503 lines
29 KiB
Plaintext
503 lines
29 KiB
Plaintext
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ÉÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍ»
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º THE COMMON GOOD AND THE VOTER'S PARADOX º
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º º
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º by º
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º Leon Felkins º
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ÈÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍͼ
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"If voting could change anything, it would be illegal."
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--Graffiti
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How many times has someone told you that everyone would
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be happy, healthy and content *if only* people would forget
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their selfish desires and work for the common good? By
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serving the common good, don't we also serve our own
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enlightened self interests because the common good guarantees
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the maximum benefit for every individual? Wasn't the *me*
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generation a tragic mistake? Isn't it time we returned to
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the ideal that each individual puts the community interests
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above his own selfish interest?
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Does working for the common good give a person greater
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benefits than working for one's own selfish behavior?
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If the answer is *yes*, then we should to be able to
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demonstrate that an individual sacrifice has a real effect on
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the common good. If my single, personal sacrifice can alter
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the final result, then I can say that my sacrifice produces
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more in rewards than my personal costs. But if my sacrifice
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makes no difference to the final result, why should I make
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it, especially if I receive the benefits of the sacrifice of
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others even if I make no personal sacrifice?
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The truth is that an individual sacrifice for the common
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good never produces a personal reward equal to the cost of
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the sacrifice. Let's look at some examples to demonstrate
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what we are talking about.
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Almost everyone will agree that voting is an important
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civil duty. Moreover, it's a duty that requires little
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personal sacrifice in our society. For most of us, it takes
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no more than a few minutes of time. Polling places are easy
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to find, almost always near the place where we live,
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registration is simple, the process is painless and most of
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us have pretty definite opinions about whom we want to elect.
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So how come only about half the eligible voters actually get
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to the polls?
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Let's say that on election day you find yourself 150
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miles away from home on a two day meeting. (The meeting was
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scheduled after the final date for requesting an absentee
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ballot.) Your have a choice: you could do your duty, drive
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home, vote and drive back. Or, you could just forget the
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whole thing.
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Most likely you will chose the option of forgetting
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about it--this time. Your reasoning is sound. The cost for
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you to vote is substantial while the return is, for all
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practical purposes, zero. Why is that so? Because your vote
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will not actually make a difference in the results of the
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election! While you may have other reasons for voting or not
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voting, as far as the election process itself is altered,
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your vote is just not significant.
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You won't be alone in deciding not to bother to vote.
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As many as half the voters will not only decide voting is not
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worth the sacrifice of driving two hundred miles, they'll
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decide it's not worth the sacrifice of the risk of getting
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rained on, missing a favorite TV show, being late for dinner,
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or driving six blocks out of the way on the way home from
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work.
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Let us look at the voting situation more carefully and
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examine some of the counter arguments often made for why you
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should vote.
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*What if the election resulted in a tie? Would not my*
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*vote count then?*
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Sure, if that ever happened. But ties don't ever occur
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in large elections and if they did there would be a re-count.
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Your vote would still get obliterated!
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*But I like to vote. I really don't care whether my*
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*vote does any good or not - I get an internal feeling of*
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*having done my duty. And, if the candidate I vote for wins,*
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*I can brag about how I help him get elected.*
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This is the real reason why most people do vote. They
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have bought into a group of myths that make them think that
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their single vote really does count. Because they believe
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those myths, voting makes them feel good. If voting gives
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you a good feeling, by all means do it, if it doesn't cost
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you a lot of time or money. But what if you don't like any
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of the candidates, you know they are all crooks and that not
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one of them will do what he or she is promising they will do?
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Do you really feel good when you are forced to choose between
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Slick Willy, Read My Lips, or a rich Texas shrimp?
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*What about the possibility that my employer may reward*
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*me for voting and/or there are other rewards for being a*
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*registered voter?*
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If the reward exceeds the cost of voting, then vote.
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That is rational. But how often does that actually happen?
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The question is not why do so few people vote, but why
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does anyone bothers to vote at all. Voting may be a fun and
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pleasurable experience but it doesn't make rational sense as
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a way of getting a payoff for the effort and sacrifice.
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*If my voting will do nothing, what can I do to help*
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*get my candidate elected?*
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Simple: get other people to vote, lots of them. If you
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can get 10,000 people to vote the way you want and your
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personal reward for doing that exceeds the cost of your doing
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it then, rationally, you should do it. It doesn't pay to
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vote, but it does pay to donate a great deal of money to a
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political candidate which is then used to con less
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intelligent and less rational people into voting for the
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candidate who will promptly ignore the desires of those who
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voted from him but do everything he can to serve the desires
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of those who made big contributions to his campaign.
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That is why it's so easy to buy elections. The thinking
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voter gets no real, tangible rewards for voting; the bought
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voter gets whatever pay-off he/she is offered.
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But if a single vote makes no difference to the outcome,
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what about the other things our leaders ask us to do as a
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civic duty?
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Let's look at another example of civic duty, one in
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which we could argue that the personal sacrifice has a much
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greater impact on the public good than the simple act of
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voting. Suppose you live in a California city that happens
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to be running out of water. The mayor declares - among other
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things - that the residents are to take baths only two days a
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week. Although this is not your day to bathe, you have just
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finished making a plumbing repair in the basement and you are
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feeling really grungy. The desire to take a bath weighs
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heavy on your mind.
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You consider the options. They can best be stated by
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the following "payoff matrix".
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| Direct |Member of Community |
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| Impact | Impact |
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----------------------------------------------------------
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Take Bath | Great | - negligible |
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----------------------------------------------------------
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Don't Take Bath | Awful | + negligible |
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----------------------------------------------------------
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(The '-' means slightly negative; the '+' means slightly
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positive)
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When I take any action that uses community resources, it
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impacts me in two ways. I am impacted directly by my action
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and I am impacted as a member of the community.
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With regard to the bath water example, the pay off
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matrix would provide enough evidence to a rational person to
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conclude that the net pay off is heavily in favor of taking a
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bath. The loss that he/she would get from cheating as a
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member of the community is insignificantly small.
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Both of these scenarios present examples of a situation
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sometime referred to as "The Voter's Paradox". Basically
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that paradox states that the return to an individual from a
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group contribution that is beneficial to the group will be
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less than the direct cost to the individual. The paradox
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results from the fact that while the individual may have a
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positive personal gain in not voting, if everyone declines to
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vote, or to conserve water resources, we have a disaster on
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our hands.
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The two scenarios actually present two classes of the
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problem.
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With regard to the voting dilemma, the problem is that
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there is no return *at all* to balance the voter's cost of
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voting. The reason why this is so is because elections are a
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binary (to use a term from the computer world) event. Your
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candidate is either elected or not. We do not put 55% of
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candidate A in office and 45% of candidate B. It is all or
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nothing, which means that one less vote simply has no impact
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on the final result. The very improbable case of a tie vote
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is statistically insignificant.
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The second example of a water shortage is not binary in
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that every little bit of water in the reservoir does help,
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even if the actual difference one bath may make is down in
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the noise ( to borrow another term from electronics). But
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one always gets a significant reward for cheating, i.e.
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instant cleanliness. Yet, if half the population does as I
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do, the impact is disastrous.
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*What if everyone did that?*
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Experience tells us that everyone won't. We can be
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pretty sure that a significant segment of any human
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population will believe the myths and do their duty. Like
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the sheep they are, they will vote, conserve water, and offer
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every sacrifice for the common good that the preacher,
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teacher, or politician tells them to make.
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But we are not writing this for the sheep who do what
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they are told to do. We're addressing this to those who
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think and act rationally in their own self interests. The
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rational individual is first concerned with the results of
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his/her actions as it impacts on his/her own happiness and
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well being. Such a person may decide to make a sacrifice in
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the common good, but will do so only if he or she is certain
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that the personal sacrifice will produce a common good result
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that is at least equal to or, hopefully, greater than the
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value of the personal sacrifice.
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What we are arguing is that such a situation almost
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never occurs. Most of the time, a personal sacrifice never
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produces an impact on the common good that would justify the
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personal cost.
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The final paradox is that if everybody did as I
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contemplate doing, then it would me even less sense for me
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not to cheat. The more people who cheat, the less rational
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it becomes to be one of those sacrificing personal good for
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the common good. The more rational, self directed, selfish
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people there are in a community, the less likely that appeals
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that everyone should work for the common good will produce
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results.
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This dilemma is sometimes called *The Tragedy of the
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Commons* which refers to the early New England practice of
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establishing a grazing commons used by everyone in the
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village. The commons pasture was a limited resource which
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all members of the village could use for grazing their milk
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cows and horses. The assumption was that the good citizens
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of the community will each limit their use of the commons to
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a fair share that would insure that the grass was not
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overgrazed. It never happened that way. In every case the
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commons was overgrazed into a dust patch. The reason was
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simple. Too many people recognized that as the grass was a
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limited resource, they had to get the maximum amount into
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their cows before some one else did. The expectation was
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always that if one didn't take more than his or her fair
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share, the next fellow would.
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The *Tragedy of the Commons* poses an extremely serious
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dilemma to those who would try to design a society based on
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the assumption that individuals will contribute to the
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group's well being rather than looking out for their own
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selfish interests. If we recognize that individuals are
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driven by selfish desires and we are looking for a rational
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basis for voluntarily contributing to community welfare, we
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are in serious trouble.
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Faced with the reality of the tragedy of the commons,
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society usually opts for one of two different methods for
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insuring the common good as well as the preservation of
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community resources. These two methods are not
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complimentary, but contradictory.
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One of these is the pay-as-you go method, that is, the
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free market. In the free market approach, every common
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resource, whether managed by private owners or by a community
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government, is sold to the public at a price high enough to
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insure that the resource is not depleted. If there is a
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water shortage, then the price of water is jacked up until
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people have no choice but to limit the amount of water they
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use for bathing. This not only has the advantage of insuring
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that water consumption goes down, it also gathers capital
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that can be used to increase the supply of water through the
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creation of new sources.
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But the modern advocate of *socially responsible*
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government objects to the market place approach because it
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results in an *unfair* situation in which the rich wash their
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cars while the poor can't take a bath at all. Such advocates
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of the common good claim that the only way to fairly
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distribute a common necessity is by regulation. That means
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that you jail people who take baths on the wrong day and the
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only fair way to gather capital to finance new public
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projects is by taxation. You not only have to collect enough
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tax to pay for the water system, but you must also collect
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enough to hire the water cops, pay the judges, and to build
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the jails where you will put both water and tax cheats.
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But does such government action really solve the voter's
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paradox or the tragedy of the commons, or does it simple
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create a new commons, a public treasury, that then becomes
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the target of plunder for selfish people who will always put
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their own selfish interest above the common good?
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If we look at recent political history, it is obvious
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that the tragedy of the commons could also be called the
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tragedy of the public treasury. No matter how much we
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collect for the public treasury, it will never be enough to
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meet the demands of those who claim a right to use the money
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from the treasury.
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It is not remarkable that each individual describes the
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public good as those things that are in his own best
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interest. The elderly want more social security and medical
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benefits, the trucker better roads, the farmer crop
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subsidies, the investor bank guarantees, and the politician
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every single benefit that will result in more votes for him
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at election time. The inevitable result is that the
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government never spends the revenue in the public good, but
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only for the benefit of those clever enough to manipulate the
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system to their own benefit.
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We can see the result in America today. The entire
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political process has degenerated into a mad scramble over
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what should be financed with public funds as our politicians
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spend us into national bankruptcy.
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This paradox affects our lives in a variety of ways
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every day. A few more examples are provided for your
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amusement and to further illustrate the general nature of the
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problem:
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-- The congressman votes for more spending and higher
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taxes because his direct reward is greater than the small
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loss to himself of having to pay higher taxes. Further,
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the electorate of each district continues to encourage the
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congressman to spend for the benefit of their area, while
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complaining about the ever increasing national debt!
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-- Even though free trade would benefit all nations and
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most consumers, I, as an auto worker or textile mill
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owner, will personally benefit more if I can elect
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politicians who will set high tariffs and limit
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competitive imports.
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-- The ecology of the earth will not be measurably
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affected by my actions. The destruction of the mahogany
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forests does not really depend on whether I buy this
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mahogany table or not. In any case, not much is likely to
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happen in my lifetime.
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-- If I somehow know that a chemical company stock is
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about to gain $5, and I decide not to buy because the
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company makes chemicals that end up in toxic dumps, two
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things happen: I lose a chance to make $5 for every share
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I could afford to purchase and the chemical company will
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feel absolutely no additional pressure to abandon the
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production of these chemicals. In fact there will be no
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impact on the company, nor their policies, whatever I
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decide to do.
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-- Currently the government is encouraging all of us
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to buy all we can in order to stimulate the economy. It
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makes much more sense for me to cut my spending and pay
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off my credit bills. If everyone does that, the recession
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becomes a depression.
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-- Young people who want to use their credit cards
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demand that the government lower interest rates even
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though that cuts the income of the elderly who are living
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on the interest off their savings.
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-- Should I contribute to Public Television? Not only
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will my $25 contribution not impact whether the station
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stays on the air or not, but my use of their service costs
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them nothing more than what they already spend.
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Rationally, I use but don't pay.
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--Consider the situation of a bank near possible
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failure. Suppose that you know that the bank's situation
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is precarious and that if several people suddenly withdraw
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their deposits, it will have to close. You have $5000 in
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deposit. What should you do? The bank will not close
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because of your individual action so your withdrawal will
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not hurt other people. But if there is a "run" on the
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bank, you lose $5000.
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If the above arguments are correct, we can only conclude
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that a rational and selfish individual will not voluntarily
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contribute to community welfare even though he/she would
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share in that welfare. We could even suggest that the
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only people who do voluntarily sacrifice personal rewards
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for the public good are nothing but patsies. The person who
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refuses to contribute to the common good gets a double
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reward. He or she gets the immediate reward of the money or
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effort saved, and the long term reward of collecting whatever
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public good the patsies created.
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*But doesn't altruism have it's own rewards?*
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There are very convincing arguments that living human
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beings are rarely altruistic. It is easier to believe that
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positive civic actions by individuals result from stupidity,
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intimidation, bribes, or the success of propaganda campaigns
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rather than true altruism!
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But can't we educate our children through the school
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system about the importance of working toward the common
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good?
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We have been trying to do that ever since the beginning
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of this century. Education hasn't converted children into
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altruistic adults in this country and it certainly didn't
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work in the Soviet Union where the school system tried
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desperately to create the new socialist man who would always
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work for the common good. Indeed, it seems that just the
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opposite happens, the more educated a person is, the more
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he/she is likely to take rational actions and less likely to
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be easily convinced to sacrifice his own good for the common
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good.
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What is the solution to this dilemma? Do those of us
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wise enough to recognize the mythologies and the bull shit
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that priest and politicians hand out decide that we have no
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choice but to go along with the program of inducing guilt,
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intimidating the ignorant, propagandizing the uneducated, and
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bribing the electorate as it has been practiced by the
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churches, governments, and teachers for thousands of years?
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Or, do we shout out the truth? Do we admit to
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ourselves, and tell anyone who wants to listen that
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sacrificing for the common good makes no rational sense, that
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the only way to achieve the common good is to make every
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thing a pay-as-you-go proposition with the free market place
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determining what the price of every commodity and benefit
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will be? Moreover, do we make a rational decision to take
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every legal advantage of the common good and the common
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treasure for as long as others are willing to believe in the
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myths that teach it is better to serve the common good rather
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than look out for one's own selfish interests?
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Indeed, do we dare examine the very concept that there
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even is such a thing as the common good? Or is that idea as
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mythical as the morality that claims humans must put aside
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their own interest in order to serve the interest of the
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community?
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In reality, society is always a chaotic mixture of
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competing needs in which the needs and wants of no two
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individuals ever match. No matter how much you may want tax
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supported public schools, I'll remain convinced that public
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schools are a failed social experiment that should be junked.
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Some argue that the war on drugs does more damage to society
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than drug addiction could ever do. Do agricultural subsidies
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really serve the common good of the consumer who must pay
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higher prices at the food counter?
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There is not a single major political issue in modern
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America in which there is anything approaching a consensus
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agreement about what action must be taken in the common good.
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*Would a society in which no one gave a damn about the*
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*common good, be such a bad place to live?*
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Such a society would not put the butcher, the baker, or
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the farmer out of business. We all must count on other
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people, but the best way to make sure that someone does what
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we want them to do is to return the favor by performing for
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them what they perceive to be an equal favor. That's what
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the free market is all about.
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If you really think about it, we already live in a
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society in which every individual is really looking out for
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their own self interest. It's just that we've allowed too
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many people to glibly lie that they were supporting the
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common good when all they are really interested in is their
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own selfish rewards. They lie about their love for the
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common good because they want to take advantage of our
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gullibility to get what they want out of the system. That
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includes every person who now holds political office and
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every person who is trying to get elected. Throwing the
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current bunch out and replacing them is not going to solve
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the problem.
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But what about the voter's paradox? How do we solve
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that problem?
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Why bother? If we give up the idea that people should
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sacrifice for the common good, we take away most of the
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justification for the politician. In a free society, voting
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shouldn't count for much. If people take full responsibility
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for their own lives, that leaves nothing for politicians to
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do. It's only when we allow the politician to make us slaves
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of the common good that we have to worry about whom we elect.
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+---------------------------------------------------------------+
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| THE CHAOS ADVOCATE is copyrighted by Mack Tanner. You |
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|
| may review and read sections of this electronic publication |
|
|
| to determine whether or not you would like to read the entire |
|
|
| work. If you decide to read the entire magazine, or if you |
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|
| keep a copy of the magazine in the unpacked, readable format |
|
|
| for your own personal use or review for more than two days |
|
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| must pay a SHARELIT fee by mailing $2.00 to |
|
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| |
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|
| Mack Tanner |
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|
| 1234 Nearing Rd. |
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| Moscow, ID 83843 |
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| |
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|
| If you want a receipt, include a self-addressed and |
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| stamped envelope. |
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+---------------------------------------------------------------+
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