2710 lines
145 KiB
Plaintext
2710 lines
145 KiB
Plaintext
HEARING OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
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AND HUMAN RIGHTS SUBCOMMITTEE
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OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
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SUBJECT: US ANTI-TERRORISM POLICY
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CHAIRED BY: REP. TOM LANTOS (D-CA)
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WITNESSES:
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TIM WIRTH, COUNSELOR, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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HARRY BRANDON III, DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, FBI
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RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ROOM 2172
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TUESDAY, JULY 13, 1993
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REP. LANTOS: (Sounds gavel) The Subcommittee on International
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Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights will please come to
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order.
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Today we are holding our third hearing on US anti-terrorism and
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counter-terrorism policy. And our two distinguished witnesses are the
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Honorable Tim Wirth, counsellor at the Department of State, and Mr. Harry
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Brandon III, assistant director in the Intlligence Division of the FBI.
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We are very pleased to have both of you, gentlemen.
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In 1992 there were 361 terrorist attacks, the lowest number since
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1975. Americans continue to be the top targets of terrorism: some 40
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percent of terrorist attacks were directed at United States citizens or
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United States property. There have been some spectacular terrorist attacks
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in recent months, and there have been some spectacular successes in
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preventing terrorist attacks in the recent past.
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Nevertheless, the American people for the first time in a decade have
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recognized that terrorism has come to the United States. There is a great
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deal of concern both about the World Trade Center outrage and the attempted
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assassination of members of Congress, attacks on important facilities in
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New York City and elsewhere. We have also seen a very well-coordinated
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series of attacks by Kurdish terrorists against Turkish facilities some --
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in some 29 cities across Western Europe.
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We are also very much concerned that in a number of instances where
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the fact of terrorism is beyond any doubt, such as the Pan Am bombing which
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took place three and a half years ago, nothing basically has happened to
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bring the perpetrators to justice. Sanctions have been in effect
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concerning Syria for well over a year with little or no visible effect.
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Qadhafi has clearly decided he will not turn over the two suspects in the
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Pan Am 103 bombing. And it's clear that some of our allies -- perhaps the
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French in particular -- will never agree to an oil embargo within the
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highly politicized context of the UN. And the time has arrived when we
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need to look at dealing with punishing terrorists no longer on a
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multilateral basis.
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I would like to commend the FBI for its extraordinary success both in
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arresting people in the World Trade Center outrage and in preventing what
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are reported to be potentially very serious terrorist plans in New York
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City and elsewhere.
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But there is a great deal of concern, as both of you gentlemen know, in the
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country about lack of coordination among our various agencies. There is a
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great deal of discussion, and we have held some hearings and we'll have one
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next week about how various individuals inciting to terrorism obtain entry
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into the United States. And clearly, as a free and open society we are
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just feeling our way in this very new and complex and dangerous arena.
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There is concern about the continuing failure to place a number of
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countries on the list of states that are supporting terrorism. Cuba, Iran,
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Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria are designated as states currently
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sponsoring terrorism. But many of my colleagues are intrigued as to why
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the Sudan is not on the list when the Sudan is clearly engaged in
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sponsoring terrorism and acts as a surrogate for Iran in many cases, and
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there are questions with respect to the placement of Pakistan on the
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terrorism list. We would like both of you gentlemen to address these
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issues.
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Before I ask you to make your opening statements, I'm very pleased to
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call on the ranking Republican member of the full committee, who has been
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engaged in the subject of fighting terrorism for many years, Congressman
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Gilman of New York.
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REP. BENJAMIN GILMAN (R-NY): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to
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commend you for arranging this timely hearing on US anti-terrorism policy.
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It's something we must address squarely and promptly. And I'm particularly
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pleased to welcome our disinguished former colleague, Tim Wirth, in his
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new role as counselor to the State Department. And as a point man for
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global affairs, his portfolio now includes terrorism, but in this area I
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must say the administration to date has been out to lunch. Those arrested
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in the World Trade Center bombing and the plan to attack the UN
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headquarters and other targets in Manhattan are followers of Sheik Omar
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Abdel Rahman. He entered the country through a string of errors and
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failures that suggest that Abbot and Costello may have been in charge of
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our visas. Their equipment is obsolete. No one is assigned to make sure
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that visa applicants are properly screened. The left hand, apparently,
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doesn't know what the right hand is doing and, apparently, didn't seem to
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care.
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Legislation I've co-sponsored will fix many of these problems, but the
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State Department says it will take more than a year just to modernize the
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visa screening system. This is more than an abstract issue for me. Many
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of my constituents work in Manhattan. One of them died in the World Trade
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Center bombing. More could easily have been victims if the FBI had not
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smashed the latest conspiracy.
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Mr. Counselor, I don't want any more of my constituents blown up in
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New York any more than my colleagues want. For that matter, I don't want
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any more Americans at risk of terrorist attacks anywhere in our country.
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I'd like to read to you a letter I've just received in the mail, and the
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text goes as follows: "As an American born and living in New York City for
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38 years and now in Rockland County for 30 years, I no longer feel safe in
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this country. The latest incident of foreign terrorists in New York City
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has made me realize you must institute legislation that changes completely
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our immigration laws. We cannot continue to allow these people into our
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country. The laws are wrong. We've allowed our US to become a dumping
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ground for hoodlums, terrorists, and people who are not interested in any
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good. They merely wish to destroy the US. I demand changes be made, and
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tomorrow will not be too soon."
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And I would venture to say that that's probably a feeling that's
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rampant amongst many of our constituents.
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I've spoken a number of times about this with administration
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officials, and Secretary Christopher says it will be fixed. And I realize
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that you are just coming onto the scene and we can't put the blame on your
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shoulders, but all we have been hearing about is talk and no action, no
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sense of urgency. The fence that should be keeping out terrorists has been
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riddled with holes. And I don't think we can wait more than a year, and I
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say it should be fixed now.
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So, today, I'm introducing legislation calling on the Secretary to
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submit to the Congress within 60 days following the enactment of that
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legislation an emergency plan to straighten out this mess in both the short
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and long term. Counselor Wirth, you and Secretary Christopher are going to
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have to work together to personally drain this swamp, or it won't happen.
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And we in the Congress will certainly do what we can to work with you to be
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of whatever assistance we can. The safety of all Americans here at home
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demands no less.
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Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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REP. LANTOS: Thank you very much, Congressman Gilman.
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Let me say before turning to my colleague from Nebraska that, with the
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possible exception of the flood in the middle of our country, there really
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ought to be no subject less open to partisanship than the subject of anti-
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terrorism and counterterrorism. And for the sake of accuracy, I would like
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to correct my good friend's statements as to who has been out to lunch.
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Sheik Rahman entered the United States under two presidents, President
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Reagan and President Bush. I do not blame either President Reagan or
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President Bush for the entry of Sheik Rahman into this country, but I think
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it's utterly unacceptable to blame an administration that took office on
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January 20th for the entry of the sheik that took place during the 1980s,
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and I believe that my friend and colleague will want to make that
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correction. If Abbott and Costello were in charge, Abbott and Costello had
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different party affiliations than the one implied by my good friend.
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REP. GILMAN: If the gentleman will yield, I think --
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REP. LANTOS: I'll be happy to yield.
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REP. GILMAN: I think the focus of our attention is on the system and
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not who's to blame in the past, but let's find the holes in the system and
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correct it and not wait a year to do it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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REP. LANTOS: That was precisely my point. The holes are in the
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system, and the system failed during the two previous administrations. And
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I think it is unfair and palpably inaccurate to blame this administration
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for those failures. And I think my friend understands this just as clearly
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as I do.
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Congress Bereuter.
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REP. DOUG BEREUTER (R-NE): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I
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want to commend you for holding these hearings and say to our distinguished
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former -- to welcome all the witnesses, but to say to our distinguished
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former colleague in the House, Tim Wirth, welcome, a sincere warm welcome
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back to you. You had a great and very distinguished career here in the
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House and the Senate. And you have big sets of diverse responsibilities in
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the State Department, and we wish you well. Hope to work constructively
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and positively with you as you approach your responsibilities there for the
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country.
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This, as many people know, is the third in a series of hearings on
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terrorism convened by the chairman.
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I recall when we had the first hearing of this series in March. At that
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time, Judge William Webster made the point that the United States is not an
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easy target for terrorists. Yet our sieve-like borders, I would say, and
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our openness to foreign visitors and our lifestyle makes us very vulnerable
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to those terrorist attacks.
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The recent arrests of the terrorist cell in New York City, caught in
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the very act of creating a bomb, provides vivid proof of the extraordinary
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job done by the relevant US agencies. As a rule, the public is not aware
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of the efforts of our law enforcement agencies in this area. They tend to
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do their job as they should, attracting little public attention. It's only
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when something dramatic, as in the case of the arrest of the would-be
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bomber terrorists, that our counterterrorism efforts become clear. But
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there have in recent years been a number of equally impressive
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counterterrorist operations that have not received public attention.
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Still, no one can be totally secure from the terrorist threat.
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Recently, Chairman Lantos and I were part of a US congressional
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delegation that met with members of the European parliament. At that
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meeting, British and Spanish parliamentarians spoke with great passion and
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great sadness about the destruction that terrorism has brought to their
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respective countries. And they gave us some very graphic examples that I,
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for reasons of security, are not going to -- that I'm not going to
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reiterate here, about the changes that would be necessary in our society in
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order to cope with what they're facing today in London, for example. They
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spoke about the ability of the IRA and the Basque guerrillas to bring the
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country to a standstill, either by exploding a random bomb or by phoning in
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a phony bomb threat. They warned that if terrorists gain a serious
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foothold in the United States, the kinds of disruption caused by the World
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Trade Center bombing will become all too commonplace.
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While Americans, thus far, have been relatively effective in combating
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terrorism state-side, it is important to note that US tourists and US
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property throughout the world continue to be prime targets for terrorist
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organizations. Our counterterrorist organizations and efforts are only as
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effective as the intelligence we receive, our ability to work with our
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friends and our allies, and the ability of our people to correctly
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interpret and respond to the information we receive. Serving now as a
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member of the Select Committee on Intelligence, I have some appreciation of
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the job that our intelligence and counterterrorist forces perform. I hope
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my colleagues will remember that as we take up the authorization and
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appropriation for the intelligence community.
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It's a thankless task that they pursue oftentimes with no public
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attention for all their successes. It is, however, these people doing
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their jobs correctly that causes us to have some successes that no one ever
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knows about. If there's a lapse, of course, they'll be subject to
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microscopic examination.
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There are a great many proposals designed to enhance the effectiveness
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of our counterterrorism efforts. I know my distinguished Republican leader
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on the full committee, Mr. Gilman, has a strong interest in preserving the
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organizational structure of the Counterterrorism Bureau in the State
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Department. And Mr. Gilman, I think, has been focusing on this subject of
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counterterrorism longer than any member of the House.
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I would say to our witnesses and my colleagues that I have a
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particular concern regarding the abuse of US political asylum laws that
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have, in some instances, permitted would-be terrorists to operate freely in
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the United States. For example, the person who killed the CIA employees
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while they were driving to work, Mr. Kansi, had claimed political asylum on
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what turned out to be a patently fraudulent basis. One of the Sudanese
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recently arrested, he was here claiming political asylum. We know, of
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course, that the blind Sheik made claims for political asylum and that has
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presented great difficulty in dealing with him for that and for other
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reasons.
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My own view is that some form of summary exclusion of patently
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fraudulent political asylum claims is absolutely essential. We have 18,000
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cases pending in New York City alone today -- no hope that those people
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will ever show up for those hearings, they'll just fade into the fabric of
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American society. And I do not blame the executive branch for that
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problem; the blame belongs squarely on the Congress of the United States.
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The INS is pleading for summary exclusion authority, and yet our judiciary
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committees will not address this issue. So that is one particular concern
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that I want to make known here today, and hope that my colleagues here, and
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the public listening to any proceedings, will cause some action to be
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taken.
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Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. It's quite
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timely. And I look forward to hearing from our distinguished witnesses.
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REP. LANTOS: Thank you very much, Congressman Bereuter. Let me just
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mention -- my colleagues know -- just a short while ago, we held a
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confidential closed hearing on Sheik Rahman and the series of events that
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led to his repeated entry into the United States. Next week, on Thursday,
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this subcommittee will hold an
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open hearing on that entire issue, and while obviously we can discuss that
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matter fully today, we have set aside an entire hearing for that purpose.
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I would also like to associate myself with the comments of my friend
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from Nebraska concerning summary exclusion. I think the time is long past
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that the United States can expose itself to terrorist threats by misguided
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policies in this field of political asylum and related matters. Probably
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no member of this body has done more to point to state sponsored terrorism
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in the former Yugoslavia than my good friend from Indiana, and I'm happy to
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call on Congressman McCloskey.
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REP. MCCLOSKEY: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. No questions or
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statements.
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REP. LANTOS: Secretary Wirth, we're delighted to hear from you.
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Oh, I'm sorry. Congresswoman Snowe? (Pause.) Won't you at least
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welcome our distinguished guest? (Laughter.)
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Okay, Secretary Wirth.
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SEC. WIRTH: Mr. Chairman, I'm delighted to be here with my
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colleagues, and want to begin by thanking you and the committee for holding
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these hearings. As a new member of the executive branch, I can assure you
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that the preparation for a hearing does cause a good deal of focus and
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coordination, exactly the kinds of things that you all have been talking
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about, and so I just want to assure how constructive we believe these
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hearing are and how helpful they are in helping to pull together data
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downtown.
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Also, we greatly appreciate and respect the bipartisan or non-partisan
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approach that you and Congressman Gilman have taken to this, both this year
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and in the past. We greatly appreciate it. That's precisely the way that
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we have to approach this. As you pointed out in your opening statement,
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probably no issue is less partisan -- perhaps only the flood issue. So let
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me just draw a little bit more out on the metaphor that you raised related
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to the floods and the problems that we have there.
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During flood conditions, if you don't repair the levees and keep them
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constructed, if you don't have a roof that works, you're going to get wet
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and run into significant problems. The parallel to that are the
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information systems that the State Department has had. And unfortunately,
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looking back on this, we have not kept the levees repaired and kept the
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roof repaired. We have not kept the information systems up, and this has
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been in fact a major, major problem. We are dealing with, as you have
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heard in previous testimony and will hear next week, extraordinarily
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antiquated information systems in an area that is not rocket science any
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more. I mean, all of us deal with information systems, for example, in our
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own personal lives with credit cards and credit checks. There are very
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broad computer systems that allow us with great ease to check on millions
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and millions -- tens of millions of Americans, and yet we have such an
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antiquated system that dealing with 2-1/2 million people who are on the
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various lists around the world, we can't keep track of them.
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We have, as you know, made requests to the Congress in the coming
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appropriations, requesting funds to sharply update this. As pointed out,
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it does take time to put in these new systems, but we really appreciate the
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support that we've gotten from the Congress in helping us to repair the
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levees, so to speak, to put in the new systems that are absolutely
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imperative so that we at least have the information necessary at all of our
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consular offices spread around the world to do a better job, to catch
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individuals before that water or those thugs seep into the country. So we
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appreciate that, and I just wanted to carry out your metaphor as a start,
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because I think it is an appropriate way of beginning.
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The past several months have brought more than their share of dramatic
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terrorist-related events. Even since the department's last testimony in
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this issue before your committee in March, we've seen Iraq's attempt to
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kill former President Bush, the arrests of suspect planning to blow up the
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UN headquarters and other facilities in New York City, coordinated
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incidents by Kurds in European cities, the burning of a Turkish hotel with
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the loss of 40 lives, and continuing violence by groups such as the PIRA
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(?) in the United Kingdom and the ETA in Spain.
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This spate of domestic and international terrorist attacks has raised
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terrorist concerns in many countries. More directly, the World Trade
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Center bombing and the threat of attacks against the United Nations
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headquarters, against tunnels leading to New York, and against Senator
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D'Amato personally, have brought the terrorist threat home to us in the
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United States,
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a point so clearly made in Congressman Gilman's opening -- opening
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statement.
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Naturally, these developments cannot help but make us wonder about
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what may happen next. As a government and people, we also have to consider
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what else can be done against the terrorist threat. How best can we
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protect our society without generating a sense of panic that may well
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further the terrorists' goals of disrupting and sapping confidence in our
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institutions?
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The terrorist threat will not go away. It takes too many forms.
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There are too many potential criminals seeking publicity for their views,
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and their weapons are often rudimentary and widely available. This should
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not, however, be cause for despair. There are steps we and other
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governments can take together to counter the threat posed by terrorists,
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steps that we are taking, and steps that we are augmenting week by week.
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I look forward to discussing the administration's counterterrorism
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policies and programs with you today, and I would suggest that perhaps we
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might first examine emerging trends in terrorism and our strategies to
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combat those threats, and then discuss areas in which the essential
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partnership between the Congress and the executive branch to counter
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terrorism can be strengthened.
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In 1992, as you pointed out in your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman,
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there were a total of 361 acts of international terrorism, the lowest level
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in 17 years. Through May of this year, our preliminary figures show that
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there have been 115 incidents of international terrorism as compared to 144
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for the similar period in 1992. These statistics are subject to revision
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and do not include the spate of anti-Turkish incidents undertaken by the
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Kurdish Workers' Party in late June. Casualties of terrorism increased
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dramatically, however, because of the number of persons injured in the
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World Trade Center bombing. That number will go up approximately a
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thousand people injured, as Congressman Gilman again pointed in his
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remarks.
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American citizens and property remain the principal targets of
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terrorists throughout the world. Nearly 40 percent of last year's
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incidents were directed at US targets, US individuals, US institutions, US
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firms. We expect that trend to continue this -- this year and into the
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future. The US influence in economic, cultural, political, and military
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terms is so much greater than any other nation that we inevitably represent
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a high profile target to terrorists around the world.
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Regrettably, while the number of overall terrorist incidents is down,
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the first six months of 1993 have seen a surge in terrorist spectaculars.
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Terrorists, as we all know, seek publicity. Those behind the World Trade
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Center bombing, Iraq's attempt to kill former President Bush, and the
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recent and chilling coordinated wave of Kurdish attacks across Europe
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sought the headline. We condemn such heinous acts and the result of
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violence against innocent people.
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Making accurate predictions about future trends in terrorism is, of
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course, difficult. Terrorism is often cyclical in nature. As old passions
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and groups fade, often we see new factors, new groups, new causes emerge to
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produce deadly terrorist attack. Addressing where terrorism will come from
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in the future is difficult, and experts disagree. But there is little
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dispute that we will be dealing terrorists and their crimes for years to
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come.
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Terrorism at its most basic is an attempt to change through violence
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and intimidation the practices and policies of people and governments. We
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are not going to yield to this. To do so only encourages future terrorism.
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The Clinton administration is committed to exerting strong and steady
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leadership in a rapidly-changing world. History has taught us the United
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States and all nations can meet that challenge by maintaining a commitment
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to democratic institutions and to the rule of law. Promoting democratic
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governments and institutions are full -- that are fully accountable to
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their citizens is our most basic tool for advancing free markets and our
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long-term national security, and addressing the great and complex global
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issues of our time.
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|
|
Democracy does not sponsor terrorism. It is no accident that states
|
|
that do -- Iraq, Iran, Libya, Cuba -- are also among the most repressive
|
|
for their own citizens.
|
|
|
|
Mr. Chairman, let me assure you the that Clinton administration
|
|
will remain vigilant in countering whatever threats may be posed by
|
|
international terrorists to US interests. Working in close consultation
|
|
with the Congress, successive administrations have developed a set of
|
|
principles which continue to guide us as we counter the threat posed by
|
|
terrorists. These include making no concessions to terrorists, continuing
|
|
to apply increasing pressure to state sponsors of terrorism, forcefully
|
|
applying the rule of law to international terrorists, and helping other
|
|
governments improve their capabilities to counter the threats posed by
|
|
international terrorists.
|
|
|
|
Countering terrorism is, of course, more than a matter of policies.
|
|
It's the effective day-to-day implementation of these policies that is so
|
|
important. The Clinton administration is committed to an effective and
|
|
interagency approach to combatting terrorism. Every day, officials at
|
|
State, Justice, Defense, the CIA and FBI cooperate closely in an ongoing
|
|
effort against the threats posed by international terrorists. Indicative
|
|
of these close working relationships is the presence here today of the good
|
|
witness from the FBI, Mr. Harry Brandon. We clearly recognize that
|
|
countering the threat of terrorism does not consist solely of applying the
|
|
rule of law or bringing intelligence or diplomacy to bear on the problem or
|
|
resorting to military might. Instead, our approach is and will be an
|
|
interagency one. This ensures that all of our efforts are coordinated and
|
|
bring to bear the best capability of our government and its people as we
|
|
jointly deal with that threat.
|
|
|
|
The post-Cold War international environment is simultaneously less and
|
|
more hospitable for terrorists. Terrorists no longer enjoy safe haven or
|
|
receive support in Eastern Europe. Moscow has reduced the flow of arms to
|
|
several of the six nations -- Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea and
|
|
Syria -- that we identify as state sponsors of terrorism. At the same
|
|
time, however, state sponsorship of terrorism remains a significant growing
|
|
threat to American interests and nationals. Iran continues to sponsor
|
|
international terrorism, maintains its unacceptable fatwa against Salman
|
|
Rushdie and represents a significant terrorist threat to American
|
|
interests. Iraq, despite the requirements imposed by the United Nations,
|
|
regularly engages in terrorism against UN relief operations and, most
|
|
dramatically, tried to kill former President Bush. Libya refuses to comply
|
|
with the requirements imposed by the UN Security Council in light of its
|
|
clear responsibility for the bombings of Pan Am 103 and UTA 772. Syria
|
|
continues to allow terrorist groups to maintain offices and training sites
|
|
in the territory it controls.
|
|
|
|
As we look toward emerging threats, we must also recognize that long-
|
|
suppressed ethnic- and religious-based conflicts may lead to new violent
|
|
expressions such as we're already seeing in the Balkans. We need to be
|
|
alert to the possible emergence of international terrorism from such ethnic
|
|
conflicts. In the Middle East and North Africa, new and radical groups
|
|
such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the FIS in Algeria have
|
|
emerged in recent years, invoking Islamic ideology but using terrorist
|
|
tactics to advance their extremist agendas. In Egypt, the Islamic group,
|
|
the group with whom Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman is so closely involved, has
|
|
undertaken violent attacks on Egyptian officials, secular intellectuals and
|
|
foreign tourists in an effort to destabilize the Mubarak government. I
|
|
would like to take this opportunity to congratulate Egypt on its forthright
|
|
decision to seek the extradition of the Sheik to stand trial for attacks
|
|
that he inspired while still in Egypt. Tough decisions such as that made
|
|
by Egypt demonstrate the worldwide recognition that applying the rule of
|
|
law is one of the most effective means possible to confront the threat
|
|
posed by terrorism.
|
|
|
|
The misuse of Islamic political rhetoric by these groups should not
|
|
cause us to confuse in our own minds terrorism and Islam. Our problem is
|
|
not, of course, with Islam or the people who practice that religion; it is
|
|
instead with the use of violence and terrorism by any person, regardless of
|
|
religion, national origin or ethnicity. Even with Iran, the most effective
|
|
state sponsor of terrorism, we have made clear that it is unacceptable
|
|
behavior, not the religious nature of the regime, that is the source of our
|
|
concerns. Drawing a distinction between behavior and religion also helps
|
|
defeat the Iranian desire to lead Islamic opinion and draw lines of
|
|
confrontation between Islam and the West.
|
|
|
|
Our counter-terrorism strategy has three key elements: to implement
|
|
our policy of no concessions, to keep pressure on state sponsors, and to
|
|
apply the rule of law. These basic policies have served us well in the
|
|
past and will do so in the future. Our strategy applies equally well to
|
|
groups such as the Abu Nidal organization or a small and unnamed group
|
|
which may come together to undertake only a single attack. Terrorists,
|
|
whether from the Provisional Irish Republican Army, Sendero Luminoso, or a
|
|
more loosely organized group such as the group that appears responsible for
|
|
the World Trade Center bombing, always have had the advantage of being able
|
|
to take the initiative in selecting the timing and choice of targets.
|
|
|
|
It's unfortunately true that terrorists have to be successful or lucky
|
|
only occasionally to gain international attention. That is one reason that
|
|
gathering intelligence is so essential to frustrating the work of
|
|
terrorists. In this regard, the efforts by the FBI to infiltrate the group
|
|
planning to undertake a savage series of attacks in New York will serve as
|
|
a landmark example of the importance of intelligence in interdicting
|
|
terrorist operations. Improving our intelligence capabilities is a major
|
|
part of our response.
|
|
|
|
Another major element of our counter-terrorism policy is a firm
|
|
response. When President Clinton ordered the cruise missile strike against
|
|
the headquarters of Iraq's intelligence service, he delivered a firm,
|
|
proportional and necessary response to the continuing threat against the
|
|
United States posed by Iraq, a shown by the outrageous Iraqi attempt
|
|
against the life of former President Bush. The strike demonstrates that
|
|
the Clinton administration will respond vigorously, decisively and
|
|
effectively to the terrorist threat around the world.
|
|
|
|
Increasingly, governments are willing to join in steps against state
|
|
sponsors of terrorism and the groups they support. An outstanding example
|
|
of international cooperation is the United Nations Security Council
|
|
condemnation of Libya for Pan Am 103 and UTA 772. The passage of landmark
|
|
UN Security Council Resolution 731 and 748 is a significant indication of
|
|
this changed attitude. Until Libya complies fully with the requirements
|
|
imposed by the Security Council, these sanctions will remain in place.
|
|
Indeed, the sanctions may be strengthened if that nation continues to
|
|
refuse to comply with the legitimate conditions imposed by the Security
|
|
Council.
|
|
|
|
Let me assure you that I personally continue to work closely with our
|
|
British and French allies on this issue. I met in Paris just two weeks ago
|
|
with my counterparts from these nations to discuss additional sanctions on
|
|
Libya. All three governments have gone on record that new and tougher
|
|
sanctions should be considered if Libya does not comply with the Council's
|
|
demands. Libya would be well advised not to misjudge our resolve.
|
|
|
|
Mr. Chairman, the State Department has the lead role in dealing with
|
|
international terrorism overseas and does so through an interagency
|
|
coordinating mechanism. The Justice Department has a similar lead role in
|
|
terrorism issues occurring within the United States.
|
|
In confronting international terrorism, we recognize that terrorists do not
|
|
just engage in acts that are purely political. They are criminal acts in
|
|
their -- to their -- there are criminal aspects to their activities.
|
|
Hijacking or bombing an aircraft or planting a bomb in a marketplace is a
|
|
crime no matter what the motivation. Furthermore, some terrorist groups
|
|
which do not enjoy state-sponsorship have tried to develop independent
|
|
means of support. Some groups have resorted to crime, such as bank robbery
|
|
or extortion, while others, particularly in the Andean region, have
|
|
developed close working relationships with drug dealers.
|
|
|
|
When the transition team began to work at the State Department, it was
|
|
struck by the number of small independent offices and bureaus that had been
|
|
established to deal with problems such as narcotics and terrorism. Many of
|
|
these offices enjoyed direct access to the Secretary or part of a complex
|
|
and ineffective management structure. One step toward rationalizing this
|
|
process was the recommendation that we form a new Bureau for Narcotics,
|
|
Terrorism and Crime. Under the reorganization plan, this new bureau will
|
|
be under my direction as the Undersecretary for Global Affairs. The
|
|
reorganization will ensure that the range of issues associated with
|
|
terrorism, including narcotics and international crime, will have my
|
|
personal attention. I strongly believe that this synergistic approach will
|
|
make our counterterrorism policies and programs more effective,
|
|
particularly in this hemisphere, where a combination of criminal activity,
|
|
narcotics trafficking and terrorism threatens the growth of fragile
|
|
democratic institutions, particularly in Central America and the Andean
|
|
region.
|
|
|
|
I recognize that there have been concerns expressed about the
|
|
reorganization. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to assure you and your colleagues
|
|
that there will be no diminution of the US government's commitment to
|
|
counterterrorism. I can and do bring counterterrorism matters directly to
|
|
the Secretary and to others in the administration. I am and will remain
|
|
available to the Congress on this important issue. And I will continue to
|
|
provide that leadership under the proposed reorganization. Besides
|
|
offering management rationality, this reorganization also offers
|
|
significant benefits by improving coordination in our international efforts
|
|
to train personnel in anti-terrorism and narcotics capabilities, a
|
|
leadership role which we in the United States are increasingly playing
|
|
around the world. In addition, this reorganization allows us to apply the
|
|
lessons learned from one strategy to counter similar problems in another
|
|
type of criminal activity.
|
|
|
|
Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me touch briefly on congressional activity
|
|
that we hope to work with you to pass through the Congress. At the
|
|
beginning of my testimony, I mentioned the need to strengthen further the
|
|
partnership between the Executive and Legislative Branches. There are a
|
|
number of legislative initiatives which need action during this session,
|
|
and I would hope that you and your colleagues could help us in the
|
|
Executive Branch by providing for prompt congressional action on these
|
|
important, yet relatively noncontroversial initiatives. Our
|
|
counterterrorism priorities include the following:
|
|
|
|
The President last month signed documents transmitting to the Congress
|
|
the Convention on the Marketing of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of
|
|
Detection, a new international convention dealing with detecting and
|
|
controlling plastic explosives. After the December 1988 destruction of Pan
|
|
Am 103 by a plastic explosives bomb, the United States and other nations
|
|
agreed to identify chemical marking agents which could be incorporated into
|
|
plastic explosives during the manufacturing stage in order to make these
|
|
explosives detectable. Our aim was to develop an international agreement
|
|
that would help prevent bombings using plastic explosives. As a result,
|
|
this international agreement was completed in Montreal in 1991. It is has
|
|
been signed by the United States and 50 other nations. The administration
|
|
is seeking urgent Senate action on this agreement.
|
|
|
|
We also seek congressional action this year on implementing
|
|
legislation for two important counterterrorism treaties -- the Protocol for
|
|
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
|
|
International Aviation and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
|
|
Attacks Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation. These treaties extend
|
|
the prosecute or extradite principle embodied in previous multilateral
|
|
anti-terrorism treaties to attacks on airports serving civilian aviation
|
|
and to attacks on civilian shipping and off-shore platforms. These
|
|
treaties were prompted in part by the 1985 Rome and Vienna airport attacks
|
|
and by the hijacking of Achille Lauro passenger liner. The Senate gave its
|
|
advice and consent to these international conventions in 1989, but approval
|
|
of the implementing legislation was delayed because it was incorporated
|
|
into the Omnibus Crime Bill. The Clinton administration included the
|
|
counterterrorism legislation in its proposed State Department authorization
|
|
bill for fiscal years 1994-95.
|
|
|
|
I understand that during its mark-up last month, your full committee
|
|
felt it could not act on the treaty legislation and the other
|
|
counterterrorism provisions because of jurisdictional issues with the
|
|
judiciary committee. I hope your committee and perhaps those who also
|
|
serve on Judiciary can be helpful in securing final approval for this
|
|
implementing legislation, the absence of which prevents US accession to
|
|
these important international agreements. Perhaps these can best be dealt
|
|
with in conference.
|
|
|
|
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, before turning to your
|
|
questions, I'd like to emphasize again our commitment to the long-term
|
|
struggle against terrorism. As both President Clinton and Secretary
|
|
Christopher have made clear, the issue of domestic and international
|
|
terrorism is a high priority for this administration. Obviously, there are
|
|
no magic solutions or silver bullets for this problem. Instead, working in
|
|
a close relationship with the Congress, we must and will maintain our
|
|
vigilance, increase and adjust our capabilities, and further development
|
|
cooperation to help ensure the safety of Americans and American interests
|
|
throughout the world. We need and appreciate your continued support, and
|
|
we thank you for your help.
|
|
|
|
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I also want to
|
|
welcome Ms. Barbara Bodeen (sp), who is acting coordinator for
|
|
counterterrorism at the State Department.
|
|
|
|
If it's all right with you, Mr. Brandon, since Secretary Wirth will
|
|
have to leave before noon, we would like to get to questions with him now
|
|
so all of my colleagues will have a full opportunity to question him. Is
|
|
that all right with you, sir?
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: Certainly, Mr. Chairman.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: I appreciate your -- your courtesy.
|
|
|
|
Before beginning the questions, let me express my appreciation to the
|
|
full committee's specialists on terrorism, Ms. Beth Ford, to Ms. Marianne
|
|
Murray (sp), our outstanding summer intern Frank Salufo (sp), the
|
|
Republican staff specialist, Mike Innis (sp), and staff director Dr. Bob
|
|
King and John Mackin (sp) for the preparation of -- of this hearing.
|
|
|
|
Mr. Secretary, you said a great deal that I agree with, but there are
|
|
a number of issues that disturb me and perhaps where the department and at
|
|
least I have differing points of view. So let me begin by focussing on the
|
|
dramatically different reaction we have had to the attempted assassination
|
|
of President Bush and the Pan Am 103 tragedy.
|
|
|
|
President Bush visited Kuwait this spring. And after a thorough
|
|
investigation, and there is no doubt in my mind that the investigation was
|
|
thorough and the evidence is conclusive, President Clinton -- and I'm
|
|
quoting from your testimony -- "ordered the cruise missile strike against
|
|
the headquarters of Iraq's intelligence service. He delivered a firm,
|
|
proportional, and necessary response to the continuing threat against the
|
|
United States posed by Iraq as shown by the outrageous Iraqi attempt
|
|
against the life of former President Bush. The strike demonstrated the
|
|
Clinton administration will respond vigorously, decisively, and effectively
|
|
to the terrorist threat around the world."
|
|
|
|
Well, let me first to clear the record tell you what I said the moment
|
|
I was advised of this attack by -- by our forces, that I fully support the
|
|
President's action. I think it was absolutely necessary. It was firm.
|
|
|
|
And unfortunately, it was proportional. I have grave doubts about the
|
|
proportionality of response to terrorist attacks. This gives the terrorist
|
|
entity the opportunity to determine tit for tat what will take place. And
|
|
I would like to, in the first place, ask you to respond to the wisdom of
|
|
this proportionality issue, and then indicate whether you will take back to
|
|
the secretary and the President the concern that many of us have that the
|
|
proportionality of response is not an effective way of dealing with
|
|
terrorism. Response has to be disproportionate, response has to be so
|
|
punishing and so severe that the terrorist will think twice before
|
|
repeating this attack or similar attacks. But be that as it may, President
|
|
Bush visited Kuwait this spring, and a couple of months later, the United
|
|
States firmly and, in my judgment, appropriately responded.
|
|
|
|
Now there is clearly no doubt about the terrorist attack having been
|
|
perpetrated against Pan Am 103. If my memory serves me right, that outrage
|
|
occurred 3-1/2 years ago -- 3-1/2 years ago. And what the failure of
|
|
response to me indicates is an internationally advertised impotence by the
|
|
civilized world to deal with such an outrage.
|
|
|
|
I was stunned by your prepared testimony, Mr. Secretary, and this is
|
|
what you are saying. Increasingly governments are willing to join in steps
|
|
against state sponsors of terrorism and the groups they support. An
|
|
outstanding example of international cooperation is the United Nations
|
|
Security Council condemnation of Libya for the Pan Am 103 and the UTA 772
|
|
bombings. Well, presumably the two people who have been identified as the
|
|
perpetrators of this outrage which resulted in the death of scores of
|
|
innocent people -- scores of innocent people with their families still
|
|
crying out for justice -- there has been nothing.
|
|
|
|
Two weeks ago, you met in Paris with your counterparts, as you say,
|
|
and you may ratchet up the sanctions. Well, you may ratchet up the
|
|
sanctions if you succeed in persuading them, but that also will result in
|
|
nothing. And I would like to ask you to engage in some introspection on
|
|
the part of this administration in this appallingly double standard in
|
|
responding to international terrorism. When the terrorist attack is aimed
|
|
at a former President, we respond practically instantaneously, as soon as
|
|
we complete the inquiry -- and forcefully. When the terrorist attack
|
|
results in the death of innocent civilians, large numbers of innocents
|
|
civilians, years ago, by a country that we have defined as a state-sponsor
|
|
of terrorism for years under the Reagan, Bush and now the Clinton
|
|
administration, we are still diddling with diplomatic niceties, and there
|
|
is no penalty
|
|
and no punishment. And I, for one, cannot comprehend the totally different
|
|
intensity and speed with which response was forthcoming.
|
|
|
|
Now, I realize that most of this occurred before your tenure. I think
|
|
retaliation should have taken place long before now, certainly under the
|
|
Bush administration. But you have now been in office, this administration
|
|
has been in office now for five, six months, and we are still talking about
|
|
ratcheting up sanctions against Libya. The people have still not been
|
|
extradited. There is still no visible punishment of the perpetrators. And
|
|
I'd be grateful if you'd try to respond.
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: Well thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate
|
|
your question and it is one that on the surface poses a dilemma. But I
|
|
think, looking underneath it, they are two very, very different situations,
|
|
different timing, and two -- as you point, two very different
|
|
administrations.
|
|
|
|
First, focusing on Iraq, it was a carefully considered response by
|
|
this administration. As you know, it was a matter that after the proof
|
|
became clear that this was the group that had attempted the assassination
|
|
of President Bush, after it was clear that that was also a state
|
|
sponsorship of that group and all of the evidence was in, we were very
|
|
careful about working that through and the response was considered. A
|
|
number of options, as you can imagine, were looked at, and the chosen
|
|
option was to operate over the weekend and to go after the headquarters of
|
|
Iraqi intelligence, to do so in a manner that we thought was proportionate
|
|
and we thought would also cause the least loss of innocent civilian life.
|
|
|
|
That was the decision made by this administration to, one, demonstrate
|
|
the fact that we were clearly willing and able and were committed to a fast
|
|
response, but also wanted to do so without killing a number of innocent
|
|
people. We are also in that business of trying to demonstrate that kind of
|
|
humanity regardless of what terrorists might do.
|
|
|
|
Related to the comparison with Pan Am 103 --
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Well, Mr. Secretary, no one is advocating the killing of
|
|
innocent people, so let's get that clear.
|
|
|
|
The question I have is whether the action, which you again
|
|
appropriately describe as proportionate, shows good judgment. Because it
|
|
seems to me, at least, that Saddam Hussein's ability to plan and carry out
|
|
further terrorist attacks may have been slightly impaired but has certainly
|
|
not been eliminated.
|
|
|
|
I very much doubt that this will have any long-term effect on Saddam's
|
|
propensity for terrorism and, as many have indicated, there may be counter-
|
|
retaliation because, clearly, the impact was so minimal. It was minimal.
|
|
We did some damage to one of the many intelligence headquarters. There are
|
|
plenty of other intelligence organizations, there are plenty of other
|
|
military organizations that Saddam has, planning terrorism, supporting
|
|
terrorism, participating in terrorism.
|
|
|
|
So the response, while it may have been effective symbolically, and it
|
|
certainly enjoyed the overwhelming support in the Congress, including mine,
|
|
and that of the American people, it does not answer the question as to why
|
|
the response was not more effective in crippling Saddam's capabilities.
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: Well, Mr. Chairman, again, it was the judgment of the
|
|
administration, looking at all of
|
|
the alternatives that were available, and once it became clear that this
|
|
was an act of attempted state-sponsored terrorism, as to what the response
|
|
ought to be, and the response that was chosen was the one that was
|
|
executed.
|
|
|
|
One can, I'm sure, disagree on what the level of response ought to be.
|
|
As I pointed out, one of the variables in our thinking was what impact this
|
|
would have on, and how we could identify and isolate various targets with a
|
|
minimum loss of the lives of innocent individuals. It was clearly one of
|
|
the variables that we at this point were concerned about.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Speaking of loss of innocent lives, what is your answer
|
|
to the families of the Pan Am victims whose innocent lives were lost 4-1/2
|
|
years ago? Now four years of that period was not under this
|
|
administration, but a half a year has been.
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: Mr. Chairman, we share exactly your exasperation, your
|
|
frustration, and your -- the reaction to the appalling bombing of Pan Am
|
|
103. I have met on a number of occasions with the families of the victims,
|
|
as has Secretary Christopher, as have any number of high-level officials in
|
|
this administration, and they are a remarkable, patient, and persistent
|
|
group of Americans who deserve not only our understanding but our enormous
|
|
admiration.
|
|
|
|
The Pan Am 103 situation, as you pointed out, occurred four-plus years
|
|
ago. The forensics, the tracing of the bomb that blew up Pan Am 103 was
|
|
really quite a remarkable but very time-consuming achievement, as you know.
|
|
Once it was very clear -- which was about two years ago -- once it was very
|
|
clear -- a little more than that -- two years ago, that this -- where the
|
|
bomb had come from, and who had made it, and it was traced back, then the
|
|
previous administration chose the route that they chose to take. And you
|
|
know, I don't want to second guess the decisions made at that point. They
|
|
were made, and that is history.
|
|
|
|
When I said that there was, in my testimony, a quite remarkable coming
|
|
together of nations on this, this is the first time that this had happened,
|
|
Mr. Chairman. Most nations have viewed the issues of terrorism, and --
|
|
like the issue of narcotics as, well, those are American problems. You
|
|
know, we don't have those, those are yours, Uncle Sam, you take care of
|
|
those. Now increasingly, countries are coming to understand that
|
|
terrorism, like narcotics, is resting in their backyards as well, and that
|
|
it is absolutely imperative that we as a community of civilized nations
|
|
under the rule of law attempt to act together forcefully through
|
|
international bodies where appropriate, and the previous administration
|
|
chose to go through the United Nations. The French, the British, and the
|
|
United States got together and led the resolution that passed through the
|
|
Security Council and then passed the United Nations to apply sanctions
|
|
against Libya. Those were economic sanctions.
|
|
|
|
Now Mr. Chairman, to suggest that those have had no impact whatsoever
|
|
I think is perhaps not to give them the credit that they deserve. I think
|
|
if we were to look carefully at the activities of the Libyans since then,
|
|
the Libyans' economy is in significant problems, the Libyans have not, to
|
|
my best knowledge, become active on the world scene as they were before.
|
|
We have, through this set of sanctions, been able to isolate the Libyans
|
|
and been able to demonstrate to them thatthe world was very concerned about
|
|
their activities and --
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Is Libya continuing to be able to sell its oil?
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: Excuse me?
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Is Libya selling oil at the moment?
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: The next step is what sanctions ought to be carried out as
|
|
the next step. Libya's still selling oil. Oil provides about 95 percent
|
|
-- 90 to 95 percent of Libya's foreign exchange and is 25 to 30 percent of
|
|
the Libyan economic base. The United States has been very concerned, as
|
|
you and I have discussed, to -- while the Libyans are hurting as a result
|
|
of the first set of sanctions, we would like in the United States to
|
|
ratchet those sanctions up to a next level, and that's what I was meeting
|
|
with our French and British colleagues about. There is a difference of
|
|
opinion between the allies about what sanctions ought to be undertaken. It
|
|
is our hope --
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Who is opposing placing an oil embargo on Iraq -- on
|
|
Libya?
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: Well, the French have been less enthusiastic about an oil
|
|
embargo than an assets freeze. The British have been less enthusiastic
|
|
about an asset freeze than an embargo on oil or oil equipment. What we are
|
|
attempting to do is to work through a kind of brokerage arrangement so that
|
|
the three of us can be in agreement, and that is, as you probably know, a
|
|
difficult negotiation. But we would like to be able to ratchet up those
|
|
sanctions. We believe that that's the appropriate response by the United
|
|
States of America and by the United Nations.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Mr. Secretary, I believe we have six countries on the
|
|
list of states currently sponsoring terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya,
|
|
North Korea, and Syria. Is that correct?
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Is there any intention on the part of the administration
|
|
to remove any of these six nations from that list?
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: I know of no intent to remove any of those six nations
|
|
from the list, Mr. Chairman.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Is there any intention on the part of this
|
|
administration, Mr. Secretary, to add any countries to this list? And I
|
|
particularly have in mind the possibility of Sudan, which in the view of
|
|
some of us should have been placed on the list a long time ago, and
|
|
possibly Pakistan.
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: The Sudanese situation is currently under review, Mr.
|
|
Chairman. The previous administration had determined that there was not
|
|
evidence of state-sponsored terrorism from Sudan, and that is the
|
|
criteria, is not individual acts of terrorism but state-sponsored
|
|
terrorism. We are reviewing that at the current time and are almost
|
|
completed with our own review of the Sudanese situation.
|
|
|
|
Similarly, ahead of that was a review of Pakistan, and that decision
|
|
will be forthcoming in the next few days.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Speaking of -- of Pakistan, a Pakistani citizen was
|
|
charged with killing two CIA employees earlier this year. Is that correct?
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: I beleve that is correct, Mr. Chairman.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: What degree of cooperation have we received from the
|
|
government of Pakistan in pursuing this matter?
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: We have extensive negotiations and discussions with the
|
|
country of Pakistan, and have made it very clear to them -- they are very
|
|
aware of the fact -- that if the country of Pakistan is placed on the
|
|
terrorism list, that, then, has significant economic repercussions for
|
|
Pakistan and for the relationships between our two countries. And as a
|
|
consequence we have found increasing cooperation from the Pakistanis.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Are you satisfied at the moment, Mr. Secretary, that
|
|
Pakistan is giving us full cooperation in apprehending the killer of two of
|
|
our CIA employees?
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: Yes, Mr. Chairman, the Pakistanis have been very
|
|
forthcoming and cooperative on this. But again, I would point out that the
|
|
procedures established by the Congress and implemented by the State
|
|
Department in terms of listing countries, you know, for state-sponsored,
|
|
and that is in the report that we put out annually, and, you know, is an
|
|
enormously important tool that is available. And countries are absolutely
|
|
aware of the fact that this tool is there and that we're willing to use it.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Now, it's the information of some of us that Sudan is
|
|
acting as a surrogate for Iran. What is the State Department's view of the
|
|
degree of cooperation between Iran and Sudan, both in the field of
|
|
perpetrating state-sponsored terrorism and in other areas?
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: There -- it appears to us, Mr. Chairman, to be a number of
|
|
suggestions that there is that linkage, and we're in the process of
|
|
examining that right now. It is no mystery that the airport in Khartoum is
|
|
a -- is a conduit out of which and into which fly all kinds of contraband,
|
|
whether those are individuals or narcotics activities or others, and we are
|
|
very, very concerned about that. And as I pointed out earlier, we are
|
|
right in the middle of our re-examination of the US position toward --
|
|
toward the government of Sudan.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Now, a number of us in the Congress have been disturbed
|
|
by official US contacts with various terrorist radical Islamic
|
|
organizations that have been involved in violent terrorist acts such as
|
|
Hamas or the Islamic group in Egypt. What did we gain from such contacts,
|
|
Mr. Secretary.
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: (to staff) Do you know what those were?
|
|
|
|
MS. : I have -- (off mike)
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: You'd have to refresh my memory. I can't comment on that.
|
|
I'll do that for the record, Mr. Chairman. I don't know about the -- I --
|
|
I cannot tell you about those specific contacts. Let me review that and
|
|
get back to you, if I might.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: That's -- that's -- that's very good.
|
|
|
|
Congressman Gilman.
|
|
|
|
REP. BENJAMIN A. GILMAN (R-NY): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
|
|
|
|
Mr. Wirth, first let me say that nobody is attempting to put blame on
|
|
your responsibilities in this office, this administration, or prior
|
|
administrations. It's just that all of the prior administrations have left
|
|
something to be desired with regard to the effective approach to
|
|
counterterrorism. And particularly now with what's happened in the last
|
|
few months, a greater amount of emphasis is due with regard to finding some
|
|
more effective ways of dealing with this.
|
|
|
|
Now, our enforcement people tell us that the most important part of
|
|
their prevention program is to get intelligence, to be able to spotlight
|
|
groups and persons who are intent on doing harm to our nation. And that's
|
|
why we've concentrated most recently in trying to close the loopholes on
|
|
our immigration areas and trying to make certain that we provide the kind
|
|
of information that's needed at our ports of entry with regard to potential
|
|
terrorists and criminals. And I know that we can't talk about the
|
|
specifics of the recent IG report on the visa to Sheik Rahman at this point
|
|
until it's finally -- the confidentiality is removed.
|
|
However, that report at the end of June pointed out some very serious flaws
|
|
in the visa system and in trying to keep terrorists out of our nation,
|
|
serious flaws which we knew about, which your office knows about. So tell
|
|
us, what is the Department, and your office particularly, charged with the
|
|
anti-terrorism portfolio, doing now and immediately to try to close these
|
|
gaping holes in our ow house of defenses against terrorism?
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: Well, I think, Mr. Gilman, your initial description of
|
|
Abbot and Costello is probably pretty accurate. In the situation of the
|
|
blind sheik getting into the country, in exploring that I came to a very
|
|
simple conclusion. Everything that could have gone wrong did, and it
|
|
happened over a significant period of time. Fundamental to this is, as we
|
|
discussed earlier, an information system. We have a tendency in our
|
|
government to neglect the basic bricks and mortar, to neglect the basic
|
|
foundation, to neglect the processes that make government work. I mean, I
|
|
can tell you, going to the State Department after being in the Congress,
|
|
the State Department makes the Congress look like a Swiss watch. And I
|
|
know that may come as a surprise because you and I were probably frustrated
|
|
in the same way, but it's remarkable. The computer system in the --
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Let the record show it's not an expensive Swiss watch;
|
|
it's an inexpensive Swiss watch. (Laughter.)
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: I'll leave the -- I'll leave that unattended, Mr.
|
|
Chairman.
|
|
|
|
But just to give you an example, the computer system in the State
|
|
Department was installed in the late 1970s. The computer system at OMB
|
|
effectively doesn't exist, and the same thing happened in the White House.
|
|
I mean, how you can get along with a telephone system surrounding the
|
|
President that is effectively the same kind of plug-in the telephones that
|
|
we all saw on "Saturday Night Live" 25 years ago -- you know, it is as much
|
|
a joke looking at this, but it's a tragedy, as well. You know, the State
|
|
Department itself just internally simply does not have the capability to do
|
|
the job that it's being asked to do in this simple matter of processing
|
|
information.
|
|
|
|
And we can't do this in our own backyard, and we certainly can't do it
|
|
around the world. We have consular posts, hundreds and hundreds of
|
|
consular offices around the world that are not linked together with any
|
|
kind of an information system. I mean, as I pointed out earlier, the
|
|
easiest parallel to think about is our own credit ratings. If you move
|
|
from New York to Colorado to California to Nebraska, you can have
|
|
information on Gilman or Wirth or Lantos or Bereuter within a matter of
|
|
minutes, and that information is very thorough, very complete, and very
|
|
simple to obtain with the technology of 1993. That does not exist in the
|
|
State Department.
|
|
|
|
The State Department Consular Affairs operation is still heavily
|
|
dependent on an old microfiche operation which is enormously awkward to
|
|
work, which is extremely old-fashioned, takes a great deal of time, and is
|
|
not capable of taking the spelling -- a transliteration of an Arab name to
|
|
English and looking at all of the permutations of that kind of a name. You
|
|
just can't do it. The consular office in Khartoum, the consular office in
|
|
Cairo both were dependent upon that old microfiche system. We are, as you
|
|
know and as you have helped us to do, trying to rapidly put new technology
|
|
in so that, in effect, our consular system can operate as a credit system
|
|
does in the United States. And again, that parallel is an easy one to come
|
|
to understand. So that's one problem that exists.
|
|
|
|
We have come to the Congress and asked for funds to do this. The
|
|
Congress has committed so far through the appropriations process most of
|
|
the money to do this, and it's essential that we do it. It's the kind of
|
|
very small investment that pays off enormously.
|
|
|
|
MR. GILMAN: Counselor Wirth, how long will it take us to attack the
|
|
priority areas, the areas where there is the most danger of having
|
|
terrorists come to our nation from those areas? What are we doing to
|
|
prioritize that kind of a reform of their systems?
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: The current operation is upgrading in particular those
|
|
consular offices and embassies through which the greatest number of
|
|
individuals come. And so, therefore, we're talking about the largest
|
|
embassies in the world are the ones that are being upgraded first, because
|
|
they are the ones where you get the greatest return and have the greatest
|
|
need for that kind of upgrade.
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: Is that underway at the present time?
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: That is currently under -- that is current underway. We
|
|
are also requesting funds for the much smaller posts, of which we have a
|
|
large number, and unfortunately, included in those, you know, is the post
|
|
in Khartoum, are a whole variety of new embassies in the former Soviet
|
|
Union, other areas around the world that, from our perspective, are a very
|
|
high priority. But until we have the funds to do it, we won't be able to.
|
|
It won't happen until the next year.
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: We're ready to help you out in any way we can to close
|
|
up those problems. In --
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: Well, we appreciate that, and I think we are in complete
|
|
agreement with your sort of Abbott and Costello description earlier.
|
|
Dealing with this with a technology that's effectively 30 years old made it
|
|
extremely difficult for consular officers to do the job that they're
|
|
trained to do.
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: Well, I welcome your thrust. In 1991 --
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: Thank you, Mr. Gilman.
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: -- Counselor Wirth, the State Department stopped
|
|
checking the FBI criminal record histories of visa applicants. That
|
|
occurred, we've been advised, because of an interagency dispute with the
|
|
FBI over whether or not the State Department would have to pay a fee for
|
|
those checks on possible known criminals. Can you tell us when the State
|
|
Department will get back into the FBI criminal record system so that we can
|
|
get some sense of their government agencies working together to try to
|
|
thwart terrorists and other criminal elements from getting visas to travel
|
|
to our nation and that threatens our very safety? And if you need to pay
|
|
the FBI a little more, we can try to negotiate a treaty with them.
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: Mr. Gilman, the -- during the late 1980s and early 1990s,
|
|
in the Congress we were all fascinated with user charges, and one of the
|
|
mandates for user fees came from the Congress that user fees be charged by
|
|
the FBI, and so, therefore, the State Department was required by law to pay
|
|
user fees to the FBI for gaining access to their information. I have been
|
|
-- met with the attorney general, Ms. Reno, no more than two weeks ago, and
|
|
we are putting together a long list of areas where we believe the State
|
|
Department and the Justice Department have got to increase and better
|
|
coordinate our activities. She has been absolutely terrific on this, and I
|
|
will defer to Mr. Brandon on this, but the -- I will say her first question
|
|
of me was, "What do you need from us?" One of our first responses is,
|
|
"Lower prices for access to your data."
|
|
|
|
Let me ask Mr. Brandon if he might want to comment on this, if I
|
|
could.
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: I welcome that.
|
|
|
|
Mr. Brandon?
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: This was mandated. The user fee was mandated. We
|
|
didn't think it was a very good idea. We don't think it's a very good idea
|
|
today.
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: Could you move the mike? Could you move the mike a
|
|
little closer, please?
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: Yes, sir. These fees were mandated. We didn't think it
|
|
was a very good idea at the time. We don't think it's a very good idea
|
|
today, because it can, unfortunately, restrict the flow of information.
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: Well, what are we talking about? How much are we
|
|
talking about to provide this kind of information to the State Department?
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: I'm not aware of the exact fee. I tend to think it's in
|
|
the record of $6 or $7 a record check. I'm not sure of the accuracy of
|
|
that fee.
|
|
|
|
BARBARA BODINE (Acting Coordinator, Office of Counterterrorism):
|
|
Probably somewhere in that neighborhood, and when you get into the
|
|
thousands of --
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: Well --
|
|
|
|
MS. BODINE: -- when you get into the thousands of record-check names,
|
|
you start getting into some serious money.
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: Could you move that mike a little closer, too? It's
|
|
hard to hear --
|
|
|
|
MR. BODINE: Sorry.
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: Mr. Chairman, this is Barbara Bodine, who is acting
|
|
coordinator of the Office of Counterterrorism.
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: Yes. Could you repeat that response?
|
|
|
|
MS. BODINE: I'd just say that, even though the individual fee may
|
|
only be about $5 a name, when you think of the thousands of names that we
|
|
will often run through, it can be quite a burden on our consular affairs
|
|
budget.
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: It's a bit embarrassing for us as members of Congress to
|
|
have to go out to the public and say, "Well, you know, we have trouble in
|
|
finding out who these terrorists are because we can't pay the subscription
|
|
fee to the FBI to get that information to where it should go.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Would the gentleman yield?
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: I'd be pleased to yield.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Has either the Department of State or the Department of
|
|
Justice requested Congress to have this fee waived?
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: Mr. Chairman, we are working with the Senate on a whole
|
|
package of activities. When the legislation came through in the House of
|
|
Representatives, you -- we were recently arrived and had not got our whole
|
|
perspective together. We have a whole package related to this and other
|
|
activities for the legislation currently going through the Senate.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Mr. Brandon, has the Department of Justice requested
|
|
that this fee be waived?
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: I'm not certain of that answer, sir.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Well, I think both departments have a responsibility of
|
|
advising the Congress how they think this could be better worked. I think
|
|
we find it absurd that we have a World Trade Center bombing with a damage
|
|
of --
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN (?): $600 billion, Mr. Chairman.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Of over $600 million, and we are --
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN (?): Billion.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: And we are haggling over $5 fees for finding out FBI
|
|
information. I think this is an absurdity which needs to come to an end,
|
|
and it needs to come to an end without delay. I mean, the FBI will either
|
|
stop charging you, or we will give you the money so you can pay them, but
|
|
this absurd lack of cooperation cannot continue.
|
|
|
|
I thank my friend for yielding.
|
|
|
|
REP. BEREUTER (?): Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman --
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: I'd be pleased to yield to the gentleman.
|
|
|
|
REP. BEREUTER (?): You know, I could see where a user fee to outside
|
|
agencies -- not agencies, but outside individuals might be appropriate, but
|
|
not between government agencies. But the FBI now provides for all of the
|
|
banks. Every individual that goes to work for a bank there's an FBI check
|
|
run on them and it costs $42 per check. And I'm wondering if in some of
|
|
the fees that you charge outside people because you have to set up a
|
|
department for doing that and personnel and equipment and everything else,
|
|
that somewhere in those -- that fee structure is included enough for the
|
|
operation of that division or department to cover the cost of their
|
|
interagency -- I'm not sure that when the government -- when the Congress
|
|
passed that that you were talking about, Mr. Wirth, that they were thinking
|
|
so much about interagency as they were from outside sources because I know
|
|
at the time they were thinking primarily about the number of employees that
|
|
were being screened by the FBI for banks.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: (Off mike) -- do you want to comment?
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: Just to say that we have attempted on the cost of this to
|
|
pass it through to the applicants, of course, as much as possible, but it
|
|
does create an awkwardness in the situation, but I think it would be --
|
|
it's fair to point out, Mr. Gilman, that the fee issue is not the key issue
|
|
in this. I mean, it's a troublesome, troublesome noise in the background.
|
|
|
|
More important is the fact that we have an information system that is
|
|
so obsolete that it can't be used efficiently and effectively, and that
|
|
once we have the new information system and have fed into that information
|
|
the 2-1/2 million -- 2-1/2 to 3 million names that are currently on various
|
|
watch lists, both in the -- of the State Department and the FBI, that this
|
|
problem will be alleviated very significantly.
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: Well, of course, it's more than troublesome, Counselor
|
|
Wirth. If -- here's one agency within the government, the FBI, that has
|
|
the information we need, but isn't passing it over to State Department
|
|
because State felt it was too expensive at one time. And yet, here we have
|
|
a $600 million property damage and the cost of lives in the World Trade
|
|
Center, some 200 lives in the Pan Am loss of life.
|
|
It's abominable that we don't have a transfer of intelligence and
|
|
information based upon cost. Does the CIA charge your agency for providing
|
|
information to you, or to the White House? And does the FBI charge the
|
|
White House for information? I think it's high time we correct this
|
|
abominable situation, and I would hope that we could get to that
|
|
immediately. And, of course, the Congress, as the chairman has indicated,
|
|
is willing to take a look at any statutory need in revising this system.
|
|
I'd welcome any comment.
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: I mean, I -- again, we will be in the -- looking at the
|
|
possibility of this in terms of the Senate legislation, which will be the
|
|
companion bill to the bill that's already gone through the House. Again, I
|
|
would say, Mr. Gilman, that while this has been awkward and not as easy as
|
|
-- as possible and somewhat expensive, this has not been a fundamental
|
|
problem. I think our system includes all of the information from the FBI.
|
|
I think that there is -- I was just checking with Mr. Brandon. I do not
|
|
know of situations where we have been limited in our access to information.
|
|
It's more difficult to get, it's more expensive to get, but we've gotten it
|
|
all.
|
|
|
|
There's been very good cooperation with the FBI. Their information is
|
|
in our system, our information system and theirs, you know, can work
|
|
together. It's just that they are not as easily compatible as modern
|
|
systems would be. And let me again go back to the fact that the basic,
|
|
fundamental reform and streamlining of our information system is the key to
|
|
this.
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: Well, I understand -- I understood that in 1991 State
|
|
stopped checking with the FBI because of the user fee problem. Has that
|
|
now been eliminated?
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MR. BRANDON: (Aside to Wirth) (Off mike) -- but it didn't stop.
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: Mr. Brandon's telling me that there was a momentary
|
|
slowdown in 1991, but it did not -- it did not stop and it's now back --
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: So we're back on -- back on track --
|
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|
|
MR. WIRTH: -- it's now back where it used to be.
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: -- despite the user fee.
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: Yes.
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: Thank you.
|
|
|
|
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Congressman McCloskey.
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|
|
REP. FRANK MCCLOSKEY (D-IN): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
|
|
commend you for holding these hearings. They are most helpful and
|
|
educational. Very good to see Mr. Wirth again.
|
|
|
|
Tim, as we talked before, I do -- I truly am in awe, and I'm not
|
|
envious at all of the complexity and difficulty of your jurisdiction. I
|
|
wish you well. But I think the -- the difficulty and the scope of your
|
|
issues are as -- probably as large -- about as large as anyone's in the --
|
|
in the -- in the federal government that have to be accountable in any
|
|
particular way. So I guess I -- I might -- I might weave a question or a
|
|
concern together that brings quite basically two of your major areas
|
|
together: terrorism and refugees.
|
|
|
|
I was almost awesomely saddened by a report about ten days ago in the
|
|
New York Times interviewing a 20-year-old Sarajevan Bosnian soldier who
|
|
said quite matter-of-factly -- and he was not -- he was not dramaticizing
|
|
(sic) or exaggerating -- he said "I am a member of a lost generation." In
|
|
essence, as we all know, the whole world has walked out on young Sarajevans
|
|
and -- and young Bosnians. What can we say to them? Most interest -- most
|
|
interestingly, he said if somehow he lives through this, he -- he plans to
|
|
be a -- a terrorist.
|
|
|
|
Mr. Chairman, to me, the Bosnian Sarajevo situation, Bosnia and --
|
|
Bosnia overall, Sarajevo specifically right now is the biggest pressure
|
|
cooker for the present and the future generating terrorism that we can
|
|
possibly imagine. And in the -- in the meantime, as you know, the -- the
|
|
partition plan goes on, the -- Lord -- Lord Owen and whatever in essence
|
|
telling the Bosnians with a gun to their head "Take this or leave it". We
|
|
see in the last four or five days the word coming from Owen and others
|
|
that, indeed, the -- the UN could be out within a matter of weeks both
|
|
militarily. And, as far as refugee aid resources, UNHCR is -- is talking
|
|
about getting out. There -- there's fuel trucks, as you know, Tim, that
|
|
would help generate the water now stranded at the Sarajevo airport. All
|
|
our -- all our resources, all our governments, all our -- all our words
|
|
somehow cannot -- cannot keep these people from
|
|
dying from thirst and being most malevolently slaughtered as they're lining
|
|
up for water. I guess on a positive note, I guess I'd like to ask you is
|
|
there any hope? Maybe more objectively, is there any slaughter, is there
|
|
any abomination, is there any travesty, is there any genocide that would
|
|
generate the administration to break from the fold and to generate the
|
|
leadership on this issue and stop this slaughter?
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: Well, Mr. McCloskey, you describe the situation, I think,
|
|
very accurately, and it is an enormous tragedy. We are building to a time
|
|
of a real watershed moment, I think, in the history of Sarajevo. There are
|
|
currently, in terms of my portfolio, responsibility for the humanitarian
|
|
side of this -- we have got two problems. One is one of access, as you
|
|
point out. The siege of Sarajevo goes on. The airport in Sarajevo --
|
|
there is six miles from town, approximately, as you point out, a good deal
|
|
of activity, and I think were the siege to be broken, if, in fact, that
|
|
happened in some way, then we would see the flowing into Sarajevo of
|
|
supplies not only from countries but from PVOs and NGOs from all over the
|
|
world, both from the West and from the countries -- Islamic countries.
|
|
|
|
Do we have the funds to do that? The United States -- people have
|
|
said we're not doing anything. The taxpayers of the United States, the
|
|
citizens of the United States have been extraordinarily generous. It
|
|
should be point out that in the last year, citizens of the United States
|
|
have spent approximately $340 million in humanitarian aid to Bosnia alone,
|
|
$95 million in the last month alone. I regret to say that the
|
|
contributions from our allies have not kept pace with what they had done
|
|
last year or with what we expect of them. Ambassador Zimmerman, whom you
|
|
know, Warren Zimmerman, who was our last ambassador to Yugoslavia, has been
|
|
appointed by Secretary Christopher as his special envoy, recently was in
|
|
the capitals of Europe talking to every one of the European governments
|
|
asking them to up their contribution, will be meeting with Mrs. Ogata in
|
|
Geneva at a specially-called UNHCR meeting this Friday, and we are hoping
|
|
that we can increase that pressure, Mr. McCloskey.
|
|
|
|
REP. MCCLOSKEY: Tim, I was in Zagreb talking to President Tudjman
|
|
about two weeks ago, and while there had a chance to drop by the UNPROFOR
|
|
headquarters. General Gudreau (sp), the second in command in the Balkan
|
|
region there, basically said that the one thing that could generate
|
|
concerted Western action would be the total slaughter and dismantling of
|
|
Sarajevo. I was heartened that he said that, but quite frankly, I was
|
|
skeptical and a little bit disbelieving at the time. I mean, can you tell
|
|
me any thought? Is there any thinking or any policy in the administration
|
|
that would not allow that? I mean, they're starving, an endangered people,
|
|
probably worse in Gorazde. But are we going to allow 350,000 people to be
|
|
slaughtered in Sarajevo, to be starved, shot, without water for days at a
|
|
time?
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: Well, just two responses to that. Of course, the
|
|
political-military options are under constant review, as you know. On the
|
|
humanitarian side, we are doing everything we can to increase the
|
|
contributions coming from sources, political, governmental sources and
|
|
nongovernmental sources, but that, as you know, is extremely difficult as
|
|
long as the siege of Sarajevo goes on. Without access, no matter how many
|
|
supplies we have, it doesn't do any good.
|
|
|
|
MR. MCCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. Wirth.
|
|
|
|
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Thank you very much.
|
|
|
|
Congressman Bereuter?
|
|
|
|
REP. DOUG BEREUTER (R-NE): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
|
|
|
|
Mr. Wirth, you are sitting down there and the recipient of some
|
|
expressed frustrations on the part of members of the House.
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: They're not shared by any of us in the State Department, I
|
|
can assure you, Mr. Bereuter.
|
|
|
|
REP. BEREUTER: I'm sure they are. And they are not aimed at you
|
|
personally, as I'm sure you understand. You, as a former member of the
|
|
House, know that members of the House are in better contact with the
|
|
American people routinely, every weekend, in the course of the week, than
|
|
any other segment of this society. We're in much better contact day to day
|
|
than the people who cover the Congress and national events. We're in much
|
|
better contact than the people that are in the bureaucracies with the
|
|
American attitude and opinion, and that level of frustration, pent up for
|
|
some number of years, is coming forth here.
|
|
|
|
Let me tell you, going back to the comments about the strike against
|
|
the intelligence service building in Iraq, that I agree with Chairman
|
|
Lantos that the response must be overwhelming. That's the kind of
|
|
statement, that's the kind of action that Saddam Hussein understands. It's
|
|
the only one he respects. And I disapprove very much of this constant use
|
|
of the term "proportionality." I see no proportionality in what happened
|
|
there. I see indisputably the Iraqi government attempting to assassinate
|
|
President Bush, and we respond by knocking out a building, damaging a
|
|
building. A former president; a building. And I look at that building,
|
|
multi-winged building, six stories high, reinforced steel and concrete, and
|
|
I wondered why wasn't that taken out in the war. Well, it was. It's been
|
|
built since the war, along with the palaces that we destroyed. They've
|
|
been built in a larger and grander scale ever. And we take great pains to
|
|
avoid any loss of life within the building by going for a weekend.
|
|
|
|
Now, do I have a better idea? Yes, I've got a better idea. We take
|
|
on the weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that are being
|
|
constructed in Iraq, and we take on the weapons of mass destruction that
|
|
are being built and rebuilt and the facilities for them in Libya. We not
|
|
only send a direct and telling message to them,
|
|
but we try to keep that kind of -- those kind of weapons of mass
|
|
destruction, the means of delivery, from reaching the operations stage that
|
|
they can be used against us and against the neighbors of those countries.
|
|
That's the kind of proportional response I think that is understood. We
|
|
looked weak, and it was a weak response.
|
|
|
|
Mr. Wirth, I -- Counselor, I do hope that you will have a chance to
|
|
try to impress once again, if you haven't already, on our Judiciary
|
|
Committee the kind of actions that they need to take over there. I am
|
|
quite concerned, if we have an incident of mass terrorism which involves
|
|
illegal aliens or people here under political asylum, there will be a kind
|
|
of a xenophobia -- already falling on fertile ground, already seeing the
|
|
signs of it in this country -- that will bring us the kind of actions that
|
|
we won't want to see in the United States. So it is important that we take
|
|
these actions to avoid that kind of xenophobia in this country.
|
|
|
|
And I just think it's quite important that you add the weight of the
|
|
administration to the plea for action from our Judiciary Committees so that
|
|
the personnel that we have in the INS and the various law enforcement
|
|
agencies have the tools that they need. I think it's important, and you
|
|
would understand this, that we listen to the people who are on the front
|
|
lines and we don't let it get filtered through a permanent bureaucracy in
|
|
some of the agencies that are accustomed to doing things one way and not
|
|
down there at Dulles Airport, not down there at JFK, not there off the
|
|
coast of California. Those are the people who we ought to listen to, I'd
|
|
say.
|
|
|
|
Can you tell me if you've had, in conclusion, any kind of opportunity
|
|
at this point to appear before a Judiciary Committee or have any of your
|
|
colleagues in State or Treasury had that opportunity?
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: The -- I can tell you I have not personally testified.
|
|
This is -- the issues of asylum and the summary or expeditious exclusion
|
|
are both issues in the Justice Department, and I would refer to Mr. Brandon
|
|
or to other testimony. But I do know that, as we look at making our whole
|
|
system better, we talked earlier about our responsibilities in the
|
|
information system. Our department is strongly in support of the
|
|
expeditious exclusion or the summary exclusion provision that I believe you
|
|
mentioned in your opening comments. The -- that was passed, as you
|
|
remember, last year by the Congress and was part of the omnibus crime bill
|
|
that ultimately got vetoed. And that is currently being reviewed by an
|
|
interagency working group in this administration. So is the reforming and
|
|
streamlining of our asylum system, which requires major changes of law.
|
|
|
|
And I think you're absolutely correct. In all of my contacts, less
|
|
intense than they used to be, I think the bond between citizens and their
|
|
government not only is from citizens a sense of the military security or
|
|
the defense that's given to them, but also a sense that their borders are
|
|
secure and they're not being overwhelmed. And I think that, you know, we
|
|
see in California and in Texas and Florida in particular a sense of
|
|
institutions just being overwhelmed and the system not being able to
|
|
respond to that. This administration is extremely sensitive to and aware
|
|
of that. And President Clinton himself has spoken to that on a number of
|
|
occasions.
|
|
|
|
REP. BEREUTER: Counselor Wirth, I want to just say in conclusion that
|
|
I am impressed with the incredible array of responsibilities that you have,
|
|
but I believe you have the right kind of experience, the right intent and
|
|
the right integrity to pursue it successfully. So I wish you well on that
|
|
effort.
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: Well, I thank you very much, Mr. Bereuter, and I -- it's a
|
|
great pleasure to be back here. When I earlier in response to Mr.
|
|
McCloskey's last comment about frustration, reflecting out my own and I
|
|
think yours as well -- you know, there are so many things you'd like to
|
|
have done immediately, and you know, my frustration comes from that it
|
|
doesn't happen as fast as you'd like it to. But, you know, I think that we
|
|
are making some significant progress. At least I hope so.
|
|
|
|
REP. BEREUTER: Thank you.
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: Thank you.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Thank you very much.
|
|
|
|
Congressman Martinez?
|
|
|
|
REP. MATTHEW MARTINEZ (D-CA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I guess, like
|
|
my colleagues, I think that it -- well, maybe I have a slightly different
|
|
view in retaliation for the attempted assassination of George Bush. Where
|
|
maybe a building wasn't sufficient, I think timing and everything else
|
|
wasn't what it should have been in response to that. But I'm not too sure
|
|
that we want to go out and declare war against Iraq. Of course, we might
|
|
do that. We did that with Grenada without declaring war, wiped out a
|
|
government there. Went into Panama and pulled a government leader out of
|
|
Panama. So I guess we can do just about anything we want, unless we're
|
|
going to abide by our membership in the UN, and then I think we are limited
|
|
in what our response would be. So I'm not sure I want to, at this time,
|
|
say that the adequate response would have been declare war on Iraq. But it
|
|
almost sounds that some of my colleagues' statements border on that.
|
|
|
|
But what I'm more interested in is, you know, you talked earlier about
|
|
how easy it was for someone -- an undesirable or someone who's been
|
|
affiliated with terrorism or a known terrorist -- to get into the country
|
|
because of the checks and everything else. And I'm wondering, more
|
|
importantly -- well, it's not more importantly. It's important to stop
|
|
them before they ever get in here, because we have seemed to allow people
|
|
to come when a lot of different -- in a lot of different ways: visas,
|
|
visitors visas and everything else.
|
|
|
|
And, you know, the average person that's coming from one of these
|
|
countries, we make it so difficult for them to get in to visit a loved one
|
|
or to even come to a funeral of a loved one here. I've had countless
|
|
number of cases in my district office arguing with the State Department and
|
|
the embassies in the other countries of allowing people to come. I
|
|
remember one where the young man wanted to come to visit his mother because
|
|
she was desperately ill, and the State Department said, "Well, she's
|
|
desperately ill, and if death is imminent as you suggest, why don't you
|
|
just wait until she dies and come to the funeral?" Smart. She did die,
|
|
and then they told him, "Well, it's too late. She's dead. Why do you want
|
|
to come and visit now?"
|
|
|
|
You know, I can't understand the State Department's mentality in some
|
|
cases like that and their other mentality when they make it not as
|
|
difficult as possible for people who are, to my own personal opinion,
|
|
undesirable in this country who would cause these problems, but more than
|
|
that, after they're here and we discover who they are, the process for
|
|
getting them out. You know, I think it takes too long. I think there's
|
|
too many appeals that they make. We give them the same system of justice
|
|
that every American citizen has, and they're not American citizens. And
|
|
they came here for dubious reasons, to commit foul play against us.
|
|
|
|
So have you or the administration or the State Department thought
|
|
about submitting legislation to us to try to correct the way to get these
|
|
people out as quickly as we can or, if they have already committed a crime,
|
|
bring them to trial as possible and take appropriate action against them?
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: Well, Mr. Martinez, first, the answer to that is yes.
|
|
First, we are respectful, as the Congress is, of the balance between civil
|
|
liberties and the respect for individual rights which is at the
|
|
fundamentals of the United States of America and everything that we've
|
|
stood for. You know, that basis, as the earlier part of your statement
|
|
reflects, is absolutely imperative for us to continue to respect.
|
|
|
|
Understanding that framework, we are -- right now there is a very
|
|
high-priority interagency working group looking at the reform and
|
|
streamlining of our asylum system in particular and also the -- what we
|
|
used to call summary exclusion. I think it's now called expeditious
|
|
exclusion. But we are looking at attempting to get that legislation back
|
|
and passed as it was the Congress last year. Although part of the omnibus
|
|
crime bill which was vetoed, that did not become law, and we would like to
|
|
move that back up to the Congress, I believe, after the current review as
|
|
rapidly as possible.
|
|
|
|
REP. MARTINEZ: I think it's long overdue. Let me ask you on another
|
|
subject -- terrorism. I was, a while back -- I can't remember how long ago
|
|
-- in Israel, and it was kind of a lunch conversation with one of the
|
|
Israelis who had been briefing us on terrorism. And his comment was that
|
|
they are so much more advanced in their intelligent -- intelligence against
|
|
communist -- against terrorism than we are in this country
|
|
because they have had years and years of training agents to infiltrate and
|
|
et cetera. And I asked him at the time was there -- and I guess at that
|
|
time there was not -- an exchange of information with the appropriate
|
|
agencies here in the United States, and his answer was no, and I'm
|
|
wondering, has that changed? Is there --
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: We have very good -- we have very, very good contacts with
|
|
Israeli intelligence as -- no, I'm very surprised to hear that.
|
|
|
|
REP. MARTINEZ: Well, it's been a couple of years ago, but maybe that
|
|
-- at that time -- evidently --
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: What we have with them is very --
|
|
|
|
REP. MARTINEZ: -- to him there was not the kind of cooperation there
|
|
should be.
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: We have with them, and increasingly we have contacts and
|
|
cooperation around the world. On Iran alone, the secretary has asked that
|
|
we really highlight the attention given by other countries as we give it to
|
|
Iran to try to lift up people's awareness of Iran as a real center of
|
|
state-sponsored terrorism.
|
|
|
|
It was two weeks ago, the first meeting of this group, Ms. Boudin (sp)
|
|
was there representing the United States of America and really leading our
|
|
efforts to attempt to get everybody's intelligence together and to get
|
|
everybody's awareness increased on this, and we again, exercising the
|
|
leadership we should exercise, are doing that there. So the sharing of
|
|
intelligence is going on on a number of fronts, and we've accelerated that
|
|
in the last four months.
|
|
|
|
REP. MARTINEZ: The retaliation afterwards is probably an appropriate
|
|
response, but you know, trying to stay ahead of them and stop them before
|
|
it actually happens I think is the best way to go, and it's awfully
|
|
difficult. You don't know when they're going to sprout up and where
|
|
they're going to sprout up.
|
|
|
|
That brings to mind -- you were talking earlier about state-sponsored
|
|
terrorism versus, I guess, independent terrorism. Do we have any
|
|
statistics or do we have any knowledge of how much of this is just
|
|
spontaneous in some little group, that they decide, hey, they have a cause
|
|
and they want to make a statement, and they go out and plan and carry out
|
|
some act of terrorism? Or do we have any information, does or intelligence
|
|
information provide us with a definite division, either percentage-wise or
|
|
numbers, between state-sponsored and independent actions?
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: Well, as I pointed out in my -- the start of my testimony,
|
|
Mr. Martinez, on the one hand, our efforts in the overall level of
|
|
terrorism has gone down. We are -- the world is much more attuned to this,
|
|
our cooperation with other countries is much better, our interagency
|
|
cooperation is much better, our intelligence is much better. We've seen
|
|
the overall trend of terrorism decline.
|
|
|
|
While I say that, there are alarming trends on the other side. While
|
|
what we've done in the past seems to be working, we're seeing new phenomena
|
|
growing. One of those is what one would call sort of the self-starter, the
|
|
freelancers, the ones that you refer to which may be a new and growing
|
|
phenomenon. And we've got to be better at that, be more vigilant at that.
|
|
We may have seen -- we don't know yet, but we may have seen that in New
|
|
York, in the World Trade Center or in the other threats targeted on the 4th
|
|
of July. We don't know yet enough about those events to tie them to a
|
|
state or whether those are freelancers.
|
|
|
|
There are some other items that are alarming, and one of those was the
|
|
ability of the PKK to, in 29 different locations around Europe, to stage
|
|
terrorist events on one day. That was a very coordinated and I would say
|
|
impressively coordinated set of events. I mean, that is a major
|
|
undertaking to have that happen in 29 different places. And you know, that
|
|
was to gain attention, that was not a terrorist -- by a terrorist act we
|
|
don't think as the World Trade Center. It was a
|
|
different sort of thing for the purposes of publicity, and that's a
|
|
different kind of a phenomenon that we're seeing. So, it's a little bit
|
|
like Whack-a-Mole. Have you ever been to an amusement park and see that
|
|
game, Whack-a-Mole? You put in a quarter and you have so much time, and
|
|
you have the thing and you're whacking down and the things pop up. You're
|
|
whacking over here and they pop up over here. Well, we have to continue to
|
|
play Whack-a-Mole on this, and there are these new phenomena that are
|
|
coming up. And, you know, your question points out that we have to change,
|
|
be more adaptable and be increasingly vigilant and increasingly well-
|
|
coordinated in taking this on.
|
|
|
|
REP. MARTINEZ: The last statement, well-coordinated, leads me to my
|
|
next question, the last question. It seems to me -- and it only seems to
|
|
me, and I couldn't really state this as a fact, but that there isn't the
|
|
kind of cooperation or coordination between, let's say, the FBI, the State
|
|
Department and Immigration Department. It almost seems much like in the
|
|
old neighborhoods that I lived in there were the gang wars and the turf
|
|
wars, and this is mine and this is yours, and boy, you try to cross over
|
|
and you get into a heck of a battle.
|
|
|
|
Is there -- and if there is, is there a way of extending that so that
|
|
the INS is able to work with the FBI and the State Department identifying
|
|
people that need to be removed from our society?
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: I came at this with the same skepticism that you had. I
|
|
expected when I was first looking at this, coming into this new job, Mr.
|
|
Martinez, to have the kind of fragmentation or non-cooperation or turf
|
|
battles that your question suggests, and I would say I found just the
|
|
opposite. This may have existed 10 years ago, this fragmentation, but
|
|
again, the previous administration set up a much broader, cooperative
|
|
effort between State, the CIA and the FBI, in particular, and that has
|
|
worked remarkably well. I mean, this is a very well-coordinated group that
|
|
works together on a steady basis. They are in touch on a daily basis. And
|
|
I would say that if there were ever an example -- if I've ever seen an
|
|
example of real interagency cooperation, government working the way it
|
|
ought to work, this was a base to me.
|
|
|
|
We are strengthening that. We are building upon that very good base.
|
|
I'll give you some examples of that. I mentioned our increased efforts
|
|
with Justice across the board. We're doing the same thing with the CIA.
|
|
We have a new border security working group that is operating out of the
|
|
counterterrorism office at the State Department. We have a group called
|
|
TREVI (sp) that we're working with, which is a European Community group,
|
|
which the United States is playing an increasing role in. We are working
|
|
with the European Community, as I pointed out, on Iran, trying to say,
|
|
okay, what lessons did we learn about this sort of cooperation, how can we
|
|
help other countries to get this kind of a cooperative effort, how do we
|
|
better share information with them. And the sense of urgency that
|
|
countries feel and that agencies feel is very real, indeed.
|
|
|
|
REP. MARTINEZ: Well, I thank you very much. It's gratifying to hear
|
|
that because there is a sense of urgency among the citizens. They see
|
|
things like the bombing more recently and the destruction in that building,
|
|
the billions of dollars of destruction, and they're concerned. And they
|
|
have no way of knowing just what our government is doing, exactly, and
|
|
you're giving us information like this, we're able to carry it back to our
|
|
constituents. Thank you.
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: Thank you, Mr. Martinez.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Thank you, Mr. Martinez.
|
|
|
|
Congresswoman Snowe.
|
|
|
|
REP. OLYMPIA SNOWE (R-ME): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
|
|
|
|
I want to welcome you, Mr. Wirth, a former colleague here in the
|
|
House. I appreciate your testimony here this morning.
|
|
|
|
Several of the issues that have been brought up here during the
|
|
question period, I have addressed in legislation that I've introduced with
|
|
Congressman Gilman, one that would require that State Department have
|
|
access to the FBI files with respect to the background of individuals and
|
|
criminal activity. The second part of that also would require an update by
|
|
the State Department of the computer system and the updated microfiche
|
|
system that led to the serious bureaucratic bungling that ultimately led to
|
|
the Sheik's admission to the United States. I'll get back to those issues
|
|
in a moment.
|
|
|
|
But in the discussion here this morning with respect to the access by
|
|
the State Department to the FBI files and the surcharge or the user fee
|
|
that is required in order to have access to that information, it seems to
|
|
me to typify the problem in the mindset that we have in this country, or
|
|
perhaps the inability to shift our mindsets from the fact that terrorism
|
|
always occurred abroad and not on domestic territory. And I know that
|
|
that's also going to be difficult, I think, for the various agencies,
|
|
including the State Department, the FBI and the immigration office, to deal
|
|
with this in a cooperative fashion. And I know there is cooperation now,
|
|
as you say.
|
|
|
|
But I think this illustrates the problem. The State Department does
|
|
not get access to FBI information
|
|
because it has to pay a user fee of only about $600,000, which is the
|
|
equivalent of three State Department officials abroad, out of 20,000
|
|
employees out of the State Department. So we're talking about a fraction
|
|
amount of money compared to the overall budget in the State Department.
|
|
|
|
And then, on the other hand, we have the FBI who has defined the fact
|
|
that we're only going to provide this information to law enforcement
|
|
agencies. So, of course, that doesn't include the State Department, rather
|
|
than looking at the overall issue, [which] is that what are we trying to
|
|
achieve here -- which is, of course, to save not only money in this
|
|
country, but to save human lives, and that the ultimate goal was to have
|
|
access to that information so that people are best equipped to make the
|
|
kind of decisions and judgments that do not allow people to come to the
|
|
United States who are dangerous individuals.
|
|
|
|
So we not only have that kind of problem -- which we do have, which in
|
|
my -- in my opinion does represent the kind of problems that I think we
|
|
have now in trying to shift, in trying to do what we need to do, in
|
|
changing the laws, whatever they may require, and that includes immigration
|
|
laws, to -- to address the problems that exist here in this country.
|
|
|
|
There was an article in the New York Times recently talking about this
|
|
very fact, and I think it's -- I think it's very good and it's realistic.
|
|
And in that article, it says America is better equipped to bomb Baghdad
|
|
than to thwart attacks on its own soil. And I think it's true. We have
|
|
yet come -- we have not come to grips with this notion, and it's a
|
|
difficult one to come to grips with. But I think that that problem with
|
|
access to the FBI files is sort of an illustration of the problem that
|
|
we're dealing with.
|
|
|
|
The second part of the issue in terms of admitting the sheik to this
|
|
country, it not only was a failed system in terms of technology and
|
|
updates, but it also was because of human failure. The individual involved
|
|
did not follow through on all the prescribed procedures in looking for that
|
|
information, and the information -- it was in the Cairo system. So it is
|
|
unfortunate that on one hand so that we do have a -- a computer failure in
|
|
terms of the -- not having the up-to-date information, but on the other
|
|
hand we also have the human failure. And my legislation would also include
|
|
the -- the requirement of personal accountability. We do that now with
|
|
ambassadors. And I think that we also should do that with individuals who
|
|
work in these embassies and consulate offices when they fail to do what
|
|
they're supposed to be doing, because this does, unfortunately, translate
|
|
into human tragedy, as we have seen here in the United States and may
|
|
continue to occur, unfortunately. And so I think that we have to sort of
|
|
shift gears here, and I think that that does require as well among the
|
|
agencies in trying to depart from how we've dealt with these issues from
|
|
the past.
|
|
|
|
Now you look at the sheik in terms of deportation and extradition. It
|
|
defies logic to suggest it's taking years. We have been trying to
|
|
extradite him and deport him since 1991, because he was issued a green
|
|
card. While one office in New York City was trying to deport him from --
|
|
in the Immigration office, in New Jersey they were issuing him a green card
|
|
simultaneously. I mean, so we are talking worse than Abbott and Costello
|
|
in my estimation, but the point is that it does defy imagination here that
|
|
it could take so long to deport a known dangerous individual.
|
|
|
|
And so I would hope that all the agencies, including the two that you
|
|
represent here today, will do everything that you can to change the
|
|
immigration laws so that we come back to -- to a situation that is far more
|
|
reasonable than currently exists today. And that's what I would like to
|
|
ask you, Mr. Wirth. Exactly what would you suggest for changes that would
|
|
make this system far more logical and far more -- much -- more safer --
|
|
more safe than it is today for Americans and what we can anticipate for the
|
|
future with respect to terrorist activities committed on American soil?
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: Well, Congresswoman Snowe, we share your sense of urgency
|
|
about this, and I can assure you that that is felt not only in the
|
|
international part of this, but in a -- I felt the same concerns in my
|
|
discussions with the Justice Department, I would say, as I -- I don't know
|
|
if you were here earlier when I met with Ms. Reno. The first thing that
|
|
she says was "What do you want me to do?" I mean, that the same thing:
|
|
"We're here. We'll do whatever you want us to do." It was a very
|
|
forthcoming and terrific discussion.
|
|
|
|
Going through your points, one, I think that the -- we may be barking
|
|
up something of a -- of a blind alley here on the issue of the user fees.
|
|
There really has not been a stoppage of information as a result of this.
|
|
It's awkward, it's more difficult than it ought to be, but it has not
|
|
resulted, as far as I know, in any stoppage of information. But since this
|
|
has come up so intensely, Mr. Chairman, what I'd like to do is to go back
|
|
and have a look at this and maybe give you a formal response to this whole
|
|
question of the user fee and how that has interfered, and so on. I think
|
|
we all ought to really examine that more closely. And let me commit to
|
|
doing that by the end of the month, if I might. I think that would be
|
|
helpful for all of us. If I can't get it by that time and it's more
|
|
complicated, I'll let you know. But let's see if we can resolve this once
|
|
and for all.
|
|
|
|
Second, the information is a significant problem. We've talked about
|
|
that. Perhaps we ought to, Mr. Chairman, be going back to the
|
|
appropriations committee and asking for more money to more rapidly upgrade
|
|
that issue. We are determined to do that within the next year, to have the
|
|
new information system in place, and maybe it should be more rapid than
|
|
that. We thought that this was what the current system could bear.
|
|
|
|
Third, Congresswoman Snowe makes a very good point about human error
|
|
and what goes into the system. I mean, this goes back to what we all
|
|
learned first dealing with computers: garbage in, garbage out. You know,
|
|
if you don't put the right information into the system, you're not going to
|
|
get reasonable information coming out of the system. And we're aware of
|
|
that, and have augmented and increased the communiques going out to our
|
|
embassies and all of our consular offices on this. Their own frustration
|
|
is reflected in having to operate often with an extraordinarily
|
|
understaffed area, with a system that doesn't work very well, but that's no
|
|
excuse for the errors that were made related to the incidents that we've
|
|
been discussing which, again, the Abbott and Costello nature of it -- if
|
|
errors could be made, they were all -- they were all made, and some of that
|
|
was human errors. I would hope that we would not be criminalizing human
|
|
error. I think rather it goes to the point of really much better training,
|
|
and a much better sense of accountability, and a much better leadership in
|
|
each one of our consular offices. And I know that that's currently
|
|
underway by the new assistant secretary for consular affairs.
|
|
|
|
Finally, on the change of immigration laws, this really isn't our
|
|
bailiwick in the State Department, and I would defer to Mr. Brandon's
|
|
questions later. We did -- have made it very clear that we believe that
|
|
reform and streamlining of our asylum system is absolutely imperative. We
|
|
see the problems with that in so many different places whether, you know,
|
|
we're dealing with the Chinese coming in illegally and sitting off the
|
|
coast of Mexico today, to the problems of the blind sheik; the issue of
|
|
summary or expeditious exclusion is another one that has to be taken care
|
|
of right away. On both of those, this administration I know is moving
|
|
rapidly, but I would leave that to Mr. Brandon and to the Justice
|
|
Department since that does fall very specifically into their bailiwick. We
|
|
are supporting their efforts in every way that we can from the State
|
|
Department, providing both testimony, anecdotal evidence, and a push to get
|
|
this to happen.
|
|
|
|
REP. SNOWE: A couple of points -- we did include, you should know, in
|
|
the State Department authorization the requirement that you have access to
|
|
the FBI files and also an update of the computer system --
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: Yes.
|
|
|
|
REP. SNOWE: So that that -- those two issues have been included.
|
|
|
|
Another point is in my legislation that has to go before the Judiciary
|
|
Committee, and I'm in hopes that they will deal -- address this issue this
|
|
year, and that is to go back to the immigration law prior to 1990 whereas
|
|
if somebody was a member of a terrorist organization, they would not be
|
|
allowed to be admitted to the United States.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The law was changed, unfortunately, in 1990 that required greater burden of
|
|
proof upon the United States government to prevent an individual from
|
|
entering the United States. Now you'd have to prove that they were about
|
|
to be personally part of a terrorist activity or were personally part of a
|
|
terrorist activity. So a much greater burden to prevent an individual from
|
|
coming to the United States, and certainly we ought to go back to the 1990
|
|
law. That would certainly have meant that the sheik would not have been
|
|
admissible, although he came in under, as we know, other circumstances.
|
|
But we would not have been able to deny him admission to the United States
|
|
on that basis, even though he was and is a member of a terrorist
|
|
organization.
|
|
|
|
Finally, one other point. You mentioned earlier in your remarks that
|
|
-- that the State Department has access to all of the criminal activity
|
|
files of an individual, crimes committed in the United States. It is my
|
|
understanding the State Department does not have access to such information
|
|
of crimes committed in the United States.
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: I'm not sure that I said that we had access to all the
|
|
criminal files of crimes committed in the United States. We do have access
|
|
to the relevant FBI information, and I do not know of a problem on that,
|
|
but I would ask Mr. Brandon would you like to comment on any of that?
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: There's -- there's not an open interface between the FBI
|
|
and State Department with regard to all criminal files. But upon request
|
|
we furnish them any information we have that's identifiable.
|
|
|
|
When I say "not an open system", it is -- the State Department is not
|
|
designated as a law enforcement agency, so they don't have their own direct
|
|
access. That's the only caveat, though. Any time they make an inquiry, if
|
|
we have the record, they get it.
|
|
|
|
REP. SNOWE: In conjunction with this issue, when I was developing
|
|
this legislation, I came across, I thought, a startling statistic, that
|
|
there was a 45 percent drop in denial of visas for individuals with past
|
|
criminal activities. And I don't know if this has any bearing or any
|
|
relationship, but I -- I certainly -- it's disconcerting, to say the least.
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: Well, again, your sense of urgency is, I can guarantee
|
|
you, reflected both in the State Department and in the Justice Department
|
|
of looking at this whole system. And this again goes fundamenally back to
|
|
the point made by Congressman Bereuter about the absolute imperative to
|
|
assure to our -- all of our constituencies, the citizens of the United
|
|
States, that in fact our government is working effectively to protect them,
|
|
and this is a very, very significant threat which they perceive, which is
|
|
very real, and which we have a responsibility to execute.
|
|
|
|
REP. SNOWE: I appreciate it. Thank you very much -- (inaudible) --
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: Thank you very much.
|
|
|
|
REP. SNOWE: -- thank you.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Thank you very much.
|
|
|
|
I know, Mr. Secretary, you have to leave shortly, but Congressman
|
|
Smith has a couple of --
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: I wanted to wait for Congressman Smith before leaving.
|
|
(Laughter)
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Very good.
|
|
|
|
REP. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH (R-NJ): I appreciate that, Tim.
|
|
|
|
Mr. Chairman, thank you for yielding.
|
|
|
|
Mr. Brandon, I'd like to direct my first question to you. Last March
|
|
24th Mr. Gilman and I wrote Secretary Christopher asking for a full and
|
|
thorough investigation concerning the five fraudulent Nicaraguan passports
|
|
that were found on March 8th at the home of one of the suspects arrested in
|
|
connection with the bombings at the World Trade Center. We received back
|
|
correspondence on April 14th advising us that there would be a full
|
|
investigation by the FBI and by the Department of State's Diplomatic
|
|
Security Service.
|
|
|
|
As you know, as members of this committee know, there have been some
|
|
-- some people convicted in Nicaragua as a result of that -- of fraud. As
|
|
a matter of fact, one of those who was sentenced to six years in prison in
|
|
mid-April, Rodolfo Locao Baretto (sp), has stated that he was scapegoated
|
|
and just a couple of weeks ago was given a stay of his sentence for, quote,
|
|
"health reasons" and apparently is going to be leaving the country very
|
|
shortly. If you could advise the committee as to the status of that
|
|
investigation, because it is very important, I think, as we proceed with
|
|
our bilateral relations with Nicaragua, because even people like Ibarra,
|
|
who made some very substantial allegations -- true or untrue we're not sure
|
|
-- raised some very serious questions, especially when his information,
|
|
perhaps circumstantially, corroborated with some of the other facts of this
|
|
case. If you could respond to that.
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: Well, I -- (off mike) -- going to have to answer this
|
|
way, but those -- there is investigative activity that's on-going. There
|
|
have been some -- there have been federal charges filed in the United
|
|
States involving one individual in connection with those passports. So
|
|
unfortunately I am basically going to have to say that it's not really
|
|
appropriate for me to -- to go into the status of the investigation.
|
|
|
|
REP. SMITH: If it --
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: But it is on-going.
|
|
|
|
REP. SMITH: It is -- hopefully it's aggressive and --
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: Yes, sir.
|
|
|
|
REP. SMITH: -- no doubt, thorough. As soon as this committee,
|
|
whether it be privately or otherwise, could be informed, it would be very,
|
|
very helpful, because it remains --
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: We will -- we certainly will do so.
|
|
|
|
REP. SMITH: I appreciate that.
|
|
|
|
One very brief second question, Mr. Chairman.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Could you -- could you direct whatever questions you
|
|
have to Counsellor Wirth first, Mr. Smith, because he has to leave.
|
|
|
|
REP. SMITH: I have no questions for Mr. Wirth at this time.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Well, then, if -- if I may just intrude for a second,
|
|
Counsellor Wirth, we are all in your debt for a very comprehensive and
|
|
extremely informative testimony. We hope your colleague will be able to
|
|
stay with us for the balance of the hearing, and we look forward to having
|
|
you back again.
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll ask Ms. Bodeen (sp) to
|
|
stay, and I -- again I want to thank you two ways: one, having this kind
|
|
of a hearing does, you know, make agencies focus more clearly than they
|
|
might and to pull things together, and that is a -- that's a very useful
|
|
contribution all by itself; second, I think the dialogue that we have had
|
|
and continue to have, you know, is extremely useful and positive and we
|
|
greatly appreciate the support of you and Congressman Gilman and members of
|
|
the committee. We are deeply indebted. I had met with Secretary
|
|
Christopher related to issues surrounding this hearing, and he wanted me to
|
|
again convey his thanks to both of you, and particularly for your great
|
|
support for the efforts which he's undertaking at the State Department.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Well, we appreciate this very much, and I understand Ms.
|
|
Snowe has a farewell comment to make to you.
|
|
|
|
REP. SMITH: (Off mike) -- quick question. Is the State Department
|
|
and FBI issuing awards to seek these international terrorists?
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: What we are attempting to do is -- we have authority in
|
|
the State Department which the FBI does not have, and what we are
|
|
attempting to do is to rationalize that reward structure so that the FBI
|
|
can use much of the authority that we currently have.
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: That's right. We do have authority -- I'll bring it up
|
|
later if I get the opportunity -- we just don't have the money.
|
|
|
|
REP. : Will the gentlewoman yield?
|
|
|
|
REP. SNOWE: Yes.
|
|
|
|
REP. : Is -- was the dispute resolved that I understand existed
|
|
between the State Department and the FBI on this --
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: Yes.
|
|
|
|
REP. : -- with regards to the World Trade Center as to offering
|
|
rewards for the finding and capture of these perpetrators?
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: There -- there was no dispute. I think --
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: There was no dispute.
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: -- that was probably an erroneous interpretation --
|
|
|
|
REP. SNOWE: As to -- as to whether or not there was enough
|
|
international connections --
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: That's correct. That's correct. It was --
|
|
|
|
REP. SNOWE: So that's -- there's no dispute between --
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: No.
|
|
|
|
REP. SNOWE: -- the agencies on that one.
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: No. No.
|
|
|
|
REP. SNOWE: So the question is one of monetary.
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: From our perspective it is. We -- we got authority in
|
|
1984 to have a reward system which is similar for acts within the United
|
|
States. We've just never been able to get any money to back that up.
|
|
|
|
REP. SNOWE: Doesn't State have a --
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: There's -- their -- their authority is for acts abroad
|
|
or acts specifically that come from abroad.
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: And what we are attempting to do is to broaden that for
|
|
information abroad as well as actions abroad --
|
|
|
|
REP. SNOWE: Yeah. Okay. That's --
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: -- which would help -- that would -- it seems to me, the
|
|
flow --
|
|
|
|
REP. SNOWE: Okay.
|
|
|
|
MR. WIRTH: -- of information and the intelligence and cooperation
|
|
between the two agencies.
|
|
|
|
REP. SNOWE: Thank you.
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: Mr. Chairman, just before Mr. Wirth departs, I would
|
|
like to comment how fortunate you are to have a career diplomat like Ms.
|
|
Bodeen (sp) working with you on counterterrorism who's had so many years of
|
|
experience in that office.
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Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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MR. WIRTH: Thank you very much.
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Thank you, Mr. Chairman -- (inaudible) --
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REP. LANTOS: Thank you very much. We're very pleased to have you.
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If my colleague from New Jersey agrees, we would like to have Mr.
|
|
Brandon make his opening statement, then we will begin the questioning with
|
|
you. Is that all right with you?
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REP. : (Off mike.)
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REP. LANTOS: That's all you have. Then, please go ahead.
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REP. : Mr. Brandon, if you could speak to the issue, and, in
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|
previous years, I think we've all been very gratified by the kind of
|
|
coordination and protection that have been afforded US citizens and those
|
|
visiting major sporting events. And as we all know, the World Cup is
|
|
coming to the United States. My sons and I had the opportunity of joining
|
|
that overflow crowd at RFK recently to see Brazil and England square off in
|
|
an excellent soccer match.
|
|
|
|
Could you speak to the kinds of -- without, obviously, revealing
|
|
anything of -- that could compromise your work -- the kinds of preparations
|
|
that are being made, particularly since this is the truest form -- when we
|
|
talk about the World Series, it's really a US series, when we talk about --
|
|
other than the Olympic games, the World Cup is a truly international event
|
|
-- the kinds of special preparations that are being made to mitigate
|
|
terrorism events.
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: We're very much aware that the World Cup is coming. And
|
|
starting about a 18 months ago, we began meeting with various law
|
|
enforcement services from abroad -- people who've had experience in dealing
|
|
with the World Cup and the tremendous problems that have to date gone along
|
|
with this.
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|
|
|
We've also had four meetings now with law enforcement authorities
|
|
from, in which you've gotten all the US cities who will host these games
|
|
involved. They've come to meetings where we've all come together, along
|
|
with some of the authorities from abroad, so that everybody is sharing the
|
|
same information and so they have the same understanding of what may face
|
|
us. Along with that, we have other government agencies working in the same
|
|
working groups. We're also setting up -- in fact, it's actually operating
|
|
now or partially operating -- an electronic system for movement of
|
|
intelligence information from abroad into the United States and then to be
|
|
funneled out to all of the venues. And this will be done instantly as
|
|
information comes up.
|
|
|
|
We've also worked very closely with the World Cup officials with
|
|
regard to physical security at all of the sites and how they're going to
|
|
handle the various crowd checks -- that sort of thing. I think that we're
|
|
very much involved with that. We hope that it goes off without incident,
|
|
that goes without saying. I think that the systems are in place to give us
|
|
the best chance of having that happen.
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REP. : You do have sufficient resources to get the job done?
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MR. BRANDON: Yes, I believe we do have at this point.
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|
REP. : Thank you very much.
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|
REP. LANTOS: Well, Mr. Brandon, let me first thank you for being so
|
|
patient and understanding. Your prepared statement will be entered in the
|
|
record in its entirety. You may summarize any way you choose, then we'll
|
|
move on to questions.
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: I appreciate that. I think that's probably a very good
|
|
way to proceed, as my prepared statement was probably too long. I'd like
|
|
to --
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Your statement is not too long. (Laughter.)
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|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: I would like to make a few brief remarks, if I might,
|
|
Mr. Chairman.
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|
In 1982, by Executive Order, the FBI was assigned specific lead agency
|
|
responsibility for combating terrorism in the United States. And at the
|
|
same time, the Department of State was given responsibility for combating
|
|
terrorism abroad. We believe we have a two-fold mission. The first and
|
|
primary mission that we have is to prevent acts of terrorism. If we are
|
|
not able to do that, then the secondary mission that we have -- which
|
|
becomes our primary mission, if there is an act of terrorism -- is to
|
|
immediately respond to an act of terrorism using all of our resources.
|
|
|
|
Throughout the 1980s and '90s, the United States has remained a major
|
|
target for international terrorist groups. The Department of State keeps
|
|
these statistics. According to their statistic, the overall number of
|
|
incidents worldwide has decline, however, the United States does continue
|
|
to be clearly the primary target abroad. At the same time, within the
|
|
United States, international terrorism has been very limited. Now, that
|
|
doesn't mean that we haven't suffered in the United States from terrorism,
|
|
because when you combine domestic and international terrorism, we've had,
|
|
since 1982, 166 separate incidents of terrorism in the United States that's
|
|
resulted in 21 deaths, hundreds -- and now with the World Trade Center
|
|
thousands of injuries.
|
|
|
|
And during the same period -- a fact that a lot of people don't know
|
|
about, because maybe we can't talk about it a lot -- the FBI and local law
|
|
enforcement authorities have prevented 74 potential acts of terrorism.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: I'm going to stop you right there --
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|
|
MR. BRANDON: Yes, sir.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: -- Mr. Brandon, because you are making an extremely
|
|
important point. In all of our anti-terrorism efforts, we need the support
|
|
of the American public.
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: Yes, sir.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: And I don't want this phrase just to slip by, because
|
|
this is really at the core of the issue we are discussing.
|
|
|
|
Now, just a short while ago, a few weeks ago, the FBI made public
|
|
attempted acts of terrorism in New York City involving the United Nations
|
|
Building, major federal building that houses the FBI, two tunnels, and
|
|
attempts at assassinating a member of Congress.
|
|
|
|
Now, you are saying to us -- and I accept this -- that there were 74
|
|
attempted acts of terrorism that were prevented by your action?
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: By the FBI or a combination or by local law enforcement.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Or the law enforcement agencies?
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: Yes, sir. Since 1982.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Since 1982. That's a decade.
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: Yes, sir.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: I will not ask you, obviously, to itemize each of those
|
|
74 attempted acts of terrorism that were prevented by our alert law
|
|
enforcement agencies. I want to tip my hat to you and to your colleagues.
|
|
But I do want to ask you to give us some information about those without,
|
|
in any sense, interfering with confidentiality of sources and other such
|
|
matters. So, let me sort of help you by asking a few questions.
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: Yes.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: What proportion of the 74 attempted acts of terrorism
|
|
that were prevented by your actions were state sponsored?
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: I'm hesitant to try to answer that off the top of my
|
|
head.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Well, just give me a ballpark. Was it 90 percent, 50
|
|
percent, 10 percent?
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: I would say probably 15 to 20 percent.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: 15 to 20 percent were state sponsored acts of terrorism.
|
|
What states were involved in those attempted acts of terrorism? You are
|
|
certainly not revealing any intelligence secrets, because they know that
|
|
they were involved. So, it's high time the American people know.
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: Specifically, to name three -- Iran, Iraq, and Libya.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Iran, Iraq, and Libya. Were there any other states
|
|
involved in attempted acts of terrorism on American soil during the course
|
|
of the last decade?
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: I don't believe so. I would like the opportunity to
|
|
respond further to you in writing.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: That's fair enough. Can you describe, in general terms,
|
|
the basic outlines of the attempted acts of terrorism that were sponsored
|
|
by Iran? We are not revealing any secrets to them, because they knew what
|
|
they were doing.
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: In very general terms, I would say, Iranian preventions
|
|
-- or potential acts of terrorism have been directed against individuals
|
|
who were anti-regime, where state organs or representatives of the
|
|
government were used -- intended to carry out acts directed against
|
|
individuals who were considered to be anti-regime.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: How about Iraq sponsored acts of terrorism? Can you
|
|
describe those to us in general terms?
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: Yes. And I can give you a very specific example in this
|
|
case.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Please.
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: In 1990, an individual was arrested in California and
|
|
charged with attempted murder -- or was planning to attempt to murder an
|
|
Iraqi dissident residing in the United States. His name is Andre Koshabe
|
|
(sp). He has subsequently entered a plea and been found guilty of this.
|
|
This was at the direction of the government of Iraq.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Can you give us some additional information on Iraq's
|
|
sponsored terrorists acts within the United States?
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: I think, probably, other than that one example, I would
|
|
be better -- we'd be better served if I were to say, in general, they have
|
|
been directed against anti-regime -- people who are viewed as being anti-
|
|
regime.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: How about Libyan sponsored acts of terrorism within the
|
|
United States?
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: In 1988, we arrested six Libyans who were charged --
|
|
actually charged with various fraud violations in an attempt to finance --
|
|
what we believe, to finance activities on the government of Libya in the
|
|
United States. They were also involved in violating the trade embargo
|
|
between the United States and Libya.
|
|
|
|
We've also had similar incidents where Libyan national -- or people
|
|
acting on behalf of the government of Libya were searching out people who
|
|
were considered to be against Gadhafi, against the government of Libya with
|
|
intent to do harm to them. So, it's a fairly similar pattern with Libya.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: This is very helpful. Is there anything else you would
|
|
be able to reveal to this committee in connection with the 74 attempted
|
|
terrorist acts?
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: I think that probably I would prefer to answer that on
|
|
the -- in writing for the committee to have in writing.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: That's fine. Please go ahead with your comments. I
|
|
thought this was very helpful.
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: Yes, sir.
|
|
|
|
While we have had 166 acts of terrorism and 74 potential acts stopped,
|
|
I do think we need to look at it and say that, in fact, even with this
|
|
number -- compared to many countries around the world, the United States
|
|
has had a relatively low rate of terrorism, both domestic and certainly
|
|
international within the United States.
|
|
|
|
Congress has played a major role in our efforts in counter-terrorism
|
|
by giving -- passing statutes, which have enabled us to investigates acts
|
|
of terrorism in the United States -- and also particularly legislation in
|
|
1984 and 1986, which resulted in a rather major expansion of FBI
|
|
jurisdiction that enabled the FBI or charged the FBI with going abroad to
|
|
investigate acts of terrorism directed against United States citizens.
|
|
|
|
We believe that the relatively low level of terrorist activity over
|
|
the past decade is simply because I think our government, our law
|
|
enforcement, and intelligence agencies have been most active in this area.
|
|
There's been a great deal of attention paid to this area, and this is
|
|
known. We've also had successes in terms of law enforcement activity in
|
|
this area. I think a way to characterize this is that I think that it is
|
|
fairly well known that the United States is a pretty hard operating area
|
|
for a terrorist. This is due to a lot of cooperation, including citizen
|
|
cooperation -- which you just mentioned. That's vital, absolutely vital.
|
|
|
|
We shouldn't, however, I think -- I think we're foolish if we try --
|
|
we become overly confident. We've just had a couple of recent incidents,
|
|
which I think serves to focus attention upon this area. Certainly, the
|
|
bombing in New York -- although I feel that what has occurred since then is
|
|
something that sends a clear message to terrorists who would come to the
|
|
United States. We have been successful in making arrests.
|
|
|
|
The plan to commit acts of violence in New York, which was just
|
|
stopped a couple of weeks ago, also serves, I think, to remind us that we
|
|
are vulnerable. There's no question about that.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: We have arrested nine people in connection with that
|
|
attempted acts of --
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: Yes, sir.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: -- terrorism. My understanding is that a tenth
|
|
individual is at large --
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: That is correct.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: -- and has not yet been arrested.
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: That's correct. Yes, sir.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Is he actively being pursued, and is it our information
|
|
that he is still in the country?
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: He is very, very actively being pursued.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Please go ahead.
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: Yes, sir. I will -- I think you understand, because of
|
|
pending prosecution, any comments that I would make in these two cases are
|
|
extremely limited.
|
|
|
|
You had expressed an interest earlier this morning, and you've
|
|
previously
|
|
|
|
|
|
expressed an interest in what our assessment is of the terrorist threat.
|
|
Speaking of the terrorist threat in the United States, it is our position,
|
|
after looking at all of our sources of information which we do on a daily,
|
|
literally hourly basis, here and abroad, that, in fact, in spite of the two
|
|
recent incidents, if you will, that we do not believe that we are about to
|
|
see a wave of terrorism sweeping the United States. We just don't see the
|
|
indicators at present that indicate that. We're not unaware of it at all.
|
|
We're looking at it very hard. But we do not believe that we see that
|
|
today, that this is a precursor of a wave of terrorism.
|
|
|
|
During the past several years, we have seen and adapted, I think, to
|
|
various forms of terrorism. Terrorism has evolved over the last 20 years.
|
|
I think that we've dealt with them as a government in a fairly well-
|
|
informed manner and it's been successful. I say it again; the value of
|
|
cooperation cannot be overstated. There is cooperation within the United
|
|
States government with state and local law enforcement within the United
|
|
States and very vital cooperation around the world with intelligence and
|
|
law enforcement agencies from around the world.
|
|
|
|
Terrorism truly, with very few exceptions, is an area in which
|
|
politics don't become -- are not a factor. It is one of the few common
|
|
bonds that we find worldwide. People have a concern about this. So we are
|
|
-- we do have this, and we push cooperation around the world. We have
|
|
challenges ahead; there's no question about that. We need to continue our
|
|
effort, and we will continue our effort.
|
|
|
|
I think I would just really say that I want to assure you, and I hope
|
|
you know this, that the women and men of the FBI are firmly committed in
|
|
this area. There should be no doubt about this. We will undertake any and
|
|
all measures necessary to ensure that we can effectively combat this menace
|
|
in the United States and abroad.
|
|
|
|
At this point I'd like to stop and be responsive to questions.
|
|
|
|
REP. LANTOS: Thank you very much. And we certainly appreciate the
|
|
enormous work done by the men and women of the FBI.
|
|
|
|
Congressman Gilman has to leave, so I'll yield the first chance for
|
|
questions to him.
|
|
|
|
REP. BENJAMIN GILMAN (R-NY): I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
|
|
permitting me to go out of order. And I want to first compliment our
|
|
Bureau for its recent arrests in New York of those terrorists who would
|
|
have targeted our UN complex and other facilities in New York City. It
|
|
would have been dreadful if they had been able to complete their mission.
|
|
And I've already expressed that to Director Sessions. I think our entire
|
|
nation and citizens in New York are most grateful for the --
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: Thank you, sir.
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: -- good enforcement work that the Bureau has undertaken.
|
|
Can you tell me how many personnel are assigned to your day-to-day
|
|
counterterrorism work?
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: We generally don't -- we don't give out that figure
|
|
publicly. I would be very happy to respond to that in writing certainly.
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: If you would, I think our committee would welcome
|
|
knowing this.
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: Yes. A side comment, and I'll just very quickly add to
|
|
that, is that the FBI is a rather unique organization. We do have the
|
|
ability to move resources very, very quickly. Trained criminal
|
|
investigators can be moved from one area to another. In the area of
|
|
terrorism, I can assure you when we have an incident such as the World
|
|
Trade Center or the investigation, the more recent investigation where the
|
|
people have been charged with conspiring to commit an act of terrorism, the
|
|
resources committed have been enormous. And without question, we've
|
|
shifted in some other areas. And then, as we can, we'll move them back.
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: Your work, though, is essentially involved in
|
|
counterterrorism.
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: Yes, sir.
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: That's full-time?
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: Yes, sir.
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: I assume, then, you have some other full-time personnel
|
|
working on counterterrorism with you.
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: Yes, sir.
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: And that's the information that I would hope you would
|
|
provide the committee.
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: Absolutely.
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: Now, Counselor Wirth indicated there was some inter-
|
|
agency task force at work, and I might pursue that with Mrs. Bodine as
|
|
well. Is that underway now? Do you meet on a regular basis? Can you tell
|
|
me a little bit about that inter-agency task force?
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: We have, for a number of years, actually been meeting
|
|
with the various parts of the US government that have an involvement and
|
|
interest in counterterrorism. This is done quite often, sometimes almost
|
|
on a daily basis if events dictate. Lacking that, I'd say at a minimum at
|
|
least every two weeks we formally get together and meet to discuss issues
|
|
of common interest.
|
|
|
|
I think that it's an extremely effective way to do business. It
|
|
really does ensure that maybe we don't let the bureaucratic problems that
|
|
sometimes crop up get in our way, because we work together very well.
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: That's encouraging. Ms. Bodine, what agencies are
|
|
involved in this inter-agency task force that meets on a regular basis?
|
|
|
|
MS. BODINE: (Inaudible) -- coordinating sub-group, and it includes
|
|
the NSC, the Director for Global Affairs, Coordinator for Counterterrorism,
|
|
FBI, Justice, CIA, JCS, OSD, Special Operations, Low-Intensity Conflict
|
|
Office, and on occasion, as needed, FAA, (MARAD?), Department of Energy,
|
|
Treasury.
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: And you meet regularly?
|
|
|
|
MS. BODINE: We meet at least every two weeks, and more often as
|
|
necessary.
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: And do you chair that?
|
|
|
|
MS. BODINE: It's chaired by the NSC, but it is very much of an open
|
|
meeting.
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: And have you found it to be effective and beneficial?
|
|
|
|
MS. BODINE: I've found it to be extraordinarily effective and
|
|
beneficial. As Counselor Wirth said, it's a model, I think, for how other
|
|
issues could be handled. We know each other. We can deal with each other
|
|
very casually on the phone. We can make things happen very quickly when we
|
|
have to, because we already know each other and we know the issues.
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: Well, that's an encouraging aspect of this whole
|
|
problem. Mr. Brandon, has the FBI completed its review of the Israeli
|
|
arrests earlier this year of several Americans who were involved in
|
|
terrorist activities on behalf of Hamas in the Middle East?
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: We have, to the extent -- yes, we have.
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: And can you tell us anything about your conclusions at
|
|
all?
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: I don't believe I can in this forum, sir. I'd be glad
|
|
to respond separately.
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: Can you tell us at least whether these people were
|
|
definitely involved with Hamas in their activities?
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: I would rather respond in writing to you, sir.
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: And would you do that for the committee?
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: Yes, sir; absolutely.
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: Mr. Chairman, with your consent, I'd like to make a
|
|
request. Can you tell us also, has the FBI concluded its work on Pan Am
|
|
103, or is that still an ongoing investigation?
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: Oh, that's an ongoing investigation. Obviously there
|
|
have been indictments that have been brought. But there are aspects of the
|
|
investigation that are continuing, yes, sir.
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: Is there some thought that there are more people
|
|
involved than you have initially found?
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: It would not really be appropriate for me to comment on
|
|
that.
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: Can you comment in writing to the committee --
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: Yes, sir.
|
|
|
|
REP. GILMAN: -- with regard to the extent of your activity in Pan Am
|
|
103?
|
|
|
|
MR. BRANDON: Yes, sir. We'd be glad to do so.
|
|
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REP. GILMAN: And again, just to reiterate what we discussed earlier,
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there is no longer any problem, then, of your providing information in your
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files to the State Department's agency on counterterrorism, that there is a
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free flow of information now to the State Department. Am I correct?
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MR. BRANDON: Yes, sir.
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REP. GILMAN: But you are still charging them for it.
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MR. BRANDON: In certain categories, I'm going to have to beg that a
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little -- beg the question a little bit, because I'm I guess what we call
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an operator, and I'm not entirely familiar with the information management
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aspect. I'm aware of the issue, but my understanding, very clear
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understanding is at this point that the -- I know, from an operational
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standpoint, the information flow is complete and thorough. I believe the
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other technical aspects have been overcome, although the State Department
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still doesn't like to have to pay for certain kinds of information.
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REP. GILMAN: Well, I would hope that both your office and Mrs.
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Bodine's office could provide us with some recommendations to try to
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overcome this glitch, so to speak, in getting information flowing freely
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and any cost problem that might be involved. It seems incredulous that we
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should have that happening in a very critical problem.
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MR. BRANDON: We'll visit that again, but I can state unequivocally in
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the area of counterterrorism there is no problem with the flow of
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information.
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REP. GILMAN: Well, we thank both of you for your input. We thank
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both of you for your continued involvement in this very critical problem.
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Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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REP. LANTOS: Thank you very much. I just have a couple of questions
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before I conclude. Ms. Bodine, what is the extent of cooperation between
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narcotics and terrorist activities in various parts of the world that you
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deal with? For instance, is it true that in the Bekaa Valley, under Syrian
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control, the various terrorist groups obtain much of their funding or most
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of their funding from narcotics activities?
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MS. BODINE: There is an intertwining of narcotics and terrorism.
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REP. LANTOS: Could you pull the microphone there?
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MS. BODINE: I'm sorry. I said there is an intertwining of narcotics
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and terrorism in a number of places. Lebanon is one. Certainly Colombia,
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the Andean region, is another. In most cases, the narcotics is used, as
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you mentioned with Lebanon, as a source of revenue. The other way that it
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will sometimes come up is that the terrorists will, in a sense, become
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mercenaries to the narco-traffickers. It's always a mercantile kind of
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arrangement.
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We are aware of and we do speak with the Syrians on the question of
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drug eradication. We are aware of that link, and it is a particularly
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bothersome one. One of the reasons that we are putting narcotics,
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terrorism and crime together in one bureau is that there is this
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intertwining of these three groups of despicable people, and it makes it
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much easier to deal with them in a coordinated fashion if we are in one
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bureau.
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REP. LANTOS: Mr. Brandon, would you care to comment on this issue of
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the intertwining of terrorism and narcotics trade?
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MR. BRANDON: I think what Ms. Bodine has stated is -- we're in
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complete agreement with that. Of course, our role being primarily domestic
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is one where we're more on the receiving end, so we're not quite as
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involved internationally. But we're very much aware of that.
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REP. LANTOS: Let me ask one final question of the two of you. With
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the end of the Cold War and with the breakdown of the very peculiar
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discipline that the Cold War provided, there are some indications that
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ethnically-based terrorist organizations are proliferating. I wonder if
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you would care to comment on this issue, Ms. Bodine.
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MS. BODINE: We have seen the same trends. Ethnicity has long been a
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basis of terrorist groups. You can look at the Irish Republican Army and
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ETA, the Corsicans. That is quite of$JL a basis. They're often the
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|
dispossessed, the disenfranchised, within a particular society. And they
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seek to redress their grievances through terrorism.
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As you said, taking the lid off of a lot of long-standing, sometimes
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century-old animosities has erupted in violence all around the rim of the
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former Soviet Union. It is quite possible that this will develop into
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terrorism. We're watching it very closely. We are working with other very
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concerned states. For example, the Austrians, who (sit?) next to
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Yugoslavia, are particularly concerned about this.
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So far the issue of new ethnic terrorism is a theory looking for
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evidence. We have not seen any infrastructure. We have not seen any of
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the build-up that would lead to some kind of organized ethnic terrorism.
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But certainly all the pieces are there. The grounds are there. And
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unfortunately, there are groups who will, in a sense, rent themselves out
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as technical advisors. So it's a phenomenon that we are watching very
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carefully.
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REP. LANTOS: Mr. Brandon?
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MR. BRANDON: Well, I would just like to add that while it's something
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that we do have to watch and be aware of, is that I think that it's also --
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we have to be equally careful with this concept. We have to be extremely
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|
careful that we are now viewing groups of people as being lawbreakers or
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|
terrorists simply because they happen to come from a country or from an
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ethnic group. And I think that is very, very important.
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|
What we're seeing, the question -- I will go ahead and say, the
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|
question comes up continually with regard to Islam. The question can be
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|
posed, "Are Muslims terrorists?" The answer is no. It's clearly, clearly
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no. There are people who advocate and use violence, very small groups on
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the fringes, as there are in many groups around the world. But it is
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something that I think we all have to stress and be careful about in the
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way we provide information to the public and the way it's characterized,
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|
because we just can't get involved in that. It's not right.
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REP. LANTOS: I fully agree with you and I think the whole Congress
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shares that view. Is there any final comment that either of you would like
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to make? It's been an extremely valuable and useful hearing.
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Ms. Bodine?
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MS. BODINE: I would just like to thank the committee for the time. I
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|
think the fact that we have all been here for this long dealing with an
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issue that doesn't go away, won't go away, but needs quite clearly in the
|
|
comments joint cooperation not only in our agency, but between the
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|
executive and the legislative branch. And thank you very much for your
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|
time and interest.
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REP. LANTOS: Thank you.
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|
Mr. Brandon?
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MR. BRANDON: I would just simply echo that I hope we can continue to
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|
have the interchange that's necessary. The area is of such concern that we
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|
can't afford not to be talking and working with each other.
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|
REP. LANTOS: Well, on behalf of this Subcommittee on International
|
|
Security, I want to thank both of you for a very valuable morning. This
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|
hearing is adjourned.
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(Gavel.)
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END
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