textfiles/politics/SPUNK/sp000228.txt

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The Power and The Prophet
BAD Broadside #9
There has been a great deal of criticism in the popular press
and elsewhere of the government's actions in the Branch Davidian
debacle in Waco. The Quincy Patriot Ledger (4/21/93) classified the
event as "among the worst disasters in the history of American law
enforcement". The ATF and the FBI are being taken over the coals for
the methods used and their failure to achieve a pacific outcome to
the siege. Reno and Clinton are faulted for lacking the prescience to
anticipate a disaster of the magnitude that occurred, and for letting
the feds force the issue. Why didn't they, it is asked, keep up the
"sanctions" until the Davidians got tired and came out? What excuse
was there for losing patience and precipitating the holocaust that
occurred? Many have even asked why the ATF felt it had to invade the
Davidian compound in gangbusters style at all. The Davidians were out
there in the middle of nowhere not bothering anyone, and Koresh could
have been seized away from the compound. Obviously the Davidians
should have been quite simply left alone.
Government sources offered a number of inadequate responses, from
Reno's frank acceptance of responsibility (for the failure at the end,
not the whole thing) to the defensive drivel from law enforcement
types who tried to lay the blame for their own bungling on Koresh, who
refused to play fair. The stockpile of legally purchased small arms is
cited as the reason for the initial precipitate action. Rumors of
undefined "child abuse," that fashionable all-round excuse for frantic
intervention, was among the reasons given for the final attack. But
the real reason for the extreme nature of the siege and the attack
wasn't over a question of guilt. It wasn't what Koresh and company had
allegedly done, or even what they might do as armed sex-mad religious
maniacs that was the problem. It was their unrepentant challenge to
the authority of the State.
Many sense an inevitability about the whole thing, and in a very
important way they are right. Given the authoritarian nature of both
the State and the Davidian sect, once the conflict was engaged, the
only way it could end was in the destruction of the offending party.
It has long been an anarchistic truism that the State reserves for
itself a monopoly on coercive control. As Benjamin Tucker says flatly,
"Aggression, invasion, government are interconvertible terms. The
essence of government is control, or the attempt to control." The
State will not and cannot allow an independent authority to evade
this control within its jurisdiction. Koresh et al have been denounced
for futilely holding out against the government rather than
negotiating. It was indeed futile, but quite possibly they were aware
that there was no real "negotiation" possible. It is a cardinal
principal of the State that no one (apparently not even the heads of
rival States) can hold themselves "above the law"; i.e., independent
of the authority of the State. Therefore the only question is how the
law will be avenged, not whether it will be. The only option open was
complete surrender and abasement, after which the details and extent
of punitive retribution could be adjusted.
The Davidian sect assumed and acted as if it had independent
authority by virtue of the dictates of christian doctrine. They
wouldn't play by the rules and give in like nice little subjects of
the State. Yet anarchists should resist the temptation to identify
with these victims of governmental repression. The tragedy occurred
because both sides shared a fatal weakness -- a hypertrophy of
authority. Religion, especially the christian religion, has long
claimed an authority that transcends that of the State in certain
matters, although few groups are so naive as to force the issue to its
logical conclusion. As anarchists have long insisted, such authority
inevitably leads to disaster. David Koresh and his followers -- it
is nonsensical to pretend they were all his dupes -- chose to follow
the dictates of their faith rather than those of the State, as other
religious groups from the Pilgrims to the Mormons have in the past.
And as in the past, they suffered by challenging the power of the
State.
The authority of the State is maintained through the demand that
its laws and regulations be acceded to without question. It
customarily took an open and active breach of these laws, an actual
perpetration of a "crime," to precipitate a coercive response by the
government. However, it has now become the fashion to anticipate
possible breaches and to move against potential "criminals" who
through their beliefs and activities (such as espousing religious,
sexual or political nonconformity) may at some point transgress the
myriad rules and regulations the government has at its disposal for
excusing coercion. Following an often brutal and intimidating
experience at the hands (and feet) of agencies such as the ATF and the
DEA, the social penitent is supposed to be led away to be made an
example of to other would-be dissidents. When the invaded refuse to
play to the State's script by not surrendering and confessing their
subjugation, they must be destroyed (socially or biologically).
By asserting their own authority over that of the government, the
Davidians laid down an irresistible challenge. The State took up the
challenge, and as is usually the case, won. The Davidians were
attacked, reviled, humiliated, demonized in the press and finally,
although inadvertently, physically destroyed. There may be
considerable criticism now and perhaps some jobs will be lost or some
ameliorating statutes passed, but the State itself will not be
affected. As long as the criticism focuses only on the manner in which
the repression was handled rather than questioning the prerogative of
the government to repress at will, nothing will change.
NO COPYRIGHT
Please send two copies of any review or reprint
of all or part of this to:
Boston Anarchist Drinking Brigade
(BAD Brigade)
PO Box 1323
Cambridge, MA 02238
Internet: bbrigade@world.std.com
April, 1993