502 lines
28 KiB
Plaintext
502 lines
28 KiB
Plaintext
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CGA SOFTWARE PRODUCTS GROUP ON COMPUTER CRIME
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INTERNAL COMPUTER CRIME PROVES GREATER THREAT THAN 'HACKERS'
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NEW YORK, July 17 /PRNewswire/ -- For every outsider who accesses
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Pentagon telephone numbers or makes fraudulent credit card purchases,
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like the seven New Jersey teenagers arrested recently, it is
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estimated that far greater numbers of disgruntled or dishonest
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employees damage their employers' computer systems internally every
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day.
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"Teenage 'hackers' are just the tip of the computer crime
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iceberg," says Carol Molloy, a computer security specialist with CGA
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Software Products Group, Holmdel, N.J. "These computer crimes get
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the spotlight because the perpetrators get caught and the victims are
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willing to prosecute."
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More insidious data fraud and malicious damage occurs inside
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corporations than any hacker ever committed, Molloy continues.
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"Employees have far greater access to sensitive information, and many
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times are so well acquainted with procedures and security features
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that they leave no trail at all," she adds. "Unhappy employees can
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leave a programming 'time bomb' in a computer that causes trouble
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long after they are fired or leave for another job."
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Carelessness, rather than malice, often causes even more
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problems, according to Molloy. "Many computer security systems are
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based on passwords, and people can be very lax about protecting
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them."
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Employee computer crimes, however, receive far less attention
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than outside break-ins, Molloy says, because victimized organizations
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are unwilling to publicize the matter through arrest and prosecution.
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"Revealing damage from internal sources doesn't do much for a
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company's image," she says.
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"Customers, corporations feel, will start to wonder about just
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how secure relevant information may be and may decide to go
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elsewhere. Also, insurance premiums often go up afte2 a theft is
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revealed."
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The question facing data processing and information managers is
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not whether a security system should be installed, but how to go
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about it, says Molloy. "Many organizations believe that security is
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solely the concern of the managers," she says. "They don't realize
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that implementing security requires extensive internal support."
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Security systems also demand ongoing maintenance, she says.
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"Just installing the system doesn't mean data is secure from then
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on," she points out.
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UPI Dmestic News Wire
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Wednesday July 17, 1985
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More may be charged in ``hacker'' ring, prosecutor says
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NEW BRUNSWICK, N.J. (UPI) _ More people may be charged with using
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home computers to make free long-distance calls and reportedly try to
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break into Pentagon computers, a prosecutor said Wednesday.
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Meanwhile, the executive director of the state chapter of the
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American Civil Liberties Union charged the Middlesex County Prosecutor's
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Office with ``trampling'' on the rights of one of the seven youths
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charged in the scheme Tuesday.
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The youths used their computers and electronic ``bulletin boards''
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to exchange information on computer codes, including some that would
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cause communications satellites to ``change position'' and possibly
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interrupt intercontinental communications, Middlesex County Prosecutor
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Alan Rockoff said.
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``Though it may sound like a copycat of (the movie) `WarGames,'
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things like this are happening in our society,'' Rockoff said, accusing
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the youths of obtaining thousands and ``possibly millions'' of dollars
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in telephone and informational services.
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A spokesman for American Telephone & Telegraph Co. said there was
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no indication that any of its satellites had been moved, or that even an
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attempt to move them was made.
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Assistant Prosecutor Frank Graves said investigators still had
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``six more computers and 9 million floppy discs'' to look through.
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``We had 300 names in one computer and we charged seven,'' Graves
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said. ``We have no idea what's in the other computers and won't know for
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a while.''
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The youths, whose names were withheld because of their ages, are
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charged with juvenile delinquency by reason of conspiracy to commit
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theft.
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South Plainfield police detective George Green said four of the
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defendants operated electronic bulletin boards, which are used for the
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exchange of legitimate information by hundreds of people.
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The youths also had a special code that provided illegal access to
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restricted information, Green said, and only those who used these parts
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of the bulletin boards were arrested.
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Rockoff said the investigation began in April when postal officials
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informed the South Plainfield police that someone using a post office
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box under a fictitious name apparently had been using a computer to gain
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illegal access to the computer of a Connecticut credit company.
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Rockoff turned over the results of the investigation to the Secret
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Service since the bulletin boards contained telephone numbers in a
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military defense communications system in the Defense Department, The
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New York Times reported Wednedsay.
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Plainfield patrolman Michael Grennier, a computer expert, said the
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youths also were able to break into an American Telephone & Telegraph
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computer after obtaining a manual from a AT&T trash bin.
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The investigation led to a South Plainfield youth, whose computer
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was seized in June. After Grennier and Green spent about 100 hours
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looking through his computer, the other six were arrested Friday _ in
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Hillsdale, Westwood, Warren Township, Martinsville, Dover and Edison.
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But Jeffrey Fogel of the ACLU office in Newark said the Dover
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youth, whom he declined to identify, was unfairly singled out.
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``He has an electronic bulletin board and arresting him and seizing
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his computer amounts to seizing a printing press,'' Fogel said. ``It
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would be like if someone put a stolen credit card number in a newspaper
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classified. Would you close down the newspaper?''
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NEW HACKER CASE RAISES FEARS:
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Computer hackers "have the capability of doing a great deal of
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damage," says Rep. William J. Hughes, D-N.J., commenting on the
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case of 7 N.J. youths charged with breaking into Pentagon computers
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and stealing satellite codes. Hughes is sponsoring federal computer
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crime bills to help fight the problem. (USA TODAY, July 18, P.1A)
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KAYPRO WINS PC COMPARISON:
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The Kaypro IIx personal computer is the best machine for home use
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costing less than $1,500, says Consumer Reports. It beat the Apple
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IIe Professional and the discontinued TRS-80 Model 4P. Kaypro was
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picked for its disk capacity (800 kilobytes) and the large amount
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of software that comes with it. (Consumer Reports, August, P.467)
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COMPUTER CALLS ABSENT STUDENTS:
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Kettering, Ohio, school officials are using a Texas Instruments
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computer to call the homes of absent students as part of the
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state's Missing Children Act. System makes 75 calls an hour.
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Computer voice tells parents their child is absent and asks for a
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response, which is recorded like an answering machine. (USA TODAY,
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P.5B)
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From
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PR NEWSWIRE
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Thursday July 18, 1985
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DOWTY ELECTRONICS SAFEGUARDS U.K. DEFENSE SECRETS
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UK "SHOULD BE SAFE" FROM DATABASE BURGLARS
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NEWBURY, England, July 18 /PRNewswire/ -- British Ministry of
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Defence secrets need never be at risk from home computer "hackers" --
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microchip technology's equivalent of cat burglars -- an electronics
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expert claimed today.
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Following disclosures of teenage hackers breaking into military
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information banks at the Pentagon -- the U.S Defense Department
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headquarters -- Bruce Brain, general manager and director of Dowty
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Electronics' Information Technology Division, said: "It need never
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happen here."
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The U.K. faced similar problems to America, said Brain. "But the
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introduction of Dowty's 'Horatius' dialback data security system --
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an anti-hacker box -- means that no-one would be able to break into
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sensitive or confidential databases, even with the knowledge of
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ex-directory phone numbers.
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"Horatius allows only authorized users to access a computer
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system, and they must also call from a pre-cleared phone number
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within an agreed time-frame," he explained.
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Horatius -- designed and manufactured in the U.K. -- is selling
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well, says Dowty, which is currently negotiating to introduce the
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system to the U.S.A through its New Jersey-based subsidiary, Dowty
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RFL Inc.
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PAPER FINDS 2 HACKER BOARDS:
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2 electronic bulletin boards have been found to contain access
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codes for computers at military, research facilities. The boards,
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"Fatland" and "Dark Side of the Moon," - both based in Virginia
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-held access numbers for the Naval Ship R&D Center, NASA's Ames
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Research Center. No arrests reported. (Online Today)
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NEW JERSEY HACKER CASE MAY BE A TEST
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OF SYSOPS' FREE SPEECH PROTECTION
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The attorney for one of seven New Jersey teenagers charged
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with conspiring to use their computers to exchange stolen credit card numbers
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and make free long-distance calls says he will argue that his client is
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protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech.
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Jeffrey E. Fogel, executive director of the New Jersey chapter of
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the American Civil Liberties Union, told BULLETIN BOARD SYSTEMS that he an
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associate will defend a teenager who operated the Private Sector BBS.
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"We are relying on his representation that all he did was run
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a bulletin board, that he didn't make a calls or use stolen credit card
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numbers," Fogel said. If that is true, he added, "I don't think there is
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any liability."
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The defendants, all under 18, were charged July 16 with juvenile
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delinquency based on an underlying charge of conspiracy to commit theft.
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Police confiscated the computers and software of some of the defendants.
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Middlesex County Prosecutor Alan A. Rockoff told reporters
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that the individuals exchanged information that would allow them to access
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commercial computers without authorization and that some of them had codes that
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could cause communications satellites to ''change position.''
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However, spokesmen for AT&T and other carriers said their
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systems are secure and denied that any satellites had been moved.
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Rockoff said the investigation began in April when postal
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officials informed police that someone using a post office box
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under a fictitious name apparently had been using a computer
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to gain illegal access to the computer of a Connecticut credit
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company.
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Fogel said he believes that the prosecution will have to show that
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his client actually used the credit card numbers or telephone access codes
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to prove his case. Allowing the information to be posted on his client's
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bulletin board, he said, is not a criminal act.
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"There's nothing illegal about those messages being there," he said.
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"Let's say you find an AT&T calling card on the street and you put an
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ad (listing the number) in the New York Times. I'm confident that the
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New York Times is not liable.
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"Bulletin boards are the same as a free press," Fogel said. "They are
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like electronic magazines in which the users can publish what they choose."
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Fogel drew an analogy to two well-known free press cases: the
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publication of plans for a hydrogen bomb in Progressive magazine and
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publication of the Pentagon Papers by the Times.
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"What really gets me upset in this case is they seized the
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'printing press.' I don't think they had the right to seize his
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computer, Fogel said.
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The concept of First Amendment protection for bulletin board
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operators has yet to be tested in court. Last year Los Angeles
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sysop Tom Tcimpidis was charged with telephone fraud when Pacific Bell
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investigators found a calling card number posted on his BBS. But the charges
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were dropped in February before the case came to trial.
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Rockoff said his case is the first major prosecution under
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recent New Jersey law that makes it a crime to obtain data
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from a computer without authorization.
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COMPUTER LAWS VARY FOR STATES:
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Computer break-ins catches states with varying laws. Example:
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Tapping into computer is felony in California, but no N.Y. law
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rules "hacker" abuse, except federal statutes on interstate
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information theft. UCLA student who tapped N.Y. college system
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faces prison for "malicious computer entry" under Calif. law.
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(Gannett News Service)
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L.A. Times, Tuesday, September 3, 1985 San Diego Section (Editorials)
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
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``Garbage In, Garbage Out''
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Many people have worried for years about what will happen when government
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finds a big computer that can catalogue everything about everybody, every scrap
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of information - true or false - would then be available at a push of a button.
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That day is not here yet, but experience with the FBI's National Crime Inform-
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ation Center, the nation's centralized computer data-base, indicates that such
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fears for the future are not groundless.
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A continuing series of FBI audits of the data base has found that it sends
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12,000 false or inaccurate reports on individual suspects every day to law-
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enforcement agencies around the country. It's not really the FBI's fault. The
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erroneous information that the computer spews out was put in by state and local
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law enforcers in the first place. There appears to be not much quality control
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in crime information, and, as one of the oldest lines in computerdom assers,
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``Garbage in, garbage out.''
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But the information in that computer is more than accounting data or the
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marketing forecasts of strategic planners. This is vital personal information
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that affects people's lives. There have been cases, and not just a few of them
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in which the wrong person has been arrested and jailed because of bad informa-
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tion from a computer. Police officers are more likely to take the word of the
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FBI's computer than of a person who claims it's all a mistake.
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About 62,000 criminal-justice agencies throughout the country seek infor-
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mation from the FBI's crime computer nearly 500,000 times a day. The FBI says
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that a 2.4% error ratio isn't so bad when you consider that the system results
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in the apprehension of more than 70,000 wanted felons a year. Tell that to
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people that have erroneous information about them sent to the local cops.
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And the police are not the only ones who get this information. A growing
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number of employers, such as day-care centers and schools, also use the FBI
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crime computer to run background checks on prospective employees. There is a
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legitimate social need to do that, but, if the information is wrong, a person's
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livelihood, carreer, and reputation may be irrepairably damaged.
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As with many ills, it is easier to describe the problem than to fix it.
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But it's clear that the accuracy of the information maintained by the FBI needs
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more scrutiny.
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Rep.Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.) has proposed giving the states more money
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to beef up their record-keeping. That would help. But no ammount of
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effort and attention can ever eliminate all errors from a human system. People
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have always made mistakes, and always will make mistakes. The trouble is that
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the computer makes it possible to give those mistakes nationwide distribution.
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Still, things can be improved, and it is vital to the FBI and to all law
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enforcement that they be improved. The future of the National Information
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Center depends on reducing the error rate so that both the police and the
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public are confident that information obtained from the computer is correct.
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Dutifully typed by Henry Spire, C.I.A.
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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LAWYERS' MICRO USERS GROUP NEWSLETTER
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September, 1985
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COMPUTER SECURITY -- DIGITAL PATHWAY'S SECURENET FAMILY OF PRODUCTS
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Computer security is on everyone's mind these days. Recently, hackers had
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at it on several BBS's in the Chicago area. And we read almost daily about
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Hacker attacks on governmental and or financial institution computers.
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Digital Pathways Inc. at 1060 East Meadow Circle, Palo Alto, California
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94303 (415) 493-5544, through it's Defender II family of products provides a
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unified approach to preventing unauthorized dial-in access to computers. One
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of these units is installed between your computer and the telephone line.
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There is a dial-in/call back feature, so when someone dials up your
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computer, this device calls the proper telephone number of the caller back.
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A synthesized voice answers each call-in and requests the caller's ID. The
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ID is entered via Touch Tone. If the ID is valid, the system looks up the
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parameters of the user and arranges for a call-back. Prices start at $3,600
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at quantity one. Although not inexpensive for a small BBS operation,
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obviously a law firm using a computer for client contact and/or for lawyers
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to call in from remote locations should seriously consider this kind of
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investment.
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THE HACKERS - FROM CURIOUS TO CRIMINAL
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The original computer hackers who broke into databases and networks were
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careful to leave no traces of their entry and not to disturb the data. This
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soon changed as less sophisticated and more malicious computer hackers came
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on the scene.
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The malicious Hacker horror stories have filled newspapers and magazines for
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over a year. Often the less responsible computer "Hackers" prowl the
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electronic alleyways at night, when many firms leave their computer systems
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on and attached to phone lines to transmit large blocks of data when the
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phone rates are cheaper. With nobody in the office, penetration of data
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bases which lack proper security is often only a matter of time and
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patience.
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Some Hackers have been amazed to discover that firms which have installed
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password protection schemes to prevent unauthorized access have failed to
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change the original password which came with the system - "PASSWORD." What
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can happen if your system is easy to penetrate? While not all Hackers are
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data thiefs or vandals, some few malicious modem miscreants have been known
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to penetrate a computer system and not only steal but also scramble the
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data.
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Imagine switching on your terminal one morning only to discover 300 pages
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of text had been transformed into a series of seemingly random numbers?
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As is often the case, the best sense of Hacking and Hacker morality comes
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from the literature of that subculture itself. Here are excerpts from three
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articles in a recent issue (Number 91!) of the original newsletter for
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Hackers and "Phone Phreaks" called, appropriately "TAP: The Hobbyist's
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Newsletter for the Communications Revolution."
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Dunn and Bradstreet:
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Do they know something that we don't
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by BIOC Agent 003 & Tuc
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In issue #90, we explained how to use the Dunn and Bradstreet system (which
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is now known as Dunsprint). A week after the issue was mailed a phellow
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phreak found out that a copy of the issue had fallen into the hands of our
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"friends" at D & B. To say the least, they weren't exactly thrilled about
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it. In fact, they did not even believe that they had a security problem!
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Well, that just goes to prove that if you are good (or they are incredibly
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stupid, whichever the case may be) no will know that you are there!
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In a big effort to defeat hackers, they called in an outside service to
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spruce up their "security." Fortunately for us, we were able to find out
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about the new system! This was really not a problem,, though. First,
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they had the new dial-ups posted when you logged on. Secondly, they have a
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nice little place on Telenet! (Where we do most of our "work"--[deleted])
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Sorry D & B ....Good news travels fast!
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A lesson in Phreaking and Hacking Morality:
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by Big Brother
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I find it truly discouraging when people, intelligent people seeking
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intellectual challenges, must revert to becomming common criminals. The
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fine arts of hacking and boxing have all but died out. Though you
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newcomers, you who have appeqred on the scene in the last year or two, may
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not realize it, we had it much better. People didn't recognize our
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potential for destruction and damage because we never flaunted it, nor did
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we exercise it.
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For hacking, it was the intellectual challenge which drove us to do it. The
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thrill of bypassing breaking through someone's computer security was
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tremendous. It wasn't a case of getting a password from a friend, logging
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on, and destroying and entire database. We broke in for the challenge of
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getting in and snooping around WITHOUT detection. We loved the potential
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for destruction that we gave ourselves but never used.
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Today, after so much publicity, the fun has turned to true criminality.
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Publicity we have received is abhorring. From WarGames to the headlined
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October Raids, to the 414's, the Inner Circle, Fargo 4A, and the recent NASA
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breakins--not to mention all the local incidents that never made the big
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newspapers, like breakins at school computers or newspaper computers. TRW
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credit information services claims hackers used the three stolen accounts to
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aid them in abusing stolen credit cards. The thrill of entering and looking
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around has shifted to criminal practicality--how can I make my bank account
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fatter--how may I use this stolen credit card to its fullest--how could I
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take revenge upon my enemies.
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by Cheshire Catalyst, Managing Editor
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The corporate types should realize that if a teenaged hacker is getting into
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their system, an industrial spy could have logged in regularly for the past
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3 years. While I may not particularly care for a TRW or [Citibank] having
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"Confidential information" about me, I especially don't like the idea of
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unauthorized people spreading the data around.
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There are no quick answers, because computer security is not just a matter
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of hardware, software, locks, and walls. Security is a people problem.
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When you put in locks, you watch the people you give the keys to (notice an
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analogy to encryption here). If these people FEEL they're being watched,
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they may get "disgruntled". Needless to say, a disgruntled employee is
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worse than almost anything else you could be combating.
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Any of our corporate subscribers who would like to wake up their management
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to the vulnerabilities of computer systems should be made aware that I am
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available for lectures and consulting. Just drop me a line at the TAP
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maildrop, or via MCI Mail (username: TAP), or telex number 650-119-5732.
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SUGGESTED PRACTICES TO FOLLOW FOR COMPUTER SECURITY
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In light of the importance of a password, the following practices should be
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followed by every user of a multiuser computer system.
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1. DON'T USE A LOGICAL PASSWORD THAT IS EASY TO FIGURE OUT. Someone intent
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on impersonating you will try the easy password guesses first. For example,
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I would never use a password consisting of any part of my name or a close
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family member's name, my address, my auto license, etc. This information is
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too easy to obtain and if an imposter has targeted you as his "doorway" to
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the system, he or she can probably get this information. Use a password that
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is either a combination of letters and numbers that are only meaningful to
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you (for example, your phone number converted to the first letter assigned
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to each number on the telephone. Please do not use this method now that it
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has been published).
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2. CHANGE YOUR PASSWORD OFTEN. If your password remains the same for a long
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period of time, the odds that a persistent imposter will hit hit upon it are
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greatly decreased. Again, don't get lazy and change your password to one
|
||
that violates the first consideration.
|
||
|
||
3. NEVER GIVE YOUR PASSWORD TO ANOTHER USER OR ENTER IT INTO A SYSTEM IF YOU
|
||
ARE UNCERTAIN AS TO THE REASON FOR THE REQUEST. Otherwise, you may have
|
||
given someone else the irrevocable authority to act on your behalf.
|
||
Furthermore, because of the nature of computer systems, you cannot prove
|
||
that your "agent" was not you. You are initially responsible for everything
|
||
that that person does while acting as you. There are several methods used by
|
||
imposters or hackers to acquire a valid user's password directly from the
|
||
user. One method is to use a system's communication's mode to send a
|
||
message to another user. This method causes some form of message to appear
|
||
on the user's screen indicating that something technically meaningless has
|
||
occurred and the user should reenter the password. The hacker then watches
|
||
what the user types. Another method involves setting up a program which
|
||
follows the same technique as above, but the program then stores the
|
||
password in a file and the hacker will check for a password later. A
|
||
recently used method is to set up a system to collect passwords. This
|
||
recently happened in the Chicago area when a bulletin board was set up by
|
||
hackers. It gave the appearance of legitimacy, but was later used by the
|
||
hackers to access other system because their users had the same password on
|
||
several systems. Which leads to the last rule of password usage.
|
||
|
||
4. NEVER USE THE SAME PASSWORD ON DIFFERENT COMPUTERS. Using the key analogy
|
||
above, if all of the locks on your personal possessions have the same key,
|
||
you wouldn't entrust that key to anyone. Why use the same password on
|
||
several systems? If you do, you run the risk that someone will get your
|
||
password and then use that information to access all of the systems you
|
||
access. You will soon be unwelcome on several systems (if not a suspect in a
|
||
computer crime case).
|
||
|
||
VIRGINIA LAW HELPS SYSOP GET REVENGE
|
||
|
||
A Virginia sysop used a new state computer crime law to help prosecute
|
||
a teenage hacker who invaded and vandalized his bulletin board.
|
||
Allen Knapp runs Washington Networks from his home in Vienna, VA, and
|
||
charges $10 for a system password. Last January, Knapp's board got a call from
|
||
a 14-year-old Montgomery County, MD, youth who used the handle Phineas Phreak.
|
||
According to Knapp, Phineas discovered Knapp's own password and
|
||
obtained access to the system files and operating program. The caller erased
|
||
part of the board's stored files and transferred others to his own computer.
|
||
The youth then called Knapp's answering machine and made several demands for
|
||
the return of the files.
|
||
However the answering machine tape allowed the Chesapeake & Potomac
|
||
Telephone Co. to trace the call.
|
||
The boy was charged with a misdemeanor under a section of Vigninia's
|
||
computer crime law that is designed to discourage erasing or altering computer
|
||
data. He was allowed to plead "not innocent" and was sentenced last month
|
||
to one year probation and ordered to pay Knapp $300 for the damages.
|
||
Knapp estimated that the files the boy erased or stole represented
|
||
about 180 hours of work.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
MENSA BBS SEEKS SMART CALLERS
|
||
|
||
Most sysops check out applicants by verifying their names and
|
||
telephone numbers. But on the MENSA BBS in Palm Beach, FL, callers face a
|
||
much tougher screening.
|
||
All registered users must pass members of Mensa, Intertel or the
|
||
Triple Nine Society to receive full system access.
|
||
Mensa is an international society in which the sole requirement for
|
||
membership is a score at or above the 98th percentile on any of a number of
|
||
standard IQ tests. Qualification for membership may be determined by tests
|
||
administered by Mensa or by submission of properly certified prior evidence
|
||
to American Mensa,Ltd., 1701 West 3rd Street, Brooklyn, NY 11223.
|
||
INTERTEL, Inc., PO BOX 15580, Lakewood, Co., 80215, is a similar
|
||
organization that requires members to score in the 99 percentile or above on
|
||
IQ tests. The Triple Nine Society, 463 Beacon St., Boston, MA, 02115, sets
|
||
its standards even higher: the 99.9 percentile.
|
||
"Please do not harass us if you do not qualify for access," say
|
||
Molly and "Pops," the boards sysops.
|
||
The system does invite amateur radio operators to also call in (use
|
||
your call sign to log in) and anyone who sends $100 to Connelly Corporation,
|
||
Box 1164, Palm Beach FL 33480 also can join.
|
||
Members are invited to swap software and generally get to know each
|
||
other through the public message section.
|
||
The board also serves as a convenient advertising medium for Pops'
|
||
classic cars. Among the bargains listed are a 1959 Corvette Roadster for
|
||
$19,500; a 1962 Corvette Coupe, for $14,500 or a 1963 Corvette convertible.
|
||
The BBS, a modified RBBS-PC, is open 24 hours at 300, 1200 or 2400
|
||
baUd. The number is 305-842-1861. You also can catch Molly on The Source,
|
||
ST7783.
|
||
|