1336 lines
45 KiB
Plaintext
1336 lines
45 KiB
Plaintext
###
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<*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*>
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<*><*><*><*><*>
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<*> Joe Cosmo Presents.....
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<*>
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<*>
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<*>
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<*> Methods of Phreaking and Telco Security
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Measures <*>
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<*>
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<*>
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<*> June 16, 1988
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1:30 am <*>
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<*>
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<*>
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<*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*>
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<*><*><*><*><*>
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(formatted to 80 Columns)
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Dedication: This phile is dedicated to all those great
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phreakers who
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taught me all of this, and to all of the newcomers being
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born to the phreak
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world. For the legends, it is here as their legacy, and for
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the newcomers, I
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hope they will use it as their guide in times of trouble,
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and may there
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always be phreakers in the world.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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CHAPTER
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I. Introduction: What Telephone Fraud Is
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II. Who Does It and Why
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III. The Systems That Are Fooled
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IV. Electronic Toll Fraud
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How Boxes Work
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The Blue Box
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Operation of a Blue Box
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Pink Noise
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The Black Box
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The Red Box
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The Cheese Box
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V. Divertors
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VI. Private Branch Exchanges
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VII. Specialized Common Carriers
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SCC Extenders List
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VIII. PC Pursuit
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How to Originate a PC Pursuit Call
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IX. Cellular Phone Fraud
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ESN Tampering
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Obtaining ESN's
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X. CN/A's
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CN/A List
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XI. Loops
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XII. Alliance Teleconferencing
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Billing an Alliance Conference
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Starting a Conference
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XIII. Telephone System Security Measure
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ESS Detection Devices
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Automatic Number Identification and Centralized
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Automatic Message Accounting Tapes
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Dialed Number Recorders
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Trap Codes
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Stopping an FBI Trace
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Common Channel Inter-office Signaling
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XIV. Laws Governing the Rights of Phreakers
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XV. Conclusion
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I. Introduction: What Telephone Fraud Is
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Telephone fraud is illegally using the communication
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facilities of
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telephone companies. This is commonly known as "phreaking."
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The writer's
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purpose is to explore the methods of phreaking, and the
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various security
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measures of telephone companies.
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II. Who Does It and Why
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The majority of people who phreak are owners of modems
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(MOdulators
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DEModulators, devices which allow computers to communicate
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over telephone
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lines) and are usually between the ages of twelve and
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seventeen. When the
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person reaches age eighteen, he or she usually stops, since
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after that age,
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if the person in caught, the penalty can become very
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serious, such as time in
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prison, and fines starting at $8000.
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Scattered throughout the country are many different
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computer bulletin
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board systems, or BBS's. These are computer systems
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established by private
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users or large organizations for the exchange of public and
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private messages
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and software. Most are not a local call, though. Since the
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normal user calls
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about ten different BBS's, with even the lowest
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long-distance rates, the
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phone bill each month can range from $100 to $1000. The
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solution is to
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phreak. When these people learn how to phreak, they also
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realize that besides
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making free long-distance calls from their home, they can
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also make free
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calls from payphones. They also find that there are many
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other facilities
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that they can used without paying.
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III. The Systems That Are Fooled
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Their are three types of telephone operating systems in
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the U.S., Step
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by Step (SxS), Crossbar (XB), and Electronic Switching
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System (ESS). They are
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described in detail in the following paragraphs.
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Step by Step
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Step by Step (SxS) was the first switching system used
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in America,
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adopted in 1918 and until 1978 Bell had over 53% of all
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exchanges using Step
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by Step. A long, and confusing train of switches is used
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for SxS switching.
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Disadvantages
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A. The switch train may become jammed, blocking calls.
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B. No DTMF (Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency), to be discussed
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later.
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C. Much maintenance and much electricity.
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D. No "Touch-Tone" dialing.
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Identification
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A. No pulsing digits after dialing or "Touch Tone".
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B. Much static in the connections.
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C. No Speed calling, Call forwarding, and other services.
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D. Pay-phone wants money first before dial-tone.
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Crossbar
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Crossbar has been Bell's primary switcher after 1960.
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Three types of
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Crossbar switchings exist, Number 1 Crossbar (1XB), Number 4
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Crossbar (4XB),
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and Number 5 Crossbar (5XB). A switching matrix is used for
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all of the phones
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in an area. When someone calls, the route is determined and
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is connected with
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the other phone. The matrix is positioned in horizontal and
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vertical paths,
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organizing the train of switches more effectively, and
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therefore, stopping
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the equipment from jamming. There are no definite
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distinguishing features of
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Crossbar switchings from Step by Step.
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Electronic Switching System
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ESS is the most advanced system employed, and has gone
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through many
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kinds of revisions. The latest system to date is ESS 11a,
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which is used in
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Washington D.C. for security reasons. ESS is the country's
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most advanced
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switching system, and has the highest security system of
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all. With its many
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special features, it is truly the phreaker's nightmare.
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Identification
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A. Dialing 911 for emergencies.
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B. Dial-tone first for pay-phones.
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C. Calling services, including Call forwarding, Speed
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dialing, and Call
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waiting.
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D. Automatic Number Identification for long-distance calls
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(ANI), to be
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discussed later.
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E. "Touch Tone"
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IV. Electronic Toll Fraud
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The ETF's are electrical devices used to get free
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long-distance calls.
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The devices are more commonly known as colored boxes, and
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using them is known
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as "boxing." Boxing is one of the oldest way to phreak, and
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therefore, it is
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also the most dangerous, since the telephone companies are
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very much aware of
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their existence. Colored boxes are not used only for
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phreaking. There are
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many types which have other uses (such as the Tron Box,
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which lowers your
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electric bill), so only those used in telephone fraud will
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be discussed.
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How Boxes Work
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In the beginning, all long distance calls were
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connected manually by
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operators who passed on the called number verbally to other
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operators in
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series. This is because pulse (rotary) digits are created by
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causing breaks
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in the DC current. Since long distance calls call for
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routing through
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various switching equipment and AC voice amplifiers, pulse
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dialing cannot be
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used to send the destination number to the end local office
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(CO).
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Eventually, the demand for faster and more efficient
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long distance
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service caused Bell to make a multi-billion dollar decision.
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They had to
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create a signaling system that could be used on the LD
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Network. They had two
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options:
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[1] To send all the signaling and supervisory information
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(eg., ON and OFF
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HOOK) over separate data links. This type of signaling is
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referred to as
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out-of-band signaling.
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[2] To send all the signaling information along with the
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conversation using
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tones to represent digits. This type of signaling is called
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in-band
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signaling.
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The second seemed to be the most economical choice, and so,
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it was
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incorporated in ESS.
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Then, in the 1960's, when the first ESS systems were
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employed, a toy
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whistle was put in each box of Captain Crunch Cereal as a
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premium. A young
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radio technician in the United States Air Force became
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fascinated with the
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whistle when he discovered that by blowing it into the
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telephone after
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dialing any long distance number, the trunk line would
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remain open without
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toll charges accounting. From then on, any number could be
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dialed for free.
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The truth was that the whistle produced a perfect-pitch 2600
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Hz tone, the one
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used to signify a disconnect in ESS switching equipment. To
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overcome the
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initial charge for the for the long distance call, he later
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used toll-free
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800 numbers.
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Being a skilled technician, Captain Crunch (he began to
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use the name as
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an alias) soon went beyond the simple whistle and
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experimented with other
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frequencies, creating many of the boxes discussed in the
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following
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paragraphs.
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The Blue Box
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The "Blue Box" was so named because of the color of the
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first one
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discovered by the authorities. The design and hardware used
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in the Blue Box
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is very sophisticated, and its size varies from a large
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piece of apparatus to
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a miniaturized unit that is approximately the size of a
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"king size" package
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of cigarettes.
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The Blue Box contains 12 or 13 buttons or switches that
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emit the
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multi-frequency tones used in the normal operation of the
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telephone toll
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(long distance) switching network. In effect, the the Blue
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Box can let a
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person become the operator of a phone line. The Blue Box
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enables its user to
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originate fraudulent toll calls by circumventing (fooling)
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toll billing
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equipment. The Blue Box may be directly connected to a phone
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line, or it may
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be acoustically coupled to a telephone handset by placing
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the Blue Box's
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speaker next to the transmitter, or the telephone handset.
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Operation of a Blue Box
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To understand the steps of a fraudulent Blue Box call,
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it is necessary
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to understand the basic operation of the Direct Distance
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Dialing (DDD)
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telephone network. When a DDD call is originated, the
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calling number is
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identified as an integral part of establishing the
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connection. This may be
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done either automatically by ANI in ESS, or in some cases,
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by an operator
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asking the calling party for his telephone number. This
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information is
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entered on a tape in the Centralized Automatic Message
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Accounting (CAMA)
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office. This tape also contains the number assigned to the
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trunk line over
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which the call is to be made. The information relating to
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the call contained
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on the tape includes the called number's identification,
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time of origination
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of the call, and if the called number answered the call. The
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time of
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disconnect is also recorded. The various data entries with
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of the call are
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correlated to provide billing information for use by the
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caller's telephone
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company's accounting department.
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The typical Blue Box user usually dials a number that
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will route the
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call into the telephone network without charge. For example,
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the user will
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very often call a well-known INWATS (toll-free) number. The
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Blue Box user,
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after gaining this access to the network when somebody picks
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up and in
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effect, "seizing" control of the line, operates a key on the
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Blue Box which
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emits a 2600 Hertz (cycles per second, abbreviated as Hz)
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tone. This tone
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causes the switching equipment to release the connection to
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the INWATS
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customer's line. The 2600 Hz tone is the signal to the
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switching system that
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the calling party has hung up. In fact though, the local
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trunk on the calling
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party's end is still connected to the toll network. The Blue
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Box user now
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operates the "KP" (Key Pulse) key on the Blue Box to notify
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the toll
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switching equipment that switching signals are about to be
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emitted. The user
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then pushes the "number" buttons on the Blue Box
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corresponding to the
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telephone number being called. After doing so, he/she
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operates the "ST"
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(Start) key to tell the switching equipment that signaling
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is complete. If
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the call is completed, only the portion of the original call
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prior to the
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operation of the 2600 Hz tone is recorded on the CAMA tape.
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The tones emitted
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by the Blue Box are not recorded on the CAMA tape.
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Therefore, because the
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original call to the INWATS number is toll-free, no billing
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is rendered in
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connection with the call.
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The above are the steps in a normal operation of a Blue
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Box, but they
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may vary in any one of the following ways:
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A. The Blue Box may include a rotary dial to apply the
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2600Hz tone and the
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switching signals. This type of Blue Box is called a "dial
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pulser" or "rotary
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SF" Blue box.
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B. A magnetic tape recording may be used to record the Blue
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Box tones. Such a
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tape recording could be used in lieu of a Blue Box to
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fraudulently place
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calls to the phone numbers recorded on the magnetic tape.
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All Blue Boxes, except "dial pulse" or "Rotary SF" Blue
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Boxes,
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must have the following four common operating capabilities:
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A. It be able to emit the 2600 Hz tone. This tone is used by
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the toll network
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to indicate, either by its presence or its absence, an "on
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hook" (idle) or
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"off hook" (busy) condition of a trunk line.
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B. The Blue Box must have a "KP" tones that unlocks or
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readies
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the multi-frequency receiver at the called end to receive
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the
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tones corresponding to the called phone number.
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C. The Blue Box must be able to emit DTMF, tones used to
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transmit phone
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numbers over the toll network. Each digit of a phone number
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is represented by
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a combination of two tones. For example, the 2 is 700 Hz and
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900 Hz.
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D. The Blue Box must have an "ST" key which consists of a
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combination of two
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tones that tell the equipment at the called end that all
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digits have been
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sent and that the equipment should start connecting the call
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to the called
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number.
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The following is a chart of the multi-frequency (MF)
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tones produced by
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the normal Blue Box.
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700 : 1 : 2 : 4 : 7 : 11 : 2600 X
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900 : + : 3 : 5 : 8 : 12 :
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1100 : + : + : 6 : 9 : KP :
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1300 : + : + : + : 10 : KP2 :
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1500 : + : + : + : + : ST :
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: 700 : 900 :1100 :1300 :1500 :
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The "Dial Pulser" or "Rotary SF" Blue Box requires only
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a dial
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with a signalling capability to produce a 2600 Hz tone.
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Pink Noise
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Since telephone companies have such advanced equipment
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to detect Blue
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Boxes, to help avoid detection "pink noise" is sometimes
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added to the 2600 Hz
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tone.
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Since 2600 Hz tones can be simulated in speech, the
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detection equipment
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of the switching system must be attentive not to
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misinterpret speech as a
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disconnect signal. Thus, a virtually
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pure 2600 Hz tone is required for disconnect. This is also
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the reason why the
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2600 Hz tone must be sent rapidly; sometimes, it will not
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work when the
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person called is speaking. It is feasible, though, to send
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some "pink noise"
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along with the 2600 Hz. Most of this energy should be above
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3000 Hz. The
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pink noise will not reach the toll network, where we want
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our pure 2600 Hz to
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hit, but it will go through the local CO and thus, the fraud
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detectors.
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The Black Box
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The Black Box is the easiest type to build. The box
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stops a call from
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being charged to some one only if it is hooked to the line
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of the person
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being called.
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In the normal telephone cable, there are four wires: a
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red, a green, a
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black, and a yellow. The red & green wires are often
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referred to as tip (T)
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and ring (R).
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When a telephone is on-hook (hung up) there is
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approximately 48 volts of
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DC current (VDC) flowing through the tip and ring. When the
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handset of a
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phone is lifted, switches close, causing a loop to be
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connected (which is
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known as the "local loop,") between the telephone and the
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CO. Once this
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happens DC current is able to flow through the telephone
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with less
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resistance. This causes a relay to energize and signal to
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other CO equipment
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that service is being requested. Eventually, a dial tone is
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emitted. This
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also causes the 48 VDC to drop down into the vicinity of 13
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volts. The
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resistance of the loop also drops below the 2500 ohm level.
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Considering that
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this voltage and resistance drop is how the CO detects that
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a telephone was
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taken off hook, how a Black Box works is by allowing the
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voltage to drop
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enough to allow talking, but not enough to signal to the CO
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equipment to
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start billing. To do this, a 10,000 Ohm, .5 Watt resistor is
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incorporated in
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the local loop on the called party's line.
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The Red Box
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A Red Box is a device that simulates the sound of a
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coin being accepted
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by a payphone. When a coin is put in the slot of a payphone,
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the first
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obstacle is the magnetic trap. This will stop any
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light-weight magnetic
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slugs. If it passes this, the coin is then classed as a
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nickel, dime, or
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quarter. Each coin is then checked for appropriate size and
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weight. If these
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tests are passed, it will then travel through a nickel,
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dime, or quarter
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magnet as proper. These magnets start an eddy current effect
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which causes
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coins of the appropriate characteristics to slow down so
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they will follow the
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correct trajectory.
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If all goes well, the coin will follow the correct
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path, striking the
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appropriate totalizer arm, causing a ratchet wheel to rotate
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once for every
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5-cent increment (eg, a quarter will cause it to rotate 5
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times). The
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totalizer then causes the coin signal oscillator to readout
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a dual-frequency
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signal indicating the value deposited to the Automated Coin
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Toll Service
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computer (ACTS) or the Traffic Service Position System
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(TSPS) operator. These
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are the tones emitted by the Red Box.
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For a quarter, five beep tones are outpulsed for 66
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milliseconds (ms). A
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dime causes two beep tones for 33 ms, while a nickel causes
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one beep tone at
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also 33 ms. A beep consists of two frequencies, 2200 Hz and
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1700 Hz. As with
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a Blue Box, Red Box tones can be recorded on a magnetic
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tape.
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Since any call from a payphone is originated with a
|
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"ground test," in
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which the TSPS operator or the ACTS computer checks for the
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presence of the
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first coin inserted into the phone, by verifying use of the
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magnetic, weight,
|
|
and size traps, when using a Red Box, it is necessary to put
|
|
in at least one
|
|
coin.
|
|
|
|
The Cheese Box
|
|
A Cheese Box lets a normal telephone emulate a
|
|
payphone. By emulating a
|
|
payphone, using a blue box now becomes safe, because if the
|
|
CO equipment
|
|
recognizes the call as one from a payphone, it does not
|
|
record it on a CAMA
|
|
tape. Since a normal telephone does not have a slot to enter
|
|
coins, a Red Box
|
|
is needed to generate the sound of a coin dropping.
|
|
|
|
V. Divertors
|
|
A divertor is a special service that allows businesses
|
|
to "divert" calls
|
|
if no one answers after a certain number of rings. For
|
|
example, a person
|
|
calls a company, and nobody answers. After about three
|
|
rings, a few clicks
|
|
are heard, then a few fainter rings are heard. The building
|
|
receiving the
|
|
call has changed from the company to another building,
|
|
usually somebody's
|
|
house. What has happened is that the call has been re-routed
|
|
from building A
|
|
to building B. In effect, the number called is not really
|
|
changed, but
|
|
instead, building A has answered the call, called building
|
|
B, and connected
|
|
the two lines together. If the person in building B
|
|
disconnects, the caller
|
|
is still connected to building A. With the way the divertor
|
|
equipment works
|
|
in the telephone company, the phone line of building A will
|
|
then emit a dial
|
|
tone and the caller has total control of the line, and can
|
|
originate another
|
|
call, charging it to building A.
|
|
|
|
|
|
VI. Private Branch Exchanges
|
|
A Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is a system of out-WATS
|
|
(Wide Area
|
|
Telephone Service) lines and in-WATS lines. An out-WATS line
|
|
allows a
|
|
business to make as long-distance calls each month for a
|
|
flat rate. An
|
|
in-WATS line is a toll-free number (800 number) that is also
|
|
leased to
|
|
businesses for flat rates. PBX's save corporations much
|
|
money when their
|
|
salesmen, distributors, and franchisees must make many calls
|
|
from different
|
|
parts of the country. It works much like specialized common
|
|
carriers (to be
|
|
discussed later).
|
|
First, the employee calls the company on the in-WATS
|
|
line. The switching
|
|
equipment picks up the phone, and send a tone to the
|
|
employee indicating for
|
|
him to enter the access code of the PBX. If the access code
|
|
is correct, then
|
|
the line is connected to the out-WATS line, and the employee
|
|
can make a call.
|
|
To use PBX's, phreakers must find the access code of
|
|
the PBX. This can
|
|
be done very easily, since the code is usually only a few
|
|
digits. One way is
|
|
to dial different combinations manually on the telephone
|
|
keypad. The other
|
|
way is of the phreaker is the owner of a modem. A simple
|
|
program can be
|
|
easily written to continuously dial digit combinations
|
|
randomly or
|
|
sequentially.
|
|
|
|
|
|
VII. Specialized Common Carriers
|
|
Ever since the break up of AT&T's monopoly on
|
|
long-distance service,
|
|
there have been many other corporations that compete with
|
|
AT&T in the
|
|
long-distance market, including Sprint, MCI, All-net, ITT,
|
|
and Metrophone.
|
|
These all boast opportunities for large savings on
|
|
long-distance calls. These
|
|
companies are called specialized common carriers (SCC's).
|
|
SCC's cost less because they do not use the AT&T's
|
|
cable-based systems,
|
|
but instead use microwave links. Some have also added
|
|
fiber-optic lines to
|
|
their networks.
|
|
Another way they can save consumers money is by using
|
|
AT&T's lines.
|
|
Instead of connecting calls by the shortest route, the
|
|
carrier will use a
|
|
different route, so the call goes through places where the
|
|
long-distance
|
|
traffic is heavy, and the rate is lower. The companies that
|
|
do this are known
|
|
as "resellers."
|
|
Most SCC's work nearly the same as PBX's. The 800
|
|
number is called, a
|
|
tone is heard, the private identification number (PIN) is
|
|
entered, and then
|
|
the call can be made. The length of the PIN number can range
|
|
from four digit
|
|
to fourteen digits.
|
|
Besides 800 toll free numbers, in some areas, a 950 can
|
|
be used. A 950
|
|
works exactly the same as an 800 number, the only difference
|
|
is that the
|
|
consumer must enter only seven digits before dialing his PIN
|
|
number instead
|
|
of ten with a toll-free number. 950's are free of charge and
|
|
can be used both
|
|
at home and at pay phones.
|
|
The PIN numbers can be found the same way as PBX access
|
|
codes. Since the
|
|
number of digits in a PIN is so great, using a computer is
|
|
much more common
|
|
practice than manual dialing.
|
|
The following pages are lists of SCC's and their
|
|
dialups, formats, and
|
|
special points. Note that some have many different dialups.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
============================================================
|
|
=================
|
|
[ SCC Extenders List
|
|
]
|
|
[ 0-9 - Number of digits in code
|
|
]
|
|
[ [ ] - Dial that exact number
|
|
]
|
|
[ # - Area code + Prefix + Suffix
|
|
]
|
|
[ : - Dial tone
|
|
]
|
|
[ + - ontinue dialing
|
|
]
|
|
============================================================
|
|
=================
|
|
| Extender | Dialing Format | Company |
|
|
Comments |
|
|
------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
-----------------
|
|
| 800-223-0548 | 8+[1]+# | TDX |
|
|
|
|
|
| 800-241-1129 | 8+[1]+# | TDX |
|
|
|
|
|
| 800-248-6248 | 6+[1]+# | SumNet Systems |
|
|
(800)824-3000 |
|
|
| 800-288-8845 | 7:[1]+# | TMC Watts |
|
|
(800)999-3339 |
|
|
| 800-325-0192 | [1]+#+6 | MCI |
|
|
950-1986 |
|
|
| 800-325-1337 | 7:[1]+# | TMC Watts |
|
|
|
|
|
| 800-325-7222 | 6+[1]+# | Max |
|
|
(800)982-4422 |
|
|
| 800-325-7970 | 6+[1]+# | Max |
|
|
(800)982-4422 |
|
|
| 800-327-4532 | 8+# | All-TelCo |
|
|
|
|
|
| 800-327-9488 | #:13 | ITT |
|
|
950-0488 |
|
|
| 800-334-0193 | [9]+# | Piedmont |
|
|
|
|
|
| 800-345-0008 | [0]+#:14 | US Sprint FON Cards
|
|
|950-1033 also 9+#|
|
|
| 800-368-4222 | 8+# | Congress Watts Lines |
|
|
|
|
|
| 800-437-7010 | 13 | GCI |
|
|
|
|
|
| 800-448-8989 | 14+[1]+# | Call US |
|
|
|
|
|
| 800-521-8400 | 8:# | TravelNet |
|
|
950-1088 (voice)|
|
|
| 800-541-2255 | 10 | MicroTel |
|
|
|
|
|
| 800-547-1784 | 13 | AmericaNet |
|
|
|
|
|
| 800-621-5640 | 6+[1]+# | ExpressTel |
|
|
|
|
|
| 800-637-4663 | 5+[1]+# | TeleSave |
|
|
|
|
|
| 800-821-6511 | 5+[1]+# | American Pioneer |
|
|
(800)852-4154 |
|
|
| 800-821-6629 | 6+[1]+# | Max |
|
|
(800)982-4422 |
|
|
| 800-821-7961 | 6+[1]+# | Max |
|
|
(800)982-4422 |
|
|
| 800-826-7397 | 6:[1]+# | Call U.S. |
|
|
|
|
|
| 800-858-4009 | 6+[1]+# | NTS |
|
|
Voice |
|
|
| 800-862-2345 | 7:[1]+# | TMC |
|
|
|
|
|
| 800-877-8000 | [0]+#:14 | US Sprint Calling
|
|
Card|950-1033 also 9+#|
|
|
| 800-882-2255 | 6:[1]+# | AmeriCall |
|
|
False Carrier |
|
|
| 800-950-1022 | [0]+#:14 | MCI Calling Card |
|
|
|
|
|
| 800-992-1444 | 9+# | AllNet |
|
|
950-1444 |
|
|
============================================================
|
|
=================
|
|
|
|
|
|
VIII. PC Pursuit
|
|
Many modem users know Telenet as a packet-switching
|
|
network through
|
|
which they can connect to different telecommunication
|
|
services throughout the
|
|
country for an hourly rate of $2. With PC Pursuit, Telenet
|
|
uses the same
|
|
method as SCC's, but instead of using microwave links, the
|
|
call is routed
|
|
through computers. Since it is routed through computers, the
|
|
service can be
|
|
used by only owners of modems. Instead of paying the hourly
|
|
rate, the
|
|
consumer needs only to pay a flat monthly rate of $25.
|
|
Using PC Pursuit is a little more difficult than using
|
|
SCC's, because
|
|
now instead of combinations of only ten different characters
|
|
(0-9), the whole
|
|
alphabet can be used in the access code. The following is a
|
|
chart showing the
|
|
steps to originate a typical PC Pursuit call.
|
|
|
|
How to Originate a PC Pursuit Call
|
|
First, the users dials the local Telenet Access Center,
|
|
which can be
|
|
found by dialing Telenet customer service at 1-800-336-0437.
|
|
|
|
Then:
|
|
|
|
Note: (cr) signifies the carriage return on a computer
|
|
keyboard.
|
|
|
|
Network Shows | User Types | Explanation
|
|
__________________|____________________________|____________
|
|
_________________
|
|
| (cr) (cr) |
|
|
__________________|____________________________|____________
|
|
_________________
|
|
TELENET | | Telenet
|
|
network called and
|
|
XXX XXX | | your
|
|
network address.
|
|
__________________|____________________________|____________
|
|
_________________
|
|
TERMINAL= | "D1" (cr) | Enter "D1"
|
|
or press (cr)
|
|
__________________|____________________________|____________
|
|
_________________
|
|
@ | For 300 bps: | CONNECT
|
|
command. To access
|
|
| "C(sp)DIALXXX/3,XXXX(cr)" | a PC
|
|
Pursuit city type a PC
|
|
| | Pursuit
|
|
access code and
|
|
| For 1200 bps: | your user
|
|
ID.
|
|
| "C(sp)DIALXXX/12,XXXX(cr)" |
|
|
__________________|____________________________|____________
|
|
_________________
|
|
PASSWORD= | "XXXXXX" (cr) | Type the
|
|
password
|
|
__________________|____________________________|____________
|
|
_________________
|
|
DIALXXX/X | "ATZ" (cr) | You are now
|
|
connected to the
|
|
CONNECTED | | PCP city.
|
|
Type ATZ (upper).
|
|
__________________|____________________________|____________
|
|
________________
|
|
OK | "ATDTXXXXXXX" (cr) | Dials a
|
|
number in PCP city
|
|
__________________|____________________________|____________
|
|
________________
|
|
CONNECT | | Your are
|
|
now connected to
|
|
| | your
|
|
destination computer.
|
|
__________________|____________________________|____________
|
|
________________
|
|
|
|
If the number dialed is busy, the user will see BUSY.
|
|
To call another
|
|
number in the same city, the user types "ATZ." The network
|
|
will answer OK.
|
|
The user then types "ATDTXXXXXXX" (cr) to dial the next
|
|
number.
|
|
To connect to a different PC Pursuit City, when the
|
|
user sees BUSY, he
|
|
types "@" (cr). When a @ appears, "D" (cr) is entered. This
|
|
disconnects the
|
|
user from the previous city. The user then follows the
|
|
above procedures to
|
|
dial another city.
|
|
|
|
IX. Cellular Phone Fraud
|
|
Cellular phones have evolved considerably from previous
|
|
systems.
|
|
Signaling between mobile and base stations uses high-speed
|
|
digital techniques
|
|
and involves many different types of digital messages. The
|
|
cellular phone
|
|
contains its own Mobile Identification Number (MIN), which
|
|
is programmed by
|
|
the seller or service shop and can be changed when, for
|
|
example, the phone is
|
|
sold to a new user. In addition, the U.S. cellular standard
|
|
incorporates a
|
|
second number, the Electronic Serial Number (ESN), which is
|
|
intended to
|
|
uniquely and permanently identify the mobile unit.
|
|
According to the Electronic Industries Association
|
|
(EIA) Interim
|
|
Standard IS-3-B, Cellular System Mobile Station Land Station
|
|
Compatibility
|
|
Specification, the serial number is a 32-bit binary number
|
|
that uniquely
|
|
identifies a mobile station to any cellular system. It must
|
|
be factory-set
|
|
and not readily alterable in the field. The circuitry that
|
|
provides the
|
|
serial number must be isolated from fraudulent contact and
|
|
tampering.
|
|
Attempts to change the serial number circuitry should render
|
|
the mobile
|
|
station inoperative.
|
|
The ESN was intended to solve two problems the industry
|
|
observed with
|
|
its older systems. First, the number of subscribers that
|
|
older systems could
|
|
support fell far short of the demand in some areas, leading
|
|
groups of users
|
|
to share a single mobile number (fraudulently) by setting
|
|
several phones to
|
|
send the same identification. Carriers lost individual user
|
|
accountability
|
|
and their means of predicting and controlling traffic on
|
|
their systems.
|
|
Second, systems had no way of automatically detecting
|
|
use of stolen
|
|
equipment because thieves could easily change the
|
|
transmitted identification.
|
|
In theory, the required properties of the ESN allow
|
|
cellular systems to
|
|
check to ensure that only the correctly registered unit uses
|
|
a particular
|
|
MIN, and the ESNs of stolen units can be permanently denied
|
|
service
|
|
("hot-listed"). This measure is an improvement over the
|
|
older systems, but
|
|
vulnerabilities remain.
|
|
|
|
ESN Tampering
|
|
Although the concept of the unalterable ESN is laudable
|
|
in theory,
|
|
weaknesses are apparent in practice. Many cellular phones
|
|
are not
|
|
constructed so that attempts to change the serial number
|
|
circuitry renders
|
|
the mobile station inoperative. Contrary to this statement,
|
|
swapping of one
|
|
ESN chip for another in a unit that has been found to
|
|
functione flawlessly
|
|
after the switch was made.
|
|
|
|
Obtaining ESN's
|
|
Since most manufacturers are using industry standard
|
|
Read-Only Memory
|
|
(ROM) chips for their ESNs, the chips are easily bought and
|
|
programmed or
|
|
copied. In programming the ESN with a valid code is another
|
|
matter.
|
|
Remembering that to obtain service from a system, a cellular
|
|
unit must
|
|
transmit a valid MIN (telephone number) and (usually) the
|
|
corresponding
|
|
serial number stored in the cellular switch's database. With
|
|
the right
|
|
equipment, the ESN/MIN pair can be read right off the air
|
|
because the mobile
|
|
transmits it each time it originates a call. Service shops
|
|
can capture this
|
|
information using test gear that automatically receives and
|
|
decodes the
|
|
reverse, or mobile-to-base, channels.
|
|
Another way to obtain the numbers is from service
|
|
shops. Service shops
|
|
keep ESN/MIN records on file for units they have sold or
|
|
serviced, and the
|
|
carriers also have these data on all of their subscribers.
|
|
Unscrupulous
|
|
employees could compromise the security of their customers'
|
|
telephones by
|
|
obtaining these records.
|
|
In many ways, trade in illegally obtained ESN/MIN pairs
|
|
could, in the
|
|
future, resemble what currently transpires in the long
|
|
distance telephone
|
|
business with AT&T credit card numbers and alternate
|
|
long-distance carrier
|
|
(such as MCI, Sprint and Alltel) account codes. Code numbers
|
|
are swapped
|
|
among friends, published on computer bulletin boards and
|
|
trafficked by career
|
|
criminal enterprises.
|
|
|
|
|
|
X. CN/A's
|
|
CN/A's, which stands for Customer Names and Addresses,
|
|
are bureaus that
|
|
exist so that authorized Bell employees can find out the
|
|
name and address of
|
|
any customer in the Bell System. All phone numbers are
|
|
maintained on file
|
|
including unlisted numbers.
|
|
To find the owner of any number, the person first must
|
|
call the local
|
|
CN/A during business hours. Then he must pretend to be from
|
|
a registered
|
|
business, and ask for the owner of the number. In some
|
|
states, though, the
|
|
operator will ask for an ID number. In these cases, one must
|
|
be guessed at.
|
|
There is also a type of reverse CN/A bureau, which is
|
|
usually called a
|
|
NON PUB DA or TOLL LIB. With these numbers, somebody can
|
|
find unpublished
|
|
numbers if the caller gives the operator the name and
|
|
locality. These are
|
|
considerably harder to use, since the operator will then
|
|
request the caller's
|
|
name, supervisors name, etc.
|
|
The following is a list of current CN/A's.
|
|
|
|
____________________________________________________________
|
|
_________________
|
|
|
|
1988 CN/A List (subject to change)
|
|
____________________________________________________________
|
|
_________________
|
|
|
|
Area: CN/A Area: CN/A Area: CN/A
|
|
201: Classified 202: 304-343-7016 203:
|
|
203-789-6815
|
|
204: 204-949-0900 206: 206-345-4082 207:
|
|
617-787-5300
|
|
208: 303-293-8777 209: 415-781-5271 212:
|
|
518-471-8111
|
|
213: 415-781-5271 214: 214-464-7400 215:
|
|
412-633-5600
|
|
216: 614-464-0519 217: 217-789-8290 218:
|
|
402-221-7199
|
|
219: 317-265-4834 301: 304-343-1401 302:
|
|
412-633-5600
|
|
303: 303-293-8777 304: 304-344-8041 305:
|
|
912-752-2000
|
|
307: 303-293-8777 308: 402-221-7199 312:
|
|
312-796-9600
|
|
313: 313-424-0900 314: 816-275-8460 316:
|
|
913-276-6708
|
|
317: 317-265-4834 318: 504-245-5330 319:
|
|
402-221-7199
|
|
401: 617-787-5300 402: 402-221-7199 404:
|
|
912-752-2000
|
|
405: 405-236-6121 406: 303-293-8777 412:
|
|
412-633-5600
|
|
413: 617-787-5300 414: 608-252-6932 415:
|
|
415-781-5271
|
|
416: 416-443-0542 417: 816-275-8460 418:
|
|
614-464-0123
|
|
419: 614-464-0519 501: 405-236-6121 502:
|
|
502-583-2861
|
|
503: 206-345-4082 504: 504-245-5330 505:
|
|
303-293-8777
|
|
509: 206-345-4082 512: 512-828-2501 513:
|
|
614-464-0519
|
|
514: 514-394-7440 515: 402-221-7199 517:
|
|
313-424-0900
|
|
518: 518-471-8111 519: 416-443-0542 601:
|
|
601-961-8139
|
|
602: 303-293-8777 603: 617-787-5300 605:
|
|
402-221-7199
|
|
606: 502-583-2861 607: 518-471-8111 608:
|
|
608-252-6932
|
|
609: Classified 612: 402-221-7199 613:
|
|
416-443-0542
|
|
614: 614-464-0519 615: 615-373-5791 616:
|
|
313-424-0900
|
|
617: 617-787-5300 619: 415-781-5271 701:
|
|
402-221-7199
|
|
702: 415-543-2861 703: 304-344-7935 704:
|
|
912-752-2000
|
|
705: 416-443-0542 707: 415-781-5271 712:
|
|
402-221-7199
|
|
713: 713-961-2397 715: 608-252-6932 716:
|
|
518-471-8111
|
|
717: 412-633-5600 718: 518-471-8111 801:
|
|
303-293-8777
|
|
802: 617-787-5300 804: 304-344-7935 805:
|
|
415-781-5271
|
|
806: 512-828-2501 809: 404-751-8871 812:
|
|
317-265-4834
|
|
813: 813-228-7871 814: 412-633-5600 815:
|
|
217-789-8290
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|
816: 816-275-8460 817: 214-464-7400 901:
|
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615-373-5791
|
|
904: 912-752-2000 906: 313-424-0900 912:
|
|
912-752-2000
|
|
914: 518-471-8111 916:
|
|
415-781-5271
|
|
918: 405-236-6121 912:
|
|
912-752-2000
|
|
____________________________________________________________
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|
_________________
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XI. Loops
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|
The loop is an alternative communication medium that
|
|
has many
|
|
potential uses. Loops are phone lines that are connected
|
|
when they are called
|
|
simultaneously. One use is when somebody wants another
|
|
person to call them
|
|
back but is reluctant to give out their home phone number
|
|
(eg., if they were
|
|
on a party line).
|
|
Loops are found in pairs that are usually close to
|
|
each other (eg.,
|
|
718-492-9996 and 718-492-9997). On a loop, one line is the
|
|
high end, and the
|
|
other is the low end. The high end is always silent. The
|
|
tone disappears on
|
|
the low end when somebody calls the high end.
|
|
It is truly only safe to use a loop during non-business
|
|
hours. During
|
|
business, loops are used to test equipment by various
|
|
telephone companies and
|
|
local CO's.
|
|
|
|
|
|
XII. Alliance Teleconferencing
|
|
Alliance Teleconferencing is an independent company
|
|
which allows the
|
|
general public to access and use its conferencing equipment.
|
|
|
|
Billing an Alliance Conference
|
|
Alliance Teleconferencing is accessed by dialing
|
|
0-700-456-1000 in most
|
|
states. In some states, the first and last digits of the
|
|
suffix vary. There
|
|
are four main ways to use Alliance illegally. The first is
|
|
through a PBX.
|
|
Some allow use of the 700 exchange, but many do not.
|
|
The second way is with a Blue Box. After seizing the
|
|
line,
|
|
KP-0-700-456-1000-ST is dialed. The equipment now thinks
|
|
that Alliance has
|
|
been dialed from a switchboard and bills the conference to
|
|
it.
|
|
The third way is to a loop. After being connected to
|
|
Alliance, the
|
|
caller contacts the operator by pressing 0. The caller then
|
|
can ask for the
|
|
conference to billed to another number, giving the operator
|
|
the number of the
|
|
high-end of a loop. The operator will then call the loop. A
|
|
friend of the
|
|
phreaker must be prepared to answer the call by calling the
|
|
low-end. When the
|
|
friend answers and accepts the billing, the conference will
|
|
be billed to the
|
|
loop.
|
|
The fourth way is from a divertor. Since the divertor
|
|
is a normal,
|
|
home-type line, the phreaker should not have any problems
|
|
starting a
|
|
conference.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Starting a Conference
|
|
When Alliance answers, a two-tone combination is
|
|
emitted. The caller
|
|
then types a two digit combination to tell the equipment how
|
|
many people will
|
|
be in the conference, including the originator. Then either
|
|
# is pressed to
|
|
continue or * is pressed to cancel the conference. To dial a
|
|
each conferee,
|
|
the phreaker simply answers each prompt with the phone
|
|
number of the
|
|
corresponding person.
|
|
To join the conference, the originator enters #, and to
|
|
return to
|
|
control mode, he enters # again. To transfer control of the
|
|
conference,
|
|
#+6+1+ the phone number of the person you wish to transfer
|
|
the control to. To
|
|
end the conference, the phreaker presses the * button.
|
|
|
|
|
|
XIII. Telephone System Security Measures
|
|
To stop telephone fraud, there are many measures which
|
|
telephone
|
|
companies can apply to identify and convict the phone
|
|
phreaker.
|
|
|
|
ESS Detection Devices
|
|
Telephone companies have had twenty years to work on
|
|
detection devices;
|
|
therefore, they are well refined. Basically, the detection
|
|
devices will look
|
|
for the presence of 2600 Hz where it does not belong, which
|
|
is in the local
|
|
CO. It then records the calling number and all activity
|
|
after the 2600 Hz.
|
|
|
|
Automatic Number Identification and the Centralized
|
|
Automatic Message
|
|
Accounting Tapes
|
|
Automatic Number Identification (ANI) is an implement
|
|
in ESS that can
|
|
instantly identify the calling party. For every call that is
|
|
made,
|
|
information including the numbers of the calling and
|
|
receiving parties, the
|
|
time of origination of the call, if the called party
|
|
answered the call, and
|
|
the time when the caller has hung-up is recorded on a tape
|
|
in the Centralized
|
|
Automatic Message Accounting (CAMA) office. This includes
|
|
wrong numbers,
|
|
toll-free numbers, and local calls. This tape is then
|
|
processed for billing
|
|
purposes.
|
|
Normally, all free calls are ignored, but the billing
|
|
equipment has been
|
|
programmed to recognize many different types of unusual
|
|
activity. One checks
|
|
if a certain 800 number is called excessively. If the number
|
|
is an SCC, the
|
|
equipment can instantly check if the caller is a subscriber
|
|
of the SCC. If it
|
|
is not, it will alert the company of the illegal activity.
|
|
Another is if
|
|
there is a call where the calling party has stayed off-hook
|
|
for a large
|
|
amount of time, but the called party never answers. The
|
|
equipment recognizes
|
|
this as possible use of a Black Box.
|
|
|
|
Dialed Number Recorders
|
|
Placing a Dialed Number Recorders (DNR) on a telephone
|
|
line is standard
|
|
procedure when telephone fraud is suspected. The most common
|
|
DNR's can do the
|
|
following: print all touch tone digits sent (in suspected
|
|
illegal use of an
|
|
SCC), print out all MF and record the presence of 2600hz on
|
|
the line (in
|
|
suspected use of a Blue Box), and activate a tape recorder
|
|
for a specific
|
|
amount of time.
|
|
|
|
Trap Codes
|
|
Trap codes are decoy PIN numbers. If a telephone
|
|
company find that a
|
|
certain PIN number is being used illegally, it will call the
|
|
real owner and
|
|
notify him of the change in his account number. The company
|
|
will then contact
|
|
the FBI to bring their telephone "lock in" trace equipment.
|
|
A lock in trace is a device used by the FBI to lock
|
|
into the phone
|
|
user's location. Since all phone connections are held open
|
|
by a certain
|
|
voltage of electricity,
|
|
the lock in trace works by patching into the line and
|
|
generate the same
|
|
voltage into the lines. If the caller tries to hang up,
|
|
voltage is retained.
|
|
The phone will continue to ring as if someone was calling
|
|
even after the call
|
|
is disconnected. The trunk then remains open and the call
|
|
can be traced. The
|
|
FBI sets its equipment so that the next time the PIN number
|
|
is illegally
|
|
used, the call goes through, but while the communication is
|
|
proceeding, the
|
|
FBI traces the call.
|
|
|
|
Stopping an FBI Trace.
|
|
Stopping a trace is quite simple. If the voltage in the
|
|
line could be
|
|
lowered, the trace could not function, since lowering the
|
|
voltage would also
|
|
probably short out the FBI voltage generator. Therefore, any
|
|
appliance which
|
|
uses many volt can be connected to the red and green wires
|
|
in a wall jack,
|
|
and the trace should be removed.
|
|
|
|
Common Channel Inter-office Signaling
|
|
Besides detection devices, Bell has begun to gradually
|
|
redesign the
|
|
network using out-of-band signaling. This is known as
|
|
Common Channel
|
|
Inter-office Signaling (CCIS). Since this signaling method
|
|
sends all the
|
|
signaling information over separate data lines, and does not
|
|
use any form of
|
|
DTMF, all colored boxes do not work under it. Of course,
|
|
until this
|
|
multi-million dollar project is totally complete, boxing
|
|
will still be
|
|
possible. It will become progressively harder to find places
|
|
to "box" off of,
|
|
though.
|
|
|
|
|
|
XIV. Laws Governing the Rights of Phreakers
|
|
Since phreaking is one-hundred percent illegal, once
|
|
discovered, there
|
|
are not many laws protecting the phreaker. There are,
|
|
however some laws
|
|
governing steps government agents may take to convict him.
|
|
The first law is the Section 605 of Title 47 of the
|
|
United States Code.
|
|
This section forbids interception of communications, except
|
|
by persons
|
|
outlined in Chapter 119, Title 18, which is a portion of the
|
|
Omnibus Crime
|
|
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.
|
|
In this chapter, Section 2511 (2) (a) (i) says "It
|
|
shall not be unlawful
|
|
under this chapter for an operator of a switchboard, or an
|
|
officer, employee,
|
|
or agent of any communications carrier, whose facilities are
|
|
used in the
|
|
transmission of a wire communication, to intercept,
|
|
disclose, or use that
|
|
communication in the normal course of his employment, while
|
|
engaged in any
|
|
activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of
|
|
his service of the
|
|
protection of the rights or property of the carrier of such
|
|
communication."
|
|
This means that agents of telephone companies are allowed
|
|
not only allowed to
|
|
tap lines without a warrant, but also allowed to disclose
|
|
the recording of a
|
|
communication.
|
|
In the case United States vs. Sugden, the following
|
|
ruling was made:
|
|
"For an unreasonable search and seizure to result from the
|
|
interception of
|
|
the defendant's communication, he must have exhibited a
|
|
reasonable
|
|
expectation of privacy. Where, as here, one uses a
|
|
communication facility
|
|
illegally, no such expectation is required." This simply
|
|
means that when you
|
|
make an illegal call, you have waved your right to privacy.
|
|
|
|
.S
|
|
|
|
|
|
Downloaded From P-80 International Information Systems 304-744-2253
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