105 lines
6.1 KiB
Standard ML
105 lines
6.1 KiB
Standard ML
Copyright 1983
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NPG,Ltd.
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NUCLEAR PROTECTION
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ISSUE: Does it make sense to invest in extensive civil defense measures in a
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time of nuclear capability? (1) Yes. Millions of lives can be saved in event
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of a nuclear attack. That is worth spending some money on. Or, (2) No. The
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percentage of lives saved in a nuclear attack and the horror and health damage
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survivors face afterwards are not worth the kind of investments required. More
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important, making these investments misleads the public and officials about the
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prospects of surviving at all.
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BACKGROUND: A year ago, in the Fall of 1982, the Reagan administration asked
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Congress for $4.3 billion for civil defense in this country. Spread over seven
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years, the funds would be spent to develop plans and facilities to help
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minimize the consequences of a nuclear attack on the civilian population.
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Estimates of probable civilian survival after a nuclear attack vary. The
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chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Vessey, testified in April
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1983: "If we rode out the attack, probably 30 percent would survive today."
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General Vessey said that the percentage would decline in coming years, as the
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accuracy and power of Soviet missiles increases. Though criticized for
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implementing a new notion of "winning" a nuclear war, officials of the Reagan
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administration have argued that their position is similiar to that first
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announced by President Nixon (a policy reportedly described in National
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Security Decision Memorandum 242, signed in January 1974). According to press
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reports, President Carter issued a further amplification that was labeled
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Presidential Decision Number 59. These documents are all classified, so their
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actual contents would be impossible to verify. However, in May 1973 Defense
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Secretary Weinberger's five-year guidance to the military services was leaked
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to, and published by, the Washington Post and other papers. In that document
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Mr. Weinberger reportedly said: "Should deterrence fail and strategic nuclear
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war with the U.S.S.R occur, the United States must prevail and be able to force
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the Soviet Union to seek earliest termination of hostilities on terms favorable
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to the United States."
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POINT: Civil defense measures are simple common sense. Nuclear war would be
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horrible, but why make it even more so by neglecting to prepare protective
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measures? As the Soviets become more beligerant and the world power balance
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becomes unstable -- as happens every so often -- a prudent country would
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prepare. If our surveillance systems warn us that the Soviet Union is shifting
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its civilian population away from the central cities -- which would indicate
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that country is preparing for an exchange of nuclear weapons -- we must be able
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to respond in kind. Otherwise the Soviets can use our own civilian population
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as hostage. The anti-nuclear forces have taken the horror of nuclear war and
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blown it completely out of proportion. We know quite a bit about nuclear
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effects, and we know that there are definite measures we can take -- now --
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which will significantly reduce these effects. We all know that a nuclear war
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would be terrible, but if we allow ourselves to become traumatized to the point
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of not even thinking about it, and if we do nothing to reduce the possible
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problem, we are being very irresponsible. Indeed, if this kind of
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"reality-avoidance" gets too strong, it will actually increase the potential
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for war; the Soviets will see it as an irresistable opportunity.
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COUNTERPOINT: The whole civil defense concept is outmoded and a waste of
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taxpayer money. But of far more importance, development of a massive civil
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defense program will tend to encourage government officials to continue to be
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even more beligerant with their Soviet counterparts. If the program is large
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enough, and highly publicized, the public may be -- falsely -- led to believe
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that nuclear war is not that bad after all. The civil defense program is so
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silly it would be laughable if it were not so serious. One part has the entire
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populations of major metropolitan areas departing en mass for the hinterlands.
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The traffic problem alone would be almost incomprehensible. But this doesn't
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seem to bother the administration -- its officials just say, in effect, "have
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faith because we will have it all figured out by the time we need it." Beyond
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creating unprecedented waste, the kind of massive civil defense program sought
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by the Administration has the potential -- in the not too distant future -- of
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turning the country into a police state overnight. All we have to have is some
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international tension -- either real, imagined or conjured -- and the military
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and their civil defense civilian counterparts will take charge. Of course, it
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will be "for our own good."
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QUESTIONS:
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o Is it worthwhile to invest lots of money for measures to protect the small
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portion of the populace which is expected to survive, say 30% or less?
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o If we learn the Soviet Union is actively shifting its civilian populations
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away from presumed targets, what should we do?
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o Do you think that civil defense precautions actually encourage government
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officials to become more bold in their relations with the Soviet Union? Do you
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think the same way about the Soviet Union's government officials?
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o What would happen to our economy if we had a civil defense plan, and it was
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accidentally triggered, causing a mass evacuation of the country's major
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cities?
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REFERENCES:
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o Administration's Nuclear War Policy Stance Still Murky,
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Michael Getler, The Washington Post, November 10, 1982, p.A22
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o Joint Chiefs Back Plan for 100 MX's, Michael Getler, The
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Washington Post, April 22, 1983
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o McNamara hits protracted nuclear war, George Archibald,
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The Washington Times, March 1, 1983
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o Thinking About National Security, Harold Brown, Westview
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Press, 1983
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o The Wizards of Armageddon, Fred Kaplan, Simon & Schuster,
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1983
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(Note: Please leave your thoughts -- message or uploaded comments -- on this
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issue on Tom Mack's RBBS, The Second Ring --- (703) 759-5049. Please address
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them to Terry Steichen of New Perspectives Group, Ltd.)
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