267 lines
14 KiB
Plaintext
267 lines
14 KiB
Plaintext
Message #13 board "P_Metaphysical (Mag Articles)"
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Date : 22-Jan-93 15:58
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From : Simon Novali
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To : All
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Subj : Lanning (10 of 11)
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experienced in such interviews. Investigators must have direct
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access to the alleged victims for interview purposes. Therapists for
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an adult survivor sometimes want to act as intermediaries in their
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patient's interview. This should be avoided if at all possible.
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Adult survivor interviews are often confusing difficult and
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extremely time-consuming. The investigator must remember however
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that almost anything is possible. Most important the investigator
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must remember that there is much middle ground. Just because one
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event did happen does not mean that all reported events happened,
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and just because one event did not happen does not mean that all
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other events did not happen. Do not become such a zealot that you
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believe it all nor such a cynic that you believe nothing. Varying
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amounts and parts of the allegation may be factual. Attempting to
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find evidence of what did happen is the great challenge of these
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cases. *All* investigative interaction with victims must be
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carefully and thoroughly documented.
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-- d. ASSESS AND EVALUATE VICTIM STATEMENTS.
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This is the part of the investigative process in child sexual
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victimization cases that seems to have been lost. Is the victim
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describing events and activities that are consistent with law
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enforcement documented criminal behavior, or that are consistent
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with distorted media accounts and erroneous public perceptions of
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criminal behavior? Investigators should apply the "template of
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probability". Accounts of child sexual victimization that are more
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like books, television, and movies (e.g. big conspiracies, child sex
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slaves, organized pornography rings) and less like documented cases
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should be viewed with skepticism but thoroughly investigated.
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Consider and investigate all possible explanations of events. It is
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the investigator's job, and the information learned will be
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invaluable in counteracting the defense attorneys when they raise
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the alternative explanations.
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For example, an adult survivor's account of ritual victimization
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might be explained by any one of at least four possibilities: First,
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the allegations may be a fairly accurate account what actually
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happened. Second, they may be deliberate lies (malingering), told
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for the usual reasons people lie (e.g. money, revenge, jealousy).
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Third, they may be deliberate lies (factitious disorder) told for
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atypical reasons (e.g. attention, forgiveness). Lies so motivated
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are less likely to be recognized by the investigator and more likely
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to be rigidly maintained by the liar unless and until confronted
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with irrefutable evidence to the contrary. Fourth, the allegations
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may be a highly inaccurate account of what actually happened, but
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the victim truly believes it (pseudomemory) and therefore is not
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lying. A polygraph examination of such a victim would be of limited
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value. Other explanations or combinations of these explanations are
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also possible. *Only* thorough *investigation* will point to the
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correct or most likely explanation.
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Investigators cannot rely on therapists or satanic crime experts as
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a shortcut to the explanation. In one case, the "experts" confirmed
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and validated the account of a female who claimed to be a 15-year-
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old deaf-mute kidnapped and held for three years by a satanic cult
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and forced to participate in bizarre rituals before recently
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escaping. Active investigation, however, determined she was a 27-
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year-old woman who could hear and speak, who had not been kidnapped
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by anyone, and who had a lengthy history of mental problems and at
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least three other similar reports of false victimization. Her
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"accurate" accounts of what the "real satanists" do were simply the
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result of having read, while in mental hospitals, the same books
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that the "experts" had. A therapist may have important insights
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about whether an individual was traumatized, but knowing the exact
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cause of that trauma is another matter. There have been cases where
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investigation has discovered that individuals diagnosed by
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therapists as suffering from Post-Vietnam Syndrome were never in
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Vietnam or saw no combat.
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Conversely, in another case, a law enforcement "expert" on satanic
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crime told a therapist that a patient's accounts of satanic murders
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in a rural Pacific Northwest town were probably true because the
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community was a hotbed of such satanic activity. When the therapist
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explained that there was almost no violent crime reported in the
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community, the officer explained that that is how you know it is the
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satanists. If you knew about the murders or found the bodies, it
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would not be satanists. How do you argue with that kind of logic?
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The first step in the assessment and evaluation of victim statements
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is to determine the disclosure sequence, including how much time has
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elapsed since disclosure was first made and the incident was
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reported to the police or social services. The longer the delay, the
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bigger the potential for problems. The next step is to determine the
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number and purpose of *all prior* interviews of the victim
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concerning the allegations. The more interviews conducted before the
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investigative interview, the larger the potential for problems.
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Although there is nothing wrong with admitting shortcomings and
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seeking help, law enforcement should never abdicate its control over
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the investigative interview. When an investigative interview is
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conducted by or with a social worker or therapist using a team
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approach, law enforcement must direct the process. Problems can also
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be created by interviews conducted by various intervenors *after*
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the investigative interview(s).
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The investigator must closely and carefully evaluate events in the
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victim's life before, during, and after the alleged abuse.
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Events to be evaluated *before* the alleged abuse include:
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---- (1) Background of victim.
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---- (2) Abuse of drugs in home.
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---- (3) Pornography in home.
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---- (4) Play, television, and VCR habits.
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---- (5) Attitudes about sexuality in home.
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---- (6) Extent of sex education in home.
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---- (7) Activities of siblings.
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---- (8) Need or craving for attention.
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---- (9) Religious beliefs and training.
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---- (10) Childhood fears.
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---- (11) Custody/visitation disputes.
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---- (12) Victimization of or by family members.
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---- (13) Interaction between victims.
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Events to be evaluated *during* the alleged abuse include:
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---- (1) Use of fear or scare tactics.
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---- (2) Degree of trauma.
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---- (3) Use of magic deception or trickery.
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---- (4) Use of rituals.
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---- (5) Use of drugs.
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---- (6) Use of pornography.
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Events to be evaluated *after* the alleged abuse include:
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---- (1) Disclosure sequence.
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---- (2) Background of prior interviewers.
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---- (3) Background of parents.
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---- (4) Co-mingling of victims.
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---- (5) Type of therapy received.
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-- e. EVALUATE CONTAGION.
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Consistent statements obtained from different multiple victims are
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powerful pieces of corroborative evidence - that is as long as those
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statements were not "contaminated". Investigation must carefully
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evaluate both pre- and post-disclosure contagion, and both victim
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and intervenor contagion. Are the different victim statements
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consistent because they describe common experiences or events, or
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because they reflect contamination or urban legends?
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The sources of potential contagion are widespread. Victims can
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communicate with each other both prior to and after their
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disclosures. Intervenors can communicate with each other and with
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victims. The team or cell concepts of investigation are attempts to
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deal with potential investigator contagion. All the victims are not
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interviewed by the same individuals, and interviewers do not
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necessarily share information directly with each other. Teams report
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to a leader or supervisor who evaluates the information and decides
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what other investigators need to know.
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Documenting existing contagion and eliminating additional contagion
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are crucial to the successful investigation and prosecution of these
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cases. There is no way, however, to erase or undo contagion. The
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best you can hope for is to identify and evaluate it and attempt to
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explain it. Mental health professionals requested to evaluate
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suspected victims must be carefully selected. Having a victim
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evaluated by one of the self-proclaimed experts on satanic ritual
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abuse or by some other overzealous intervenor may result in the
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credibility of that victim's testimony being severely damaged.
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In order to evaluate the contagion element, investigators must
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meticulously and aggressively investigate these cases. The precise
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disclosure sequence of the victim must be carefully identified and
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documented. Investigators must verify through active investigation
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the exact nature and content of each disclosure outcry or statement
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made by the victim. Second-hand information about disclosure is not
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good enough.
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Whenever possible, personal visits should be made to all locations
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of alleged abuse and the victim's homes. Events prior to the alleged
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abuse must be carefully evaluated. Investigators may have to view
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television programs, films, and videotapes seen by the victims. It
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may be necessary to conduct a background investigation and
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evaluation of everyone, both professional and nonprofessional, who
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interviewed the victims about the allegations prior to and after the
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investigative interview(s). Investigators must be familiar with the
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information about ritual abuse of children being disseminated in
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magazines, books, television programs, videotapes, and conferences.
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Every possible way that a victim could have learned about the
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details of the abuse must be explored if for no other reason than to
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eliminate them and counter the defense's arguments.
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There may, however, be validity to these contagion factors. *They
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may explain some of the "unbelievable" aspects of the case and
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result in the successful prosecution of the substance of the case.*
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Consistency of statements becomes more significant if contagion is
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identified or disproved by independent investigation. The easier
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cases are the ones where there is a single, identifiable source of
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contagion. Most cases, however, seem to involve multiple contagion
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factors.
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Munchausen Syndrome and Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy are complex and
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controversial issues in these cases. No attempt will be made to
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discuss them in detail, but they are documented facts (Rosenberg,
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1987). Most of the literature about them focuses on their
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manifestation in the medical setting as false or self-inflicted
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illness or injury. They are also manifested in the criminal justice
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setting as false or self-inflicted crime victimization. If parents
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would poison their children to prove an illness, they might sexually
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abuse their children to prove a crime. "Victims" have been known to
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destroy property, manufacture evidence, and mutilate themselves in
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order to convince others of their victimization. The motivation is
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psychological gain (i.e. attention, forgiveness, etc.) and not
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necessarily money, jealousy, or revenge. These are the unpopular,
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but documented, realities of the world. Recognizing their existence
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does not mean that child sexual abuse and sexual assault are not
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real and serious problems.
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-- f. ESTABLISH COMMUNICATION WITH PARENTS.
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The importance and difficulty of this technique in extrafamilial
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cases involving young children cannot be overemphasized. An
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investigator must maintain ongoing communication with the parents of
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victims in these abuse cases. Not all parents react the same way to
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the alleged abuse of their children. Some are very supportive and
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cooperative. Others overreact and some even deny the victimization.
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Sometimes there is animosity and mistrust among parents with
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different reactions. Once the parents lose faith in the police or
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prosecutor and begin to interrogate their own children and conduct
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their own investigation, the case may be lost forever. Parents from
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one case communicate the results of their "investigation" with each
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other, and some have even contacted the parents in other cases. Such
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parental activity is an obvious source of potential contamination.
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Parents must be made to understand that their children's credibility
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will be jeopardized when and if the information obtained turns out
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to be unsubstantiated or false. To minimize this problem, within the
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limits of the law and without jeopardizing investigative techniques,
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parents must be told on a regular basis how the case is progressing.
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Parents can also be assigned constructive things to do (e.g.
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lobbying for new legislation, working on awareness and prevention
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programs) in order to channel their energy, concern, and "guilt".
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-- g. DEVELOP A CONTINGENCY PLAN.
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If a department waits until actually confronted with a case before a
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response is developed, it may be too late. In cases involving
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ongoing abuse of children, departments must respond quickly, and
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this requires advanced planning. There are added problems for small-
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to medium-sized departments with limited personnel and resources.
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Effective investigation of these cases requires planning,
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identification of resources, and, in many cases, mutual aid
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agreements between agencies. The U.S. Department of Defense has
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conducted specialized training and has developed such a plan for
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child sex ring cases involving military facilities and personnel.
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Once a case is contaminated and out of control, I have little advice
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on how to salvage what may once have been a prosecutable criminal
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violation. A few of these cases have even been lost on appeal after
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a conviction because of contamination problems.
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-- h. MULTIDISCIPLINARY TASK FORCES.
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Sergeant Beth Dickinson, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department,
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was the chairperson of the Multi-Victim, Multi-Suspect Child Sexual
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--- msgedsq 2.1a
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* Origin: The Northern Lights 916-729-0304 (1:203/444)
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