123 lines
7.3 KiB
Plaintext
123 lines
7.3 KiB
Plaintext
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D-Notice
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Moyra Grant
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How free are the press and broadcasting media in Britain? The externa=
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l
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constraints are quite well known - though their range and scope may not
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be. For example, the broadcasting laws allow the Home Secretary complete
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control over all broadcasting content , which - without reference to
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Parliament - has enabled the Home Office since 1988 to ban direct
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reporting of Irish activists, including members of legal political parties
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such as Sinn Fein. Other legislative constraints include the Official
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Secrets Act, Prevention of Terrorism Act, Police and Criminal Evidence
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Act, Contempt of Court Act, and laws relating to obscenity, libel, race
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relations, sedition, incitement to disaffection and treason - amongst
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others. To these can be added the many instances of direct Government
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censorship - notably during the Falklands and Gulf conflicts - and the
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informal but sometimes intense pressures of advertisers and distributors.
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The most insidious form of political control on the media, however, is not
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external constraint but self-censorship. I am not referring here to any
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readiness by the media to check their own sometimes discreditable
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behaviour, intrusions into privacy, missta tements of fact or
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unwillingness to present diverse views and to foster democratic debate.
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That (in the case of newspapers) is supposedly the job of the Press
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Complaints Commission, which replaced the Press Council in 1990 as a
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voluntary self-regulating b ody. The likes of Fergie and David Mellor
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might be forgiven for regarding it as a watchdog without teeth. The most
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institutionalised method of self-censorship is the D Notice system (short
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for Defence Notices). They are a unique peacetime arrangement of voluntary
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suppression of certain categories of information on the advice - not
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orders - of the Government . The system was established in 1912 and
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continues to this day. The justification for the system, as stated in the
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official guidelines, is as follows: Hostile intelligence services draw o=
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n
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information from a variety of sources both overt and covert, and by
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piecing it together can build up a composite picture of a sub ject. The
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dissemination of sensitive information can make their task easier and put
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national security at risk. It can also be of value to terrorist groups who
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lack the resources to obtain it through their own efforts. For these
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reasons there are dangers i nherent even in the publication of information
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covered by D Notices which has already appeared elsewhere. It is strongly
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requested that there should be no elaboration, nor confirmation or denial,
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of the accuracy of items published elsewhere, without refer ence to the [D
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Notice] Secretary. There are currently eight general D Notices (which,
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incidentally, used to be secret information themselves, but were made
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public in 1982): No.1:Defence plans, operational capability, state of
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readiness and training No.2:Defence equipment No.3:Nuclear weapons and
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equipment No.4:Radio and radar transmissions No.5:Cyphers and
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comm-unications No.6: British security and intelligence services No.7:War
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precautions and civil defence No.8:Photography etc. of defence
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establishments and installations
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There is no direct relationship between the D Notice system and the
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Official Secrets Act; the latter has legal force, the former does not. As
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the official guidelines say, The D Notice system is entirely voluntary
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and has no legal authority; the final res ponsibility for the decision
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whether or not to publish lies solely with the editor or publisher
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concerned. However, the guidelines also state pointedly that the D Notic=
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e
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system is a useful reminder of the legal sanctions which may be brought to
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bear if a n editor or producer oversteps the mark. Moreover, pressure to
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comply can be overwhelming. When in the early 1980s Granada TV made a
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documentary about the Official Secrets Act, the D Notice Committee asked
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them to exclude the address of the Governments C ommunications
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Headquarters (GCHQ) at Cheltenham. Granada objected, because the address
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was in Whitakers Almanac and other registers and was therefore pub=
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lic
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knowledge. However, the IBA - the body which then allocated broadcasting
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franchises and monitor ed commercial programmes - intervened and ordered
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Granada to cut the reference out of the programme. (The Governments
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subsequent ban on trade union membership at GCHQ and the resulting
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publicity, strikes and court cases, ironically, ensured that the exis
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tence and location of GCHQ rapidly became household knowledge.) The
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Notices are issued and amended on the authority of the Defence Press and
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Broadcasting committee (DPBC), which is made up of officials from relevant
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government departments (e.g. Defence, Foreign and Home Offices) together
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with representatives of the pr ess and broadcasting organisations. It is
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chaired by a senior MoD civil servant. The D Notices are sent out to
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national and provincial newspaper editors, radio and TV companies, and to
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some publishers of books and periodicals. When editors know that certa in
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information falls under a particular D Notice they simply exclude it; when
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they are uncertain, they may seek advice. The Secretary of the D Notice
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Committee, Rear Admiral Higgins, receives on average one phone call a week
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from editors seeking guidance on potentially sensitive material; he gives
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positive advice not to publish about a dozen times a year. More often=
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,
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editors err on the side of caution and omit dubious information without
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consulting anyone. On a whim, I telephoned Whitehall in search of
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information about the D Notice system. I was put through almost at once to
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Bill Higgins himself. When I told him that I was a Politics teacher he
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replied jocularly, Well, Im sure I can safely assume that no ne of yo=
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ur
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students are anarchist subversives. I thought of the two who had been
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arrested just the previous week for staging a sit-down demo in the middle
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of Oxford Street, and maintained a discreet silence. He was, incidentally,
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very open and informativ e. A day later the post brought a list of the D
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Notices currently in force, together with an explanatory handout. There is
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an annual review of the D Notices, which took place in October and made
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some minor adjustments in the light of John Majors professed commitment
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to more open government: for example, they incorporated the public
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acknowledgement of MI5 and MI6, th e names of their chiefs and location of
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their headquarters. A discussion group of media representatives (chaired
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by Guardian editor Peter Preston) was held just prior to that review, to
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ponder the whole existence of the D Notice system. There were isolated
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calls for the system to be abolished and replaced by separ ate lists of
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sensitive items and areas to be issued by each government department.
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However, it was generally felt that this would be, at least, a recipe for
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chaos and, at worst, would result in more rather than less secrecy. The D
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Notice system therefor e lives on, but is of declining importance - likely
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to wither on the vine, as Higgins put it - in comparison to the whole
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panoply of Britains secret state. For civil libertarians, the main
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targets of attack must still be the Official Secrets Act on t he one hand
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and, on the other, those editors and producers who supinely collude in the
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withholding of information from the public even when national security=
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is clearly not threatened. As Ernest Bevin once said in a Cabinet debate
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on media censorship, " Why bother to muzzle sheep?"
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