264 lines
16 KiB
Plaintext
264 lines
16 KiB
Plaintext
To Catch A Hacker. The true story of John Maxfield, electronic private eye.
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Appeared in August 1990 issue of PC Computing Magazine, by Rick Manning.
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The computer crackers and phone phreaks who visited Cable Pair's cluttered
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office one August evening in 1983 must have thought they were in heaven.
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Cable Pair was a sysop for a hacker forum on the Twilight Phone, a Detroit
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area computer bulletin board. The forum had become a meeting place for
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members of the Inner Circle, a nationwide hacker group that used words and
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swap tips on phone phreaking--getting free use of long-distance phone systems.
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Cable Pair's visitors that evening were some of the Inner Circle's most
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active members, highly placed in the hacker pecking order. They had come in
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response to messages that Cable Pair had posted on the board, inviting them to
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take a guided tour of his headquarters, and they were suitably impressed.
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Computer equipment was everywhere. The sysop's console consisted of several
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terminals connected to a remote Hewlett-Packard minicomputer.
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In a back room was a bank of electromechanical telephone switches--old
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stuff, but enough to run a phone system for a small town. Cable Pair even had
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an official Bell version of the infamous "Blue Box," a device that sends out
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the precisely calibrated tones that unlock long distance telephone circuits.
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To
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demonstrate the magic box, he keyed in a 2600 cycle per second tone and was
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rewarded with the clear whisper of AT&T's long distance circuit.
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Then like jazz players in a jam session, group members took turns showing
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what they could do. One tapped into AT&T's teleconfrencing system. Another
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bragged about how he once nearly had Ron Reagan, Queen Elizabeth, and the pope
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on the same conference call.
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One hacker's specialty was getting into Arpanet, the advanced research
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network that links universities and government agencies, including defense
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research centers. "The Wizard of Arpanet sat right there at that keyboard and
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hacked into the system," says Cable Pair smiling at the memory. "And we
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captured every keystroke."
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It was probable Cable Pair's finest hour. He was not, after all just
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another hacker. The gathering that evening was the culmination of an elaborate
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sting operation.
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Outside the office, FBI agents watched everyone who entered and left the
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building. A few months after the jam session, police raided homes across the
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country. The confiscated computers and disks and charged about a dozen adults
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and teenagers with various counts of computer abuse and wire fraud.
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Cable Pair was John Maxfield, whose career as an FBI informant had started
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a year earlier. Now approaching the age of 50, he is still chasing hackers,
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phone phreaks, and computer pirates. When his cover was blown in a hacker
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newsletter soon after the office party, he attracted a network of double
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agents, people who found it more convenient and safer to work with him than
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against him. Some continue to maintain their status in the hacker underground
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and pass information to Maxfield.
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The nature of Maxfield's calling depends on your frame of reference. If
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you've read enough cheap fiction, you might see him as a private dick in a
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digital overcoat. Or a stagecoach guard sitting on the strongbox, eyes
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scanning the horizon, electron gun across his knees. He refers to the hacker
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phenomenon in the nebulous language of Cold War espionage, casting himself in
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a spy novel role as a warrior fighting battles that both sides will deny ever
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happened.
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"He's very good at getting hackers together on one thing," says Eric
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Corley, editor of 2600, the hacker publication that fingered Maxfield more
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than six years ago. "I can think of nothing that hackers agree on except that
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John Maxfield is evil!"
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Maxfield responds in kind "Hackers are like electronic cockroaches," he
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says. "You can't see them, but they're there, and at night they raid the
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refrigerator." Although a lot of hackers are what Maxfield calls "tourists"--
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young people who go into a system to simply look around--more sinister
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influences often lurk behind them.
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"The tourist may go into a system and look around, but when he leaves,
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he's got a password and he'll share it with others because he's got an ego and
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wants to show how good he is," says Maxfield.
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"It's my experience that ever hacker gang has one or more adult members
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who direct activities and manipulate the younger ones. What could be better
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than to have the naifs doing your dirty work for you? They can open all the
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doors and unlock the systems and then you go in and steal space shuttle
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plans."
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The hackers are one step away from the shadowy world of spies." says
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Maxfield. "Some have deliberately sought out and made contact with the KGB."
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Maxfield wasn't suprised at all when West German police announced in March
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1988 that they had arrested a group of computer hackers who used overseas
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links to U.S. computer networks to steal sensitive data. And he thinks
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computer companies and corporations haven't learned much about securing their
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systems. "There are more interconnections," he says "and that leads to more
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vulnerability."
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A good example was the worm that Robert T. Morris Jr., unleashed in Nov
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1988 through the Unix based Internet research and defense network that shut
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down more than 6000 computers.
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"The hackers will tell you that this kind of thing is just a practical
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joke, a harmless prank. But in can do some very serious damage," says
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Maxfield. Computer systems experts who testified at Morris's trial last Jan.
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estimated that the cost of cleaning up after the chaos wreaked by the Unix
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worm was $15 million!.
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The information that Maxfield collects about these computer pranksters and
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criminals goes into a database that he maintains to help him identify
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hackers and monitor their activities. Maxfield tracks the phone phreaks'
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identities and aliases to help his clients, who are managers at large
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corporations, credit card companies, and telephone companies--business people
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who feel the need to protect their electronic goods and services.
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What can Maxfield do for them? If a corporation's phone system is abused
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by unauthorized users or if its computer system is invaded by hackers, he can
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conduct an investigation and advise the company on how to contain the problem.
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He can also tell them where their system is vulnerable and what to do about
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it.
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Most of the hackers whose names and aliases are in Maxfield's database
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probably are pranksters, teenagers attracted by the danger and excitement of
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electronic lock-picking. Their activities would remain mostly benign, Maxfield
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says, if it weren't for the organized online groups and the criminally-minded
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adults that urge them on.
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"That's the real threat," he says. "It's not the pranksters so much as
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the
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people they're associated with. The people who don't run bulletin boards, who
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don't brag openly about what they can do.
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Maxfield could easily have become one of the hackers he now fights against
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.
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As a teenager growing up in Ann Arbor, Michigan, in the late 1950's he had a
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comsuming passion for telephones and computers. During the summer he worked
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for an independent phone equipment manufacturer and spent time hanging around
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the offices of Michigan Bell. He also made some friends within Bell.
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Naturally curious, Maxfield experimented with his telephone at home and
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learned how to blow fuses at distant switching stations and even how to shut
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down whole portions of an exchange. By studying AT&T technical journals used
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on his job and by picking up technical information from his contacts at Bell,
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he learned how to make his own blue box. In 1961, when dirrect dial service
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reached Ann Arbor, Maxfield was finally able to test his discovery.
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Maxfield was shocked when he realized he could make long-distance phone
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calls for free. He called a friend at the phone company, and he mentioned his
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triumph to other friends. Maxfield's discovery attracted the attention of some
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people who offered to pay him $350 each for 1000 blue boxes.
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Word also got back to AT&T special audit inspectors through the friend at
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Michigan Bell. After paying Maxfield a visit, the inspectors let him off with
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a warning, but not before suggesting that it was probably the Mafia that
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wanted to buy the boxes.
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"They said the records of the bookmakers' long distance calls get them
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convicted in court," Maxfield recalls. If bookmakers manage to evade the
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telephone company's billing equipment, of course, they not only avoid having
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to
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pay for the long-distance calls they make, there are no records that federal
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prosecutors can use against them.
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Maxfield's prototype blue box took a midnight swim of a Huron bridge, and
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the kid stayed out of trouble after that. For the next 20 years he channeled
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his electronic expertise into fixing and installing phone equipment.
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In fact, Maxfield's career as a counterhacker began quite innocently, in
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1978, when he helped a local computer club start one of the nations first
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electronic bulletin boards. Four years later, the FBI cam looking for pirated
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software.
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"I knew the pirated software wasn't in the clubs, but I also knew about
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pirate bulletin boards that had sprung up in the area," Maxfield recalls. So
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he printed out some of the messages from the pirate boards and took them to
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the local FBI office in 1982.
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The FBI scarcely knew what to make of all of the information that Maxfield
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handed them. "They were still keeping records on 3X5 index cards!" he says.
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But the bureau offered to compensate Maxfield for his expenses if he would
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monitor the hacker bulletin boards and report to them.
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Maxfield accepted. The arrangement gave him what every hacker and phone
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phreak would love to have...a license to hack. He could call anywhere in the
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world or attack any computer and not worry about the consequences.
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Maxfield might still be undercover for the FBI today if he and his contact
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at the bureau had kept their mouths shut and not underestimated the
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resourcefulness of the hackers.
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Following the success of his 1983 office party and the resulting raids,
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Maxfield, still undercover, got involved with a New York hacker group that had
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take control of a corporate voice-mail system.
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Against the FBI's advice, Maxfield tipped off the voice-mail system
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administrator, leaving a message urging him to contact the FBI. "What I didn't
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know as that the hackers also had access to the system administrator's account
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so they got the message first." Maxfield says.
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One of the gang members, posing as the system administrator, called the
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FBI and learned enough to identify Maxfield. A story about Cable Pair's
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involvement with he government appeared in the first issue of 2600 in January
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1984.
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"We thought Cable Pair would be a promising contributor to this
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publication," the story concluded. "Instead we learned a valuable lesson:
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Don't trust ANYBODY."
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"That's when the shit hit the fan," recalls Maxfield. "I was burned six
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ways from Sunday.
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"My phone was ringing off the hook with death threats," he says. "The
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hackers were after me, and even the FBI didn't like me for a while."
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"It was an ignorminious finish to Maxfield's underground activities for
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the government, but it launched his career as a consultant and electronic
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private eye. Several hackers who were worried about how much Maxfield know
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about their activities offered to become his double agents. "Some were even
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more highly placed than I was, and a couple of those people are still good
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sources today."
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"Hacker groups are like street gangs," he says: the hierarchy changes all
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the time, and the organization is very loose.
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One way to get to the top of this shifting hierarchy is to be a sysop for
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a pirate bulletin board, as Cable Pair was. Another way is to boast online
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about hacking exploits ("Well, I hacked into NASA's network and figured out
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how to alter the course of the Hubble Space Telescope...") or to post a lot of
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pirated information on the system.
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Maxfield uses the hackers' own techniques to penetrate their private
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bulletin board systems. "It's a mind game," he explains. "Hackers will seek me
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out and feed me information about someone they hate or someone higher placed
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that they are" just to get them out of the way. They're "absolute anarchists,"
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says Maxfield.
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While Maxfield is watching the hackers, the hackers are watching him. Says
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Corley, "We have a nice thick file folder on him."
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Maxfield keeps more than file folders. His database which has entries on
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about 6000 suspected hackers and phone phreaks, is cross-referenced by name,
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alias, phone number, gang associations, and criminal arrest record for phone
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fraud. He also tracks the names and numbers of pirate BBS's--and it's all at
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his fingertips.
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Maxfield downloads information from his database directly to some clients.
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Others receive his periodical, which reports on hacker activities and lists
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phone numbers of active hackers and pirate bulletin boards. Companies that
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suspect illegal phone activity can use the list like a reverse phone
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directory, comparing phone numbers on their bills against the list to isolate
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the BBS from which the perpetrator is operating. Then they can work on
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preparing a case for law enforcement. Very often, the same perpetrators tap
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into the same system over and over, and companies that wish to prosecute must
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assemble evidence over a considerable period.
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Sometimes Maxfield gets involved directly, but he says he is "not a bounty
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hunter" and claims that he'll tip off corporations or phone companies about
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security breaches even if they aren't clients.
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He'll even help AT&T, although his relations with the company are
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strained. "They still think I'm one of the bad guys."
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Other's in the industry, however, find Maxfield's work helpful and
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valuable.
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"I put a lot of trust in the work he does," says Donn Parker, a computer
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crime expert at SRI International, in Menlo Park, California, and a regular
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subscriber to Maxfield's reports. "He does a very good job of keeping track of
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the malicious hackers and the phone phreak community."
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Maxfield often conducts computer security seminars for corporate clients
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and government agencies. He can alert corporate clients to weak spots in their
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systems and advise them on how to tighten their electronic security. He tells
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his clients that networks are particularly vulnerable to invasion because
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"when you network systems together, it's like a chain, and you need only
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attack the weakest link. All you need is one site with poor security and you
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have a loophole."
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Data sent over the telephone lines can also be tapped. "Some people sit on
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a telephone pole or in a car holding a laptop computer wired directly into the
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phone lines, picking off data and passwords," he says.
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"Computer security isn't a computer problem, It's a people problem," says
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Maxfield. "And people just aren't security-conscious. The leave doors
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unlocked, and they write their passwords down and tape them to the fronts of
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their terminals.
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"We have the technical knowledge to secure these systems. We know how to
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keep the hackers out, but it's a problem of implementation. It's expensive,
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and it makes the system harder to use."
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"Any system that's user-friendly," cautions Maxfield, "is also hacker-
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friendly."
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Maxfield is as addicted to his profession as the hacerks are to their
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online capers. Even if he wanted to quit the business, he says, he couldn't:
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"The hackers just won't leave me alone."
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Maxfield admits that sometimes it's a little scary to be the Lone Ranger
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out there. Much of what he's seen and worked on can't be discussed for fear
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that hackers will be onto what he's doing. But, he says, that problem is dire,
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and "we've got to wake people up to this. We need to increase corporate
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awareness, law enforcement awareness, and public awareness. Computer
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manufacturers need to think about designing systems that are more secure, and
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the phone system needs to rethink its entire network design."
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And so Maxfield feels an obligation to continue his crusade. He knows too
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much to stop now.
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A little info......
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This article is one of many controversial articles that is being
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debated on the Master Control Program BBS. File retyped on 7/19/90 by user #1
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of the MCP. Call today! (314)-993-3689.
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