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601 lines
25 KiB
Plaintext
Via NY Transfer News Collective * All the News that Doesn't Fit
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LOVE AND RAGE VOL. 5, NO. 1 MARCH/APRIL 1994
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Electronic Edition * Produced March 10, 1994
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SPECIAL ISSUE ON FEMINISM AND REVOLUTION
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*+**+**+**+**+**+**+**+**+**+**+**+**+**+**+**+**+**+**+**+**+*
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Special Section:
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THE ZAPATISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY
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OF CHIAPAS, ME'XICO:
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AN ANARCHIST ASSESSMENT OF THE EZLN
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By Todd Prane and Elizabeth Bright
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"To the Workers of the Republic: Greetings!
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"Brothers and Sisters of the cities, come to meet
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with your brothers and sisters of the countryside;
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brothers and sisters of the workshop, come embrace
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your brothers and sisters of the plow; brothers and
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sisters of the mines, of the railroad, of the port,
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save the rivers, mountains, seas, and mingle your
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desire for freedom with our desire, your
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anxiousness for justice with our own.
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"Workers of Puebla, of Orizaba, of Monterrey, of
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Guanajuato, of Cananea, of Parra, of Pachuca, of
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Ebano, of Necaxa, workers and operators in the
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factories and mines of the republic, heed our
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fraternal call, help us with the valiant push of
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our effort; it is already rusting, it is already
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swaying this skeleton of tyranny...
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"The realization of the truth was cruel and did not
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wait. Instead of the help promised to our unions
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came the imposition of government tyranny; they
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tried to make the worker into the docile creature
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of the government, to prepare for the coming farce
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of the elections...
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"...And as if this were not enough, those who
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protested went to prison! As if this were not
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enough, to those who resisted, the scaffold! Do you
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want more? Do you want a greater injustice?
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"No; you cannot be with your enemies. Your demands
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are like ours. You demand an increase in wages, a
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reduction of working hours; that is to say, greater
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economic freedom, greater right to enjoy life; it
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is exactly that that we demand as we proclaim our
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rights to land. It is only that, less tyrannized
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than us, you believed that you would find, in
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peaceful unions, the infallible formula to solve
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your problems; we, however, could think of nothing
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but of arms, of open rebellion against those who
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violate our rights; because the oppressed are not
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even the owner of their laments, when the same,
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just protest is drowned, even as it forms in their
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throats; therefore, there is no dignified path left
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for this oppressed, no redemptory gesture other
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than to take up arms, proclaiming victory or death;
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death first, before remaining any longer a slave...
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"May the callused hands of the fields and the
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callused hands of the workshop reach out in
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fraternal greeting and accord; because in truth,
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the workers united are invincible, we are the
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strength and we are the right, we are the tomorrow!
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"Greetings, brother and sister workers, greetings!
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Your friends, the peasants, await you!"
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--Emiliano Zapata, Tlaltizapan, Morelos, 15 March,
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1918
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"Here we are, the dead. We die again, but this time
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to truly live."
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Since Jan 1 of this year, our Zapatista troops
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began a series of politico-military actions with
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the principal objective of letting the Mexican
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people and the world know the miserable conditions
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that millions of Mexican, especially we the
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Indigenous people, live and die in. With these
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actions, we also let people know our decision to
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fight for our elementary rights in the only way
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that the government authorities have left us: armed
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struggle.
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The grave conditions of poverty of our compatriots
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has a common cause: the lack of freedom and
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democracy. We believe that an authentic respect for
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freedom and the democratic will of the people are
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the indispensable prerequisites for the improvement
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of the economic and social conditions of the
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dispossessed of our country. For this reason, just
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as we demand the improvement of the living
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conditions of the Mexican people, we demand freedom
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and political democracy...
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--General Command of the Indigenous Revolutionary
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Clandestine Committee of the Eje'rcito Zapatista de
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Liberacio'n Nacional (EZLN), from the mountains of
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Southeastern Me'xico. January, 6, 1994
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The 75 year-old call for solidarity and assistance
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issued by Zapata to the urban and industrial
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workers of Me'xico could have been written last
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month. The EZLN's declaration was. The EZLN has
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declared a war for land, food, and freedom to
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control their own lives in southern Me'xico and
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anti-authoritarians in North America finally have
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an armed liberation organization that they can (and
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should) support with few qualms. In the first three
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weeks of armed struggle the Zapatista National
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Liberation Army (Eje'rcito Zapatista de Liberacio'n
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Nacional) accomplished more, militarily and
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politically, than any of the guerrillas of Central
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America have in the past 12 years. They claim a
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tradition of radical Indigenous self-determination,
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Zapatismo, and in doing so set themselves
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politically and strategically apart from almost
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every other clandestine armed group in Latin
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America. They are not vanguard Marxist guerrillas
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in search of a social base to lead into the
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revolution. They are not even trying to conquer the
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rest of the country (although they clearly wouldn't
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mind if some other Mexicans caught on to their
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ideas). They are trying to reclaim their land,
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their culture, their families, their villages and
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towns, their lives.
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The Beginning
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The real beginnings of the current rebellion can be
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found in 1492 and 1910, of course. Spain's conquest
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of what is now Latin America gave rise to the
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conditions under which most Native peoples in this
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hemisphere still struggle, and die. Emiliano Zapata
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offered a radical solution to those conditions:
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that Indigenous campesinos take back their land by
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any means necessary. Zapata's army of Indigenous
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peasants played a pivotal role in the Mexican
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Revolution. Although recent events have been
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reported several times over by various capitalist
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and progressive news agencies, a short summary is
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useful.
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The facts, in brief, are the following: several
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thousand combatants liberated several towns and
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cities (among them, San Cristo'bal de las Casas,
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Ocosingo, Las Margaritas and Altamirano) in the
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name of the EZLN. They were armed, but sometimes
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with little more than ancient rifles or machetes.
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They wore bandannas over their faces and flew a
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black flag with a red star on it. After securing
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the city of San Cristo'bal de las Casas, with a
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population of 100,000, the EZLN fighters attacked
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the jail, freeing 129 prisoners. The soldiers
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opened prisons in several other towns as well, and
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redistributed stockpiled food among the people. In
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Ocosingo, much of the EZLN hid away for three days
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prior to the attack-- around two thousand soldiers
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hid among the people in a small town and were "not
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noticed." Proceso, a Me'xico City news weekly,
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offered the following explanation: "... in a 'war
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region' like this, for every one of the
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revolutionaries there exists a base of support
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among the communities, and for this reason it is
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difficult to find those involved." In several other
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towns and cities, not only were Mexican police
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officers disarmed by the EZLN, but disrobed as
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well, and left in their own jails.
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What is most distinctive about the EZLN is their
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political sophistication, both in their development
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of an extensive base in the population of Chiapas
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and in the timing and justification of their recent
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armed actions. The insurgents have justified their
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entire revolt under the Mexican constitution and
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have demanded to be officially recognized under
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international law as a belligerent force in order
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to bring the conflict under international war
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conventions. As further criteria for dialogue with
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the government negotiator, the EZLN demanded an end
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to aerial bombings of Indigenous communities;
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respect for the human rights of the local
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population; the withdrawal of government troops to
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their barracks; and the declaration of a cease-
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fire.
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Article 39 of the Mexican constitution, which
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legally justifies the entire rebellion, was
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ratified under pressure from Zapatista and other
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liberatory forces in 1917, at the end of the
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Mexican Revolution. The Zapatistas, distrusting the
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pro-government forces in the center of the country,
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demanded that land be guaranteed in perpetuity for
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the Indigenous population, that the land be held
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communally in ejidos (land trusts) which could not
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be bought or sold (provided for by articles 4 and
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27, which were respectively deleted and gutted when
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the constitution was revised two years ago). They
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also demanded the right to rebel. Article 39 reads
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as follows:
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"National sovereignty essentially and originally
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resides in the people. All political power emanates
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from the people and its purpose is to help the
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people. The people have, at all times, the
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inalienable right to alter or modify their form of
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government."
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It was this right that the EZLN claimed as they
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began their struggle. If that were not enough
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legitimacy for one armed revolutionary movement,
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they went still further: "We also ask that
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international organizations and the International
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Red Cross watch over and regulate our battles, so
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that our efforts are carried out while still
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protecting our civilian population. We declare now
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and always that we are subject to the Geneva
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Accord, forming the EZLN as the fighting arm of our
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liberation struggle." The EZLN has tried to put
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itself in a curious place: a legitimate (in fact,
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legal), Indigenous people's liberation army.
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Almost from the start the Mexican government has
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tried to claim that the situation in Chiapas was
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caused by some sort of outside agitator. The first
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tack was to claim that the EZLN were trained, led,
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supported or supplied by Guatemalan guerrillas.
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This theory is doubtful for at least three reasons:
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the politics of the EZLN are incompatible with
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those of the Guatemalan guerrillas, the military
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tactics are quite different (the Zapatistas have
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been much more successful), and there is absolutely
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no evidence of significant amounts of Guatemalans
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in the EZLN or coordination with other groups in
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Guatemala. Reports that they have encircled towns
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to try to force new "conscripts" to the EZLN are
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obviously of government creation.
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Another "outside agitator" was found in the person
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of Bishop Samuel Ruiz. Ruiz, a longtime supporter
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of peasant economic rights, was charged with
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leading the rebellion with some brand of liberation
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theology and the government of Carlos Salinas de
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Gortari went as far as to ask the Pope to remove
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him. He has since been cleared of all such charges
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and is actively participating in the negotiation
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process. In sum: there are no outside agitators.
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Who are the EZLN and What are Their Politics?
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The EZLN is an Indigenous, peasant army. During one
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interview, Subcomandante Marcos [Press Secretary
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and most public face of the EZLN--see essays and
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interviews page 15] stated that it was organized by
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Indigenous ethnicities, each with its own Sub-
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Commander, with the Clandestine Indigenous
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Revolutionary Committee setting the strategic and
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political direction based upon broad "accords"
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existing between the different Indigenous groups.
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The EZLN is a liberation army that seeks not to
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establish a political regime of one kind or
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another, but rather to free the people to make
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those decisions themselves. Their stated goal is to
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establish liberated zones in which the people can
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be freed from the one-party dictatorship of the PRI
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(the Party of the Institutional Revolution,
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Me'xico's ruling party for over 50 years) and can
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decide their own direction. This struggle for
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political freedom is central to the strategy of the
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EZLN, more central even than land. The point was
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made in the opening quotes from the declaration on
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Jan 6: For them the lack of food, of health care,
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of water, of land itself, are all caused by the
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lack of political autonomy and freedom. It is this
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freedom that comes first.
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The Legacy of Emiliano
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When they call themselves "Zapatistas" they make a
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strong claim and locate themselves in a particular
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place in Mexican political history. Zapata
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championed and fought for Indigenous ownership of
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land (which at that time, as now, meant removing
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the mestizo capitalist owners), and autonomous
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local political control. Anarchists have long drawn
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the connection between Zapatismo and anarchism (see
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page 20) and it should not be difficult for others
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to draw the connections, especially knowing the
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history. Subcomandante Marcos, specifically stated
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in an interview with the Italian Communist Party
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newspaper, Unita, that they are "not communist or
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Marxist-Leninist." Their strategy does not involve
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an attempt to seize state power. They are calling
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for democracy and even democratic elections, but
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the ambiguities of this are difficult to sort out.
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They could be calling for a restructuring of the
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political landscape of the country--they have
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stated that they want a "true" democracy that
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includes Indigenous political participation. It is
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difficult to think what this could be if not more
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localized control over resources such as land, food
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and water, and decentralized political control.
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However, the EZLN has not stated that they are
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anti-state or even radically decentralist. This can
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only be determined by inference from other
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statements and from the history of Zapatismo.
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There are several ideological and strategic
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problems in the communiques, especially in some of
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the"Revolutionary Laws." [see page 16] These laws,
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presumably, embody the vision that the Zapatistas
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have of a society undergoing revolutionary
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transformation and provide the richest ground for
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information about their politics. The revolutionary
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law on women may seem outdated and anachronistic to
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North American readers, but it is a powerful
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statement of opposition to patriarchy in a set of
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societies in which women are routinely forced into
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marriage, where men are entitled to wear shoes in
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public but women go barefoot. The Revolutionary
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Agrarian Law also does not pose serious challenges
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to anti-authoritarian politics. On the other hand,
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The Law of the Rights and Obligations of a People
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in Struggle, as well as the Law of War Taxes, are
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both extremely problematic for an anti-
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authoritarian reading of the EZLN's politics. Both
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of these laws sanction (in fact require explicitly)
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the election of "civil authorities" who have both
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increased rights and increased obligations over
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those of other citizens. They are empowered to levy
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taxes and to imprison or punish violators of the
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community's standards. While the Rights and
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Obligations specifically excludes the revolutionary
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military from participation in civil rule, it does
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give them emergency powers that could easily be
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abused. The overriding electoral strategy, which
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appears in several of the laws and is mentioned in
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a number of the communiques, is worrisome, but only
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to the degree that it shifts power away from people
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at the base of the society (campesinos, in this
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case). It is unclear to what degree the EZLN is
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interested in national, or even regional, elections
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and posts, but this is obviously important.
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Indigenous or Nationalist
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There is a contradiction of some sort between the
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Indigenous and the nationalist character of the
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EZLN. They emphasize repeatedly that they are an
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Indigenous movement acting from a base of
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Indigenous anger and Indigenous demands. They also
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call themselves a "national liberation army" and
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evoke Zapata's name. If both of those two concepts
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have meaning for the Zapatistas, there are
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questions about what the main bases for the EZLN
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are: ethnic, class, or national. Clearly it is some
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combination of these but where the priorities fall
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is an important question. Some of the most
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nationalist EZLN rhetoric is clearly geared at
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getting and keeping widespread Mexican public
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support (that they always respect the Mexican
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national flag, for example), and can be taken as
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evidence of their political shrewdness and realism.
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(Given the rally of over 130,000 people in the
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Zo'calo in Me'xico City in mid-January, they have
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had quite a bit of success.) This is precisely what
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is most problematic about their apparent
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nationalism: its repetition of prejudices within
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broader Mexican soceity (the widespread xenophobia,
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for example). They cannot maintain that they are
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Indigenous, including Indigenous ethnicities that
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cross the Guatemalan border, and claim that they
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are a uniquely and characteristically Mexican
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formation.
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NAFTA/TLC
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Much has been said about the question of timing of
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the rebellion with respect to the North American
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Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA--TLC in its Spanish
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initialogram). NAFTA formally went into effect at
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midnight, Jan 1, 1994 and it was this point that
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the Chiapanecos chose for the onset of their
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revolution. That NAFTA had something to do with it
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is clear, but what, exactly, remains uncertain.
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Some, such as Marc Cooper of the Village Voice,
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have attributed to the EZLN strategists a
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sophistication almost beyond belief: they chose
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just after, rather than before, NAFTA to ensure the
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longevity of their struggle--with big, trading
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brother watching, the Mexican Army could not be
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quite so free to suppress the peasants. The EZLN,
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through spokesperson Marcos, offer a much simpler
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analysis: "NAFTA... for the Indians is a death
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sentence. Once it goes into effect, it means an
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international massacre." Marcos was referring to
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the economic impact of NAFTA on the peasants in
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rural southern Me'xico. Campesinos currently live
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at a barely subsistence level by working small
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plots of land and selling their labor to fincas,
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farms owned by the land-owning bourgeoisie. What
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NAFTA brings to Me'xico are cheap beans and grain
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grown by the enormous agribusiness firms of the
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midwestern US. They will consistently be able to
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outprice the small-plot farmers of Chiapas, whose
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lives are now at risk. Without the food and income
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from the small plots of land they work, they will
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not be able to survive. In fact, NAFTA is merely
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one economic factor, although an important one, in
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the stew of trouble that has brewed in Chiapas,
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Morelos, Guerrero and other southern states in
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Me'xico for decades.
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Armed and Unarmed Uprisings Elsewhere
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As Subcomandante Marcos said, the winds of change
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are blowing from the South of Me'xico [see essay
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page 15]. Shortly after the second week of January
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there were scattered (and almost unreported)
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incidents of armed uprisings in isolated areas of
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the state of Guerrero. More recently a columnist
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reported in El Financiero that November, 1993 saw a
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meeting of 52 armed groups in Me'xico under the
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auspices of the "Guerrilla General Coordinate." At
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that time, according to the columnist, 51 of the
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groups agreed to hold off on widespread actions
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until just before the August elections. Only the
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EZLN differed. Some believe that 51 other armed
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groups may be seeing the wisdom of the EZLN's ways,
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and may begin their activities much sooner than
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expected, all of which could make for a very
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interesting summer. Finally, in the second week of
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February, peasants in towns across several states
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in Southern Me'xico stormed their City Halls
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demanding the expulsion of their PRI Mayors.
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Several of the campesino groups that originally
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expressed concerns and lack of support for the EZLN
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have come full circle and have even admitted that
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they are inspired by their activities. The
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possibility that large numbers of campesinos across
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the South of the Mexican state will rise up in the
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near future is very real.
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US Military involvement
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We have learned that, according to a Sergeant in US
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Army intelligence, on March 18 a small group of
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military intelligence operatives of the US army
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will arrive in Guatemala to scout out the border
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with Chiapas and locate a spot appropriate for a
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battalion-sized encampment. The camp should be
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established some time this summer. This is solid
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information that the US considers the situation in
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Chipaps serious and of potentially long duration.
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The Rest of Me'xico
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The national elections in Me'xico are less than six
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months away and how Chiapas is or is not resolved
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will have everything to do with who wins. The PRI
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are widely, and accurately, believed to have
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engaged in vote fraud for decades, and after the
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last elections in 1988, several towns rose up
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against the fraudulent vote counts. Chiapas voted
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overwhelmingly (over 90%) for the PRI in the last
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|
election, according to the official counts. Many
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|
are joking that they cannot understand what the
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|
Mexican Government is afraid of: with such a high
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|
level of support in the region, the EZLN must, in
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|
fact, be members of the PRI!
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|
The choice of Manuel Camacho Soli's as negotiator
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|
represents a significant shake-up in the succession
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|
strategy of the PRI. Camacho Soli's was iced out of
|
|
the presidentital maneuvering late last fall (see
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|
L&R, vol 4, no. 5). However, Colosio, Salinas's
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|
chosen successor, was not selected as the primary
|
|
negotiator in this rebellion, in large part because
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|
he has no support. There were widespread doubts
|
|
about him in the past, but Chiapas has, for all
|
|
purposes, opened up the power succession struggle
|
|
within the PRI. Whatever faction within the PRI
|
|
comes out on top of the management of the rebellion
|
|
will be positioned to decide who is the next PRI
|
|
candidate for president. However, this rebellion
|
|
may be the death knell of the PRI: unable to carry
|
|
off the massive voter fraud that has propelled them
|
|
into victory in the past and suffering from this
|
|
recent humiliating uprising (whose economic causes
|
|
can only be their fault), they seem unlikely to
|
|
continue in power at this point. The changing of
|
|
ruling parties in Me'xico would be such a major
|
|
shift that no one is really positioned to predict
|
|
what it could mean. For the campesinos, in the end,
|
|
it is likely to mean more of the same exploitation
|
|
and oppression.
|
|
|
|
Solidarity Organizations
|
|
|
|
In the US, actions in solidarity with the
|
|
Zapatistas began only days into January, with most
|
|
of the demonstrations carried out by ad-hoc
|
|
coalitions or groupings. Several small
|
|
organizations geared towards longer-term solidarity
|
|
have already sprung up, including in Santa Cruz
|
|
where a collection of anarchists have begun holding
|
|
weekly meetings of the Committee to Support the
|
|
Mexican Revolution; and in New York City, where the
|
|
Zapatista Solidarity Committee was recently formed.
|
|
|
|
It is difficult to say whether longer-term
|
|
solidarity groupings will come out of the
|
|
coalitions formed to conduct demonstrations in
|
|
early January. One of the largest coalitions was
|
|
formed in San Francisco with the participation of
|
|
31 separate groups, and there is clearly a basis
|
|
for long-term activity around this issue there,
|
|
although its form remains to be seen.
|
|
|
|
What the Future May Bring
|
|
|
|
Several factors indicate that the EZLN will affect
|
|
Mexican politics for some time to come. Since they
|
|
have such a strong base in the population of
|
|
Chiapas, time is to their advantage. Increased
|
|
repression by the Mexican army will only reinforce
|
|
resentment on the part of the Chiapanecos and push
|
|
them towards the Zapatistas. There is already
|
|
evidence of that sort of sympathy spreading in the
|
|
actions of campesinos taking over their town halls.
|
|
In addition, there is the possibility of other
|
|
armed actions breaking out. There have been two
|
|
armed incidents in the state of Guerrero since Jan 1
|
|
(both largely unreported). It remains to be seen
|
|
whether and to what extent any of the other armed
|
|
groups will surface before August, but it seems
|
|
certain that at least a few will try to disrupt the
|
|
elections.
|
|
|
|
Anti-authoritarians should support the Zapatistas
|
|
(and should draw inspiration from their bold
|
|
actions) but we should not do so uncritically.
|
|
There are tensions and problems within the politics
|
|
of the EZLN as we currently understand them, and
|
|
others are certain to surface.
|
|
|
|
As we continue to struggle to find issues of broad-
|
|
ranging concern with the power to ignite people to
|
|
political action, we need to use the opportunity
|
|
presented to us by the revolutionaries in Me'xico.
|
|
The likelihood of the rebellion in Chiapas having
|
|
begun a long term class war in Me'xico, combined
|
|
with NAFTA, explain the US intervention. Our
|
|
failure to recognize the importance of the fight in
|
|
southern Me'xico would mean losing out on an
|
|
opportunity to finally demonstrate that revolutions
|
|
do not need to assume control of the state
|
|
apparatus to be successful; that revolutions can be
|
|
based on an idea as simple, and as profound, as
|
|
poor peasants taking control of the land, and their
|
|
lives.
|
|
|
|
[Communique packets available. Send $1 and 3 stamps to
|
|
L&R]
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
__________________________________________________
|
|
Love and Rage is a Revolutionary Anarchist
|
|
Newspaper published bimonthly by the Love and Rage
|
|
Revolutionary Anarchist Federation.
|
|
|
|
Email subscriptions cost $10 per year (6 issues)
|
|
Paper subscriptions are $13 first class or outside
|
|
of the US and PR/ $9 Third class (in US and PR)
|
|
Amor y Rabia is the Spanish-language version and is
|
|
available for similar rates.
|
|
|
|
Love and Rage POB 853 Stuy. Sta, NY, NY 10009 USA
|
|
e-mail: lnr@blythe.org voice/fax (212) 460 8390
|
|
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