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The Proletariat as Subject and Representation
The equal right of all to the goods and enjoyment of this world, the
destruction of all authority, the negation of all moral restraints --
these, at bottom, are the raison d'être of the March 18th insurrection and
the charter of the fearsome organization that furnished it with an army.
Enquête parlementaire sur l'insurrection du 18 mars
73
The real movement that abolishes reigning conditions governed society from
the moment the bourgeoisie triumphed in the economic sphere, and it did so
visibly once that victory was translated onto the political plane. The
development of the forces of production had shattered the old relations of
production; every static order had crumbled to nothing. And everything that
had formerly been absolute became historical.
74
It is because human beings have thus been thrust into history, and into
participation in the labor and the struggles which constitute history, that
they find themselves obliged to view their relationships in a clear-eyed
manner. The history in question has no goal aside from whatever effects it
works upon itself, even though the last unconscious metaphysical vision of
the historical era may view the productive progression through which history
has unfolded as itself the object of that history. As for the subject of
history, it can only be the self-production of the living: the living
becoming master and possessor of its world -- that is, of history -- and
coming to exist as consciousness of its own activity.
75
The class struggles of the long revolutionary period ushered in by the rise
of the bourgeoisie have evolved in tandem with the "thought of history," with
the dialectic -- with a truly historical thinking that is not content simply
to seek the meaning of what is but aspires to understand the dissolution of
everything that is -- and in the process to dissolve all separation.
76
For Hegel it was no longer a matter of interpreting the world, but rather of
interpreting the world's transformation. Inasmuch as he did no more than
interpret that transformation, however, Hegel was merely the philosophical
culmination of philosophy. He sought to understand a world that made itself.
Such historical thought was still part of that consciousness which comes on
the scene too late and supplies a justification after the fact. It thus
transcended separation -- but it did so in thought only. Hegel's paradoxical
posture, which subordinates the meaning of all reality to its historical
culmination, while at the same time revealing this meaning by proclaiming
itself to be that culmination, arises from the simple fact that the great
thinker of the bourgeois revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries strove in his philosophy merely for reconciliation with the results
of those revolutions. "Even as a philosophy of the bourgeois revolution, it
does not reflect the entire process of that revolution, but only its
concluding phase. It is thus a philosophy, not of the revolution, but of the
restoration" (Karl Korsch, "Theses on Hegel and Revolution"). Hegel performed
the task of the philosopher -- "the glorification of what exists" -- for the
last time, but, even for him, what existed could only be the totality of the
movement of history. Since the external position of thought was nevertheless
maintained, this could be masked only by identifying that thought with a
preexisting project of the Spirit -- of that absolute heroic force which has
done what it willed and willed what it has done, that force whose achievement
is the present. So philosophy, as it expires in the arms of truly historical
thinking, can no longer glorify its world without denying it, for even in
order to express itself it must assume that the total history in which it has
vested everything has come to an end, and that the only court capable of
ruling on truth or falsehood has been adjourned.
77
When the proletariat demonstrates through its own actions that historical
thought has not after all forgotten and lost itself, that thought's
conclusions are negated, but at the same time the validity of its method is
confirmed.
78
Historical thought can be saved only if it becomes practical thought; and the
practice of the proletariat as a revolutionary class cannot be less than
historical consciousness applied to the totality of its world. All the
theoretical strands of the revolutionary workers' movement stem from critical
confrontation with Hegelian thought, and this goes for Marx as for Stirner
and Bakunin.
79
The inseparability of Marx's theory from the Hegelian method is itself
inseparable from that theory's revolutionary character, that is to say, from
its truth. It is under this aspect that the relationship between Marx and
Hegel has generally been ignored, ill understood or even denounced as the
weak point of what has been fallaciously transformed into a Marxist dogma.
Deploring the less-than-scientific predictions of the Manifesto of 1848
concerning the imminence of proletarian revolution in Germany, Bernstein
perfectly described this connection between the dialectical method and a
historical taking of sides: "Such historical autosuggestion, so grievously
mistaken that the commonest of political visionaries would be hard pressed to
top it, would be incomprehensible in a Marx -- who by that period had already
become a serious student of the economy -- were it not possible to recognize
here the traces of a lingering loyalty to Hegel's antithetical dialectics,
from which Marx, no more than Engels, had never completely emancipated
himself. In view of the general turbulence of the times, this was all the
more fatal to him."
80
The inversion that Marx effected in order to salvage the thought of the
bourgeois revolutions by "transplanting" it was no trivial substitution of
the material development of the forces of production for the unfolding of the
Hegelian Spirit on its way to its rendezvous with itself in time, its
objectification being indistinguishable from its alienation, and its
historical wounds leaving no scars. For history, once it becomes real, no
longer has an end. What Marx did was to demolish Hegel's detached stance with
respect to what occurs, along with the contemplation of a supreme external
agent of whatever kind. Theory thence-forward had nothing to know beyond what
it itself did. By contrast, the contemplation of the movement of the economy
in the dominant thought of present-day society is indeed a non-inverted
legacy of the undialectical aspect of the Hegelian attempt to create a
circular system; this thought is an approbatory one which no longer has the
dimension of the concept, which no longer has any need of Hegelianism to
justify it, because the movement that it is designed to laud is a sector of
the world where thought no longer has any place -- a sector whose mechanical
development in effect dominates the world's development overall. Marx's
project is the project of a conscious history whereby the quantitative realm
that arises from the blind development of purely economic productive forces
would be transformed into a qualitative appropriation of history. The
critique of political economy is the first act of this end of prehistory: "Of
all the instruments of production, the greatest productive power is the
revolutionary class itself."
81
The close affinity of Marx's thinking with scientific thinking lies in its
rational grasp of the forces actually at work in society. Fundamentally,
though, Marx's theory lies beyond science, which is only preserved within it
inasmuch as it is transcended by it. For Marx it is the struggle -- and by no
means the law -- that has to be understood. "We know only a single science,"
says The German Ideology, "the science of history."
82
The bourgeois era, though eager to give history a scientific foundation,
neglects the fact that the science available to it must certainly have been
itself founded -- along with the economy -- on history. On the other hand,
history is fundamentally dependent on economic knowledge only so long as it
remains merely economic history. History's intervention in the economy (a
global process that is after all capable of changing its own basic scientific
preconditions) has in fact been overlooked by scientific observers to a
degree well illustrated by the vain calculations of those socialists who
believed that they could ascertain the exact periodicity of crises. Now that
continual tinkering by the State has succeeded in compensating for the
tendency for crises to occur, the same type of reasoning takes this delicate
balance for a permanent economic harmony. If it is to master the science of
society and bring it under its governance, the project of transcending the
economy and taking possession of history cannot itself be scientific in
character. The revolutionary point of view, so long as it persists in
espousing the notion that history in the present period can be mastered by
means of scientific knowledge, has failed to rid itself of all its bourgeois
traits.
83
The utopian strands in socialism, though they do have their historical roots
in the critique of the existing social organization, are properly so called
inasmuch as they deny history -- inasmuch, that is, as they deny the struggle
that exists, along with any movement of the times beyond the immutable
perfection of their image of a happy society. Not, however, because they deny
science. On the contrary, the utopians were completely in thrall to
scientific thinking, in the form in which this had imposed itself in the
preceding centuries. Their goal was the perfection of this rational system.
They certainly did not look upon themselves as prophets disarmed, for they
believed firmly in the social power of scientific proof -- and even, in the
case of Saint-Simonism, in the seizure of power by science. "However did they
imagine," Sombart wonders, "that what needed to be proved might be won by
fighting?" All the same, the utopians' scientific orientation did not extend
to knowledge of the fact that social groups are liable to have vested
interests in a status quo, forces at their disposal equipped to maintain it
and indeed forms of false consciousness designed to buttress their positions.
Their idea of things thus lagged far behind the historical reality of the
development of science itself, which was by this time largely governed by the
social demand arising from factors, such as those mentioned above, which
determined not only what was considered scientifically acceptable but also
just what might become an object of scientific research. The utopian
socialists remained prisoners to the scientific manner of expounding the
truth, and they viewed this truth in accordance with its pure abstract image
-- the form in which it had established itself at a much earlier moment in
social development. As Sorel noted, the utopians took astronomy as their
model for the discovery and demonstration of the laws of society: their
conception of harmony, so hostile to history, was the product, logically
enough, of an attempted application to society of the science least dependent
on history. This conception was introduced and promoted with an experimental
ingenuousness worthy of Newtonism, and the smiling future continually evoked
by the utopians played "a role in their social science analogous to that
played by inertia in rational mechanics" (Matériaux pour une théorie du
prolétariat).
84
The scientific-determinist side of Marx's thought was indeed what made it
vulnerable to "ideologization"; the breach was opened in Marx's own lifetime,
and greatly widened in his theoretical legacy to the workers' movement. The
advent of the subject of history was consequently set back even further, as
economics, the historical science par excellence, was depended on more and
more as guarantor of the necessity of its own future negation. In this way
revolutionary practice -- the only true agent of this negation -- tended to
be thrust out of theory's field of vision altogether. It became important
patiently to study economic development, and once more to accept, with
Hegelian tranquility, the suffering it imposed -- that suffering whose
outcome was still a "graveyard of good intentions." All of a sudden it was
discovered that, according to the "science of revolutions," consciousness now
always came on the scene too soon, and needed to be taught. "History has
proved us, and all who thought like us, wrong," Engels would write in 1895.
"It has made it clear that the state of economic development on the Continent
at that time was not, by a long way, ripe...." Throughout his life Marx
upheld his theory's unitary standpoint, yet in the exposition of that theory
he was drawn onto the ground of the dominant forms of thought, in that he
undertook critiques of particular disciplines, and notably that of the
fundamental science of bourgeois society, political economy. It was in this
mutilated form, later taken as definitive, that Marx's theory became
"Marxism."
85
The weakness of Marx's theory is naturally part and parcel of the weakness of
the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat of his time. The working class
failed to inaugurate permanent revolution in 1848, and the Commune went down
in isolation. Revolutionary theory was thus still unable to come into full
possession of its own existence. That Marx should have been reduced to
defending and honing that theory in the detachment of scholarly work in the
British Museum can only have had a debilitating effect on the theory itself.
What is certain is that the scientific conclusions that Marx drew about the
future development of the working class -- along with the organizational
practice founded on them -- would later become obstacles to proletarian
consciousness.
86
All the theoretical shortcomings of a scientific defense of proletarian
revolution, be they in the content or in the form of the exposition, come
down in the end to the identification of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie
with respect to the revolutionary seizure of power.
87
As early as the Manifesto, the urge to demonstrate the scientific legitimacy
of proletarian power by citing a sequence of precedents only served to muddy
Marx's historical thinking. This approach led him to defend a linear model of
the development of modes of production according to which, at each stage,
class struggles would end "either in a revolutionary reconstitution of
society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes." The plain
facts of history, however, are that, just as the "Asiatic mode of production"
(as Marx himself observed in another connection) preserved its stasis in
spite of class conflict, so too no jacquerie of serfs ever overthrew the
barons and no slave revolt in the ancient world ever ended the rule of
freemen. The first thing the linear model loses sight of is the fact that the
bourgeoisie is the only revolutionary class that has ever been victorious;
the only class, also, for which the development of the economy was the cause
and consequence of its capture of society. The same simplified view led Marx
to neglect the economic role of the State in the management of a class
society. If the rising bourgeoisie appears to have liberated the economy from
the State, this is true only to the extent that the State was formerly the
instrument of class oppression in a static economy. The bourgeoisie developed
its autonomous economic power during the medieval period when the State had
been weakened, when feudalism was breaking up a stable equilibrium between
powers. The modern State, on the other hand, which first supported the
developing bourgeoisie thanks to the mercantile system, and then went on, in
the time of "laisser faire, laisser passer," to become the bourgeoisie's own
State, was eventually to emerge as wielder of a power central to the planned
management of the economic process. Marx was already able, under the rubric
of Bonapartism, accurately to depict a foreshadowing of modern State
bureaucracy in that fusion of capital and State which established "capital's
national power over labor and a public authority designed to maintain social
servitude"; the bourgeoisie thus renounced any historical existence beyond
its own reduction to the economic history of things, and permitted itself to
be "condemned along with the other classes to a like political nullity."
Already discernible in outline here are the sociopolitical bases of the
modern spectacle, which in a negative way defines the proletariat as the only
pretender to historical existence.
88
The only two classes that really correspond to Marx's theory, the two pure
classes that the whole thrust of Capital's analysis tends to bring to the
fore, are the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. These are also the only two
revolutionary classes in history -- but they are revolutionary under
different conditions. The bourgeois revolution is a fait accompli. The
proletarian revolution is a project, formulated on the basis of the earlier
revolution but differing qualitatively from it. To neglect the originality of
the bourgeoisie's historical role serves only to conceal the concrete
originality of the proletarian project, which can get nowhere unless it
advances under its own banner and comes to grips with the "prodigiousness of
its own aims." The bourgeoisie came to power because it was the class of the
developing economy. The proletariat will never come to embody power unless it
becomes the class of consciousness. The growth of the forces of production
cannot in itself guarantee this accession to power -- not even indirectly,
via the increase in dispossession that this growth entails. Nor can any
Jacobin-style seizure of the State be a means to that end. The proletariat
cannot make use of any ideology designed to pass partial goals off as general
ones, because it cannot maintain any partial reality that is truly its own.
89
It is true that during a certain period of his participation in the struggle
of the proletariat Marx overrated the value of scientific prediction --
indeed he went so far in this direction that he provided the illusions of
economism with an intellectual justification; however, he clearly never fell
prey himself to such illusions. In a well-known letter of 7 December 1867,
accompanying an article criticizing Capital which he himself had written, and
which Engels was supposed to publish as if it were that of an opponent, Marx
clearly indicated the limits of his scientific stance: "The author's
subjective tendency (imposed on him, perhaps, by his political position and
his past) -- that is to say, the way in which he himself pictures, and
portrays for others, the ultimate outcome of the present movement, the
present social process -- has nothing whatsoever to do with his real
analysis." By thus censuring the "tendentious conclusions" of his own
objective analysis, and by interpolating an ironic "perhaps" apropos of the
unscientific choices supposedly "imposed" on him, Marx in effect reveals the
methodological key to tackling the two aspects of the matter.
90
The fusion of knowledge and action must be effected within the historical
struggle itself, in such a way that each of these poles depends for its
validation on the other. What constitutes the proletarian class as a subject
is its organizing of revolutionary struggles and its organizing of society at
the moment of revolution: this is the point at which the practical conditions
of consciousness must be assembled and the theory of praxis verified by
virtue of its transformation into theory-in-practice. This pivotal issue of
organization, however, received but the scantest attention from revolutionary
theory during the founding period of the workers' movement -- the very period
when that theory still possessed the unitary character which it had inherited
from historical thought (and which it had rightly vowed to develop into a
unitary historical practice). As it turned out, organization became the locus
of revolutionary theory's inconsistency, allowing the tenets of that theory
to be imposed by statist and hierarchical methods borrowed from the bourgeois
revolution. The forms of organization developed subsequently by the workers'
movement on the basis of this dereliction of theory have tended in turn to
bar the construction of a unitary theory, to break theory up instead into a
variety of specialized and fragmentary types of knowledge. Thus ideologically
alienated, theory cannot even recognize the practical verification of the
unitary historical thought that it has betrayed whenever that verification
emerges in spontaneous workers' struggles; on the contrary, all it can do is
help to repress it and destroy all memory of it. Yet such historical forms,
thrown up by the struggle, are the very practical medium that theory needs in
order to be true. They are in fact a requirement of theory, but one that has
not been given theoretical expression. The soviets, for example, were not a
theoretical discovery; and, to go back even farther, the highest theoretical
truth attained by the International Workingmen's Association was its own
existence in practice.
91
Early successes in the First International's struggle enabled it to free
itself from the confused influences that the dominant ideology continued for
a time to exercise upon it from within. But the defeat and repression that it
soon confronted brought to the surface a conflict between two conceptions of
the proletarian revolution, each of which had an authoritarian dimension
spelling the abandonment of the conscious self-emancipation of the working
class. The rift between Marxists and Bakuninists, which eventually became an
irreconcilable one, had a dual aspect in that it bore both upon the question
of power in a future revolutionary society and upon the current organization
of the movement; and both the opposing factions reversed their own position
in moving from one of these issues to the other. Bakunin denounced as an
illusion the idea that classes could be abolished by means of an
authoritarian use of State power, warning that this course would lead to the
reconstruction of a bureaucratic ruling class and to the dictatorship of the
most knowledgeable (or of those reputed to be the most knowledgeable). Marx,
who held that the combined maturation, of economic contradictions on the one
hand, and of the democratic education of the workers on the other hand, would
reduce the proletarian State's role to the short phase needed to give the
stamp of legality to new social relations brought into being by objective
factors, charged Bakunin and his supporters with the authoritarianism of a
conspiratorial elite that had deliberately placed itself above the
International with the hare-brained intention of imposing on society an
irresponsible dictatorship of the most revolutionary (or of those
self-designated as such). Bakunin unquestionably recruited followers on just
such a basis: "in the midst of the popular tempest, we must be the invisible
pilots guiding the Revolution, not by any kind of overt power but by the
collective dictatorship of all our allies, a dictatorship without badges,
without official titles, without any official status, and therefore all the
more powerful, as it does not carry the trappings of power." This was clearly
a clash between two ideologies of workers' revolution; each embodied a
partially correct critique, but each, having lost the unity of historical
thought, aspired to set itself up as an ideological authority. Powerful
organizations, among them the German Social Democracy and the Iberian
Anarchist Federation, would subsequently faithfully serve one or the other of
these ideologies; in every case the result produced was greatly different
from the one sought.
92
The fact that the anarchists regard the goal of the proletarian revolution as
immediately present is at once the great strength and the great weakness of
the real anarchist struggle (I refer to the struggle of collectivist
anarchism; the claims of anarchism in its individualist variants are
laughable). Collectivist anarchism retains only the terminal point of the
historical thought of modern class struggles, and its unconditional demand
that this point be attained instantly is echoed in its systematic contempt
for method. Its critique of the political struggle consequently remains an
abstract one, while its commitment to the economic struggle is framed only in
terms of the mirage of a definitive solution to be achieved at one stroke, on
the economic battleground itself, on the day of the general strike or
insurrection. The anarchist agenda is the fulfillment of an ideal. Anarchism
is the still ideological negation of the State and of classes, that is to
say, of the very social preconditions of any separated ideology. It is an
ideology of pure freedom which makes everything equal and eschews any
suggestion of historical evil. This position, which fuses all partial demands
into a single demand, has given anarchism the great merit of representing the
refusal of existing conditions from the standpoint of the whole of life, not
merely from the standpoint of some particular critical specialization. On the
other hand, the fact that this fusion of demands is envisaged in the
absolute, at the whim of the individual, and in advance of any actualization,
has doomed anarchism to an incoherence that is only too easy to discern: the
doctrine requires no more than the reiteration, and the reintroduction into
each particular struggle, of the same simple and all-encompassing idea -- the
same end-point that anarchism has identified from the first as the movement's
sole and entire goal. Thus Bakunin, on quitting the Jura Federation in 1873,
found it easy to write that "During the last nine years more than enough
ideas for the salvation of the world have been developed in the International
(if the world can be saved by ideas) and I defy anyone to come up with a new
one. This is the time not for ideas but for action, for deeds." No doubt this
attitude preserves the commitment of the truly historical thought of the
proletariat to the notion that ideas must become practical, but it leaves the
ground of history by assuming that the adequate forms of this transition to
practice have already been discovered and are no longer subject to variation.
93
The anarchists, whose ideological fervor clearly distinguished them from the
rest of the workers' movement, extended this specialization of tasks into
their own ranks, so offering a hospitable field of action, within any
anarchist organization, to the propagandists and defenders of anarchist
ideology; and the mediocrity of these specialists was only reinforced by the
fact that their intellectual activity was generally confined to the
repetition of a clutch of unchanging truths. An ideological respect for
unanimity in the taking of decisions tended to favor the uncontrolled
exercise of power, within the organization itself, by "specialists of
freedom"; and revolutionary anarchism expects a comparable unanimity,
obtained by comparable means, from the people once they are liberated.
Furthermore, the refusal to distinguish between the opposed situations of a
minority grouped in the ongoing struggle and a new society of free
individuals has led time and again to the permanent isolation of anarchists
when the time for common decisions arrives -- one need only think of the
countless anarchist insurrections in Spain that have been contained and
crushed at a local level.
94
The illusion more or less explicitly upheld in all genuine anarchism is that
of the permanent imminence of a revolution which, because it will be made
instantaneously, is bound to validate both anarchist ideology and the form of
practical organization that flows from it. In 1936 anarchism really did lead
a social revolution, setting up the most advanced model of proletarian power
ever realized. Even here, though, it is pertinent to recall, for one thing,
that the general insurrection was dictated by an army pronunciamento.
Furthermore, inasmuch as the revolution was not completed in its earliest
days -- Franco, enjoying strong foreign backing at a time when the rest of
the international proletarian movement had already been defeated, held power
in half the country, while bourgeois forces and other workers' parties of
statist bent still existed in the Republican camp -- the organized anarchist
movement proved incapable of broadening the revolution's semi-victories, or
even of safeguarding them. The movement's leaders became government ministers
-- hostages to a bourgeois state that was dismantling the revolution even as
it proceeded to lose the civil war.
95
The "orthodox Marxism" of the Second International was the scientific
ideology of the socialist revolution, an ideology which asserted that its
whole truth resided in objective economic processes, and in the gradual
recognition of their necessity by a working class educated by the
organization. This ideology exhumed utopian socialism's faith in pedagogics,
eking this out with a contemplative evocation of the course of history. So
out of touch was this attitude with the Hegelian dimension of a total
history, however, that it lost even the static image of the totality present
in the utopians' (and signally in Fourier's) critique. A scientific
orientation of this variety, hardly capable of doing anything more than
rehash symmetrical ethical alternatives, informed Hilferding's insipid
observation in Das Finanzkapital that recognizing the necessity of socialism
"gives no clue as to what practical attitude should be adopted. For it is one
thing to recognize a necessity, and quite another to place oneself in the
service of that necessity." Those who chose not to understand that for Marx,
and for the revolutionary proletariat, a unitary historical thought was
itself nothing more and nothing less than the practical attitude to be
adopted could only fall victim to the practice which that choice immediately
entailed.
96
The ideology of the social-democratic organization placed that organization
in the hands of teachers who were supposed to educate the working class, and
the organizational form adopted corresponded perfectly to the sort of passive
learning that this implied. The participation of the socialists of the Second
International in the political and economic struggles was concrete enough,
but it was profoundly uncritical. Theirs was a manifestly reformist practice
carried on in the name of an illusory revolution. It was inevitable that this
ideology of revolution should founder on the very success of those who
proclaimed it. The setting apart of parliamentary representatives and
journalists within the movement encouraged people who had in any case been
recruited from the bourgeois intelligentsia to pursue a bourgeois style of
life, while the trade-union bureaucracy turned even those drawn in through
industrial struggle, and of working-class background, into mere brokers of
labor -- traders in labor-power as a commodity to be bought and sold like any
other. For the activity of all these people to have retained any
revolutionary aspect whatsoever, capitalism would have had to find itself
conveniently unable to put up with a reformism on the economic plane that it
was perfectly able to tolerate on the political, in the shape of the social
democrats' legalistic agitation. The "science" of the social democrats
vouched for the inevitability of such a paradoxical occurrence; history,
however, gave the lie to it at every turn.
97
This was a contradiction that Bernstein, being the social democrat farthest
removed from political ideology, and the one who most unabashedly embraced
the methodology of bourgeois science, was honest enough to draw attention to;
the reformism of the English workers' movement, which did without
revolutionary ideology altogether, also attested to it; but only historical
development itself could demonstrate it beyond all possibility of doubt.
Though prey to all kinds of illusions in other areas, Bernstein had rejected
the notion that a crisis of capitalism must miraculously occur, thus forcing
the hand of the socialists, who declined to assume any revolutionary mantle
in the absence of such a legitimating event. The profound social upheaval set
in train by the First World War, though it raised consciousness on a wide
scale, proved twice over that the social-democratic hierarchy had failed to
educate the German workers in a revolutionary way, that it had failed, in
short, to turn them into theoreticians: the first time was when the
overwhelming majority of the party lent its support to the imperialist war;
the second time was when, in defeat, the party crushed the Spartacist
revolutionaries. The sometime worker Ebert still believed in sin -- declaring
that he hated revolution "like sin." He also proved himself to be a fine
herald of that image of socialism which was soon to emerge as the mortal
enemy of the proletariat of Russia and elsewhere, by precisely articulating
the agenda of this new form of alienation: "Socialism," said Ebert, "means
working hard."
98
As a Marxist thinker, Lenin was simply a faithful and consistent Kautskyist
who applied the revolutionary ideology of "orthodox Marxism" to the
conditions existing in Russia, conditions that did not permit of the sort of
reformist practice pursued in parallel fashion by the Second International.
The task of directing the proletariat from without, by means of a disciplined
clandestine party under the control of intellectuals who had become
"professional revolutionaries," gave rise to a genuine profession -- and one
disinclined to make compacts with any professional strata of capitalist
society (even had such an overture -- presupposing the attainment of an
advanced stage of bourgeois development -- been within the power of the
czarist political regime to make). In consequence the speciality of the
profession in question became that of total social management.
99
With the advent of the war, and the collapse of international social
democracy in face of it, the authoritarian ideological radicalism of the
Bolsheviks was able to cast its net across the globe. The bloody end of the
workers' movement's democratic illusions made a Russia of the whole world,
and Bolshevism, reigning over the first revolutionary rift opened up by this
period of crisis, proposed its hierarchical and ideological model to the
proletariat of all countries as the way to "talk Russian" to the ruling
class. Lenin never reproached the Second International's Marxism for being a
revolutionary ideology -- but only for having ceased to be such an ideology.
100
This same historical moment, when Bolshevism triumphed for itself in Russia
and social democracy fought victoriously for the old world, also marks the
definitive inauguration of an order of things that lies at the core of the
modern spectacle's rule: this was the moment when an image of the working
class arose in radical opposition to the working class itself.
101
"In all earlier revolutions," wrote Rosa Luxemburg in Die Rote Fahne for 21
December 1918, "the opponents confronted one another face to face: class
against class, program against program. In the present revolution, the troops
that protect the old order, instead of intervening in the name of the ruling
classes, intervene under the banner of a 'social-democratic party.' If the
central question of the revolution were posed openly and honestly -- in the
form 'Capitalism or socialism?' -- then no doubt or hesitation would be
possible today among the broad proletarian masses." Thus, a few days before
its destruction, the radical current within the German proletariat uncovered
the secret of the new conditions brought into being by the whole process
which had gone before (and to which the image of the working class had
largely contributed): the spectacular organization of the ruling order's
defense, and a social reign of appearances under which no "central question"
could any longer be "openly and honestly" posed. By this time the
revolutionary image of the proletariat had become both the main element in,
and the chief result of, a general falsification of society.
102
The organization of the proletariat according to the Bolshevik model stemmed
from the backwardness of Russia and from the abdication from the
revolutionary struggle of the workers' movement in the advanced countries.
Russian backwardness also embodied all the conditions needed to carry this
form of organization in the direction of the counterrevolutionary reversal
that it had unconsciously contained from its beginnings; and the repeated
balking of the mass of the European workers' movement at the Hic Rhodus, hic
salta of the 1918-1920 period -- a balking that included the violent
annihilation of its own radical minority -- further facilitated the complete
unfolding of a process whose end result could fraudulently present itself to
the world as the only possible proletarian solution. The Bolshevik party
justified itself in terms of the necessity of a State monopoly over the
representation and defense of the power of the workers, and its success in
this quest turned the party into what it truly was, namely the party of the
owners of the proletariat, which essentially dislodged all earlier forms of
ownership.
103
For twenty years the various tendencies of Russian social democracy had
engaged in an unresolved debate over which conditions were most propitious
for the overthrow of czarism: the weakness of the bourgeoisie, the weight in
the balance of the peasant majority, the decisive role to be played by a
centralized and militant proletariat and so on. When practice finally
provided the solution, however, it did so thanks to a factor that had figured
in none of these hypotheses, namely the revolutionary bureaucracy which
placed itself at the head of the proletariat, seized the State and proceeded
to impose a new form of class rule on society. A strictly bourgeois
revolution was impossible; talk of a "democratic dictatorship of workers and
peasants" had no real meaning; and, as for the proletarian power of the
soviets, it could not be maintained at once against the class of small
landholding peasants, against a national and international White reaction,
and against its own externalized and alienated representation in the shape of
a workers' party of absolute masters of the State, of the economy, of the
means of expression and (before long) of thought. Trotsky and Parvus's theory
of permanent revolution -- which Lenin in effect espoused in April 1917 --
was the only theory that held true for countries that were backward from the
point of view of the social development of the bourgeoisie, but even here it
only applied once the unknown quantity of the bureaucracy's class power had
come into play. In the many clashes within the Bolshevik leadership, Lenin
was the most consistent defender of the concentration of dictatorial powers
in the hands of this supreme ideological representation. He invariably had
the advantage over his opponents because he championed solutions that flowed
logically from the earlier choices made by the minority that now exercised
absolute power: a democracy refused to peasants on the State level should be
by the same token refused to workers, and hence also to Communist union
leaders, to party members in general, and even, in the end, to the highest
ranks of the party's hierarchy. At the Tenth Congress, as the Kronstadt
soviet was being put down by force of arms and deluged in slander, Lenin
passed a judgment on the leftist bureaucrats of the "Workers' Opposition,"
the logic of which Stalin would later extend into a perfect division of the
world: "Here with us -- or out there with a gun in your hand -- but not as an
opposition. We have had enough of opposition."
104
Finding itself the sole owner of a state capitalism, the bureaucracy at first
secured its power internally by entering, after Kronstadt, and under the "New
Economic Policy," into a temporary alliance with the peasantry; externally,
in parallel fashion, it defended its power by using the regimented workers of
the bureaucratic parties of the Third International to back up Russian
diplomacy, to sabotage revolutionary movements and to support bourgeois
governments on whose support in the international sphere it was counting (the
Kuomintang in the China of 1925-1927, Popular Fronts in Spain and France,
etc.). In pursuit of its self-realization, however, bureaucratic society then
proceeded, by means of terror exercised against the peasantry, to effect
history's most brutal primitive accumulation of capital ever. The
industrialization of the Stalin era reveals the bureaucracy's true nature:
the prolonging of the reign of the economy and the salvaging of all essential
aspects of market society, not least the institution of labor-as-commodity.
The economy in its independence thus showed itself so thoroughly able to
dominate society as to recreate for its own purposes that class domination
which is essential to its operation. It proved, in other words, that the
bourgeoisie had created a power so autonomous that, so long as it endured, it
could even do without a bourgeoisie. The totalitarian bureaucracy was not, in
Bruno Rizzi's sense, "the last property-owning class in history," for it was
merely a substitute ruling class for the market economy. A tottering
capitalist property system was replaced by an inferior version of itself --
simplified, less diversified and concentrated as the collective property of
the bureaucratic class. This underdeveloped type of ruling class was likewise
a reflection of economic underdevelopment, and it had no agenda beyond
correcting this backwardness in particular parts of the world. The
hierarchical, statist framework for this cheap remake of the capitalist
ruling class was supplied by the party of the workers, organized on the
bourgeois model of separation. As Anton Ciliga noted from the depths of one
of Stalin's prisons, "Technical questions of organization turned out to be
social questions" (Lenin and Revolution).
105
As the coherence of the separate, the revolutionary ideology of which
Leninism was the highest voluntaristic expression governed the management of
a reality that was resistant to it; with Stalinism, this ideology
rediscovered its own incoherent essence. Ideology was no longer a weapon, but
an end in itself. But a lie that can no longer be challenged becomes a form
of madness. Eventually both reality and the goal sought dissolved in a
totalitarian ideology proclaiming that whatever it said was all there was.
This was a local primitivism of the spectacle that has nonetheless played an
essential part in the spectacle's worldwide development. The ideology that
took on material form in this context-did not transform the world
economically, as capitalism in its affluent stage has done; it succeeded only
in using police methods to transform perception.
106
The ideological-totalitarian class in power is the power of a world turned on
its head: the stronger the class, the more forcefully it proclaims that it
does not exist, and its strength serves first and foremost to assert its
nonexistence. This is as far as its modesty goes, however, for its official
nonexistence is supposed to coincide with the ne plus ultra of historical
development, which is indeed owed to its infallible leadership. Though
everywhere in evidence, the bureaucracy is obliged to be a class
imperceptible to consciousness, thus making the whole of social life
unfathomable and insane. The social organization of the absolute lie reposes
on this fundamental contradiction.
107
Stalinism was a reign of terror within the bureaucratic class. The terror on
which the bureaucracy's power was founded was bound to strike the class
itself, because this class had no legal basis, no juridical status as a
property-owning class that could be extended to each of its members
individually. Its real proprietorship was masked, because it had become an
owner only by means of false consciousness. False consciousness can maintain
absolute power only through absolute terror, where all real motives soon
vanish. Members of the ruling bureaucratic class have the right of ownership
over society only collectively, as participants in a basic lie: they have to
play the part of the proletariat governing a socialist society; they are
actors faithful to the text of ideological betrayal. Yet their effective
participation in this counterfeit being has to be perceived as real. No
bureaucrat can individually assert his right to power, because to prove
himself a socialist proletarian he would have to present himself as the
opposite of a bureaucrat, while to prove himself a bureaucrat is impossible
because the official truth of the bureaucracy is that the bureaucracy does
not exist. Thus each bureaucrat is completely dependent on a central
guarantee from ideology, which acknowledges the collective participation in
"socialist power" of all such bureaucrats as it does not liquidate. As a
group the bureaucrats may be said to make all the decisions, but the
cohesiveness of their class can only be ensured by the concentration of their
terroristic power in one person. In this person reposes the only practical
truth of the lie in power: the power to lay down an unchallengeable boundary
that is ever subject to revision. Stalin thus had the power to decide without
appeal exactly who was a bureaucrat, and hence an owner; his word alone
distinguished "proletarians" in power from "traitors in the pay of the Mikado
and Wall Street." The atomized bureaucrat could find the shared essence of
his juridical status only in the person of Stalin -- that lord and master of
the world who takes himself in this way to be the absolute person and for
whom there exists no higher type of spirit: "The lord of the world becomes
really conscious of what he is -- viz., the universal might of actuality --
by that power of destruction which he exercises against the contrasted
selfhood of his subjects." He is at once the power that defines the field of
domination and the power that devastates that field.
108
By the time ideology, become absolute because it possesses absolute power,
has been transformed from a fragmentary knowledge into a totalitarian lie,
truly historical thinking has for its part been so utterly annihilated that
history itself, even at the level of the most empirical knowledge, can no
longer exist. Totalitarian bureaucratic society lives in a perpetual present
in which everything that has happened earlier exists for it solely as a space
accessible to its police. A project already formulated by Napoleon, that of
"monarchically directing the energy of memories," has thus been made concrete
in a permanent manipulation of the past, and this not just in respect of the
past's meaning, but even in respect of the facts themselves. The price paid
for this emancipation from all historical reality, though, is the loss of the
rational orientation indispensable to capitalism as a historical social
system. We know how much the scientific application of an ideology gone mad
has cost Russia -- one need only think of the Lysenko fiasco. The internal
contradictions besetting totalitarian bureaucracy in its administration of an
industrialized society -- its simultaneous need for rationality and refusal
of it -- also constitutes one of its chief shortcomings as compared with
normal capitalist development. Just as the bureaucracy cannot resolve the
question of agriculture as capitalism does, so too it turns out eventually to
be inferior to capitalism in industrial production, which it seeks to plan in
an authoritarian manner on the twin bases of a complete lack of realism and
an adherence to an all-embracing lie.
109
Between the two world wars the revolutionary workers movement was destroyed
by the action, on the one hand, of the Stalinist bureaucracy and, on the
other, of fascist totalitarianism, the latter having borrowed its
organizational form from the totalitarian party as first tried out in Russia.
Fascism was an attempt of the bourgeois economy to defend itself, in
extremis, from the dual threat of crisis and proletarian subversion; it was a
state of siege in capitalist society, a way for that society to survive
through the administration of an emergency dose of rationalization in the
form of massive State intervention in its management. Such rationalization,
however, inevitably bore the stamp of the immensely irrational nature of the
means whereby it was imposed. Even though fascism came to the aid of the
chief icons (the family, private property, the moral order, the nation) of a
bourgeois order that was by now conservative, and effectively mobilized both
the petty bourgeoisie and unemployed workers panic-stricken because of the
crisis or disillusioned by the impotence of revolutionary socialism, it was
not itself fundamentally ideological in character. Fascism presented itself
for what it was -- a violent resurrection of myth calling for participation
in a community defined by archaic pseudo-values: race, blood, leader. Fascism
is a cult of the archaic completely fitted out by modern technology. Its
degenerate ersatz of myth has been revived in the spectacular context of the
most modern means of conditioning and illusion. It is thus one factor in the
formation of the modern spectacle, as well as being, thanks to its part in
the destruction of the old workers' movement, one of the founding forces of
present-day society. But inasmuch as fascism happens also to be the costliest
method of maintaining the capitalist order, it was normal enough that it
should be dislodged by more rational and stronger forms of this order -- that
it should leave the front of the stage to the lead players, namely the
capitalist States.
110
When the Russian bureaucracy at last successfully disencumbered itself of
relics of bourgeois property standing in the way of its hegemony over the
economy, once it had developed this economy in accordance with its own
purposes, and once it had achieved recognition from without as a great power
among others, it sought to enjoy its own world in tranquility, and to remove
the arbitrariness to which it was still itself subjected; it therefore
proceeded to denounce the Stalinism of its beginnings. Such a denunciation
was bound, however, to remain Stalinist, arbitrary, unexplained and subject
to continual adjustment, for the simple reason that the ideological falsehood
that had attended the bureaucracy's birth could never be exposed. The
bureaucracy cannot liberalize itself either culturally or politically because
its existence as a class depends on its monopoly of an ideology -- which, for
all its cumbersomeness, is its sole title to ownership. Admittedly this
ideology has lost the passion that informed its original self-affirmation,
yet even the pithless triviality which is all that is left retains the
oppressive role of prohibiting the least suggestion of competition and
holding the entirety of thought captive. The bureaucracy is thus helplessly
tied to an ideology no longer believed by anyone. What inspired terror now
inspires derision, but even this derision would disappear were it not for the
fact that the terror it mocks still lurks in the wings. So it is that at the
very moment when the bureaucracy attempts to demonstrate its superiority on
capitalism's own ground, it is exposed as capitalism's poor cousin. Just as
its actual history is at odds with its judicial status, and its crudely
maintained ignorance in contradiction with its scientific pretensions, so its
wish to vie with the bourgeoisie in the production of an abundance of
commodities is stymied by the fact that an abundance of this kind contains
its own implicit ideology, and is generally accompanied by the freedom to
choose from an unlimited range of spectacular false alternatives -- a
pseudo-freedom, yes, but one which, for all that, is incompatible with the
bureaucracy's ideology.
111
At the present stage in the bureaucracy's development, its ideological title
to ownership is already collapsing internationally: a power set up on the
national level as a basically internationalist model must now renounce any
claim to maintaining its false cohesion irrespective of national frontiers.
The unequal economic development experienced by those competing bureaucracies
that have succeeded in owning "socialism" in more than one country has led
only to a public and all-out confrontation between the Russian lie and the
Chinese lie. Henceforward each bureaucracy in power, and likewise each of
those totalitarian parties aspiring to a power that has outlived the
Stalinist period within one national working class or another, will have to
find its own way. Considered in conjunction with the expressions of internal
negation which first became visible to the outside world when the workers of
East Berlin revolted against the bureaucrats and demanded a "government of
metalworkers," and which have since even extended to the setting up of
workers' councils in Hungary, this crumbling of the worldwide alliance
founded on bureaucratic mystification is in the last analysis the most
unfavorable portent for the future development of capitalist society. For the
bourgeoisie is now in danger of losing an adversary that has objectively
supported it by investing all opposition to its order with a purely illusory
unity. A rift in the pseudo-revolutionary component of the established
division of spectacular labor can only herald the end of that system itself.
This spectacular aspect of the dissolution of the workers' movement is thus
itself headed for dissolution.
112
The mirage of Leninism today has no basis today outside the various
Trotskyist tendencies, where the conflation of the proletarian project with a
hierarchical organization grounded in ideology has stolidly survived all the
evidence of that conflation's real consequences. The gap between Trotskyism
and a revolutionary critique of present-day society is in effect coextensive
with the respectful distance that the Trotskyists maintain toward positions
that were already mistaken when they played themselves out in a real
struggle. Until 1927 Trotsky remained fundamentally loyal to the high
bureaucracy, though he sought to gain control of this bureaucracy and cause
it to resume a properly Bolshevik foreign policy. (It is well known that at
this time he went so far, in order to help conceal Lenin's famous
"Testament," as to disavow slanderously his supporter Max Eastman, who had
made it public.) Trotsky was doomed by his basic perspective; the fact was
that as soon as the bureaucratic class knew itself, on the basis of the
results of its action, to be a counterrevolutionary class on the domestic
front, it was bound to opt for a counterrevolutionary role on the world
stage, albeit one assumed in the name of revolution -- in short, to act
abroad just as it did at home. Trotsky's subsequent struggle to set up a
Fourth International enshrined the same inconsistency. Having once, during
the second Russian revolution, become an unconditional partisan of the
Bolshevik form of organization, Trotsky simply refused, for the rest of his
life, to see that the bureaucracy's power was the power of a separate class.
When Lukacs, in 1923, pointed to this same organizational form as the
long-sought mediation between theory and practice thanks to which
proletarians, instead of being mere "spectators" of events that occur in
their own organization, consciously choose and experience those events, what
he was describing as actual virtues of the Bolshevik party were in fact
everything that the Party was not. The depth of his theoretical work
notwithstanding, Lukacs was an ideologist speaking for a power that was in
the crudest way external to the proletarian movement, believing and giving
his audience to believe that he himself, his entire personal being, partook
of this power as though it were truly his own. While subsequent events were
to demonstrate exactly how the power in question repudiated and eliminated
its servants, Lukacs, with his endless self-repudiations, revealed with
caricatural clarity precisely what he had identified with, namely, the
opposite of himself, and the opposite of everything for which he had argued
in History and Class Consciousness. No one better than Lukacs illustrates the
validity of a fundamental rule for assessing all the intellectuals of this
century: what they respect is a precise gauge of their own contemptible
reality. It certainly cannot be said that Lenin encouraged illusions of this
kind concerning his activities, for it was Lenin who acknowledged that "a
political party cannot examine its members to see whether contradictions
exist between their philosophy and the party program." The real subject of
Lukacs's purely imaginary -- and inopportune -- portrait was a party that was
indeed coherent with respect to one precise and partial task only -- to wit,
the seizure of State power.
113
The neo-Leninist mirage entertained by present-day Trotskyism is contradicted
at every moment by the reality of modern capitalist society, whether of the
bourgeois or the bureaucratic type. It is therefore not surprising that it
gets its best reception in the formally independent "underdeveloped"
countries, where a variety of fraudulent versions of state and bureaucratic
socialism are consciously passed off by local ruling classes as, quite
simply, the ideology of economic development. The hybrid nature of such
classes is more or less directly associated with their position on the
bourgeois-bureaucratic spectrum. Their international maneuvering between
these two poles of existing capitalist power, along with ideological
compromises (notably with Islam) corresponding to their heterogeneous social
bases, together serve to strip these last retreads of ideological socialism
of all credibility except for that of their police. One type of bureaucracy
has established itself by providing a common framework for nationalist
struggle and peasant agrarian revolt; in such cases, as in China, the
Stalinist model of industrialization tends to be applied in societies even
less advanced than the Russia of 1917. A bureaucracy capable of
industrializing a nation may also arise out of the petty bourgeoisie, with
power being seized by army officers, as happened for instance in Egypt. In
other places, among them Algeria following its war of independence, a
bureaucracy that has established itself as a para-State authority in the
course of a struggle seeks stability through compromise, and fuses with a
weak national bourgeoisie. Lastly, in those former colonies of black Africa
that have maintained overt ties to Western bourgeoisies, whether European or
American, a local bourgeoisie is constituted -- generally reposing on the
power of traditional tribal chiefs -- through possession of the State: in
such countries, where foreign imperialism is still the true master of the
economy, a stage is reached at which the compradors' compensation for the
sale of local products is ownership of a local State that is independent of
the masses though not of the imperialist power. The result is an artificial
bourgeoisie that is incapable of accumulating capital and merely squanders
its revenue -- as much the portion of surplus value it extracts from local
labor as the foreign subsidies it receives from protector States or
monopolies. The manifest incapacity of such a bourgeoisie to fulfill normal
bourgeois economic functions leads to its soon being confronted by a
subversive opposition, structured on the bureaucratic model and more or less
well adapted to local conditions, that is eager to usurp what the bourgeoisie
has inherited. But the successful realization by any bureaucracy of its
fundamental project of industrialization itself necessarily embodies the
prospect of its historical failure, for as it accumulates capital it also
accumulates the proletariat, so creating its own negation in countries where
that negation did not yet exist.
114
In the course of the complex and terrible evolution that has brought the era
of class struggle under a new set of conditions, the proletariat of the
industrialized countries has lost the ability to assert its own independence.
It has also, in the last reckoning, lost its illusions. But it has not lost
its being. The proletariat has not been eliminated, and indeed it remains
irreducibly present, under the intensified alienation of modern capitalism,
in the shape of the vast mass of workers who have lost all power over the use
of their own lives and who, once they realize this, must necessarily redefine
themselves as the proletariat -- as negation at work in the bosom of today's
society. This class is objectively reinforced by the peasantry's gradual
disappearance, as also by the extension of the logic of the factory system to
a broad sector of labor in the "services" and the intellectual professions.
Subjectively, though, this is a proletariat still very far removed from any
practical class consciousness, and this goes not only for white-collar
workers but also for wage workers who as yet know nothing but the impotence
and mystifications of the old politics. But when the proletariat discovers
that its own externalized power conspires in the continual reinforcement of
capitalist society, no longer merely thanks to the alienation of its labor,
but also thanks to the form taken on by unions, parties and institutions of
State power that it had established in pursuit of its own self-emancipation,
then it must also discover through concrete historical experience that it is
indeed that class which is totally opposed to all reified externalizations
and all specializations of power. The proletariat is the bearer of a
revolution that can leave no other sphere of society untransformed, that
enforces the permanent domination of the past by the present and demands a
universal critique of separation; the action of the proletariat must assume a
form adequate to these tasks. No quantitative relief of its poverty, no
illusory hierarchical incorporation, can supply a lasting cure for its
dissatisfaction, for the proletariat cannot truly recognize itself in any
particular wrong it has suffered; nor, therefore, in the righting of any
particular wrong -- nor even in the righting of many such wrongs; but only in
the righting of the unqualified wrong that has been perpetrated upon it --
the universal wrong of its exclusion from life.
115
Signs of a new and growing tendency toward negation proliferate in the more
economically advanced countries. The spectacular system reacts to these signs
with incomprehension or attempts to misrepresent them, but they are
sufficient proof that a new period has begun. After the failure of the
working class's first subversive assault on capitalism, we are now witness to
the failure of capitalist abundance. On the one hand, we see anti-union
struggles of Western workers that have to be repressed (and repressed
primarily by the unions themselves); at the same time rebellious tendencies
among the young generate a protest that is still tentative and amorphous, yet
already clearly embodies a rejection of the specialized sphere of the old
politics, as well as of art and everyday life. These are two sides of the
same coin, both signaling a new spontaneous struggle emerging under the sign
of criminality, both portents of a second proletarian onslaught on class
society. When the lost children of this as-yet immobile horde enter once
again upon the battlefield, which has changed yet stayed the same, a new
General Ludd will be at their head -- leading them this time in an onslaught
on the machinery of permitted consumption.
116
That long-sought political form whereby the economic emancipation of labor
might finally be achieved" has taken on a clear outline in this century, in
the shape of revolutionary workers' councils vesting all decision-making and
executive powers in themselves and federating with one another through the
exchange of delegates answerable to the base and recallable at any time. As
yet such councils have enjoyed only a brief and experimental existence; their
appearance has invariably occasioned attack and defeat by one or another of
class society's means of defence -- often including, it must be said, the
presence of false consciousness within the councils themselves. As Pannekoek
rightly stressed, the decision to set up workers' councils does not in itself
provide solutions so much as it "proposes problems." Yet the power of
workers' councils is the one context in which the problems of the revolution
of the proletariat can be truly solved. It is here that the objective
preconditions of historical consciousness are assembled, opening the door to
the realization of that active direct communication which marks the end of
all specialization, all hierarchy, and all separation, and thanks to which
existing conditions are transformed "into the conditions of unity." And it is
here too that the proletarian subject can emerge from the struggle against a
purely contemplative role, for consciousness is now equal to the practical
organization that it has chosen for itself, and it has become inseparable
from a coherent intervention in history.
117
Once embodied in the power of workers councils -- a power destined to
supplant all other powers worldwide -- the proletarian movement becomes its
own product; this product is the producer himself, and in his own eyes the
producer has himself as his goal. Only in this context can the spectacle's
negation of life be negated in its turn.
118
The appearance of workers councils during the first quarter of this century
was the high point of the proletarian movement, but this reality has gone
unnoticed, or else been presented in travestied form, because it inevitably
vanished along with the remainder of a movement that the whole historical
experience of the time tended to deny and destroy. From the standpoint of the
renewal of the proletariat's critical enterprise, however, the councils may
be seen in their true light as the only undefeated aspect of a defeated
movement: historical consciousness, aware that this is the only environment
in which it can thrive, now perceives the councils as situated historically
not at the periphery of an ebbing tide but rather at the center of a rising
one.
119
A revolutionary organization that exists before the establishment of the
power of workers' councils -- which must discover its own appropriate form
through struggle -- will know that, for all these historical reasons, it
cannot represent the revolutionary class. It must simply recognize itself as
radically separated from the world of separation.
120
The revolutionary organization is the coherent expression of the theory of
praxis entering into two-way communication with practical struggles; it is
thus part of the process of the coming into being of practical theory.
121
The revolutionary organization must necessarily constitute an integral
critique of society -- a critique, that is to say, which refuses to
compromise with any form of separated power and which is directed globally
against every aspect of alienated social life. In the revolutionary
organization's struggle with class society, the weapons are nothing less than
the essence of the antagonists themselves: the revolutionary organization
cannot allow the conditions of division and hierarchy that obtain in the
dominant society to be reproduced within itself. It must also fight
constantly against its own distortion by and within the reigning spectacle.
The only restriction on individual participation in the revolutionary
organization's total democracy is that imposed by the effective recognition
and appropriation by each member of the coherence of the organization's
critique, a coherence that must be borne out both in critical theory proper
and in the relationship between that theory and practical activity.
122
As capitalism's ever-intensifying imposition of alienation at all levels
makes it increasingly hard for workers to recognize and name their own
impoverishment, and eventually puts them in the position of having either to
reject it in its totality or do nothing at all, the revolutionary
organization must learn that it can no longer combat alienation by means of
alienated forms of struggle.
123
The proletarian revolution is predicated entirely on the requirement that,
for the first time, theory as the understanding of human practice be
recognized and directly lived by the masses. This revolution demands that
workers become dialecticians, and inscribe their thought upon practice; it
thus asks much more of its men without qualities than the bourgeois
revolution asked of those men with qualifications that it enlisted to run
things (the partial ideological consciousness constructed by a segment of the
bourgeois class had as its basis only a key portion of social life, namely
the economy, where this class was already in power). It is thus the very
evolution of class society into the spectacular organization of non-life that
obliges the revolutionary project to become visibly what it always was in
essence.
124
Revolutionary theory is now the sworn enemy of all revolutionary ideology --
and it knows it.
From the Society of the Spectacle, by Guy Debord