255 lines
14 KiB
Plaintext
255 lines
14 KiB
Plaintext
FAX INTERCEPTION
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This article is reprinted from Full Disclosure #23. Copyright (c) 1991 Full
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Disclosure. Permission granted by publisher to reprint when subscription
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information provided: Full Disclosure, Box 903-R, Libertyville, Illinois
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60048, Phone: (708) 395-6200, Fax: (708) 395-6022, BBS: (708) 395-3244, Toll
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free: (800) 786-6184. Subscriptions: $18 for 12 issues.
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As with the introduction of all new communications technologies, there is a
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time lag between the availability of the technology and commercial
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development of interception devices. Accompanying the use of both are
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unanticipated risks and the potential for misuse and misunderstandings.
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False Sense of Security
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With the widespread proliferation of fax machines came increased use. In
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general, a document transferred has been given the same sort of validity as
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one sent or received by U.S. Mail. In general, such communications were
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originally secure. Now that interception equipment is available, the sense of
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security has become false.
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For all practical purposes, fax is a remote photocopying machine. The process
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begins with the sending unit converting the image on the page into a
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digitized image (numbers in an electronic format) and transmitting it as a
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noise sounding signal over a phone line. The receiving fax converts the
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signal into dots and prints it.
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Since the image is transmitted over standard phone lines, the communication
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is subject to interception. However, rather than tapping the line with a tape
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recorder or simply listening to the oral communications, an interception
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device that makes sense of the specialized signal is necessary. Sometimes
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this is done by recording the transmission and later converting the recording
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of the modem signal to a computer image, sometimes it is done 'on the fly' as
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the signal is being intercepted.
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Simple Fax Intercepts
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Why not just use a standard fax machine for interception? The signal
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sequences and handshaking at the time machines first connect complicates the
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possibility. During startup, the machines automatically select one of several
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built in protocols depending on line conditions. That is why on really noisy
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connections, the transmission of a page can take much longer. Directly
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connecting a 3rd fax machine to the line may confuse this process. Both the
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receiving unit and the intercepting machine would be sending signals about
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line conditions and protocol. However, if a 3rd fax machine did manage to get
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properly synchronized to the signal in use without interfering with the
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initial handshake, it would print an image identical to the one received by
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the intended recipient. We had mixed results when we tried this in our lab.
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Sometimes we managed to get all three machines synchronized. Using unmodified
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fax machines to attempt intercepts didn't provide sufficient reliability to
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be considered a viable approach. Indeed, continued attempts of this approach
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would likely put both sender and recipient(s) on notice that something was
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wrong as connections would be repeatedly lost.
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This doesn't mean that it is really complicated to intercept faxes. The
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Philadelphia Inquirer reported in September 1990 that Japanese hackers have
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been stealing valuable information from corporations by using fax
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interception. The article claimed it could be done by anyone with a little
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knowledge of electronics. We agree, we have intercepted faxes in our lab.
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(See front cover for one such example.)
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Doing It Right
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The latest commercially available fax interception devices generally use fax
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boards in IBM PC or compatible computers. The actual hardware used for fax
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interception is often the same as used by normal computer-fax systems. The
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software is more sophisticated. Rather than attempting to synchronize with
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the sending unit by sending protocol information, it adjusts to whatever
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protocol the two main players have established and stores the signal
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information.
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After interception, the electronic information is stored in the computer and
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is available for review, to be printed, altered or discarded. Such equipment
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can be left unattended for long periods if necessary, or monitored for the
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instant use of information in cases where law enforcement is standing by
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waiting for some specific bit evidence.
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Cellular Fax Interception
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Cellular phone based fax machines provide ripe opportunity for `hacker'
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intercepts, since the signal is available via low cost police scanners. No
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physical connection to a common carrier network is necessary. There is
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absolutely no risk of being detected.
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Commercial fax interception equipment gets more complicated, though. Since
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fax messages might be on the same phone lines as voice or other computer
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modem communications, some of the interception devices automatically route
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different types of communications to different interception devices. This
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provides the interceptor with a separate recordings of voice phone calls,
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faxes, and other computer communications.
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Such fax interceptions are based upon the interceptor having a specific
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target. Distributing the sorts of information received for analysis isn't
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much different from an ordinary, now old fashioned, wiretap.
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Broadband Interception
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Presorting of signals and voice communications as described above makes
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broadband scanning for fax messages easy. The interception of satellite or
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microwave links has become possibile. Cooperation by a common carrier with
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the government has happened in the past, and strikes a chord of dangerous
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reality today. But it really takes little by way of home fabricated equipment
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to monitor much of the satellite link traffic. Commercial equipment is also
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available. One commercial fax interception unit can decode up to 150
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simultaneous fax transmissions from a 6,000 phone line satellite link.
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Such broadband interception can also be done on oral calls, however, the task
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of listening to all the conversations for the important ones is much, much
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greater compared to scanning faxes. First, faxes are usually much more direct
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and to the point than normal phone conversations (not so much about Sunday's
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game). Additionally, optical character recognition (OCR) process can be used
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to convert much of the text to standard computer data and then be
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mechanistically selected for closer scrutiny by an automated search of
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keywords of interest. Encryption of a fax could also be noted, perhaps
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triggering further attention.
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The risks resulting from broadband interceptions are henious. Your fax could
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be intercepted not because you were a selected target of law enforcement,
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industrial spies or miscreant hackers, but because of the route your fax
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travelled through the common carrier networks. Broadband interceptions become
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a modern day version of general warrants. Satellite signals don't respect
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borders. Interception in nations with no privacy concerns for radio signals
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of what we, as users, understand to be Constitutionally protected
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communications has become a real threat. There are areas contained within our
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national frontiers where the United States Constitution does not apply.
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Foreign embassies present one such clearcut example. The status on Indian
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Reservations is not cleancut.
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Dangers of Fax
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The February 13, 1990 issue of the American Bankers' Association publication
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``Bankers Weekly'' reported that ``In one incident, a bank suffered a $1.2
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million loss through fraudulent funds transfer requests which were
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accomplished using nothing more than business letterhead, tape and sissors.''
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A fax machine made such simple tools effective. Inordinate reliance on
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technology permitted the loss to actually happen.
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The journal continues that there is a need for legislation (changes to the
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Uniform Commercial Code) to put a stop to the problem. Unfortunately,
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legislative efforts alone cannot correct the problem. The first step, is an
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understanding of the technology.
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Once the technology is understood, administrative procedures can be
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implemented by users of fax machines to protect themselves. That protection
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cannot be successful without understanding the limitations of the machinery.
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Taking any communications device for granted is a high risk path.
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New Techniques For Fraud
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The advent of fax technology has opened the door to new methods of fraud.
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Those intent on committing fraud have always devised methods of bypassing
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normal authentication systems in order to steal. As technology evolves, these
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methods also evolve. Protective measures must follow suit.
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Faxes represent a multiple whammy. People who send faxes have some geographic
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distance between them. Because of past reliance on semi-automated
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communications, formal verification proceedures are bypassed, substituting
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the mysterious nature of modern communications. There was a time, even
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recently, that tellers at banks asked for positive identification even in the
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case of small cash transactions inside a bank. Yet today we witness orders
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for large sums being processed simply because ``it came by fax.'' This is
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truly a conspiracy of laxness and misinformation.
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A written purchase order from a company is likely to have a particular form,
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and include a signature. One attempting to issue a fraudulent purchase order
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would need to forge both the form and the signature. Additionally, envelopes
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and possibly a postage meter imprint from the issuing company would also be
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needed. Elsewhere in this issue we reprint a letter from the Federal
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Communications Commission. The letterhead was, for reasons we have been
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unable to determine, typed instead of printed. Some of the recipients we've
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talked to have placed calls to verify the authenticity of the letter. As it
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turns out, the letter was authentic and official.
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A purchase order sent by fax on the other hand, can be created by cutting,
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pasting and xeroxing together parts of other orders from the company. When
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received by fax, the fake would appear legitimate.
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PC's & Fax: The Miscreants Gun
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The advent of PC based fax boards exaggerates these problem. A fax that
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originates, is received by, or intercepted by a personal computer (PC) fax
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board really opens the door for miscreants.
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A fax, when stored on a PC is easily modified using ordinary commercial
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software intended for preparation of graphics. An image of the fax can be
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brought up on the screen and parts of it altered or cut and pasted
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electronically. For example, a purchase order could have a shipping address
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altered. A signature could be removed from one document and placed on
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another. All such operations can be done on a computer screen in moments.
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Document changes that could take a professional forger hours to accomplish
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could be done in minutes by an amateur, even an underage one.
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Bogus faxes can be created to be sent to another fax, or incoming faxes could
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be altered by an employee and printed as authentic. Detection is difficult to
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impossible, depending on verification techniques used at audit.
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The difficulty of intercepting standard U.S. Mail or voice phone calls and
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altering the content by a third party is enormous compared to fax messages.
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Before a fax message is printed, it is just a series of electrical signals.
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Any alternations result in changes without a trace of the alteration.
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The receipt of a fax is <B>not<D> a confirmation of its content, unless other
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corroborative authentication validates the information.
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Someone with access to a phone closet can route incoming fax line to a PC.
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The fax can then be connected to a different phone line. All incoming faxes
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would be first received by the PC and the operator could alter, erase, or
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forward without change those faxes to the standard fax machine. A pre-review
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and alteration if desired scheme can be effected. The same can not easily be
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accomplished with normal voice phone calls, or the U.S. Mail.
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With the advent of the Caller-ID services, this information should soon be
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incorporated into fax machines, so the true number of the caller will be
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placed on the fax. This will still do nothing to prevent transmission of
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bogus faxes over that phone line.
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Protect Yourself
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The best rule for protecting one's interests when using faxes is to use them
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only with other confirmation or as confirmation of other communications. They
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should never be used for final copies of contracts, purchase orders or other
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important documents that could have a significant impact if altered, or
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entirely fabricated. Where would we be if our WW2 treaties terminating
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hostilities were faxed documents. Additionally, information that would not be
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given out over a standard phone conversation, subject to a wiretap, or other
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listeners (via a speakerphone, extension, etc), should not be sent by fax.
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There is no way to tell who may pick up a received fax and read it. In fact,
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it is more likely an unintended party will read a fax than pick up an
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extension phone and eavesdrop on a voice call (intentionally or not).
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It should be kept in mind that any errant employees or others that could get
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access to the fax phone line(s) could intercept all faxes sent or received
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and make use of the fax images for whatever purpose they desired.
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The intercepted faxes can be used to collect or create incriminating
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evidence, industrial espionage, or as the base of documents to be used in
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forgery. There's a whole new meaning to autograph collection.
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Conclusion
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Fax technology in its current form provides a useful service for business and
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others. However, the risks must be examined so the use doesn't go beyond that
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which is appropriate given its current functionality / risk ratio.
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In conclusion, the convenience of a fax must be weighed against its risks and
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procedures implemented to authenticate incoming and outgoing faxes as well as
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what information is communicated by fax. As with all technologies, it must be
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understood so that it can be used for purposes that are appropriate for the
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needs of the technology and the user. A lack of understanding can leave the
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user exposed to unnecessary danger, liability and loss. When used with an
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understanding of the benefits as well as the pitfalls, a fax machine can
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greatly enhance productivity.
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