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405 lines
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Plaintext
This file was uploaded by Ben Morehead, Associate Publisher of
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_Policy_Review_ magazine and authorized agent for the copyright
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To order Policy Review, call 800-544-4843.
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From the Fall 1993 issue of Policy Review magazine:
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1983
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Awakening from Orwell's Nightmare
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by
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ANDREW E. BUSCH AND ELIZABETH EDWARDS SPALDING
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This year marks the 10th anniversary of the beginning of the end of
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the Cold War. Although it was difficult to foresee at the time, a
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series of events in 1983 would come together to stop the seemingly
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inexorable advance of Soviet totalitarianism and to lay the
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groundwork for the eventual triumph of the West.
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These events were neither inevitable nor self-executing. They
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depended upon the decisions of men, and of one man in
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particular -- Ronald Reagan -- who understood the meaning of this
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century, the nature of the Cold War, and the set of circumstances
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that he and his country faced. In 1983, the elements of President
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Reagan's strategy joined for the first time, making possible the
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successes that wrought the changes in Eastern Europe in 1989 and
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culminated in the 1991 implosion of the Soviet regime and the rest
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of its empire.
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The Evil Empire Speech
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The central theme of President Reagan's foreign policy was the
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ethical distinction he continually made between the West and the
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Soviet bloc. At his first press conference as president, Mr. Reagan
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bluntly referred to the nature of Leninist "morality," correctly
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telling a contemptuous press corps that Soviet leaders "reserve
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unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat,"
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in order to achieve their objective of world communism. In a famous
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speech before the British Parliament in June 1982, the president
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called for a "crusade for freedom," and he predicted that it would
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be communism, not freedom, that would end up on the "ash-heap of
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history."
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But President Reagan's most important Cold War speech was his March
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1983 address to religious broadcasters in which he called the
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Soviet Union an "evil empire":
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Let us be aware that while they [the Soviet regime]
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preach the supremacy of the state, declare its omnipotence over
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individual man, and predict its eventual domination over all people
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on the earth, they are the focus of evil in the modern world.... I
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urge you to beware the temptation of pride -- the temptation of
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blithely declaring yourselves above it all and labelling both sides
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equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive
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impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant
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misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the struggle
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between right and wrong and good and evil.
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Mr. Reagan underscored the message that no longer
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would the United States remain silent about the true nature of the
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Soviet regime. Apprehending the importance of ideas and the danger
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of truth far better than Mr. Reagan's critics did, the Kremlin
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construed the evil empire speech as an act of political aggression.
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Many people understood from the beginning that Mr. Reagan was
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right. What since has become clear, however, is the effect that his
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pronouncement had on those who lived in that empire. Among others,
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Lech Walesa later maintained that the evil empire speech was an
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epochal event in the long struggle of Eastern Europe to be free;
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even former Soviet officials since have acknowledged that the
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speech, in the words of Reagan biographer Edmund Morris, helped
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"the motherland realize ... it was indeed evil." President Reagan's
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ultimate vindication came when the foreign minister of the Russian
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Federation, Andrei Kozyrev, added his concurrence: The Soviet
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Union, Mr. Kozyrev said in 1992, had been an "evil empire."
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The legitimacy of this rhetorical counteroffensive was reinforced
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in September 1983 when the Soviets under Yuri Andropov shot down a
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Korean Airlines passenger jet, KAL 007, demonstrating with
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appalling clarity the accuracy of President Reagan's March charge.
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The incident not only gave momentum to Mr. Reagan's exposure of the
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nature of the Soviet regime; it also shut down a nascent movement
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within the administration for a more accommodationist stance toward
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the Kremlin.
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The year 1983 also was significant for the intermediate-range
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nuclear forces (INF) deployments in Western Europe. In November
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1981, President Reagan reaffirmed the 1979 North Atlantic Treaty
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Organization (NATO) dual-track decision, then championed by West
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German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, to deploy missiles and to
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negotiate for arms control. With the Soviets more aggressive than
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ever as they deployed one SS-20 a week, President Reagan sought to
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strengthen the West through the deployment of 108 Pershing II and
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464 ground-launched cruise missiles, scheduled to begin in November
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1983. To do so, he had to overcome one of the most powerful Soviet
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propoganda offensives in the entire Cold War.
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Peace Movements
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As the Soviets had attempted to stymie NATO's founding and the
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Western alliance in the late 1940s through subversion, aggression,
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and totalitarian propaganda, so too, they tried to shape a
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situation favorable to Kremlin hegemony in the superpower nuclear
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age. It was all part of the same Cold War. The key to success, the
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Kremlin knew, lay in dividing and sapping NATO of its unity and
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meaning. The Soviets hoped, at a minimum, that opposition to the
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Pershings and cruise missiles would become a substantial lever to
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crack the Atlantic alliance. To this end, they sponsored and
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inspired large portions of the nuclear freeze movement in Europe.
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Six European countries had scheduled elections for 1983 -- Great
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Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, Norway,
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and the Netherlands -- and in each of these countries, the leading
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liberal-left party had been captured by the peace movement and was
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opposing INF deployment. Had voters in these countries turned
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against deployment, the NATO alliance probably would have collapsed
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at its greatest moment of peril.
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Because of the resolution of key statesmen, the parties that stood
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for military preparedness all won in 1983. Helmut Kohl and the
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Christian Democrats won the West German elections in March,
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defeating a Social Democratic Party that had drifted to the left.
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Margaret Thatcher, who did so much to draw together NATO allies at
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the Williamsburg summit of late 1982, was overwhelmingly re-elected
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in Britain in June. Pro-deployment parties also won 1983 elections
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in Italy, Belgium, Norway, and the Netherlands. France did not have
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an election that year, but President Francois Mitterand, though a
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Socialist, stood strong in his support of Mr. Reagan and
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deployment, and against Soviet domination of the continent.
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Euromissile deployment proceeded on schedule, and, more important,
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the Atlantic alliance held strong. Late 1983 into 1984 was a period
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of NATO cohesion unprecedented since the collective defense
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organization's founding. NATO allies saw through the Kremlin
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tactics aimed at straining Western unity in November 1983, when the
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Soviets walked out of the START talks in Geneva. The allies
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concurred with President Reagan that negotiations could come only
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after the establishment of Western strength and acknowledgment of
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that strength by the Soviet Union. As Mrs. Thatcher noted that
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Reagan "strengthened not only America's defenses, but also the will
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of America's allies."
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The SDI Wild Card
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President Reagan's revolution in strategic defense also came in
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1983. His March 23 speech challenged the very nature of modern
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warfare. It dazed the Soviets and helped to break the back of the
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nuclear freeze movement. Mr. Reagan rejected the logic of mutually
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assured destruction (MAD) and flexible response, which left
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civilian populations totally vulnerable to nuclear destruction. He
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announced the goal of making nuclear weapons "impotent and
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obsolete." As the president said, "What if free people could live
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secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the
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threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that
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we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before
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they reached our own soil or that of our allies?"
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With this March 1983 speech, President Reagan finished putting
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forth his vision to transform radically the global strategic
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situation and the nature of defense. Mr. Reagan showed that the
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West had the political courage and know-how to fight and win what
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Soviet thinkers commonly called the scientific-technical revolution
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in military affairs. The Kremlin referred over and over to American
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militarization of space. Soviet leaders Konstantin Chernenko and
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especially Mikhail Gorbachev attempted vigorously to derail SDI.
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Mr. Gorbachev and his Foreign Ministers Eduard Shevardnadze and
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Aleksandr Bessmertnykh now have conceded the importance of SDI in
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driving change in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. President
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Reagan had begun to move the West beyond containment with the
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promise of propelling the world beyond communism and Cold War.
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Turning the Tide in El Salvador
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As Ronald Reagan pursued a two-track strategy in Europe and on
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defense policy -- one track securing the base of the Western alliance
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and restoring our deterrent capacity, the other track seizing the
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initiative with SDI -- he also constructed a two-tiered policy in the
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Third World. First, President Reagan sought to brace American
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friends and prevent further Soviet penetration. Second, he began to
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pursue the offensive against many of the Kremlin clients that had
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taken power in the 1970s: Cambodia, Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan,
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Grenada, and Nicaragua. No other year was as pivotal to the
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president's strategy as was 1983.
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It is easy to forget that, throughout 1982 and 1983, a serious
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question existed as to whether the United States would be able to
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ensure the survival of a fledgling democracy in El Salvador. When
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the communists launched a major offensive in late 1983 that scored
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several important victories, the Faribundo Marti National
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Liberation Front (FMLN) was at its peak, leading Newsweek to
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hypothesize that the Salvadoran army might collapse before
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Christmas. There can be little doubt that failure in El Salvador
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would have worsened prospects for democracy in Guatemala and
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Honduras, if not prompted their fall. In that event, Mexico would
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have been the next likely target.
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Yet, while the war in El Salvador remained a stalemate, the first
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signs appeared that U.S. aid was slowing the FMLN in the field.
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Through American encouragement, El Salvador's government amended
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itself: death-squad killings declined rapidly, and a crucial
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shakeup occurred in the Salvadoran high command in November 1983.
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All told, 1983 was the last year that the survival of the incipient
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Salvadoran democracy was in immediate doubt.
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Although the issue had surfaced in 1982, vigorous debate over aid
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to the Nicaraguan resistance exploded in the summer of 1983. The
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aid battle and the Contras' fortunes see-sawed throughout the
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1980s, but 1983 was the first year the United States concentrated
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significant political attention on the Nicaraguan resistance. It
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was in 1983 that the Reagan administration, for the first time,
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frankly made the case for aid. Turning back attempts in Congress to
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end existing funding for the Contras, the administration also
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proposed expanding Contra troop strength to 15,000. The Nicaraguan
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resistance already had reached 12,000 men under arms, higher than
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any other guerrilla army in Latin America, and the Contras grew
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bolder.
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The Reagan Doctrine Defined
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A turning point had been reached in policy toward Nicaragua and,
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more generally, in policy toward Soviet Third-World clients:
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"covert" aid to resistance forces increasingly would be covert in
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name only. While the successes in El Salvador were crucial, they
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came within the framework of traditional containment policy. At the
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same time, a much more proactive policy in the Third World began to
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take shape in Nicaragua -- what became known as the Reagan Doctrine.
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The Reagan administration had staked out a position putting the
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U.S. on the side of anti-communist forces not only materially but
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also morally, and it had given notice to the Soviets that the
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Brezhnev Doctrine was not an acceptable point of departure for
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superpower relations. In addition, aid to the Nicaraguan resistance
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was linked with aid to El Salvador as two sides -- offensive and
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defensive -- of a coherent policy.
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Just how correct President Reagan was about communist designs for
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the region became clear later. Contra pressure helped force the
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Sandinistas to hold elections in February 1990; shortly after they
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were ousted, the FMLN sued for peace. This linkage further was
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dramatized last May when a cache of arms and documents that proved
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continuing ties between the Sandinistas and communist guerrillas in
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El Salvador and elsewhere was discovered outside Managua.
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Grenada: Puncturing Brezhnev
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The most dramatic and abrupt reversal of the Soviet design
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throughout the eight years of the Reagan presidency came on October
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25, 1983, when U.S. airborne troops and Marines landed on the
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island of Grenada. This small island country 100 miles off the
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coast of Venezuela had fallen into the Soviet orbit in March 1979,
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after Maurice Bishop, a Marxist lawyer, and his "New Jewel
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Movement" seized power in a coup d'<27>tat. For the next
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four-and-a-half years, Grenada moved closer to serving as a base
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for Kremlin ambitions and power projection in the Caribbean, a
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threat that President Reagan had identified and warned of in his
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March SDI speech.
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When Mr. Bishop was overthrown and executed in mid-October by even
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more hard-line communist elements of the New Jewel Movement,
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Grenada's small island neighbors, in the form of the Organization
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of East Caribbean States, invited U.S. intervention. President
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Reagan ordered the invasion to proceed on October 25. When the
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operation ended a few days later, 75 percent of the American people
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and 90 percent of the Grenadian people polled had supported the
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action.
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The American invasion of Grenada was the first major use of force
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by the United States since the Vietnam War, and it was the first
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time that U.S. troops had been used to liberate a communist
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country. Vast stockpiles of Soviet weapons and a collection of
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damning documents were discovered, American students were evacuated
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successfully, Cuban forces were defeated in battle, and the
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Brezhnev Doctrine was punctured. For the first time in recent
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memory, the United States was on the offensive for freedom, both
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substantively and directly.
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Grenada was a tiny island with a tiny population of 85,000, but its
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significance was huge. Historians should record that October 24,
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1983, represented the high-water mark of the Soviet empire. Never
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again would the communists in the Kremlin control as much territory
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or wield as much influence as they did on the day before Army
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Rangers landed at Point Salines. At the end of 1983, the Soviet
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Third-World strategy was thwarted in key respects, and important
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American allies had been reinvigorated.
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Shock Waves of the Economic Rebound
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Finally, victory against the Soviet Union in the Cold War was
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undergirded by the remarkable recovery of the U.S. economy from the
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stagflation of the late 1970s and early 1980s. In January 1983, the
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United States began a 93-month period of sustained, noninflationary
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economic growth. By the time the expansion ended in the summer of
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1990 during the Bush administration, the Berlin Wall no longer
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existed.
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This economic expansion had three important effects. First, it
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ensured the 1984 re-election of Ronald Reagan and the continuation
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of the policies that were instrumental to victory in the primary
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theater of the Cold War. Second, it guaranteed the economic
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resources necessary to pursue these policies and, more generally,
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to maintain a strong American presence in the world. Lastly, the
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ability of the United States to pull itself out of its economic
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doldrums had a momentous impact on the Soviets' faith in their
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Marxist beliefs. America's economic growth disproved the
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"inevitability" of the collapse of capitalism, which the Soviets
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had thought to be at hand. Indeed, the recovery led to a serious
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re-appraisal of economic collectivism throughout the West and the
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Third World, inducing many socialist governments to introduce
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capitalist reforms.
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The Vulnerable Empire
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Ronald Reagan entered office determined to turn around the Cold War
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and complete the policy of containment. In both theory and
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practice, President Reagan grasped that the Soviet Union was at a
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crisis point in the early 1980s, and he saw clearly the central
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contradiction within Kremlin policy that made the Soviet empire
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vulnerable: it was bankrupt economically, yet was engaging in
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renewed heights of external aggression. By 1980, still on a
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perpetual wartime footing because of their ideology, the Soviets
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invested more than two to three times what the United States did on
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military spending. Mr. Reagan aimed to push this Soviet paradox of
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internal decay and outward expansion, all the while reminding the
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world of the tyrannical nature of the Soviet regime. In this task
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he succeeded. Although their economy continued to falter and their
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military spending consumed over 25 percent of GNP by 1987, the
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Soviets under Mikhail Gorbachev still attempted to accelerate world
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communism and emulate the arms and military capacity of the West.
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But within the next four years, the Kremlin lost its empire, and
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its domestic and foreign policies collapsed.
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Certainly there were important points in shifting the Cold War
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prior to 1983: the growth of the consensus in favor of increased
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defense spending in the late 1970s; the throttling of SALT II; the
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catalytic impact of Iran and Afghanistan; and the election of
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Ronald Reagan in 1980. The president understood the import of these
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factors, conveyed them to the American people, and incorporated
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them into his policies. While victory against the Soviets was
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nearer after 1983, its outline was not visible for several years.
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In contrast to most of the media and foreign policy experts,
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President Reagan knew that the triumphs of 1983 should not be
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translated into conciliation and compromise as the political theme
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of 1984.
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The Beginning of the End
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In sum, then, 1983 was the crucial year. It was the year that
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America conclusively demonstrated it was not in decline, as had
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seemed the trend at any point from 1968 on, but vigorously would
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defend itself and carry the fight to the Soviets. The ideological
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counterattack reached full voice, NATO was saved, nuclear
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deterrence was protected successfully from the assault of the
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nuclear freeze movement, the strategic defense initiative was
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launched, El Salvador and with it containment in Central America
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survived the worst that could be thrown against it, the groundwork
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was laid for the Reagan Doctrine, the Brezhnev Doctrine was
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disassembled in Grenada, and an economic expansion began that
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reaffirmed American prosperity for the rest of the decade. In many
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respects, the "Vietnam syndrome" that had prevented American vigor
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for a decade was dismantled, not in the Persian Gulf War of 1991,
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but in 1983.
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These factors, including SDI, Euromissile deployment, and elements
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of the rhetorical counteroffensive, created what Mr. Shevardnadze
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later referred to as a "Gordian knot" for the Soviet leadership,
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which found itself at times "sinking into despair over the impasse"
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that ultimately would lead to a radically new policy direction.
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Genrikh Trofimenko, who was head of the Department for the Study of
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the U.S. Foreign Policy at the former Soviet Institute of the USA
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and Canada, similarly remarked that Mr. Reagan's strategy, and the
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effect it had on the Soviet regime, convinced "99 percent of all
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Russians that Reagan won the Cold War."
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None of President Reagan's grand strategy that began to coalesce in
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1983 was inevitable; in fact, every element of it was bitterly
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opposed and ridiculed by powerful segments of American and Western
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political, cultural, and intellectual opinion. And even those who
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believed in the policies could not know the outcome. Only the
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steadfast political wisdom, confidence, and determination of Ronald
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Reagan -- and the common sense of the American citizenry -- ensured that
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America held firm. A president must join prudence and courage in
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the service of right principles, and he must be led by the soul of
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his people while being willing and able to lead their minds.
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As 1980 denotes a watershed in domestic politics, 1983 is the
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counterpart in world politics. The year 1983 -- a year of
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extraordinary importance to the ongoing triumph of human freedom in
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the protracted conflict against communist totalitarianism -- stands
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out as more than a historical marker. It is an anniversary worth
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noting not only for its own sake but also for the lessons it
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offers: history is made by human beings making choices, and in a
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battle for the survival of great and good principles, simply being
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right is not enough. Fortune favors the brave.
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To reprint more than short quotations, please write or FAX Ben
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Morehead, Associate Publisher, Policy Review, 214 Massachusetts
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Avenue, NE, Washington, DC 20002, FAX (202) 675-0291.
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