599 lines
37 KiB
Plaintext
599 lines
37 KiB
Plaintext
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Underground eXperts United
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Presents...
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[ On Friendship ] [ By The GNN ]
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____________________________________________________________________
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____________________________________________________________________
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ON FRIENDSHIP
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by THE GNN/DualCrew-Shining/uXu
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Not only is this a long and complicated textfile, it is
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also written within the tradition of 'analytic'
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philosophy, which makes it pretty scientifically stiff
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(i.e., 'boring'). I do encourage the reader to give it a
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chance, though. The notion of friendship is not only an
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interesting concept to examine for-itself; it is an
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interpersonal relation that is most necessary for our
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lives. Some people, however, have not realized this fact,
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believing that friends come and go by themselves, that
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one need not actively uphold certain relations, as they
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are somewhat 'automatic' to their character. Nothing
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could be more wrong. As I have grown older, I have
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noticed that I am about to lose many good friends since
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they (and me too, certainly) are unable to understand
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what it takes to be a real friend. To save you from grief
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and despair in the future, I recommend you to study this
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text, and think twice what it means to truly be a 'real
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friend'. (First-time readers may omit section VIII and
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the footnotes, as they probably are only of interest for
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specialists in the field of Aristotelian ethics.)
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I. Introduction
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In our seemingly cold-comfort western culture, public demonstration of
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friendship is rather uncommon, limited to formalities such as greeting
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cards or handshakes. But to jump to the conclusion that there is no such
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thing as deep affection between people (which need not necessarily fall
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into the category of 'lovers') from this shallow observation would be too
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rash. A denial of the very existence of friendship and its impact on our
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lives is to misconstrue an important part of the good life. Some prefer to
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live in solitude - but I believe most of us do not.
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The term 'friendship' is often used and abused in various circumstances
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which makes it hard to get a grip of. Of course, the difficulties are not
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solely to be blamed on the excessive use of the notion. It is undoubtedly a
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complicated relation. It would clearly be a mistake to believe that it is
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possible for a philosopher to be able to easily organize and perfectly
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define all aspects involved in it. Aware of this, I do understand that this
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paper is to be understood as merely being a tentative attempt for all that
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it is worth.
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The definition will be broadly Aristotelian.(1) I will not however
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strive for an answer to the question whether this kind of human conduct is
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morally good or not. I will only argue for what I believe this special
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relation requires. These requirements will be non-instrumentality,
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irreplaceability, and the existence of mutual altruistic emotions. I will
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shortly deal with questions on how friendships evolve in our lives through
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practice, argue that it requires certain proper attitudes - 'psychological
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dispositions' - and finally that the relation in question cannot be said to
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be true if it is based upon deceit.
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II. Non-Instrumentality
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Friendship separates itself from certain other kinds of interpersonal
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relations by being essentially non-instrumental. It is not a relation like
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those which exists between business associates, doctor and patients,
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students and teachers, and so on. While a relation of friendship is upheld
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thanks to an interrelation between several complex parts, relations of the
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former kind are sought strictly for the sake of utility. They seize to be
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the very moment the purpose has been fulfilled, and the attitudes entailing
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such instrumental relations do not work very well with friendship. If we
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regard our beloved ones as mere instruments toward some personal goal (or
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universal even), as recommended in obscure publications like 'How to Win
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Friends and Influence People', we would soon find ourselves living
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alone.(2)
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This quickly calls for an objection: that there is in fact no such thing
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as a truly non-instrumental relation. We enter all relations, it could be
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said, only because we in the end want to gain something. In friendship,
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perhaps it is pleasure or self-fulfilment. The difference between business
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associates and friends would only be what they seek, not how they seek it.
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This simplification is not the whole truth though. Friendship is a more
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complex matter than that. Yes, we do gain things out of our friends. It
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would be utmost strange and even a failure if we did not. Friendship is, as
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Aristotle puts it, 'reciprocated goodwill'.(3) Friends do things for each
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other, and they gain both pleasure and self-fulfilment among other things
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out of it. But the main difference is that the various things we gain are
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results of the relation, not its primary goal (or 'focus', 'object'). It is
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no secret that an instrumental relation has as its goal the results
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themselves (money, grades, entertainment, etc.). All of the involved
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parties are aware of this. A non-instrumental ditto has as its goal the
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relation itself, and friends are aware of this too.(4) Out of this non-
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instrumentality follow several enjoyable results which would not follow if
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we regarded it instrumentally.
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The objection seems based upon a mix-up between what it means to use
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friendship as means to a further end, or to regard it as something that
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partially constitutes this end. If we find out that certain personal
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relations are necessary for, say, the good life, this does not
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automatically imply that we in all circumstances are bound to engage in
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such relations instrumentally. On the contrary, it could be a part of the
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good life, not a part to it.
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Say that I enter a relation with a car dealer for the purpose of buying
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a car. We talk and he amuses me with his jokes. He buys me coffee and shows
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me around in the shop. If one did not know the background information
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concerning my visit to the dealer, one might from mere observance believe
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that we were friends. But this is something we are not. When the car is
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bought, the relation between me and the dealer has vanished - perhaps until
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the day I need some other favor from him.(5) This would not have been the
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case if the dealer had been my friend. When I had bought the car, our
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relation would not have seized to be. Maybe I would have bought the car at
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a lower cost thanks to our relation, but I would not have used it for
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getting the car cheaper. I have not entered the relation, and I do not
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uphold it, in the intention of getting such things. Friendship is more
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about loving than being loved.(6) In a relation of utility, we strive to
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get more than we give; in friendship, we need necessarily not get more than
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we give. Certainly, friendship includes reciprocity. But this is of a
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special kind - radically different from the reciprocity existing in
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instrumental relations. Friends 'give' each other things (affection, trust,
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company, and so on) because they want to, not because they feel like they
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have to. Although we do not demand our friend to always give us something,
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we do expect that the other person is equally interested in being a friend.
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If we hang on to a relation even though we never gain anything in return at
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all, we are not really 'friends' - one of us is just exercising a form of
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unconditional love. But friendship does not and ought not require this form
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of love. As strict search for utility is unfitting, so is unconditional
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love. Friendship lies somewhere in between those two extreme point of
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views.(7) I will return to some questions concerning this in the part on
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'irreplaceability' which will follow later.
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III. Emotions
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Per definition, friendship involves sentiments. It requires that we are
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fond of the other person.(8) It must also involve emotions of the
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altruistic kind, which is defined as a wish for the weal and woe of the
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other person for his own sake.(9) We do not expect to be let down by those
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we care about, because we believe them to care for us too. Friends trust
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each other. We dare to share with them.(10) In instrumental relations
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there can exist something that looks like such emotions. After all, the car
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dealer might with a convincing voice assure me that he wants to know if I
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am in good spirits. But what one sees is not always what one gets. Only
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because a benevolent act, as asking me if I feel all right, looks like it
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has sprung from an emotion it does not necessarily imply that it has.
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Even though goodwill and altruistic emotions are necessary parts, they
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are not all there is to friendship. I could be fully altruistic in my
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feelings and acts toward a complete stranger. But this does not mean that
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we are automatically friends. Altruistic emotions are directed toward
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particular persons in particular circumstances. Even though both my friend
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and the stranger could be in the same situation, it does not mean that I
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always feel the same for the stranger.
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Emotions of this kind have often been quite oversimplified. They are not
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seldom regarded as 'unreliable' as they are said to be too closely
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connected to 'moods'. Yes, altruistic emotions do have a tendency to change
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with the mood, but they do not seize to exist just because we do not
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temporarily 'feel' them in fullest bloom. Genuine feelings of altruism
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toward particular persons do not completely disappear with moods. If they
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do - they were hardly genuine in the first place.(11) If a friend in
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despair wants me to spend an evening with him it would be very strange if I
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refused only because 'I did not feel for it'. If it had been a complete
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stranger on the other hand, it would not have been equally surprising.
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Altruistic emotions are not 'passive'. They are active in the sense that
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they motivate us to act benevolent, out of a non-instrumental
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perspective.(12) Even though we cannot force ourselves to have certain
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emotions, this does not mean that we are equally unable to control the
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sometimes spontaneous actions that follow from them.(13) Partially due to
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the requirement of certain emotions, it seems clear that we cannot have too
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many friends. If we try to become a friend with anybody we encounter, we
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will probably just end up having a lot of 'fellows'. This is not to say
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that it is impossible to feel 'something' for large groups. Some might
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fancy certain people because they are members of a group - 'Swedes',
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'liberals', 'table-tennis players'. But to claim that we can appreciate one
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and every member of such a group as equally good personal friends would be
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to exaggerate our emotional abilities. Imagined godlike creatures can do
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this, but we are not of that kind - and, as I will argue below, such
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'arbitrary' manifestations of affection are inappropriate for friendship
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anyway.
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IV. Irreplaceability
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We have now reached the single most important criterion. That a friend is
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essentially irreplaceable. If I treat a stranger non-instrumentally in the
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mood of pure altruism, this does not mean that we are friends. Because, to
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me, the stranger could be any person. That he is who he is, is in fact of
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no interest. If you are my friend, on the other hand, I like you, and do
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things for you, because you are you. I like 'the whole' of you, not merely
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certain parts of your character (even though I might like some more than
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others); as your amusing jokes, your exquisite taste of automobiles or
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views of the world. What I like are not these features in themselves, but
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the combination of them: you. Even if some other person could serve my
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'needs' for happiness and self-fulfilment better, or equally good as you, I
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would not swap. Not because you give me more pleasure qua being you, but
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because you are you and no one else. I fancy your essential features, not
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your incidental; you are (to me, at least) a unique person.
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But then, how far does this 'irreplacability' stretch? What if your
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character changes? What happens with our relation if you suddenly turn into
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a completely different person, perhaps due to a neural disease or the wrong
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company? Must I then hang on to the relation?
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No. The relation is a result of an empirical investigation, I have found
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out that I like your characteristics. If those features suddenly vanish,
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there is nothing left to like. You would not longer be you, but someone
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else, a stranger. It would be utmost strange, however, if a relation of
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friendship seized to be just because you went through some minor changes.
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After all, people do change as their lives pass by. Friendship is more
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elastic than less strong relations. If my favorite car dealer changed
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occupation, I would probably never have anything to do with him again.
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How much you must change for me to be allowed to break the relation
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without being accused for not have been a real friend is a complicated
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question and cannot be answered here, if at all. If I come from a family of
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a different culture and you, all of a sudden, turn into a hard-core
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xenophobic with certain unappealing pragmatic final solutions concerning my
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worldly existence, can we be friends? That would be utmost surprising. What
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if you are badly brain damaged in a car accident and fall into a deep coma
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that will last until your body dies? Can we be friends even though all your
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essential features are irreversibly gone? I do not think so. My emotions
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for you might last, but those alone are not all there is to friendship.
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The main issue is that it is very hard, if possible, to try to come up
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with a top-ten-style index over what one fancies with a special person, and
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how many of these features that must be around for the relation to
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last.(14)
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A fatal change need not only be that you actually turn into someone
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else. I might find out who you really are, discover something I missed when
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I first encountered you. Maybe you have only pretended to be my friend, but
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in reality simply need me as a tool for reaching some personal or universal
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goal. As I become aware of this, my trust in you will vanish. I realize
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that me-being-me does not matter in your eyes, only me-being-a-tool-for-
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some-other-end. This I cannot accept. A common complaint of friends when
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they break up is that they were manipulated and used, that they painfully
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discovered the truth beyond the other part's seemingly good intentions. We
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expect the other person to hold similar attitudes toward us as we do toward
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him or her. If we do not expect any of this from the other person, but
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still loved the person (unconditionally), we are not friends. Because we
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need not, and ought not, love the other person unconditionally in a state
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of friendship.
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Unconditional love resembles 'agape' - the kind of love that it is
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claimed that omnipotent, omniscient, good, yet imagined, godlike creatures
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feel for their creations. The 'problem' with this kind of appreciation is
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that the lover does not love the unique and irreplaceable person for what
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he is, but merely his incidental features, as 'being a human' or 'my
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creation'. But friends do not appreciate such incidental features of the
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other person, but the essential. Agape makes a person numerically
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replaceable; any person that bears the same simple qualities (like 'being
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human') deserves the same love.(15) In instrumental relations, the person
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is qualitatively replaceable, any person who bears the same qualities
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('sells cheap cars') gets the same attention. Thus, unconditional love is
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as instrumental love not proper for friendship - because they both fail to
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appreciate the unique person.(16) Friends are phenomenologically
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irreplaceable. I cannot regard your twin brother as an equally good friend
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even if you share many characteristics. I appreciate you as a friend,
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because only you are your essential features.(17)
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Lastly, while we are at the subject of which kind of loving that is
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proper for friendship, I do not believe that friendship is the kind of
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relation that should be ascribed as existing between parents and children.
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Love does exist between both friends and family members. But '[l]ove is a
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feeling, but friendship is a state.'(18) And this kind of state is
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incompatible with the state that exists between parent-child, out of two
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main reasons.
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Firstly, it resembles the arbitrariness of unconditional love too much.
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The love of children and parents is not brought about due to an empirical
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investigation in the same sense as friends. I have perceived that I like
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your character; I have made a choice of being your friend (even though the
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choice is not as self-conscious as when we chose what to have for
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dinner).(19) Exactly why I have found this out is hard to put a finger on.
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Maybe it is because we share alike beliefs, values and interests - a shared
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conception of the good.(20) I have not just stumbled over you and without
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any further motivation come to the conclusion that we ought to be friends.
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Children do not choose their parents, and parents do not choose to have a
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child with those-and-those essential qualities.
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Secondly, friends regard each other as equals, no one having authority
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over the other, while parents (even though some would like to deny the
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force, especially concerning teenagers) believe they have the power and wit
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to determine the good for their children. This usually remains for the rest
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of their lives, since parents have the tendency to regard their offspring
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as - children, no matter how old they are.(21) Even if we look away from
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these details, which need not always be facts of the matter, I believe
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there is a more fundamental reason why claiming that children can have true
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friends is incorrect. We now partly turn to this.
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V. Practice
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If we follow Aristotle, friendship is not something we 'naturally' can do (
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as we, for example, naturally can digest the food we eat). Friendship
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requires training.(22) Not mere theoretical teaching, but practical real-
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life experiences. What we learn to do, we learn by doing. As we grow up,
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and participate in various relations, we learn more and more about what
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they really are and imply. Concerning friendship, what we learn is a
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complex concept (need for non-instrumentality, emotions, irreplaceability,
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among more). If we by some reason are unable to grasp and live by this
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concept, we will not be able to have friends.
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This means that children and animals are unable to have any friends.
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Please note that I do not claim that children or animals are unable to have
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any feelings for other creatures. What I only intend to propose is that
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friendship is a relation that is more advanced than the mere experience of
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feelings. Children lack the experience and knowledge needed. Children make
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and break 'friendships' with amazing rapidity; consult your local
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sociologist if your experiences of the real world must be supplemented with
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academic proof. After all, they have just entered the world, still not
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aware of all of its components and rules. No blame on them.
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Animals are unable to have relations of friendship out of similar
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epistemic reasons. The difference is that while children - due to the fact
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that they actually grow up - are able to obtain knowledge concerning the
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complexity of friendship. Animals are not. It is popular to claim that
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"dog is man's best friend" but unfortunately this is not true. A dog might
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be man's best 'companion' or 'fellow', but certainly not 'friend' within
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the Aristotelian definition. Friendship is solely a human conduct, since
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humans are the only ones who are able to understand the concept. Well, we
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invented it - what did you expect?
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Anyway, one could still deny this whole idea and for some reason claim
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that friendship can be the case even though the involved objects are unable
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to grasp the concept. But where will this generosity lead us? If we allow
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any kind of relation to be labelled friendship, the very term itself would
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quickly lose all meaning. My computer could be a friend of mine. It seldom
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demands anything of me (except for occasional defragmentations), and it is
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somewhat good company. Company which I can enjoy without feeling that I
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must give something back - almost like a friend! This sounds mighty strange
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in my ears.(23)
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Our best friends are often those we have had for a long time, as we have
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learned more about both the persons and how to master the appropriate
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concept.(24) Many relations changes as we grow older. We could very well
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have been involved in an instrumental relation from the beginning, but then
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swung over to a non-instrumental one. Perhaps I found out that I shared
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many other interests than automobiles with my car dealer, which eventually
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led to a state of friendship between me and him. The opposite works too:
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due to circumstances, a formerly real friend might turn into an object of
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utility. Perhaps we have grown, or moved, away from each other. Our
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interests and world-views have radically separated. We do not longer know
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each other as we used to.(25)
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VI. Deceit
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Can any form of deceived beliefs or corrupt attitudes be reconciled with
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the proper form of friendship? That all depends on which belief that is
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false or which attitude that is corrupt. Children and animals cannot have
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friends since they lack the appropriate knowledge. But what about those who
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fully know about the concepts of friendship, but in a state of it yet aim
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at something else - since they with the help of deception to a certain
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extent have 'forgotten' about this aim? Could such a person be said to
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truly be in a state of friendship?
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No. To state the obvious: I could believe I am someone's friend; but
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this belief alone does not mean that I am someone's friend. I might look
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and act as if I were a friend. Yet, this charade does not automatically
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make me one. The relation requires the above criteria, and if these are not
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fulfilled, well, when we do not have a relation of friendship. We might
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have pseudo-friendship, but that is something else.(26)
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Say that I realize that I will be able to come across a car cheaper if I
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work on becoming a friend with the dealer. I also realize that acting as a
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friend will not work if I do not believe that I really am one, as
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professional actors claim that they must truly believe that they are the
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character they play on stage to succeed. Still, they are not the character
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they play - and neither am I a friend only because I believe so. The actor
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is not really angry, happy, good, evil, while playing, but he has forced
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himself into believing so. Likewise, I do not really care for the car
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dealer, he as a unique person is not really something I value; I only make
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believe, for the sake of buying a car.
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Still, this is way too vague. What exactly is missing in pseudo-
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friendship? Well, I would not have fled to vagueness if I did not have a
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hard time putting the finger on the problem. What is for certain is that
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friendship is built upon a special set of attitudes and dispositions.
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Deception on the other hand is built upon another set, which can hardly be
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logically compatible with those required for friendship. Simply feeling
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like a friend cannot be all there is to friendship.
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But then, what would happen if it turned out that we all are deceived?
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Maybe there is no such thing as friendship in the terms described? Maybe
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all our attitudes, actions and emotions can be reduced to our sexual
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drive?(27) Or maybe we (or more precisely, me) are nothing more than brains
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in a vat, dreaming fully determined experiences. If that were so, what we
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believed to be friendship would not be so. We would not 'really' care for
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our friends, just for our personal reproduction, or, the other person in
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our dreams would not be a friend, since 'he' would be unable to have any
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kind of proper attitudes toward us. But speculations of this kind neither
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|
add nor reduce anything of interest from the present context. Those kinds
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|
of deception are totally beyond our control. There is nothing we can do,
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|
since we cannot have any knowledge about them. They would be incorporated
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|
in ourselves to the extent that they are impossible to notice. We must
|
|
assume that the world is constituted in certain ways, otherwise we cannot
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|
discuss this subject at all. If these assumptions one day turn out to be
|
|
untrue, we will have to reconsider. But that day has yet not come.
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|
What is of interest here is thus only the kind of deception that we
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|
knowingly and intentionally enters, that is, self-deception. We could
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|
engage in such deception in relation to friendship for a number of reasons.
|
|
Perhaps for the sake of making money, getting to buy a car cheaper or
|
|
preserving the world from its oncoming doom. But even though such deception
|
|
is logically incompatible with friendship, it need not be a psychological
|
|
problem. Our heads do not explode only because we hold incompatible
|
|
beliefs.
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|
Contrary to brains-in-the-vat variants of deception, however, self-
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|
deception is more within our control. We create it ourselves - and what we
|
|
create, we can pull down. This is of course not to say that it might not be
|
|
all that easy though. But it is hardly impossible, as we are not biological
|
|
robots that can be programmed to do anything, but simply flexible human
|
|
beings. To claim that it is possible for us to completely alienate
|
|
ourselves from ourselves to the extent that we never in any way notice it
|
|
is to ascribe us capacities we do not possess. Someone suffering from deep
|
|
insanity could of course believe anything - but such extreme cases are
|
|
seldom due to the kind of self-deception most people practice now and then.
|
|
As I mentioned earlier, a relation might begin on the basis of
|
|
instrumentality, and later become one of non-instrumentality. Can
|
|
friendship equally begin on the basis of self-deception, and then 'swing
|
|
over' to become a genuine, non-deceived, relation? Of course it can - but
|
|
any switch will not do. The person must first come to understand that he is
|
|
practising self-deception. Otherwise no fundamental change will ever occur.
|
|
This is not necessary between the switch between instrumentality and non-
|
|
instrumentality. Because there is nothing 'hidden' in the closet of those
|
|
relations.
|
|
|
|
This concludes the main subject of this paper. In the last part I will make
|
|
some final unfounded remarks on the notion of friendship and morality, yet
|
|
not try to answer any question on rightness or goodness.
|
|
|
|
VII. Aristotelian Friendship and Rivalling Moral Systems
|
|
|
|
Ought we aim for genuine, non-deceived forms of friendship? Not obviously.
|
|
Perhaps the world will become a much better place if more people tactically
|
|
aimed for instrumental relations with the help of deceit. But many
|
|
philosophers have argued that genuine friendship is one important part of a
|
|
world that goes around in an acceptable manner. Aristotle claimed that no
|
|
one would choose to live without friends, as it is 'most necessary for our
|
|
lives'.(28) If this is true or an exaggeration is another discussion. But
|
|
it seems somewhat clear that personal relations do play an important role.
|
|
We see ourselves through others; thus, relations gives shape and meaning to
|
|
our lives.
|
|
But do we really have this kind of relation to those we refer to as
|
|
'friends' Or is the Aristotelian definition merely an ideal image that does
|
|
not really exist, proposed by philosophical hermits who have never
|
|
experienced how the world actually works? Even if that is so, which I
|
|
hardly believe, the blame need not be put on the concept anyway. Perhaps
|
|
the world has increasingly been made to make it superfluous. If so, there
|
|
might be something wrong with the world, not with this kind of
|
|
friendship.(29)
|
|
It need not only be the world as we know it that makes friendship a
|
|
practical problem however. Some moral philosophers do not hesitate to
|
|
criticize certain ethical theories on the basis that they are unable to
|
|
incorporate and explain the notion of friendship in a satisfying manner,
|
|
leaving us only with the possibility of having pseudo-friends if we want to
|
|
be fully moral. Due to this, these theories are said to malfunction, being
|
|
only theoretical constructions which either are hard to follow as a
|
|
personal moral theory, or, if followed, a menace to the well-being of the
|
|
human race.
|
|
Not all that unexpected, the defenders equally without hesitation claim
|
|
the opposite. In a traditional philosophical manner the debate seemingly
|
|
goes nowhere. But this is maybe not due to mutually convincing arguments,
|
|
but because the opponents are viewing not only friendship but the whole
|
|
concept of morality from different viewpoints.
|
|
In between the battle between - taking the standpoints to their most
|
|
extreme outlooks - moral theories which rest on unfounded opinions
|
|
supported by emotional outbursts (even though some of its defenders seldom
|
|
hesitate to claim that the morality is actually endorsed by 'God'), and
|
|
theories which more resembles mathematics than moral philosophy with the
|
|
result of being completely useless (even though the defenders seldom
|
|
hesitate to argue that they mainly aim for the abstract notions of 'truth'
|
|
and 'clarity') we might find a third alternative: versions of Aristotelian
|
|
virtue ethics, despite its age still not sunk into oblivion, but then, not
|
|
fully developed either. And even if we discover that Aristotle really had
|
|
no acceptable moral system to offer, a closer examination of this different
|
|
kind of ethics might perhaps help us come closer to a understanding of
|
|
where and why the debate in question went wrong.
|
|
|
|
--- (1) As put forward in the Nichomachean Ethics, book viii and ix
|
|
(translated by Terence Irwin, Indiana: Hacket Publishing Company, 1985).
|
|
For this paper I have also used Lawrence Blum's Friendship, Altruism and
|
|
Morality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Limited, 1980), Laurence Thomas'
|
|
article "Friendship" (Synthese, 72, 1987, pp. 217-236), but mainly Neera
|
|
Badhwar Kapur's "Friends as Ends in Themselves" (Philosophy and
|
|
Phenomenological Research, 48, 1987, pp. 1-23). A few less philosophical,
|
|
but more sociological and anthropological, aspects have been found in
|
|
Robert Brain's Friends and Lovers (London: Macgibbon Limited, 1976) and
|
|
Rosemary Blieszner and Rebecca Adams' Adult Friendship (London: Sage
|
|
Publications Inc., 1992).
|
|
(2) This is not a problem which should be mixed up with those like 'the
|
|
paradox of hedonism' or similar. It is not merely the case that we fail
|
|
with our friendship because we view it from an instrumental angle. That
|
|
would be to put the cart before the horse. The problem is more fundamental;
|
|
if we view the relation from this angle, we actually have no friendship at
|
|
all.
|
|
(3) NE, 1155b30.
|
|
(4) Of course, friends do not really have 'the relation' as the goal,
|
|
but the friend himself. It is not some abstract idea of 'friendly relation'
|
|
that is in focus, but the other person.
|
|
(5) Aristotle do not say that it is something immediately wrong with
|
|
relations for utility. They are useful - and we need such relations
|
|
sometimes - but that is all. True friendships are more than useful. To
|
|
knowingly enter a relation and fool the other person into believing that it
|
|
is friendship, while it is not, is not a 'bad friendship', because
|
|
friendship cannot by definition be so - it is simply some other kind of
|
|
relation.
|
|
(6) NE, 1159a30.
|
|
(7) C.f. Aristotle's 'doctrine of the mean', NE book vi.
|
|
(8) NE, 1126b20.
|
|
(9) NE,1156a20-1158b5; Blum pp. 43-44. It should be kept in mind that
|
|
it is not true by definition that 'altruistic acts' automatically imply
|
|
'self-sacrifice' or 'self-neglect'.
|
|
(10) Laurence, 224.
|
|
(11) Blum, p. 18, 30.
|
|
(12) Blum, p. 13.
|
|
(13) C.f. Aristotle 1111b15 and 1121a.
|
|
(14) Mainly because persons are not built upon a variety of individual
|
|
features which can be separated from each other. Persons are more of a
|
|
bundle of features, and a few of these cannot be 'separated' from the rest,
|
|
as they all hang together. Some features are more shallow than others -
|
|
your way of eating or walking for example. But certainly not the most
|
|
interesting and deep ones, as your conception of the good, those which
|
|
really constitutes your personality. In a relation of utility with a car
|
|
dealer it is easier to point out which feature one likes - the ability of
|
|
selling cars, nothing more.
|
|
(15) Aristotle points out that the most complete friendships are those
|
|
between the most virtuous. This could mean some kind of 'god'. This,
|
|
however, does not run counter with the arguments put forward here, as 'the
|
|
gods' in the ancient Greece more resembled real people than the 'God' in
|
|
Christian tradition, which is too perfect for comfort.
|
|
(16) Kapur, pp. 5-8.
|
|
(17) But what happens if you copy yourself in some science fiction
|
|
device; would I regard both of you as equally good friends? I guess I would
|
|
do. But not for long. The two of you would not be qualitatively the same _
|
|
forever.
|
|
(18) NE 1158a30.
|
|
(19) Laurence, 218.
|
|
(20) NE 1167a25, Laurence 220. Friends cannot be too alike though. The
|
|
best friendships are those in which the involved people differ in some
|
|
respects from each other. I would not be able to have a copy of myself as
|
|
my best friend, as I, firstly, cannot stand people who believes they always
|
|
know best, and secondly, would neither be able to give nor receive any new
|
|
perspectives on my life to and from myself.
|
|
(21) Laurence, 221-223.
|
|
(22) Friendship is a Aristotelian virtue and all such virtues requires
|
|
practice. See NE, book ii.
|
|
(23) And it does not work very well with Aristotle either. 'Love for a
|
|
soulless thing is not called friendship, since there is no mutual loving,
|
|
and you do not wish good to it. (...) To a friend, however, it is said, you
|
|
must wish goods for his own sake.' (NE, 1155b30.) 'Soul' need not be
|
|
interpreted into meaning a cartesian transcendent substance, but 'those
|
|
which posses the ability of loving' - i.e. humans.
|
|
(24) Following from this, it is better to have few friends than many.
|
|
Not only because we should avoid 'god-like' manifestations of arbitrary
|
|
love, but also because good friendships cannot properly develop if we are
|
|
unable to take the time needed for actually developing them. For the sake
|
|
of our friends, we should take care of them and do things for them, and let
|
|
them do things for us; but this we cannot do if they are too many. We would
|
|
rush from friend to friend, eventually ending up with a bunch of shallow
|
|
friendships (or none at all), (NE, 1171a10).
|
|
(25) 'Living together is essential for the best friendship' (NE,
|
|
1171a30). What Aristotle meant was not 'the same house', but shared
|
|
activities. Without the presence of such activities, friendships will
|
|
decline. Lack of activities might be due an excess in the number of friends
|
|
or simply because the persons are due to distance unable to spend time with
|
|
each other. (Mere physical distance alone is not a problem nowadays,
|
|
however, as we can use modern means of communication for those purposes.)
|
|
(26) I have throughout this paper mainly talked about how we regard our
|
|
friends. Is this all there is to friendship, the mere need for the proper
|
|
set of psychological dispositions, attitudes? Maybe not. But in this
|
|
context, complex metaphysical speculations seems superfluous, as this paper
|
|
does not deal with the morality of friendship or its ontological status.
|
|
(27) A popular way to come up with theories of 'natural deception' is
|
|
by misconstruing Darwin's theories of evolution. By observing the way
|
|
nature and mankind has evolved, some people conclude that it is
|
|
'scientifically proven' that we 'by nature' are only interested in the weal
|
|
and woe of ourselves. Friendship would then be completely impossible, as it
|
|
has been defined here. A short glance reveals though that the theories of
|
|
evolutionary egoism in question are not 'scientific' in the usual sense, as
|
|
they extrapolate beyond what is acceptable. They thus deserve no attention,
|
|
unless they add something of importance to the question on how we ought to
|
|
be. But since their conclusions are based upon how we are, and these
|
|
conclusions are highly dubious, their prescriptions for ought becomes
|
|
nothing more than uninteresting speculations extracted from nothing.
|
|
(28) NE, 1155a-1155a5.
|
|
(29) Because the Aristotelian requirements are neither radical nor
|
|
controversial. They are not 'romantic', demanding the impossible.
|
|
Furthermore, they are not even tied to any particular culture. A closer
|
|
look reveals that people all over the world regards friendship as built
|
|
upon these requirements. Certainly, people of different cultures do
|
|
different things to demonstrate their affection - some send greeting
|
|
cards, others cut their veins and mix blood, certain tribes in Africa throw
|
|
excrement at their beloved ones. Striking differences indeed. But only on
|
|
the surface. Deeper down it is virtually the same concept for everybody.
|
|
---
|
|
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uXu #417 Underground eXperts United 1998 uXu #417
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Call UNPHAMILIAR TERRITORY -> telnet upt.org
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