840 lines
31 KiB
Plaintext
840 lines
31 KiB
Plaintext
Red & Black Revolution
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A magazine of libertarian communism
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Issue 1 October 1994
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Produced by Workers Solidarity Movement
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Trade Union Fightback
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The lessons to be learned
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The Programme for National Recovery,
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launched in October 1987, was the
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culmination of almost a year of talks
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between the Irish Congress of Trade Unions
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and the then Fianna Fail government led by
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Charlie Haughey. It was a three-year deal
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which committed the trade union movement to
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industrial peace in return for 'moderate'
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pay increases (i.e less than inflation), tax
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reform, and government action on
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unemployment. Pointing to the situation in
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Britain where Thatcher had decimated trade
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union organisation, ICTU leaders claimed
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that the deal would protect the movement
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here from similar attacks from the right.
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It was sold to workers on the basis that by
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accepting pay increases which were lower
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than inflation, this would help the
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government to get the public finances under
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control and that as a result of this jobs
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would be created. Despite the fact that
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within days of the Programme's launch (at a
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Press reception attended by the entire
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Fianna Fail cabinet and the leadership of
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ICTU) the government announced a massive
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round of public service cuts, and despite
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the fact that the Programme itself
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specifically endorsed job losses in the
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public sector, ICTU leaders heralded the PNR
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as a victory for the trade union movement.
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What ICTU failed to point out was that the
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only side which had given specific
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commitments in the deal was the trade
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unions. While pay increases were
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specifically pegged at rates which were well
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below expected inflation - with no review
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for at least two years - commitments by
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government and employers were couched in
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vague and generalised terms. Indeed, it
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would be more correct to describe them as
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aspirations rather than commitments. The
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deal was opposed by some on the grounds that
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it was a poor deal, that more could have
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been achieved with stronger negotiators.
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Others - including the WSM - opposed the
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very notion of the trade union leadership
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doing centralised deals with government and
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employers over the heads of the members.
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So began what was to become known as "social
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partnership", leading to The Programme for
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Economic and Social Progress (1991 - 1993)
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and the current deal the Programme for
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Competitiveness and Work (due to run until
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the end of 1996). Each succesive deal has
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brought ICTU closer and closer to the
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government - to the extent that it is no
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exaggeration to describe them as being the
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third arm of the current Fianna Fail/Labour
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coalition government. All of the
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consequences pointed out by the deals'
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opponents back in 1987 have come to
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fruition.
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When the Programme for National Recovery
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(PNR) was proposed for ratification by the
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Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) in
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October 1987, organised opposition was
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negligible. Most of the left appeared to be
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almost unaware of the long term consequences
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of the bureaucrats' adoption of "social
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partnership" and only about a dozen
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independent socialists, Trotskyists and
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anarchists got together to run a limited
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campaign, producing no more than a couple of
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thousand leaflets and posters.
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At the beginning of the PNR's third and
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final year, ICTU held a special conference
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(February 8th 1990) to discuss its continued
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involvement in the Programme. To coincide
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with this conference, the Portobello
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Unemployed Action Group (PUAG) organised a
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public meeting under the title "Withdraw
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from the Programme; Fight the Cuts " .
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This meeting attracted no more than twenty
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people - including most of those involved in
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the 1987 campaign. Yet from this small
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beginning, it was decided to establish a
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campaign to work for the rejection of a PNR
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MarkII.
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Over the following months, Trade Unionists
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and Unemployed against the Programme (TUUAP)
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was established and managed to build a
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campaign which attracted the sponsorship of
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over 300 trade union activists across most
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unions - both public and private sector
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-with groups in over a dozen towns and
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cities. Although the number of campaign
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activists was considerably smaller than
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this, TUUAP organised two successful
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conferences (one of which was attended by
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over 130 people) and public meetings in at
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least 10 different venues. In the 3-week
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period before the vote on the Programme for
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Economic and Social Progress (PESP) almost
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100,000 leaflets were distributed. In
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addition local TUUAP groups in several areas
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produced their own leaflets and sectoral
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leaflets were distributed among INTO, TUI,
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Public Sector and Building workers.
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TUUAP brought together shop stewards and
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activists from SIPTU, ATGWU, IDATU, TUI,
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INTO, ASTI, MSF, CWU, CPSU, IMPACT, AEU,
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ETU, NEETU, NUSMW, AGEMOU, UCATT, GMBTU,
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BATU, EEPTU, NGA, PNA, PSEU, NUJ, BFAWU,
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UMTTIE as well as unemployed activists from
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Dublin, Thurles, Clonmel and Portlaoise.
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Groups were established in Dublin, Cork,
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Limerick, Galway, Waterford, Dungarvan,
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Shannon, Clonmel, Thurles, Portlaoise,
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Dundalk, Drogheda and Letterkenny. Public
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meetings were held around the country,
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factories were leafletted, motions brought
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to branch meetings and to trades councils.
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For the first time in years there was the
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genesis of a challenge to the leadership's
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thinking.
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In Dublin, the TUUAP group met fortnightly -
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and weekly when required. Attendances varied
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somewhat but there was always a minimum of
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between 15 and 20, with an average
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attendance of 25 to 30. There was a
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constant buzz of activity and TUUAP
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activists formed the backbone of the
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Waterford Glass Strike Support Group. Trade
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union meetings, Trades Council meetings,
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etc. were all leafletted looking for support
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for the campaign. Press releases and
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letters to the papers were issued weekly
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(sometimes even two or three a week) &
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several press conferences were held. While
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the media were not very generous in their
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coverage, the campaign did make the front
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page of the national dailies on more than
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one occasion. In the three week period of
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the vote on PESP, this activity reached its
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peak and over 40 people distributed
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approximately 50,000 leaflets in the Dublin
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area alone. There was therefore a consistent
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level of activity and a sense that the
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campaign was a real and genuine attempt to
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challenge the concept of 'social
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partnership'.
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Less Glorious
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The history of TUUAP in the post-PESP period
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is, however, somewhat less glorious. The
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Conference held on 25th May 1991 attracted
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an attendance of less than 60 with just 9
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people from outside Dublin. This conference
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debated 19 motions - all of which envisaged
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the campaign continuing on in some form.
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Among the objectives which these motions set
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out for a supposedly renewed TUUAP were to
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"...campaign against the [Industrial
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Relations] Act..." (Motion A)
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"...constitute ...as an ongoing campaign..."
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(Motion B)
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"...maintain and develop the network of shop
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stewards and trade union activists built up
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around TUUAP..." (Motion C)
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"...intervene in all workers' struggles,
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initiating support groups for strikes,
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raising financial support and
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solidarity..."(Motion F)
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"...raise in...public sector unions the need
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for action to defend the C&A scheme" (Motion
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I)
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"...renew the struggle...to force a change
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in the policy of ICTU, as expressed through
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the PNR and the PESP, to the public
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sector..."(Motion J)
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"...produce a regular newspaper/bulletin..."
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(Motion L)
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"...provide practical and organisational
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support to strikes as they occur..." (Motion
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P)
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...stand/support candidates for
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Branch/Regional/National Executive
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Committees..." (Motion Q)
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The reality however was somewhat different.
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Having begun life as a single-issue
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campaign, much of the energy around TUUAP
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was already dissipated by the time of the
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conference. The core group of activists had
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dwindled to less than ten and nothing that
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was said at the conference indicated that
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this core group was likely to increase in
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size.
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In fact in the post-conference scenario, the
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number of activists dwindled even further
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and nothing more than the rather irregular
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production of a newsletter was possible. In
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early 1992, it was decided to attempt to
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expand this newsletter to a more regular
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tabloid-size publication. However after
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just two issues (April/May 1992 and Autumn
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1992) this had to be abandoned due to a lack
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of resources and personnel. While the
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response to "Trade Union Fighttback " (as
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the paper was titled) was generally
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positive, the number of people willing to
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take out subscriptions, take copies for sale
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or indeed write articles for publication was
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disappointingly small and meant that the
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venture was unsustainable.
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Poor response
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As PESP began to approach the end of its
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life, several attempts were made to
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reconstitute TUUAP as a campaigning group
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with some real base. The name was changed
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to "Trade Union Fightback" (TUF) at a
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'national' meeting held on 22nd May 1993.
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It was an indication of what was to come
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that this meeting had an attendance of less
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than 30 people - with just one from outside
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Dublin. Despite several mailouts to almost
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300 contacts in the months between May 1993
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and February 1994, the response was almost
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non-existent. Dublin meetings - even during
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the vote on PESP's successor, the Programme
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for Competitiveness and Work (PCW) - had
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less than ten regular attenders. In the
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rest of the country there was only one
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formal meeting - in Portlaoise where the
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initiative came from an unemployed TUF
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supporter. In the end, the campaign
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amounted to just 5,000 leaflets, most of
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which were posted to contacts in the hope
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that they would be distributed.
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It is difficult to explain exactly why a
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campaign which had put up one hell of a
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fight in 1990/1991 was hardly able to raise
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even a whimper of protest in late 1993. I
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think, however, that the writing was on the
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wall since the conference of May 1991. In
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hindsight we can see that the attendance at
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that conference (or rather those who did not
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attend) was evidence of a huge
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demoralisation following the ballot. To a
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certain extent TUUAP had become a victim of
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its own success. A campaign which had begun
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as an attempt to maximise the 'No' vote had
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drawn in such a layer of supporters that
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some people began to feel that we could
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actually deliver a rejection of the PESP.
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When we failed to achieve the result,
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demoralisation set in. If at that
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conference in May '91, we had taken stock of
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the situation, and taken this into account,
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perhaps we would have adopted a more
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realistic set of motions.
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The subsuquent period of time (i.e. 1991,
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'92, '93) saw an even greater fall-off in
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general trade union and political activity
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than had been the case in the previous
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number of years. Disillusionment with trade
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unions was more the rule than the exception
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and TUUAP/TUF's attempts to keep going as a
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focus for anti-'social partnership' activity
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fell onto the shoulders of just three or
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four activists. As the PCW approached,
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Militant Labour decided to focus its
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energies on the newly-established Militant
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Labour Trade Union Group, the Socialist
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Workers Movement made no attempt to involve
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themselves in the campaign and again it was
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left to a handful of activists to attempt to
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launch a 'national' campaign. It simply
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proved unsustainable and, following a
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disastrous campaign, the few people who had
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attempted to keep the initiative alive were
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left with no option but to formally wind up
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TUF - at least for the time being.
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Untapped Potential?
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In attempting to analyse the level of
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success or failure which TUUAP/TUF achieved,
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it is important to start from a position of
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realising exactly what the initiative
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represented. Was it laden with untapped
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potential? With a more 'correct' programme
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could TUUAP/TUF have become the genesis of a
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mass rank-and-file movement? Or did it
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simply tap into an anti-'social partnership'
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feeling among a layer of activists and
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provide a forum through which their activity
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could be co-ordinated?
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As already mentioned, TUUAP was established
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as a single-issue campaign. It had one
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objective - to defeat the ICTU's planned
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successor to the PNR (or at least to
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maximise the vote against). In a document
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circulated to TUUAP activists in the lead-up
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to the Conference of 25th May 1991, Des
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Derwin (TUUAP Chairperson) stated
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"It need not have been a shop stewards
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campaign. It was never explicitly so and
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the level of participation indicates that it
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was hardly a spontaneous initiative from the
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shop stewards of Ireland! The aim was to
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defeat or at least oppose the Programme and
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it could have been an organisation of
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concerned individuals like most single-issue
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campaigns. And, let's face it, as regards
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its core and activities it was like that,
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with little participation from the shop
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stewards on the ground and, of course, no
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structural participation from union
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committees etc."(1)
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Further on, he continued
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"At base TUUAP committed many stewards and
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union activists to opposing the Programmes
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and to a modestly comprehensive 'fightback'
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alternative programme. For many this was
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their first embracing of alternative ideas
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for the labour movement and they may not
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even be aware of the many other practical
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and comprehensive proposals for change and
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advance."(2)
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So TUUAP achieved the endorsement of a
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relatively broad layer of trade union
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activists united on the specific issue of
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fighting PNR/PESP. It never attempted to
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present a radical alternative strategy for
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democracy and change in the trade union
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movement. While the 300 or so sponsors of
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the campaign were united in their criticism
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of the state of the movement and the
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direction in which trade union leaders were
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taking it, there was not necessarily
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agreement on all the tactics and strategies
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which would be needed to reclaim the
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movement.
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Indeed, there was always a considerable gap
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betwen the level of formal support (as
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expressed by endorsement of the TUUAP
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statement) and the level of active support.
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As Des Derwin put it:
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"While TUUAP could present itself now and
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again as an alliance of shop stewards (the
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Dublin press conferences, the National
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Conference, the founding meetings of the
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main groups, its literature), these were
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exceptional occasions, requiring great
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organising efforts (and even then only a
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small minority of the signatories were
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involved) and the active nuclei in the
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groups were very small and did not retain
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the participation of many 'ordinary decent'
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stewards and reps."(3)
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Nevertheless the campaign could justifiably
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claim to be the biggest and most
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representative gathering of shop stewards
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and activists since the national federation
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of shop stewards and rank and file
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committees of the 1970's. As already
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mentioned, fortnightly meetings in Dublin in
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the months leading up to the PESP ballot
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were very well attended (20-30 attended
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regularly). Many groups outside the capital
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produced and distributed local leaflets.
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The distribution of almost 100,000 leaflets
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in the 3 weeks immediately before the ballot
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indicated a high level of activism - albeit
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for a limited period.
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Following the ballot however the unifying
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factor of campaigning for a No vote was
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gone. Having provided a co-ordinating
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structure for trade unionists who wished to
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oppose the PESP, TUUAP now had to look to
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the future and attempt to discover a way to
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use what had been achieved as a base for
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building a more long-term focus for
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opposition to the rightward stampede of the
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leadership.
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Narrow Focus
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While the majority consensus in TUUAP had
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been that the campaign should - in the run
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up to the ballot - confine itself to the
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maximisation of the No vote, there had been
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a school of thought - mainly represented by
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Irish Workers Group (IWG) members active in
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the campaign - that this focus was too
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narrow. The IWG paper "Class Struggle"
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argued
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"...lodged within the singleness of purpose
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with which TUUAP approaches its goal is a
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fundamental contradiction. Insofar as it
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limits itself to the single isue of getting
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out the 'no' vote, the campaign has turned
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its back on the vital need to build an
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alternative to the Plan. This is a fatal
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flaw - for when faced with a barrage of
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propaganda coming from the union tops, many
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workers who are thoroughly sickened by the
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programme still see no real alternative to
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it."(4)
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IWG argued that TUUAP should aim to be more
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than a 'vote no' campaign:
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"Its branches and sectoral groups can and
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must become the basis, not only for
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mobilising a No vote, but for taking up
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related issues. The key to this is to
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develop beyond limited anti-PNR bulletins
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and begin to organise rank and file
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bulletins in each sector.....They must be
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constituted as a permanent network of
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militant activists that will remain in
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existence long after the battle over the PNR
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is fought, to co-ordinate a class-wide
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response to the bosses' attacks."(5)
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Looking back on the history of TUUAP after
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the PESP ballot, this is still the question
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for debate - would TUUAP have been any more
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of a 'viable entity' in May 1991 if it had
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twelve months previously set as one of its
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main objectives the building of a rank-and-
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file movement?
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Rhetorical Gesture
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There were very few TUUAP activists who were
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- and are - not fully aware of the need for
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a mass rank-and-file movement. If, however,
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TUUAP had set the building of such a
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movement as an immediate objective, it is
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likely that differences would have arisen as
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to the tactics, strategies and indeed
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structures needed. In any event, to have
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done so without first establishing a solid
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base among shop stewards and union activists
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would have been nothing more than a
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rhetorical gesture.
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A rank-and-file movement cannot be willed
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into existence. It will not be the cause of
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on-the-ground activity but will come about
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as the result of such activity. TUUAP/TUF
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was never - at any stage of its existence -
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in a position to declare itself a shop
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stewards/rank-and-file movement:
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"Although it may wish to adopt the aim of
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establishing a shop stewards movement, the
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proportion nationally of shop stewards
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involved in TUUAP, the input from workplaces
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(as opposed to individual activists) and
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committes, the level of participation beyond
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formal support, and the breadth of the basis
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of that support (opposition to the
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Programmes) are all insufficient to describe
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TUUAP or its immediate successor as a shop
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stewards movement...it would be a shell
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without any real substance."(6)
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A genuine rank-and-file movement will only
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be built as a result of both experience of
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struggle and clearly worked-out ideas of
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what can be done within the unions. There
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is no evidence to suggest that had TUUAP
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from its outset set the building of such a
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movement as one of its main aims, it would
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have been one iota closer to the achievement
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of that aim by the time voting on the PESP
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had finished.
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Low ebb
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Industrial and political struggle in the
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1990-'91 period - and since - was at a low
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ebb. Workers' confidence is low and most
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industrial struggle which is taking place is
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of a defensive rather than an offensive
|
|
nature. All trade union activists are aware
|
|
of the growing sense of apathy and
|
|
disillusionment and the fact that trade
|
|
union consciousness can no longer be taken
|
|
for granted. Attendance at union meetings
|
|
is extremely low and even Phil Flynn (IMPACT
|
|
general secretary and current President of
|
|
ICTU) complained of the low level of
|
|
participation in the ballot on the PCW. (7)
|
|
For a whole layer of workers - both young
|
|
and not so young - 'the union' is something
|
|
abstract and this sense of alienation is
|
|
deepened by the "New Realism" and "social
|
|
partnership" of the leadership.
|
|
|
|
In a feature in "Industrial Relations News"
|
|
(IRN) in early 1993, Norman Croke (SIPTU
|
|
official and recent candidate for the vice-
|
|
presidency of that union) admitted that
|
|
centralised bargaining is eroding trade
|
|
union democracy
|
|
"When negotiations take place in camera
|
|
through the aegis of the Social Partners,
|
|
active trade union membership participation
|
|
is severely curtailed. Trade union members
|
|
and lay officials are relegated to the
|
|
position of passive observer within their
|
|
own organisation and workplace." (8)
|
|
Croke noted that in a study of membership
|
|
participation carried out in the Irish
|
|
Transport and General Workers Union (ITGWU)
|
|
- forerunner to SIPTU - during a period of
|
|
decentralised wage bargaining and reported
|
|
in IRN 24/1989, 81% of trade union members
|
|
studied had participated in votes on wage
|
|
deals. However, the result of SIPTU's
|
|
ballot on the PESP showed that out of a
|
|
claimed membership at the time (1991) of
|
|
208,000 (he admits that the actual book
|
|
membership was only approximately 180,000),
|
|
only 90,805 members voted. In other words,
|
|
only 50.5% of members cast a vote, showing
|
|
that 30% more trade union members voted when
|
|
the wage deal was negotiated locally through
|
|
free collective bargaining. More recently,
|
|
this conclusion has been reinforced by the
|
|
vote on the PCW. Of SIPTU's claimed 1993
|
|
membership of 197,500, only 91,419 (46.3%)
|
|
participated in the ballot. (It is
|
|
interesting to note here that only 61,173
|
|
SIPTU members - 31% of the total membership
|
|
- actually voted in favour of the PCW).
|
|
|
|
Croke himself carried out a study of the
|
|
opinions of a sample of 91 lay activist and
|
|
rank-and-file members within SIPTU - a study
|
|
whose findings reiterated the fact that
|
|
centralised bargaining has increasingly
|
|
isolated ordinary trade unionists from the
|
|
decision making process. Among the comments
|
|
made by Croke in the course of his IRN
|
|
article are
|
|
"...rank-and-file participation at the
|
|
central decision making forums is all but
|
|
non-existent..."
|
|
"...trade union activists and members have a
|
|
preference for decentralised bargaining and
|
|
prefer such bargaining to be undertaken by
|
|
their elected shop stewards and local full-
|
|
time Branch officials."
|
|
"...the developing consensus or Social
|
|
Partnership approach to industrial relations
|
|
within the trade union movement is confined
|
|
principally to the leadership..."
|
|
"The implications for the trade union
|
|
leadership and movement in containing lay
|
|
and rank-and-file activists in a passive
|
|
role...carries with it the danger that the
|
|
leadership and the movement may become less
|
|
relevant to its members."(9)
|
|
|
|
While we do not need Norman Croke or anybody
|
|
else to tell us that 'social partnership' is
|
|
anti-democratic, it is interesting to note
|
|
that even among the bureaucrats there is a
|
|
realisation that it is not safe for them to
|
|
be too open about their duplicity. And
|
|
while the bureaucracy will remain happy
|
|
enough with a quiet, disillusioned
|
|
membership (as long as that membership
|
|
continues to fund their huge salaries and
|
|
high-flying lifestyles), our challenge is to
|
|
turn the apathy into anger and a demand for
|
|
change.
|
|
|
|
What's to be done?
|
|
The question for trade union activists is
|
|
not whether rank-and-file activity is a good
|
|
thing but how such activity can be motivated
|
|
- in other words, what are the aims,
|
|
structures and strategies needed to combat
|
|
the apathy and, in periods of low activity
|
|
such as we are currently experiencing, where
|
|
should our energies be directed? With over
|
|
55% of all Irish employees unionised, there
|
|
is a great potential power in the trade
|
|
union movement. The tapping of that
|
|
potential poses a challenge for all those
|
|
interested in building a free and democratic
|
|
society. It is important that in discussing
|
|
what can be achieved, we realistically
|
|
assess the current position and avoid
|
|
trotting out ritualistic slogans.
|
|
|
|
On the organised left, the main strategies
|
|
put forward for trade union work could be
|
|
summarised as 1.Building Broad Lefts, 2.
|
|
Rank-and-filism 3.Building a Solidarity
|
|
Network (Laying the groundwork) . It is
|
|
crucial that we understand what each
|
|
involves.
|
|
|
|
1. The Broad Left Strategy
|
|
The principal objective of the Broad Left
|
|
Strategy is to elect a more 'radical' or
|
|
'left-wing' leadership. Those who advocate
|
|
a Broad Left Strategy do of course usually
|
|
argue for officials to be electable and re-
|
|
callable and for them to be paid at the
|
|
average wage of the members they represent.
|
|
The fundamental flaw in this strategy is
|
|
however that it is presumed that by electing
|
|
a new leadership the unions can be changed
|
|
from the top down.
|
|
|
|
This strategy does not however address the
|
|
basic problem. Just as society cannot be
|
|
improved fundamentally by electing a 'left-
|
|
wing' government, neither can the trade
|
|
union movement be reformed in this way.
|
|
Pursuit of the Broad Left Strategy means
|
|
that the election of leaders becomes more
|
|
important than fighting for changes in the
|
|
very rules and structures of the movement
|
|
which would allow for more democratic
|
|
participation.
|
|
|
|
Just as Anarchists believe that workers do
|
|
not need leaders to organise our society, so
|
|
we contend that the potential power of the
|
|
trade union movement is stymied by the
|
|
current divisions between leaders and led.
|
|
Real decision making is concentrated in the
|
|
hands of a very small number of people.
|
|
This situation has been compounded by the
|
|
amalgamations and 'rationalisation of
|
|
structures' which have occured over the past
|
|
number of years.
|
|
|
|
Within the current structures, a trade union
|
|
official's role is that of arbitrator,
|
|
conciliator and fixer. In order to fulfil
|
|
this role, an official must have control of
|
|
his/her members. If an employer cannot be
|
|
sure that the official can deliver workers'
|
|
compliance with a deal, why would that
|
|
employer bother with negotiations at all?
|
|
It is because of this that officials are so
|
|
quick to condemn 'unofficial' action (i.e.
|
|
action which hasn't been given their
|
|
approval) and this is also the reason why
|
|
the average official does not encourage a
|
|
high level of debate and activity among the
|
|
rank-and-file.
|
|
|
|
No matter how 'radical' the official might
|
|
personally be, the structures of the
|
|
movement dictate that he/she is not in a
|
|
position to encourage members to fight for
|
|
their demands. The Broad Left Strategy -
|
|
while usually padded out by calls for a
|
|
'fighting leadership' (whatever that is!)
|
|
and for internal democracy and
|
|
accountability - is essentially aimed at the
|
|
election of a new leadership who will
|
|
supposedly bring about change from the top.
|
|
It fails to address the crunch issue - it is
|
|
not the individual leaders who are the real
|
|
problem, rather it is the structures which
|
|
give them all-encompassing power.
|
|
|
|
2.Rank-and-Filism
|
|
This strategy involves fighting within the
|
|
trade unions for more democracy, more
|
|
struggle and more involvement by 'ordinary'
|
|
members. It is a strategy with which
|
|
Anarchists would be in full agreement. As
|
|
already mentioned, however, a rank-and-file
|
|
movement cannot be willed into existence.
|
|
Constant repititious calls for the building
|
|
of a rank-and-file movement do little or
|
|
nothing to bring about such a movement.
|
|
Where such groupings have existed in the
|
|
past they have come about as a result of
|
|
groups of workers coming to the realisation
|
|
that the union bureaucracy is an obstacle to
|
|
them in their struggle. In circumstances
|
|
where they are denied sanction for strikes
|
|
or find themselves being dragged into
|
|
endless rounds of mediation, conciliation,
|
|
Labour Court hearings, Labour Relations
|
|
Commissions etc., workers often come to the
|
|
conclusion that it is necessary to bypass
|
|
the union officials in order to fight. It
|
|
is when workers are in conflict with bosses,
|
|
when their confidence in the bureaucracy has
|
|
been eroded and when they themselves are
|
|
confident enough to take up the fight that
|
|
they realise the need for independent
|
|
organisation within the unions. The point
|
|
is that - as I mentioned earlier- rank-and-
|
|
file movements come about as a result of
|
|
workers' confidence and experience of
|
|
struggle - not the other way round. At a
|
|
time of low struggle and confidence, any
|
|
attempt to build such a movement will
|
|
attract only a very small number of
|
|
activists. That is not to say that such
|
|
attempts (where they arise from a genuine
|
|
anti-bureaucratic feeling) are wrong, just
|
|
to counsel against unrealistic goals.
|
|
|
|
3.The Solidarity Network
|
|
Nothing is to be gained by constantly
|
|
putting out calls for the ideal- a genuine
|
|
mass rank-and-file movement which would take
|
|
the power away from the bureaucrats. Indeed
|
|
the constant issuing of such calls can often
|
|
provide cover for those who do not wish to
|
|
make a realistic assessment of the current
|
|
position and apply themselves to what can be
|
|
done in the here and now.
|
|
|
|
In a climate of widespread
|
|
disillusionment/demoralisation, TUUAP/TUF's
|
|
great strength was that it provided a forum
|
|
for an admittedly small layer of activists
|
|
to come together on a limited platform. It
|
|
aimed - and to some extent at least
|
|
succeeded - to break down the isolation felt
|
|
by the most militant activists. It provided
|
|
a network for efforts to be pooled against
|
|
the concept of 'social partnership'. I
|
|
believe that the correct decision was made
|
|
at the outset when TUUAP confined itself to
|
|
the maximisation of the 'No' vote on PESP
|
|
II. This did not mean that all the other
|
|
issues which confront the trade union
|
|
movement were ignored. It meant instead
|
|
that these issues could be discussed in an
|
|
open non-sectarian manner.
|
|
|
|
In periods of low struggle such as that
|
|
which we are currently experiencing, it is
|
|
important that trade unionists take stock of
|
|
the possibilities for action, that we
|
|
address and debate issues such as:- What is
|
|
the best way to organise the reclamation of
|
|
the trade union movement by rank-and-file
|
|
activists? What tactics should be employed
|
|
when an upturn in struggle does come? It is
|
|
also important for socialists within the
|
|
trade unions to continue to provide support
|
|
for those struggles which do occur. (In fact
|
|
such support is even more necessary in
|
|
periods of low struggle in that those trade
|
|
union battles which do take place are
|
|
invariably of a defensive nature). Now is
|
|
the time for those of us who wish to see
|
|
wholesale change in the trade unions and
|
|
their structures to be laying the
|
|
groundwork, to be identifying key
|
|
acticivists and discussing issues with them,
|
|
to be building contacts within various
|
|
sectors and various unions. This is work
|
|
which can often be slow, tedious and
|
|
unglamorous but it is work which is crucial
|
|
if we are ever to take realistic steps along
|
|
the road to building the oft-demanded 'mass
|
|
rank-and-file movement'. This is what we
|
|
mean when we talk about building a
|
|
Solidarity Network, what is involved in
|
|
reality is the laying of the foundation
|
|
stones for our greater ambitions.
|
|
|
|
While TUUAP/TUF has now been formally laid
|
|
to rest, such initiaives will inevitably
|
|
arise again. Whether as strike support
|
|
groups , action groups within individual
|
|
unions or more long-term pro-democracy,
|
|
anti-bureaucracy campaigns, workers will
|
|
always be coming together and discussing the
|
|
issues which confront us. Anarchists will
|
|
be to the forefront of these discussions -
|
|
not as self-appointed leaders but as a
|
|
'leadership of ideas' - arguing for change
|
|
and working to bring about that change.
|
|
|
|
References
|
|
1. Derwin, Des: "Some thoughts on the future
|
|
of TUUAP", May 1991. Page 2
|
|
2. ibid. Page 2
|
|
3. ibid. Page 3
|
|
4. "Class Struggle" No.22 November/December
|
|
1990. Page 2 "TUUAP Challenge"
|
|
5. ibid.
|
|
6. Derwin, Des op. cit.
|
|
7. Reported in "Irish Times", Monday 21st
|
|
March 1994.
|
|
8. Croke, Norman: "Trade Union Membership
|
|
Participation in Centralised Bargaining"
|
|
in Industrial Relations News No.2, 14th
|
|
January 1993. Page 17.
|
|
9. Croke, Norman op. cit. Pp. 18-21
|
|
|
|
|
|
|