows people to communicate
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securely and conveniently with people they've never met, with no
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prior exchange of keys over secure channels. No more special key
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couriers with black bags. This, coupled with the trappings of the
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information age, means the great masses of people can at last use
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cryptography. This new technology also provides digital signatures
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to authenticate transactions and messages, and allows for digital
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money, with all the implications that has for an electronic digital
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economy. (See appendix)
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This convergence of technology-- cheap ubiquitous PCs, modems, FAX,
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digital phones, information superhighways, et cetera-- is all part of
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the information revolution. Encryption is just simple arithmetic to
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all this digital hardware. All these devices will be using
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encryption. The rest of the world uses it, and they laugh at the US
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because we are railing against nature, trying to stop it. Trying to
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stop this is like trying to legislate the tides and the weather. It's
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like the buggy whip manufacturers trying to stop the cars-- even with
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the NSA on their side, it's still impossible. The information
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revolution is good for democracy-- good for a free market and trade.
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It contributed to the fall of the Soviet empire. They couldn't stop
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it either.
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Soon, every off-the-shelf multimedia PC will become a secure voice
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telephone, through the use of freely available software. What does
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this mean for the Government's Clipper chip and key escrow systems?
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Like every new technology, this comes at some cost. Cars pollute the
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air. Cryptography can help criminals hide their activities. People
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in the law enforcement and intelligence communities are going to look
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at this only in their own terms. But even with these costs, we still
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can't stop this from happening in a free market global economy. Most
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people I talk to outside of Government feel that the net result of
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providing privacy will be positive.
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President Clinton is fond of saying that we should "make change our
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friend". These sweeping technological changes have big implications,
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but are unstoppable. Are we going to make change our friend? Or are
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we going to criminalize cryptography? Are we going to incarcerate
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our honest, well-intentioned software engineers?
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Law enforcement and intelligence interests in the Government have
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attempted many times to suppress the availability of strong domestic
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encryption technology. The most recent examples are Senate Bill 266
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which mandated back doors in crypto systems, the FBI Digital
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Telephony bill, and the Clipper chip key escrow initiative. All of
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these have met with strong opposition from industry and civil liberties
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groups. It is impossible to obtain real privacy in the information
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age without good cryptography.
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The Clinton Administration has made it a major policy priority to
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help build the National Information Infrastructure (NII). Yet, some
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elements of the Government seems intent on deploying and entrenching
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a communications infrastructure that would deny the citizenry the
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ability to protect its privacy. This is unsettling because in a
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democracy, it is possible for bad people to occasionally get
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elected-- sometimes very bad people. Normally, a well-functioning
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democracy has ways to remove these people from power. But the wrong
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technology infrastructure could allow such a future government to
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watch every move anyone makes to oppose it. It could very well be
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the last government we ever elect.
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When making public policy decisions about new technologies for the
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Government, I think one should ask oneself which technologies would
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best strengthen the hand of a police state. Then, do not allow the
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Government to deploy those technologies. This is simply a matter of
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good civic hygiene.
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II. Export controls are outdated and are a threat to privacy and
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economic competitivness.
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The current export control regime makes no sense anymore, given
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advances in technology.
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There has been considerable debate about allowing the export of
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implementations of the full 56-bit Data Encryption Standard (DES).
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At a recent academic cryptography conference, Michael Wiener of Bell
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Northern Research in Ottawa presented a paper on how to crack the DES
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with a special machine. He has fully designed and tested a chip that
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guesses DES keys at high speed until it finds the right one.
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Although he has refrained from building the real chips so far, he can
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get these chips manufactured for $10.50 each, and can build 57000 of
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them into a special machine for $1 million that can try every DES key
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in 7 hours, averaging a solution in 3.5 hours. $1 million can be
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hidden in the budget of many companies. For $10 million, it takes 21
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minutes to crack, and for $100 million, just two minutes. That's
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full 56-bit DES, cracked in just two minutes. I'm sure the NSA can
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do it in seconds, with their budget. This means that DES is now
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effectively dead for purposes of serious data security applications.
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If Congress acts now to enable the export of full DES products, it
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will be a day late and a dollar short.
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If a Boeing executive who carries his notebook computer to the Paris
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airshow wants to use PGP to send email to his home office in Seattle,
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are we helping American competitivness by arguing that he has even
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potentially committed a federal crime?
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Knowledge of cryptography is becoming so widespread, that export
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controls are no longer effective at controlling the spread of this
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technology. People everywhere can and do write good cryptographic
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software, and we import it here but cannot export it, to the detriment
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of our indigenous software industry.
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I wrote PGP from information in the open literature, putting it into
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a convenient package that everyone can use in a desktop or palmtop
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computer. Then I gave it away for free, for the good of our
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democracy. This could have popped up anywhere, and spread. Other
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people could have and would have done it. And are doing it. Again
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and again. All over the planet. This technology belongs to
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everybody.
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III. People want their privacy very badly.
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PGP has spread like a prairie fire, fanned by countless people who
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fervently want their privacy restored in the information age.
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Today, human rights organizations are using PGP to protect their
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people overseas. Amnesty International uses it. The human rights
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group in the American Association for the Advancement of Science uses
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it.
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Some Americans don't understand why I should be this concerned about
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the power of Government. But talking to people in Eastern Europe, you
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don't have to explain it to them. They already get it-- and they
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don't understand why we don't.
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I want to read you a quote from some E-mail I got last week from
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someone in Latvia, on the day that Boris Yeltsin was going to war
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with his Parliament:
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"Phil I wish you to know: let it never be, but if dictatorship
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takes over Russia your PGP is widespread from Baltic to Far East
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now and will help democratic people if necessary. Thanks."
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Appendix -- How Public-Key Cryptography Works
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---------------------------------------------
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In conventional cryptosystems, such as the US Federal Data Encryption
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Standard (DES), a single key is used for both encryption and
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decryption. This means that a key must be initially transmitted via
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secure channels so that both parties have it before encrypted
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messages can be sent over insecure channels. This may be
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inconvenient. If you have a secure channel for exchanging keys, then
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why do you need cryptography in the first place?
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In public key cryptosystems, everyone has two related complementary
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keys, a publicly revealed key and a secret key. Each key unlocks the
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code that the other key makes. Knowing the public key does not help
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you deduce the corresponding secret key. The public key can be
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published and widely disseminated across a communications network.
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This protocol provides privacy without the need for the same kind of
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secure channels that a conventional cryptosystem requires.
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Anyone can use a recipient's public key to encrypt a message to that
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person, and that recipient uses her own corresponding secret key to
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decrypt that message. No one but the recipient can decrypt it,
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because no one else has access to that secret key. Not even the
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person who encrypted the message can decrypt it.
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Message authentication is also provided. The sender's own secret key
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can be used to encrypt a message, thereby "signing" it. This creates
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a digital signature of a message, which the recipient (or anyone
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else) can check by using the sender's public key to decrypt it. This
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proves that the sender was the true originator of the message, and
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that the message has not been subsequently altered by anyone else,
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because the sender alone possesses the secret key that made that
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signature. Forgery of a signed message is infeasible, and the sender
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cannot later disavow his signature.
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These two processes can be combined to provide both privacy and
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authentication by first signing a message with your own secret key,
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then encrypting the signed message with the recipient's public key.
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The recipient reverses these steps by first decrypting the message
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with her own secret key, then checking the enclosed signature with
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your public key. These steps are done automatically by the
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recipient's software.
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--
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Philip Zimmermann
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3021 11th Street
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Boulder, Colorado 80304
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303 541-0140
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E-mail: prz@acm.org
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--
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ld231782@longs.LANCE.ColoState.EDU
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