76 lines
3.8 KiB
Plaintext
76 lines
3.8 KiB
Plaintext
FLASH: Vice President Gore Questions Current Key Escrow Policy
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Date: 10 Feb 1994 23:40:13 GMT
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National Information Infrastructure Advisory Committee met today in
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Washington at the Old Executive Office Building. In comments made after
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a question and answer period, Vice President Al Gore said that key
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escrow policy announced last Friday (2/4/94) had serious flaws and that
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he hope the issue of who holds the keys and under what terms would be
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given more serious, careful consideration.
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Gore made it clear that some amount of control of cryptography technology
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was necessary for national security. However, the key escrow policies
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announced by the Departments of Justice, Commerce & State, and the NSA,
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were "low level decisions" that got out before thorough analysis. In a
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conversation with Mitchell Kapor, Esther Dyson, and Mike Nelson (of the
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White House Staff), Gore said that he would prefer that the keys be held
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by some part of the Judiciary branch, or perhaps even by trusted, private
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escrow agents. He made it clear that he believed that the escrow agents
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named in last Friday's announcement (National Institute of Standards &
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Technology and the Treasure Department) were no appropriate key holders.
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Mike Nelson also indicated that there was real interest in a
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software-based escrow system instead of the hardware-based SKIPJACK
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standard
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Those of us who heard Gore were quite surprised. His remarks suggest
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that the key escrow policies to date do not have full support of the
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White House.
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Still, Gore was quite firm in asserting that some control of encryption
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technology is essential to national security. "Encryption and
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codebreaking have determined the outcome of world wars. He stated
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(incorrectly) that most our industrialized allies place must stricter
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controls in encryption that the US does. In fact, almost all COCOM
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countries allow the export of DES-based products, though some do not
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allow DES to be imported.
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The whole question of encryption was raised when Mitchell Kapor told the
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Vice President that over half of the Advisory Council members had serious
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reservations about the current Clipper/Skipjack policies. Gore and Kapor
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agreed that the Advisory Council should be used to have a serious
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dialogue about encryption policy. Given Gore's departure from the
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current Clipper proposals, there might actually be something to talk
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about.
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==========
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NOTE: This DOES NOT mean that Clipper is going away. Part of stopping
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Clipper is to lift export controls on encryption and enable US companies
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to start producing products that enable all of us to protect our privacy
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with strong encryption.
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I urge you to write to Rep. Cantwell today at cantwell@eff.org. In the
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Subject header of your message, type "I support HR 3627." In the body of
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your message, express your reasons for supporting the bill. EFF will
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deliver printouts of all letters to Rep. Cantwell. With a strong showing
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of support from the Net community, Rep. Cantwell can tell her colleagues
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on Capitol Hill that encryption is not only an industry concern, but also
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a grassroots issue. *Again: remember to put "I support HR 3627" in your
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Subject header.*
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P.S. If you want additional information about the Cantwell bill, send
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e-mail to cantwell-info@eff.org. To join EFF, write membership@eff.org.
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For introductory info about EFF, send any message to info@eff.org.
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The text of the Cantwell bill can be found on the Internet with the any of
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the following URLs (Universal Resource Locaters):
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ftp://ftp.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Legislation/cantwell.bill
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http://www.eff.org/ftp/EFF/Policy/Legislation/cantwell.bill
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gopher://gopher.eff.org/00/EFF/legislation/cantwell.bill
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Danny Weitzner Senior Staff Counsel, EFF
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+1 202 347-5400
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*** Become a member of EFF!!! Write to membership@eff.org ***
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