317 lines
13 KiB
Plaintext
317 lines
13 KiB
Plaintext
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#######################################
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# <Tolmes News Service> #
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# ''''''''''''''''''''' #
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# > Written by Dr. Hugo P. Tolmes < #
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#######################################
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Issue Number: 02
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Release Date: November 19, 1987
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Welcome to the first REAL issue. Real meaning that it contains articles. With
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nothing further, this issue now goes to the articles.
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Issue #2 Index:
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1) They sure can talk in Raleigh
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2) Teaching Computer Ethics in the Schools
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3) Cash-Machine Magician
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4) Cheaper Electronics Makes it a Snap to Snoop
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5) Los Alamos Nuclear Facility Security Boost
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$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
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TITLE: "They sure can talk in Raleigh"
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FROM: The Chicago Tribune (Tempo Section)
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DATE: July 21, 1987 (Wednesday)
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"What is that?" Kathy Riedy asked her husband, John, as he entered the
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family home in Raleigh, N.C., the other day with a box under his arm.
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"It's the phone bill," he said, and before she had a chance to let that
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register, he opened the box. Inside was one long-distance phone bill from
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Sprint- all 729 pages of it, all 3 pounds, 13.5 ounces of it- for
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$24,129.99. The Riedys' Sprint bill usually runs about $5 a month. But in
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June, according to the statement, he had been on the long-distance line for
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10,731 minutes, or 72 days and 51 minutes. Examining the statement in
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detail, Riedy discovered that most of the calls had been made over a
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three-day period, June 15-17. Not even as teenagers, so far as they could
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recall, had either of the Riedys spent 72 days on the phone in a month, let
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alone three days. Riedy had been ready for something like this. He received a notice that his calling card would be
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revoked because of excessive use. Evidently phone companies get
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suspicious when a single residential customer suddenly runs up a monthly
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bill in five figures.
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Puzzled by the notice, Riedy tried several times to call Sprint, he
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said, but the lines were always busy. "We had some fun with it," says Kathy
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Riedy. "Our 22-year-old son is here for the summer. So we asked him if he would
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look at the phone bill and tell us which calls were his. Then we handed
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him the box." The bills showed that Riedy had made $3.27 worth of
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long-distance calls from Raleigh in June. The rest were dialed in
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Minneapolis, Indianapolis and Chicago, about 1,500 of them all together, including calls to
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California, New York, Colorado and Texas. "We were never worried," says
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Kathy Riedy. "It's easy to prove you didn't make $24,000 worth of calls,"
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she explained, "but imagine the trouble we would have had if the bill
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had been for $200."
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---- Clarence Petersen ----
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$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
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NOTA (Notes On the Article):
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T of code abuse. There are some important
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details that should be remembered:
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"received a notice that his calling card would be revoked because of
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excessive use"- The LDC computer detected excessive use of the code.
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"phone companies get suspicious when a single residential customer suddenly
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runs up a monthly bill in five figures"- This is the main reason why
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LD Companies (LDC's) cancel codes.
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"dialed in Minneapolis, Indianapolis and Chicago, about 1,500 of them all
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together, including calls to California, New York, Colorado and
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Texas"- This makes it very likely that the code was hacked out and then passed
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to different phreak bulletin boards. That would be a logical reason why the
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calls were placed from different states.
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$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
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TITLE: "Teaching Computer Ethics in the Schools"
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FROM: Education Digest
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DATE: February 1987
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Changing the Attitudes of "Hackers" by William Weintraub
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Several outstanding problems with computer use must be addressed by any
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responsible school district: copyright violations, unauthorized entry into
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computers and phone fraud. John Rogers, a security agent for Bell Atlantic,
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says, "75 % of computer phone fraud is committed by people under 25....the
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rest is often committed by adults using the children as vehicles for the
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crime."
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Schools that teach computer literacy and don't teach the
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ethical/legal use of computers are doing a disservice to their students.
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The FBI has taken a serious approach to computer crime, many agents focusing on
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nothing but this type of fraud. FBI Special Agent Larry Hurst says,
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"Teaching kids about computers without teaching the ethical use and rules is
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like giving a child a car and not teaching him the rules of the road."
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One of the reasons schools have been slow to react to this type of crime is
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that it usually involves students who ordinarily do not get into troulbe and
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who justify their acts by saying, "I really didn't hurt anyone." As Rogers
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states, "Many of the people involved are not the kind who would ever
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consider stealing from anyone in a physical manner." They are often of
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above-average intelligence, considered trustworthy, and just trying to "beat
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the system." However it isn't a victimless crime. In 1984, in New York
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City alone, $70 million in phone and computer fraud occurred. This charge is
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passed right on to the customer. After a NEWSWEEK reporter wrote an article on
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people who invade computer systems without authorization some of these
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so-called "hackers" invaded a national credit history computer and destroyed
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the financial history of the writer of the article. They charged thousands of
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dollars to his account numbers, shut off his utilities, and sent him death
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threats from across the nation. Computer fraud is not a victimless
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crime.
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$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
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NOTA:
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Here are some thing that will help clear up this article:
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"a NEWSWEEK reporter wrote an article on people who invade computeorization"- The person they are talking about is Richard "Revenge
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of Hackers" Sandza.
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"invaded a national credit history computer and destroyed the financial
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history of the writer of the article"- This refers to someone on Pirate-80
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getting into TRW and posting Richard Sandza's credit-card numbers.
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$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
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TITLE: "Cash-Machine Magician"
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FROM: US News & World Report
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DATE: Unknown
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Automated bank-teller machines can be maddening devices, but there is one
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thing they supposedly do will: protect customers' accounts. Not always
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apparently. Police are looking hard for Robert Post, 35, a Polish-born
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electronics expert and former ATM repairman who brags that he is something of
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a magician. According to the secret service, Post last year managed to make
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some $86,000 disappear from cash machines-all from other people's bank
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accounts. Post allegedly worked his legerdemain with blank white plastic
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cards and a small magnetic encoding machine that he bought for $1,800. By
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peering over customers' shoulders and retrieving their discarded banking
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receipts, he obtained the personal ID and bank account numbers need to
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activate the computerized tellers.
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Using the encoding machine, he embellished his plastic with strips of
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magnetic tap bearing digital codes almost identical to those on the
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defrauded customers' cards. Eventually,
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though, a recurring flaw in Post's codes was picked up by the bank's
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computer. Post skipped out on a $25,000 bail in Manhattan. He is still
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at large.
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$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
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NOTA:
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I found this article very interesting. The most important piece was the part
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about the magnetic encoding machine. ATM fraud is definitely the crime of
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the future. The magnetic encoding machine most likely encoded the cards
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with the customers' PIN.
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"a recurring flaw in Post's codes was picked up by the computer"- Was
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something really wrong with his method or did the customers just report the
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things that were wrong with their accounts?
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After making $86,000 from ATM's, I don't think that Mr. Post will be
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turning himself in.
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$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
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TITLE: "Cheaper Electronics Makes it a Snap to Snoop"
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FROM: US News & World Report (Business Section)
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DATE: May 18, 1987
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In the old-tech days, a wiretap had to be hooked up directly to the phone
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line, leaving a physical trace of tampering. Newer devices are impossible
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to detect. Take long-distance phone calls. At least part of their trip
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usually takes place over micro wave-relay links, pairs of dish-shaped
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antennas on hilltops about 30 miles apart. Anyone in the path of these kind
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of microwave beams with the right kind of radio receiver can pick up calls
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loud and clear. To find frequencies serving two particluar phones and
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eavesdropper might have accomplices place a brief call between those phones
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and send a distintive tracer signal over the line. A microcomputer could
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then channels and switch on a recorder when it detected
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the the dialing code. International calls, which are often beamed up by
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satellites, can be intercepted with a satellite dish anywhere within hundreds
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of miles of a ground station.
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To protect its own secrets, the US government uses only buried telephone
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lines and fiber-optic cables for most of its most sensitive communications.
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Scramblers and other devices encrypt all classified telephone calls, telexed
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messages and computer data sent over phone lines. And, under a program
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code-named TEMPEST, computer equipment used for classified work is tightly
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shielded to prevent electronic leaks.
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Until recently, bulk and expense restricted sophisticated scramblers to
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government agencies that use classified information. Their file-cabinet size
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and $60,000-plus price tag had put them out of the reach of paper-clip
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manufactureres worried mostly about keeping the wraps on next month's
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production figures. Microchip technology has now cut the costs to
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about $20,000, however, and at lease one manufacturer E-Systems- a Dallas-
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based defense contractor- is beginning to promote the equipment for sale to
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private companies.
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TEMPEST equipment, required for defense contractors who handle
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classified data, is being adopted by others as well. Chase Manhattan, the
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third-largest bank in the US, is planning to include electronic
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shielding in new office construction. Encrypting computer data sent over
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telephone lines has been more widely accepted by industry, especially banks,
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though most bank managers refuse to believe that something dire can
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happen to them. "They say, 'A spy would have to pick out that one little wire
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that has our stuff on it,'" says Bob Meadows, former assistant director for
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security and risk management at American Bankers Association. That's
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one reason why most ATM's, and many electronic funds transfers, are still
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unencryped. In addition, confustion has arisen over a uniform coding standard,
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needed so that everyone speaks the same encrypted language. The federal
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government has been trying to introduce a new, more secure standard to replace
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one already adopted by many banks. The banks have balked at the new code
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because of classification restrictions that forbid its use outside of the US.
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$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
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NOTA:
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This article explained many different types of telecommunications security.
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Operation TEMPEST was mentioned and so was other news on government security.
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One of the main things that was emphasized was the picking up of radio
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waves to monitor both calls and transmissions from computer equipment.
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Only certain portions of the article were typed up (the interesting parts.)
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$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
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TITLE: Los Alamos Nuclear Facility Security Boost
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FROM: -------
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DATE: September 7, 1987
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LAB UPGRADES RADIO SECURITY
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Concerned about illegal interception of computer-emitted radio signals, the US
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Departmened security systems at the Los Alamos
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National Laboratory. An article by the lab's security division says recently
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security personnel at the lab went outdoors and used radios to detect
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computer information leaks, finding that computer and communication systems
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data inside could be detected by spy radios in a nearby parking lot.
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DOE spokesman Dave Jackson told The Associated Press, "We had our own
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people go out there with sophisticated equipment to detect this."
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First to call attention to the problem was an article published in PanorAma, a
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monthly for employees of Pan Am World Services, which has about 1,600
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employees at the lab.
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--Charles Bowen
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$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
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NOTA:
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This is just a report on more security at military installations because of
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Operation TEMPEST.
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