8167 lines
385 KiB
Plaintext
8167 lines
385 KiB
Plaintext
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==Phrack Inc.==
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Volume Three, Issue Thirty-five, File 1 of 13
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Issue XXXV Index
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__________________
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P H R A C K 3 5
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November 17,1991
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__________________
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~Don't Tread on Me!~
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Phrack Inc. is going great! In fact so great that we already have enough
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material for the next two issues including the long-awaited sequel to Phrack 13
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(the infamous joke issue released on April 1, 1987), Diet Phrack! That issue
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which will be number 36 is scheduled for release next month and will mark the
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end of Volume 3. If you have anything that is somewhat humorous, send it over
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to us at Phrack as soon as possible so we can include it.
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Phrack Inc. celebrates its sixth birthday with the release of this issue.
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Exactly six years ago, sitting in front of an IBM PC known as Metal Shop
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Private, were Taran King and Knight Lightning releasing a soon to be famous
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publication called Phrack Inc. That first issue wasn't much, a small
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collection of eight files sent across the country to bulletin boards at 1200
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baud. Six years is quite a long time in the hacker underground. Today we send
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Phrack to thousands of people at hundreds of Internet sites spanning the entire
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world. Phrack has become more than a magazine, it truly is an institution.
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Long Live Phrack!
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Pay close attention to Phrack World News this issue for details on HoHo/
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XMAScon and many other stories with serious ramifications to our way of life.
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Special thanks to Twisted Pair (for the help in a jam), Amadeus, The
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Butler, and Black Kat for the great files. Thanks to the Great Gatsby, just
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because he is cool. It's people like you that keeps this magazine comming out
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so frequently.
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This month we have had a ton of letters for Phrack Loopback. If your
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letter or question did not appear, we are sorry that it has to wait one more
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issue! The last issue really got some administrators (or wanna-be admins)
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steamed at us. Check out Phrack Loopback and PWN Quicknotes for details.
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Your Editors,
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Crimson Death and Dispater
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phrack@stormking.com
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Submissions: phrack@stormking.com
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FTP Distribution: cs.widener.edu or eff.org
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______________________________________________________________________________
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Phrack XXXV Table of Contents
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=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
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1. Introduction to Phrack 34 by Crimson Death and Dispater
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2. Phrack Loopback by Phrack Staff
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3. Phrack Profile of Chris Goggans by S. Leonard Spitz
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4. Telenet/Sprintnet's PC Pursuit Outdial Directory by Amadeus
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5. Sting Operations by Sovereign Immunity
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6. Social Security Numbers & Privacy by Chris Hibbert of CPSR
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7. Users Guide to VAX/VMS Part 1 of 3 by Black Kat
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8. A Beginners Guide to Novell Netware 386 by The Butler
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9. Auto-Answer It by Twisted Pair
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10. PWN/Part 1 by Dispater
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11. PWN/Part 2 by Dispater
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12. PWN/Part 3 by Dispater
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13. PWN/Part 4 by Dispater
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______________________________________________________________________________
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==Phrack Inc.==
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Volume Three, Issue Thirty-five, File 2 of 13
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[-=:< Phrack Loopback >:=-]
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By Phrack Staff
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Phrack Loopback is a forum for you, the reader, to ask questions, air
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problems, and talk about what ever topic you would like to discuss. This is
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also the place The Phrack Staff will make suggestions to you by reviewing
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various items of note; magazines, software, catalogs, hardware, etc.
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______________________________________________________________________________
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What's on Your Mind
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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:: Hacking VMB's ::
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From: Mr. Upsetter
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To: phracksub@stormking.com
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Subject: Phrack 34 VMB article
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The article in Phrack 34 on voice mail hacking by Night Ranger was really good.
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It reminded me of some experiences I had with a cellular voice mail system a
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couple years ago in San Diego. I would bet there are similar systems in other
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cities.
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These VMB's would automatically answer calls when the subscriber wasn't on the
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air. They worked just like standard VMB's. To access the box, the owner could
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dial his or her own cellular number, then hit * when it answered. Then the VMB
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would ask for a password.
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Guess what the default password was? None! That meant all you had to do was
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dial up a cellular VMB and hit *, and you were in. How many VMB's still had
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the default password? About half...
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To scan for cellular VMB's all you had to do was dial numbers in the cellular
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prefix. It was pretty fun...almost too easy.
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Cheers,
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Mr. Upsetter
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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>From: Zoso Puda
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>
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>After reading PHRACK 34 I thought it was good. Especially the article on VMB
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>hacking. As a matter of fact I wrote a SALT script to help me do it.
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This is exactly what we like to see. People actually getting basic
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information and building on it.
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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+-------------------------------------+
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| ZoSoft Telix VMB Hacker |
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| |
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| written by: Zoso Puda |
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+-------------------------------------+
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First words
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-----------
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After reading Night Ranger's article (see PHRACK 34), I decided to make a
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VMB hacking program. Night Ranger provided good insight into how to hack VMB
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systems but some VMBs are hard to crack. What I came up with is a program to
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help me hack some of the harder systems. The ones that don't use the defaults
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are tough. Also my phone has the buttons and earpiece in one unit and I had to
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dial then put the phone to my ear and listen, look at the buttons to dial a
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number and put the phone back to my ear to listen. It soon became tiresome.
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What I finally came up with was a program to let me run all the phone
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functions from the keyboard. My modem speaker is loud enough to hear clearly so
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it seemed like the perfect thing to do. I also automated certain features like
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incrementing the password or box number. The program is not fully automated
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however. You must run this program manually. It's main purpose is to allow you
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to run normal phone functions via the keyboard. If you cannot hear clearly
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through your modem speaker then pick up the phone after the program dials the
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VMB phone # and hang up the phone before hanging up the modem.
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What follows is a brief description on how to use the program, compile the
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program, and run the program. A working knowledge of VMB systems is expected.
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Parameter details
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-----------------
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VMB phone number : If you don't know this, give it up.
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Setup sequence : This code is used for systems that require a '9' or '#' or
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'*' to be pressed before the box number. Up to 3 characters
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can be in this string.
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Valid Box # : This would be a known valid box or the box you will
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be attempting to hack. This value remains constant.
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Codefile filename: You may use a file to get 'default' or your favorite
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passwords from. You must include the extension.
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Starting box/code: Box # or code to start checking. This value will
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increase automatically upon pressing [F7].
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Using the function keys
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-----------------------
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[F1] Dials the VMB system (see params).
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[F2] Hangs-up the modem.
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[F3] Closes the current codefile.(see params).
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[F4] Lets you set the current code/box #.
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[F5] Dials the Setup sequence (see params).
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[F6] Dials the current code.
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[F7] Makes the next code current.
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[F8] Dials the valid box (see params).
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[F9] Allows you to re-set the parameters.
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[F10] Hangs-up and quits the program.
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[0 - 9] These keys will dial 0 - 9 respectively.
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[*, #] These keys will dial * and #.
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[/] Used as a substitute # for the keypad.
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Basic Insructions
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-----------------
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Codefiles should be stored in the same directory as your Telix program.
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A sample codefile should look like this:
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1111
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2222
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3333
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etc...
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I suggest you make seperate codefiles for the number of digits in each code.
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For example, all 3 digit codes should be in a file called 3DIGIT.COD, or
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something similar.
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During parameter entry, if you enter a codefile and it exists, you will NOT
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be prompted for a 'Starting box/code'. When the codefile is finished, the
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current code will set itself to 1000.
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If you enter a blank for the codefile or the name you entered doesn't exist
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then you will be prompted for a 'Starting Box/Code'.
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Compiling
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---------
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Save the program within the 'CUT HERE' lines as VMBHACK.SLT. Copy the file
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VMBHACK.SLT into the directory where your Telix scripts are. Compile using
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CS.EXE. (example: CS VMBHACK.SLT) To run the program, load Telix and press
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Alt-G followed by the program name (VMBHACK).
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//---------------------------<CUT HERE>-------------------------------------
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// ZoSoft VMB Hacker Version 1.4
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// Code by: Zoso, November 1991
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//
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// See PHRACK 34 for more information on VMB systems.
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//
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// NOTE: Do not remove the credits of the original author, modified versions
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// you may add credits, but please do not remove any.
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//
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str code[10], // Global Variables
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codes[10],
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reset[1],
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vmb_number[15],
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borc[1],
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valid[10],
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setup[3];
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str filename[12],
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fstatus[10];
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int f;
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int fflag = 0;
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init_modem() // Modem initialization
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{
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cputs("AT X3 S6=0 S7=0 S11=105 M1 L3"); // X must be 3, L is Loudness on
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cputs("^M"); // some modems, you may have to
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waitfor("OK",20); // alter this. See you modem
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manual.
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}
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vmb_dial(str string) // Dial function
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{
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str workstr[20];
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workstr = string;
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strcat(workstr,";");
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cputs("ATDT");
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cputs(workstr);
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cputs("^M");
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cputs("^M");
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}
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hang_up() // Hang Up function
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{
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hangup();
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waitfor("",20);
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cputs("ATH0");
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cputs("^M");
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cputs("^M");
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clear_scr();
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display();
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}
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next_code() // Next code function
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{
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int cd;
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if (fflag)
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{
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if (not feof(f)) // Check for file first
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{
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fgets(code,10,f);
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return;
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}
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if (feof(f))
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{
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file_close();
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code = "999";
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goto NEXTCODE;
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}
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}
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NEXTCODE:
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cd = stoi(code);
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cd = cd + 1; // This line determines how the
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code
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itos(cd,code); // gets incremented.
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}
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set_code() // Enter new code
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{
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gotoxy(65,2);
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gets(code,10);
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}
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parameters() // Set parameters
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{
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str c[1];
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file_close();
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GETINFO:
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clear_scr();
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printsc("VMB Hacker Parameters^M^J");
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printsc("^M^JVMB phone number :");
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gets(vmb_number,15);
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printsc("^M^JSetup sequence :");
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gets(setup,3);
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printsc("^M^JValid box # :");
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gets(valid,10);
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printsc("^M^JCodefile filename :");
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gets(filename,12);
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if (filename != "")
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{
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open_file();
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next_code();
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}
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if (not fflag)
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{
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filename = "N/A";
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printsc("^M^JStarting box/code :");
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gets(code,10);
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}
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printsc("^M^J^M^JCorrect? (Y/n):");
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gets(c,1);
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if (c == "n" || c == "N")
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goto GETINFO;
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}
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press_enter() // Pause routine
|
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{
|
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str a[1];
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pstraxy("Press [ENTER] to continue...",20,23,11);
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gets(a,1);
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}
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title_scr() // Title screen
|
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{
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str i[1];
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TITLE:
|
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clear_scr();
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pstraxy(" - ZoSoft VMB Hacker V1.4 -",20,4,11);
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pstraxy("written for Telix by: Zoso Puda",20,6,14);
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press_enter();
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}
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display() // Display screen
|
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{
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box(0,0,78,3,4,0,19); box(0,0,78,5,4,0,19);
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pstraxy("[ ZoSoft VMB Hacker V1.4 ]",25,0,31);
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pstraxy("VMB Number:",4,2,31); // Information display
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pstraxy(vmb_number,16,2,27);
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pstraxy("Valid #:",33,2,31);
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pstraxy(valid,42,2,27);
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pstraxy("Current:",57,2,31);
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pstraxy(code,66,2,27);
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pstraxy("Codefile:",6,4,31);
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pstraxy(filename,16,4,27);
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pstraxy("File status:",29,4,31);
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pstraxy(fstatus,42,4,27);
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pstraxy("Setup sequence:",50,4,31);
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pstraxy(setup,66,4,27);
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box(0,6,78,10,4,0,103); // Function key display
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pstraxy("[ ]",30,6,111);
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pstraxy(" 0 - 9,*,#",31,6,110);
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pstraxy("[ ] Dial VMB", 2,7,111);
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pstraxy("F1", 3,7,110);
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pstraxy("[ ] Hang up",22,7,111);
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pstraxy("F2",23,7,110);
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pstraxy("[ ] Close file",42,7,111);
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pstraxy("F3",43,7,110);
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pstraxy("[ ] Set Current",61,7,111);
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pstraxy("F4",62,7,110);
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pstraxy("[ ] Setup seq.",2,8,111);
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pstraxy("F5", 3,8,110);
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pstraxy("[ ] Dial current",22,8,111);
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pstraxy("F6",23,8,110);
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pstraxy("[ ] Next box/code",42,8,111);
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pstraxy("F7",43,8,110);
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pstraxy("[ ] Valid box",61,8,111);
|
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pstraxy("F8",62,8,110);
|
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pstraxy("[ ] Parameters",22,9,111);
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pstraxy("F9",23,9,110);
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pstraxy("[ ] QUIT",41,9,111);
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pstraxy("F10",42,9,110);
|
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gotoxy(0,11);
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}
|
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quit_vmb() // End program
|
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{
|
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file_close();
|
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hangup();
|
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waitfor("",20);
|
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clear_scr();
|
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printsc("Thanks for using ZoSoft's VMB Hacker.^M^J^M^J");
|
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cputs_tr(_mdm_init_str); // Restore modem params
|
|
}
|
|
open_file() // Open Codefile
|
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{
|
|
fflag = 1;
|
|
f = fopen(filename,"r");
|
|
fstatus = "OPEN";
|
|
if (ferror(f))
|
|
file_close();
|
|
}
|
|
file_close() // Close Codefile
|
|
{
|
|
fflag = 0;
|
|
fclose(f);
|
|
fstatus = "CLOSED";
|
|
}
|
|
main() // MAIN program module
|
|
{
|
|
int chr;
|
|
title_scr();
|
|
parameters();
|
|
clear_scr();
|
|
display();
|
|
init_modem();
|
|
TOP:
|
|
gotoxy(0,11);
|
|
chr = inkeyw();
|
|
if (chr == '0') vmb_dial("0"); // Dial 0-9
|
|
if (chr == '1') vmb_dial("1");
|
|
if (chr == '2') vmb_dial("2");
|
|
if (chr == '3') vmb_dial("3");
|
|
if (chr == '4') vmb_dial("4");
|
|
if (chr == '5') vmb_dial("5");
|
|
if (chr == '6') vmb_dial("6");
|
|
if (chr == '7') vmb_dial("7");
|
|
if (chr == '8') vmb_dial("8");
|
|
if (chr == '9') vmb_dial("9");
|
|
if (chr == '#') vmb_dial("#"); // Pound sign (#)
|
|
if (chr == '/') vmb_dial("#"); // Make (/) same as (#) for keypad
|
|
if (chr == '*') vmb_dial("*"); // Asterisk (*)
|
|
if (chr == 15104) // F1
|
|
vmb_dial(vmb_number);
|
|
if (chr == 15360) // F2
|
|
hang_up();
|
|
if (chr == 15616) // F3
|
|
{
|
|
file_close();
|
|
display();
|
|
}
|
|
if (chr == 15872) // F4
|
|
{
|
|
set_code();
|
|
display();
|
|
}
|
|
if (chr == 16128) // F5
|
|
vmb_dial(setup);
|
|
if (chr == 16384) // F6
|
|
vmb_dial(code);
|
|
if (chr == 16640) // F7
|
|
{
|
|
next_code();
|
|
display();
|
|
}
|
|
if (chr == 16896) // F8
|
|
vmb_dial(valid);
|
|
if (chr == 17152) // F9
|
|
{
|
|
hang_up();
|
|
parameters();
|
|
display();
|
|
}
|
|
if (chr == 17408) // F10
|
|
{
|
|
quit_vmb();
|
|
goto END;
|
|
}
|
|
goto TOP;
|
|
END:
|
|
prints("^M^J");
|
|
}
|
|
//---------------------------<CUT HERE>---------------------
|
|
|
|
______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
:: More Legal Stuff ::
|
|
|
|
>From: "Michael Lawrie, Operations" <MICHAEL@hicom.loughborough.ac.uk>
|
|
>Subject: RE: Who/What is this?
|
|
>
|
|
>In this country, the receipt of documents like this would probably be
|
|
>pretty helpful in sending a person down on a conspiracy to contravene
|
|
>a section or more of the Computer Misuse Act, I do not appreciate crap
|
|
>like this appearing on my machine but since you didn't send it me, I
|
|
>can't really moan at you - What I would appreciate though is if you
|
|
>told people that forwarding it to people who don't want it is probably
|
|
>not a good idea, unless you want all your list members locked up in
|
|
>some pokey British gaol that is!
|
|
>
|
|
>Michael Lawrie.
|
|
>---
|
|
>Michael Lawrie, Hicom Group Security <security@uk.ac.lut.hicom>
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
Sir,
|
|
You will have to excuse my ignorance of telecom laws in other countries.
|
|
In the United States, distribution of technical information such as Phrack Inc.
|
|
is protected by law.
|
|
|
|
Hackers are not involved in conspiracies or plots. Most hackers could
|
|
care less about politics. Hackers are interested in the progression of
|
|
technology and learning about how our advanced society works. The inefficient
|
|
structure known as government is the last thing most hackers are interested in
|
|
exploring.
|
|
|
|
Phrack Inc. has no "membership." Phrack Inc. is an electronically
|
|
distributed publication. It is like any other security oriented newsletter.
|
|
Have you ever heard of "Computer Security Journal", "Computers and Security",
|
|
or "Computer Crime Digest?" These are some of the "security industry"
|
|
publications that are read in the U.S. Phrack Inc. merely has a little
|
|
different flavor to it. If you are interested in seeing any of these printed
|
|
journals, I can forward their address to you.
|
|
|
|
I am sorry if you received Phrack Inc. and didn't wish to read it. You
|
|
might wish to take the matter up with the person that forwarded it to you. I
|
|
hope it wasn't too big of an inconvenience for you to delete the mail message
|
|
containing Phrack Inc.
|
|
|
|
Cheers,
|
|
|
|
Dispater
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
After a (as it turns out not so private) conversation with Torq, it seems
|
|
this guy isn't even an admin anywhere. He just likes to pretend he is. Did my
|
|
reply end this little debate? NOT! This person had the nerve to intercept my
|
|
private mail to Torq and then proceeded to bitch about it some more.
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
>From MICHAEL@hicom.loughborough.ac.uk Sat Nov 9 09:45:53 1991
|
|
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 91 13:19 GMT
|
|
From: "Michael Lawrie, Operations" <MICHAEL@hicom.loughborough.ac.uk>
|
|
To: PHRACKSUB <<@nsfnet-relay.ac.uk:PHRACKSUB@STORMKING.com>>
|
|
Subject: The EFF.
|
|
|
|
I found the following message the other day, whilst routing around, I am to
|
|
assume you lied to me about taking him off the list but for now we'll forget
|
|
that.
|
|
|
|
> From phrack@gnu.ai.mit.edu Wed Oct 23 01:41:51 1991
|
|
> Date: Wed, 23 Oct 91 01:41:47 -0400
|
|
> From: phracksub@stormking.com
|
|
> Message-Id: <::::::::::::::::::::::>
|
|
> To: torq@:::::::::::::::
|
|
> Subject: Phrack
|
|
>
|
|
> This guy sounds like a total idiot. If he does kill your account or something
|
|
> stupid, get a hold of the EFF. They went to bat for someone who had their
|
|
> account revoked because he/she had issues of Phrack on their directory.
|
|
>
|
|
> people should get a clue....
|
|
>
|
|
> Dispater
|
|
> phracksub@stormking.com
|
|
|
|
As you say, people should get a clue. Are you assuming that 'torq' is perhaps
|
|
American and as such has his rights protected by constitution? He isn't, he is
|
|
British and doesn't really as such have much going for him. If I want to kill
|
|
his account I can do it at the bat of an eyelid, whilst him receiving 'Phrack'
|
|
is not breaking any laws because it does not show intent, it would be breaking
|
|
my machine's regulations if it came here. I would enjoy the EFF to come 'to
|
|
bat' for Torq if I revoke his account for having issues of Phrack in his
|
|
directory, Its a shame he hasn't. Does the EFF have any good lawyers in the UK
|
|
that you know of?
|
|
|
|
Regards...
|
|
Michael.
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
Michael Lawrie, Operations Group, Systems Development and Security.
|
|
Mail: michael@uk.ac.lut.hicom (Span:19527::60478::lorry)
|
|
[What pretentious signature?] (Inet: lorry@mit.edu)
|
|
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
From: Dispater
|
|
To: MICHAEL@hicom.loughborough.ac.uk
|
|
|
|
I never said I would delete him from the distribution list. I don't
|
|
have to DO anything. Who the hell are you pretending to be anyway? You aren't
|
|
the admin of MIT's gnu machine.
|
|
|
|
>I found the following message the other day, whilst routing around, I am to
|
|
>assume you lied to me about taking him off the list but for now we'll forget
|
|
>that.
|
|
|
|
Really? What the hell were you doing prowling though someone else's
|
|
mail? I assume you did it without Torq's permission. I wonder if MIT would
|
|
like to hear that some British hacker is rummaging around their machine? Your
|
|
"finding" of our private e-mail might place you in criminal violation of the
|
|
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986. This is a federal law in the
|
|
United States which protects the privacy of electronic communications. Your
|
|
interception of our communications has violated our privacy. How would you
|
|
like me to have a little chat with YOUR supervisor?
|
|
|
|
Why you care about what takes place on the MIT computer which is located
|
|
here in the USA? In this country freedom of speech is a right granted to all
|
|
its citizens. The previous publisher of Phrack had to go to Federal Court to
|
|
prove it and he succeeded. Phrack Inc. is 100% legal here and there is not one
|
|
damn thing you can do about it!
|
|
|
|
Dispater
|
|
______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
:: Hacker Philosophy ::
|
|
|
|
From: The Dark Lord Sarik Malthus
|
|
Organization: Underground Computing Foundation
|
|
|
|
|
|
> I'm curious...now, don't think I am trying to judge you, or your
|
|
> actions, or anything...but I am wondering how you, in your mind, justify the
|
|
> actions of hackers and the kind of information provided by your magazine?
|
|
|
|
I don't. I think people spend too much time attempting to justify
|
|
their "morality." I don't play that guilt trip. I only seek information.
|
|
Information has no morality. It is simple and pure, just like truth.
|
|
|
|
I do feel that with knowledge comes responsibility not to use it in a
|
|
destructive way. This is why I will not print "how to make bomb" files in
|
|
Phrack Inc. Explosives are made for one thing and it doesn't involve too
|
|
much creativity. People can get that type of stuff elsewhere.
|
|
|
|
I have never damaged any system or hurt any individual financially.
|
|
Carding is unquestionable robbery. If you know the person you are carding
|
|
from, that is revenge and is a different category, as far as I am concerned,
|
|
but it still doesn't make it right. Besides, any poser with half a brain can
|
|
pull a CBI. That doesn't demonstrate much talent to me. I admit I went
|
|
through the c0deZ phase, but I moved onto better things.
|
|
|
|
I guess your basic question may boil down to, "Why hack?" I see the
|
|
internet and the telecom world in as the latest frontier to be explored. If
|
|
you look back at how this country started, you will see that it was explored
|
|
by people who probably had a similar mentality to that of hackers. We want
|
|
to test ourselves. We want to have a broad range of different experiences in
|
|
our lives. We are not content with ignorance of the unknown. And, to some
|
|
extent we are sick of our current society's norms. With that in mind we
|
|
leave the security of what is considered acceptable at times.
|
|
|
|
I guess I have a lot of different unpopular views....oh well.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
A Review of:
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Full Disclosure #23 - a publication For Truth, Justice, and The American Way
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Full Disclosure Subscription Rates:
|
|
P.O. Box 903-FD23 U.S - 12 issues for $18.00
|
|
Libertyville IL 60048 24 issues for $29.95
|
|
No Canadian orders, please!
|
|
by:Twisted Pair
|
|
|
|
|
|
About a month ago I mailed in a coupon I got from friend in order to get a
|
|
sample issue of Full Disclosure. Within a week I received Issue #23. It's got
|
|
articles on fax interception, dumpster diving, computer security tips,
|
|
surveillance tips, technical stuff, mail surveillance, etc.
|
|
|
|
The Fax Interception article was most interesting to me. I've often
|
|
wondered just how easy it could be to intercept faxes. Its all explained in
|
|
the article. Here's some text from the article:
|
|
|
|
| False Sense of Security:
|
|
|
|
|
| With the widespread proliferation of fax machines came increased use.
|
|
| In general, a document transferred has been given the same sort of
|
|
| validity as one sent or received by the U.S. Mail.* In general, such
|
|
| communications were originally secure. Now that interception equipment is
|
|
| available, the
|
|
| sense of security has become false.
|
|
|
|
*Note: Just this month, the FCC has stopped accepting paperwork with faxed
|
|
signatures on them. Their new policy states that they only accept
|
|
original signatures.
|
|
|
|
How could the average Phrack reader start intercepting faxes? Use a
|
|
standard fax machine hooked up to someone's line? Naaah. Wouldn't work. The
|
|
handshaking routine between the two corresponding fax machines would be screwed
|
|
all to hell if you threw a third machine into the mix. Full Disclosure claims
|
|
to have successfully nabbed faxes with another method. They've pointed out
|
|
this assertion with a photo on their front page of a "fax". It was supposedly
|
|
intercepted from the FBI. It shows a computer screen with an FBI "FAX" on it.
|
|
It looks more like the photo was made with some cutting and pasting at the
|
|
neighborhood PIP store. Maybe they should have added the caption "Simulated
|
|
Picture" to their front page.
|
|
|
|
They recommend using IBM PC fax boards to intercept faxes. You'd need
|
|
"sophisticated" software that would ignore the handshaking sequences between
|
|
the two fax machines you're spying on. The IBM would just save all the page
|
|
information and ignore the protocol information transmitted.
|
|
|
|
Back to the article....
|
|
|
|
| Cellular phone-based fax machines provide ripe opportunity for "hacker"
|
|
| intercepts, since the signal is available via low cost police scanners.*
|
|
| No physical connection to a common carrier network is necessary. There is
|
|
| absolutely no risk of being detected.
|
|
|
|
*Note: That should read MODIFIED police scanners. See any of the ads in
|
|
"Nuts & Volts" for a book on doing this.
|
|
|
|
Discussed in the article is something called Broadband Interception.
|
|
Commercial fax interception equipment can be hooked up to monitor satellite
|
|
link traffic. One unit can decode up to 150 simultaneous fax transmissions
|
|
from a 6,000 phone line satellite link.
|
|
|
|
Next, all the consequences of forged faxes are discussed. People have
|
|
become so reliant on fax technology that they incorrectly assume that anything
|
|
that "comes over the fax" must be legitimate. Forgers find faxing much simpler
|
|
than trying to make a "real" document. The trouble of altering postmarks and
|
|
signatures is bypassed. All they need now is scissors and tape to make any
|
|
"legitimate-looking" document needed. In their next issue, they further
|
|
discuss fax interception and all the implications of sending sensitive info by
|
|
fax.
|
|
|
|
| Fax Intercept Suppliers
|
|
| (The sale and/or use of fax interception equipment may be
|
|
| restricted by State and Federal law)
|
|
|
|
|
| Burlex International, Box 6094, Silver Springs MD 20906 (301) 460-4444;
|
|
| Communications Devices,3510 Mountain Rd,Haymarket VA 22069 (703) 754-9316;
|
|
| El-Tec Intl, 205 Van Buren St #220, Herndon VA 22080 (703) 709-9673;
|
|
| [Many others listed]
|
|
|
|
Oh, here's an ad from Full Disclosure. It's a business card run:
|
|
______________________________________________________
|
|
| | |
|
|
| | Unix Systems Specialists Available July 10, 1992 |
|
|
| | |
|
|
| | L E N R O S E |
|
|
| | |
|
|
| | Convicted "Hacker" |
|
|
| | and |
|
|
| | Computer Consultant |
|
|
| | 799 Royal St. Geore #105 |
|
|
| | Naperville, IL 60563 (708) 527-1293 |
|
|
| |______________________________________________________|
|
|
|
|
Since you might want to check out a copy of Full Disclosure for yourself,
|
|
I'll include their address and stuff. The issue I had was 16 pages long,
|
|
half-newspaper size.
|
|
______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
|
|
A Review of TAP #105
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
TAP Magazine Subscription Rates:
|
|
PO Box 20264 10 issues for $10.00
|
|
Louisville KY 40250-0264
|
|
|
|
by Dispater
|
|
|
|
Around March of 1991 I mailed in my $10. for a subscription to TAP
|
|
Magazine. Promoted as "the oldest hacker magazine" and "created by Abbie
|
|
Hoffman." I still, to this day, have not received ONE issue for my money.
|
|
|
|
While attending CyberView '91, I met Predat0r and gave him $5.00 for a few
|
|
back issues consisting of #97, #100 through issue #104. I was later given a
|
|
complimentary issue of #105. After asking about #98 & #99, Predat0r said that
|
|
he wasn't going to give those out because of some bullshit with Aristotle.
|
|
Whatever...I still don't see why we couldn't see it.
|
|
|
|
Anyway, Issue #105 of TAP Magazine (June 1991) was nothing spectacular,
|
|
but it wasn't bad either. The issue was 18 pages long. For those of you who
|
|
have never seen it, TAP contains information on hacking and phreaking as well
|
|
as some political commentary. The articles are always diverse and interesting.
|
|
|
|
TAP #105 contained information about the DNA Box. This is basically
|
|
cellular phone phreaking. It was very good and quite detailed. There were
|
|
also schematics of bugs and a flow chart explaining the incident initiation
|
|
sequence of the E-911 system. This issue of TAP was sprinkled with some neat
|
|
advertisements and news clippings (as usual) and wrapped up with a file about
|
|
Blue Boxing. The price of $10.00 for 10 issues is worth it, but read on...
|
|
|
|
Last week I asked Predat0r what was going on with TAP magazine. He told
|
|
me that he had the material for the next three issues, but his copier or some
|
|
other equipment was broken. This is an excuse I have heard before. Whether it
|
|
is a valid excuse or not, only he knows. Since issue #105 (June) there has
|
|
been not one issue of TAP. If you have ordered a subscription prior to July
|
|
and not received anything, I highly suggest you write to Predat0r.
|
|
|
|
The material contained in TAP is good and very much worth the price.
|
|
(Especially compared to 2600 Magazine) However, I find that the general
|
|
management of TAP to be poor, at this time, and therefore I highly recommend
|
|
that you NOT send your $10 to TAP Magazine. Considering the amount of
|
|
advertisements that we have all seen by TAP (in magazines such as Mondo 2000,
|
|
2600, etc.) in the past year, there is no excuse for the non-existent service
|
|
that has transpired. Predat0r is a good sysop and needs to manage TAP as he
|
|
does his BBS. I do urge you to call BLITZKREIG BBS (502) 499-8933 : NUP:
|
|
COLUMBIAN COKE.
|
|
|
|
I really don't like to be so critical, but I know some people I've talked
|
|
to are feeling ripped off. This is why I wrote this. I truly hope that TAP
|
|
can get out of this slump.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
==Phrack Inc.==
|
|
|
|
Volume Three, Issue Thirty-five, File 3 of 13
|
|
|
|
-*[ P H R A C K XXXV P R O P H I L E ]*-
|
|
|
|
-=>[ Presents ]<=-
|
|
|
|
Sincerely Yours, Chris Goggans
|
|
-===--===--===--===--===--===-
|
|
by S. Leonard Spitz
|
|
Associate Publisher
|
|
INFOSecurity Product News
|
|
|
|
"A provocative interview with a former member of the "Legion of Doom" suggests
|
|
that the ethics of hacking (or cracking) are often in the eye of the beholder."
|
|
|
|
Malicious hackers, even though most operate undercover, are often notorious for
|
|
the colorful pseudonyms they travel under. Reformed hackers, however, prefer a
|
|
low profile so as to shed their image of perceived criminality. Kevin Mitnick,
|
|
infamous for the DEC caper, is one of the foremost advocates of this strategy.
|
|
|
|
Now comes Chris Goggans, trailing his former "Legion of Doom" moniker, Erik
|
|
Bloodaxe, behind him, to try it his way. Goggans insists that where once he
|
|
may have bent the rules, he is now ready to give something back to society.
|
|
And coming across with a high degree of sincerity, he affirms his intention to
|
|
try. Are he and his colleagues, wearing their newly acquired information
|
|
security consultants hats, tilting at windmills, or does their embryonic,
|
|
cracker-breaking start-up, Comsec Data Security Co., stand a fighting chance?
|
|
We thought we would ask him.
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
ISPNews: I am going to ask several legitimate questions. Please answer them
|
|
completely, truthfully, and honestly.
|
|
|
|
Chris Goggans: OK.
|
|
|
|
|
|
JUDGEMENT BY THE MEDIA
|
|
|
|
ISPNews: Would you react to Computerworld's July 29 piece, "Group Dupes
|
|
Security Experts," <also seen in Phrack World News issue 33, part 2
|
|
as part of the article called "Legion of Doom Goes Corporate> in
|
|
which members of your organization were accused of masquerading as
|
|
potential customers to obtain information, proposals, and prices from
|
|
other security consultants?
|
|
|
|
CG: We were all amazed that something like that would ever be printed
|
|
because, as we understand common business practices, we weren't doing
|
|
anything unusual.
|
|
|
|
ISPNews: Computerworld reported that the Legion of Doom was "one of the
|
|
nation's most notorious hacker groups, according to federal law
|
|
enforcers." Can you respond to that?
|
|
|
|
CG: Notorious is a relative term. There has always been a shroud of
|
|
mystery covering the Legion of Doom, because it was an organization
|
|
whose membership was private. When you keep people in the dark about
|
|
the activities of something, there is always going to be the
|
|
perception that more is going on than there really is.
|
|
|
|
ISPNews: Would you say then that the characterization of being notorious is
|
|
unfair?
|
|
|
|
CG: To some degree, yes. There certainly was activity going on within
|
|
the group that could be considered illegal. But most of this was
|
|
taking place when members of the group were all between the ages
|
|
of 14 and 17. While I don't want to blame immaturity, that's
|
|
certainly a factor to be considered.
|
|
|
|
The Legion of Doom put out four <issues of an> on-line electronic
|
|
newsletter <called the Legion of Doom Technical Journals> composed
|
|
of different files relating to various types of computer systems
|
|
or netware. They explained different operating systems or
|
|
outlined different procedures used by networks. They were always
|
|
informative and explained how to use a computer. We never said
|
|
"This is a computer and this is how to break into it."
|
|
|
|
Colorful names and words used to describe groups also add to
|
|
notoriety. If we had been the "Legion of Flower Pickers," the
|
|
"Legion of Good Guys," or the "SuperFriends," there probably
|
|
wouldn't be this dark cloud hanging over the group.
|
|
|
|
ISPNews: Could you be charged with intent to provide information to others
|
|
which would make it easier to gain unauthorized access?
|
|
|
|
CG: I don't see how that could be a charge. There's the first amendment.
|
|
I maintain that talking about something and encouraging or forcing
|
|
someone to do it are completely different.
|
|
|
|
|
|
EARNING AN "A" IN INFOSECURITY
|
|
|
|
ISPNews: What attracted you to computer security?
|
|
|
|
CG: The same thing that would attract anybody to being a hacker. For
|
|
half of my life I've been in front of a computer every day.
|
|
Sometimes from early in the morning until the wee hours of the night.
|
|
And my particular focus has been on computer security.
|
|
|
|
ISPNews: At least the dark side of that coin.
|
|
|
|
CG: I wouldn't say the dark side. I'd say the flip side. If you do
|
|
something for 11 years, you are going to pick up a lot of knowledge.
|
|
And I've always wanted to find some kind of productive career that I
|
|
thoroughly enjoyed. So this was just an obvious progression. No one
|
|
wants to be a 40-year-old hacker living in fear of the Secret
|
|
Service.
|
|
|
|
ISPNews: When you first applied to enter college, did you feel that it was the
|
|
right place to learn about information security?
|
|
|
|
CG: Yes, I thought it was the right place, mainly because college is the
|
|
most obvious choice to pursue an education in any field. I just
|
|
assumed that I would be able to find formal training leading to
|
|
certification or a degree in this field. Yet, at the University of
|
|
Texas, there wasn't anything along those lines.
|
|
|
|
ISPNews: Did you graduate from the University of Texas?
|
|
|
|
CG: No, I changed majors and then moved to Houston. I had started out in
|
|
computer science but it was completely unrelated to any kind of
|
|
career I wanted to pursue. I eventually changed my major to
|
|
journalism. There are only two things I like to do: Work on
|
|
computers, and write. So, if I wasn't going to get a degree in one,
|
|
it was going to be in the other. I'm a semester away, and I do plan
|
|
on finishing.
|
|
|
|
ISPNews: If you were to structure a college curriculum for studies in
|
|
information security, would you design it to focus on technical
|
|
issues, ethics, business issues, or legal matters?
|
|
|
|
CG: I would try to focus on all of these. If you don't have a technical
|
|
background, you can't understand the way the operating system works,
|
|
and you really can't focus on some of the issues that need to be
|
|
addressed with information security.
|
|
|
|
Ethics certainly come into play ass well for obvious reasons. I
|
|
don't think hackers are going to go away. Even with the advent of
|
|
newer technology, there are always going to be people who have an
|
|
interest in that technology and will learn how to manipulate it.
|
|
|
|
|
|
ETHICS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND THE LAW
|
|
|
|
ISPNews: What is your definition of a hacker?
|
|
|
|
CG: A Hacker is someone who wants to find out everything that there is to
|
|
know about the workings of a particular computer system, and will
|
|
exhaust every means within his ability to do so.
|
|
|
|
ISPNews: Would you also comment on the ethics of hacking?
|
|
|
|
CG: There is an unwritten code of ethics that most people tend to adhere
|
|
to. It holds that: no one would ever cause damage to anything; and
|
|
no one would use any information found for personal gain of any kind.
|
|
|
|
For the most part, the only personal gain that I have ever seen from
|
|
any sort of hacking activity is the moderate fame from letting others
|
|
know about a particular deed. And even in these cases, the total
|
|
audience has been limited to just a few hundred.
|
|
|
|
ISPNews: Are you unaware of hackers who have in fact accessed information,
|
|
then sold it or massaged it for money?
|
|
|
|
CG: No, certainly not. I am just acknowledging and defining a code of
|
|
ethics. We of the Legion of Doom tried to adhere to that code of
|
|
ethics. For example, members of the original nine who acted
|
|
unethically were removed from the group.
|
|
|
|
ISPNews: Do you believe that penetrating a computer system without either
|
|
making changes or removing information is ethical, or a least is not
|
|
unethical?
|
|
|
|
CG: At one time in the past I may have held that belief, but now I
|
|
certainly must not, because the whole idea of being involved in the
|
|
formation of my new company, Comsec Data Security, would show
|
|
otherwise.
|
|
|
|
ISPNews: So today, you believe that unauthorized entry is unethical.
|
|
|
|
CG: Exactly. As a hacker, I didn't particularly hold that. But as
|
|
things such as invasion of privacy, even though I never caused any
|
|
damage, and breach of trust became more apparent to me, I was able to
|
|
step back, see the picture, and realize it was wrong.
|
|
|
|
ISPNews: Can I conclude that you are speaking for you company and its
|
|
principals?
|
|
|
|
CG: Yes, I am speaking for all of the principals.
|
|
|
|
ISPNews: What are your views on the ownership of information?
|
|
|
|
CG: I feel that proprietary information, national-security-related
|
|
information, information that could be considered a trade secret, all
|
|
definitely have ownership, and access should be restricted.
|
|
|
|
In the past, I felt that information that affected me or had some
|
|
relevance to my life should be available to me. I felt that
|
|
information should be available to the people it affected, whether
|
|
that be phone company information, credit bureau information, banking
|
|
information, or computer system information in general. I am saying
|
|
this in the past tense.
|
|
|
|
In the present tense, I feel that the public is entitled only to
|
|
information in the public domain. Information not available legally
|
|
through normal channels is just going to have to be left at that.
|
|
|
|
ISPNews: Do you believe that software should always be in the public
|
|
domain.?
|
|
|
|
CG: No, I do not. If I wrote something as wonderful as Lotus, or any of
|
|
the Microsoft programs, or Windows, I would want people to pay for
|
|
them.
|
|
|
|
ISPNews: Then you do believe in private ownership of and protection for
|
|
software?
|
|
|
|
CG: Yes, definitely.
|
|
|
|
ISPNews: What are you views on current U.S. Computer crime laws?
|
|
|
|
CG: I think that the current laws are too broad. They do not make
|
|
distinctions between various types of computer crimes. I consider
|
|
breaking into a computer akin to trespassing. If someone simply
|
|
walks across my lawn, I might be upset because they trampled my
|
|
grass, but I would leave it at that. If someone drives across my
|
|
lawn and leaves big trenches, and then comes over and kicks down my
|
|
rosebush, well that's another thing. Then, if someone drives up my
|
|
steps, goes through my house, through my kitchen, steals all my
|
|
silverware, and then leaves, that's something completely different.
|
|
And while these physical representations of trespassing can't be
|
|
applied directly to an electronic format, distinctions are still
|
|
necessary.
|
|
|
|
ISPNews: And the present computer crime laws do not make these distinctions?
|
|
|
|
CG: I am no lawyer, but from my understanding they do not. They need to
|
|
be brought into focus.
|
|
|
|
ISPNews: If they were brought into the kind of focus you suggest, would they
|
|
be fair and equitable?
|
|
|
|
CG: Definitely, depending on the punishment that went along with them. I
|
|
don't think that people who own and operate computer systems would
|
|
view someone who has logged into their system using a guest account
|
|
that was deliberately left with no password to be as serious an
|
|
intrusion as someone who got the system administrator password and
|
|
then went through and deleted all the files. I don't think that
|
|
simple intrusion would be considered as serious as unauthorized
|
|
penetration along with the wholesale theft and sale to a competitor
|
|
of marketing information, and advertising plans, and financial
|
|
projections for the next quarter.
|
|
|
|
ISPNews: What are your views on security training for users?
|
|
|
|
CG: People need to be taught what the computer operating system is and
|
|
how it works. After that, they need to establish some sort of
|
|
channel by which information can be transmitted to others. Direct
|
|
physical contact between communicating parties, covered by official,
|
|
standard company procedures, is the best way to do this.
|
|
|
|
People need to be aware that their account, no matter the level of
|
|
importance, is a link in a chain that makes up the security of the
|
|
system. Information from one account can be used as a springboard to
|
|
other, more powerful accounts. All users within a network must
|
|
understand that their information is just as important in the
|
|
security chain as is that of the next person.
|
|
|
|
ISPNews: Given where you are coming from, why should a potential client trust
|
|
you?
|
|
|
|
CG: I know that is a natural question. Just the very nature of creating
|
|
a company should project an image that we are trying to come out of
|
|
the shadows, out of the underground. We are saying, "Look everybody,
|
|
we've been doing this for a long time, now we want to help. We have
|
|
11 years of working information about how people compromise existing
|
|
security, and we can help with your particular situation."
|
|
|
|
ISPNews: I am sure that you understand the natural suspicion that people have.
|
|
|
|
CG: No, that's what I don't understand. If we at Comsec were out to
|
|
compromise information from an existing company's computer network,
|
|
we wouldn't have incorporated. We could have done that, and someone
|
|
else out there probably has already done so. Then the information
|
|
would be available to from one hacker to another.
|
|
|
|
ISPNews: Are you suggesting there is no system out there that you can't break
|
|
into?
|
|
|
|
CG: No, I'm not suggesting that. But I am saying the vast majority can
|
|
be penetrated.
|
|
|
|
ISPNews: Which system is easiest to crack; and which is most difficult?
|
|
|
|
CG: It is hard to say which system is more inherently penetrable than
|
|
another. From the initial log-in, it's not the operating system;
|
|
rather it's the system's operating environment that is the problem.
|
|
Users may not have addressed security measures. Certain types of
|
|
security holes may not have been closed. That's where a technical
|
|
background comes into play: to understand the way the applications
|
|
work; how different systems are accessed; to close holes in the
|
|
system which have become apparent. You have to deal with human
|
|
factors and technical issues. You must understand the way the
|
|
computer works and the way programs are run.
|
|
|
|
ISPNews: What is the best way to foil hackers?
|
|
|
|
CG: It depends on the hacker. There are different types. Some people
|
|
hack with modems. The casual hacker may just stumble across your
|
|
particular computer system, and may be foiled with something as
|
|
simple as good external security. He may be turned off by physical
|
|
security devices such as a call-back modem, some sort of code access,
|
|
or smart card.
|
|
|
|
These measures will not stop a serious hacker who is after your
|
|
company specifically. In this case, you have to beef up security,
|
|
and take additional steps to ensure the safety of your computer. And
|
|
you must make certain that security on the inside is as tight as on
|
|
the outside.
|
|
|
|
ISPN Editor's Note: Chris Goggans will respond, in every other issue of
|
|
ISPNews, to your questions on hacking computer systems.
|
|
His answers promise to be problem-solving, interesting,
|
|
and even entertaining. We invite you to write Chris c/o:
|
|
|
|
"Hackers' Mailbag"
|
|
ISPNews
|
|
498 Concord Street
|
|
Framingham, MA 01701-2357
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
|
|
==Phrack Inc.==
|
|
|
|
Volume Three, Issue Thirty-five, File 4 of 13
|
|
|
|
Amadeus Presents
|
|
//////////////////////////////////////\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\
|
|
<<<<<<<<<<<<< TELENET/SPRINTNET'S PC PURSUIT OUTDIAL DIRECTORY >>>>>>>>>>>
|
|
\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\////////////////////////////////////
|
|
October 25, 1991
|
|
|
|
Area
|
|
Code City, State U.S.A. 300 bps 1200 bps 2400 bps
|
|
--- --------------------------------- ------------ ------------ ------------
|
|
201 Newark, New Jersey 311020100001 311020100301 311020100022
|
|
NJNEW 2011 201301 20122
|
|
202 Washington, D.C. 311020200115 311020200116 311020200117
|
|
DCWAS 202115 202116 202117
|
|
203 Hartford, Connecticutt 311020300120 311020300121 311020300105
|
|
CTHAR 203120 203121 203105
|
|
206 Seattle, Washington 311020600205 311020600206 311020600208
|
|
WASEA 206205 206206 206208
|
|
212 New York, New York 311021200315 311021200316 311021200412
|
|
NYNYO 212315 212316 212412
|
|
311021200028
|
|
21228
|
|
213 Glendale, California Same as 818,see 818's NUAs & addresses
|
|
CAGLE (Dial 1213+number)
|
|
213 Los Angeles, California 311021300412 311021300413
|
|
CALAN 213412 213413
|
|
311021300103 311021300023
|
|
213103 21323
|
|
213 Santa Ana, California Same as 714,see 714's NUAs & addresses
|
|
CASAN (Dial 1213+number)
|
|
214 Dallas, Texas 311021400117 311021400118 311021400022
|
|
TXDAL 214117 214118 21422
|
|
215 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 311021500005 311021500112 311021500022
|
|
PAPHI 2155 215112 21522
|
|
216 Cleveland, Ohio 311021600020 311021600021 311021600120
|
|
OHCLE 21620 21621 216120
|
|
301 Washington, D.C. Same as 202,see 202's NUAs & Addresses
|
|
DCWAS (Dial 1301+number)
|
|
303 Denver, Colorado 311030300114 311030300115 311030300021
|
|
CODEN 303114 303115 30321
|
|
305 Miami, Florida 311030500120 311030500121 311030500122
|
|
FLMIA 305120 305121 305122
|
|
312 Chicago, Illinois 311031200410 311031200411 311031200024
|
|
ILCHI 312410 312411 31224
|
|
313 Ann Arbor, Michigan No 300 bps
|
|
MIAAR access
|
|
313 Detroit, Michigan 311031300214 311031300216 311031300024
|
|
MIDET 313214 313216 31324
|
|
314 St. Louis, Missouri 311031400020 311031400021 311031400005
|
|
MOSLO 31420 31421 3145
|
|
317 Indianapolis, Indiana No 300 bps
|
|
ININD access
|
|
404 Atlanta, Georgia 311040400113 311040400114 311040400022
|
|
GAATL 404113 404114 40422
|
|
407 Miami, Florida Same as 305,use 305's NUAs & addresses
|
|
FLMIA (Dial 1407+number)
|
|
407 Orlando, Florida No 300 bps
|
|
FLORL access
|
|
408 San Jose, California 311040800110 311040800111 311040800021
|
|
CASAN 408110 408111 40821
|
|
412 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania No 300 bps
|
|
PAPIT access
|
|
414 Milwaukee, Wisconsin 311041400020 311041400021 311041400120
|
|
WIMIL 41420 41421 414120
|
|
415 Oakland, California 311041500108 311041500109 311041500224
|
|
CAOAK 415108 415109 415224
|
|
415 Palo Alto, California 311041500108 311041500011 311041500005
|
|
CAPAL 415108? 41511 4155?
|
|
415 San Francisco, California 311041500215 311041500217 311041500217
|
|
CASFA 415215 415217 415217?
|
|
415 San Jose, California Same as 408,use 408's NUAs & addresses
|
|
CASJO (Dial 1415+number)
|
|
503 Portland, Oregon 311050300020 311050300021
|
|
ORPOR 50320 50321
|
|
504 New Orleans, Louisiana No 300 bps
|
|
LANOR access
|
|
512 Austin, Texas No 300 bps
|
|
TXAUS access
|
|
516 Hempstead, New York No 300 bps 311051600014
|
|
NYHEM access 51614
|
|
516 New York, New York Same as 212,use 212's NUAs & addresses
|
|
NYNYO (Dial 1516+number)
|
|
601 Memphis, Tennessee Same as 901,use 901's NUAs & addresses
|
|
TNMEM (Dial 1601+number)
|
|
602 Phoenix, Arizona 311060200020 311060200021
|
|
AZPHO (Some 602 numbers require 60220 60221
|
|
1602+number, see exchange 311060200022 311060200023 311060200026
|
|
database below) 60222 60223 60226
|
|
612 Minneapolis, Minnesota 311061200120 311061200121 311061200022
|
|
MNMIN 612120 612121 61222
|
|
614 Columbus, Ohio No 300 bps
|
|
OHCOL access
|
|
617 Boston, Massachusetts 311061700311 311061700313 311061700026
|
|
MABOS 617311 617313 61726
|
|
618 St. Louis, Missouri Same as 314,use 314's NUAs & addresses
|
|
MOSLO (Dial 1618+number)
|
|
619 San Diego, California
|
|
CASDI
|
|
703 Washington, D.C. Same as 202,use 202's NUAs & addresses
|
|
DCWAS (Dial 1703+number)
|
|
708 Chicago, Illinois Same as 312,use 312's NUAs & addresses
|
|
ILCHI (Dial 1708+number)
|
|
713 Houston, Texas 311071300113 311071300114 311071300024
|
|
TXHOU 713113 713114 71324
|
|
714 Colton, California 311071400119 311071400121 311071400102
|
|
CACOL 714119 714121 714102
|
|
714 Santa Ana, California 311071400023 311071400024 311071400021
|
|
CASAN 71423 71424 71421
|
|
311071400210 311071400213 311071400004
|
|
714210 714213 7144
|
|
718 New York, New York Same as 212,use 212's NUAs & addresses
|
|
NYNYO (Dial 1718+number)
|
|
801 Salt Lake City, Utah 311080100020 311080100021 311080100012
|
|
UTSLC 80120 80121 80112
|
|
813 Tampa, Florida 311081300020 311081300021 311081300124
|
|
FLTAM 81320 81321 813124
|
|
815 Chicago, Illinois Same as 312,use 312's NUAs & addresses
|
|
ILCHI (Dial 1312+number)
|
|
816 Kansas City, Missouri 311081600104 311081600221 311081600113
|
|
MOKCI 816104 816221 816113
|
|
817 Dallas, Texas Same as 214,use 214's NUAs & addresses
|
|
TXDAL (Dial 1817+number)
|
|
818 Glendale, California 311081800021
|
|
CAGLE 81821
|
|
818 Los Angeles, California Same as 213,use 213's NUAs & addresses
|
|
CALAN (Dial 1818+number)
|
|
901 Memphis, Tennessee No 300 bps
|
|
TNMEM access
|
|
908 New Brunswick, New Jersey No 300 bps
|
|
NJNBR access
|
|
908 Newark, New Jersey Same as 201,use 201's NUAs & addresses
|
|
NJNEW (Dial 1908+number)
|
|
913 Kansas City, Missouri Same as 816,use 816's NUAs & addresses
|
|
MOKCI (Dial 1913+number)
|
|
914 New York, New York Same as 212,use 212's NUAs & addresses
|
|
NYNYO (Dial 1914+number)
|
|
916 Sacramento, California 311091600011 311091600012 311091600007
|
|
CASAC 91611 91612 9167
|
|
919 Research Triangle Park,N Carolina 311091900020 311091900021 311091900124
|
|
NCRTP 91920 91921 919124
|
|
|
|
KEY: NUA (X.25 International Inter-Network User Address)------>311012300456
|
|
Sprintnet/Telenet's Intra-network address ---------------> 123456
|
|
|
|
PC Pursuit Outdial City/Area Code Cross Reference Directory
|
|
-----------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Ann Arbor, Michigan 313 New Brunswick, New Jersey 908
|
|
Atlanta, Georigia 404 New Orleans, Louisiana 504
|
|
Austin, Texas 512 New York, New York 212,516,718 &914
|
|
Boston, Massachusetts 617 Newark, New Jersey 201 &908
|
|
Chicago, Illinois 312, 708 & 815 Oakland, California 415
|
|
Cleveland, Ohio 216 Orlando, Florida 407
|
|
Colton, California 714 Palo Alto, California 415
|
|
Columbus, Ohio 614 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 215
|
|
Dallas, Texas 214 & 817 Phoenix, Arizona 602
|
|
Denver, Colorado 303 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 412
|
|
Detroit, Michigan 313 Portland, Oregon 503
|
|
Glendale, California 213 & 818 Research Triangle Park,N Carolina919
|
|
Hartford, Connecticutt 203 Sacramento, California 916
|
|
Hempstead, New York 516 Salt Lake City, Utah 801
|
|
Houston, Texas 713 San Diego, California 619
|
|
Indianapolis, Indiana 317 San Francisco, California 415
|
|
Kansas City, Missouri 816 & 913 San Jose, California 408 &415
|
|
Los Angeles, California 213 & 818 Santa Ana, California 213 &714
|
|
Memphis, Tennessee 601 & 901 Seattle, Washington 206
|
|
Miami, Florida 305 & 407 St. Louis, Missouri 314 &618
|
|
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 414 Tampa, Florida 813
|
|
Minneapolis, Minnesota 612 Washington, D.C. 202, 301 &703
|
|
|
|
Preface
|
|
-------
|
|
|
|
The PC Pursuit outdials, although limited in their dialing range, are of
|
|
fundamental knowledge to any X.25 hacker in the world. Collecting the
|
|
addresses of the PC Pursuit outdials is among the first projects of any
|
|
hacker new to the X.25 hacking arena. On and off through the years since
|
|
1986 when I first happened upon the X.25 scene, I have been attempting to
|
|
compile the complete list of NUAs for all of the outdials. I still haven't
|
|
realized this goal five years later, as can be evidenced by blanks in the
|
|
above list.
|
|
|
|
Other outdials, such as the ones hacked out of explorations of internal
|
|
corporate, government, or educational networks, come and go usually as fast
|
|
as codes. Some of these outdials are prize finds that can dial any number
|
|
in the world and would supplant the usefulness of this list. But such out-
|
|
dials are normally gone in a matter of weeks. The ones that do stay around
|
|
(such as the infamous 30209160xxxx global outdials) do not work very well.
|
|
Of course there are exceptions to every rule. Some Global OutDials (GODs)
|
|
go on working for years, but only because they are known only by one or a
|
|
few hackers who don't go around giving it to everyone in hackerdom far and
|
|
wide.
|
|
|
|
The PC Pursuit outdials have been functioning without fail for several years
|
|
and will continue to be a reliable and useful hacker's tool for the foreseeable
|
|
future. You can count on them to be there when you need them, especially when
|
|
a GOD you've been using fails and you need something to fall back on. I have
|
|
put together these two files to help further facilitate your use of the PC
|
|
Pursuit outdials. I hope you find them useful references.
|
|
|
|
Some Notes for Beginners
|
|
------------------------
|
|
|
|
All the modems that you access on the outdials are of the Racal-Vadic brand
|
|
and accept the standard Hayes AT command set as a default. I will not go
|
|
into an explanation of AT commands since you should already know them as a
|
|
competent user of your computer and modem. If not, check your modem's
|
|
manual since it is almost certainly a Hayes compatible modem.
|
|
|
|
The Racal-Vadic modem offers its own command mode as an alternative to the
|
|
industry standard Hayes AT command set. To access the Racal-Vadic mode, type a
|
|
CTRL-E and then RETURN. You will see "READY" and an asterisk for a prompt.
|
|
Type "?" for a list of commands. This mode is more attractive to many users
|
|
because of its verbose interface and detailed call progress messages; because
|
|
fewer keystrokes are needed to execute commands such as dial, and because of
|
|
its ability to redial up to nine times until a connection is made.
|
|
|
|
None of the outdials allow you to call them collect. You will have to call
|
|
them from either a PAD (Packet Assembler Deassembler) or NUI (Network User
|
|
ID). PC Pursuit IDs can also be used as pseudo-NUIs by typing the NUA
|
|
followed by a comma, the PCP ID, another comma, and the PCP Password. If
|
|
you do not already have one, you will have to consult a fellow hacker for a
|
|
valid NUI or PAD (not as freely traded nowadays). Or, to really impress
|
|
your hacker friends, hack your own. (Consult other files featured in Phrack
|
|
that deal with this subject matter.)
|
|
|
|
The 12 digit NUA (Network User Address) for each outdial above is for accessing
|
|
the outdial from a network other than SprintNet/Telenet.
|
|
|
|
The shorter five to six digit number below it is for accessing the outdial
|
|
from SprintNet/Telenet. Actually, you can use the 12 digit number as well
|
|
as the shorter five to six digit number (if you precede the 12 digit NUA
|
|
with a 0) on SprintNet, but the shorter one is easier to remember and use.
|
|
|
|
For the purposes of memorizing the outdials that you will use more often, it is
|
|
a simple matter of remembering the shorter SprintNet address and convert- ing
|
|
it to the 12 digit NUA as needed like this:
|
|
|
|
SprintNet address xxxyyy becomes 3110xxx00yyy (Add 0's in yyy where needed)
|
|
EXAMPLE: 813124 becomes 311081300124
|
|
EXAMPLE2: 4155 becomes 311041500005 (Add preceding 0's in yyy)
|
|
|
|
Note that networks usually require you to precede the NUA with a 0 or 1
|
|
(usually 0) much like when you dial a long distance phone call. For
|
|
example, on Tymnet, typing an NUA does not require a 0 or 1. On Canada's
|
|
DataPac, a 1 is required before the 12 digit NUA. On SprintNet and most
|
|
European X.25 networks, a 0 is needed.
|
|
|
|
When you connect with an outdial modem, the first thing you might want to
|
|
do is to redial the last number dialed. The last person who used the modem
|
|
might have called a number that would be of interest to you in your hacking
|
|
endeavors. Enter the Racal-Vadic mode and execute the "R" redial command.
|
|
The last number dialed is shown on the screen and dialed. The A/ command
|
|
in the Hayes AT command mode won't work for this purpose since the last
|
|
number dialed is not shown and the last command executed isn't necessarily a
|
|
dialing command.
|
|
|
|
Unfortunately, when a person exits the outdial, the modem resets itself in
|
|
most cases and the last number dialed is lost. But occasionally you'll get
|
|
lucky and find an interesting new number to call
|
|
|
|
Calling Specific Modems, and GODs (Global OutDials)
|
|
---------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Each outdial has many modems that you can connect to. When calling the
|
|
outdial NUA, you will be connected to the first available modem. If all
|
|
are being used, you will get a busy message. It is possible for you to
|
|
attempt to connect to one particular modem in the series rather than
|
|
connect to the first available unused modem.
|
|
|
|
Append two digits to the end of a NUA to specify which modem you want.
|
|
For example, to connect to the third modem on 311061200022, you would
|
|
call NUA 31106120002203. So theoretically, you can call up to 99
|
|
different modems on the same outdial (31106120002200 is the same as
|
|
311061200022), but no outdials have this many modems.
|
|
|
|
On SprintNet, you can append a letter to the four to six digit address
|
|
to specify a modem. You can also add a decimal point and then the two
|
|
digits for modems above 26 (and below). For example, 31106120002203 is
|
|
the same as 61222C and 61222.03; 31108130012426 is the same as 813124Z
|
|
and 813124.26.
|
|
|
|
So, you may ask, why would I want to call a specific modem?
|
|
|
|
The reason is that some modems permit unrestrictive dialing. Such modems
|
|
will let you dial ANY number in the world, not just the local numbers
|
|
that you're only suppose to call. Such modems are known as GODs, which
|
|
stands for Global OutDial.
|
|
|
|
GODs don't last forever. As soon as the SprintNet priests discover the
|
|
abuse occurring on a particular modem, they'll fix it. So you'll have to
|
|
talk with your fellow hackers to find out which modems are known to be
|
|
GODs, or better yet, scan for your own.
|
|
|
|
Local Exchange Database
|
|
-----------------------
|
|
|
|
For those using the outdials from international locations, it is important
|
|
to note that you cannot call just any number in the same area code as the
|
|
outdial. Unless you're using a GOD (see part A), you can only dial numbers
|
|
local to the city the outdial is in.
|
|
|
|
At the end of this file you will find a database of all the exchanges (the
|
|
three numbers in a telephone number after the area code) that are dial-able
|
|
from each outdial. This database will not only be useful to verify for sure
|
|
that you can dial a particular number from a PC Pursuit outdial, but will also
|
|
be useful for checking which outdial to use in cases where multiple outdials
|
|
can be used to dial different numbers in the same area code. For example you
|
|
can dial numbers in area code 213 from THREE different outdials: 213 CALAN, 818
|
|
CAGLE, *and* 714 CASAN. Unless you are familiar with the geographic dialing
|
|
plan of the Los Angeles area, you would have to consult the exchange database
|
|
to figure out which outdial to use.
|
|
|
|
The raw data for the list was downloaded from the PC Pursuit Service BBS
|
|
(call collectable from SprintNet at 311090900631, @C PURSUIT or @909631;
|
|
logon as "Sprint Guest" with password "outdial"). I made some very time
|
|
consuming modifications to the format of the list so that it could be used
|
|
effectively with Unix's grep command or MS-DOG's FIND command (and similar
|
|
commands on other operating systems).
|
|
|
|
For example, let's say you wanted to call a BBS at 213-395-0221. As I
|
|
mentioned earlier, there are three different outdials that can dial numbers in
|
|
the 213 area code. You have to find out which one to use. On Unix, you would
|
|
type:
|
|
|
|
% grep 213 <filename>|grep 395
|
|
|
|
Or on MS-DOS, you would type:
|
|
|
|
C:\>FIND "213" <filename>|FIND "395"
|
|
|
|
where <filename> is the name this file is saved under. You will then see:
|
|
OB
|
|
1 213 CAGLE 393 394 395 396 399 400 413 415 450 451 452 453 454 455 458
|
|
213 CALAN 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400
|
|
|
|
As you can see, you can call 1-213-395-0221 from two outdials: CAGLE and
|
|
CALAN. But notice that the CAGLE outdial has a 1 in front of it. This
|
|
means that if you use the CAGLE outdial, you will have to dial with the
|
|
toll prefix (1) and area code preceding the local number since CAGLE is
|
|
in the 818 area code.
|
|
|
|
Dialing from CAGLE: ATDT12133950221
|
|
Dialing from CALAN: ATDT3950221
|
|
|
|
The Database
|
|
------------
|
|
|
|
602 AZPHO 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234
|
|
602 AZPHO 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249
|
|
602 AZPHO 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264
|
|
602 AZPHO 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279
|
|
602 AZPHO 280 285 320 331 336 340 345 350 351 352 370 371 375 376 377
|
|
602 AZPHO 379 381 382 389 390 391 392 393 395 396 397 412 420 423 431
|
|
602 AZPHO 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 443 450 451 460 461 464
|
|
602 AZPHO 468 470 481 482 483 484 486 490 491 493 494 495 496 497 498
|
|
602 AZPHO 528 530 531 534 540 542 543 545 547 548 549 551 553 554 563
|
|
602 AZPHO 585 588 589 596 597 598 630 631 640 641 644 649 650 661 678
|
|
602 AZPHO 681 693 730 731 732 752 756 759 784 786 788 789 820 821 827
|
|
602 AZPHO 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 846
|
|
602 AZPHO 848 849 852 853 856 860 861 862 863 864 866 867 869 870 872
|
|
602 AZPHO 873 876 877 878 879 890 891 892 893 894 895 897 898 899 921
|
|
602 AZPHO 924 925 926 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 940
|
|
602 AZPHO 941 942 943 944 945 946 947 948 949 951 952 953 954 955 956
|
|
602 AZPHO 957 961 962 963 964 965 966 967 968 969 970 971 972 973 974
|
|
602 AZPHO 975 977 978 979 980 981 985 986 990 991 992 993 994 995 996
|
|
602 AZPHO 997 998
|
|
1 602 AZPHO 566 583 584 546 492 561 581 582 780 569 586 471 837 373 380
|
|
1 602 AZPHO 983 982 984 986 983 671 987 988
|
|
714 CACOL 275 276 335 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 369
|
|
714 CACOL 370 381 382 383 384 386 387 422 431 602 681 682 683 684 685
|
|
714 CACOL 686 687 688 689 749 780 781 782 783 784 785 787 788 789 790
|
|
714 CACOL 791 792 793 794 795 796 797 798 799 820 822 823 824 825 829
|
|
714 CACOL 872 873 874 875 876 877 880 881 882 883 884 885 886 887 888
|
|
714 CACOL 889
|
|
1 213 CAGLE 201 202 203 204 205 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230
|
|
1 213 CAGLE 236 237 238 239 245 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259
|
|
1 213 CAGLE 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284
|
|
1 213 CAGLE 285 286 287 288 289 303 310 314 315 319 340 341 342 343 345
|
|
1 213 CAGLE 347 351 353 362 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 392
|
|
1 213 CAGLE 393 394 395 396 399 400 413 415 450 451 452 453 454 455 458
|
|
1 213 CAGLE 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 480 481 482 483
|
|
1 213 CAGLE 484 485 486 487 488 489 520 550 551 552 553 556 557 558 559
|
|
1 213 CAGLE 573 580 612 613 614 617 619 620 621 622 623 624 625 626 627
|
|
1 213 CAGLE 628 629 650 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 658 659 660 661 662
|
|
1 213 CAGLE 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 680 681 682 683 684 686 687 688
|
|
1 213 CAGLE 689 714 730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739 740 741 742
|
|
1 213 CAGLE 743 744 745 746 747 748 749 765 785 828 829 836 837 838 839
|
|
1 213 CAGLE 840 841 842 849 850 851 852 854 855 856 857 858 859 870 871
|
|
1 213 CAGLE 872 873 874 875 876 877 878 879 891 892 893 894 895 896 912
|
|
1 213 CAGLE 913 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 955 960 962 963
|
|
1 213 CAGLE 964 965 966 967 968 969 972 974 975 977
|
|
818 CAGLE 200 240 241 242 243 244 246 247 248 249 301 303 304 350 351
|
|
818 CAGLE 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366
|
|
818 CAGLE 367 368 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 381 382 393
|
|
818 CAGLE 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 409 440 441 442 443
|
|
818 CAGLE 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 459 500 501 502 503 504 505 506
|
|
818 CAGLE 507 508 509 528 542 545 546 547 548 560 564 565 566 567 568
|
|
818 CAGLE 569 574 575 577 578 579 580 584 753 754 760 761 762 763 764
|
|
818 CAGLE 765 766 767 768 769 777 780 781 782 783 784 785 786 787 788
|
|
818 CAGLE 789 790 791 792 793 794 795 796 797 798 799 818 821 831 840
|
|
818 CAGLE 841 842 843 845 846 847 848 890 891 892 893 894 895 896 897
|
|
818 CAGLE 898 899 901 902 903 904 905 906 907 908 909 951 952 953 954
|
|
818 CAGLE 955 956 957 972 980 981 982 983 984 985 986 987 988 989 990
|
|
818 CAGLE 994 995 997
|
|
213 CALAN 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 212 214 215 216 217
|
|
213 CALAN 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233
|
|
213 CALAN 234 235 236 237 238 239 241 245 248 249 250 251 252 253 254
|
|
213 CALAN 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269
|
|
213 CALAN 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284
|
|
213 CALAN 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299
|
|
213 CALAN 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 312 313 314 315
|
|
213 CALAN 316 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 327 328 329 330 331
|
|
213 CALAN 334 335 336 337 338 340 341 342 343 345 347 351 353 362 370
|
|
213 CALAN 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385
|
|
213 CALAN 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400
|
|
213 CALAN 402 404 406 408 410 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 440 442
|
|
213 CALAN 443 444 445 446 447 450 451 452 453 454 455 458 459 460 461
|
|
213 CALAN 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476
|
|
213 CALAN 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 500 512
|
|
213 CALAN 515 516 520 527 531 532 533 535 536 537 538 540 541 542 543
|
|
213 CALAN 544 545 546 550 551 552 553 554 556 557 558 559 560 561 562
|
|
213 CALAN 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 573 574 578 580 581 582 583 584
|
|
213 CALAN 585 586 587 588 589 600 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 609
|
|
213 CALAN 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 625 626
|
|
213 CALAN 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641
|
|
213 CALAN 642 643 644 645 646 647 648 649 650 651 652 653 654 655 656
|
|
213 CALAN 657 658 659 660 661 662 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 670 671
|
|
213 CALAN 672 673 674 675 676 677 678 679 680 681 682 683 684 685 686
|
|
213 CALAN 687 688 689 692 693 695 696 698 699 700 702 703 712 713 714
|
|
213 CALAN 715 716 717 718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729
|
|
213 CALAN 730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739 740 741 742 743 744
|
|
213 CALAN 745 746 747 748 749 750 751 752 753 754 755 756 757 758 759
|
|
213 CALAN 760 761 762 763 764 765 769 770 771 772 773 774 775 776 777
|
|
213 CALAN 778 779 780 781 782 783 785 791 794 801 802 803 804 806 807
|
|
213 CALAN 809 812 813 814 819 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829
|
|
213 CALAN 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 846 849 850 851 852 854 855 856
|
|
213 CALAN 857 858 859 860 861 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 870 871
|
|
213 CALAN 872 873 874 875 876 877 878 879 881 887 888 889 891 892 893
|
|
213 CALAN 894 895 896 903 904 907 908 912 913 920 921 922 923 924 925
|
|
213 CALAN 926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 940
|
|
213 CALAN 941 942 944 945 946 948 949 955 960 962 963 964 965 966 967
|
|
213 CALAN 968 969 970 971 972 973 974 975 977 978 979
|
|
1 818 CALAN 200 240 241 242 243 244 246 247 280 281 282 284 285 286 287
|
|
1 818 CALAN 288 289 300 301 302 303 307 308 309 350 357 358 359 401 402
|
|
1 818 CALAN 409 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 450 451 457 458 459 500 502
|
|
1 818 CALAN 507 529 545 546 547 548 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 579 580
|
|
1 818 CALAN 805 821 956
|
|
415 CAOAK 200 222 223 227 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 241 243 251 252
|
|
415 CAOAK 253 254 255 256 261 262 263 264 265 267 268 269 271 272 273
|
|
415 CAOAK 274 276 278 279 282 283 284 285 287 291 292 295 296 297 298
|
|
415 CAOAK 302 339 346 351 352 357 362 374 376 385 391 392 393 394 395
|
|
415 CAOAK 396 397 398 399 420 421 425 428 430 431 433 434 436 437 441
|
|
415 CAOAK 442 444 445 446 448 451 452 464 465 466 474 477 478 481 482
|
|
415 CAOAK 483 486 495 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532
|
|
415 CAOAK 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547
|
|
415 CAOAK 548 549 550 552 553 554 556 557 558 559 561 562 563 565 567
|
|
415 CAOAK 568 569 576 577 581 582 596 597 620 621 622 624 626 627 631
|
|
415 CAOAK 632 633 635 636 638 639 641 642 643 644 645 647 648 649 652
|
|
415 CAOAK 653 654 655 658 660 667 668 670 673 677 678 695 724 727 729
|
|
415 CAOAK 732 733 736 739 741 743 746 748 749 758 762 763 764 765 768
|
|
415 CAOAK 769 771 772 773 774 775 776 777 781 782 783 784 785 786 788
|
|
415 CAOAK 799 820 821 822 824 826 831 832 834 835 836 837 838 839 840
|
|
415 CAOAK 841 843 845 848 849 860 861 863 864 865 869 874 881 882 884
|
|
415 CAOAK 885 886 887 888 889 891 893 894 895 896 921 922 923 928 929
|
|
415 CAOAK 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 942 943 944 945 946
|
|
415 CAOAK 947 951 953 954 955 956 957 970 971 972 973 974 975 977 978
|
|
415 CAOAK 979 981 982 983 984 985 986 987 989 990 995 996 998 999
|
|
415 CAPAL 226 276 278 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 335 336 340
|
|
415 CAPAL 341 342 343 344 345 347 348 349 354 358 361 363 364 365 366
|
|
415 CAPAL 367 368 369 371 375 377 378 424 429 438 471 475 481 487 489
|
|
415 CAPAL 490 493 494 496 497 498 537 538 570 571 572 573 574 578 579
|
|
415 CAPAL 581 582 591 592 593 594 595 598 623 637 651 656 657 659 670
|
|
415 CAPAL 683 688 691 694 696 722 723 725 727 732 733 745 770 780 782
|
|
415 CAPAL 783 784 785 786 790 791 792 793 794 795 796 797 851 852 853
|
|
415 CAPAL 854 855 856 857 858 859 881 884 886 887 888 889 926 940 941
|
|
415 CAPAL 948 949 960 961 962 964 965 966 967 968 969
|
|
916 CASAC 278 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 331 332 334 338 339
|
|
916 CASAC 344 348 349 351 353 355 361 362 363 364 366 368 369 371 372
|
|
916 CASAC 373 381 383 386 387 388 391 392 393 394 395 399 421 422 423
|
|
916 CASAC 424 425 427 428 429 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449
|
|
916 CASAC 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487
|
|
916 CASAC 488 489 531 535 537 539 551 552 553 557 567 568 593 631 635
|
|
916 CASAC 636 638 641 643 646 648 649 653 654 657 665 682 683 684 685
|
|
916 CASAC 686 687 688 689 721 722 723 725 726 727 728 729 731 732 733
|
|
916 CASAC 734 736 737 739 745 747 761 762 763 764 765 766 767 768 785
|
|
916 CASAC 852 855 863 920 921 922 923 924 925 927 928 929 933 939 944
|
|
916 CASAC 951 957 961 962 965 966 967 969 971 972 973 974 978 983 985
|
|
916 CASAC 987 988 989 991 992
|
|
1 213 CASAN 430 431 433 434 438 439 493 494 498 592 594 596 597 598 797
|
|
1 213 CASAN 799 985 987
|
|
714 CASAN 220 228 229 236 239 241 250 251 253 255 256 258 259 261 262
|
|
714 CASAN 265 282 283 285 289 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 332
|
|
714 CASAN 367 372 373 374 380 385 414 415 418 432 433 441 447 449 455
|
|
714 CASAN 458 472 474 475 476 490 491 494 497 499 502 503 509 513 515
|
|
714 CASAN 516 517 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531
|
|
714 CASAN 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546
|
|
714 CASAN 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 556 557 558 559 565 566 567
|
|
714 CASAN 568 569 572 579 581 582 583 586 587 588 589 630 631 632 633
|
|
714 CASAN 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 646 647 648
|
|
714 CASAN 649 650 651 660 662 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 670 671 673
|
|
714 CASAN 675 680 691 692 693 707 708 712 720 721 722 723 724 725 726
|
|
714 CASAN 727 729 730 731 732 733 738 739 740 741 742 743 744 745 746
|
|
714 CASAN 747 748 750 751 752 754 755 756 757 758 759 760 761 762 764
|
|
714 CASAN 768 770 771 772 773 774 775 776 777 778 779 786 821 826 827
|
|
714 CASAN 828 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843
|
|
714 CASAN 846 847 848 850 851 852 854 855 856 857 858 859 863 870 871
|
|
714 CASAN 879 890 891 892 893 894 895 896 897 898 921 937 938 939 951
|
|
714 CASAN 952 953 954 955 956 957 960 961 962 963 964 965 966 968 969
|
|
714 CASAN 970 971 972 973 974 975 977 978 979 990 991 992 993 994 995
|
|
714 CASAN 996 997 998 999
|
|
619 CASDI 221 222 223 224 225 226 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237
|
|
619 CASDI 238 239 258 260 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 270 271 272 273
|
|
619 CASDI 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288
|
|
619 CASDI 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 336 338 390 401
|
|
619 CASDI 404 406 408 412 413 416 417 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426
|
|
619 CASDI 427 428 429 435 437 440 441 442 443 444 447 448 449 450 451
|
|
619 CASDI 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466
|
|
619 CASDI 469 470 472 474 475 476 477 479 482 483 484 485 487 488 490
|
|
619 CASDI 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 502 505 506 508 514 518 522 524
|
|
619 CASDI 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539
|
|
619 CASDI 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 551 552 553 554 556
|
|
619 CASDI 557 558 559 560 561 562 563 565 566 569 570 571 573 574 575
|
|
619 CASDI 576 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 592 594
|
|
619 CASDI 604 660 661 662 668 669 670 672 673 690 691 692 693 694 695
|
|
619 CASDI 696 697 698 699 701 702 717 980 981 987 990 991
|
|
415 CASFA 200 221 227 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 239 241 243 244 251
|
|
415 CASFA 252 255 257 258 259 261 263 264 266 267 268 269 271 272 273
|
|
415 CASFA 274 279 282 285 287 289 291 292 296 298 302 330 331 332 333
|
|
415 CASFA 334 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 355
|
|
415 CASFA 358 359 362 371 374 375 377 378 381 383 385 386 387 388 389
|
|
415 CASFA 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 420 421 428 431 433 434
|
|
415 CASFA 435 436 437 441 442 444 445 446 448 451 452 453 454 456 457
|
|
415 CASFA 459 461 464 465 466 467 468 469 472 474 476 477 478 479 482
|
|
415 CASFA 485 488 491 492 495 499 502 521 522 523 530 531 532 533 534
|
|
415 CASFA 535 536 539 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 550 552 553 554 556
|
|
415 CASFA 557 558 561 563 564 565 566 567 570 571 572 573 574 576 578
|
|
415 CASFA 579 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 596 597 620 621 622 624 626
|
|
415 CASFA 627 641 645 647 648 652 653 654 655 658 660 661 664 665 666
|
|
415 CASFA 668 673 677 681 692 695 696 697 721 722 731 737 738 739 742
|
|
415 CASFA 748 749 750 751 752 753 755 756 759 761 762 763 764 765 768
|
|
415 CASFA 769 771 772 773 774 775 776 777 781 788 789 821 822 824 826
|
|
415 CASFA 832 834 835 836 839 840 860 861 863 864 865 869 871 872 873
|
|
415 CASFA 874 875 876 877 878 882 885 891 893 894 896 921 922 923 924
|
|
415 CASFA 925 927 928 929 931 936 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 970 971
|
|
415 CASFA 972 973 974 978 979 981 982 983 984 985 986 987 989 990 991
|
|
415 CASFA 992 993 994 995 996 997 998 999
|
|
408 CASJO 221 223 224 225 226 227 234 235 236 237 238 241 243 244 245
|
|
408 CASJO 246 247 248 249 251 252 253 255 256 257 258 259 262 263 264
|
|
408 CASJO 265 266 267 268 269 270 272 274 275 276 277 279 280 281 282
|
|
408 CASJO 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298
|
|
408 CASJO 299 332 345 353 354 356 358 365 370 371 374 376 377 378 379
|
|
408 CASJO 395 398 399 432 433 434 435 436 437 441 446 447 448 452 453
|
|
408 CASJO 463 473 491 492 496 499 522 524 534 552 553 554 559 562 575
|
|
408 CASJO 578 629 720 721 723 725 727 729 730 732 733 734 735 736 737
|
|
408 CASJO 738 739 741 742 743 744 745 746 747 748 749 752 756 765 773
|
|
408 CASJO 864 865 866 867 879 920 922 923 924 925 926 927 929 942 943
|
|
408 CASJO 945 946 947 954 957 970 971 972 973 974 977 978 980 982 983
|
|
408 CASJO 984 985 986 987 988 989 991 992 993 994 995 996 997 998
|
|
1 415 CASJO 226 335 336 438 490 498 623 651 656 657 659 683 691 694 77
|
|
1 415 CASJO 940 941 948 949 960 961 962 964 965 966 967 968 969
|
|
303 CODEN 200 220 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 252 255 261
|
|
303 CODEN 266 270 271 273 277 278 279 280 281 286 287 288 289 290 291
|
|
303 CODEN 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 320 321 322 329 331 333 337
|
|
303 CODEN 340 341 343 344 348 355 360 361 363 364 366 367 368 369 370
|
|
303 CODEN 371 372 373 375 377 388 393 394 397 398 399 420 421 422 423
|
|
303 CODEN 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 433 440 441 442 443 444 447
|
|
303 CODEN 449 450 451 452 455 457 458 460 461 465 466 467 469 470 477
|
|
303 CODEN 478 480 492 494 497 499 526 530 534 538 556 571 572 573 575
|
|
303 CODEN 581 592 595 620 623 624 628 629 631 639 640 642 643 649 650
|
|
303 CODEN 654 657 659 660 665 666 670 671 673 674 676 680 681 688 689
|
|
303 CODEN 690 691 692 693 694 695 696 697 698 699 720 721 722 727 730
|
|
303 CODEN 733 739 740 741 743 744 745 750 751 752 753 755 756 757 758
|
|
303 CODEN 759 760 761 762 763 764 766 770 771 773 777 778 779 780 781
|
|
303 CODEN 782 786 787 788 789 790 791 792 793 794 795 796 797 798 799
|
|
303 CODEN 820 821 825 826 829 830 831 832 836 837 839 840 841 843 844
|
|
303 CODEN 850 851 855 860 861 863 866 868 869 871 877 880 888 889 890
|
|
303 CODEN 891 892 893 894 896 898 899 922 924 930 932 933 934 935 936
|
|
303 CODEN 937 938 939 940 964 965 966 969 971 972 973 977 978 979 980
|
|
303 CODEN 985 986 987 988 989
|
|
203 CTHAR 223 224 225 229 231 232 233 236 240 241 242 243 244 246 247
|
|
203 CTHAR 249 252 257 258 273 275 277 278 279 280 282 285 286 289 291
|
|
203 CTHAR 292 293 296 297 298 299 520 521 522 523 524 525 527 528 529
|
|
203 CTHAR 547 548 549 557 559 560 561 563 565 566 568 569 623 627 633
|
|
203 CTHAR 643 644 645 646 647 648 649 651 653 654 657 658 659 660 665
|
|
203 CTHAR 666 667 668 673 674 675 676 677 678 679 683 688 693 721 722
|
|
203 CTHAR 724 725 726 727 728 826 827 828 829 841 843 870 871 872 875
|
|
203 CTHAR 930 936 951 952 953 954
|
|
202 DCWAS 200 204 206 207 208 209 210 213 214 217 218 220 222 223 224
|
|
202 DCWAS 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239
|
|
202 DCWAS 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 254 255
|
|
202 DCWAS 256 258 259 260 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272
|
|
202 DCWAS 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287
|
|
202 DCWAS 288 289 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 306 307 309 310
|
|
202 DCWAS 317 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 328 329 330 331 332 333
|
|
202 DCWAS 334 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 350
|
|
202 DCWAS 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 362 363 364 365 366
|
|
202 DCWAS 369 370 371 372 373 374 376 377 378 379 380 382 383 384 385
|
|
202 DCWAS 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 401
|
|
202 DCWAS 402 403 404 406 407 408 409 415 416 417 418 420 421 422 423
|
|
202 DCWAS 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438
|
|
202 DCWAS 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454
|
|
202 DCWAS 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 466 467 468 469 470
|
|
202 DCWAS 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485
|
|
202 DCWAS 486 487 488 490 492 493 495 496 497 498 499 501 502 503 504
|
|
202 DCWAS 505 506 507 509 513 514 516 517 519 520 521 522 523 524 525
|
|
202 DCWAS 526 527 528 529 530 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541
|
|
202 DCWAS 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 556 557
|
|
202 DCWAS 558 559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572
|
|
202 DCWAS 573 574 575 576 577 578 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588
|
|
202 DCWAS 589 590 591 592 593 595 597 598 599 601 602 603 604 605 606
|
|
202 DCWAS 608 610 613 618 619 620 622 623 624 625 626 627 628 630 631
|
|
202 DCWAS 632 633 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 646 647
|
|
202 DCWAS 648 649 650 651 652 653 654 656 657 658 659 660 661 662 663
|
|
202 DCWAS 664 665 666 667 668 669 670 671 673 675 676 678 679 680 681
|
|
202 DCWAS 682 683 684 685 686 687 688 689 690 691 692 693 694 695 696
|
|
202 DCWAS 697 698 699 702 706 707 708 709 712 713 714 715 719 722 723
|
|
202 DCWAS 724 725 726 727 728 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739 742
|
|
202 DCWAS 745 746 749 750 751 752 753 755 756 758 759 760 761 762 763
|
|
202 DCWAS 764 765 767 768 769 770 772 773 774 775 776 778 779 780 781
|
|
202 DCWAS 783 784 785 786 787 789 790 794 795 797 799 801 802 803 805
|
|
202 DCWAS 806 807 808 812 815 816 817 818 820 821 822 823 824 825 826
|
|
202 DCWAS 827 828 829 830 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842
|
|
202 DCWAS 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 856 857 860 861
|
|
202 DCWAS 862 863 864 865 866 868 869 870 871 872 874 875 876 877 879
|
|
202 DCWAS 881 882 883 885 887 888 889 890 891 892 893 894 895 896 897
|
|
202 DCWAS 898 899 901 904 906 907 912 913 914 916 917 920 921 922 924
|
|
202 DCWAS 925 926 927 928 929 930 931 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 940
|
|
202 DCWAS 941 942 943 944 946 947 948 949 951 952 953 954 955 956 957
|
|
202 DCWAS 960 961 962 963 965 966 967 968 971 972 974 975 977 978 979
|
|
202 DCWAS 980 981 982 983 984 985 986 989 990 991 994 996 998
|
|
1 301 DCWAS 206 209 210 217 220 227 229 230 231 236 238 240 248 249 251
|
|
1 301 DCWAS 258 262 270 277 279 283 286 292 294 295 297 299 306 309 317
|
|
1 301 DCWAS 320 322 330 336 340 341 344 345 350 353 365 369 372 380 384
|
|
1 301 DCWAS 386 390 394 402 403 409 417 420 421 422 423 424 427 428 431
|
|
1 301 DCWAS 434 436 439 441 443 445 449 454 459 460 464 468 469 470 474
|
|
1 301 DCWAS 480 490 492 493 495 496 497 498 499 502 505 507 509 513 520
|
|
1 301 DCWAS 530 540 552 559 564 565 567 568 570 571 572 577 580 585 587
|
|
1 301 DCWAS 588 589 590 593 595 598 599 601 604 608 618 622 627 630 640
|
|
1 301 DCWAS 649 650 652 654 656 657 670 680 681 688 699 702 713 725 731
|
|
1 301 DCWAS 735 736 738 753 762 763 770 772 773 774 776 779 794 805 807
|
|
1 301 DCWAS 808 816 839 840 843 851 852 853 856 864 868 869 870 871 881
|
|
1 301 DCWAS 888 890 891 894 897 899 907 913 916 921 924 925 926 927 929
|
|
1 301 DCWAS 930 933 935 937 940 942 946 948 949 951 952 953 961 963 967
|
|
1 301 DCWAS 972 975 977 980 981 982 983 984 985 986 989 990
|
|
1 703 DCWAS 204 207 214 218 222 235 237 239 241 242 243 246 247 250 255
|
|
1 703 DCWAS 256 260 263 264 266 271 273 274 276 278 280 281 284 285 321
|
|
1 703 DCWAS 323 325 329 339 351 352 354 355 356 358 359 360 370 378 379
|
|
1 703 DCWAS 385 391 406 407 415 418 425 430 435 437 438 440 442 444 448
|
|
1 703 DCWAS 450 451 455 461 471 476 478 481 482 486 487 503 506 516 517
|
|
1 703 DCWAS 519 521 522 524 525 527 528 532 533 534 536 538 548 549 550
|
|
1 703 DCWAS 551 553 556 557 558 560 569 573 578 591 602 603 620 631 641
|
|
1 703 DCWAS 642 643 644 648 658 660 661 664 671 683 684 685 689 690 691
|
|
1 703 DCWAS 698 706 709 712 715 719 733 734 739 742 746 749 750 751 756
|
|
1 703 DCWAS 758 759 760 761 764 765 768 769 780 781 787 790 795 799 802
|
|
1 703 DCWAS 803 815 817 818 820 821 823 824 826 827 830 834 836 838 841
|
|
1 703 DCWAS 845 846 847 848 849 850 860 866 874 875 876 883 892 893 904
|
|
1 703 DCWAS 912 914 920 922 931 934 938 941 960 968 971 974 978 979 998
|
|
305 FLMIA 220 221 222 223 224 226 227 230 232 233 235 238 242 245 246
|
|
305 FLMIA 247 248 250 251 252 253 254 255 257 258 261 262 263 264 266
|
|
305 FLMIA 267 268 270 271 274 279 284 285 324 325 326 327 329 332 342
|
|
305 FLMIA 343 347 348 349 350 352 353 354 358 361 362 363 364 365 366
|
|
305 FLMIA 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 385 386 387
|
|
305 FLMIA 388 397 399 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 460 464 470
|
|
305 FLMIA 471 477 478 520 526 529 530 531 532 534 535 536 538 539 541
|
|
305 FLMIA 542 543 544 545 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 556 557 558
|
|
305 FLMIA 559 560 567 571 573 575 576 577 578 579 590 591 592 593 594
|
|
305 FLMIA 595 596 598 599 620 621 623 624 625 628 633 634 635 636 637
|
|
305 FLMIA 638 642 643 644 649 651 652 653 654 661 662 663 665 666 667
|
|
305 FLMIA 669 670 672 673 674 681 685 687 688 691 693 694 696 751 754
|
|
305 FLMIA 756 757 758 759 762 769 770 773 775 780 787 789 794 795 821
|
|
305 FLMIA 822 823 825 827 829 835 836 854 855 856 858 859 861 864 865
|
|
305 FLMIA 866 867 868 871 873 874 876 880 881 882 883 884 885 886 887
|
|
305 FLMIA 888 889 891 892 893 895 899 931 932 933 935 937 939 940 944
|
|
305 FLMIA 945 947 948 949 951 952 953 956 957 993 995
|
|
407 FLORL 222 228 236 237 238 239 240 244 246 247 249 256 257 260 262
|
|
407 FLORL 263 273 275 277 281 282 290 291 292 293 294 295 297 298 299
|
|
407 FLORL 327 331 332 339 341 342 345 351 352 354 356 363 365 366 380
|
|
407 FLORL 381 382 420 422 423 424 425 438 469 539 560 568 578 579 623
|
|
407 FLORL 628 629 644 645 646 647 648 649 651 656 657 658 660 661 671
|
|
407 FLORL 672 675 677 678 679 682 695 696 699 740 767 774 788 823 824
|
|
407 FLORL 825 826 827 828 830 831 834 836 839 841 843 849 850 851 855
|
|
407 FLORL 856 857 859 862 869 872 875 876 877 880 884 886 889 894 895
|
|
407 FLORL 896 897 898 899 934 939
|
|
813 FLTAM 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 231 232 234 236 237 238
|
|
813 FLTAM 239 240 241 242 247 248 251 253 254 258 259 264 265 272 273
|
|
813 FLTAM 276 281 286 287 289 620 621 622 623 626 628 633 634 641 645
|
|
813 FLTAM 653 654 661 662 664 671 677 681 684 685 689 690 830 831 832
|
|
813 FLTAM 835 837 839 840 854 855 870 871 872 873 874 875 876 877 878
|
|
813 FLTAM 879 880 881 882 883 884 885 886 887 888 889 920 931 932 933
|
|
813 FLTAM 935 948 949 960 961 962 963 968 969 971 972 973 974 977 978
|
|
813 FLTAM 979 980 985 986 987 988 989 990 996
|
|
404 GAATL 200 212 215 220 221 222 223 225 230 231 233 237 238 239 240
|
|
404 GAATL 241 242 243 244 246 247 248 249 250 252 255 256 257 260 261
|
|
404 GAATL 262 263 264 266 270 271 279 280 281 284 286 288 289 292 294
|
|
404 GAATL 296 297 299 310 312 313 314 315 316 319 320 321 325 329 330
|
|
404 GAATL 331 332 333 339 341 343 344 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 355
|
|
404 GAATL 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 368 370 371 372 373 377 378 380
|
|
404 GAATL 381 383 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 399 413 416 417
|
|
404 GAATL 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 431 432 433 434 435
|
|
404 GAATL 436 438 439 441 442 443 445 446 447 448 449 451 452 454 455
|
|
404 GAATL 457 458 460 461 463 466 469 471 473 474 475 476 477 478 482
|
|
404 GAATL 483 484 487 488 489 491 493 494 496 497 498 499 505 508 512
|
|
404 GAATL 513 515 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 533 550
|
|
404 GAATL 551 552 558 559 564 565 566 570 572 573 577 578 580 581 584
|
|
404 GAATL 586 587 588 589 590 591 593 594 603 607 610 618 619 621 622
|
|
404 GAATL 623 624 626 627 631 633 634 636 639 640 641 642 651 653 656
|
|
404 GAATL 658 659 661 662 664 668 669 671 676 679 680 681 683 686 688
|
|
404 GAATL 690 691 696 697 698 699 712 717 723 726 727 728 729 730 732
|
|
404 GAATL 739 740 741 744 750 751 752 753 755 756 758 760 761 762 763
|
|
404 GAATL 765 766 767 768 772 774 785 792 794 799 804 808 810 815 822
|
|
404 GAATL 827 833 835 837 839 840 841 842 843 847 848 850 851 852 853
|
|
404 GAATL 859 870 871 872 873 874 875 876 877 879 880 881 885 888 890
|
|
404 GAATL 892 894 897 898 899 907 916 920 921 922 923 924 925 926 928
|
|
404 GAATL 929 932 933 934 936 938 939 941 942 943 944 945 946 948 949
|
|
404 GAATL 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 960 961 962 963 964 968 969 971
|
|
404 GAATL 972 973 974 975 977 978 979 980 981 982 984 985 986 987 988
|
|
404 GAATL 991 992 993 994 995 996 997 998 999
|
|
312 ILCHI 202 204 207 214 220 221 222 224 225 226 227 229 230 233 235
|
|
312 ILCHI 236 237 238 239 241 242 243 245 247 248 252 254 261 262 263
|
|
312 ILCHI 264 265 266 267 268 269 271 273 274 275 276 277 278 280 281
|
|
312 ILCHI 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 292 294 302 306 308 313 321 322
|
|
312 ILCHI 324 326 327 329 332 334 337 338 341 342 346 347 348 353 363
|
|
312 ILCHI 368 372 373 374 375 376 378 379 380 384 404 407 408 410 413
|
|
312 ILCHI 413 415 417 419 421 427 431 434 435 436 440 443 444 445 454
|
|
312 ILCHI 461 463 465 467 468 471 472 476 477 478 483 486 487 488 489
|
|
312 ILCHI 493 507 508 509 514 521 522 523 525 527 528 533 536 538 539
|
|
312 ILCHI 542 545 548 549 558 559 561 565 567 568 569 580 581 582 583
|
|
312 ILCHI 585 586 588 589 591 592 601 602 604 606 609 621 622 624 625
|
|
312 ILCHI 626 630 631 633 637 638 641 642 643 644 645 646 648 649 650
|
|
312 ILCHI 651 660 661 663 664 666 667 670 684 685 686 693 694 701 702
|
|
312 ILCHI 703 704 707 712 715 716 718 721 722 723 725 726 727 728 731
|
|
312 ILCHI 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 743 744 745 750 751 752 753 760
|
|
312 ILCHI 761 762 763 764 765 767 768 769 770 772 774 775 776 777 778
|
|
312 ILCHI 779 781 782 783 784 785 786 787 791 792 793 794 796 797 802
|
|
312 ILCHI 804 805 807 808 812 814 819 821 822 826 828 829 836 838 842
|
|
312 ILCHI 845 846 847 853 854 855 856 861 871 873 874 875 876 878 880
|
|
312 ILCHI 881 883 886 889 890 899 901 902 903 906 907 908 909 915 917
|
|
312 ILCHI 918 921 922 923 924 925 927 928 929 930 933 935 936 938 939
|
|
312 ILCHI 942 943 944 947 951 955 962 973 975 977 978 984 987 988 989
|
|
312 ILCHI 992 993 994 995 996 997
|
|
1 708 ILCHI 200 201 203 205 206 208 209 210 213 215 216 218 223 228 231
|
|
1 708 ILCHI 232 234 240 244 246 249 250 251 253 255 256 257 258 259 260
|
|
1 708 ILCHI 272 279 289 290 291 293 295 296 297 298 299 301 303 304 307
|
|
1 708 ILCHI 310 314 315 316 317 318 319 323 325 328 330 331 333 335 336
|
|
1 708 ILCHI 339 343 344 345 349 350 351 352 354 355 357 358 359 360 361
|
|
1 708 ILCHI 362 364 366 367 369 371 377 381 382 383 385 386 387 388 389
|
|
1 708 ILCHI 390 391 392 393 394 396 397 398 401 402 403 405 406 409 412
|
|
1 708 ILCHI 416 418 420 422 423 424 425 426 428 429 430 432 433 437 438
|
|
1 708 ILCHI 439 441 442 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 455 456 457 458
|
|
1 708 ILCHI 459 460 462 469 470 473 474 475 479 480 481 482 484 485 490
|
|
1 708 ILCHI 491 492 495 496 498 499 501 502 503 504 505 506 510 512 513
|
|
1 708 ILCHI 515 516 517 518 519 520 524 526 529 530 531 532 534 535 537
|
|
1 708 ILCHI 540 541 543 544 547 550 551 560 562 563 564 566 570 571 572
|
|
1 708 ILCHI 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 584 590 593 594 595 596 597 598
|
|
1 708 ILCHI 599 603 605 607 608 612 613 614 615 617 618 619 620 623 627
|
|
1 708 ILCHI 628 629 632 634 635 636 639 640 647 652 653 654 655 656 657
|
|
1 708 ILCHI 658 659 662 665 668 671 672 673 674 675 676 677 678 679 680
|
|
1 708 ILCHI 681 682 687 688 689 690 691 692 695 696 697 698 699 705 706
|
|
1 708 ILCHI 709 713 714 717 719 720 724 729 730 739 741 742 746 747 748
|
|
1 708 ILCHI 749 754 755 756 757 758 759 766 771 773 780 788 789 790 795
|
|
1 708 ILCHI 798 799 801 803 806 810 816 817 818 820 823 824 825 827 830
|
|
1 708 ILCHI 831 832 833 834 835 837 839 840 841 843 844 848 849 850 851
|
|
1 708 ILCHI 852 857 858 859 860 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 870 872
|
|
1 708 ILCHI 877 879 882 884 885 887 888 891 892 893 894 895 896 897 898
|
|
1 708 ILCHI 904 905 910 913 914 916 919 920 926 931 932 934 937 940 941
|
|
1 708 ILCHI 945 946 948 949 952 953 954 956 957 960 961 963 964 965 966
|
|
1 708 ILCHI 967 968 969 971 972 974 979 980 981 982 983 985 986 990 991
|
|
1 708 ILCHI 998
|
|
1 815 ILCHI 254 372 423 424 436 439 469 474 478 485 722 723 725 726 727
|
|
1 815 ILCHI 729 740 741 744 773 774 834 838 886
|
|
317 ININD 200 222 226 228 230 231 232 233 235 236 237 238 239 240 241
|
|
317 ININD 242 243 244 247 248 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 259 261 262
|
|
317 ININD 263 264 265 266 267 269 271 272 273 274 276 277 278 283 290
|
|
317 ININD 291 293 297 298 299 321 322 326 328 335 351 352 353 355 356
|
|
317 ININD 357 359 422 424 425 431 432 439 441 442 443 445 461 462 464
|
|
317 ININD 465 466 467 469 470 471 485 486 488 535 539 541 542 543 545
|
|
317 ININD 546 547 549 556 571 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 630 631
|
|
317 ININD 632 633 634 635 636 637 638 639 681 684 685 686 687 691 694
|
|
317 ININD 736 738 745 769 773 776 780 781 782 783 784 786 787 788 823
|
|
317 ININD 831 835 838 839 841 842 843 844 845 846 848 849 852 856 861
|
|
317 ININD 862 867 870 871 872 873 875 876 877 878 879 881 882 885 887
|
|
317 ININD 888 889 891 892 894 895 896 897 898 899 920 921 923 924 925
|
|
317 ININD 926 927 928 929 976 994 996
|
|
504 LANOR 241 242 243 244 245 246 253 254 255 257 260 271 277 278 279
|
|
504 LANOR 282 283 286 288 340 341 347 348 349 361 362 363 364 366 367
|
|
504 LANOR 368 391 392 393 394 398 431 436 441 443 450 451 454 455 456
|
|
504 LANOR 461 462 464 465 466 467 468 469 482 483 484 486 488 521 522
|
|
504 LANOR 523 524 525 527 528 529 552 561 565 566 568 569 581 582 583
|
|
504 LANOR 584 585 586 587 588 589 592 593 595 596 597 656 662 671 676
|
|
504 LANOR 682 684 689 731 733 734 736 737 738 739 762 821 822 824 826
|
|
504 LANOR 827 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 861 862 865 866 883
|
|
504 LANOR 884 885 887 888 889 891 895 896 897 899 941 942 943 944 945
|
|
504 LANOR 947 948 949 976
|
|
617 MABOS 200 223 224 225 226 227 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 239
|
|
617 MABOS 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 252 253 254 257 258 261 262
|
|
617 MABOS 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 271 274 275 276 277 278 279 280
|
|
617 MABOS 282 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 292 296 298 320 321 322 323
|
|
617 MABOS 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 335 337 338 340 343
|
|
617 MABOS 345 348 349 350 353 354 357 361 362 364 367 375 377 380 381
|
|
617 MABOS 382 387 389 391 393 394 395 396 397 421 423 424 426 427 428
|
|
617 MABOS 429 431 432 434 436 437 438 439 442 444 445 446 449 450 451
|
|
617 MABOS 455 456 457 461 463 464 466 469 471 472 473 479 482 483 484
|
|
617 MABOS 486 487 488 489 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 522 523
|
|
617 MABOS 524 527 532 534 536 538 539 541 542 546 547 552 553 556 558
|
|
617 MABOS 560 561 562 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 576 577
|
|
617 MABOS 578 579 581 586 589 592 593 594 595 596 598 599 621 622 623
|
|
617 MABOS 625 628 629 630 633 635 637 638 641 642 643 646 647 648 654
|
|
617 MABOS 661 662 665 666 669 674 680 684 693 694 695 696 698 720 721
|
|
617 MABOS 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 730 731 732 733 734 735 736
|
|
617 MABOS 737 738 739 740 742 743 748 749 756 770 773 774 776 781 782
|
|
617 MABOS 783 786 787 789 825 841 842 843 845 846 847 848 849 855 859
|
|
617 MABOS 860 861 862 863 864 868 873 876 884 887 889 890 891 893 894
|
|
617 MABOS 895 899 923 924 925 926 929 930 931 932 933 935 936 937 938
|
|
617 MABOS 942 944 945 951 954 955 956 958 962 964 965 966 969 972 973
|
|
617 MABOS 974 979 981 983 984 985
|
|
313 MIAAR 420 426 428 429 434 437 439 449 451 453 454 455 459 475 481
|
|
313 MIAAR 482 483 484 485 486 487 495 572 662 663 665 668 677 747 761
|
|
313 MIAAR 763 764 769 930 936 971 973 981 994 995 996 998
|
|
313 MIDET 222 223 224 225 226 237 240 245 252 255 256 259 267 270 271
|
|
313 MIDET 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 291 292 295 297 298 320 321 322
|
|
313 MIDET 323 328 330 331 336 337 341 342 343 345 361 365 366 368 369
|
|
313 MIDET 371 372 381 382 383 386 388 389 390 393 396 430 431 436 438
|
|
313 MIDET 440 441 444 446 448 460 491 493 494 496 499 520 521 526 527
|
|
313 MIDET 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 554 556 560 561 562 563 564
|
|
313 MIDET 565 567 568 571 577 579 581 582 584 592 593 594 596 599 630
|
|
313 MIDET 690 745 770 780 821 822 823 824 829 831 832 833 834 835 836
|
|
313 MIDET 837 838 839 841 842 843 845 846 849 861 862 863 864 865 866
|
|
313 MIDET 867 868 869 871 872 873 874 875 876 881 882 883 884 885 886
|
|
313 MIDET 891 892 893 894 895 896 897 898 899 921 922 923 924 925 926
|
|
313 MIDET 927 928 929 931 933 934 935 937 940 943 945 956 961 962 963
|
|
313 MIDET 964 965 966 972 974 976 980 983 993
|
|
612 MNMIN 220 221 222 223 224 227 228 229 290 291 292 293 296 297 298
|
|
612 MNMIN 323 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343
|
|
612 MNMIN 344 347 348 349 368 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379
|
|
612 MNMIN 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434
|
|
612 MNMIN 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450
|
|
612 MNMIN 451 452 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 469 470
|
|
612 MNMIN 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 481 482 483 484 487 488
|
|
612 MNMIN 489 490 491 492 493 494 496 497 498 499 520 521 522 526 527
|
|
612 MNMIN 529 533 534 535 536 537 538 540 541 542 544 545 546 552 553
|
|
612 MNMIN 557 559 560 561 566 569 571 572 574 588 591 593 620 621 622
|
|
612 MNMIN 623 624 625 626 627 631 633 635 636 638 639 640 641 642 643
|
|
612 MNMIN 644 645 646 647 648 649 653 663 667 673 681 683 687 688 690
|
|
612 MNMIN 696 698 699 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 730 731
|
|
612 MNMIN 733 735 736 737 738 739 741 750 753 754 755 757 770 771 772
|
|
612 MNMIN 774 776 777 778 779 780 781 782 784 785 786 788 789 822 823
|
|
612 MNMIN 824 825 827 828 829 830 831 832 835 851 853 854 858 861 863
|
|
612 MNMIN 865 866 867 868 869 870 871 872 874 879 881 884 885 887 888
|
|
612 MNMIN 890 891 892 893 894 895 896 897 920 921 922 924 925 926 927
|
|
612 MNMIN 929 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 941 942 944 949 976
|
|
612 MNMIN 977 989
|
|
816 MOKCI 221 223 224 225 228 229 231 234 241 242 243 245 246 247 251
|
|
816 MOKCI 252 254 257 274 275 276 283 292 322 331 333 346 348 353 356
|
|
816 MOKCI 358 361 363 373 374 391 395 421 426 435 436 444 452 453 454
|
|
816 MOKCI 455 459 461 464 466 468 471 472 474 478 483 497 521 523 524
|
|
816 MOKCI 525 531 532 537 556 561 572 576 578 587 589 591 654 698 734
|
|
816 MOKCI 737 741 743 751 753 756 757 759 761 763 765 767 781 792 795
|
|
816 MOKCI 796 821 822 833 836 842 844 854 861 871 881 891 921 922 923
|
|
816 MOKCI 924 926 931 932 941 942 943 966 968 995 997
|
|
1 913 MOKCI 236 262 268 281 287 299 321 334 339 341 342 345 362 371 375
|
|
1 913 MOKCI 381 383 384 422 432 441 451 469 491 492 541 551 573 574 576
|
|
1 913 MOKCI 588 596 599 621 631 642 648 649 661 676 677 681 721 722 724
|
|
1 913 MOKCI 764 780 782 787 788 791 829 831 888 894 897 962 967
|
|
314 MOSLO 225 227 231 232 233 234 235 241 247 253 259 261 263 268 275
|
|
314 MOSLO 277 289 291 296 298 321 331 342 343 344 349 351 352 353 355
|
|
314 MOSLO 361 362 367 371 381 382 383 385 388 389 391 394 421 423 424
|
|
314 MOSLO 425 426 427 428 429 432 434 436 441 444 454 458 464 466 469
|
|
314 MOSLO 476 481 487 489 521 522 523 524 525 529 531 532 533 534 535
|
|
314 MOSLO 538 539 541 542 544 551 553 554 567 569 571 572 576 577 578
|
|
314 MOSLO 595 621 622 623 631 638 644 645 647 652 653 658 664 671 677
|
|
314 MOSLO 679 694 721 725 726 727 731 739 741 746 747 752 755 758 768
|
|
314 MOSLO 771 772 773 776 777 781 791 795 821 822 823 826 829 831 832
|
|
314 MOSLO 836 837 838 839 841 842 843 845 846 848 849 851 854 855 862
|
|
314 MOSLO 863 865 867 868 869 871 872 878 879 889 891 892 894 895 899
|
|
314 MOSLO 921 928 938 939 941 942 946 947 949 957 961 962 963 965 966
|
|
314 MOSLO 968 969 973 982 984 991 992 993 994 997
|
|
1 618 MOSLO 271 274 337 451 452 482 583 797
|
|
919 NCRTP 248 254 266 269 280 286 361 362 365 382 383 387 460 467 469
|
|
919 NCRTP 470 471 477 479 481 489 490 493 528 530 541 543 544 546 549
|
|
919 NCRTP 560 575 596 598 620 660 662 664 677 681 682 683 684 687 688
|
|
919 NCRTP 733 737 740 755 772 779 781 782 783 787 790 821 828 829 831
|
|
919 NCRTP 832 833 834 836 839 840 846 847 848 850 851 856 859 860 870
|
|
919 NCRTP 872 876 878 880 881 890 899 929 932 933 941 942 956 962 966
|
|
919 NCRTP 967 968 976 990 991 992
|
|
908 NJNBR 202 205 214 218 220 225 231 238 246 247 248 249 251 254 257
|
|
908 NJNBR 271 274 283 287 297 302 306 321 324 329 356 360 390 406 407
|
|
908 NJNBR 412 417 418 422 424 442 457 463 469 494 510 519 524 525 526
|
|
908 NJNBR 545 548 549 560 561 562 563 572 602 603 607 613 632 634 636
|
|
908 NJNBR 658 668 679 685 699 704 707 715 721 722 723 725 727 738 745
|
|
908 NJNBR 750 752 753 754 755 756 757 769 805 819 821 826 828 844 846
|
|
908 NJNBR 855 873 878 880 883 885 906 932 937 954 968 980 981 985
|
|
201 NJNEW 200 207 216 217 224 226 227 228 232 233 235 239 241 242 245
|
|
201 NJNEW 256 259 266 268 272 273 276 277 278 279 284 288 289 298 301
|
|
201 NJNEW 304 305 309 312 313 314 315 317 318 319 322 325 330 332 333
|
|
201 NJNEW 338 339 340 342 343 344 345 346 348 351 352 353 354 355 365
|
|
201 NJNEW 368 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 381 382 386 388 392
|
|
201 NJNEW 393 394 396 399 401 403 408 413 414 416 419 420 421 423 427
|
|
201 NJNEW 428 429 430 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 440 441 450 451 456
|
|
201 NJNEW 460 461 464 465 467 468 470 471 472 473 474 478 480 481 482
|
|
201 NJNEW 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 499 503 504 507 509 514 515 516
|
|
201 NJNEW 522 523 527 533 535 541 546 547 558 564 565 567 568 569 570
|
|
201 NJNEW 574 575 578 581 582 585 587 589 592 593 594 595 596 601 602
|
|
201 NJNEW 608 614 617 621 622 623 624 626 628 633 634 635 636 641 642
|
|
201 NJNEW 643 645 646 648 649 653 654 656 659 661 662 665 667 669 672
|
|
201 NJNEW 673 674 675 676 677 678 680 684 686 687 688 690 692 694 695
|
|
201 NJNEW 696 701 703 705 708 709 712 714 716 731 733 736 737 740 742
|
|
201 NJNEW 743 744 746 748 750 751 759 760 761 762 763 765 771 772 773
|
|
201 NJNEW 777 778 779 783 785 789 790 791 792 794 795 796 797 798 801
|
|
201 NJNEW 802 803 804 807 808 812 814 815 816 817 820 822 823 824 833
|
|
201 NJNEW 836 837 843 845 851 854 855 857 858 860 861 862 863 864 865
|
|
201 NJNEW 866 867 868 869 871 877 881 882 884 886 887 889 890 893 894
|
|
201 NJNEW 896 902 904 907 909 912 913 915 916 923 925 926 931 933 935
|
|
201 NJNEW 939 941 942 943 944 945 947 952 955 956 960 961 963 964 965
|
|
201 NJNEW 966 969 977 991 992 994 997 998
|
|
1 908 NJNEW 200 232 233 241 245 272 273 276 277 289 298 317 322 351 352
|
|
1 908 NJNEW 353 354 355 381 382 388 396 419 464 474 486 499 522 527 541
|
|
1 908 NJNEW 558 574 582 594 602 634 636 654 665 686 687 688 709 737 750
|
|
1 908 NJNEW 760 771 789 815 820 851 855 862 889 913 925 931 964 965 969
|
|
516 NYHEM 220 221 222 223 227 228 229 235 236 237 238 239 248 249 252
|
|
516 NYHEM 255 264 270 285 292 293 294 295 296 299 326 328 333 334 335
|
|
516 NYHEM 336 338 346 349 352 354 355 357 358 364 365 367 371 374 378
|
|
516 NYHEM 379 383 384 391 394 420 431 432 433 437 454 463 466 481 482
|
|
516 NYHEM 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 496 520 521 522 526 531 535 536
|
|
516 NYHEM 538 541 542 546 559 560 561 562 564 565 566 568 569 573 574
|
|
516 NYHEM 575 576 577 579 593 596 598 599 621 623 624 625 626 627 628
|
|
516 NYHEM 629 644 647 656 658 659 663 671 674 676 677 678 679 681 682
|
|
516 NYHEM 683 684 686 691 692 694 731 733 735 739 741 742 745 746 747
|
|
516 NYHEM 752 753 755 756 759 763 764 766 767 773 775 777 781 783 785
|
|
516 NYHEM 789 791 794 795 796 797 798 799 822 823 824 825 826 829 832
|
|
516 NYHEM 833 842 844 845 847 867 868 869 872 873 876 877 883 887 889
|
|
516 NYHEM 890 897 921 922 925 926 931 932 933 934 935 937 938 939 942
|
|
516 NYHEM 943 944 949 997
|
|
212 NYNYO 200 205 206 207 208 210 213 214 216 218 219 220 221 222 223
|
|
212 NYNYO 225 226 227 228 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240
|
|
212 NYNYO 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 254 255 260
|
|
212 NYNYO 262 264 265 266 267 268 269 272 276 277 279 280 281 283 285
|
|
212 NYNYO 286 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 301 302
|
|
212 NYNYO 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 312 313 314 315 316 319 320
|
|
212 NYNYO 321 322 323 324 325 326 328 329 330 333 334 335 337 339 340
|
|
212 NYNYO 341 342 344 346 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358
|
|
212 NYNYO 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 367 368 369 370 371 373 374 378
|
|
212 NYNYO 379 380 382 385 390 391 392 393 395 396 397 398 399 401 402
|
|
212 NYNYO 404 406 407 408 409 410 412 413 414 415 416 418 419 420 421
|
|
212 NYNYO 422 425 427 428 430 431 432 433 436 437 439 440 446 447 448
|
|
212 NYNYO 449 451 452 453 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 463 464 465 466
|
|
212 NYNYO 467 468 469 472 473 474 475 476 477 480 481 482 483 484 485
|
|
212 NYNYO 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 495 496 502 503 504 505 506
|
|
212 NYNYO 508 509 510 512 513 514 515 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524
|
|
212 NYNYO 525 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 541 542
|
|
212 NYNYO 543 545 546 547 548 549 551 552 553 554 556 557 558 559 560
|
|
212 NYNYO 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575
|
|
212 NYNYO 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590
|
|
212 NYNYO 593 594 595 597 598 599 601 602 603 605 606 607 608 609 610
|
|
212 NYNYO 612 613 614 616 617 618 619 620 621 623 624 625 627 628 629
|
|
212 NYNYO 632 633 635 637 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 648 649 650 652
|
|
212 NYNYO 653 654 655 656 657 658 659 661 662 663 664 665 666 667 668
|
|
212 NYNYO 669 671 673 674 675 676 677 678 679 681 682 683 684 685 686
|
|
212 NYNYO 687 688 689 690 691 692 693 694 695 696 697 698 701 702 703
|
|
212 NYNYO 704 705 707 708 709 711 713 714 715 716 717 719 720 721 722
|
|
212 NYNYO 724 725 727 730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 740 741 742 744
|
|
212 NYNYO 745 746 747 749 750 751 752 753 754 755 757 758 759 760 761
|
|
212 NYNYO 764 765 766 767 768 769 770 772 775 776 777 779 781 785 786
|
|
212 NYNYO 787 790 791 792 793 794 795 796 797 798 799 804 806 807 808
|
|
212 NYNYO 809 812 813 815 818 819 820 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829
|
|
212 NYNYO 830 831 832 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 844 847 848 850 852
|
|
212 NYNYO 853 854 855 856 858 860 861 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869
|
|
212 NYNYO 870 871 872 873 874 876 877 878 879 880 881 882 883 884 885
|
|
212 NYNYO 886 887 888 889 891 892 893 898 899 901 902 903 904 905 906
|
|
212 NYNYO 907 908 909 912 916 918 920 921 922 923 924 925 926 927 928
|
|
212 NYNYO 929 930 931 932 933 935 936 938 940 941 942 943 944 945 947
|
|
212 NYNYO 949 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 960 962 963 964 966 967 968
|
|
212 NYNYO 969 971 972 973 974 975 977 978 979 980 982 983 984 985 986
|
|
212 NYNYO 988 989 991 992 993 994 995 996 997 998 999
|
|
1 516 NYNYO 221 222 223 227 228 229 235 236 237 238 239 248 249 252 255
|
|
1 516 NYNYO 264 270 285 292 293 294 295 296 299 326 328 333 334 336 338
|
|
1 516 NYNYO 346 349 352 354 357 358 364 365 367 371 374 378 379 391 420
|
|
1 516 NYNYO 431 432 433 437 454 463 466 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488
|
|
1 516 NYNYO 489 496 520 521 526 531 535 536 538 541 542 546 559 560 561
|
|
1 516 NYNYO 562 564 565 566 568 569 574 575 576 577 579 593 596 598 599
|
|
1 516 NYNYO 621 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 644 647 656 658 663 671 674
|
|
1 516 NYNYO 676 677 678 679 681 682 683 684 686 691 692 694 731 733 735
|
|
1 516 NYNYO 739 741 742 745 746 747 752 753 755 756 759 763 764 766 767
|
|
1 516 NYNYO 773 775 781 783 785 789 791 794 795 796 797 798 799 822 823
|
|
1 516 NYNYO 824 825 826 829 832 842 844 845 847 867 868 869 872 873 876
|
|
1 516 NYNYO 877 883 887 889 890 897 921 922 926 931 932 933 934 935 937
|
|
1 516 NYNYO 938 939 942 943 944 949 997
|
|
1 718 NYNYO 200 204 209 217 221 224 225 229 230 232 233 234 235 236 237
|
|
1 718 NYNYO 238 240 241 244 247 248 251 252 253 256 257 258 259 260 261
|
|
1 718 NYNYO 262 263 265 266 267 268 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278
|
|
1 718 NYNYO 279 282 284 287 291 296 297 317 318 321 322 326 327 330 331
|
|
1 718 NYNYO 332 335 336 337 338 339 341 342 343 345 346 347 349 351 352
|
|
1 718 NYNYO 353 354 356 357 358 359 360 361 363 366 370 372 373 375 376
|
|
1 718 NYNYO 377 380 381 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 392 395 397 398
|
|
1 718 NYNYO 403 417 421 423 424 426 428 429 434 435 436 438 439 441 442
|
|
1 718 NYNYO 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458
|
|
1 718 NYNYO 459 461 462 463 464 465 467 468 469 470 471 474 476 478 479
|
|
1 718 NYNYO 480 481 482 485 486 489 492 493 494 495 497 498 499 507 520
|
|
1 718 NYNYO 522 523 525 526 527 528 529 531 533 539 541 544 545 552 557
|
|
1 718 NYNYO 565 571 574 575 591 592 596 599 604 615 622 624 625 626 627
|
|
1 718 NYNYO 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 636 638 639 641 642 643 644 645
|
|
1 718 NYNYO 646 647 648 649 651 656 657 658 659 667 670 672 680 692 693
|
|
1 718 NYNYO 694 698 699 706 712 720 721 723 726 727 728 729 735 738 739
|
|
1 718 NYNYO 740 743 745 746 748 754 755 756 760 761 762 763 764 767 768
|
|
1 718 NYNYO 769 771 773 774 776 778 779 780 782 783 784 786 788 789 793
|
|
1 718 NYNYO 797 802 803 805 816 821 826 827 830 831 832 833 834 835 836
|
|
1 718 NYNYO 837 843 845 846 847 848 849 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858
|
|
1 718 NYNYO 859 868 871 875 876 883 886 891 894 895 896 897 898 899 917
|
|
1 718 NYNYO 919 921 922 927 932 934 935 937 938 939 941 942 945 946 948
|
|
1 718 NYNYO 949 951 953 955 956 961 962 963 965 966 967 968 969 972 977
|
|
1 718 NYNYO 978 979 981 983 984 987 990 995 996 997 998 999
|
|
1 914 NYNYO 235 237 251 253 270 282 285 286 287 288 289 321 328 332 333
|
|
1 914 NYNYO 335 337 345 347 375 376 378 381 390 391 395 397 422 423 428
|
|
1 914 NYNYO 472 476 478 523 524 576 591 592 631 632 633 636 641 642 644
|
|
1 914 NYNYO 654 662 664 665 667 668 674 681 682 683 684 686 693 694 696
|
|
1 914 NYNYO 697 698 699 721 723 725 738 761 768 771 776 779 784 789 792
|
|
1 914 NYNYO 793 833 834 835 899 921 925 933 934 935 937 939 946 948 949
|
|
1 914 NYNYO 961 963 964 965 967 968 969 993 997
|
|
216 OHCLE 221 226 228 229 231 232 234 235 236 237 238 241 243 247 248
|
|
216 OHCLE 249 251 252 261 265 266 267 268 271 278 281 283 289 291 292
|
|
216 OHCLE 295 299 321 328 331 333 338 341 344 348 349 351 356 361 362
|
|
216 OHCLE 363 368 371 381 382 383 389 391 397 398 421 423 425 429 431
|
|
216 OHCLE 432 433 439 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 449 451 459 461 463
|
|
216 OHCLE 464 467 468 469 471 473 475 476 479 481 486 487 491 521 522
|
|
216 OHCLE 523 524 526 529 531 541 543 561 562 566 572 574 575 578 579
|
|
216 OHCLE 581 582 585 586 587 589 591 621 622 623 631 634 641 642 646
|
|
216 OHCLE 651 656 659 661 662 663 664 671 676 681 687 689 691 692 694
|
|
216 OHCLE 696 721 728 729 731 732 734 736 737 741 749 751 752 754 761
|
|
216 OHCLE 765 766 771 777 779 781 789 791 795 822 826 831 835 838 842
|
|
216 OHCLE 843 844 845 851 861 871 881 883 884 885 886 888 891 892 899
|
|
216 OHCLE 921 931 932 941 942 943 944 946 951 953 961 975 987 991 995
|
|
614 OHCOL 221 222 223 224 225 227 228 229 231 235 236 237 238 239 243
|
|
614 OHCOL 248 249 251 252 253 258 261 262 263 265 267 268 271 272 274
|
|
614 OHCOL 275 276 278 279 281 288 291 292 293 294 296 297 299 325 329
|
|
614 OHCOL 337 338 341 351 361 365 371 395 421 424 431 433 436 438 442
|
|
614 OHCOL 443 444 445 447 451 457 459 460 461 462 463 464 466 469 471
|
|
614 OHCOL 475 476 478 479 481 486 487 488 491 492 497 523 538 548 575
|
|
614 OHCOL 621 644 645 752 755 756 759 761 764 766 771 777 785 786 791
|
|
614 OHCOL 792 793 794 821 833 836 837 841 842 846 847 848 851 852 855
|
|
614 OHCOL 860 861 863 864 866 868 870 871 875 876 877 878 879 881 882
|
|
614 OHCOL 885 888 889 890 891 895 898 899 927 964 965
|
|
503 ORPOR 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234
|
|
503 ORPOR 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 248 249 250
|
|
503 ORPOR 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 273 274 275 279 280 281 282 283
|
|
503 ORPOR 284 285 286 287 288 289 291 292 293 294 295 297 299 323 324
|
|
503 ORPOR 326 335 357 359 452 464 526 591 620 621 624 625 626 627 628
|
|
503 ORPOR 629 630 631 632 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 645
|
|
503 ORPOR 646 647 648 649 650 652 653 654 655 656 657 658 659 661 663
|
|
503 ORPOR 665 666 667 668 669 677 681 682 684 685 690 691 692 693 694
|
|
503 ORPOR 695 696 697 698 721 731 733 760 761 771 774 775 777 778 781
|
|
503 ORPOR 789 790 796 936 976 985
|
|
215 PAPHI 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 231 232 233 235 236 237
|
|
215 PAPHI 238 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 254 259 260 263 265 270
|
|
215 PAPHI 271 272 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 283 284 288 289 291 293
|
|
215 PAPHI 299 324 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 341
|
|
215 PAPHI 342 349 350 351 352 353 354 356 359 365 379 382 386 387 389
|
|
215 PAPHI 422 423 424 425 426 427 438 440 446 447 448 449 450 452 455
|
|
215 PAPHI 456 457 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 470 471 472 473
|
|
215 PAPHI 474 476 477 480 482 483 485 487 490 492 494 496 497 499 520
|
|
215 PAPHI 521 522 523 525 526 527 528 531 532 533 534 535 537 539 540
|
|
215 PAPHI 542 543 544 545 546 548 549 551 552 553 557 560 561 563 564
|
|
215 PAPHI 565 566 567 568 569 570 572 573 574 576 577 578 580 581 583
|
|
215 PAPHI 585 586 587 590 591 592 595 596 597 620 621 622 623 624 625
|
|
215 PAPHI 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 634 635 636 637 638 639 641 642
|
|
215 PAPHI 643 645 646 649 653 657 659 660 662 663 664 665 667 668 671
|
|
215 PAPHI 673 676 677 680 684 685 686 687 688 690 697 698 722 724 725
|
|
215 PAPHI 726 727 728 729 732 734 735 737 739 742 743 744 745 747 748
|
|
215 PAPHI 751 753 755 761 763 765 768 769 782 784 786 787 789 790 823
|
|
215 PAPHI 824 825 828 829 830 831 833 834 835 836 839 840 841 842 843
|
|
215 PAPHI 844 846 848 849 851 853 854 864 870 871 872 874 875 876 877
|
|
215 PAPHI 878 879 880 881 884 885 886 887 891 892 893 894 895 896 897
|
|
215 PAPHI 898 899 920 922 923 924 925 927 928 930 931 934 936 937 938
|
|
215 PAPHI 940 941 947 951 952 955 960 961 962 963 964 969 971 972 973
|
|
215 PAPHI 975 977 978 980 981 985 986 988 990 991 998
|
|
412 PAPIT 200 221 227 231 232 234 236 237 241 242 243 244 247 255 256
|
|
412 PAPIT 257 261 262 263 264 268 269 271 273 276 279 281 288 298 321
|
|
412 PAPIT 322 323 328 331 333 338 341 343 344 351 355 359 361 362 363
|
|
412 PAPIT 364 365 366 367 369 371 372 373 374 381 389 391 392 393 394
|
|
412 PAPIT 421 422 427 429 431 433 434 441 442 456 461 462 464 466 469
|
|
412 PAPIT 471 472 476 481 486 487 488 491 492 497 521 531 551 553 561
|
|
412 PAPIT 562 563 565 566 571 572 578 594 621 622 623 624 633 636 642
|
|
412 PAPIT 644 645 647 648 653 655 661 664 665 672 673 674 675 678 681
|
|
412 PAPIT 682 683 687 692 699 731 734 741 747 749 751 754 761 762 765
|
|
412 PAPIT 766 767 771 777 778 781 782 784 787 788 793 795 798 821 822
|
|
412 PAPIT 823 824 825 826 828 829 831 833 835 840 854 855 856 858 859
|
|
412 PAPIT 881 882 884 885 889 892 921 922 923 928 931 936 937 939 961
|
|
412 PAPIT 963 967
|
|
1 601 TNMEM 342 349 393 781 851
|
|
901 TNMEM 227 272 274 276 278 320 323 324 325 327 332 344 345 346 348
|
|
901 TNMEM 353 357 358 360 362 363 365 366 367 368 369 371 372 373 375
|
|
901 TNMEM 377 382 385 386 387 388 395 396 397 398 452 454 458 465 475
|
|
901 TNMEM 476 483 484 485 486 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 531
|
|
901 TNMEM 532 533 535 543 544 572 575 576 577 578 579 597 654 678 681
|
|
901 TNMEM 682 683 684 685 721 722 725 726 728 729 743 744 745 747 748
|
|
901 TNMEM 752 753 754 755 756 757 758 761 762 763 765 766 767 774 775
|
|
901 TNMEM 785 789 794 795 797 829 853 854 867 872 873 876 877 922 942
|
|
901 TNMEM 946 947 948 976
|
|
512 TXAUS 218 219 243 244 247 250 251 255 258 259 261 263 264 266 267
|
|
512 TXAUS 272 276 280 282 288 292 320 322 323 326 327 328 329 331 335
|
|
512 TXAUS 338 339 343 345 346 356 369 370 371 385 386 388 389 390 397
|
|
512 TXAUS 403 416 422 440 441 442 443 444 445 447 448 450 451 452 453
|
|
512 TXAUS 454 458 459 461 462 463 465 467 469 471 472 473 474 475 476
|
|
512 TXAUS 477 478 479 480 482 483 495 499 750 794 823 832 834 835 836
|
|
512 TXAUS 837 838 860 867 870 873 891 892 926 928 929 940 941 973 984
|
|
512 TXAUS 990
|
|
214 TXDAL 202 203 204 205 212 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225
|
|
214 TXDAL 226 227 228 229 230 231 233 234 235 238 239 240 241 242 243
|
|
214 TXDAL 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258
|
|
214 TXDAL 259 260 262 263 264 266 269 270 271 272 275 276 278 279 281
|
|
214 TXDAL 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 293 296 298 299 301 302 303
|
|
214 TXDAL 305 306 307 308 309 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 323
|
|
214 TXDAL 324 327 328 330 331 332 333 336 337 339 340 341 343 348 349
|
|
214 TXDAL 350 351 352 353 357 358 360 361 363 368 369 371 372 373 374
|
|
214 TXDAL 375 376 380 381 384 385 386 387 388 391 392 393 394 397 398
|
|
214 TXDAL 399 401 402 403 404 406 407 412 413 414 416 417 418 420 421
|
|
214 TXDAL 422 423 424 426 428 434 436 437 438 441 442 443 444 445 446
|
|
214 TXDAL 450 453 456 458 462 464 466 470 471 475 480 484 487 490 492
|
|
214 TXDAL 494 495 497 502 503 504 506 508 513 514 516 517 518 519 520
|
|
214 TXDAL 521 522 526 528 530 533 539 541 550 553 554 556 557 558 559
|
|
214 TXDAL 565 570 573 574 575 578 579 580 590 591 594 596 601 602 603
|
|
214 TXDAL 604 605 606 607 608 609 612 613 615 616 618 620 621 630 631
|
|
214 TXDAL 634 637 638 641 642 644 647 650 651 653 655 658 659 660 661
|
|
214 TXDAL 669 670 676 680 681 686 688 689 690 691 692 696 698 699 701
|
|
214 TXDAL 702 704 705 706 707 708 709 712 713 714 715 716 717 718 720
|
|
214 TXDAL 721 724 727 733 739 740 741 742 744 745 746 747 748 749 750
|
|
214 TXDAL 751 754 760 761 767 770 771 780 781 783 787 788 790 791 799
|
|
214 TXDAL 804 808 812 815 818 819 820 821 823 824 826 827 828 830 840
|
|
214 TXDAL 841 844 850 851 855 864 867 869 871 879 880 881 888 890 891
|
|
214 TXDAL 902 904 905 907 909 913 917 918 919 920 922 929 931 933 934
|
|
214 TXDAL 939 941 942 943 944 946 948 949 951 952 953 954 956 957 960
|
|
214 TXDAL 964 969 977 978 979 980 985 986 987 988 991 992 993 995 996
|
|
214 TXDAL 997 999
|
|
1 817 TXDAL 261 265 267 268 273 329 355 356 366 379 421 424 425 429 430
|
|
1 817 TXDAL 432 449 450 461 467 469 475 477 481 498 530 540 543 572 577
|
|
1 817 TXDAL 588 589 640 654 667 671 679 695 784 792 832 856 884 890 922
|
|
1 817 TXDAL 925 929 930 961 962 963 967
|
|
713 TXHOU 200 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 233 235 236
|
|
713 TXHOU 237 238 240 241 242 244 246 247 252 253 254 261 263 264 265
|
|
713 TXHOU 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 274 277 278 280 282 283 284 285
|
|
713 TXHOU 286 287 289 293 295 320 324 326 328 331 332 333 334 335 336
|
|
713 TXHOU 337 338 339 341 342 343 346 347 350 351 353 354 355 356 358
|
|
713 TXHOU 359 360 363 364 367 370 371 373 374 376 377 378 383 388 390
|
|
713 TXHOU 391 392 393 394 395 420 421 422 424 425 426 427 428 431 432
|
|
713 TXHOU 433 434 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448
|
|
713 TXHOU 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463
|
|
713 TXHOU 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478
|
|
713 TXHOU 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493
|
|
713 TXHOU 494 495 496 497 498 499 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528
|
|
713 TXHOU 529 530 531 535 536 537 540 541 542 546 547 548 549 550 551
|
|
713 TXHOU 552 556 558 561 563 565 568 571 575 577 578 579 580 583 584
|
|
713 TXHOU 586 587 588 589 590 591 596 599 620 621 622 623 626 627 629
|
|
713 TXHOU 630 631 633 635 636 639 640 641 643 644 645 649 650 651 652
|
|
713 TXHOU 653 654 655 656 657 658 659 660 661 662 663 664 665 666 667
|
|
713 TXHOU 668 669 670 671 672 673 674 675 676 678 679 680 681 682 683
|
|
713 TXHOU 684 685 686 688 690 691 692 694 695 696 697 699 720 721 723
|
|
713 TXHOU 726 728 729 731 732 733 734 738 739 741 744 746 747 748 749
|
|
713 TXHOU 750 751 752 753 754 757 758 759 761 762 763 764 765 768 769
|
|
713 TXHOU 771 772 774 775 776 777 778 779 780 781 782 783 784 785 786
|
|
713 TXHOU 787 788 789 790 791 792 793 794 795 796 797 798 799 820 821
|
|
713 TXHOU 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 831 833 834 835 836 840 841
|
|
713 TXHOU 842 844 845 846 847 850 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 861
|
|
713 TXHOU 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 870 871 872 873 874 875 876
|
|
713 TXHOU 877 878 879 880 882 883 884 886 888 890 891 892 893 894 895
|
|
713 TXHOU 896 897 898 899 920 921 922 923 924 926 928 929 930 931 932
|
|
713 TXHOU 933 935 937 938 939 940 941 943 944 946 947 948 951 952 953
|
|
713 TXHOU 954 955 956 957 960 961 963 964 965 966 967 968 969 971 972
|
|
713 TXHOU 973 974 975 977 978 980 981 983 984 985 986 987 988 989 991
|
|
713 TXHOU 992 993 995 996 997 998 999
|
|
801 UTSLC 220 237 240 250 251 252 254 255 261 262 263 264 265 266 268
|
|
801 UTSLC 269 272 273 277 278 287 292 295 298 299 321 322 328 350 355
|
|
801 UTSLC 359 363 364 366 451 460 461 466 467 468 480 481 482 483 484
|
|
801 UTSLC 485 486 487 488 521 522 524 526 530 531 532 533 534 535 536
|
|
801 UTSLC 537 538 539 543 544 546 547 549 561 562 565 566 569 570 571
|
|
801 UTSLC 572 573 575 576 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 588 594 595
|
|
801 UTSLC 596 633 799 933 942 943 944 947 964 965 966 967 968 969 972
|
|
801 UTSLC 973 974 975 977
|
|
206 WASEA 223 224 226 227 228 232 233 234 235 236 237 241 242 243 244
|
|
206 WASEA 246 248 251 255 271 277 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 292 296
|
|
206 WASEA 298 320 322 323 324 325 326 328 329 340 343 344 345 346 358
|
|
206 WASEA 361 362 363 364 365 367 368 382 386 389 391 392 393 394 395
|
|
206 WASEA 421 431 432 433 439 441 442 443 447 448 451 453 454 455 461
|
|
206 WASEA 462 464 467 477 481 483 485 486 487 488 489 522 523 524 525
|
|
206 WASEA 526 527 528 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 554 557 562 575 583
|
|
206 WASEA 585 587 621 622 623 624 625 626 628 630 631 632 633 634 635
|
|
206 WASEA 637 639 641 643 644 646 649 654 655 656 657 661 662 667 670
|
|
206 WASEA 672 682 684 685 720 721 722 723 725 726 727 728 742 743 744
|
|
206 WASEA 745 746 747 762 763 764 767 768 771 772 773 774 775 776 778
|
|
206 WASEA 781 782 783 784 787 788 789 820 821 822 823 824 827 828 836
|
|
206 WASEA 838 839 842 850 852 854 859 861 865 867 868 869 870 872 874
|
|
206 WASEA 878 880 881 882 883 885 889 930 932 933 935 936 937 938 940
|
|
206 WASEA 941 946 947 948 949 953 954 955 965 969 972 977 979 982 986
|
|
206 WASEA 989 991 993 994 995 996 997 998 999
|
|
414 WIMIL 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 237 241 242 243 246 251
|
|
414 WIMIL 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 263 264 265 266 271 272 273
|
|
414 WIMIL 274 276 277 278 281 282 283 287 288 289 291 297 298 299 321
|
|
414 WIMIL 322 323 327 332 341 342 343 344 345 347 351 352 353 354 355
|
|
414 WIMIL 357 358 359 362 365 367 372 374 375 377 382 383 384 385 421
|
|
414 WIMIL 422 423 425 427 438 442 444 445 447 449 453 454 461 462 463
|
|
414 WIMIL 464 466 471 475 476 481 482 483 486 491 521 523 524 527 529
|
|
414 WIMIL 535 536 538 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 562 575 579
|
|
414 WIMIL 581 643 645 647 649 662 663 671 672 678 679 691 744 747 761
|
|
414 WIMIL 762 764 765 768 769 771 774 778 781 782 783 784 785 786 789
|
|
414 WIMIL 791 792 796 797 798 799 821 835 844 871 873 874 881 896 931
|
|
414 WIMIL 933 935 936 937 941 955 961 962 963 964 966
|
|
|
|
Conclusion
|
|
----------
|
|
|
|
I could hardly take credit for scanning and finding the NUAs that make
|
|
make up this list. I put this list together because the lists I've seen
|
|
in the past were either partially incomplete or partially incorrect. A
|
|
list put out by OpusWiz and Dawn Treader several years ago served as the
|
|
base data for this list. I've spoken to many many hackers over the years
|
|
to add to and correct the list. Erik Bloodaxe's Telenet Directory,
|
|
published in the Legion of Doom Technical Journals, was of great help in
|
|
clarifying and adding to the data.
|
|
|
|
The list is still neither complete or fully accurate. For example, I still
|
|
don't know the outdials for San Diego, California (619). The 415 and 714
|
|
outdials might be mixed up. If you have any additions or corrections, please
|
|
e/mail one of my Internet accounts.
|
|
|
|
By the way, the new 510 area code will have an impact on the PC Pursuit
|
|
dialout list. SprintNet hasn't incorporated the new area code into its
|
|
lists yet, so I haven't either. But they will soon, so be aware that the
|
|
Oakland, California dialout will change from area code 415 to 510 someday.
|
|
_____________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
|
|
== Phrack Inc. ==
|
|
|
|
Volume Three, Issue Thirty-five, File 5 of 13
|
|
|
|
______________________________________________________________
|
|
|| ||
|
|
|| Don't let THIS happen to you! ||
|
|
|| ||
|
|
|| __________ ||
|
|
|| Heh | |/No life, no future... ||
|
|
|| /Heh! | 0 H S L Q I F X ||
|
|
|| O | --|-- ||
|
|
|| --|-- | / \ ||
|
|
|| / \ | / \ ||
|
|
|| / \____|____ E N _ R _ P M E N _ ||
|
|
|| Dale ^ ||
|
|
|| Drew | ||
|
|
|| Will this be YOU?! ||
|
|
||______________________________________________________________||
|
|
|
|
|
|
The following is a reprint of the article "Sting Operations" from the book
|
|
_Dedicated Computer Crime Units_ (pages 101-103) written by J. Thomas McEwen
|
|
for the U.S. Department of Justice and published in June 1989.
|
|
|
|
If you would like to get your own FREE copy of this book, or its companion
|
|
books:
|
|
|
|
- Organizing for Computer Crime Investigation and Prosecution
|
|
- Electronic Fund Transfer and Crime
|
|
- Electronic Fund Transfer Fraud
|
|
|
|
you can contact:
|
|
|
|
U.S. Department of Justice
|
|
Office of Justice Programs
|
|
National Institute of Justice
|
|
Washington, D.C. 20531
|
|
(301)251-5500
|
|
(800)851-3420
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
S T I N G O P E R A T I O N S
|
|
~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Will *YOU* Be The Next Victim?!
|
|
|
|
Transcribed by Sovereign Immunity
|
|
|
|
|
|
ELECTRONIC BULLETIN BOARDS
|
|
|
|
An electronic bulletin board allows for the storage of information which can be
|
|
retrieved by other systems calling into the board. It is essentially a
|
|
database maintained by a system that is accessible by others over telephone
|
|
lines. Most bulletin boards have been created for specific purposes, usually
|
|
for the exchange of messages and information among parties with common
|
|
interests. For example, members of computer clubs maintain bulletin boards for
|
|
communicating with each other between meetings.
|
|
|
|
Bulletin boards are especially popular among microcomputer users.
|
|
Establishment of a bulletin board is facilitated by programs that can be
|
|
purchased or obtained from public domain software. With one of these programs,
|
|
a user can establish tailored menus for anyone dialing into the board. These
|
|
menus will usually contain options on information about the board, bulletins,
|
|
news summaries, personal mail, conferences, and leaving messages.
|
|
|
|
In addition, most bulletin boards have different levels of access to restrict
|
|
users from certain parts of the board. The bulletin board owner, usually
|
|
called the System Operator (SYSOP), personally establishes the authorized
|
|
access levels for each user and enters this information into the system.
|
|
Access is determined by having a user provide their name and password when
|
|
signing on to the system. A telephone line into the system is the only other
|
|
requirement for establishing a board on a microcomputer.
|
|
|
|
Access to bulletin boards generally operates along the following lines:
|
|
|
|
- A user dials into the bulletin board.
|
|
- The board responds with a message asking for the person's name and password.
|
|
- The board then provides a menu showing the options available to the user.
|
|
- The user selects an option and starts interacting with the system.
|
|
- During a session, a user typically may read messages, leave messages,
|
|
download files, upload files, or join a conference.
|
|
- The user eventually "quits" the session and hangs up from the board.
|
|
|
|
While most bulletin boards have been established for legitimate purposes, there
|
|
are also "pirate" or "elite" boards that contain illegal information or have
|
|
been established to advance an illegal activity. Security on those boards is
|
|
tightly controlled by the owners. With these bulletin boards, users usually
|
|
have to contact the owner directly to obtain a password for access to different
|
|
levels of the system. A degree of trust must therefore be established before
|
|
the owner will allow access to the board, and the owners develop "power" over
|
|
who can use the system.
|
|
|
|
Pirate boards have been found with a variety of illegal information on them
|
|
including the following:
|
|
|
|
- Stolen credit card account numbers
|
|
- Long distance telephone service codes
|
|
- Telephone numbers to mainframe computers, including passwords and account
|
|
numbers
|
|
- Procedures for making illegal drugs
|
|
- Procedures for making car bombs
|
|
- Hacking programs
|
|
- Tips on how to break into computer systems
|
|
- Schematics for electronic boxes (e.g., black box)
|
|
|
|
These boards obviously are a threat to communities, and their existence has
|
|
gained the attention of some police departments.
|
|
|
|
|
|
STING OPERATIONS WITH BULLETIN BOARDS
|
|
|
|
The experiences of the Maricopa County, Arizona, Sheriff's Department and the
|
|
Fremont, California, Police Department are very instructive on how local
|
|
departments can establish their own bulletin boards and become part of the
|
|
network with other boards. Members of the Maricopa County Sheriff's Department
|
|
were the first in the country to establish such a board. Their board resulted
|
|
in over 50 arrests with the usual charge being telecommunications fraud.
|
|
|
|
In September, 1985, the Fremont Police Department established a bulletin board
|
|
for the primary purpose of gathering intelligence on hackers and phreakers in
|
|
the area. The operation was partially funded by VISA, Inc. with additional
|
|
support from Wells Fargo Bank, Western Union, Sprint, MCI, and ITT.
|
|
|
|
After establishing their bulletin board, they advertised it on other boards as
|
|
the newest "phreak board" in the area. Within the first four days, over 300
|
|
calls were received on the board. During the next three months, the board
|
|
logged over 2,500 calls from 130 regular users. Through the bulletin board,
|
|
they persuaded these groups that they had stolen or hacked long-distance
|
|
telephone service codes and credit account numbers. They were readily accepted
|
|
and were allowed access to pirate boards in the area.
|
|
|
|
The board was operated for a total of three months. During that period, over
|
|
300 stolen credit card numbers and long-distance telephone service codes were
|
|
recovered. Passwords to many government, educational, and corporate computers
|
|
were also discovered on other boards.
|
|
|
|
The operation resulted in the apprehension of eight teenagers in the area who
|
|
were charged with trafficking in stolen credit card accounts, trafficking in
|
|
stolen long-distance telephone service codes, and possession of stolen
|
|
property. Within the next week, seven more teenagers in California and other
|
|
states were arrested on information from this operation.
|
|
|
|
It was established that this group had been illegally accessing between ten and
|
|
fifteen businesses and institutions in California. They were regularly
|
|
bypassing the security of these systems with stolen phone numbers and access
|
|
codes. One victim company estimated that it intended to spend $10,000 to
|
|
improve its security and data integrity procedures. Other victimized
|
|
businesses were proceeding along the same lines.
|
|
|
|
|
|
CONCLUSIONS
|
|
|
|
There are several reasons for conducting Sting operations of this type. One of
|
|
the most important is that it provides a proactive method of identifying
|
|
hackers and phreakers in the area. These groups are particularly hard to find
|
|
since they operate in closed circles with personal networks developed from
|
|
friendships.
|
|
|
|
Another byproduct of these operations is the publicity surrounding the cases.
|
|
Sting operations result in considerable amount of attention from the media.
|
|
The publicity has the effect of closing down other pirate boards in the area.
|
|
One of the greatest fears of these offenders in that their systems will be
|
|
taken, and in the Fremont operation over $12,000 of computer equipment was
|
|
seized. The publicity associated with these seizures seems to be the primary
|
|
reason for others to stop their pirate boards.
|
|
|
|
These operations also lead to other types of offenses. In Fremont, for
|
|
example, drug and alcohol cases were developed as a result of the Sting
|
|
operation. This has been typical of these operations.
|
|
|
|
The Sting operations with bulletin boards have been criticized because
|
|
teenagers, rather than hardened criminals, are arrested. Many hackers believe
|
|
that they have a right to the data in other systems and that their activities
|
|
are not illegal since the companies can afford the losses. On the other hand,
|
|
as one investigator observed, the hackers of today may be the sophisticated
|
|
computer criminals of tomorrow. It is therefore important to set a lesson
|
|
early in their careers steering them away from these offenses.
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
RESPONSE FROM A MEMBER OF THE HACKER COMMUNITY:
|
|
|
|
Now lets take a look at this article and the ignorant author J. Thomas
|
|
McEwen.
|
|
|
|
"Pirate boards have been found with a variety of illegal
|
|
information on them..."
|
|
|
|
The author names:
|
|
|
|
"Telephone numbers to mainframe computers" -- There is nothing illegal in
|
|
having the telephone number to a mainframe computer. It is illegal to access a
|
|
computer without authorization.
|
|
|
|
"Procedures for making illegal drugs" -- It is NOT illegal to know how to
|
|
manufacture illegal drugs, only to actually manufacture or use them.
|
|
|
|
"Procedures for making car bombs" -- It is NOT illegal to know how to
|
|
manufacture car bombs, only to actually manufacture or use them.
|
|
|
|
"Hacking programs" -- Indeed most security companies, private security
|
|
consultants, or mainframe owners and operators use these to test their systems
|
|
very often. It would only be illegal to use one on a machine that you are not
|
|
authorized to use it on.
|
|
|
|
"Tips on how to break into computer systems" -- Again, it is NOT illegal to
|
|
know how to break into a computer... although for a change, according to a
|
|
section of the Computer Fraud & Abuse Act of 1986 (Federal Law), it would be
|
|
illegal to traffic in passwords, codes, and theoretically any instructions that
|
|
would be the equivalent of passwords or codes for the unauthorized entry into
|
|
computer systems.
|
|
|
|
"Schematics for electronic boxes (e.g., black box)" -- This is getting boring.
|
|
It is NOT illegal to know how to build these devices, only the actual
|
|
construction or use of them is illegal.
|
|
|
|
|
|
"These boards obviously are a threat to communities, and their
|
|
existence has gained the attention of some police departments."
|
|
|
|
How are they obviously a threat?
|
|
|
|
The author would like us to believe that if the information on how to make
|
|
telephone devices, explosives, or narcotics is available on bulletin boards,
|
|
this is enough to make them a threat to communities.
|
|
|
|
What he ignores is that the same information can be found in public and
|
|
university libraries, text books, and technical journals;
|
|
|
|
He ignores that the mere possession of information on how a crime MIGHT be
|
|
committed is NOT a crime; and finally,
|
|
|
|
He fails to recognize any First Amendment rights whatsoever of computer
|
|
bulletin boards to have all such information to begin with.
|
|
|
|
|
|
"It is therefore important to set a lesson early in the careers
|
|
steering them away from these offenses."
|
|
|
|
Of course an arrest for some minor computer mischief is not going to be great
|
|
resume material when these teenagers start applying for jobs, even though the
|
|
establishment has inspired within them the socially acceptable goal of
|
|
conforming to society's expectations.
|
|
|
|
|
|
CONCLUSIONS
|
|
|
|
The author, J. Thomas McEwen, does not know much about freedom of speech and
|
|
for that matter, he does not know much about the law. He does know a lot about
|
|
how to sensationalize very benign conduct into dangerous conspiracy. Perhaps
|
|
he is close friends with Geraldo Rivera.
|
|
|
|
Bulletin board operators and users take note of the law and your rights. Don't
|
|
let yourself get taken in by Sting boards or ignorant law enforcement officers
|
|
looking for some gratification on the job since they aren't getting it at home.
|
|
|
|
|
|
S o v e r e i g n I m m u n i t y
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
Editor's Comments by: Dispater
|
|
|
|
Sting boards have been a popular topic in Phrack and Phrack World News over the
|
|
years. In this file, Sovereign Immunity, showed us an excerpt that discussed a
|
|
Sting bulletin board in Fremont, California. As it turns out, Knight Lightning
|
|
had some material about this way back in Phrack World News Issue 3 (which
|
|
actually appeared in Phrack Issue 4). The article was titled "Phoenix
|
|
Phortress Stings 7." There have also been many other articles in Phrack World
|
|
News about sting operations and bulletin boards.
|
|
|
|
Additionally, Phrack Issues 21-23 each carried one part of Knight Lightning's
|
|
"Vicious Circle" Trilogy. The first two parts of which ("Shadows Of A Future
|
|
Past" and "The Judas Contract") contained a lot of material about sting boards
|
|
and informants.
|
|
|
|
Although Phrack has not presented material concerning Sting boards in Maricopa
|
|
County, Arizona, there was discussion about a bulletin board (The Dark Side) in
|
|
Arizona (602) run by "The Dictator" (Dale Drew) as a sting operation revealed
|
|
in Computer Underground Digest 3.02 and recently we heard that he was back in
|
|
action under the name "Blind Faith."
|
|
|
|
Dispater
|
|
_____________________________________________________________________________?_
|
|
|
|
|
|
== Phrack Inc. ==
|
|
|
|
Volume Three, Issue Thirty-five, File 6 of 13
|
|
|
|
***** Social Security Numbers & Privacy *****
|
|
*** ***
|
|
* b y C h r i s H i b b e r t *
|
|
*** ***
|
|
***** June 1, 1991 *****
|
|
|
|
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
|
|
|
|
Many people are concerned about the number of organizations asking for their
|
|
Social Security Numbers. They worry about invasions of privacy and the
|
|
oppressive feeling of being treated as just a number.
|
|
|
|
Unfortunately, I can't offer any hope about the dehumanizing effects of
|
|
identifying you with your numbers. I *can* try to help you keep your Social
|
|
Security Number from being used as a tool in the invasion of your privacy.
|
|
|
|
Surprisingly, government agencies are reasonably easy to deal with; private
|
|
organizations are much more troublesome. Federal law restricts the agencies at
|
|
all levels of government that can demand your number and a fairly complete
|
|
disclosure is required even if its use is voluntary. There are no comparable
|
|
laws restricting the uses non-government organizations can make of it, or
|
|
compelling them to tell you anything about their plans. With private
|
|
institutions, your main recourse is refusing to do business with anyone whose
|
|
terms you don't like.
|
|
|
|
*********************
|
|
*** ***
|
|
*** Short History ***
|
|
*** ***
|
|
*********************
|
|
|
|
Social Security numbers were introduced by the Social Security Act of 1935.
|
|
They were originally intended to be used only by the social security program,
|
|
and public assurances were given at the time that use would be strictly
|
|
limited. In 1943 Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9397 which required federal
|
|
agencies to use the number when creating new record-keeping systems. In 1961
|
|
the IRS began to use it as a taxpayer ID number. The Privacy Act of 1974
|
|
required authorization for government agencies to use SSNs in their data bases
|
|
and required disclosures (detailed below) when government agencies request the
|
|
number. Agencies which were already using SSN as an identifier were allowed to
|
|
continue using it. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 gave authority to state or local
|
|
tax, welfare, driver's license, or motor vehicle registration authorities to
|
|
use the number in order to establish identities. The Privacy Protection Study
|
|
Commission of 1977 recommended that the Executive Order be repealed after some
|
|
agencies referred to it as their authorization to use SSNs. I don't know
|
|
whether it was repealed, but that practice has stopped.
|
|
|
|
The Privacy Act of 1974 (5 USC 552a) requires that any federal, state, or local
|
|
government agency that requests your Social Security Number has to tell you
|
|
three things:
|
|
|
|
1. Whether disclosure of your Social Security Number is required or
|
|
optional;
|
|
|
|
2. What law authorizes them to ask for your Social Security Number; and,
|
|
|
|
3. How your Social Security Number will be used if you give it to them.
|
|
|
|
In addition, the Act says that only Federal law can make use of the Social
|
|
Security Number mandatory. So anytime you're dealing with a government
|
|
institution and you're asked for your Social Security Number, just look for the
|
|
Privacy Act Statement. If there isn't one, complain and don't give your
|
|
number. If the statement is present, read it. If it says giving your Social
|
|
Security Number is voluntary, you'll have to decide for yourself whether to
|
|
fill in the number.
|
|
|
|
*****************************
|
|
*** ***
|
|
*** Private Organizations ***
|
|
*** ***
|
|
*****************************
|
|
|
|
The guidelines for dealing with non-governmental institutions are much more
|
|
tenuous. Most of the time private organizations that request your Social
|
|
Security Number can get by quite well without your number, and if you can find
|
|
the right person to negotiate with, they'll willingly admit it. The problem is
|
|
finding that right person. The person behind the counter is often told no more
|
|
than "get the customers to fill out the form completely."
|
|
|
|
Most of the time, you can convince them to use some other number. Usually the
|
|
simplest way to refuse to give your Social Security Number is simply to leave
|
|
the appropriate space blank. One of the times when this isn't a strong enough
|
|
statement of your desire to conceal your number is when dealing with
|
|
institutions which have direct contact with your employer. Most employers have
|
|
no policy against revealing your Social Security Number; they apparently
|
|
believe the omission must have been an unintentional slip.
|
|
|
|
*****************************
|
|
*** ***
|
|
*** Lenders and Borrowers ***
|
|
*** ***
|
|
*****************************
|
|
|
|
Banks and credit card issuers are required by the IRS to report the SSNs of
|
|
account holders to whom they pay interest or when they charge interest and
|
|
report it to the IRS. If you don't tell them your number you will probably
|
|
either be refused an account or be charged a penalty such as withholding of
|
|
taxes on your interest.
|
|
|
|
************************************
|
|
*** ***
|
|
*** Insurers, Hospitals, Doctors ***
|
|
*** ***
|
|
************************************
|
|
|
|
No laws require medical service providers to use your Social Security Number as
|
|
an ID number (except for Medicare, Medicaid, etc). They often use it because
|
|
it's convenient or because your employer uses it to certify employees to its
|
|
groups health plan. In the latter case, you have to get your employer to
|
|
change their policies. Often, the people who work in personnel assume that the
|
|
employer or insurance company requires use of the SSN when that's not really
|
|
the case. When my current employer asked for my SSN for an insurance form, I
|
|
asked them to try to find out if they had to use it. After a week they
|
|
reported that the insurance company had gone along with my request and told me
|
|
what number to use. Blood banks also ask for the number but are willing to do
|
|
without if pressed on the issue. After I asked politely and persistently, the
|
|
blood bank I go to agreed that they didn't have any use for the number, and is
|
|
in the process of teaching their receptionists not to request the number.
|
|
|
|
************************************************************
|
|
*** ***
|
|
*** Why Is The Use of Social Security Numbers A Problem? ***
|
|
*** ***
|
|
************************************************************
|
|
|
|
The Social Security Number doesn't work well as an identifier for several
|
|
reasons. The first reason is that it isn't at all secure; if someone makes up
|
|
a nine-digit number, it's quite likely that they've picked a number that is
|
|
assigned to someone. There are quite a few reasons why people would make up a
|
|
number: to hide their identity or the fact that they're doing something;
|
|
because they're not allowed to have a number of their own (illegal immigrants,
|
|
e.g.), or to protect their privacy. In addition, it's easy to write the number
|
|
down wrong, which can lead to the same problems as intentionally giving a false
|
|
number. There are several numbers that have been used by thousands of people
|
|
because they were on sample cards shipped in wallets by their manufacturers
|
|
(one is included below).
|
|
|
|
When more than one person uses the same number, it clouds up the records. If
|
|
someone intended to hide their activities, it's likely that it'll look bad on
|
|
whichever record it shows up on. When it happens accidently, it can be
|
|
unexpected, embarrassing, or worse. How do you prove that you weren't the one
|
|
using your number when the record was made?
|
|
|
|
A second problem with the use of SSNs as identifiers is that it makes it hard
|
|
to control access to personal information. Even assuming you want someone to
|
|
be able to find out some things about you, there's no reason to believe that
|
|
you want to make all records concerning yourself available. When multiple
|
|
record systems are all keyed by the same identifier, and all are intended to be
|
|
easily accessible to some users, it becomes difficult to allow someone access
|
|
to some of the information about a person while restricting them to specific
|
|
topics.
|
|
|
|
***********************************************
|
|
*** ***
|
|
*** What Can You Do To Protect Your Number? ***
|
|
*** ***
|
|
***********************************************
|
|
|
|
If despite your having written "refused" in the box for Social Security Number,
|
|
it still shows up on the forms someone sends back to you (or worse, on the ID
|
|
card they issue), your recourse is to write letters or make phone calls. Start
|
|
politely, explaining your position and expecting them to understand and
|
|
cooperate. If that doesn't work, there are several more things to try:
|
|
|
|
1. Talk to people higher up in the organization. This often works simply
|
|
because the organization has a standard way of dealing with requests
|
|
not to use the SSN, and the first person you deal with just hasn't
|
|
been around long enough to know what it is.
|
|
|
|
2. Enlist the aid of your employer. You have to decide whether talking
|
|
to someone in personnel, and possibly trying to change corporate
|
|
policy is going to get back to your supervisor and affect your job.
|
|
|
|
3. Threaten to complain to a consumer affairs bureau. Most newspapers
|
|
can get a quick response. Some cities, counties, and states also have
|
|
programs that might be able to help.
|
|
|
|
4. Tell them you'll take your business elsewhere (and follow through if
|
|
they don't cooperate).
|
|
|
|
5. If it's a case where you've gotten service already, but someone
|
|
insists that you have to provide your number in order to have a
|
|
continuing relationship, you can choose to ignore the request in hopes
|
|
that they'll forget or find another solution before you get tired of
|
|
the interruption.
|
|
|
|
If someone absolutely insists on getting your Social Security Number, you may
|
|
want to give a fake number. There is no legal penalty as long as you're not
|
|
doing it to get something from a government agency or to commit fraud. There
|
|
are a few good choices for "anonymous" numbers. Making one up at random is a
|
|
bad idea, as it may coincide with someone's real number and cause them some
|
|
amount of grief. It's better to use a number like 078-05-1120, which was
|
|
printed on "sample" cards inserted in thousands of new wallets sold in the 40s
|
|
and 50s. It's been used so widely that both the IRS and SSA recognize it
|
|
immediately as bogus, while most clerks haven't heard of it. It's also safe to
|
|
invent a number that has only zeros in one of the fields. The Social Security
|
|
Administration never issues numbers with this pattern. They also recommend
|
|
that people showing Social Security cards in advertisements use numbers in the
|
|
range 987-65-4320 through 987-65-4329.
|
|
|
|
The Social Security Administration recommends that you request a copy of your
|
|
file from them every few years to make sure that your records are correct.
|
|
|
|
***************
|
|
*** ***
|
|
*** THE END ***
|
|
*** ***
|
|
***************
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
==Phrack Inc.==
|
|
|
|
Volume Three, Issue Thirty-five, File 7 of 13
|
|
|
|
<:=--=:><:=--=:><:=--=:><:=--=:>\|/<:=--=:><:=--=:><:=--=:><:=--=:>
|
|
<:=--=:> <:=--=:>
|
|
<:=--=:> >>>>>=-* Users Guide to VAX/VMS *-=<<<<< <:=--=:>
|
|
<:=--=:> <:=--=:>
|
|
<:=--=:> Part I of III <:=--=:>
|
|
<:=--=:> <:=--=:>
|
|
<:=--=:> Part A: Basic Information <:=--=:>
|
|
<:=--=:> Part B: Programming the VAX/VMS <:=--=:>
|
|
<:=--=:> <:=--=:>
|
|
<:=--=:> By: Black Kat <:=--=:>
|
|
<:=--=:> <:=--=:>
|
|
<:=--=:><:=--=:><:=--=:><:=--=:>/|\<:=--=:><:=--=:><:=--=:><:=--=:>
|
|
|
|
|
|
Index
|
|
~~~~
|
|
Part A contains information on the following topics:
|
|
|
|
o Background o Logical Names
|
|
o Terminal Control Keys o System Default Logical Names
|
|
o Logging in o Logical Name Tables
|
|
o Digital Command Language (DCL) o User Environment
|
|
o Error Messages o Terminal Characteristics
|
|
o Command Line Editing o File Security
|
|
o Files and Directories o EDT Text Editor
|
|
o File Operations o EDT Help manual
|
|
|
|
Part B contains information on the following topics:
|
|
|
|
o Programming VAX/VMS o Parameters
|
|
o DCL Expressions o Terminal I/O
|
|
o Command Procedures o File I/O
|
|
o Writing Command Procedures o Redirecting Command Procedure I/O
|
|
o Comments o Branching and Conditionals
|
|
o Labels o Loops
|
|
o Debugging o Subroutines
|
|
o Invoking Command Procedures o Error Handling
|
|
o Symbols o Termination
|
|
o Lexical Functions o Example Command Procedures
|
|
|
|
|
|
<:=- Part A : Basic Information -=:>
|
|
|
|
Introduction
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
VAX is an acronym for Virtual Address eXtension, a 32-bit computer developed by
|
|
Digital in the 1970's. The VAX architecture supports multiprogramming, where
|
|
many users running different programs can use the VAX simultaneously and each
|
|
appears to have full control of the computer's resources. The multiprocessing
|
|
VAX functions vary differently from the old timesharing systems, which would
|
|
allocate a slice of CPU time to each user of the system in a rotating fashion,
|
|
whether the time slice was required or not. The VAX/VMS environment, however,
|
|
provides each user an allocation of processor time based on the user's needs
|
|
and priority. If a user does not need his quantum of time, or a portion of it,
|
|
it is given to the next user. This scheduling method is very efficient when
|
|
compared to the old method of timesharing.
|
|
|
|
The VAX is capable of addressing more than four billion addresses, through a
|
|
method known as virtual memory addressing. Because the memory is virtual
|
|
however, there is no need to have four billion bytes of physical memory. The
|
|
VAX executes programs by a technique known as paging, whereby a single "page"
|
|
of the program is read into memory at a time, and when a new page is needed,
|
|
the old one is "swapped" back out to disk to make room for the new one. The
|
|
VMS operating system ties everything together. The user interacts with VMS
|
|
(Virtual Memory System) through a Command Language Interpreter (CLI), usually
|
|
the Digital Command Language (DCL).
|
|
|
|
When you use VAX/VMS, you are known to the system as a process, which is
|
|
created when you log in to the system and deleted when you log out. This
|
|
process carries with it various attributes to identify you from other system
|
|
users (process name, identification, user identification code, privileges,
|
|
etc).
|
|
|
|
|
|
Terminal Control Keys
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Ctrl-A Allows you to insert, rather than overstrike, characters on a
|
|
DCL command line that you're editing.
|
|
Ctrl-B Displays DCL commands that you've previously entered.
|
|
Ctrl-C Interrupts the coessed or the program being executed.
|
|
Ctrl-E Positions the cursor at the end of the line.
|
|
Ctrl-H Positions the cursor at the beginning of the line.
|
|
Ctrl-I Tab
|
|
Ctrl-O Alternately suppresses and continues the display of the output
|
|
terminal.
|
|
Ctrl-Q Enables (toggles on) output to the display after CTRL-S.
|
|
Ctrl-R Retypes the current input line and repositions the cursor atthe
|
|
end of the retyped line.
|
|
Ctrl-S Disables (toggles off) output to the display until CTRL-Q is
|
|
pressed.
|
|
Ctrl-T Displays process statistics.
|
|
Ctrl-U Discards the current input line and performs carriage return.
|
|
Ctrl-W Refreshes the screen.
|
|
Ctrl-X Flushes the type-ahead buffer.
|
|
Ctrl-Y Interrupts command or program execution and returns control to
|
|
the DCL command line interpreter.
|
|
Ctrl-Z Indicates end of file for data entered from terminal.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Logging in
|
|
~~~~~~~~
|
|
Most VAX systems prompt you with something like this:
|
|
|
|
Welcome to VAX1
|
|
Username:
|
|
|
|
Type your username and press <enter>. You'll then be prompted for your
|
|
password. If you enter the correct username/password combination, you'll
|
|
be given something like the following:
|
|
|
|
Welcome to VAX/VMS V4.4
|
|
Last interactive login on Monday, 16-JUL-87 16:12
|
|
Last non-interactive login on Friday, 13-JUL-87 00:14
|
|
$
|
|
|
|
If you entered an incorrect username and password, you'll receive the
|
|
message:
|
|
|
|
User authorization failure
|
|
|
|
Just hit <enter> and you'll be prompted for your username again. Once
|
|
you're logged in, you'll be given the DCL prompt ($). This indicates that
|
|
the system is ready to accept interactive commands.
|
|
|
|
To log out, use the command:
|
|
|
|
$ LOGOUT
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Digital Command Language (DCL)
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
DCL is comprised of more than 200 commands called verbs. Each DCL verb acts on
|
|
a parameter or assumed parameter, and the action of these verbs and the scope
|
|
of their parameters can be modified with qualifiers. The basic command
|
|
structure is:
|
|
|
|
$ LABEL: COMMAND-NAME PARAMETER(S) /QUALIFIER(S) !COMMENT
|
|
| | | | |
|
|
| | | | +-- Optional Comment
|
|
| | | |
|
|
| | | +-------------- Command modifier(s)
|
|
| | |
|
|
| | +---------------------------- Object of the
|
|
Command
|
|
| |
|
|
| +-------------------------------------- DCL command verb
|
|
|
|
|
+-------------------------------------------------- Optional Label
|
|
|
|
A label is an optional, user-specified string with a maximum length of
|
|
255 characters. It is most commonly used in command procedures.
|
|
|
|
A DCL command verb defines the action the VAX will take when the command
|
|
line is interpreted.
|
|
|
|
Parameter(s) specify the object or a list of objects the DCL command verb
|
|
will act upon. Multiple parameters may be specified but must be separated
|
|
from one another by a space, multiple spaces, or a tab. If you enter a DCL
|
|
command that requires parameters, but you don't enter them on the command
|
|
line, the DCL interpreter will prompt you for them automatically.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers further define or modify the function the DCL command will
|
|
perform. They consist of a keyword followed by a value or a list of
|
|
values.
|
|
|
|
The qualifier keyword must be preceded by a slash (/). Multiple qualifiers
|
|
may be specified, but each must be preceded with a slash. Qualifiers
|
|
usually aren't required. There are three kinds of qualifiers: parameter,
|
|
positional, and command. A command qualifier applies to the whole command.
|
|
Generally, these are placed at the end of the command. For example:
|
|
|
|
$ DIRECTORY [BYNON],[BYNON.DECPRO]/FULL
|
|
|
|
This displays a full listing of two directories, using the /FULL qualifier of
|
|
the DIRECTORY command. A positional qualifier takes on a different meaning
|
|
based on where it is located in the command. If a positional qualifier is
|
|
placed after the command verb, but before the first parameter, the qualifier
|
|
will affect the entire command. If the same positional qualifier is placed
|
|
after a parameter, only that parameter will be affected. For example:
|
|
|
|
$ PRINT/COPIES=3 MEMO1.TXT,MEMO2.TXT
|
|
$ PRINT MEMO1.TXT/COPIES=2,MEMO2.TXT
|
|
|
|
The first command prints three copies of each file. The second command prints
|
|
two copies of the first file, but only one copy of the second. A parameter
|
|
qualifier affects only the parameter it follows. In the following example,
|
|
MEMO1.TXT is sent to the queue LASER and MEMO2.TXT is sent to queue FAST_PRINT:
|
|
|
|
$ PRINT MEMO1.TXT/QUEUE=LASER,MEMO2.TXT/QUEUE=FAST_PRINT
|
|
|
|
A comment is an optional, user-specified comment about the command. It is
|
|
commonly used in command procedures to document the command.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Error Messages
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Generally, error messages are of the format:
|
|
|
|
% FACILIT-L-IDENT, TEXT
|
|
| | | | |
|
|
| | | | +-- explanation of the error message
|
|
| | | |
|
|
| | | +--------- abbreviated message text, for reference
|
|
| | |
|
|
| | +------------- error severity
|
|
| |
|
|
| +------------------- Vax/VMS facility or component (error source)
|
|
|
|
|
+----------------------- message number: "%" = first, "-" = subsequent
|
|
|
|
A percent sign (%) indicates the first error message for a given command.
|
|
All subsequent errors for that command are preceded with a hyphen (-).
|
|
|
|
The facility indicates the source of the error. The source may be the DCL
|
|
command line interpreter, one of the various VMS utilities, or a program
|
|
image.
|
|
|
|
The severity level indicator (L) will have one of the following values:
|
|
S (successful completion), I (information), W (warning), E (error), or
|
|
F (fatal or severe error).
|
|
|
|
The ident is an abbreviation of the error message text. It can be referenced
|
|
in the VAX/VMS System Messages manual.
|
|
|
|
The text provides an explanation of the error message.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Command line editing
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
DCL stores the last 20 command lines entered. You can display a list of them
|
|
with:
|
|
|
|
$ RECALL /ALL
|
|
|
|
The resulting display might look like:
|
|
|
|
1 DIR
|
|
2 COPY VAX1::$1$DUA5:[BYNON]LOGIN.COM LOGIN.COM;1
|
|
3 EDIT LOGIN.COM
|
|
$
|
|
|
|
To recall a specific command from the recall buffer, use the DCL RECALL
|
|
command with a command line number as a parameter. For example:
|
|
|
|
$ RECALL 2
|
|
$ COPY VAX1::$1$6DUA5:[BYNON]LOGIN.COM LOGIN.COM;1
|
|
|
|
|
|
Files and Directories
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Files are organized much like MS-DOS, with a directory-tree structure. The
|
|
user's default directory (assigned by the system administrator) is the "root"
|
|
directory. Up to seven subdirectories may be created, each containing as many
|
|
subdirectories as you like. The complete file specification looks like:
|
|
|
|
VAX1 :: DUA0 : [BYNON.PROGRAMMING.FORTRAN]WINDOWS.FOR;3
|
|
| | | | | |
|
|
| | | | | |
|
|
node device directory filename | version
|
|
type
|
|
|
|
The node name identifies a computer system in a network. If no node name is
|
|
specified, VMS assumes the file is located on the local node where you're
|
|
logged in.
|
|
|
|
The device name is the physical device where the file is stored. It is a
|
|
four-character alphanumeric code which identifies the device type, hardware
|
|
controller to which it is attached, and the unit number of the device on the
|
|
controller. If you omit the device name from a file specification, VMS assumes
|
|
you are referring to your default device.
|
|
|
|
The directory entry is enclosed in brackets, and is the name of the directory
|
|
that contains the file. If you omit the directory name from a file
|
|
specification, VMS will assume you are referring to your default directory.
|
|
|
|
The filename may consist of up to 39 alphanumeric characters.
|
|
|
|
The file type is a code consisting of up to 39 alphanumeric characters, and it
|
|
generally indicates the type of information supplied in the file. Some system
|
|
programs and utilities supply a three character default file type.
|
|
|
|
The version number is a 1 to 5 digit number the system assigns to every file by
|
|
default. When a file is created, it is assigned a version number of 1. Each
|
|
time the file is edited or another version of it is created, the version number
|
|
is automatically incremented by 1. Alternatively, you may specify a version
|
|
number of your choice.
|
|
|
|
No blank spaces are allowed within any portion of a file specification. In
|
|
VMS Version 4.x, the maximum lengths are as follows:
|
|
|
|
node name up to 6 characters
|
|
device name four characters
|
|
directory name up to 39 characters
|
|
subdirectory name up to 39 characters
|
|
file name up to 39 characters
|
|
file type up to 39 characters
|
|
version number up to 5 decimal digits with a value between 1
|
|
and 32,767
|
|
|
|
File specifications must be unique; no two files can have completely identical
|
|
specifications. It's conceivable to have many copies of NOTES.TXT in a
|
|
subdirectory, but only one NOTES.TXT;8 may exist in the same subdirectory.
|
|
|
|
Wildcards are similar to those in MS-DOS, with an asterisk (*) representing
|
|
a filename or filetype, and a percent sign (%) indicating a single
|
|
character.
|
|
|
|
|
|
File operations
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Creating and modifying files: $ CREATE TEMP.DAT
|
|
TEMP 1
|
|
TEMP 2
|
|
<CTRL-Z>
|
|
|
|
Renaming files: $ RENAME TEMP.DAT NEW.DAT
|
|
$ RENAME TEMP.DAT [BYNON.PROG]TEMP.DAT
|
|
Note: you cannot rename files across devices, just
|
|
directories.
|
|
|
|
Copying files: $ COPY TEMP.DAT NEW.DAT
|
|
$ COPY TEMP.DAT,TEST.DAT NEW.DAT
|
|
|
|
Appending files: $ APPEND TEMP.DAT NEW.DAT
|
|
|
|
Deleting files: $ DELETE TEMP.DAT;1
|
|
$ DELETE *.DAT;*
|
|
$ DELETE /CONFIRM .DAT;* (confirm each file)
|
|
|
|
Displaying files: $ TYPE /PAGE TEMP.DATE (one page at a time)
|
|
|
|
Directories: $ DIRECTORY
|
|
$ DIRECTORY DJA1:[BYNON.PROG]
|
|
|
|
Printing files: $ PRINT TEMP.DAT
|
|
|
|
Purging files: $ PURGE *.DAT (erase all but latest version of .DAT files)
|
|
|
|
Create a dir: $ CREATE/DIRECTORY [.BUDGET]
|
|
|
|
Set default dir: $ SET DEFAULT [BYNON.PROG]
|
|
$ SET DEFAULT [.PROG]
|
|
|
|
Delete a dir: $ SET DEFAULT [BYNON.PROG]
|
|
$ DELETE *.*;*
|
|
$ SET DEFAULT [BYNON]
|
|
$ SET PROTECTION=(0:D) PROG.DIR;1
|
|
$ DELETE BUDGET.DIR;1
|
|
|
|
|
|
Logical Names
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
A logical name is a substitute for a file specification, portion of a file
|
|
specification, or another logical name. They provide two primary functions:
|
|
file and device independence and file specification shorthand.
|
|
|
|
File and device independence means that you are not constrained by a physical
|
|
element, such as a disk or printer name. If you use files nested deeply in
|
|
subdirectories, with long names, or on devices or nodes other than your
|
|
default, you can define a meaningful logical name to represent it. These
|
|
shorthand names are faster to type and easier to remember.
|
|
|
|
To define a logical name:
|
|
|
|
$ DEFINE PARTS_DBF DJA2:[DATABASES]PARTS.DAT
|
|
|
|
This example will associate the logical name PARTS_DBF with the file
|
|
specification DJA2 : [DATABASES]PARTS.DAT. Now, PARTS_DBF may be used
|
|
anywhere as a substitute for the complete file specification.
|
|
|
|
Other commands also can be used to assign logical names.
|
|
|
|
Assign : Associates equivalence names with a logical name
|
|
Mount : Mounts a disk or tape volume and assigns a system logical for the
|
|
volume.
|
|
Allocate: Allocates a system device for private use and optionally (command
|
|
qualifier) assigns a logical name to the device.
|
|
Open : Opens a file for read or write operations and assigns a logical
|
|
name to the file specification.
|
|
|
|
To display the logical name translations: $ SHOW LOGICAL PARTS_DBF will
|
|
display: "PARTS_DBF" = "DJA2:[DATABASES]PARTS.DAT" (LNM$PROCESS_TABLE).
|
|
|
|
To deassign a logical name: $ DEASSIGN PARTS_DBF
|
|
|
|
|
|
System default logical names
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
SYS$COMMAND The initial file, or input stream, from which the DCL command
|
|
line interpreter reads input data. The logical name
|
|
SYS$COMMAND is equated to your terminal for interactive
|
|
processes.
|
|
SYS$DISK Your default disk as assigned in the UAF.
|
|
SYS$ERROR The device on which the system displays all error and
|
|
informational messages. By default, SYS$ERROR is assigned
|
|
to your terminal for interactive processes, and to the batch
|
|
job log file for any batch processes.
|
|
SYS$INPUT The default file or input stream from which data and commands
|
|
are read by either the DCL command line interpreter or
|
|
programs executing in your account. By default, SYS$INPUT is
|
|
equated to your terminal for interactive processes and to the
|
|
batch job stream (or command procedure) for batch processes.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Logical Name Tables
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Logical names are stored in system files called logical name tables.
|
|
The following are the four most commonly used:
|
|
|
|
Group table : Contains the logical names available to all users in your
|
|
UIC (User Identification Code) group.
|
|
Job table : Contains the logical names available to your process and
|
|
any subprocess it creates.
|
|
Process table: Contains the logical names available to your process only.
|
|
System table : Contains the logical names that may be used by all users
|
|
of the system.
|
|
|
|
|
|
User Environment
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
The User Authorization File (UAF) is a system file controlled and modified
|
|
by the system manager. A record for each system user is contained in the
|
|
UAF.
|
|
|
|
A User Identification Code (UIC) is an identifier used by VAX/VMS to identify
|
|
users and groups of users. It is used to identify processes, directories,
|
|
files, and other objects in the system. A UIC may be specified numerically or
|
|
alphanumerically, and is made up of two parts, a group and a member, specified
|
|
in the format: [group,member]. For example, UIC [10,14] identifies group 10,
|
|
user 14. The group number is an octal number in the range 1-37776, and the
|
|
member is an octal number in the range 0-177776. An alphanumeric UIC contains
|
|
a member name and optionally, a group name in the format: [member] or
|
|
[group,member]. The group and member names in an alphanumeric UIC may contain
|
|
1 to 31 alphanumeric characters (A-Z, 0-9, underscore, dollar sign).
|
|
|
|
Each user of the system is limited in the consumption of system
|
|
resources, and these limits control the rate at which your process or
|
|
any subprocesses you create may consume a resource. There are 32 levels
|
|
of priority in the VAX/VMS system, 0 through 31, the highest being 31.
|
|
The priorities are divided into two ranges: timesharing (0-15) and
|
|
real-time (16-31). The default user priority is 4. Depending on how
|
|
heavily the system is being used, your priority may be raised above the
|
|
default, but never lowered below it. VAX/VMS maintains 35 privileges,
|
|
divided into the following seven categories classified by how much
|
|
damage could be done to the system by possessing them:
|
|
|
|
None No privileges.
|
|
Normal The minimum privilege needed to use the system effectively.
|
|
Group The ability to effect members of the same UIC group.
|
|
Devour The potential to consume noncritical system-wide resources.
|
|
System The ability to interfere with normal system operation.
|
|
File The potential to bypass file protection security.
|
|
All The ability to take over the entire system.
|
|
|
|
VAX/VMS systems keep a record of overall computer system use by account
|
|
holder in a system file called ACCOUNTING.DAT. The system manager uses
|
|
this file to produce reports with the Accounting Utility. This can be
|
|
used to learn more about how the system is being used, how it performs,
|
|
and how a particular user is using the system. It can also be used to
|
|
bill users for system time.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Terminal Characteristics
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Setting display width: $ SET TERMINAL/WIDTH=132
|
|
|
|
Shutting messages off: $ SET TERMINAL/NOBROADCAST
|
|
This prevents other users from phoning you, sending mail messages, and
|
|
some system messages from appearing on your screen. If you just want
|
|
mail and phone messages screened, use: $ SET BROADCAST=(NOMAIL,NOPHONE).
|
|
|
|
Increasing type-ahead buffer: $ SET TERMINAL/ALTYPEHD/PERMANENT
|
|
|
|
Line editing modes: $ SET TERMINAL/INSERT or $ SET TERMINAL/OVERSTRIKE
|
|
|
|
Defining keys: $ DEFINE/KEY PF1 "SET DEFAULT DUA3:[INV.SUP]"
|
|
% DCL-I-DEFKEY, DEFAULT key PF1 has been defined
|
|
|
|
Showing keys: $ SHOW KEY PF1 (or $ SHOW KEY ALL)
|
|
DEFAULT keypad definitions:
|
|
PF1 = "SET DEFAULT DUA3:[INV.SUP]"
|
|
|
|
Deleting keys: $ DELETE/KEY PF1 (or $ DELETE/KEY ALL)
|
|
% DCL-I-DELKEY, DEFAULT key PF1 has been deleted
|
|
|
|
|
|
Changing prompt: $ SET PROMPT = "What now?"
|
|
|
|
Displaying process information: $ SHOW PROCESS (add a qualifier)
|
|
|
|
Changing process information: $ SET PROCESS/NAME="Bob"
|
|
$ SET PROCESS/PRIVILEGES=OPER
|
|
|
|
|
|
File Security
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
UIC-based protection permits access to be granted or denied based on
|
|
protection codes that reflect four user categories:
|
|
|
|
System: system manager
|
|
Owner : account owner
|
|
Group : users in same UIC group
|
|
World : all users of system, regardless of UIC
|
|
|
|
Four type of file access can be granted or denied to members of these user
|
|
categories:
|
|
|
|
Read (R): read the file
|
|
Write (W): create or modify the file
|
|
Execute (E): run a program
|
|
Delete (D): delete the file
|
|
|
|
Generally, any category of user can be granted or denied file access
|
|
with this protection scheme. However, you can read a file in a
|
|
subdirectory with EXECUTE access if you know its filename and filetype.
|
|
Also, since SYSTEM privileges include the ability to bypass all file
|
|
protection, anyone within the SYSTEM category can read a file.
|
|
|
|
CONTROL access, or the ability to change the protection and ownership of
|
|
a volume, is never specified in the UIC-based protection code. This is
|
|
the fifth type of protection that can be specified in an access control
|
|
list (ACL). It's automatically granted to two user categories when VMS
|
|
examines UIC-based protection. Users in the SYSTEM and OWNER categories
|
|
receive CONTROL access by default while GROUP and WORLD categories are
|
|
denied CONTROL access.
|
|
|
|
File protection defaults are as follows:
|
|
|
|
System: RWED
|
|
Owner : RWED
|
|
Group : RE
|
|
World : No access
|
|
|
|
To determine the existing or default protection of a file, use the SHOW
|
|
PROTECTION command. The default in the previous example would be:
|
|
$ SHOW PROTECTION
|
|
SYSTEM=RWED, OWNER=RWED, GROUP=RE, WORLD=NO ACCESS
|
|
|
|
If you want to see file protection in directories, use the /PROTECTION
|
|
qualifier with the DIRECTORY command.
|
|
|
|
To change the protection of a file, use the command:
|
|
|
|
$ SET PROTECTION=(O:RWE,G,W) LOGIN.COM
|
|
|
|
In this example, the account owner has READ, WRITE, and EXECUTE access
|
|
to his LOGIN.COM file. The GROUP and WORLD categories have no access
|
|
and SYSTEM access remains unchanged.
|
|
|
|
Rules for specifying protection codes:
|
|
1. Access types must be abbreviated with one letter: R, W, E, or D.
|
|
2. User categories may be spelled out or abbreviated.
|
|
3. Each user category must be separated from its access types with a colon.
|
|
4. If you specify multiple user categories, separate each with a comma
|
|
and enclose the entire code in parenthesis.
|
|
5. User categories and access types may be specified in any order.
|
|
6. If you include a user category, but do not specify an access type
|
|
for that category, access is automatically denied.
|
|
7. If you omit a user category entirely, protection for that category
|
|
is unchanged.
|
|
|
|
Remember that VAX/VMS evaluates directory protection before file
|
|
protection. If you grant WORLD:R access to a file, but the file is in a
|
|
directory without WORLD:R access, another user couldn't read the file.
|
|
|
|
|
|
EDT Text Editor
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
When you enter EDT, you automatically enter line mode, indicated by the
|
|
EDT prompt, an asterisk (*). All line mode commands are made at the
|
|
asterisk prompt and terminated by pressing <Return>. Lines that you
|
|
input are numbered sequentially by the editor. You can reference a line
|
|
or group of li^S^Qnes based on the line number or range of line numbers. A
|
|
list of basic EDT commands follows. Each command may be abbreviated to
|
|
the characters in parenthesis. Complete information on all EDT line
|
|
mode commands can be found through the use of the line mode EDT HELP
|
|
command.
|
|
|
|
Commands Function
|
|
~~~~~~~
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Change (C) Change from line to keypad mode. To switch back from
|
|
keypad mode to line mode, press <Ctrl-Z>.
|
|
Copy (CO) Copy a line or group of lines from one place to another.
|
|
If you enter the command CO 5 to 10, line 5 will be
|
|
copied to the line immediately preceding line 10. The
|
|
command CO 5:10 to 20 would copy the contents of lines 5
|
|
through 10 into the area immediately preceding line 20.
|
|
Delete (D) Delete a line or group of lines. The command D13 would
|
|
delete line 13, while D13:20 will delete lines 13 to 20.
|
|
Exit (EX) Terminates the EDT session, saving all changes. This
|
|
also creates a new version of the file being edited.
|
|
Help (H) Display on-line help on all EDT line mode commands. The
|
|
help messages will not be included in the file being edited.
|
|
Include (INC) Copy text from an external file into the file being edited.
|
|
When the EDT command INCLUDE FILENAME.TYPE is executed,
|
|
the contents of FILENAME.TYPE are copied into the file
|
|
being edited.
|
|
Insert (I) Inserts specified text directly before the current
|
|
position in the file. While inserting text, you will
|
|
not receive the EDT "*" prompt. Press <Ctrl-Z> to
|
|
return to the "*" prompt when you're finished inserting.
|
|
Move (M) You can't cut and paste with a line-oriented editor.
|
|
Text will be moved to the area immediately preceding a
|
|
specified line. The command M 10:15 to 50 would move
|
|
lines 10 through 15 to the area immediately preceding
|
|
line 50.
|
|
Quit (QUI) Exit the EDT editor without saving changes.
|
|
Replace (R) Deletes a specified line or group of lines and enters the
|
|
INSERT mode so you can add text in that place. The
|
|
command R5:10 would delete lines 5 through 10 and switch
|
|
to the INSERT mode to permit you to enter new text. To
|
|
exit the INSERT mode, press <Ctrl-Z>.
|
|
Resequence (RES) Numbers all of the lines in the file that you're
|
|
editing in increments of 1. This is useful because
|
|
text insertion, movement, or deletion causes the file
|
|
to lose numeric sequence.
|
|
Substitute (S) Substitute a new text element for an old one in the
|
|
format s/oldtext/newtext/range. The old and new text
|
|
elements must be enclosed in angle bracket (< >)
|
|
delimiters and the range must be specified.
|
|
Write (WR) Write a given range of text to a new file.
|
|
WRHISTORY.TXT 50:100 would write lines 50 through 100 to
|
|
a new file called HISTORY.TXT.
|
|
|
|
|
|
EDT Help Manual
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
To dump the entire EDT Help file to disk, enter the following DCL command
|
|
during a terminal session: $ ASSIGN EDTHELP.FIL SYS$OUTPUT. Now, enter
|
|
line mode EDT and type: * HELP *. Now exit EDT and enter the DCL
|
|
command: $ ASSIGN TTnn: SYS$OUTPUTT (TTnn: is your terminal number).
|
|
|
|
|
|
<:=- Part B : Programming VAX/VMS -=:>
|
|
|
|
Introduction
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
A symbol is a name chosen to represent a string of characters, a numeric value,
|
|
or a logical (true/false) value. A symbol may be used wherever the value it
|
|
represents would normally be found, and can be up to 255 characters long.
|
|
Symbols must begin with a character, dollar sign, or underscore, and are not
|
|
case-sensitive. Symbols are created like this:
|
|
|
|
symbol_name = value (local symbol)
|
|
symbol_name == value (global symbol)
|
|
|
|
A global symbol may be used at any command level, but local symbols are lost
|
|
when command procedures are finished. For example:
|
|
|
|
$ WIDE = "SET TERMINAL/WIDTH=132"
|
|
|
|
Now, anytime you type WIDE at the DCL command line, the terminal width will
|
|
be changed to 132 characters. To show the contents of a symbol:
|
|
|
|
$ SHOW SYMBOL ANSWER
|
|
ANSWER = 1584 HEX = 00000630 OCTAL = 000000003060
|
|
|
|
The SHOW SYMBOL command uses the local symbol table by default. To show
|
|
the value of a global symbol, use the /GLOBAL qualifier. To show all
|
|
symbols, use the /ALL qualifier (or /GLOBAL/ALL). To delete symbols,
|
|
use: $ DELETE/SYMBOL symbol_name command (with /GLOBAL if it's global).
|
|
|
|
When a DCL command is executed, symbols in the following positions are
|
|
automatically translated:
|
|
|
|
o the beginning of the command
|
|
o in a lexical function
|
|
o in a WRITE or IF statement
|
|
o on the right side of an = or == assignment statement
|
|
o inside brackets on the left side of an assignment statement when
|
|
you're preforming string substitution
|
|
|
|
If none of these cases fits, apostrophes will force the translation:
|
|
$ DIRECTORY 'PARTS' (after $ PARTS = "DJA2:[DBA]PARTS.DAT")
|
|
|
|
Symbols are commonly used for shorthand. For example, to clear the screen:
|
|
|
|
$ ESC[0,8] == 27
|
|
$ CLEAR == "[J"
|
|
$ HOME == "[H"
|
|
$ CLR == WRITE SYS$OUTPUT ESC,HOME,ESC,CLEAR
|
|
|
|
Now, anytime you enter CLR, the screen will be cleared. Symbols can also be
|
|
used to execute command procedures:
|
|
|
|
$ NETBACK == "@SYS$LOGIN:NETBACKUP"
|
|
|
|
Finally, foreign commands unknown to DCL can be executed by using symbols:
|
|
|
|
$ KERMIT == RUN SYS$$SYSTEM:KERMIT
|
|
|
|
|
|
DCL Expressions
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Expressions are built by combining data elements with operators. A logical
|
|
comparison evaluates the relationship between two components as true or
|
|
false (True = 1, False = 0).
|
|
|
|
Lexical functions are VAX/VMS routines that return process or system
|
|
information, or manipulate user-supplied data. Lexical functions are unique
|
|
because the result is returned in the function name, allowing it to be used as
|
|
a symbol (much like Pascal). Lexical functions are called with the following
|
|
format:
|
|
|
|
F$function_name(parameter, parameter...)
|
|
|
|
For example, the following lexical function manipulates user-supplied data:
|
|
|
|
$ STRING = "Go home right now!"
|
|
$ STRING = F$EDIT(STRING, "COMPRESS, UPCASE")
|
|
$ SHOW SYMBOL STRING
|
|
STRING = "GO HOME RIGHT NOW!"
|
|
|
|
|
|
Command Procedures
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
A command procedure is a file consisting of a sequence of DCL commands which
|
|
can be executed interactively or as a batch job (like a .BAT file in MS-DOS or
|
|
a REXX EXEC in VM/SP). Command procedures are used in VAX/VMS to perform
|
|
repetitive or complex tasks and to save time. With a command procedure, you
|
|
can execute many DCL commands with a single statement.
|
|
|
|
Command procedures aren't bound by simple lists of DCL commands executed in
|
|
sequence. They can take advantage of labels, lexical functions, symbols and
|
|
relational operators to build sophisticated procedures which act like VAX/VMS
|
|
programs. Command procedures are flexible. They can be written to take
|
|
specific actions based on responses to questions, or even to perform a given
|
|
function depending on the time or date.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Writing Command Procedures
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
A text editor such as EDT or EVE is used to create and edit command procedures,
|
|
which should be named "PROCEDURE_NAME.COM". The file type ".COM" is the
|
|
default procedure file type, and if a different file type is included, it must
|
|
be included when the procedure is invoked.
|
|
|
|
Each new command line must begin with a dollar sign ($). Multiple spaces or
|
|
tabs may be included after the "$" for readability, and command lines may be
|
|
extended past a single line by ending the previous line with a hyphen (-) and
|
|
not starting the next line with a dollar sign.
|
|
|
|
Data input to programs, such as responses, must be entered without the dollar
|
|
sign. Data lines are used by the program running and are not processed by the
|
|
DCL command line interpreter. For example:
|
|
|
|
$ MAIL <--- invokes the Mail Utility
|
|
SEND <--- Mail SEND command
|
|
JONES, BOB <--- response to Mail prompt "To:"
|
|
Memo <--- response to Mail prompt "Subj:"
|
|
Bob, <--- Mail message
|
|
|
|
How's it going?'?
|
|
|
|
Joe
|
|
$ <--- terminates Mail program
|
|
$ EXIT <--- terminates command procedure
|
|
|
|
|
|
Comments
|
|
~~~~~
|
|
Comments may be included by preceding them with an exclamation point (!),
|
|
which causes everything to the right of it to be ignored by the DCL command
|
|
interpreter. Comments make command procedures easier to debug and modify
|
|
later. Spelling DCL commands out rather than using the abbreviations also
|
|
makes the command procedure more readable.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Labels
|
|
~~~
|
|
Labels are used by the DCL command line interpreter for conditional
|
|
processing and repetitive looping. Labels should be placed on separate
|
|
lines, making them easier to find. Labels can be 255 characters long, may
|
|
not contain blanks, and must be terminated with a colon (:).
|
|
|
|
|
|
Debugging
|
|
~~~~~~
|
|
The SET VERIFY command tells DCL to display each command as it processes it.
|
|
This allows you to see where errors are generated, and how strings are
|
|
translated. SET NOVERIFY turns the verify mode off.
|
|
|
|
The SHOW SYMBOL command displays the contents of defined symbols, and is
|
|
used to show the contents of a symbol in a command procedure as it is being
|
|
executed.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Invoking Command Procedures
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Command procedures may be invoked interactively by typing the "at" sign (@)
|
|
followed by the procedure name. The file type must also be included if it is
|
|
not ".COM" (the default). Command procedures may be invoked at the command
|
|
line or from within another command procedure, called nesting. The DCL SUBMIT
|
|
command will place your command (job) in a batch queue with other jobs waiting
|
|
to be run. Command procedures are generally submitted as batch jobs when you
|
|
want them to execute at a specific time, they will take a long time to run, or
|
|
when a job must run at a reduced priority. The following command submits the
|
|
command procedure ACCOUNT.COM to the VAX/VMS batch processor:
|
|
|
|
$ SUBMIT ACCOUNT
|
|
Job ACCOUNT (queue SYS$BATCH, entry 103) started on SYS$BATCH
|
|
|
|
The SYS$BATCH queue is the default and is used unless otherwise specified with
|
|
the /QUEUE qualifier. When VAX/VMS runs this job, a process with your rights
|
|
and privileges will be created and the procedure executed within that process.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Symbols
|
|
~~~~~~
|
|
Symbols may be local (single equal sign) or global (double equal sign).
|
|
Local symbols are recognized by DCL only at the command level at which it
|
|
was defined and more deeply nested levels (subsequently called command
|
|
procedures). Global symbols are recognized at any command level. Local
|
|
symbols should be used when the symbols is only needed for the duration of
|
|
the command procedure employing it. You should only define global symbols
|
|
if you're going to use them in other command procedures or for the duration
|
|
of your login session.
|
|
|
|
An asterisk can be used to tell the command line interpreter (CLI) to accept
|
|
abbreviations. For example:
|
|
|
|
$ NO*TES == "@SYS$LOGIN:NOTES"
|
|
|
|
This tells the CLI to accept NO, NOT, NOTE, or NOTES as a valid abbreviation
|
|
for the NOTES command. This notation is usevul for long symbol names.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Lexical Functions
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Lexical functions allow you to obtain basically the same information as DCL
|
|
SHOW commands. However, it's easier to manipulate information which comes
|
|
from a lexical function. As an example, the following two command give the
|
|
same information:
|
|
|
|
$ SHOW TIME ! DCL SHOW TIME command
|
|
12-JUN-1989 14:29:23
|
|
$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT F$TIME() ! lexical function
|
|
12-JUN-1989 14:29:25.17
|
|
|
|
The second command is more usable, however:
|
|
|
|
$! Show_Date.COM
|
|
$!
|
|
$ TIME&DATE = F$TIME()
|
|
$ DATE = F$EXTRACT(0,11,TIME&DATE)
|
|
$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT DATE
|
|
|
|
This procedure displays only the date portion of the string returned by the
|
|
lexical function F$TIME(). (Use @SHOW_DATE to invoke it) VAX/VMS supports
|
|
lexical functions to manipulate text strings, convert data types, and return
|
|
information about the system, your process, symbols, files and devices.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Parameters
|
|
~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Eight reserved symbols (P1 through P8) are available to command procedures to
|
|
supply data to process. By using these parameters in a command procedure,
|
|
different data can be specified each time it's run. Parameter specification is
|
|
done on the command line where the procedure is called. Unless designed to,
|
|
the command procedure will not prompt for parameters. Parameters are separated
|
|
with spaces and may be character strings, integers, or symbols. If you want to
|
|
skip a parameter, us a null string (" ").
|
|
|
|
$! Add.Com
|
|
$! command procedure to demonstrate passing parameters
|
|
$! (add the first and third parameter)
|
|
$!
|
|
$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT P1+P3
|
|
|
|
$ @ADD 12 " " 14
|
|
26
|
|
|
|
If a command procedure requires multiple letters or words as a single
|
|
parameter, enclose it in quotes and it will be treated as one parameter and
|
|
not converted to uppercase.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Terminal Output
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
The WRITE and TYPE commands send data to the terminal. TYPE is used to
|
|
display the contents of a file, but may also be used to print lines of text
|
|
from within a command procedure. TYPE may only be used to output text
|
|
strings. Since the WRITE command is processed be DCL, expressions, symbols
|
|
and lexical functions are evaluated before the data is sent to the
|
|
terminal.
|
|
|
|
The output expression must translate to a string and be sent to the logical
|
|
device SYS$OUTPUT, but may be a string, lexical function, symbol, or any
|
|
combination of the three. Here's an example of a command procedure that
|
|
uses terminal output:
|
|
|
|
$! Writing a simple text string
|
|
$!
|
|
$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "This is a test..."
|
|
$!
|
|
$! Displaying multiple lines at the terminal
|
|
$!
|
|
$ TYPE SYS$OUTPUT Warning!
|
|
It's been 30 days since you changed
|
|
your password. Change it now!
|
|
$!
|
|
$! Writing a string with a lexical function
|
|
$!
|
|
$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT " "HI' You are in directory "F$DIRECTORY()' "
|
|
|
|
|
|
Terminal Input
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
The INQUIRE command's default device is the terminal keyboard, while the
|
|
READ command must be told where to accept data from. The INQUIRE command
|
|
prompts for input, reads data and assigns it to a symbol. All data is
|
|
accepted as a character string and is converted to uppercase and compressed
|
|
(extra blanks removed). The READ command prompts for input if the /PROMPT
|
|
qualifier is used, accepts data from a specified source and assigns it to a
|
|
symbol. The data is accepted with no string conversion or compression
|
|
occurring. Here's an example of a command procedure that uses terminal
|
|
input:
|
|
|
|
$! Puts whatever you type in the symbol NAME
|
|
$! the /NOPUNCTUATION qualifier will suppress the colon
|
|
$! and space INQUIRE puts at the end of the prompt
|
|
$!
|
|
$ INQUIRE /NOPUNCTUATION NAME "What is your name? "
|
|
$!
|
|
$! Example of READ using SYS$INPUT (terminal) for data
|
|
$!
|
|
$ READ /PROMPT = "First value: " SYS$INPUT VALUE_1
|
|
$ READ /PROMPT = "Second value: " SYS$INPUT VALUE_2
|
|
$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT VALUE_1," + ",VALUE_2," = ",VALUE_1+VALUE_2
|
|
|
|
|
|
File I/O
|
|
~~~~~~~
|
|
The basic steps to read and write files from within command procedures are
|
|
similar to most other languages. Use the OPEN command to open the file. If it
|
|
does not exist, OPEN will create it. Use the READ or WRITE commands to read or
|
|
write text records from the file. Use the CLOSE command to close the
|
|
file when you're done.
|
|
|
|
To open a file for writing, you must use the /APPEND or /WRITE qualifier. The
|
|
/WRITE qualifier creates a new file and places the record pointer at the
|
|
beginning of the file. If the file already exists, a new version will be
|
|
created by OPEN/WRITE. The /APPEND qualifier is used to add records to the end
|
|
of an existing file. The file must already exist before using the OPEN/APPEND
|
|
command, and when the file is opened, the record pointer is placed at the end
|
|
of the file.
|
|
|
|
To open a file for reading, use the /READ qualifier (the default for the
|
|
OPEN command). A file opened for reading may not be written to, and the
|
|
record pointer will initially be placed at the first record in the file.
|
|
Each time a record is read, the pointer is moved down to the next record.
|
|
The WRITE/UPDATE must be used to write over an existing record. Here's an
|
|
example of a command procedure using file input and output:
|
|
|
|
$ OPEN/APPEND OUTPUT_FILE NEW.DAT
|
|
$ OPEN/READ INPUT_FILE OLD.DAT
|
|
$ READ INPUT_FILE RECORD
|
|
$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "First record from OLD.DAT - ",RECORD
|
|
$ WRITE OUTPUT_FILE "First record from OLD.DAT - ",RECORD
|
|
|
|
To open a file for both reading and writing, use both the /READ and /WRITE
|
|
qualifiers. The record pointer will be placed at the first record in the file.
|
|
Using this method, however, you can only overwrite the record you most recently
|
|
read, and records you replace must be the same length.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Redirecting Command Procedure I/O
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Command procedures often invoke VAX/VMS utilities, and these programs will
|
|
normally get input from the logical device SYS$INPUT. While executing a
|
|
command procedure, SYS$INPUT is directed to the command procedure itself, and
|
|
this is why you can put command and data lines for a utility or program
|
|
directly in the procedure. SYS$COMMAND defaults to the terminal from where a
|
|
command procedure is being executed, and by redirecting SYS$INPUT to
|
|
SYS$COMMAND you can use utilities and other programs interactively from command
|
|
procedures:
|
|
|
|
$ DEFINE/USER_MODE SYS$INPUT SYS$COMMAND:
|
|
$ EDIT JUNK.DAT
|
|
|
|
The /USER_MODE qualifier causes the re-assignment to be in effect only for
|
|
the next command.
|
|
|
|
Normally command procedure output is displayed at your terminal. You may
|
|
redirect output to a file by using the /OUTPUT qualifier:
|
|
|
|
$ @SHOW_TIME/OUTPUT = TIME.DAT
|
|
|
|
By default, DCL error and severe error messages are directed to the file
|
|
represented by the logical name SYS$ERROR, which usually points to your
|
|
terminal. If you want to log error messages, simply redirect SYS$ERROR to
|
|
a file. If you redirect SYS$ERROR without also redirecting SYS$OUTPUT, DCL
|
|
will send error messages to both, and you'll receive the error messages
|
|
twice -- at your terminal and in the file.
|
|
|
|
To completely suppress error messages you can redirect both SYS$ERROR
|
|
and SYS$OUTPUT to the null device (NL:) or you can use the SET MESSAGE
|
|
command to turn off all message output. To suppress all messages, use:
|
|
SET MESSAGE/NOTEXT/NOIDENTIFICATION/NOFACILITY/NOSEVERITY.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Branching and Conditionals
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
You can use the DCL IF/THEN statements and conditional operators withing
|
|
command procedures to cause the execution of a command based on the
|
|
evaluation of a condition. The basic use is: $ IF condition THEN command.
|
|
The condition is a Boolean expression (True or False) and the command is
|
|
any legal DCL command. The following is a list of conditional operators:
|
|
|
|
Operator Function
|
|
~~~~~~~
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
.EQ. / .EQS. Determines if two numbers/character strings are equal
|
|
.GE. / .GES. Tests to see whether the first number/character string is
|
|
greater than or equal to the second
|
|
.GT. / .GTS. Determines if the first number/character string is greater
|
|
than the second
|
|
.LE. / .LES. Tests to see if the first number/character string is less
|
|
than or equal to the second
|
|
.LT. / .LTS. Determines if the first number/character string is less than
|
|
the second
|
|
.NE. / .NES. Tests to see whether the two numbers/character strings are
|
|
not equal
|
|
.AND. Combines two numbers with a logical AND (boolean algebra)
|
|
.OR. Combines two numbers with a logical OR (boolean algebra)
|
|
.NOT. Logically negates a value
|
|
|
|
The following is a command procedure using conditional branching:
|
|
|
|
$! Time.Com
|
|
$!
|
|
$ TIME = F$TIME()
|
|
$ HOUR = F$EXTRACT(12,2,TIME)
|
|
$ IF HOUR .LT. 12 THEN GOTO MORNING
|
|
$ IF HOUR .LT. 17 THEN GOTO AFTERNOON
|
|
$ IF HOUR .LT. 18 THEN GOTO EVENING
|
|
$ GOTO END
|
|
$ MORNING:
|
|
$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "Good morning!"
|
|
$ AFTERNOON:
|
|
$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "Good afternoon!"
|
|
$ EVENING:
|
|
$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "Good evening!"
|
|
$ END:
|
|
$ EXIT
|
|
|
|
|
|
Loops
|
|
~~
|
|
Loops are used to repeat a statement or group of statements until a
|
|
given condition is met. DCL supports both DO WHILE and DO UNTIL loops.
|
|
The DO WHILE loop tests the condition before evaluation:
|
|
|
|
$ LOOP:
|
|
$ IF .NOT. condition THEN GOTO END
|
|
.
|
|
.
|
|
.
|
|
$ GOTO LOOP
|
|
$ END:
|
|
$ EXIT
|
|
|
|
The DO UNTIL loop executes the statement(s) and then tests the condition:
|
|
|
|
$ LOOP:
|
|
.
|
|
.
|
|
.
|
|
$ IF condition THEN GOTO LOOP
|
|
$ EXIT
|
|
|
|
|
|
Subroutines
|
|
~~~~~~~~
|
|
The DCL command GOSUB transfers execution control to a label and the RETURN
|
|
command terminates subroutine execution, returning control to the statement
|
|
after the GOSUB command. Subroutines are useful where you need to do the same
|
|
series of commands repeatedly in different parts of a command procedure. They
|
|
also make procedures easier to read and more compact. The DCL commands GOSUB
|
|
and RETURN are not supported in VAX/VMS versions before VAX/VMS Version 4.4.
|
|
The following is an example procedure using a subroutine:
|
|
|
|
$! Personal.Com
|
|
$!
|
|
$! opens the personal info file
|
|
$!
|
|
$ OPEN/WRITE OUTPUT_FILE PERINFO.DAT
|
|
$!
|
|
$! collect info
|
|
$!
|
|
$ INQUIRE RECORD "Enter full name"
|
|
$ GOSUB WRITE_FILE
|
|
$ INQUIRE RECORD "Enter address"
|
|
$ GOSUB WRITE_FILE
|
|
$ INQUIRE RECORD "Enter phone number"
|
|
$ GOSUB WRITE_FILE
|
|
$ CLOSE OUTPUT_FILE
|
|
$ EXIT
|
|
$!
|
|
$! subroutine WRITE_FILE
|
|
$!
|
|
$ WRITE_FILE:
|
|
$ WRITE OUTPUT_FILE RECORD
|
|
$ RETURN
|
|
|
|
|
|
Error Handling
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
The command interpreter will execute an EXIT command if a severe error occurs,
|
|
terminating the procedure and returning control to the previous command level,
|
|
unless the DCL ON command is used to specify an action for the command
|
|
interpreter to take. The ON command supports the three keywords WARNING,
|
|
ERROR, and SEVERE_ERROR. To override error handling for procedure warnings,
|
|
for example, use something like this:
|
|
|
|
$ ON WARNING THEN EXIT
|
|
or
|
|
$ ON WARNING THEN GOTO label
|
|
|
|
WARNING causes the command procedure to take action if a warning, error, or
|
|
severe error occurs. ERROR causes the action if an error or severe error
|
|
occurs, and SEVERE_ERROR causes the action only if a fatal error occurs.
|
|
|
|
$STATUS and $SEVERITY are reserved DCL global symbols, and each time a command
|
|
is executed, values are assigned to these symbols. $STATUS holds the full
|
|
condition code of the last statement and $SEVERITY holds an error severity
|
|
level. The condition code in $STATUS is valid to the VAX/VMS MESSAGE facility
|
|
and can be used in conjunction with F$MESSAGE to obtain the actual text message
|
|
associated with the code:
|
|
|
|
$ SET DEFAULT DUB1:[BYNON]
|
|
$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT $STATUS $X00000001
|
|
$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT F$MESSAGE(%X00000001)
|
|
% SYSTEM-S-NORMAL, normal successful completion
|
|
|
|
All DCL commands will return a condition code, but not all condition codes
|
|
have text messages. Condition codes without text messages will return the
|
|
message "%NONAME-E-NOMSG Message number (8-digit code)".
|
|
|
|
The message text isn't very useful for making conditional decisions though, so
|
|
$SEVERITY is used. It contains one of five possible values extracted from the
|
|
first three bits of $STATUS. Here are the codes:
|
|
|
|
Code Definition
|
|
~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
0 Warning
|
|
1 Success
|
|
2 Error
|
|
3 Information
|
|
4 Severe Error
|
|
|
|
Odd values (1,3) indicate success while even values (0,2,4) indicate failure.
|
|
There are basically two ways to use the status and severity codes to handle
|
|
errors. The first is to treat $STATUS as a Boolean value:
|
|
|
|
$ SET NOON
|
|
$ command ! a DCL command
|
|
$ IF $STATUS THEN GOTO NO_ERR ! test $STATUS for T or F
|
|
.
|
|
. ! handle the error
|
|
.
|
|
$ NO_ERR ! continue processing
|
|
.
|
|
.
|
|
.
|
|
$ EXIT
|
|
|
|
The second method is to trap the error with the ON WARNING command, then use
|
|
the severity level to determine an appropriate course of action:
|
|
|
|
$ SET NOON
|
|
$ ON WARNING GOTO ERR_TRAP
|
|
$ command ! a DCL command
|
|
$ command ! a DCL command
|
|
.
|
|
.
|
|
.
|
|
$ EXIT
|
|
$!
|
|
$! error trap code
|
|
$!
|
|
$ ERR_TRAP:
|
|
$ SEVERITY = $SEVERITY ! save the error code
|
|
$ IF SEVERITY = 0 THEN command ! if warning...
|
|
$ GOTO DONE
|
|
$ IF SEVERITY = 2 THEN command ! if error...
|
|
$ GOTO DONE
|
|
$ IF SEVERITY = 4 THEN command ! if severe error...
|
|
$ DONE:
|
|
.
|
|
.
|
|
.
|
|
$ EXIT
|
|
|
|
Error checking can be completely disabled with the SET NOON command. When
|
|
this is in effect, the command interpreter continues updating the condition
|
|
code, but does not perform any error checking. The DCL command SET ON
|
|
restors error checking to normal. For example:
|
|
|
|
$ SET NOON ! turn off error checking
|
|
$ command ! a DCL command
|
|
$ SET ON ! restor error checking
|
|
|
|
|
|
Termination
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
The EXIT command will terminate the current command procedure and return
|
|
control to the command level that called it while the STOP command terminates
|
|
all command procedures (if nested) and returns control to DCL.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Example Command Procedures
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
The following are two example command procedures to demonstrate some of
|
|
the previously discussed techniques.
|
|
|
|
Login.Com
|
|
~~~~~~~~
|
|
$! Login.Com - executed each time you log in
|
|
$!
|
|
$! Check for a network or batch login
|
|
$!
|
|
$ IF F$MODE() .EQS. "NETWORK" THEN GOTO NETWORK
|
|
$ IF F$MODE() .EQS. "BATCH" THEN GOTO BATCH
|
|
$!
|
|
$! Define process permanent symbols for convenience
|
|
$!
|
|
$ SD == "SET DEFAULT"
|
|
$ SH == "SET HOST"
|
|
$ WI*DE == "SET TERMINAL/WIDTH=132"
|
|
$ NA*RROW == "SET TERMINAL/WIDTH=80"
|
|
$ DIR*ECTORY == "DIRECTORY/SIZE"
|
|
$ PU*RGE == "PURGE/LOG/KEEP=2" ! keep latest 2 version
|
|
$ HO*ME == "SET DEFAULT SYS$LOGIN:"
|
|
$ WHO == "SHOW USERS"
|
|
$ EVE == "EDIT/TPU"
|
|
$ EDT == "EDIT/EDT/COMMAND=SYS$LOGIN:EDTINI.EDT"
|
|
$ BR*OWSE == "TYPE/PAGE"
|
|
$!
|
|
$! Define special keys
|
|
$!
|
|
$ DEFINE/KEY/NOLOG/TERM PF1 "DIR" ! term ends with <enter>
|
|
$ DEFINE/KEY/NOLOG PF2 "EDIT"
|
|
$ DEFINE/KEY/NOLOG/TERM/NOECHO PF3 "LOGOUT"
|
|
$ DEFINE/KEY/NOLOG/TERM/NOECHO HELP "SHOW KEY/ALL"
|
|
$!
|
|
$! Modify terminal characteristics
|
|
$!
|
|
$ SET TERMINAL/INSERT ! insert mode
|
|
$ SET PROMPT = "[BYNON]> "
|
|
$!
|
|
$! Show time and quit
|
|
$!
|
|
$ SHOW TIME
|
|
$ EXIT
|
|
$!
|
|
$! If it's a network login, we can now
|
|
$! perform some other commands if desired.
|
|
$! Just quit for now though.
|
|
$!
|
|
$ NETWORK:
|
|
$ EXIT
|
|
$!
|
|
$! If it's a batch job login, set verification on and quit.
|
|
$!
|
|
$ BATCH:
|
|
$ SET VERIFY
|
|
$ EXIT
|
|
|
|
|
|
Subdir.Com
|
|
~~~~~~~~~
|
|
$! Subdir.Com - how to search and parse character strings
|
|
$!
|
|
$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT F$DIRECTORY()+ " Subdirectories:"
|
|
$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT " "
|
|
$!
|
|
$! Search for subdirectory names and display them on the terminal
|
|
$!
|
|
$ DIR$LOOP:
|
|
$ FILE = F$SEARCH("*.DIR")
|
|
$!
|
|
$! If DCL returns a null string (" ") we're done
|
|
$!
|
|
$ IF FILE .EQS. " "THEN GOTO END$DIR$LOOP
|
|
$!
|
|
$! Find the position of the period
|
|
$!
|
|
$ DOT = F$LOCATE(".",FILE)
|
|
$!
|
|
$! Find the position of the right bracket
|
|
$!
|
|
$ BRACKET = F$LOCATE("]",FILE)
|
|
$!
|
|
$! Extract the string between the dot and bracket
|
|
$!
|
|
$ FILE = F$EXTRACT(BRACKET+1,DOT-BRACKET-1,FILE)
|
|
$!
|
|
$! Display the subdirectory name and start over
|
|
$!
|
|
$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT " ' 'FILE' "
|
|
$ GOTO DIR$LOOP
|
|
$ END$DIR$LOOP:
|
|
$ EXIT
|
|
|
|
<END PART I>
|
|
______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
|
|
==Phrack Inc.==
|
|
|
|
Volume Three, Issue Thirty-five, File 8 of 13
|
|
|
|
|
|
+=========================================================================+
|
|
|
|
|
|
A Beginners Guide to Novell Netware 386
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Brought to you by:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Butler
|
|
|
|
|
|
+=========================================================================+
|
|
|
|
As most of you know NOVELL is the most popular PC network software around,with
|
|
that being the case I decided to put together a little file on just what you
|
|
can do with a NOVELL network.
|
|
|
|
* The information in this file is primarily for NOVELL NETWARE 386 networks!!!
|
|
If you have NOVELL NETWARE 286 some of this information may not be correct.
|
|
|
|
When the word "Network" is mentioned in this file I am referring to a PC-based
|
|
network or LAN (Local Area Network).
|
|
|
|
If you are not familiar with the concept of a "Network" I would suggest you
|
|
first get acquainted with it by either picking up a good book or if you have
|
|
access to one, go exploring.
|
|
|
|
This file is for those who have some experience with networks and or the
|
|
concept of a network.
|
|
|
|
(----------------------------------------------------------------------------)
|
|
|
|
Variations in Setups:
|
|
|
|
Every network is setup differently is some way. Even within the same company
|
|
two different networks may be setup different. The differences may be slight
|
|
or major and can consist of everything from menus to naming conventions.
|
|
|
|
Companies that install networks as a business are inconsistent with their
|
|
setups also because every network technician does things differently and every
|
|
customer wants things to be a certain way.
|
|
|
|
Keep this idea in mind when exploring different networks because most likely
|
|
the setup will be different from network to network.
|
|
|
|
(----------------------------------------------------------------------------)
|
|
|
|
Terminology:
|
|
|
|
Bindery-- A database that contains definitions of entities such as users
|
|
groups, and workgroups. The bindery is comprised of three
|
|
components: objects, properties, and property data sets.
|
|
|
|
Console-- The monitor and keyboard at which you actually control fileserver
|
|
activity.
|
|
|
|
File Server-- The Computer that the Network software, applications, and some
|
|
data reside on. (Usually a very powerful one, i.e. Compaq 486
|
|
with 1 gigabyte of storage).
|
|
|
|
Groups-- A means of dealing with users collectively rather than individually.
|
|
i.e. Word Processing, Accounting.
|
|
|
|
LAN-- Local Area Network
|
|
|
|
Login Script-- Similar to autoexec.bat, contains commands that initialize
|
|
environmental variables, map network drives, and control the
|
|
user's program execution.
|
|
|
|
Netware-- Novell's Network Operating System.
|
|
|
|
Netwire-- Novell's on-line information service, accessible via Compuserve.
|
|
|
|
Network-- A group of computers that can communicate with each other.
|
|
|
|
NIC-- Network Interface Card
|
|
|
|
Novell-- Software Manufacturer
|
|
|
|
Objects-- any physical or logical entities, including users, user groups,
|
|
workgroups, file servers, print servers, or any other entity that
|
|
has been given a name.
|
|
|
|
Print Server-- A computer dedicated to controlling all jobs for a specified
|
|
printer.
|
|
|
|
Properties-- the characteristics of each bindery object. Passwords, account
|
|
restrictions, account balances, internetwork addresses, list of
|
|
authorized clients, and group members are all properties.
|
|
|
|
Property Data Sets-- the values assigned to an entity's bindery properties.
|
|
|
|
Rights-- Rights control which directories and files a user or group can
|
|
access and what the user or group is allowed to do with those
|
|
directories and files.
|
|
|
|
User-- Any person allowed to work on the network.
|
|
|
|
WAN-- Wide Area Network
|
|
|
|
Workstation-- Any usable computer connected to a network.
|
|
|
|
(----------------------------------------------------------------------------)
|
|
|
|
Netware Environment:
|
|
|
|
The SYS:SYSTEM directory is used for system administration and contains
|
|
operating system files, NetWare utilities, and programs reserved for
|
|
SUPERVISOR.
|
|
|
|
The SYS:PUBLIC directory is used for general access and contains NetWare
|
|
utilities and programs for regular network users.
|
|
|
|
The SYS:LOGIN directory contains the programs necessary for logging in.
|
|
|
|
The SYS:MAIL directory is used by NetWare-compatible mail programs. This
|
|
directory also has and ID number subdirectory for each user that contains
|
|
the user login script and print job configurations.
|
|
|
|
(----------------------------------------------------------------------------)
|
|
|
|
Breaches in Security:
|
|
|
|
Set Allow Unencrypted Passwords=on/off.
|
|
|
|
Enter this command from the "CONSOLE".
|
|
|
|
By changing this command you will disable the encryption scheme which will
|
|
then allow you to sniff passwords from the cables between workstations and
|
|
servers.
|
|
|
|
By default Netware comes with usernames GUEST and SUPERVISOR that have no
|
|
passwords.
|
|
|
|
Also try names like TAPE, BACKUP, SERVER, REMOTE, CONNECT, NOVELL, etc... If
|
|
you have access to an existing account use SYSCON to get a list of all the user
|
|
names, most likely there will be one or two accounts that don't have passwords.
|
|
|
|
Also on some of these accounts that do not have passwords, part of their logon
|
|
process is the execution of a batch file that executes the individual software
|
|
i.e. backup. A batch file is a batch file so if its not disabled do the old
|
|
CTRL-C to break out of the batch file and roam around. Some accounts like the
|
|
backup account must have supervisor rights so that everything can be backed up.
|
|
So if you can break out of one of these you can roam the whole Network.
|
|
|
|
There are also a few neat little programs out there in cyberspace that will
|
|
make your task of getting access a little easier:
|
|
|
|
1. THIEFNOV.ZIP ===> THIEFNOV is a TSR that will capture usernames
|
|
and passwords from a workstation on Novell
|
|
Networks. The Thief works by hiding in a user's
|
|
autoexec.bat file, and executing every time
|
|
someone tries to login to the network. The Thief
|
|
captures their username and password and saves
|
|
them in a hidden file in the root directory of
|
|
their C: drive.
|
|
|
|
2. TEMPSUP.ZIP ====> TEMPSUP is a utility that will create a user for
|
|
you to play with. TEMPSUP comes with two
|
|
programs, an executable and a NLM module. The
|
|
executable can be run by any user with access to
|
|
DOS but only gives you the rights of that user.
|
|
But, the NLM module can be loaded at the Console
|
|
and will give you Supervisor Rights to the whole
|
|
Network. The syntax is "Tempsup_username to be
|
|
created" i.e. f:> tempsup hacker <return>.
|
|
|
|
3. NETCRACK.ZIP ===> NETCRACK is a brute force hacking program
|
|
designed for Novell. NETCRACK can be run with
|
|
out login in to the network but by just loading
|
|
ipx and netx. NETCRACK starts with AAA and goes
|
|
from there trying to guess the password for any
|
|
user. The syntax is "netcrack_username <return>.
|
|
|
|
|
|
These are the only programs I know of made especially for Novell and I have
|
|
personally tried them all out with excellent results.
|
|
|
|
If you do get access to a Novell Network and you are not sure what to do, then
|
|
go to the F:\PUBLIC directory and type HELP. Novell comes with an online help
|
|
system that uses FOLIO Infobases. The HELP system is very easy to navigate
|
|
through and is better that the actual Novell Manuals. You can even download
|
|
the programs NFOLIO.COM & NFOLIO.EXE and the infobases *.NFO to your local PC
|
|
to examine further.
|
|
|
|
If you are using the brute force hacking method Novell will stop you dead in
|
|
your tracks if the Intruder Detection/Lockout option has been enabled because
|
|
after 3 unsuccessful login attempts the account is locked until a supervisor
|
|
resets it.
|
|
|
|
Intruder Detection/Lockout options are as follows:
|
|
|
|
Detect Intruders: Yes/No
|
|
Intruder Detection Threshold
|
|
Incorrect Login Attempts: #
|
|
Bad Login Count Retention Time: # Days # Hours # Minutes
|
|
|
|
Lock Account After Detection: Yes/No
|
|
Length of Account Lockout: # Days # Hours # Minutes
|
|
|
|
|
|
The following restrictions are optional for every user account:
|
|
|
|
Account Disabled: Yes/No
|
|
Account Has Expiration Date: Yes/No
|
|
Date Account Expires:
|
|
Limit Concurrent Connections: Yes/No
|
|
Maximum Connections:
|
|
Allow User To Change Password Yes/No
|
|
Require Password: Yes/No
|
|
Minimum Password Length:
|
|
Force Periodic Password Changes: Yes/No
|
|
Days Between Forced Changes:
|
|
Date Password Expires:
|
|
Limit Grace Logins: Yes/No
|
|
Grace Logins Allowed:
|
|
Remaining Grace Logins:
|
|
Require Unique Passwords: Yes/No
|
|
|
|
|
|
Novell can also be setup so that users can only logon during certain hours,
|
|
i.e. 8 a.m. - 5 p.m. Monday thru Friday.
|
|
|
|
Trustee Assignments grant rights to specific users (or groups) that allow
|
|
them to use a file or directory in particular ways (i.e., only for reading)
|
|
The network supervisor can select the appropriate rights to assign to users
|
|
or groups in each directory or file.
|
|
|
|
A trustee assignment automatically grants users the right to see to the root of
|
|
a directory. However, the users can't see any of the subdirectories unless
|
|
they also have been granted rights in the subdirectories.
|
|
|
|
Inherited Rights Masks are given to each file and directory when they are
|
|
created. The default Inherited Rights Mask includes all rights. But this does
|
|
not mean that users have all rights; users can only use rights that they been
|
|
granted in trustee assignments.
|
|
|
|
If the Inherited Rights Mask is modified for a file or subdirectory below the
|
|
original trustee assignment, the only rights the user can "inherit" for the
|
|
file or subdirectory are rights that are allowed by the Inherited Rights Mask.
|
|
For example, if a user is granted Read right with a directory trustee
|
|
assignment, the right to read files in a subdirectory could be revoked by
|
|
having the Read right removed from the subdirectory's Inherited Rights Mask.
|
|
|
|
Both trustee assignments and Inherited Rights Masks use the same eight trustee
|
|
rights to control access to directories and file.
|
|
|
|
S -- Supervisory
|
|
|
|
Supervisory right grants all rights to the directory or file. At the
|
|
directory level, this right grants all rights to the directory and to
|
|
any files, subdirectories, or subdirectory files in that directory.
|
|
The Supervisory right overrides any restrictions placed on subdirs or
|
|
files with Inherited Rights Masks. Users who have the Supervisory
|
|
right in a directory can grant other users Supervisory rights to the
|
|
directory, its files, and subdirectories.
|
|
|
|
Once the Supervisory right has been granted, it can be revoked only
|
|
from the directory is was granted to. It cannot be revoked in a
|
|
file or subdirectory.
|
|
|
|
R -- Read
|
|
|
|
Read right allows users to open and read files. At the directory
|
|
level this right allows users to open files in a directory and read
|
|
the contents or run the program. At the file level, this right allows
|
|
users to open and read the file (even when the right has been revoked
|
|
at the directory level).
|
|
|
|
W -- Write
|
|
|
|
Write right allows users to write to files. At the directory level,
|
|
this right allows users to open and write to (modify the contents of)
|
|
file in the directory. At the file level, this right allows users
|
|
to open and write to the file (even if the right has been revoked at
|
|
the directory level).
|
|
|
|
C -- Create
|
|
|
|
Create right allows users to create directories and files. At the
|
|
directory level, this right allows users to create files and
|
|
subdirectories in the directory. At the file level, this right
|
|
allows users to salvage a file after it has been deleted.
|
|
|
|
E -- Erase
|
|
|
|
Erase right allows users to delete directories and files. At the
|
|
directory level, this right allows users to delete a directory as well
|
|
as any files, subdirectories, and subdirectory files in that
|
|
directory. At the file level, this right allows users to delete the
|
|
file (even when the right has been revoked at the directory level).
|
|
|
|
M -- Modify
|
|
|
|
Modify right allows users to change directory and file attribute sand
|
|
to rename subdirectories and files. At the directory level, this right
|
|
allows users to change the attributes of and rename any file, subdir,
|
|
or subdirectory file in that directory. At the file level, this right
|
|
allows users to change the file's attributes or to rename the file
|
|
(even when the right has been revoked at the directory level).
|
|
|
|
F -- File Scan
|
|
|
|
File Scan right allows users to see files. At the directory level,
|
|
this right allows users to see files and subdirectories in a
|
|
directory. At the file level, this right allows users to see the file
|
|
(even when the right has been revoked at the directory level).
|
|
|
|
A -- Access Control
|
|
|
|
Access Control right allows users to modify trustee assignments and
|
|
Inherited Rights Masks.
|
|
|
|
(----------------------------------------------------------------------------)
|
|
|
|
As a network user, you should be familiar with the operation of the personal
|
|
computer you are using. If you have an IBM PC-type workstation, you should
|
|
also be familiar with basic Disk Operating System (DOS) commands.
|
|
|
|
User Basics is divided into the following ten sections. The first section
|
|
explains basic networking concepts and gives an overview of how a NetWare
|
|
network operates.
|
|
|
|
The second section introduces the NetWare menu and command line utilities and
|
|
explains how to use them.
|
|
|
|
The next seven sections explain some basic network tasks:
|
|
|
|
o Booting up
|
|
o Logging in and out
|
|
o Creating your login script
|
|
o Mapping your drives
|
|
o Sending messages
|
|
o Managing files and directories
|
|
o Printing
|
|
|
|
Some basic troubleshooting hints are covered under "What If ..." at the end of
|
|
each of these modules and are also listed in the index.
|
|
|
|
The last section lists some common error messages and how to respond to them.
|
|
|
|
This booklet does not explain how to perform every network task or how to use
|
|
every available network command. For complete explanations of all network
|
|
tasks and commands, see NetWare v3.11 Utilities Reference.
|
|
|
|
INTRODUCTION TO NETWARE
|
|
|
|
If your personal computer is part of a NetWare network, it is connected to
|
|
other computers and peripherals. You can share files and resources and
|
|
communicate with others in your workgroup, thus increasing productivity.
|
|
|
|
This introduction answers the following questions about using a NetWare
|
|
network:
|
|
|
|
o What is a NetWare network?
|
|
o How does a network operate?
|
|
o How are files stored on a network?
|
|
o Who can use the network?
|
|
o How is information protected on a network?
|
|
|
|
WHAT IS A NETWARE NETWORK?
|
|
|
|
A NetWare network is a group of computers (such as IBM PCs or Macintoshes)
|
|
that are linked together so they can communicate and share resources.
|
|
|
|
Network users, each working on a different personal computer, can communicate
|
|
with each other via the network. They can also share network resources (hard
|
|
disks on the file server, data, applications, and printers) and use any service
|
|
the network provides (for example, access to a mainframe system).
|
|
|
|
HOW DOES A NETWORK OPERATE?
|
|
|
|
To understand how a network operates, you must know about the principal
|
|
components of a network: the file server, the workstations, and the software
|
|
that runs on each----NetWare and operating systems like DOS, OS/2, VMS, UNIX,
|
|
and the Macintosh operating system.
|
|
|
|
Beyond these basic components, a NetWare network can incorporate mainframe
|
|
computers, backup devices, modem pools, and different types of servers (such as
|
|
file servers, print servers, or archive servers).
|
|
|
|
The Network Workstations and DOS
|
|
|
|
Workstations are the personal computers on which network users do their work.
|
|
Workstations are used much like non-networked personal computers. The only
|
|
difference is that they can access files from more than just the local drives.
|
|
Each workstation processes its own files and uses its own copy of DOS.
|
|
|
|
The Network File Server and NetWare
|
|
|
|
The file server is a personal computer that uses the NetWare operating system
|
|
to control the network. The file server coordinates all of the workstations
|
|
and regulates the way they share network resources. It regulates who can
|
|
access which files, who can make changes to data, and who can use the printer
|
|
first.
|
|
|
|
All network files are stored on a hard disk in or attached to the file server,
|
|
instead of on diskettes or hard disks in individual workstations.
|
|
|
|
The NetWare Workstation
|
|
|
|
Workstations use two pieces of software to communicate with the file server,
|
|
the shell and a protocol. The shell must be loaded into each workstation
|
|
before that workstation can function on the network.
|
|
|
|
The NetWare shell, either NET3 or NET4 (depending on whether you are using DOS
|
|
3.x or 4.x), directs workstation requests to DOS or NetWare. When a
|
|
workstation makes a request (asks to do a task), the shell decides if it is a
|
|
workstation task (to be directed to DOS) or a network task (to be directed to
|
|
NetWare). If the request is a workstation task (such as using the DOS DIR
|
|
command to list the files in a local directory), DOS should handle the request.
|
|
If the request is a network task (such as printing a job on a network printer),
|
|
NetWare should handle the request. The shell sends the request to the
|
|
appropriate operating system, somewhat like a railroad track switcher sends
|
|
trains to the proper destination.
|
|
|
|
The workstation shell uses another file, IPX.COM, to send network messages to
|
|
the file server and, in some cases, directly to other network stations. This
|
|
IPX protocol is the language the workstation uses to communicate with the file
|
|
server.
|
|
|
|
HOW ARE FILES STORED ON A NETWORK?
|
|
|
|
All network information is stored on the file server's hard disk. The system
|
|
for storing that information is called the "directory structure."
|
|
|
|
The NetWare directory structure, or storage system, is organized into
|
|
|
|
o File servers, which contain one or more
|
|
o Volumes, which can span several hard disks and are divided into
|
|
o Directories, which can contain other directories (subdirectories) and
|
|
o Files.
|
|
|
|
A directory structure can be compared to a filing cabinet system.
|
|
|
|
o The file server corresponds to the filing cabinet.
|
|
|
|
o The volumes correspond to the filing cabinet drawers. Each file server
|
|
has at least one volume, the SYS volume, which is created when the server
|
|
is installed. In NetWare v3.11, however, one volume can span several
|
|
hard disks.
|
|
|
|
o The directories correspond to the hanging folders within the filing
|
|
cabinet drawers. You can create and delete directories to suit your
|
|
organizational needs, much as you insert hanging folders into, and remove
|
|
them from, a filing cabinet.
|
|
|
|
o Directories can contain other directories, which are sometimes referred
|
|
to as "subdirectories. These directories within a directory then
|
|
correspond to the manila folders inside the hanging folders. They divide
|
|
directories into smaller units, just as manila folders divide hanging
|
|
folders into smaller units.
|
|
|
|
o And finally, directories contain actual files, just as manila folders
|
|
contain individual documents. A file might be a letter or a list of
|
|
addresses. When you save information in a file, you give the file a
|
|
unique name so you can retrieve it later.
|
|
|
|
WHO CAN USE THE NETWORK?
|
|
|
|
Before being able to work on the network, a person must be designated as a
|
|
network user. Network users can be assigned four levels of responsibility on
|
|
the network.
|
|
|
|
o Regular network users
|
|
|
|
o Operators (file server console operators, print queue operators, print
|
|
server operators)
|
|
|
|
o Managers (workgroup managers, user account managers)
|
|
|
|
o Network supervisors
|
|
|
|
Regular network users are the people who work on the network. They can run
|
|
applications and work with files according to the rights assigned to them.
|
|
|
|
Operators are regular network users who have been assigned additional
|
|
privileges. For example, a file server console operator is a network user
|
|
who is given specific rights to use the FCONSOLE utility.
|
|
|
|
Managers are users who have been given responsibility for creating and/or
|
|
managing other users. Workgroup managers can create and manage users; user
|
|
account managers can manage, but not create, users. Managers function as
|
|
supervisors over a particular group, but they do not have supervisor
|
|
equivalence.
|
|
|
|
Network supervisors are responsible for the smooth operation of the whole
|
|
network. Network supervisors maintain the system, restructuring and updating
|
|
it as needed. Supervisors may also teach regular network users how to use the
|
|
network.
|
|
|
|
HOW IS INFORMATION PROTECTED ON A NETWORK?
|
|
|
|
All information on a NetWare network is stored in a central location---the file
|
|
server's hard disk. However, all users should not be able to access all
|
|
information (such as payroll files). In addition, users should not always be
|
|
able to access the same data file at the same time; otherwise, they may
|
|
overwrite each other's work.
|
|
|
|
To prevent problems like these, NetWare provides an extensive security system
|
|
to protect the data on the network.
|
|
|
|
NetWare security consists of a combination of the following:
|
|
|
|
o Login security
|
|
|
|
Login security includes creating usernames and passwords and imposing
|
|
station, time, and account restrictions on users.
|
|
|
|
o Trustee rights (privileges) assigned to users
|
|
|
|
Trustee rights control which directories and files a user can access and
|
|
what the user is allowed to do with those directories and files, such as
|
|
creating, reading, erasing, or writing to them.
|
|
|
|
o Attributes assigned to directories and files
|
|
|
|
Directory and file attributes determine whether that directory or file
|
|
can be deleted, copied, viewed, or written to. Among other things, they
|
|
also mark a file as shareable or non-shareable.
|
|
|
|
These three levels of security work together to protect the network from
|
|
unauthorized access.
|
|
|
|
REVIEW
|
|
|
|
This introduction explained the following:
|
|
|
|
o A NetWare network links personal computers so users can communicate and
|
|
share resources.
|
|
|
|
o A NetWare network consists of two or more workstations and at least one
|
|
file server.
|
|
|
|
Workstations are personal computers on which network users do their work.
|
|
Workstations run their own native operating system (for example, DOS) and
|
|
process their own files. They can access files, applications, and
|
|
resources through the file server.
|
|
|
|
File servers are personal computers that use the NetWare operating system
|
|
to coordinate all network activities.
|
|
|
|
o Workstations and the file server communicate via the NetWare shell, which
|
|
must be loaded into each workstation (just as DOS must be loaded into
|
|
each workstation). NET3 or NET4 (the NetWare shells corresponding to DOS
|
|
3.x or 4.x) sends workstation requests to the proper operating system
|
|
(file server or workstation) for processing.
|
|
|
|
o The shell uses a protocol, such as IPX, to send messages to the
|
|
appropriate network station.
|
|
|
|
o Information is stored on the file server in a directory structure that is
|
|
made up of volumes, directories, and files.
|
|
|
|
o There are four types of network users: regular network users, network
|
|
operators, network managers, and network supervisors. The type of user
|
|
you are is determined by your responsibilities.
|
|
|
|
o NetWare's extensive security system prevents users from corrupting data
|
|
in network files and prevents unauthorized users from accessing
|
|
restricted files.
|
|
|
|
WHAT ARE MENU AND COMMAND LINE UTILITIES?
|
|
|
|
You use NetWare utilities to perform network tasks. There are two types of
|
|
utilities: menu utilities and command line utilities. Menu utilities let you
|
|
perform network tasks by choosing options from menus. Command line utilities
|
|
let you perform tasks by typing commands at the DOS command line. This section
|
|
explains how to execute both types of NetWare utilities.
|
|
|
|
WORK WITH MENU UTILITIES
|
|
|
|
Access a Menu Utility
|
|
|
|
To access a menu utility, such as FILER, type the utility's name
|
|
at the DOS prompt and press <Enter>. The utility's main menu
|
|
is displayed along with a screen header showing the following:
|
|
|
|
o The utility's full name
|
|
o The current date and time
|
|
o The directory path leading up to your current directory (some utilities)
|
|
o Your username on your file server (some utilities)
|
|
o Your connection number (some utilities)
|
|
|
|
Exit a Menu Utility
|
|
|
|
There are two ways to exit a menu utility:
|
|
|
|
o Press <Escape> until an exit confirmation box appears. Then highlight
|
|
"Yes" and press <Enter>.
|
|
|
|
o Press the Exit key (usually <Alt><F10>). Do not press the Exit key to exit
|
|
a menu utility if you have made changes within the utility; if you do, the
|
|
changes are not saved. Exiting via the Escape key saves your changes.
|
|
|
|
Additional Information
|
|
|
|
Once you have accessed a menu utility and the main menu is displayed, you are
|
|
ready to work. Menu utilities use certain keys to perform special functions.
|
|
The utilities also have certain standard components. The keys, wildcards, and
|
|
components are described below.
|
|
|
|
F1 (Help) Key. Displays help screens.
|
|
If you press the help screen once, a help screen that applies to the task
|
|
you are currently working on appears. The help screen describes all the
|
|
options on the screen. To get help on a specific option, highlight the
|
|
option and press <Enter>.
|
|
|
|
If you press the Help key twice, your computer's function key assignments
|
|
are listed. There are three screens containing function key assignments.
|
|
Press the <PageDown> key to see subsequent screens.
|
|
|
|
F5 (Mark) Key. Allows you to mark multiple items in a list so you can add or
|
|
delete several items at once.
|
|
|
|
Esc (Escape) Key. Has three functions:
|
|
|
|
1) If you are on a menu screen, pressing <Escape> allows you to return to
|
|
a previous menu.
|
|
|
|
2) If you are at the main menu, pressing <Escape> causes an exit
|
|
confirmation box to appear. By highlighting "Yes" and pressing
|
|
<Enter>, you exit the menu utility and return to the menu or command
|
|
line prompt.
|
|
|
|
3) If you are performing a process, pressing <Escape> allows you to
|
|
continue.
|
|
|
|
Wildcard characters (* and ?). DOS and NetWare recognize these as universal
|
|
replacements for any other character or set of characters. Wildcards can be
|
|
used to search for groups of volumes, directories, or files, or they can be
|
|
used to search for a particular file when you are unsure of its complete
|
|
name.
|
|
|
|
An asterisk (*) in a filename indicates that any character can occupy that
|
|
position and all remaining positions in the filename. For example, in the
|
|
FILER utility, to copy all subdirectory's files with the extension .EXE to
|
|
another directory, type "*.EXE" in the menu's entry box and press <Enter>.
|
|
|
|
In contrast, a question mark (?) in a filename indicates that any character can
|
|
occupy that position, and that position only. So, if you were to type
|
|
"ACCOUNT?.NEW", you would copy files like ACCOUNT1.NEW, ACCOUNT2.NEW, and so
|
|
on.
|
|
|
|
NetWare's use of wildcard characters differs from DOS's in one respect. For
|
|
example, to represent all files in a directory, DOS expects you to type "*.*",
|
|
whereas NetWare only needs one asterisk (*).
|
|
|
|
For more information about wildcard characters (global filename characters),
|
|
see your DOS manual.
|
|
|
|
Components. When you first access a menu utility, the main menu is displayed.
|
|
Menus contain options you can choose from. Options can be selected one of two
|
|
ways:
|
|
|
|
o You can use the arrow keys to highlight the option you want. Then press
|
|
<Enter>.
|
|
|
|
o You can type the first letter of an option to highlight that option. If
|
|
more than one option in the menu starts with the same letter(s), type
|
|
enough additional letters to distinguish one option from the others. (For
|
|
example, if both "Search" and "Select" were options, you would have to type
|
|
"Sel" to highlight "Select.") Once the option you want is highlighted,
|
|
press <Enter>.
|
|
|
|
When you select an option from the main menu, additional menus and displays
|
|
appear on the screen. These displays include lists, entry boxes, insets,
|
|
forms, and confirmation boxes. Each type of screen display is explained
|
|
below.
|
|
|
|
Lists Lists are similar to menus, and items in the lists can be
|
|
selected the same way menu options are. However, you can
|
|
also add to and delete items from some lists. Lists may
|
|
have more than one column, and they may extend below the
|
|
screen display. Press the Down-arrow key to see additional
|
|
items. Pressing <Ctrl><PageDown> takes you to the bottom
|
|
of the list. Pressing <Ctrl><PageUp> takes you to the top
|
|
of the list.
|
|
|
|
Entry boxes Entry boxes are boxes in which you can get information,
|
|
such as a username or pathname. The Delete, Backspace, and
|
|
arrow keys work in these boxes.
|
|
|
|
Insets Insets display information that cannot be edited (except by
|
|
the network supervisor). Regular users cannot add to or
|
|
delete from the information in this window.
|
|
|
|
Forms Forms are windows that contain fields. You can move around
|
|
in a form using the arrow keys or the Enter key. (When you
|
|
press <Enter>, the cursor moves to the next field in the
|
|
form.) You can change the information in the field by
|
|
highlighting the field and pressing <Enter>.
|
|
|
|
What you do next depends on the type of field. Some fields
|
|
allow you to type in information; others display menu items
|
|
to select.
|
|
|
|
Confirmation boxes Confirmation boxes are displayed whenever you exit a menu
|
|
utility or whenever you create or delete items (such as
|
|
directories or files). You can either confirm or cancel
|
|
the action by selecting "Yes" or "No" and pressing <Enter>.
|
|
|
|
WORK WITH COMMAND LINE UTILITIES
|
|
|
|
Command Format
|
|
|
|
The command format displays the appropriate syntax for command line utilities.
|
|
Command line utilities are typed in at the DOS prompt.
|
|
|
|
The following are examples of the command formats for the NPRINT and the TLIST
|
|
utilities:
|
|
|
|
NPRINT path [option...] <Enter>
|
|
|
|
TLIST [path [USERS | GROUPS]] <Enter>
|
|
|
|
Conventions
|
|
|
|
The conventions for these example command formats are explained below:
|
|
|
|
NPRINT Words that appear in all capital letters must be spelled exactly as
|
|
shown. Although they appear in capital letters, they can be typed
|
|
in either upper or lower case.
|
|
|
|
path Words that appear in lower case are variables. They should be
|
|
replaced with the information pertinent to your task. In this
|
|
case, "path" would be replaced with the path leading to and
|
|
including the file you want to indicate, and you would replace
|
|
"option" with any NPRINT options you want to specify.
|
|
|
|
[ ] Square brackets indicate that the enclosed item is optional: you
|
|
can enter a command with or without the enclosed item. In this
|
|
case, "option" is optional.
|
|
|
|
.... Ellipses indicate that more than one option can be used with the
|
|
command. In this case, more than one NPRINT option can be entered
|
|
in the command.
|
|
|
|
<Enter> The angle brackets indicate that you should press the key whose
|
|
name appears between them.
|
|
|
|
Always press <Enter> after typing the command format for
|
|
command
|
|
line utilities.
|
|
|
|
[[ ]] Nested square brackets indicate that all enclosed items are
|
|
optional. However, if you use the item(s) within the innermost
|
|
brackets, you must also use the item(s) within the outer brackets.
|
|
|
|
| A vertical bar or "pipe" means "either, or." You can use either
|
|
the item to the left of the vertical bar or the item to the right,
|
|
but not both.
|
|
|
|
Wildcard Characters
|
|
|
|
DOS and NetWare recognize wildcard characters (* and ?) as universal
|
|
replacements for any other character or set of characters. Wildcards can be
|
|
used to search for groups of volumes, directories, or files, or to search for a
|
|
particular file when you are unsure of its complete name.
|
|
|
|
An asterisk (*) in a filename indicates that any character can occupy that
|
|
position and all remaining positions in the filename. For example, to search
|
|
for all filenames with the extension .EXE in your default directory, type "NDIR
|
|
*.EXE" and press <Enter> to display the list.
|
|
|
|
In contrast, a question mark (?) in a filename indicates that any character can
|
|
occupy that position, and that position only. So, if you were to type "NDIR
|
|
*.?", you would see a list of all files in your default directory with a
|
|
single-character extension or no extension at all.
|
|
|
|
NetWare's use of wildcard characters differs from DOS's in one respect. For
|
|
example, to represent all files in a directory, DOS expects you to type "*.*",
|
|
whereas NetWare only needs one asterisk (*).
|
|
|
|
For more information about wildcard characters (global filename characters),
|
|
see your DOS manual.
|
|
|
|
GET HELP IN NETWARE
|
|
|
|
Use the NetWare HELP utility to view on-line information about NetWare
|
|
utilities, NetWare system messages, and NetWare concepts. NetWare HELP allows
|
|
you to search for and retrieve information from infobases (information
|
|
databases). To access HELP, type
|
|
|
|
HELP <Enter>
|
|
|
|
Press <Enter> again to bring up the main menu. For more information on how to
|
|
use NetWare HELP, press the Tab key until you get to "How to use this
|
|
reference." Then press <Enter>.
|
|
|
|
BOOT UP
|
|
|
|
To "boot up" your workstation means to turn on your computer, load DOS, and
|
|
then load the workstation shell. You accomplish all of this with a boot
|
|
diskette, or you can put the necessary boot files on your workstation's hard
|
|
disk. These boot files start up the workstation operating system, load the
|
|
NetWare shell, and gain access to the network.
|
|
|
|
Create Boot Diskettes
|
|
|
|
1. Format a blank diskette as a boot diskette, using the DOS FORMAT command.
|
|
Insert a diskette into drive A and type
|
|
|
|
Format a: /s <Enter>
|
|
|
|
Follow the screen prompts.
|
|
|
|
2. Copy IPX.COM and the shell file (NETx.COM) onto the boot diskette or to the
|
|
root directory of your workstation's hard disk.
|
|
|
|
If your workstation uses DOS 3.x, use NET3.COM.
|
|
|
|
If your workstation uses DOS 4.x, use NET4.COM.
|
|
|
|
3. Copy these following additional boot files to the boot diskette or your
|
|
hard disk, if needed. Your network supervisor can provide you with these
|
|
files:
|
|
|
|
AUTOEXEC.BAT
|
|
CONFIG.SYS
|
|
SHELL.CFG
|
|
|
|
See also "Boot files" in NetWare v3.11 Concepts and Appendix A in NetWare
|
|
v3.11 Installation.
|
|
|
|
4. Label the boot diskette.
|
|
|
|
Create an AUTOEXEC.BAT File
|
|
|
|
You can create an AUTOEXEC.BAT file that automatically loads the shell file
|
|
each time you boot the workstation. This AUTOEXEC.BAT file can also set your
|
|
workstation to the first network drive (F), connect you (user MARIA) to a file
|
|
server (WONDER), and set your DOS prompt to show your current directory (PROMPT
|
|
$P$G).
|
|
|
|
Follow these steps to create your AUTOEXEC.BAT file:
|
|
|
|
1. Insert your boot diskette into drive A and change to drive A. If you plan
|
|
to boot from your hard disk, change to your hard disk drive (C or D).
|
|
|
|
2. If you are using DOS 4.x, type
|
|
|
|
COPY CON AUTOEXEC.BAT <Enter>
|
|
IPX <Enter>
|
|
NET4 <Enter>
|
|
F: <Enter>
|
|
LOGIN WONDER/MARIA <Enter>
|
|
PROMPT $P$G <Enter>
|
|
<Ctrl>Z <Enter>
|
|
|
|
If you are using DOS 3.x, replace NET4 with NET3.
|
|
|
|
LOGIN/LOGOUT
|
|
|
|
When you log in to a network, you establish a connection between your
|
|
workstation and the file server. When you log out, you terminate that
|
|
connection.
|
|
|
|
To log in to the network, you must type in a unique password. If there were no
|
|
password, other unauthorized users could easily get to your files and use them
|
|
for their purposes.
|
|
|
|
Log In to Your Network
|
|
|
|
To log in to your default server, type
|
|
|
|
LOGIN servername/username <Enter>
|
|
|
|
Replace servername with the name of the file server you want to log in to.
|
|
Replace username with your login name and (if applicable) type your password
|
|
when you are prompted for it.
|
|
|
|
Log Out of Your Network
|
|
|
|
To log out of your default server, type
|
|
|
|
LOGOUT <Enter>
|
|
|
|
To log out of a file server you are attached to, type
|
|
|
|
LOGOUT servername <Enter>
|
|
|
|
Attach to Another File Server
|
|
|
|
Attach to another file server if you want to do the following:
|
|
|
|
o Send messages to users on that file server
|
|
|
|
o Map a drive to that file server
|
|
|
|
o Copy a directory to that file server
|
|
|
|
To access another file server while remaining logged in to your default file
|
|
server, type
|
|
|
|
ATTACH servername/username <Enter>
|
|
|
|
Replace servername with the name of the server you want to attach to. Replace
|
|
username with the username you have been assigned to use on that file server.
|
|
|
|
Create or Change a Password
|
|
|
|
1. To create or change a password on your default server, type
|
|
|
|
SETPASS <Enter>
|
|
|
|
The following prompt appears on the screen:
|
|
|
|
Enter your old password:
|
|
|
|
2. If you are changing a password, enter the old password. If you are
|
|
creating a new password, press <Enter>. The following prompt appears on
|
|
your screen:
|
|
|
|
Enter your new password:
|
|
|
|
3. Enter the password you want. The following prompt appears:
|
|
|
|
Retype your new password:
|
|
|
|
4. Enter the new password again. The following message appears on your
|
|
screen:
|
|
|
|
Your password has been changed.
|
|
|
|
View Who You Are on Your Network
|
|
|
|
Type
|
|
|
|
WHOAMI <Enter>
|
|
|
|
Information similar to the following is displayed:
|
|
|
|
You are user FRANK attached to server MKTG, connection 1
|
|
Server MKTG is running NetWare v3.11.
|
|
Login time: Wednesday October 2, 1991 8:05 am
|
|
|
|
You are user GUEST attached to server ACCT, connection 7
|
|
Server ACCT is running NetWare v3.11.
|
|
Login time: Wednesday, October 2, 1991 8:05 am
|
|
|
|
|
|
This screen display indicates that you are attached to both file servers MKTG
|
|
and ACCT. Your username on MKTG is FRANK, and your username on ACCT is GUEST.
|
|
|
|
View File Servers on Your Network
|
|
|
|
Type
|
|
|
|
SLIST <Enter>
|
|
|
|
Information similar to the following appears:
|
|
|
|
Known NetWare File Servers Network Node Address
|
|
-------------------------- ------- ------------
|
|
RECORDS [CED88] [2608C234732]
|
|
SALES [CED87] [2608C217651]
|
|
MFG [CED86] [2608C293185]
|
|
|
|
View Current Users on Your File Server
|
|
|
|
You must be attached to a file server before you can view the list of users for
|
|
that file server.
|
|
|
|
Type
|
|
|
|
USERLIST <Enter>
|
|
|
|
Information similar to the following appears:
|
|
|
|
User Information for Server BLOOM
|
|
Connection User Name Login Time
|
|
---------- --------- ------------------
|
|
1 JOE 4-17-1991 8:05 am
|
|
2 *CORRINE 4-17-1991 11:20 am
|
|
3 PAULO 4-17-1991 7:58 am
|
|
4 GUS 4-17-1991 6:01 pm
|
|
|
|
An asterisk (*) appears next to your username.
|
|
|
|
What If ...
|
|
|
|
.... I can't log in?
|
|
|
|
o Your password may have expired or you may have run out of grace logins.
|
|
|
|
Your supervisor or manager has to unlock your account.
|
|
|
|
o You haven't changed to the network login drive (F).
|
|
|
|
o The LOGIN.EXE file is missing.
|
|
|
|
o Your shell may be outdated. Type
|
|
|
|
NVER <Enter>
|
|
|
|
Report the version number to your supervisor.
|
|
|
|
o Your network board may not be seated correctly.
|
|
|
|
o Your file server may be down. Type
|
|
|
|
SLIST <Enter>
|
|
|
|
If your file server is listed, log in by typing
|
|
|
|
LOGIN servername/username <Enter>
|
|
|
|
o You may be restricted from logging in during certain times. Ask the
|
|
network supervisor.
|
|
|
|
.... My screen is frozen?
|
|
|
|
o Your supervisor should run the MONITOR utility and clear your connection.
|
|
This saves the work you were doing. Then complete one of the two following
|
|
tasks:
|
|
|
|
o To warm boot, press <CTRL><ALT><DEL> simultaneously.
|
|
|
|
o To cold boot, turn the computer OFF, wait 15 seconds, and then turn it
|
|
ON again.
|
|
|
|
o Your network cable may not be connected or terminated properly. Notify
|
|
your supervisor.
|
|
|
|
o Your node (or station) address may be in conflict with another workstation.
|
|
See if new workstations have been added to your network.
|
|
|
|
o You may have the wrong IPX configuration. Ask your supervisor.
|
|
|
|
o You may have received a message while in graphics mode. Disable messages
|
|
before entering graphics mode by typing
|
|
|
|
CASTOFF <Enter>
|
|
|
|
CREATE YOUR LOGIN SCRIPT
|
|
|
|
Your login script is a program that automatically sets up your workstation's
|
|
environment each time you log in. It performs tasks such as mapping network
|
|
drives for you, automatically executing programs and starting applications, and
|
|
attaching you to different file servers.
|
|
|
|
This section introduces some basic login script commands.
|
|
|
|
To access your login script, follow these steps:
|
|
|
|
1. Type
|
|
|
|
SYSCON <Enter>
|
|
|
|
2. Select "User Information" from the main menu.
|
|
|
|
3. Select your user name from the list of users that appears.
|
|
|
|
4. Select "Login Script."
|
|
|
|
5. Enter the commands you need in your login script. Some common commands are
|
|
listed under "Common Login Script Commands" below.
|
|
|
|
6. Exit and save the login script by pressing <Escape> and answering "Yes" in
|
|
the confirmation box.
|
|
|
|
7. To execute your new login script, you must first log out of the network,
|
|
and then log in again.
|
|
|
|
Common Login Script Commands
|
|
|
|
The commands below can be used in your login script. Each command is followed
|
|
by its purpose and an example of how to use it.
|
|
|
|
MAP INS16:= Inserts the drive as the next available search drive.
|
|
|
|
MAP INS16:=pd3\sys:jan
|
|
|
|
MAP drive:= Maps the specified drive to the given directory.
|
|
|
|
MAP G:=pd3\sys:home\jan
|
|
|
|
MAP *n:= Maps the next available drive to the given directory.
|
|
|
|
MAP *1:=pd3\sys:home\jan
|
|
|
|
# Runs an executable file (a file with an .EXE or .COM
|
|
extension).
|
|
|
|
#SYSCON
|
|
|
|
REMARK These three commands allow you to insert explanatory text in
|
|
* the login script. They will not appear on your screen.
|
|
;
|
|
REMARK Be sure to update the PROJECTS file.
|
|
|
|
* Check for new mail.
|
|
|
|
; Assign OS-dependent Search mappings.
|
|
|
|
ATTACH Allows you to attach to other file servers while remaining
|
|
logged in to your current file server.
|
|
|
|
ATTACH pd3\jan
|
|
|
|
SET Allows you to set DOS variables.
|
|
|
|
SET wp="/u-jlw/"
|
|
|
|
SET usr="jwilson"
|
|
|
|
IF...THEN Executes certain commands, if a specified condition exists.
|
|
|
|
IF DAY_OF_WEEK="Monday" THEN WRITE "AARGH..."
|
|
|
|
What If ...
|
|
|
|
.... My login script doesn't execute all the way?
|
|
|
|
o You may have inserted an EXIT command to a batch file in the middle of your
|
|
login script. Anything after the EXIT command is ignored. Move the EXIT
|
|
command to the end of your login script.
|
|
|
|
o An IF...THEN clause in your login script may be incomplete or incorrect.
|
|
Check the proper command format in Appendix A of NetWare v3.11
|
|
Installation.
|
|
|
|
.... I am unable to map a drive to another file server?
|
|
|
|
The file server you want to map a drive to may be down. To check whether the
|
|
file server is up, type
|
|
|
|
SLIST <Enter>
|
|
|
|
.... I add some mapped drives to my login script and some I wanted are gone?
|
|
|
|
The system login script executes before the user login script. You can
|
|
overwrite the mapped drives in the system login script with those in your user
|
|
login script. Instead of using the command "map drive:=", use the command "map
|
|
ins 16:=" or "map *1:=". (Remember: You can have only 26 drive mappings.)
|
|
|
|
VIEW OR CREATE YOUR MAPPED DRIVES
|
|
|
|
Mapped drives point to particular locations in the directory structure. In
|
|
NetWare, there are three type of drives: local drives, network drives, and
|
|
search drives. Local drives are physically attached to a workstation. Network
|
|
drives allow users to access particular locations in the directory structure.
|
|
Search drives allow users to execute program files (such as applications or
|
|
utilities) that are in a directory other than the user's current directory.
|
|
For more information, see "Drive mappings" in NetWare v3.11 Concepts.
|
|
|
|
This section tells you how to do the following:
|
|
|
|
o View all mappings
|
|
o Map network drives
|
|
o Map search drives
|
|
|
|
View All Mapped Drives
|
|
|
|
Type
|
|
|
|
MAP <Enter>
|
|
|
|
You see information similar to the following:
|
|
|
|
DRIVE A: maps to a local drive
|
|
DRIVE B: maps to a local drive
|
|
|
|
DRIVE F:= COUNT/SYS: /HOME/KAREN
|
|
DRIVE G:= COUNT/SYS: /
|
|
DRIVE H:= COUNT/ACCT: /ACCDATA
|
|
|
|
-------
|
|
|
|
SEARCH1:=Z: [COUNT/SYS: /PUBLIC]
|
|
SEARCH2:=Y: [COUNT/SYS: /PUBLIC/WP]
|
|
SEARCH3:=X: [COUNT/ACCT: /ACCREC]
|
|
|
|
Map Network Drives
|
|
|
|
Suppose you want to map a network drive to a directory in which you have files.
|
|
To see what network drive letters are available, type
|
|
|
|
MAP <Enter>
|
|
|
|
Choose a drive letter that is not being used, such as J. Type
|
|
|
|
MAP J:= path <Enter>
|
|
|
|
Replace path with the directory path (including the file server name and the
|
|
volume name) leading to the directory to which you want to map network drive J.
|
|
|
|
For example, suppose your username is MARIA and you want to map drive J to your
|
|
home directory, which is on file server COUNT in volume SYS. Type
|
|
|
|
MAP J:= COUNT/SYS:HOME/MARIA <Enter>
|
|
|
|
MAP SEARCH DRIVES
|
|
|
|
Suppose your search drives appear as follows:
|
|
|
|
SEARCH1:=Z: [COUNT/SYS: /PUBLIC]
|
|
SEARCH2:=Y: [COUNT/SYS: /PUBLIC/WP]
|
|
|
|
The next available search drive is SEARCH3 (S3). To map a
|
|
search drive to directory ACCREC on volume ACCT, type
|
|
|
|
MAP S3:=COUNT/ACCT:ACCREC <Enter>
|
|
|
|
When you type MAP again, the new search drive appears:
|
|
|
|
SEARCH1:=Z: [COUNT/SYS: /PUBLIC]
|
|
SEARCH2:=Y: [COUNT/SYS: /PUBLIC/WP]
|
|
SEARCH3:=X: [COUNT/ACCT: /ACCREC]
|
|
|
|
What if ...
|
|
|
|
.... I just mapped a drive and then rebooted, and now the mapped drive is gone?
|
|
|
|
Did you map the drive in your login script? Drives mapped at the command line
|
|
are temporary----they are deleted when you log out of your file server or turn
|
|
off your workstation. If you want the mapping to be permanent, you must enter
|
|
it in your login script.
|
|
|
|
.... The system won't accept my mapped drives?
|
|
|
|
o You may not have rights to the directory you want to map to. Change to
|
|
that directory and type
|
|
|
|
RIGHTS <Enter>
|
|
|
|
If your rights aren't sufficient, see your supervisor.
|
|
|
|
o You may have used the wrong command format.
|
|
|
|
|
|
.... I just viewed my mapped drives and some of them seem to be incorrect?
|
|
|
|
Did you use the DOS CD command to change your default directory? Changing
|
|
directories changes your mapping.
|
|
|
|
.... My search drives are in reverse order?
|
|
|
|
Search drives are numbered, but their associated drive letters begin in reverse
|
|
alphabetical order. For example, the first search drive (Search 1 or S1)
|
|
appears as network drive Z, the second one appears as network drive Y, and so
|
|
on. However, in your login script, they should appear in normal alphabetical
|
|
order.
|
|
|
|
SEND MESSAGES TO OTHER USERS
|
|
|
|
You can communicate with other users on your network by
|
|
sending messages from your workstation command line.
|
|
|
|
This section explains how to do the following:
|
|
|
|
o Send a message to one or more users
|
|
o Send a message to all workstations
|
|
o Block/allow messages from other workstations
|
|
|
|
Send a Message to One or More Users
|
|
|
|
Suppose you want to send the following message to users CINDY and ERIC:
|
|
"Meeting at 1:30 today." Also suppose that CINDY and ERIC are logged in to
|
|
your default server. Type
|
|
|
|
SEND "MEETING AT 1:30 TODAY" CINDY, ERIC <Enter>
|
|
|
|
A confirmation message appears, telling you that the message was sent.
|
|
|
|
If CINDY is logged in to another file server called SALES, attach to that file
|
|
server and type
|
|
|
|
SEND "MEETING AT 1:30 TODAY" SALES/CINDY <Enter>
|
|
|
|
Send a Message to All Workstations
|
|
|
|
Suppose you want to send the following message to all workstations: "Paychecks
|
|
are here." Type
|
|
|
|
SEND "PAYCHECKS ARE HERE." EVERYONE <Enter>
|
|
|
|
A confirmation message appears listing all the users to whom the message was
|
|
sent.
|
|
|
|
If you want to send a message to everyone on another file server, you must be
|
|
attached to that file server and specify the name of the file server in the
|
|
command.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Block/Allow Messages from Other Workstations
|
|
|
|
If you do not want to receive messages sent to you from any network stations,
|
|
type
|
|
|
|
CASTOFF <Enter>
|
|
|
|
The following message appears on your screen:
|
|
|
|
Broadcasts from other stations will now be rejected.
|
|
|
|
To allow your workstation to again receive messages from other network users,
|
|
type
|
|
|
|
CASTON <Enter>
|
|
|
|
The following message appears on your screen:
|
|
|
|
Broadcast messages from the console and other stations will now be
|
|
accepted.
|
|
|
|
What If ...
|
|
|
|
.... I am unable to send a message to a user?
|
|
|
|
o Is the user logged in? Type
|
|
|
|
USERLIST <Enter>
|
|
|
|
o Is your message buffer full? You can only receive up to two messages. You
|
|
must clear these messages from your screen (by pressing <Ctrl><Enter>)
|
|
before you can receive others.
|
|
|
|
o Did you type the SEND command properly?
|
|
|
|
.... I am unable to send messages to users on another file server?
|
|
|
|
o Did you attach to that file server?
|
|
o Is the user logged in? Type
|
|
|
|
USERLIST <Enter>
|
|
|
|
o Did you type the SEND command properly?
|
|
|
|
|
|
MANAGE FILES AND DIRECTORIES
|
|
|
|
You can manage your files and directories in a variety of ways. You can copy,
|
|
delete, rename, view, write to, share, and print them. NetWare uses a system
|
|
of file and directory rights and attributes to make sure that only authorized
|
|
network users can access and handle network data.
|
|
|
|
Attributes are assigned to files and directories. They override rights, which
|
|
are assigned to users. For example, suppose you have the right to rename files
|
|
(the Modify right). However, the file you want to copy is flagged with the
|
|
Rename Inhibit attribute. This prevents you from renaming it, even though you
|
|
have the right to do so.
|
|
|
|
For more information, see "Attributes" and "Rights" in NetWare v3.11 Concepts.
|
|
|
|
Know Your Rights
|
|
|
|
To view your rights in your default directory, type
|
|
|
|
RIGHTS <Enter>
|
|
|
|
If your effective rights include all rights, the following information appears:
|
|
|
|
SERVER1\SYS:PUBLIC\UTIL
|
|
Your effective rights for this directory are [SRWCEMFA]
|
|
You have Supervisor Rights to Directory. (S)
|
|
*May Read from File. (R)
|
|
*May Write to File. (W)
|
|
May Create Subdirectories and Files. (C)
|
|
May Erase Directory. (E)
|
|
May Modify Directory. (M)
|
|
May Scan for Files. (F)
|
|
May Change Access Control. (A)
|
|
|
|
*Has no effect in directory.
|
|
|
|
Entries in Directory May Inherit [SRWCEMFA] rights. You have ALL RIGHTS to
|
|
Directory Entry.
|
|
|
|
Copy a File to Another Network Directory
|
|
|
|
Suppose you want to copy a file called ACC.DAT from your default directory (for
|
|
example, F) to the SALEPROG directory in volume SYS on the file server SALES.
|
|
First, make sure you have a drive (for example, G) mapped to SALEPROG as
|
|
follows:
|
|
|
|
G:=SALES/SYS:SALEPROG
|
|
|
|
To copy ACC.DAT from your default directory to the SALEPROG directory, type
|
|
|
|
NCOPY F:ACC.DAT TO G: <Enter>
|
|
|
|
Suppose you want to copy a file called ACC.DAT from the SALEPROG directory in
|
|
volume SYS on the file server SALES to your default directory. Also suppose
|
|
drive G is mapped to SALEPROG as G:=SALES/SYS:SALEPROG. Type
|
|
|
|
NCOPY G:ACC.DAT F: <Enter>
|
|
|
|
Copy All of a Directory's Files to Another Directory
|
|
|
|
1. Type
|
|
|
|
FILER <Enter>
|
|
|
|
and select "Directory Contents" from the "Available Topics" menu.
|
|
|
|
2. Select the directory you want to copy from the "Directory Contents" window.
|
|
The "Subdirectory Options" window appears.
|
|
|
|
3. Select "Copy Subdirectory's Files." The "Copy Subdirectory To:" window
|
|
appears.
|
|
|
|
4. To copy subdirectory files, complete one of the following:
|
|
|
|
o Copy to a subdirectory in your current directory. Type the name of the
|
|
directory; then press <Enter>.
|
|
|
|
You can also use <Insert> to bring up the "File Servers/Local Drives"
|
|
window, from which you can select your directory path by selecting file
|
|
server, volume, and directory options.
|
|
|
|
After you select your directory path, press <Escape> to bring your
|
|
cursor back to the "Copy subdirectory To:" window. Then press <Enter>
|
|
to copy your subdirectory's files.
|
|
|
|
o Copy to a directory on another volume on your file server. Type in the
|
|
name of the volume and directory; then press <Enter>.
|
|
|
|
You can also use <Insert> to bring up the "File Servers/Local Drives"
|
|
window, from which you can select your directory path by selecting file
|
|
server, volume, and directory options.
|
|
|
|
o Copy to a directory to another file server. You must be attached to
|
|
the file server you want to copy files to. Type in the name of the
|
|
file server, volume, and directory; then press <Enter>.
|
|
|
|
Delete a File
|
|
|
|
1. Type
|
|
|
|
FILER <Enter>
|
|
|
|
2. Select "Directory Contents" from the "Available Topics" menu.
|
|
|
|
3. Highlight the file you want to delete from the "Directory Contents" window
|
|
and^S press <Delete>. Answer "Yes" in the confirmation box.
|
|
|
|
To delete more than one file, use the Mark key (<F5>) to highlight multiple
|
|
files; then press <Delete>. Answer "Yes" in the confirmation box.
|
|
|
|
Salvage a File You Just Deleted
|
|
|
|
1. Type
|
|
|
|
SALVAGE <Enter>
|
|
|
|
2. Select "View/Recover Deleted Files" from the "Main Menu Options"window.
|
|
To change to another volume, you must select the directory path from the
|
|
"Select Current Directory" option in the main menu.
|
|
|
|
Note: If you have too many salvageable files to fit on the screen, you will
|
|
see the heading "Inc^Qomplete." Scroll through the list to see the
|
|
entire list, or use the Mark Pattern key <F6> to mark the file pattern.
|
|
Then exit the list and reenter it.
|
|
|
|
3. To salvage files using wildcards or to salvage a specific file, type the
|
|
information in the "Erased File Name Pattern To Match" window.
|
|
|
|
To view all salvageable files, press <Enter>.
|
|
|
|
4. To salvage a file, complete one of the following:
|
|
|
|
o Salvage a single file. Select the file you want to salvage. Select
|
|
"Yes" from the "Recover This File" box.
|
|
|
|
o Salvage multiple files. Use the Mark key (<F5>) to select multiple
|
|
files. Select "Yes" from the confirmation box.
|
|
|
|
o Salvage multiple files using wildcards. To match a filename pattern or
|
|
extension, press the Mark Pattern key (<F6>) and type the pattern you
|
|
want to match.
|
|
|
|
Once you match the pattern of the files you want to salvage, press
|
|
<Enter> and select "Yes" from the "Recover ALL marked files?"
|
|
confirmation box.
|
|
|
|
5. Press <Escape> to exit SALVAGE.
|
|
|
|
Find a Lost File
|
|
|
|
Suppose you don't remember the location of a file. The file is called
|
|
FUTURE.DAT. You think it may be in the PROGRAMS directory, and drive G is
|
|
mapped to that directory.
|
|
|
|
To find the location of the lost file, type
|
|
|
|
NDIR G: FUTURE.DAT <Enter>
|
|
|
|
If you don't know which directory the file is in, change directories back to
|
|
the volume level. Then type
|
|
|
|
NDIR filename sub <Enter>
|
|
|
|
The NDIR utility searches all those directories you have rights to on the
|
|
volume for the file.
|
|
|
|
Rename a Directory
|
|
|
|
Suppose you want to change the name of the ACCT directory to PROGRAMS. Also
|
|
suppose drive G is mapped to ACCT in volume SYS on file server RECORDS as
|
|
follows:
|
|
|
|
Drive G: = RECORDS/SYS:ACCT
|
|
|
|
To rename the directory, type
|
|
|
|
RENDIR G: PROGRAMS <Enter>
|
|
|
|
Note: You must be attached to a file server before you can change the name of
|
|
a directory on that file server.
|
|
|
|
You must also have the Modify right in the directory to rename
|
|
subdirectories in that directory.
|
|
|
|
Drive mappings in login scripts (if they exist) must be changed to
|
|
reflect the new name of the directory.
|
|
|
|
What If ...
|
|
|
|
.... I can't copy?
|
|
|
|
o You may not have sufficient rights. Type
|
|
|
|
RIGHTS <Enter>
|
|
|
|
You must have the Create right to copy files into a directory.
|
|
|
|
o The file may be flagged "non-shareable" and may be in use. Type
|
|
|
|
FLAG filename <Enter>
|
|
|
|
If it is flagged "non-shareable," try again at a later time, when the file
|
|
is not in use.
|
|
|
|
|
|
.... I can't see a directory?
|
|
|
|
o You may not have enough rights to that directory. Type
|
|
|
|
RIGHTS <Enter>
|
|
|
|
o The directory attribute may be set to "Hidden" or "System." Type
|
|
|
|
FLAG filename <Enter>
|
|
|
|
o The directory may have set disk space limitations. To view the directory
|
|
restrictions, type
|
|
|
|
DSPACE <Enter>
|
|
|
|
o The directory may have been deleted. Ask your supervisor.
|
|
|
|
PRINTING
|
|
|
|
Printing from a network workstation is similar to printing from a stand alone
|
|
workstation. When you send a print job to a network printer, however, the job
|
|
is routed first through the file server and then delivered to the printer by
|
|
the print server.
|
|
|
|
When a print job leaves the workstation, it is stored temporarily in a print
|
|
queue on the file server. This queue, which is a subdirectory on the file
|
|
server, stores the print job until the print server can deliver it to the
|
|
printer. When the printer is ready to service the job, the print server moves
|
|
it from the queue to the printer.
|
|
|
|
Permanently Set Up Workstation Printing
|
|
|
|
If you want to print from a non-NetWare-compatible application or from the
|
|
screen, you need to route print files from your local printer port (LPT1) to a
|
|
file server queue.
|
|
|
|
1. Enter the SYSCON utility.
|
|
|
|
2. Select "User Information" from SYSCON's main menu.
|
|
|
|
3. Select your username.
|
|
|
|
4. Select "Login Script."
|
|
|
|
5. Insert the following command into the login script:
|
|
|
|
#CAPTURE Q=queuename TI=5
|
|
|
|
6. Exit SYSCON, saving changes when prompted.
|
|
|
|
7. Log back in to or reboot your workstation to allow the CAPTURE command to
|
|
take effect.
|
|
|
|
Print Screens Using CAPTURE
|
|
|
|
Before you start printing screens using CAPTURE, you need to set the CAPTURE
|
|
parameters in your login script. See "Permanently Set Up Workstation Printing"
|
|
on the previous page. Also, your supervisor needs to set up a default queue.
|
|
|
|
1. At the command line, type
|
|
|
|
CAPTURE <Enter>
|
|
|
|
You can include any of the CAPTURE options except Show. Some of the most
|
|
common CAPTURE options are the following:
|
|
|
|
L=n
|
|
Indicates which of your workstation's LPT ports (local parallel
|
|
printing ports) to capture. Replace "n" with 1, 2, or 3. Default:
|
|
|
|
^S^Q L=LPT1
|
|
|
|
Q=queuename
|
|
Indicates the queue the print job should be sent to. If multiple
|
|
queues are mapped to a printer, you must include this option. Replace
|
|
"queuename" with the name of the queue.
|
|
|
|
TI=n
|
|
Indicates the number of seconds between the last time the application
|
|
writes to the file and the time it releases the file to the queue.
|
|
Include this option if you want to print from an application without
|
|
exiting the application. Replace "n" with a number of seconds
|
|
(1-1000). Default: TI=O (Timeout disabled)
|
|
|
|
2. Access the application containing the screen you want to print.
|
|
|
|
3. Press <Shift><Print Screen>.
|
|
|
|
4. If you want to print more screens, repeat steps 2 and 3.
|
|
|
|
5. When you have selected the screens you want printed, return to the DOS
|
|
prompt and type
|
|
|
|
ENDCAP <Enter>
|
|
|
|
ENDCAP sends your print job to the default print queue of your default file
|
|
server, and then the job is printed. ENDCAP also ends the capture of your
|
|
LPT port.
|
|
|
|
Note: Your workstation might hang if you press the <Shift><Print Screen> keys
|
|
when none of your LPT ports are captured and no local printers are
|
|
attached to your workstation. To prevent this, ask your supervisor to
|
|
include the following line in the SHELL.DFG file on your workstation
|
|
boot disk.
|
|
|
|
LOCAL PRINTERS = 0
|
|
|
|
List the Jobs in a Queue
|
|
|
|
A queue is a special directory where print files are stored while waiting for
|
|
printer services. To see which jobs are waiting in a queue to be printed,
|
|
complete the following steps:
|
|
|
|
1. Type
|
|
|
|
PCONSOLE <Enter>
|
|
|
|
2. Select your file server (if other than your current file server).
|
|
|
|
3. Select "Print Queue Information" from the "Available Options" menu.
|
|
|
|
4. Select the print queue whose print job you want to view. If you don't know
|
|
the name of the print queue, ask your supervisor.
|
|
|
|
5. Select "Current Print Job Entries" from the "Print Queue Information" list.
|
|
The print job entries are displayed.
|
|
|
|
Delete Your Print Job from a Queue
|
|
|
|
You can cancel your print job by deleting it from the print queue (even after
|
|
the job has started printing). You can delete a print job only if you are the
|
|
owner of the job or if you are the print queue operator.
|
|
|
|
To delete your print job, complete the following steps:
|
|
|
|
1. Type
|
|
|
|
PCONSOLE <Enter>
|
|
|
|
2. Select "Print Queue Information" from the "Available Options" menu.
|
|
|
|
3. Select the print queue whose entries you want to view. The "Print Queue
|
|
Information" list is displayed.
|
|
|
|
4. Select "Current Print Job Entries."
|
|
|
|
5. Highlight the print job entry and press <Delete>.
|
|
|
|
6. Select "Yes" at the confirmation box.
|
|
|
|
What If...
|
|
|
|
.... I send commands to print a screen, but it doesn't print?
|
|
|
|
Did you include the CAPTURE command in your login script? See a previous
|
|
section called "Permanently Set Up Workstation Printing."
|
|
|
|
.... The application I'm using says that the print job was sent, but it doesn't
|
|
print out?
|
|
|
|
o Did you use CAPTURE to redirect output to a print queue first?
|
|
|
|
o Are the LPT ports captured? Type
|
|
|
|
CAPTURE SH <Enter>
|
|
|
|
o Check PCONSOLE and find the appropriate queue. If the queue has a long
|
|
list of jobs and none are marked "active," see your print server operator.
|
|
If your job isn't in the queue, the application is not set up properly;
|
|
check with the applications expert.
|
|
|
|
COMMON ERROR MESSAGES
|
|
|
|
Error messages point to a software or hardware error that doesn't allow further
|
|
processing. An explanation of the nature of the message and a recommended
|
|
course of action follow each message listed below.
|
|
|
|
"Access denied"
|
|
|
|
Explanation 1
|
|
|
|
This message indicates one of the following:
|
|
|
|
o You entered your username, your password, or both incorrectly.
|
|
o You tried to log in to a file server on which you are not defined as a
|
|
user.
|
|
|
|
Action 1
|
|
|
|
Try to log in again and make sure you type the username and password correctly.
|
|
Make sure you are logging in to a file server on which you are defined as a
|
|
user or as a member of a group. You can log in to most file servers as GUEST
|
|
because user GUEST seldom requires a password.
|
|
|
|
Explanation 2
|
|
|
|
You tried to copy, delete, rename, or modify the file attributes of a file for
|
|
which you lack rights.
|
|
|
|
Action 2
|
|
|
|
Find out about your rights to this file by typing
|
|
|
|
RIGHTS filename <Enter>
|
|
|
|
or by asking your supervisor.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
"A File Server could not be found"
|
|
|
|
Explanation
|
|
|
|
The shell tried to build a connection with the network, but no file server
|
|
responded to the request in the given time limit.
|
|
|
|
Action
|
|
|
|
Check the cable connection and make sure at least one active file server exists
|
|
on the network. Also ask your supervisor to make sure the IPX file and the
|
|
network board have the same configuration.
|
|
|
|
|
|
"Message NOT sent to <servername>/<username> (station number)"
|
|
|
|
Explanation
|
|
|
|
If a number of messages have been sent to the user or group and have not been
|
|
cleared, either of the following may be true:
|
|
|
|
o The workstation's buffer for incoming messages may be full.
|
|
|
|
o The message was not sent to the user or group because the user or group
|
|
used the CASTOFF utility.
|
|
|
|
Action
|
|
|
|
Send the message later, or try another method of communication.
|
|
|
|
|
|
"Network Error <cause> during <operation>. File = <drive>:<filename> Abort,
|
|
Retry or Fail?" (or "Abort, Retry?")
|
|
|
|
Explanation 1
|
|
|
|
The shell called a function call or a DOS interrupt, but the specified
|
|
operation could not be performed. The <drive>:<filename> specify the drive and
|
|
filename on which the error condition occurred.
|
|
|
|
Action 1
|
|
|
|
Press the R key to retry the operation and, if necessary, repeat this several
|
|
times. If the problem persists, ask your supervisor or look up the specific
|
|
message in NetWare v3.11 System Messages.
|
|
|
|
Explanation 2
|
|
|
|
Your file server may be down.
|
|
|
|
Action 2
|
|
|
|
Press the A key to abort the operation, and then try to connect to the file
|
|
server again. If this attempt fails, contact your supervisor.
|
|
|
|
"Password has expired"
|
|
|
|
Explanation
|
|
|
|
This message indicates your password has expired.
|
|
|
|
The network supervisor can require users to periodically change their passwords
|
|
on the file server to protect the file server from access by unauthorized
|
|
persons. The network supervisor can also assign a number of grace logins
|
|
during which users can still use their old passwords (after they have expired)
|
|
before having to create new passwords.
|
|
|
|
Action
|
|
|
|
Use the SETPASS command to change your password. If you use the old password
|
|
during your remaining grace logins, be sure to change it before you run out of
|
|
grace logins, or else your network supervisor has to change it for you.
|
|
|
|
"Password has expired and grace period has also expired."
|
|
|
|
Explanation
|
|
|
|
This message indicates that your user account is locked because your password
|
|
has expired and you have used all your grace logins.
|
|
|
|
After your password expires, you may have a number of grace logins during which
|
|
you can still use your old password. If you do not change your password before
|
|
your grace logins are used, you are denied access.
|
|
|
|
Action
|
|
|
|
Since you have run out of grace logins, you cannot access your account until
|
|
your network supervisor or manager assigns you a new password.
|
|
|
|
"Server <servername> not found"
|
|
|
|
Explanation
|
|
|
|
This message indicates that you tried to attach to the file server
|
|
<servername>, but the file server did not respond for one of the following
|
|
reasons:
|
|
|
|
o You mistyped the name of the file server.
|
|
o You specified a file server not cabled to your network.
|
|
o You specified a file server that is down for system maintenance.
|
|
|
|
Action
|
|
|
|
o Type the file server name correctly.
|
|
|
|
o Use the SLIST command to list all the available file servers.
|
|
|
|
o If the file server is down for maintenance, try the command later when the
|
|
file server has been brought back up.
|
|
|
|
If you still have problems, ask your network supervisor for help.
|
|
|
|
"Unable to attach to server <servername>"
|
|
|
|
Explanation
|
|
|
|
This message indicates one of the following:
|
|
|
|
o You mistyped the name of the file server.
|
|
o You specified a file server not cabled to your network.
|
|
o You specified a file server that is down for system maintenance.
|
|
|
|
Action
|
|
|
|
o Type the file server name correctly.
|
|
|
|
o Use the SLIST command to list all available file servers.
|
|
|
|
o If the file server is down for maintenance, try the command later when the
|
|
file server has been brought back up.
|
|
|
|
If you still have problems, ask your network supervisor for help.
|
|
|
|
"User <fileserver>/<username> not found"
|
|
|
|
Explanation
|
|
|
|
This message indicates that you either specified a user who does not exist on
|
|
<fileserver> or mistyped the user's name.
|
|
|
|
Action
|
|
|
|
o Make sure you have typed the user's name correctly.
|
|
|
|
o If you are not certain which users are established on the file server, use
|
|
the SYSCON utility to view the list of network users.
|
|
|
|
o You can also use the USERLIST command to view a list of currently attached
|
|
users.
|
|
|
|
(----------------------------------------------------------------------------)
|
|
|
|
One of the most useful tools that any Novell Network user can have is access to
|
|
Netwire on Compuserve. Netwire is a forum that contains messages, files, and
|
|
access to Novell product information firsthand. You can submit questions to
|
|
Novell technicians and hundreds of other Novell users. A must for any Netware
|
|
user.
|
|
|
|
Another handy tool for those that do have access is the SALVAGE program.
|
|
SALVAGE will let you undelete files throughout the system unless the directory
|
|
is marked to be purged. PURGE is nice too because it will allow you to
|
|
completely erase any files you created or copied. To use purge and or salvage
|
|
make sure you are mapped to the public directory and execute them from any DOS
|
|
prompt.
|
|
|
|
(----------------------------------------------------------------------------)
|
|
|
|
As far as dialing up a Novell Network the means are unlimited. Some have very
|
|
tight security systems that only let users with certain hardware dial-in and
|
|
others limit the usernames that are allowed dial-in access.
|
|
______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
|
|
==Phrack Inc.==
|
|
|
|
Volume Three, Issue Thirty-five, File 9 of 13
|
|
|
|
////////// //////////////////////////////////////
|
|
// C // // //
|
|
// r // // A U T O - A N S W E R I T ! //
|
|
// e // // //
|
|
// a // //////////////////////////////////////
|
|
// t //
|
|
// e ////////////////////////////////////////////
|
|
// d B y : T w i s t e d P a i r //
|
|
////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
|
|
|
Many times I've wanted to be able to start and/or listen to devices at my
|
|
home when I'm somewhere else. I've developed the following circuits to do this
|
|
for me. The circuits have all kinds of uses. I'll let your mind ponder the
|
|
endless fun activities you can have. Some of the things I have used them for
|
|
are monitoring my own house, tape record my friends for fun without their
|
|
knowledge, or listen to a radio station when you're out of town, etc.
|
|
|
|
///// Automatically Answer a Phone /////
|
|
|
|
This has got to be the best way to automatically answer the phone. With
|
|
just 2 parts, we can couple an audio source into a phone line. The cost will
|
|
be less than $5 no matter where you get the parts!
|
|
|
|
|
|
. . Radio Shack
|
|
. . / ECG 6412 273-1374 Transformer
|
|
Red __ __ Diac /
|
|
(+) O-------------I\ /I------------) || (---------O <-
|
|
Tip . \ / . ) || (
|
|
._\____/_. ) || ( Audio Source
|
|
. . ) || ( feeding IN
|
|
Green ) || ( to transformer
|
|
(-) O-------------------------------------) || (---------O <-
|
|
Ring
|
|
|
|
The "Diac" or "Bilateral Trigger Diode" looks like an open circuit until a
|
|
voltage of either polarity is applied that is above its threshold of 63 Volts.
|
|
(plus or minus 7 Volts) When this voltage is exceeded, like when the line
|
|
rings, the device acts as a switch and goes into conduction. This "answers"
|
|
the phone and holds the line through the transformer, which couples the audio
|
|
to the line.
|
|
|
|
When the caller hangs up, most telephone companies provide a momentary
|
|
reversal of Tip and Ring which causes the Diac to stop conducting and release
|
|
the line.
|
|
|
|
///// Another Way to Automatically Answer /////
|
|
|
|
For those who want to really play with this circuit, I suggest the
|
|
following additions. I have added a bridge rectifier and an optical coupler to
|
|
the circuit. The bridge just makes sure that the LED inside the optical coupler
|
|
gets the proper polarity. If you are careful to observe polarity when
|
|
connecting to Ma Bell, you can leave out the diodes and save a little money.
|
|
|
|
. .
|
|
. . Radio Shack
|
|
|----------|-----------------__ __---------------| 273-1374
|
|
| | .I\ /I. | Transformer
|
|
--- --- ._\____/_. |--) || (-----O
|
|
\ / \ / . . ) || (
|
|
--- --- ECG 6412 ) || ( Audio
|
|
O---| | Diac ) || ( Source
|
|
Tip | O----| 1N4003 Diodes ) || (
|
|
(+) | Ring | ( 4 ) |--) || (-----O
|
|
--- (-) --- ECG 3045 Optical Coupler |
|
|
\ / \ / ______________ / |
|
|
--- --- | | |
|
|
| | 2 | |\ | | 1 |
|
|
-------------------------------| \|------------------|
|
|
| |/ | |
|
|
| |
|
|
| \ \ |
|
|
| v v |
|
|
| ________ |
|
|
| / \ |
|
|
| V \ |
|
|
|___|______|___|
|
|
| |
|
|
4 5
|
|
|
|
Pins 4 and 5 on the optical coupler can be wired to remotely start a
|
|
device upon answering the line. An example would be a tape machine or battery-
|
|
powered bugging amplifier. Be careful not to connect anything over 25 volts to
|
|
pins 4 and 5 to avoid frying the opto-coupler. Either circuit will accommodate
|
|
an extra LED that could be used as a status indicator. Just be sure to keep
|
|
the polarity proper and put it in series with the other components.
|
|
|
|
The Audio Source can be almost ANYTHING. If you want to hook up a
|
|
microphone as the Audio Source, connect the microphone to some kind of
|
|
amplifier first, then to the transformer.
|
|
|
|
///// An Interesting Catalog to Read Through /////
|
|
|
|
If you really want to get fancy, you could consider ordering a free
|
|
catalog from Monroe Electronics. They sell the following products you might
|
|
wish to play with. Use these as building blocks to make whatever you need...
|
|
|
|
DTMF Decoders (a) Which provide a momentary or latching relay
|
|
------------- output for the duration of time the DTMF digit
|
|
is being pressed. (If you're really obnoxious,
|
|
you'd use one of these with one of the above
|
|
circuits. Then you could call and randomly turn
|
|
things on and off like maybe a TV scrambler/
|
|
jammer.)
|
|
|
|
(b) Which can accept multiple digits and be programmed
|
|
for a momentary or latching relay output. (Use one
|
|
of these to make a DTMF combination lock for your
|
|
BBS. Or use as a call screener, i.e. only the
|
|
correct DTMF sequence could make your phone actually
|
|
ring)
|
|
|
|
(c) Which can control access by a 4 digit code to latch
|
|
a relay, then a single digit to unlatch it. (A
|
|
little bit more sophisticated than (b) above.
|
|
|
|
DTMF Encoders Which can convert BCD to DTMF tones. Crystal-
|
|
------------- controlled, of course. 600-ohm audio output.
|
|
(Use one of these to convert your computer's
|
|
output into ANY DTMF tones of your choosing. You'd
|
|
be able to choose the duration as well! Then this
|
|
circuit would couple your evil DTMF into the phone
|
|
line)
|
|
|
|
Audio Detectors Detect BUSY and DIAL TONE and operate a relay.
|
|
--------------- (Useful when making scanning hardware/software
|
|
applications)
|
|
|
|
Audio Generators Generate Ring Tone, Dial Tone, Busy Tone, Tone
|
|
---------------- Burst, etc. (Start your own phone company. Fool
|
|
your friends, trip out the operator)
|
|
|
|
|
|
Dial-up DTMF remote control systems which can be used to control and
|
|
monitor remote relays and status inputs at unattended sites.
|
|
They can also provide automatic dialing of stored phone numbers to
|
|
report status of inputs, and can make use of an internal timer to
|
|
execute control commands. (Water strange plants by call-in remote
|
|
control, check moisture levels, see if a certain mailbox is empty
|
|
or full, have the mailbox CALL you when something is delivered,
|
|
etc. Do I have to tell you everything? Just get the catalog!)
|
|
|
|
|
|
Their address is:
|
|
MONROE ELECTRONICS, INC.
|
|
100 HOUSEL AVENUE
|
|
LYNDONVILLE NY 14098
|
|
(716) 765-2254
|
|
|
|
//////////////////////\/\/- T W I S T E D P A I R-/\/\////////////////////////
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
==Phrack Inc.==
|
|
|
|
Volume Three, Issue Thirty-five, File 10 of 13
|
|
|
|
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Phrack World News PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Issue XXXV / Part One PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Compiled by Dispater PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
|
|
|
|
Welcome to another edition of Phrack World News. Read this issue very
|
|
carefully because it is full of very important stories about a multitude of
|
|
different issues. Special thanks goes to Dark OverLord, Stainless Steel
|
|
Provider, and Private Citizen for their help in preparing this issue.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
XMASCON 1991
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
NIA Magazine & Phrack Inc. present:
|
|
|
|
The Second Annual
|
|
|
|
X M A S C O N
|
|
|
|
|
|
Who: All Hackers, Journalists, Security Personnel, Federal Agents, Lawyers,
|
|
Authors and Other Interested Parties.
|
|
|
|
Where: Houston Airport Hilton Inn
|
|
500 North Belt East
|
|
Houston, Texas 77060
|
|
U.S.A.
|
|
Tel: (713) 931-0101
|
|
Fax: (713) 931-3523
|
|
|
|
When: Friday December 27 through Sunday December 29, 1991
|
|
|
|
|
|
Yes, ladies and gentlemen, you read it right... Xmascon has returned! This will
|
|
undoubtedly be the telecom event of the year. Unlike certain conferences in the
|
|
past, Xmascon 91 has a devoted and dedicated staff who are putting in an
|
|
unmentionable amount of time to ensure a large, vast and organized collection
|
|
of some of the most diversified people in the telecommunications world. The
|
|
event will be open to the public so that anyone may attend and learn more about
|
|
the different aspects of computer security.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Hotel Information
|
|
-----------------
|
|
|
|
The Houston Airport Hilton Inn is located about 6 miles from Intercontinental
|
|
Airport. The Xmascon group room rates are $49.00 plus tax (15%) per night, your
|
|
choice of either single or double. There are also 7 suites available, the
|
|
prices of which vary from $140 to $250. You can call the hotel to find out the
|
|
differences and availability of the suites, and you will also NEED to tell them
|
|
you are with the Xmascon Conference to receive the reduced room rate,
|
|
otherwise, you will be paying $69.00. There is no charge for children,
|
|
regardless of age, when they occupy the same room as their parents. Specially
|
|
designed rooms for the handicapped are available. The hotel provides free
|
|
transportation to and from the airport, as well as neighboring Greenspoint
|
|
Mall, every 30 minutes on the hour, and on call, if needed. There are 2
|
|
restaurants in the hotel. The Wicker Works is open until 11:00 pm, and The
|
|
Forty Love is open 24 Hours. There will also be breakfast, lunch and dinner
|
|
buffets each day. There is a piano bar, The Cycle Club, as well as a sports
|
|
bar, Chaps, which features numerous table games, large screen TV, and a disco
|
|
with a DJ. Within the hotel compound, there are 3 pools, 2 of which are
|
|
indoors, a jacuzzi, a miniature golf course, and a fully equipped health club
|
|
which features universal weights, a whirlpool and sauna. A car rental agency
|
|
is located in the hotel lobby, and you can arrange to pick your car up at
|
|
either the airport or the hotel. Xmascon attendees are entitled to a discounted
|
|
rate. Contact the hotel for more information.
|
|
|
|
Xmascon will last 3 days, with the main conference being held on Saturday,
|
|
December 28, in the Osage meeting room, starting at 12:00 p.m. and continuing
|
|
on throughout the evening. This year, we have our own complete wing of the
|
|
hotel, which is housed around a 3,000 square foot atrium ballroom. The wing
|
|
is completely separated from the rest of the hotel, so we are strongly
|
|
encouraging people to make their reservations as far in advance as possible
|
|
to ensure themselves a room within our area.
|
|
|
|
We are hoping to have a number of people speak on a varied assortment of
|
|
topics. If you would like to speak, please contact us as soon as possible and
|
|
let us know who you are, who you represent (if anyone), the topic you wish to
|
|
speak on, a rough estimate of how long you will need, and whether or not you
|
|
will be needing any audio-visual aids.
|
|
|
|
There will be a display case inside the meeting room which will hold items of
|
|
telecom interest. Specific items that will be available, or that we hope to
|
|
have, include the first issues of 2600, Tap, Mondo 2000, and other magazines,
|
|
non-computer related magazines that feature articles of interest, a wide array
|
|
of boxes, the Quaker Oats 2600 mhz whistle, The Metal AE, etc. We will also
|
|
have a VCR and monitor set up, so if you have any interesting videos (such as
|
|
the Unsolved Mysteries show featuring Kevin Poulsen), or if you have anything
|
|
you think people would enjoy having the chance to see, please let us know ahead
|
|
of time, and tell us if you will need any help getting it to the conference.
|
|
If all else fails, just bring it to the con and give it to us when you arrive.
|
|
|
|
If anyone requires any additional information, needs to ask any questions,
|
|
wants to RSVP, or would like to be added to the mailing list to receive the
|
|
Xmascon updates, you may write to either myself (Drunkfux), Judge Dredd, or
|
|
Lord Macduff via Internet at:
|
|
|
|
nia@nuchat.sccsi.com
|
|
|
|
Or via US Mail at:
|
|
|
|
Hard Data Corporation
|
|
ATTN: HoHo
|
|
P.O. Box 60695
|
|
Airport Mail Facility
|
|
Houston, Texas 77205-9998
|
|
U.S.A.
|
|
|
|
We will hopefully have an 800 mailbox before the next update is sent out. If
|
|
someone cares to donate a decent one, that will stay up throughout the end of
|
|
the year, please let us know. We should also be listing a few systems as an
|
|
alternative form of reaching us.
|
|
|
|
Xmascon 91 will be a priceless learning experience for professionals, and gives
|
|
journalists a chance to gather information and ideas direct from the source. It
|
|
is also one of the very few times when all the members of the computer
|
|
underground can come together for a realistic purpose. We urge people not to
|
|
miss out on an event of this caliber, which doesn't happen very often. If
|
|
you've ever wanted to meet some of the most famous people from the hacking
|
|
community, this may be your one and only chance. Don't wait to read about it in
|
|
all the magazines, and then wish you had attended, make your plans to be there
|
|
now! Be a part of our largest and greatest conference ever.
|
|
|
|
Remember, to make your reservations, call (713) 931-0101 and tell them you're
|
|
with Xmascon.
|
|
|
|
In closing... if you miss this one, you're only cheating yourself.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
MindRape Revisited September 27,1991
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
>From Arizona State University State Press
|
|
Further Reading: Phrack Issue 34, File 11, "MindRape or MediaRape?"
|
|
|
|
An Arizona State University (ASU) student is one of seven suspects in a
|
|
computer fraud scheme that one US West Communications official said could cost
|
|
the carrier and the phone company as much as $5 billion in one year.
|
|
|
|
Police in Phoenix, Arizona have seized computer equipment, software, and a
|
|
list of long distance calling card codes from the home of the unidentified
|
|
19-year-old student.
|
|
|
|
The student is one of seven people -- three in Oregon and one each in
|
|
Washington, Utah, and Iowa -- singled out as suspects in a month-long
|
|
investigation of electronic phone fraud conducted by Phoenix police, said Jim
|
|
Waltman, a fraud manager for US West Communications. The Phoenix man has not
|
|
been arrested.
|
|
|
|
The computer "hackers" allegedly used their computers to gain access to
|
|
secret long distance phone access codes such as the ones found on calling
|
|
cards, and sold codes to other students for profit.
|
|
|
|
US West officials told the Associated Press that it is unknown how many
|
|
local customers have been wrongfully billed for long distance calls on their
|
|
accounts.
|
|
|
|
Kevin Robinson, public information sergeant for the Phoenix Police
|
|
Department, would not comment on the investigation.
|
|
|
|
Art Carter, dean of Student Life at Arizona State University (ASU), said
|
|
that if the student is charged, the case will be reviewed under the ASU Code of
|
|
Conduct and the action taken by the University will be determined at that time.
|
|
|
|
Mark Knighton, security director for LDL Long Distance, said his company
|
|
and US West were able to trace calls to several location, including the home of
|
|
the Phoenix man.
|
|
|
|
The Phoenix man has not been arrested, authorities said.
|
|
|
|
Waltman said he was with Phoenix police a week ago when they searched the
|
|
north Phoenix home and uncovered what turned out to be an inexpensive and
|
|
relatively simple system for getting free codes.
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
Editor's Comment by: Dispater
|
|
|
|
What MindRape has been charged with cannot be determined now. A request
|
|
must be submitted to Arizona Public Records and be considered for release to
|
|
the requestor.
|
|
|
|
Here are some possibly useful numbers:
|
|
|
|
Arizona Special Investigations Division (602)542-4853
|
|
County Attorney's Office (602)262-3411 (Gail Thackeray)
|
|
Arizona Republic Newspaper (602)271-8000
|
|
Phoenix Police Department
|
|
- General Investigations (602)262-6141
|
|
- Police Information (602)262-7626
|
|
- Police Records (602)262-6134
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
East Coast LOD Hackers Create Virtual Reality MAELSTROM
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
"It's reached the point where hacking is counter-productive."
|
|
|
|
If the 1980's were the decade that hackers emerged from their relative
|
|
obscurity as computer oddities, to be transformed in the public's perception as
|
|
front-page news -- then the 90's are shaping up to be the decade of hacker
|
|
turned entrepreneur. Lately the notorious hacker group Legion of Doom seems to
|
|
be a particularly fertile spawning ground for ex-hackers turned
|
|
young-businessman.
|
|
|
|
Two former East-Coast Legion of Doom members, Bruce Fanscher <Dead Lord> and
|
|
Patrick Krupa <Lord Digital>, have pooled their talents to form a new company
|
|
in the burgeoning field of Virtual Reality.
|
|
|
|
The arena of Virtual Reality has often been called technology in search of a
|
|
purpose and at times resembles nothing more than an interactive movie meets
|
|
videogame. This chaotic state of affairs has led to a never-never land of
|
|
incompatible technologies and far-out ideas, that have tremendous potential,
|
|
but little commercial application at present. Fanscher and Krupa plan to
|
|
change all that. "VR isn't anything new, it's something we've been living for
|
|
over half our lives. The only difference is the state of current technology,
|
|
makes possible an incredible variety of application." said Krupa in an
|
|
interview. "Right now we're in the ideal position to move forward on ideas
|
|
we've been working on for years," added Fanscher.
|
|
|
|
Krupa, who had attained the status of cult figure in the hacker underground
|
|
prior to his arrest, as chronicled by John Markoff (New York Times) technology
|
|
columnist, has spent the last several years working in the very lo-tech world
|
|
of theater, "Basically I was totally burnt out on computers. I mean I don't
|
|
give a damn if my word processor boots in one second instead of eight, and
|
|
that's the only place anything was heading for a long time. The NeXT has
|
|
changed all that and brought to market something truly innovative, although I
|
|
still don't care too much about technology as anything but a medium through
|
|
which you can reach people and affect their experiences and perceptions."
|
|
|
|
No stranger to creative innovation himself, Fanscher, Krupa's longtime
|
|
compatriot, has spent his share of time in the somewhat murky spotlight of the
|
|
hacker underground. Musing about his days as a hacker delving into computer
|
|
systems to see how they worked, Fanscher remarked that:
|
|
|
|
"It's reached the point where hacking is counter-productive. You can
|
|
only take apart things other people have designed and see what makes
|
|
them work, for so long, before it becomes an exercise in boredom and
|
|
the time comes to use what you've learned to create something new
|
|
that nobody has ever seen before. My current interest in other
|
|
people's systems is zero. It was a useful learning experience for me,
|
|
but there's no future in it."
|
|
|
|
This oddly charismatic, dynamic duo is rounded out by Delia Kopold a former
|
|
actress and theater major who is the architect of the worlds that make
|
|
MAELSTROM come alive. This initial offering by the collection of talents will
|
|
be an online system run on the NeXTcube supermicro -- a machine that looks more
|
|
like a piece of modern art than a computer -- that offers enhanced versions of
|
|
all the usual amenities like electronic messaging, file transfers, and
|
|
networking, all revolving around MAELSTROM, a program Fanscher calls, "a
|
|
real-time virtual interaction simulation engine." MAELSTROM will initially
|
|
take the form of an extremely detailed fantasy world complete with custom
|
|
graphic programs that run on MS-DOS, Macintosh and Amiga computers, allowing
|
|
users to tap into the NeXTcube's system architecture through their home
|
|
computers connected to telephone lines. "Maelstrom isn't really a fantasy
|
|
game, it's actually a universal engine comprised of objects that can be
|
|
accessed by a variety of graphic, sound and data files to create just about any
|
|
multi-user reality you can dream up," explains Krupa.
|
|
|
|
The MAELSTROM system is about to go through a short beta-test run in New York
|
|
City prior to a national ad campaign that will herald its universal
|
|
accessibility on packet switch. "Our beta system already offers everything
|
|
that competing services offer, but at a much lower cost -- and we're still
|
|
adding features. And nothing like Maelstrom has ever existed before, the
|
|
technology just wasn't there," concludes Fanscher.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
2600 Magazine Exposes Security Holes October 18,1991
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
by John F. McMullen & Barbara E. McMullen (Newbytes)
|
|
|
|
Armonk, New York -- Supported by videotape examples, Emmanuel Goldstein, editor
|
|
and publisher of 2600 Magazine: The Hacker Quarterly, told those in attendance
|
|
at an October 17th New York City press conference that "the American public is
|
|
often lulled into a false sense of security; a security that is often not
|
|
supported by the facts of specific cases."
|
|
|
|
The videotapes, produced by 2600 and provided to the press show both the
|
|
intrusion of a Dutch "hacker" in to United States Military computers and what
|
|
Goldstein alleges is the fallibility of a brand of mechanical, pushbutton locks
|
|
used by, among others, New York State University sites, Federal Express, United
|
|
Parcel Service, JFK International Airport, IBM and NASA.
|
|
|
|
Goldstein told Newsbytes "We invested considerable time and money to wake
|
|
people up to the fact that we have a false sense of security when it comes not
|
|
only to computer networks but to physical safety as well."
|
|
|
|
The tape of the Dutch "hacker" was made by Goldstein while in Europe. and shows
|
|
the intrusion into a Unites States Army computer system. The intruder was able
|
|
to set up a fictitious account called "danquayle" and, once into the system,
|
|
was able to obtain "root" privileges thus giving him total control of the
|
|
workings of the system.
|
|
|
|
A portion of this tape had previously been shown with Goldstein's approval on
|
|
an episode of the Geraldo Rivera television show "Now It Can Be Told".
|
|
Goldstein told Newsbytes that one^S^Q reason for his release of the entire tape to
|
|
the press was his feeling that the Rivera episode entitled "The Mad Hacker's
|
|
Key Party" had distorted the message of the tape -- "This was not a case of a
|
|
terrorist break-in but was rather simply a demonstration of the lack of
|
|
security of our systems. To find root accounts with password like "Kuwait" and
|
|
lack of sophisticated security in our military computers should be of real
|
|
concern and should not be lost in an exploitation of the 'hacker' issue."
|
|
|
|
A background paper provided at the conference by 2600 explains the entire
|
|
intrusion effort in detail and states "The purpose of this demonstration is to
|
|
show just how easy it really was. Great care was taken to ensure that no
|
|
damage or alteration of data occurred on this particular system. No military
|
|
secrets were taken and no files were saved to a disk by the hackers. What is
|
|
frightening is that nobody knows who else has access to this information or
|
|
what their motivations might be. This is a warning that cannot be taken
|
|
lightly."
|
|
|
|
The second videotape show Goldstein and other 2600 staff opening seemingly at
|
|
will locks manufactured by Simplex Security Systems. The locks of the
|
|
mechanical pushbutton combination variety were shown to be installed at the
|
|
State of New York University at Stony Brook, JFK International Airport and on
|
|
Federal Express and United Parcel pick-up boxes throughout the New York
|
|
Metropolitan area.
|
|
|
|
In the film, Goldstein is shown filling out a Federal Express envelope for
|
|
delivery to 2600 Magazine and inserting in the Fedex dropbox. He then lifts
|
|
the weather protection cover on the box's lock and keys a combination that
|
|
allows him to open the lock and remove his envelope. Scott Skinner, a SUNY
|
|
student and 2600 staff member told Newsbytes that it had actually taken the
|
|
staff 10 minutes to determine the proper code combinations to open the lock.
|
|
|
|
Skinner explained, "While Simplex prefers people to think that there is an
|
|
endless number of permutations to the lock, there are actually only 1,085. In
|
|
most cases, even this number is greatly reduced -- if one knows that only three
|
|
buttons are being used, it reduces the possibilities to 135. Additionally, we
|
|
found that, once we had the combination to one Federal Express dropbox, it
|
|
worked in every other one that we tried in the New York area."
|
|
|
|
Goldstein told Newsbytes "When we contacted Simplex, they first denied that the
|
|
locks were unsafe and then said that the permutations were much greater. After
|
|
some discussion, they admitted that the 1,085 figure was correct but said that
|
|
it would take a person with a complete listing of the combinations over four
|
|
hours to try them all. Our experience obviously shows that they may be opened
|
|
in a much shorter time than that."
|
|
|
|
Goldstein also pointed out that, "although a $5 Master combination lock may be
|
|
broken by a crowbar, it is a much more secure combination device. It has
|
|
64,000 combinations compared to the 1,085 with the Simplex."
|
|
|
|
Goldstein continued, "One of the real problems is that, should a person have
|
|
the misfortune to be robbed, entry due to a failure of the Simplex lock gives
|
|
no evidence of a forcible break-in and police and insurance companies often put
|
|
the blame on the homeowner or office manager for 'giving away the combination.'
|
|
It really can create a problem."
|
|
|
|
Skinner told Newsbytes "I'm really concerned about t^Shis. I'm a student at
|
|
SUNY, Stony Brook and all our dormitories use these locks as the only means of
|
|
security. I've shown the problem to Scott Law who is responsible for residence
|
|
security but he has discounted the problem and said that the locks were
|
|
installed at the recommendation of the campus locksmith. The locksmith, Garry
|
|
Lenox contradicts Law and says that he recommended against these locks years
|
|
ago and said that they were not secure for dormitory use." Skinner said that
|
|
he will write an article for the college newspaper in an attempt to raise
|
|
consciousness about this problem.
|
|
|
|
Goldstein also said that he intends to publish the list of valid combinations
|
|
in an up-coming iss^Que of 2600 to demonstrate to the public the problems with
|
|
the lock. He further said that he will raise the issue on his weekly radio
|
|
show, "Off The Hook", heard on New York's WBAI-FM.
|
|
|
|
In response to a Newsbytes question concerning how the 2600 staff happened to
|
|
become involved in a problem with locks, Goldstein said, "We're hackers and
|
|
when we see something with buttons on it, whether it's a computer or not, we
|
|
tend to try it. While the average person tends to accept that things are
|
|
secure just because he is told that they are, hackers will usually try them
|
|
out. It's because of this 'trying out' that we can point out the problems with
|
|
both the US military computer security and this lock -- and we feel that, in
|
|
both cases, we have performed a service. People should be aware when they are
|
|
at risk so that they may take action to correct it."
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Questions Exist On Israeli Break-In Of US Systems September 10,1991
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
by Barbara E. McMullen & John F. McMullen (Newsbytes)
|
|
|
|
NEW YORK -- Amidst reports of the intrusion by an Israeli national into United
|
|
States military computer systems, there have been conflicting accounts of the
|
|
extent and nature of the invasion.
|
|
|
|
According to wire services, Deri Schriebman, an 18 year-old graduate of
|
|
Israel's Technion Institute and a native of the northern Israeli city of
|
|
Carmiel, was arrested by Israeli police for allegedly breaking into US military
|
|
computers and commercial credit card systems. Israeli spokes person Eitan Raz,
|
|
commenting on the equipment found at Schriebman's home for allegedly making
|
|
free overseas phone calls, was quoted as saying "This was a very complex
|
|
system. It was the first time such technology was discovered in Israel."
|
|
|
|
Newsbytes has ben able to confirm with sources that a trail of credit card
|
|
fraud in the United States and Canada led investigators to Schriebman but has
|
|
not been able to confirm that Schriebman, as reported in Israeli press, was
|
|
able to access classified Pentagon information concerning Patriot missiles
|
|
during the recent Gulf War. A US government investigative official told
|
|
Newsbytes that, while his agency has formally requested documentation of the
|
|
events from the Israeli police, that there seems to have been no contact to
|
|
date between any US service and the Israeli investigators.
|
|
|
|
Other investigative sources have told Newsbytes that the investigation into
|
|
Schriebman's activities began in May 1991 when two Quebec teenagers were
|
|
arrested for purchasing goods through the use of stolen credit card
|
|
identification. The teenagers told Canadian authorities that they had received
|
|
the information from a source in Carmiel, Israel and the authorities notified
|
|
Israeli police. According to the Israeli reports, Schriebman admitted the
|
|
intrusion into credit card files and the subsequent dissemination of codes but
|
|
denied making any use of the information. He was quoted as saying that his
|
|
cracking into the systems was done only out of curiosity.
|
|
|
|
A "hacker" source told Newsbytes that underground bulletin boards utilized for
|
|
the exchange of such credit information are often frequented by foreign
|
|
nationals. He said that the most frequent visitors come from Australia, Israel
|
|
and Germany and that many of the Israelis identify themselves as have a
|
|
connection with the Technion Institute.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
==Phrack Inc.==
|
|
|
|
Volume Three, Issue Thirty-five, File 11 of 13
|
|
|
|
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Phrack World News PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Issue XXXV / Part Two PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Compiled by Dispater PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
|
|
|
|
Justice Revs Up Battle On Computer Crime October 7, 1991
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
by Michael Alexander (ComputerWorld)(Page 4)
|
|
|
|
Washington D.C. -- The nation's top federal computer crime law enforcers
|
|
announced plans to escalate the war on computer crime.
|
|
|
|
At the federal government's 14th National Computer Security Conference held in
|
|
Washington D.C., officials at the U.S. Department of Justice said the
|
|
department is launching a computer crime unit that will be charged with
|
|
prosecuting crimes and pushing for stiffer penalties for convicted computer
|
|
outlaws.
|
|
|
|
"Computer crime is on the rise, and the Justice Department is taking this area
|
|
very seriously -- as well as the FBI, U.S. Secret Service, and the military,"
|
|
said Mary Spearing, chief of general litigation and legal advice in the
|
|
criminal division at the Justice Department.
|
|
|
|
The new crime unit will also advocate closing loopholes in the government's
|
|
computer crime statute. The Computer Fraud & Abuse Act of 1986 "is outmoded
|
|
and outdated," said Scott Charney, a computer crime prosecutor and chief of the
|
|
new computer crime unit.
|
|
|
|
The Justice Department wants to amend the law with a provision that would make
|
|
inserting a virus or worm into a computer system a crime, Charney said.
|
|
|
|
Those convicted of computer crimes will more often be sentenced according to
|
|
federal guidelines rather than on recommendation of prosecutors, who may ask
|
|
for lighter penalties, said Mark Rasch, the government's attorney who
|
|
prosecuted Robert Morris in the infamous Internet worm case.
|
|
|
|
A new Justice Department policy now mandates that all defendants will be
|
|
treated equally, without regard for personal history or other factors that
|
|
might mitigate stiffer sentences, Rasch said.
|
|
|
|
"The penalties for computer crime will become increasingly more severe,"
|
|
predicted Kent Alexander, assistant U.S. attorney in Atlanta <prosecutor of the
|
|
Atlanta members of the Legion of Doom>. "In five years, they are going to look
|
|
back and think a year in jail was a light sentence."
|
|
|
|
The FBI is "staffing up to address concerns about computer crimes" and
|
|
increasing its training efforts, said Mike Gibbons, FBI supervisory special
|
|
agent <who worked on both the Morris and the Clifford Stoll KGB hackers
|
|
cases>.
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
Supreme Court Refuses Morris Appeal October 14, 1991
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
by Michael Alexander (ComputerWorld)(Page 14)
|
|
|
|
Washington, D.C. -- The U.S. Supreme Court refused without comment to hear
|
|
Robert T. Morris' appeal last week, ending a legal journey that began nearly
|
|
three years ago when he injected a worm into the Internet network.
|
|
|
|
While the trek is over for Morris, there remain serious questions about the
|
|
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, the statute under which he was
|
|
prosecuted.
|
|
|
|
The refusal to review the Morris case leave intact a "bone breaker" law that
|
|
could transform otherwise law-abiding computer users in felons and inhibit the
|
|
creative uses of computer technology according to Thomas Viles, an attorney at
|
|
the Silverglate & Good law firm in Boston. Viles authored a friend of the
|
|
court brief in the Morris appeal on behalf of the Electronic Frontier
|
|
Foundation.
|
|
|
|
Some legal experts worry that computer users who enter a computer system
|
|
without authorization, either unwittingly or with the intention of merely
|
|
looking around, could be given penalties that are overly severe.
|
|
|
|
"A single computer entry is of an entirely different order than the destruction
|
|
of data or the intentional alteration of data, just as simple trespass is
|
|
pretty minor stuff compared to vandalism or burglary," Viles said. "Now if
|
|
people whose livelihoods depend on computers get into somebody else's computer
|
|
without authorization, they could be in Leavenworth for five years."
|
|
|
|
The Morris appeal boiled down to the critical question of whether he intended
|
|
to cause the harm that ensued after he set loose his ill-conceived computer
|
|
program on November 2, 1988.
|
|
|
|
In 1990, a federal judge in Syracuse, New York ruled that it was not necessary
|
|
for the government to prove that Morris intended to cause harm, only that
|
|
Morris intended to access computers with authorization or to exceed
|
|
authorization that he may have had. Earlier this year a federal appeals court
|
|
upheld Morris' May 1990 conviction under which he received three years
|
|
probation, a $10,000 fine, and 400 hours of community service.
|
|
|
|
That affirmation goes against the widely accepted tenet that an injury can
|
|
amount to a crime only when deliberately intended, Viles said. "The law
|
|
distinguishes, say, between murder and manslaughter. You can't be guilty of
|
|
murder if the killing was utterly accidental and unintended."
|
|
|
|
A General Accounting Office (GAO) report released in 1989 noted other flaws in
|
|
the federal computer statute. While the law makes it a felony to access a
|
|
computer without authorization, the law does not define what is meant by
|
|
"access" or "authorization," the GAO reported.
|
|
|
|
UPDATING THE LAW
|
|
|
|
U.S. Department of Justice Officials recently acknowledged that the Computer
|
|
Fraud and Abuse Act is outdated and noted that it should be refined <see
|
|
Justice Revs Up Battle On Computer Crime (the previous article)>. Scott
|
|
Charney, chief of the Justice Department's newly created computer crime unit,
|
|
said the department will lobby to fortify the law with provisions that would
|
|
outlaw releasing viruses and worms and make it a felony to access a computer
|
|
without authorization and cause damage through reckless behavior.
|
|
|
|
Trespassing into a computer is more serious than it may appear at first
|
|
glance, Charney said. "It is not easy to determine what happened, whether
|
|
there was damage, how safe the system now is or what the intruder's motives
|
|
were."
|
|
|
|
Some legal experts said they believe the law is already overly broad and do not
|
|
advocate expanding it with new provisions. "It is a far-reaching law, whose
|
|
boundaries are still not known," said Marc Rotenberg, an attorney and director
|
|
of the Washington, D.C. office of Computer Professionals for Social
|
|
Responsibility. "The way I read the law is, the Justice Department has
|
|
everything it needs and more," he said. "After the Morris decisions, if you
|
|
sneeze, you could be indicted."
|
|
|
|
The Morris case pointed out deficiencies in the law that have resulted from
|
|
technology's rapid advance, said Thomas Guidoboni, the Washington, D.C.-based
|
|
attorney who defended Morris.
|
|
|
|
Neither Guidoboni nor Morris were surprised by the Supreme Court's refusal to
|
|
hear his appeal, according to Guidoboni. "Robert's case had a particular
|
|
problem in that it was the first one involving the 1986 act. They like to take
|
|
cases after the circuit courts had had some chance to play with them and see if
|
|
there is a disagreement."
|
|
|
|
Morris is working as a computer programmer in Cambridge, Massachusetts for a
|
|
company that "knows who he is and what he's done," Guidoboni said. He declined
|
|
to identify the company.
|
|
|
|
<Editor's Note: Morris was actually the SECOND person to be tried under the
|
|
1986 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. The first person was Herbert Zinn, Jr.
|
|
a/k/a Shadow Hawk of Chicago, Illinois, who was convicted in 1989 in a
|
|
prosecution led by William Cook, a now former assistant U.S. attorney whose
|
|
name most of you should recognize from the Craig Neidorf (Knight Lightning)
|
|
and Lynn Doucette (Kyrie) cases.
|
|
|
|
Zinn was tried as a minor and therefore in a bench trial before a sole judge.
|
|
Morris is the first person to be tried under the Act in front of a jury.
|
|
Zinn's conviction earned him 10 months in a juveniles prison facility in South
|
|
Dakota, a fine of $10,000, and an additional 2 1/2 years of probation that
|
|
began after his prison term ended.
|
|
|
|
For additional information about the Shadow Hawk case, please read "Shadow
|
|
Hawk Gets Prison Term," which appeared in Phrack World News, Issue 24,
|
|
Part 2.
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
Justice Unit Spurred On By Cross-Border Hackers October 21, 1991
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
by Michael Alexander (ComputerWorld)(Page 6)
|
|
|
|
Washington D.C. -- The U.S. Department of Justice's formal launch of a computer
|
|
crime unit was prompted largely by an alarming rise in computer invasions that
|
|
traverse geographic and jurisdictional boundaries, according to a top Justice
|
|
Department official.
|
|
|
|
Robert Mueller III, assistant U.S. attorney general, said the Justice
|
|
Department needs to be better prepared to prosecute computer criminals. he is
|
|
one of the architects of a five-person unit recently established by the justice
|
|
department expressly to combat computer crime.
|
|
|
|
"One of the principal functions of the unit is to anticipate areas where
|
|
federal, state, and local law enforcement will have to expend resources in the
|
|
future," Mueller said. "One that comes immediately to our attention is crime
|
|
related to computers used as a target as in The Cuckoo's Egg." He was
|
|
referring to author Clifford Stoll's account of how he tracked West German
|
|
hackers who penetrated U.S. computers for the KGB in exchange for cash and
|
|
cocaine.
|
|
|
|
Increasingly, computer crimes cut across state and international boundaries,
|
|
making them difficult to investigate because of jurisdictional limits and
|
|
differing laws, Mueller said. The computer crime unit will be charged with
|
|
coordinating the efforts of U.S. attorneys general nationwide during
|
|
investigations of crimes that may have been committed by individuals in several
|
|
states.
|
|
|
|
One of the unit's first assignments will be to take a pivotal role in OPERATION
|
|
SUN-DEVIL, last year's much-publicized roundup of computer hackers in several
|
|
states. That investigation is still under way, although no arrests have
|
|
resulted, Justice Department officials said.
|
|
|
|
The unit will coordinate efforts with foreign law enforcers to prosecute
|
|
hackers who enter U.S. computer systems from abroad while also working to
|
|
promote greater cooperation in prosecuting computer criminals according to
|
|
Mueller.
|
|
|
|
The unit will also assist in investigations when computers are used as a tool
|
|
of a crime -- for example, when a computer is used to divert electronically
|
|
transferred funds -- and when computers are incidental to a crime, such as when
|
|
a money launderer uses a computer to store records of illegal activities,
|
|
Mueller said.
|
|
|
|
"There have been many publicized cases involving people illegally accessing
|
|
computers, from phone phreaks to hackers trying to take military information,"
|
|
said Scott Charney, chief of the new computer unit. "Those cases have high
|
|
importance to us because any time that computers are the target of an offense,
|
|
the social cost is very high. If you bring down the Internet and cripple 6,000
|
|
machines and inconvenience thousands of users, there is a high social cost to
|
|
that type of activity."
|
|
|
|
The computer crime unit will also work to promote closer cooperation between
|
|
the Justice Department and businesses that have been the victims of computer
|
|
crime, Charney said.
|
|
|
|
Law enforcers are better trained and more knowledgeable in investigating and
|
|
prosecuting computer crimes, Charney said. "Businesses need not be concerned
|
|
that we are going to come in, remove all of their computers, and shut their
|
|
businesses down. FBI and Secret Service agents can go in and talk to the
|
|
victim in a language they understand and get the information they need with a
|
|
minimum amount of intrusion."
|
|
|
|
<Editor's Note: "Businesses need not be concerned that we are going to come
|
|
in, remove all of their computers, and shut their businesses down." Excuse
|
|
me, but I think STEVE JACKSON GAMES in Austin, Texas might disagree with that
|
|
statement. Mr. Charney -- Perhaps you should issue an apology!>
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
V I E W P O I N T
|
|
|
|
Let's Look Before We Legislate October 21, 1991
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
by Marc Rotenberg (ComputerWorld)(Page 25)
|
|
|
|
"Laws Are Adequate To Handle Computer Crime -- 'Net Police' Not Needed"
|
|
|
|
The U.S. Department of Justice is now circulating a proposal to expand the
|
|
reach of federal computer crime law. On first pass, this might seem a sensible
|
|
response to concerns about computer crime. The reality, however, it that the
|
|
current federal law is more than adequate and the Justice Department proposal
|
|
is poorly conceived.
|
|
|
|
The Justice Department proposal will give federal agencies broad authority to
|
|
investigate computer crime, allowing them to intercede in any situations
|
|
involving a computer hooked to a network.
|
|
|
|
Creating a worm or virus could become a felony act, no questions asked.
|
|
Espionage laws would be broadened and intent requirements would be lowered.
|
|
Certain procedural safeguards would be removed from existing law.
|
|
|
|
CURRENT LAW ADEQUATE
|
|
|
|
Taken as a whole, the proposal will make it possible for the federal government
|
|
to prosecute many more computer crimes, but the question is whether this
|
|
additional authority will improve computer security. Between the current
|
|
federal statute, the Morris decision, and the sentencing guidelines, federal
|
|
prosecutors already have more than enough tools to prosecute computer crime.
|
|
|
|
Under the Computer Fraud & Abuse Act, passed in 1984 and amended in 1986, the
|
|
unauthorized use of a computer system is a felony. Though the act does not
|
|
define what "authorization" is or how it is obtained, a person found guilty
|
|
faces up to five years in jail and fines of $250,000. It is a far-reaching law
|
|
whose boundaries are still not known.
|
|
|
|
THE MORRIS FACTOR
|
|
|
|
The Morris case strengthened the hand of federal prosecutors still further.
|
|
The judge ruled that it was not necessary for the government to prove that
|
|
Morris intended the harm that resulted when the worm was released, only that he
|
|
intended unauthorized use when he did what he did.
|
|
|
|
>From a common law viewpoint, that's a surprising result. Traditional criminal
|
|
law distinguishes between trespass, burglary, and arson. In trespass, which is
|
|
a misdemeanor, the offense is entering onto someone else's property. Burglary
|
|
is simple theft and arson is destruction. To punish a trespasser as an
|
|
arsonist is to presume an intent that may not exist.
|
|
|
|
A federal appeals court affirmed the Morris decision, and the Supreme Court has
|
|
refused to hear his appeal, so now the computer crime statute is essentially a
|
|
trip-wire law. The government only has to show that the entry was unauthorized
|
|
-- not that any resulting harm was intentional.
|
|
|
|
There is another aspect of the Morris case that should be clearly understood.
|
|
Some people were surprised that Morris served no time and jumped to the
|
|
conclusion that sentencing provisions for this type of offense were
|
|
insufficient. In fact, under the existing federal sentencing guidelines,
|
|
Morris could easily have received two years in jail. The judge in Syracuse,
|
|
New York, considered that Morris was a first-time offender, had no criminal
|
|
record, was unlikely to commit a crime in the future, and, not unreasonably,
|
|
decided that community service and a stiff fine were appropriate.
|
|
|
|
To "depart" as the judge did from the recommended sentence was unusual. Most
|
|
judges follow the guidelines and many depart upwards.
|
|
|
|
That said, if the Department of Justice persists in its efforts, there are at
|
|
least three other issues that should be explored.
|
|
|
|
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
|
|
|
|
First there is the question of whether it is sensible to expand the authority
|
|
of federal agents at the expense of local police and state government. If
|
|
theft from a cash register is routinely prosecuted by local police, why should
|
|
the FBI be called in if the cash register is a computer?
|
|
|
|
What will happen to the ability of state government to tailor their laws to
|
|
their particular needs? Do we really want "Net Police"?
|
|
|
|
There is also the need to explore the government's performance in recent
|
|
computer crime investigations before granting new powers. For example, the
|
|
botch Operation Sun-Devil raid, which involved almost one quarter of all Secret
|
|
Service agents, resulted in hardly a conviction. (A good cop could have done
|
|
better in a night's work.)
|
|
|
|
In a related investigation, Steve Jackson, the operator of a game business in
|
|
Texas was nearly forced out of business by a poorly conceived raid.
|
|
|
|
In fact, documents just released to Computer Professionals for Social
|
|
Responsibility by the Secret Service under the Freedom of Information Act raise
|
|
substantial questions about the conduct, scope, and purpose of Operation
|
|
Sun-Devil investigations. They reveal, for example, that the Secret Service
|
|
monitored and downloaded information from a variety of on-line newsletters and
|
|
conferences.
|
|
|
|
A congressional hearing to assess Operation Sun-Devil would certainly be in
|
|
order before granting federal officials new powers.
|
|
|
|
PROTECTION OF RIGHTS
|
|
|
|
Finally we should not rush to create new criminal sanctions without fully
|
|
recognizing the important civil liberties interests in information
|
|
technologies, such as the rights of privacy and free expression. There are,
|
|
for example, laws that recognize a special First Amendment interest in newsroom
|
|
searches.
|
|
|
|
But no case has yet made clear the important principle that similar protections
|
|
should be extended to computer bulletin boards. New criminal sanctions without
|
|
necessary procedural safeguards throws off an important balance in the criminal
|
|
justice system.
|
|
|
|
Expanding the reach of federal law might sound good to many people who are
|
|
concerned about computer crime, but broadening criminal law is always
|
|
double-edged. Could you prove to a court that you have never used a computer
|
|
in an "unauthorized" manner?
|
|
|
|
<Editor's Note: Marc Rotenberg is the Director of the Washington office of
|
|
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility and he has testified in both
|
|
the House of Representatives and the Senate on computer crime legislation.>
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
PWN Quicknotes
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
|
|
1. Operation Sun-Devil Scope Emerges (ComputerWorld, 10/14/91, page 119)
|
|
--
|
|
The Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR), an advocacy
|
|
group, received more than 2,400 documents from the U.S. Secret Service
|
|
under the Freedom of Information Act. The documents relate to Operation
|
|
Sun-Devil, last year's nationwide dragnet through the hacker underground.
|
|
An early look at the documents reveals that the scope of the operation was
|
|
considerably broader than the U.S. Secret Service has admitted, said Marc
|
|
Rotenberg, director of CPSR's Washington, D.C. office. CPSR will soon hold
|
|
a press conference to discuss the findings, he added.
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
2. 6 Police Employees Probed for Wiretaps (Washington Post/AP, 10/24/91, page
|
|
A4) -- Jefferson City, Missouri -- Missouri's Highway Patrol is
|
|
investigating six employees implicated in three illegal wiretaps, officials
|
|
said.
|
|
|
|
The wiretaps were "stupid" and were intended to "gain personal information
|
|
in an effort to supervise subordinates," said Colonel C.E. 'Mel' Fisher,
|
|
the patrol's chief.
|
|
|
|
Fisher said that six employees are on administrative leave without pay
|
|
after a two-month internal investigation confirmed conversations were
|
|
recorded at patrol headquarters and at a troop office in Kirkwood,
|
|
Missouri.
|
|
|
|
Fisher did not identify the employees, who face hearings that could lead
|
|
to possible penalties ranging from a written reprimand to dismissal. It is
|
|
a federal felony to conduct an illegal wiretap. He said the FBI
|
|
investigated the wiretaps.
|
|
|
|
Major Bobby G. Gibson, chief of the patrol's Criminal Investigation Bureau,
|
|
in which two of the wiretaps occurred, committed suicide on October 9,
|
|
1991. He was among five defendants in a $7 million federal lawsuit filed
|
|
recently by a black patrolman, Corporal Oliver Dixon, who alleged he had
|
|
been wiretapped and denied promotions because of his race. All of the
|
|
defendants, including Fisher, are white.
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
3. Patrick Townson, the moderator of the Internet's Telecom Digest
|
|
(comp.dcom.telecom) was less than pleased when an unknown person placed
|
|
Phrack 34 into alt.dcom.telecom. Townson consistently preaches about the
|
|
evils of hacking, but we know that he did not learn everything he knows
|
|
about telecommunications in the classroom. See you after World War Three
|
|
Pat! We know who you are, we know who you WERE and we know what crimes
|
|
you have committed in the realm of telecommunications. We're anxious to
|
|
talk some more with you about this in the near future.
|
|
|
|
See below:
|
|
|
|
"I assume you saw the stuff which was left in alt.dcom.telecom today:
|
|
A whole series of messages telling how to break into several voicemail
|
|
systems; how to break into the MILNET; a program designed to discover
|
|
passwords; and other obnoxious files. All of them were left by the same
|
|
anonymous user at the same non-existent site. Siemens Medical Systems
|
|
(one of the victims in the theft-of-voicemail-services tutorial in
|
|
alt.dcom.telecom today) has been notified that their 800 number link to
|
|
voicemail is now under attack, and given the box number involved. Like
|
|
cockroaches, you can stomp on those people all you like; they seem to
|
|
survive. One person has said in the event of WW-3, the only species to
|
|
survive will be the cockroaches and the hackerphreaks. Good socially
|
|
responsible computing, that's what it is! PAT"
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
4. The existence of back issues of Phrack Inc. found in a user's home
|
|
directory was enough for a system administrator at Tufts University in
|
|
Massachusetts to revoke a users account. Michael Godwin, an attorney for
|
|
the Electronic Frontier Foundation went to bat for this individual and
|
|
succeeded in restoring the user's account. The incident prompted the
|
|
following response by a reader of Telecom Digest (comp.dcom.telecom):
|
|
|
|
On Oct 19 at 11:51, TELECOM Moderator writes:
|
|
|
|
> Is it easier and more pragmatic for a
|
|
> system administrator to answer to his/her superiors regarding files at
|
|
> the site which harassed or defrauded some third party (ie. telco) or
|
|
> to simply remove the files and/or discontinue the feed" PAT]
|
|
|
|
But this requires a judgment call on the part of the system
|
|
administrator, does it not? Most of the system administrators that I
|
|
know are too busy administering the system to worry about this file or
|
|
that feed, except perhaps as it relates to traffic volume or disk space
|
|
consumed.
|
|
|
|
Will we ever get to the point where those in charge will stop dreaming of
|
|
practicing mind control? I am so sick of those who are paranoid that
|
|
someone somewhere may actually express an uncontrolled thought or idea to
|
|
someone else.
|
|
|
|
Ah, the advantages of owning one's own UUCP site ...
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
5. The National Public Network Begins Now. You Can Help Build it.
|
|
|
|
Telecommunications in the United States is at a crossroads. With the
|
|
Regional Bell Operating Companies now free to provide content, the shape
|
|
of the information networking is about to be irrevocably altered. But
|
|
will that network be the open, accessible, affordable network that the
|
|
American public needs? You can help decide this question.
|
|
|
|
The Electronic Frontier Foundation recently presented a plan to Congress
|
|
calling for the immediate deployment of a national network based on
|
|
existing ISDN technology, accessible to anyone with a telephone
|
|
connection, and priced like local voice service. We believe deployment of
|
|
such a platform will spur the development of innovative new information
|
|
services, and maximize freedom, competitiveness, and civil liberties
|
|
throughout the nation.
|
|
|
|
The EFF is testifying before Congress and the FCC; making presentations to
|
|
public utility commissions from Massachusetts to California; and meeting
|
|
with representatives from telephone companies, publishers, consumer
|
|
advocates, and other stakeholders in the telecommunications policy debate.
|
|
|
|
The EFF believes that participants on the Internet, as pioneers on the
|
|
electronic frontier, need to have their voices heard at this critical
|
|
moment.
|
|
|
|
To automatically receive a description of the platform and details, send
|
|
mail to archive-server@eff.org, with the following line:
|
|
|
|
send documents open-platform-overview
|
|
|
|
or send mail to eff@eff.org.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
6. The September/October 1991 issue of The Humanist has a cover story
|
|
regarding Cyberspace, rights and freedoms on nets such as Usenet, and makes
|
|
reference to Craig Neidorf, Jolnet, Prodigy and other matters.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
7. A Virginia Beach restaurateur plead guilty to illegally taping a telephone
|
|
call by Governor L. Douglas Wilder and said he arranged for the tape to be
|
|
delivered to the staff of Senator Charles Robb, D-Va., hoping it would be
|
|
damaging to Wilder and politically helpful to Robb.
|
|
|
|
Robert Dunnington, a onetime social companion of Robb's, admitted in
|
|
federal court that he intercepted a 1988 car phone call by then-Lt.
|
|
Governor Wilder as part of his hobby of monitoring and recording cellular
|
|
calls.
|
|
|
|
From February 1988 to October 1990, Dunnington overheard and taped hundreds
|
|
of calls and, his attorney said, it was "just happenstance" that Wilder's
|
|
call was picked up. (Washington Post)
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
8. A Federal District Judge in New York ruled that a computer-network company
|
|
is not legally liable for the contents of information it disseminates.
|
|
While the decision could be influential because it tackles free speech on
|
|
an electronic network, it is not clear how the ruling would affect bulletin
|
|
boards ^S^Qon which users add comments. The decision concerned an electronic
|
|
gossip column carried by CompuServe. In the decision, the judge stated
|
|
"CompuServe has no more editorial control over such a publication than
|
|
does a public library, bookstore or newsstand, and it would be no more
|
|
feasible for CompuServe to examine every publication it carries for
|
|
potentially defamatory statements than it would be for any other
|
|
distributor to do so." (Wall Street Journal, October 31, 1991)
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
|
|
==Phrack Inc.==
|
|
|
|
Volume Three, Issue Thirty-five, File 12 of 13
|
|
|
|
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Phrack World News PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Issue XXXV / Part Three PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Compiled by Dispater PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
|
|
|
|
Prodigy Stumbles as a Forum...Again
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
by Mike Godwin (Electronic Frontier Foundation)
|
|
|
|
On some days, Prodigy representatives tell us they're running "the Disney
|
|
Channel of online services." On other days the service is touted as a forum
|
|
for "the free expression of ideas." But management has missed the conflict
|
|
between these two missions. And it is just this unperceived conflict that has
|
|
led the B'nai B'rith's Anti-Defamation League to launch a protest against the
|
|
online service..
|
|
|
|
On one level, the controversy stems from Prodigy's decision to censor
|
|
messages responding to claims that, among other things, the Holocaust never
|
|
took place. These messages--which included such statements as "Hitler had some
|
|
valid points" and that "wherever Jews exercise influence and power, misery,
|
|
warfare and economic exploitation ... follow"--were the sort likely to stir up
|
|
indignant responses among Jews and non-Jews alike. But some Prodigy members
|
|
have complained to the ADL that when they tried to respond to both the overt
|
|
content of these messages and their implicit anti-Semitism, their responses
|
|
were rejected by Prodigy's staff of censors.
|
|
|
|
The rationale for the censorship? Prodigy has a policy of barring
|
|
messages directed at other members, but allows messages that condemn a group.
|
|
The result of this policy, mechanically applied, is that one member can post a
|
|
message saying that "pogroms, 'persecutions,' and the mythical holocaust" are
|
|
things that Jews "so very richly deserve" (this was an actual message). But
|
|
another member might be barred from posting some like "Member A's comments are
|
|
viciously anti-Semitic." It is no wonder that the Anti-Defamation League is
|
|
upset at what looks very much like unequal treatment.
|
|
|
|
But the problem exposed by this controversy is broader than simply a badly
|
|
crafted policy. The problem is that Prodigy, while insisting on its Disney
|
|
Channel metaphor, also gives lip service to the notion of a public forum.
|
|
Henry Heilbrunn, a senior vice president of Prodigy, refers in the Wall Street
|
|
Journal to the service's "policy of free expression," while Bruce Thurlby,
|
|
Prodigy's manager of editorial business and operations, invokes in a letter to
|
|
ADL "the right of individuals to express opinions that are contrary to personal
|
|
standards or individual beliefs."
|
|
|
|
Yet it is impossible for any free-expression policy to explain both the
|
|
allowing of those anti-Semitic postings and the barring of responses to those
|
|
postings from outraged and offended members. Historically, this country has
|
|
embraced the principle that best cure for offensive or disturbing speech is
|
|
more speech. No regime of censorship--even of the most neutral and well-
|
|
meaning kind--can avoid the kind of result that appears in this case: some
|
|
people get to speak while others get no chance to reply. So long as a board of
|
|
censors is in place, Prodigy is no public forum.
|
|
|
|
Thus, the service is left in a double bind. If Prodigy really means to be
|
|
taken as a computer-network version of "the Disney Channel"--with all the
|
|
content control that this metaphor implies--then it's taking responsibility for
|
|
(and, to some members, even seeming to endorse) the anti-Semitic messages that
|
|
were posted. On the other hand, if Prodigy really regards itself as a forum
|
|
for free expression, it has no business refusing to allow members to respond to
|
|
what they saw as lies, distortions, and hate. A true free-speech forum would
|
|
allow not only the original messages but also the responses to them.
|
|
|
|
So, what's the fix for Prodigy? The answer may lie in replacing the
|
|
service's censors with a system of "conference hosts" of the sort one sees on
|
|
CompuServe or on the WELL. As WELL manager Cliff Figallo conceives of his
|
|
service, the management is like an apartment manager who normally allows
|
|
tenants to do what they want, but who steps in if they do something
|
|
outrageously disruptive. Hosts on the WELL normally steer discussions rather
|
|
than censoring them, and merely offensive speech is almost never censored.
|
|
|
|
But even if Prodigy doesn't adopt a "conference host" system, it
|
|
ultimately will satisfy its members better if it does allow a true forum for
|
|
free expression. And the service may be moving in that direction already:
|
|
Heilbrunn is quoted in the Wall Street Journal as saying that Prodigy has been
|
|
loosening its content restrictions over the past month. Good news, but not
|
|
good enough--merely easing some content restrictions is likely to be no more
|
|
successful at solving Prodigy's problems than Gorbachev's easing market
|
|
restrictions was at solving the Soviet Union's problems. The best solution is
|
|
to allow what Oliver Wendell Holmes called "the marketplace of ideas" to
|
|
flourish--to get out of the censorship business.
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
Computer Network to Ban 'Repugnant' Comments
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
>From Washington Post
|
|
|
|
Prodigy has been charged with allowing "antisemitic slurs" to run on its
|
|
network. Prodigy officials said they would *not* censor discussion of
|
|
controversial subjects, such as the one that has been raging over the net for
|
|
several months -- whether the Holocaust was a hoax.
|
|
|
|
The controversial message that was labeled "repugnant" included the
|
|
statements: "Hitler had some valid points...", and "...whenever Jews exercise
|
|
influence and power, misery, warfare and economic exploitation [are the
|
|
result]". There were six other messages that the Anti-Defamation League of
|
|
B'nai B'rith are complaining about. The Hitler message was not available to
|
|
all subscribers, it was just personal mail between users. The person who
|
|
received the mail brought it to the ADL's attention.
|
|
|
|
Civil liberties groups have compared computer networks to telephone
|
|
companies, which do not censor calls. However, Prodigy officials object to
|
|
that analogy, saying it is more like a newspaper, and that Prodigy must judge
|
|
what is acceptable and what is not, much as a newspaper editor must.
|
|
|
|
Prodigy officials take the position of, and I quote, "we were speaking in
|
|
broader terms ... we were focused on the broad issue of free expression".
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
More on Proctor & Gamble August 15, 1991
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
by Randall Rothenberg (New York Times)
|
|
Further Reading: Phrack Inc., Issue 33 , File.12, "Proctor & Gamble"
|
|
|
|
Law-enforcement officials in Ohio have searched the records of every
|
|
telephone user in southwestern Ohio to determine who, if anyone, called a Wall
|
|
Street Journal reporter to provide information that Proctor & Gamble said was
|
|
confidential and protected by state law.
|
|
|
|
The investigation goes far beyond examining the telephone records of
|
|
current and former employees of the giant consumer products company, an inquiry
|
|
the Hamilton County prosecutor's office confirmed on Monday. The Journal
|
|
reported the scope of the investigation Thursday.
|
|
|
|
The prosecutor, Arthur Ney Jr., acting on a complaint by Procter & Gamble,
|
|
ordered Cincinnati Bell to turn over all the telephone numbers from which
|
|
people called the home or office of the reporter, Alecia Swasy, from March 1 to
|
|
June 15.
|
|
|
|
The situation began sometime before June 17 when Procter & Gamble, which
|
|
makes Tide detergent, Crest toothpaste and other familiar supermarket products,
|
|
asked the Cincinnati police to determine whether current or former employees
|
|
were leaking confidential corporate information to The Wall Street Journal.
|
|
|
|
On Monday the newspaper reported that the company had been bothered by two
|
|
news articles published on June 10 and June 11 written by Ms. Swasy, a reporter
|
|
based in Pittsburgh who covers Procter & Gamble. The articles cited
|
|
unidentified sources saying that a senior executive was under pressure to
|
|
resign from the company, and that it might sell some unprofitable divisions.
|
|
|
|
But a spokeswoman for Procter and Gamble, Sydney McHugh, said Thursday
|
|
that the company "had been observing a disturbing pattern of leaks" since the
|
|
beginning of the year. She refused to elaborate, but said the decision to
|
|
pursue legal action was reviewed at several levels in the company and was made
|
|
by Jim Jessee, a corporate security officer.
|
|
|
|
Two Ohio statutes protect the unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets.
|
|
One makes it a felony to transmit formulas, customer lists or other tangible
|
|
pieces of information that would be valuable to a company and its competitors.
|
|
But another, broader law makes it a misdemeanor to disclose "any confidential
|
|
matter or information" without the company's consent.
|
|
|
|
The Cincinnati police approached the Hamilton County prosecutor's office,
|
|
which sought and received from a grand jury a subpoena for telephone records.
|
|
|
|
A copy of the subpoena, dated June 17, was given to The New York Times by
|
|
someone involved in the case who insisted on anonymity. The subpoena ordered
|
|
Cincinnati Bell to "identify all (513) area code numbers that have dialed" Ms.
|
|
Swasy's home or office telephones in Pittsburgh during an eight-week period
|
|
that started on March 1.
|
|
|
|
Cincinnati Bell serves 655,297 telephone numbers in the 513 area code, in
|
|
an area covering 1,156 square miles, said Cyndy Cantoni, a spokeswoman for the
|
|
company. In the company's entire jurisdiction, which also covers parts of
|
|
Kentucky and Pennsylvania, about 13 million toll calls are placed in an average
|
|
month, she said.
|
|
|
|
Ms. Cantoni said she could not comment on what Cincinnati Bell turned over
|
|
to the authorities, but said the company routinely complied with subpoenas.
|
|
Under normal procedure, the company's computers would have automatically
|
|
searched its customer list and printed out only the originating numbers, and
|
|
not the names or addresses, of calls to Ms. Swasy's numbers, Ms. Cantoni said.
|
|
|
|
The Wall Street Journal, which is published by Dow Jones & Co., reported
|
|
on Monday that neither Ms. Swasy nor executives at the Journal were informed of
|
|
the subpoena by the authorities.
|
|
|
|
Neither Terry Gaines, a first assistant prosecutor, nor Ed Ammann, a
|
|
police department colonel involved with the investigation, returned repeated
|
|
calls to their offices.
|
|
|
|
Alan F. Westin of Columbia University, an authority on technology and
|
|
privacy issues, said the legality of the Ohio authorities' search for the
|
|
Procter & Gamble whistleblower may depend on how the investigation was pursued.
|
|
|
|
If Procter & Gamble turned over the names and phone numbers of present and
|
|
former employees to the police and the police matched that list against the
|
|
numbers they were given by the telephone company, the rights of other,
|
|
uninvolved parties may not have been violated, Westin said. But if the police
|
|
learned the names of people unaffiliated with Procter & Gamble who called the
|
|
Journal's reporter, he said, or if they turned over a list of numbers to
|
|
Procter & Gamble for research, some Ohio residents' Fourth Amendment
|
|
protections may have been sullied.
|
|
|
|
"When technology allows you to run millions of calls involving 650,000
|
|
telephone subscribers through a computer in order to identify who called a
|
|
person, potentially to find out whether a crime was committed, you raise the
|
|
question of whether technological capacity has gone over the line in terms of
|
|
what is a reasonable search and seizure," Westin said.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Expert Fraud Shares Tricks of His Trade October 7, 1991
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
by Bob Reilly (New York Times)
|
|
|
|
PHOENIX -- A freelance writer didn't think the $333 that Forbes magazine
|
|
paid him for a one-page article was enough money so he used his personal
|
|
computer to duplicate the check in the amount of $30,000. And, the check
|
|
cleared.
|
|
|
|
A handyman fixes a bedroom window and gets paid by check. The handyman
|
|
copies down the homeowner's bank account number, name, address and check number
|
|
sequences and sends $4.95 to a company that prints fancy colored checks. The
|
|
handyman masters the homeowner's signature and then proceeds to cash the checks
|
|
after they arrive.
|
|
|
|
American Express and Mastercard traveler's checks are duplicated on a
|
|
colored photostat machine and spent in hotels and restaurants.
|
|
|
|
A man rents a banquet room in a hotel for $800 and gets the bill in the
|
|
mail a few days later. The man sends in a check for $400 with the notation
|
|
"paid in full" written in the lower left-hand corner. The hotel cashes the
|
|
check and sends a notice to the man saying $400 is still owed. The man refuses
|
|
to pay the $400 and wins in court because the law says by cashing the check the
|
|
hotel conceded the debt was paid.
|
|
|
|
White-collar crime amounts to more than $50 billion a year, said Frank
|
|
Abagnale, who cited the examples at a business-sponsored seminar in the Phoenix
|
|
Civic Center. By contrast, bank robbers, who get most of the media attention,
|
|
abscond with a paltry $450 million, he said.
|
|
|
|
Abagnale is said to have conducted scams and frauds in 26 nations. Known
|
|
as "The Imposter," he now advises government and industry. He says he served
|
|
six years in jail in France, Sweden and the U.S. for his crimes, which included
|
|
writing bad checks for more than $2.5 million.
|
|
|
|
"As technology improves, so does the ability to commit fraud," said
|
|
Abagnale.
|
|
|
|
He claims that at 16 he impersonated an airline pilot, at 18 was a chief
|
|
resident pediatrician in a Georgia hospital, at 19 passed the Louisiana state
|
|
bar exam and served as an assistant attorney general for the state.
|
|
|
|
Abagnale also claims he never flew an airplane or treated a patient but
|
|
along the way used false names to get jobs and pass bad checks. He claims he
|
|
even got a job at age 20 teaching sociology at Brigham Young University,
|
|
beating out three Ph.D.s for the job.
|
|
|
|
"I was always just one chapter ahead of the class," he said. Demeanor,
|
|
style, confidence, clothes and the overt display of wealth also help the con
|
|
man, Abagnale said.
|
|
|
|
Abagnale claimed he got one teller to cash a napkin because he drove up to
|
|
the bank in a chauffeur-driven Rolls Royce and entered wearing a $600 suit and
|
|
all the confidence of a billionaire. The feat was recorded for television by
|
|
CBS, he said.
|
|
|
|
Another time he supposedly put the numbers of the bank account he was
|
|
using on a bunch of deposit slips, placed the deposit slips in a bank for
|
|
public use, and in one day alone more than $40,000 was deposited into his
|
|
account by unsuspecting customers who picked up his slips because they had
|
|
either run out of their own or hadn't yet got their own deposit slips.
|
|
|
|
Abagnale asserted that there are several ways to discourage fraud,
|
|
including:
|
|
|
|
-- Use checks that are impossible to duplicate on a home computer.
|
|
-- Don't cash checks that don't have at least one rough edge.
|
|
-- Scan travelers checks by looking for impossible to reproduce
|
|
pictures or symbols that can only be seen at eye level or by
|
|
wetting the back, left-hand side of an American Express traveler's
|
|
check, which will smudge if it is authentic.
|
|
|
|
Abagnale is known as the author of a book called "Catch Me If You Can."
|
|
|
|
"I always knew I would eventually get caught," he said. "Only a fool
|
|
believes he won't. The law sometimes sleeps, but it never dies."
|
|
|
|
Abagnale claimed he started a life of crime when his parents divorced and
|
|
he was forced to choose between living with his mother or father. He said he
|
|
couldn't make the choice and ran away.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Dumb Jocks Learn First Lesson of Phreaking October 17, 1991
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
>From Associate Press
|
|
|
|
Four current Ball State University basketball players have admitted to
|
|
investigators that they charged a total of $820.90 in unauthorized long
|
|
distance calls. School officials announced the preliminary findings in the
|
|
first phase of their report the the NCAA. What the investigators found, in
|
|
regards to the unauthorized calls, was the following information:
|
|
|
|
Person Yr Calls Cost
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~ ~~~~~ ~~~~~~~
|
|
Jeermal Sylvester Sop 255 $769.93
|
|
Chandler Thompson Sen 28 $ 45.14
|
|
Michael Spicer Sen 3 $ 4.43
|
|
Keith Stalling Sen 1 $ 1.40
|
|
|
|
Investigators reported three of the men said former players had provided
|
|
the long distance credit card numbers or authorization codes on which the calls
|
|
were made. The fourth player Keith Stalling, could not explain how his call
|
|
had been charged to the university. Head basketball coach Dick Hunsaker
|
|
reiterated that neither he nor the coaching staff had made available the
|
|
numbers that were assigned to the coaches.
|
|
|
|
"When this problem was first discovered back in August, it came as a shock
|
|
to me," Hunsaker said. "I'm disappointed with the judgement of the players
|
|
involved, but I'm glad we're getting to the bottom of it quickly and clearing
|
|
it up before the season starts."
|
|
|
|
"Our attention now will focus on former players and other people not
|
|
connected with the basketball program who might have used the same credit cards
|
|
and access numbers," said the university's auditor. The investigation that
|
|
began in August was conducted by the Ball State university's auditor and
|
|
Department of Public Safety. The investigation started one week after a
|
|
routine review of telephone records by athletic department officials. At the
|
|
time, investigators said the total cost of the unauthorized calls was in the
|
|
thousands of dollars.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Silicon Government in California October 28, 1991
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
>From UPI Sacramento
|
|
|
|
California unveiled an easy-to-use computer system Wednesday that is
|
|
designed to tell people about such topics as statewide job openings, where
|
|
parents can find child care and how to re-register a car.
|
|
|
|
Officials described the experimental "Info/California" program as an
|
|
information-dispensing version of an automatic teller machine at a bank. It
|
|
will operate in Sacramento and San Diego as a pilot project for the next nine
|
|
months.
|
|
|
|
Users will obtain free information on a variety of state services as they
|
|
touch the television-like computer screen to evoke an on-screen narration and
|
|
color graphics in English, Spanish and potentially other languages.
|
|
|
|
"It literally puts state government at our fingertips," a computerized
|
|
image of Gov. Pete Wilson said at a Capitol news conference.
|
|
|
|
Secretary Russell Gould of the Health and Welfare Agency said the system
|
|
may be especially useful to announce job openings as the economy rebounds from
|
|
the recession. Job-seekers will need a fourth-grade literacy level to use the
|
|
machine, which will refer them to Employment Development Department offices for
|
|
follow-up.
|
|
|
|
Director Frank Zolin of the Department of Motor Vehicles said the system
|
|
will benefit 20 million drivers who want vehicle registration renewals, vanity
|
|
license plate orders and faster service.
|
|
|
|
John Poland, Central California manager for IBM -- the state's partner in
|
|
the project -- said that besides telling the public about job opportunities, it
|
|
will allow Californians to order birth certificates and get information about
|
|
education, transportation, health and welfare at more than one site.
|
|
|
|
During the nine-month trial, people will use the system at 15 kiosks in
|
|
Sacramento and San Diego that will be similar to, and eventually integrated
|
|
with, local system kiosks such as those in the courts in Los Angeles and Long
|
|
Beach, and for community services in San Diego and Tulare counties.
|
|
|
|
Info/California was authorized under 1988 legislation. It is based on an
|
|
experimental touchscreen network in Hawaii that 30,260 people used over a six-
|
|
month period.
|
|
|
|
The state spent about $300,000 on the project, and IBM invested about $3
|
|
million to develop the technology. By performing functions now done by humans,
|
|
the system may ultimately replace some state workers and produce cost savings
|
|
for taxpayers.
|
|
|
|
"We're working smart here," Gould said. "This may diminish some of the
|
|
need for new state workers."
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Digital Tapes Deal Endorsed by Music Industry October 30, 1991
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
>From (Congressional Monitor)
|
|
|
|
Record industry executives joined with retailers and consumer groups in
|
|
endorsing legislation (S 1623) that would pave the way for widescale
|
|
introduction of digital audio tapes into the U.S. marketplace.
|
|
|
|
For the first time, consumers would be allowed to legally make copies of
|
|
prerecordings for home use.
|
|
|
|
The agreement would allow artists, songwriters, and record companies to
|
|
collect royalty fees on the sale of blank tapes and digital audio recorders.
|
|
|
|
In addition, an electronics chip will be placed in the recorders to
|
|
prevent anything other than the original recording to be copied.
|
|
|
|
In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on
|
|
Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks, pop star Debbie Gibson said that many
|
|
artists had been concerned that digital copying could spell the end of a
|
|
profitable music industry.
|
|
|
|
Unlike conventional tapes, digital audio recorders allow consumers to make
|
|
a perfect copy of a prerecording. The record industry says it already loses $1
|
|
billion a year in sales due to illegal copying. And, the industry says,
|
|
unchecked digital technology would dramatically increase that figure.
|
|
|
|
Electronics manufacturers and retailers won the assurance that they will
|
|
not be sued for copyright infringement due to the sale of blank tapes or
|
|
recorders.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Computer Cryptography: A Cure For The Common Code
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
|
|
Anyone can sign a postcard, but how do you sign a piece of electronic
|
|
mail? Without a "signature" to demonstrate that, say, an electronic transfer
|
|
of funds really comes from someone authorized to make the transfer, progress
|
|
towards all-electronic commerce is stymied. Ways of producing such signatures
|
|
are available, thanks to the technology of public-key cryptography. They will
|
|
not work to everyone's best advantage, though, until everyone uses the same
|
|
public- key system.
|
|
|
|
It is an obvious opportunity for standards-makers -- but in America they
|
|
have turned up their noses at all the variations on the theme currently in use.
|
|
The alternative standard for digital signatures now offered by America's
|
|
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has brought a long-
|
|
simmering controversy back to the boil.
|
|
|
|
Public-key cryptography could become one of the most common technologies
|
|
of the information age, underpinning all sorts of routine transactions. Not
|
|
only does it promise to provide the digital equivalent of a signature, it could
|
|
also give users an electronic envelope to keep private messages from prying
|
|
eyes. The idea is to create codes that have two related keys. In conventional
|
|
cryptography the sender and receiver share a single secret key; the sender uses
|
|
it to encode the message, the receiver to decode it.
|
|
|
|
In public-key techniques, each person has a pair of keys: a disclosed
|
|
public key and a secret private key. Messages encoded with the private key can
|
|
only be decoded with the corresponding public key, and vice versa. The public
|
|
keys are published like telephone numbers. The private keys are secret. With
|
|
this technology, digital signatures are simple. Encode your message, or just
|
|
the name you sign it with, using your private key. If the recipient can decode
|
|
the message with your public key, he can be confident it came from you.
|
|
Sending a confidential message -- putting electronic mail in a tamper-proof
|
|
envelope -- is equally straightforward.
|
|
|
|
To send a secret to Alice encode it with her public key. Only Alice (or
|
|
someone else who knows her private key) will be able to decode the message.
|
|
The heart of any system of public-key cryptography is a mathematical function
|
|
which takes in a message and a key, and puts out a code. This function must be
|
|
fairly quick and easy to use, so that putting things into code does not take
|
|
forever. It must be very hard to undo, so that getting things out of code does
|
|
take forever, unless the decoder has the decoding key. Obviously, there must
|
|
be no easy way to deduce the private key from the public key. Finding
|
|
functions that meet these criteria is "a combination of mathematics and
|
|
muddle," according to Roger Needham of the Cambridge Computer Laboratory.
|
|
|
|
The greatest successes to arise from the muddle so far are those using
|
|
functions called prime factorisation algorithms. They are based on the
|
|
mathematical insight that, while it is easy to multiply two numbers together,
|
|
it is very hard to work backwards to find the particular two numbers which were
|
|
multiplied together to produce some given number. If Alice chooses two large
|
|
prime numbers as her private key and publishes their 150-digit product as her
|
|
public key, it would probably take a code-breaker thousands of years to work
|
|
backwards to calculate her private keys.
|
|
|
|
A variety of schemes have been worked out which use this insight as the
|
|
basis for a workable public-key code. Most popular of these is the so-called
|
|
RSA algorithm, named after the three MIT professors who created it -- Ronald
|
|
Rivest, Adi Shamir and Len Adleman. It has been patented and is sold by a
|
|
Silicon Valley company, called RSA, that employs 15 people, most of them ex-MIT
|
|
graduate students. Faculty firms are to computer start-ups what family firms
|
|
were to the industrial revolution. RSA has attracted both academic praise and
|
|
a range of heavyweight commercial customers: Microsoft, Sun Microsystems,
|
|
Digital Equipment and Lotus Development. But, despite repeated applications, it
|
|
has never been endorsed by those in government. Rumors abound that the
|
|
codebreakers in the National Security Agency have discouraged standard-setters
|
|
from recommending RSA because they do not want to promote the use of codes they
|
|
cannot break. RSA, for obvious reasons, does not discourage the rumors.
|
|
Whatever the reason, the standard-setters at the NIST have sidestepped the
|
|
debate over RSA with their new algorithm, DSA. As set out in the standard, DSA
|
|
verifies the identity of the sender, but does not encrypt the message. It
|
|
appends to the message a number calculated from the message and the sender's
|
|
private key. The recipient can then use this number, the message and the
|
|
sender's public key to verify that the message is what it seems.
|
|
|
|
The NIST says that this technique is well suited to "smart cards" and
|
|
other applications where there is not a lot of computing power available for
|
|
working out codes. Because it hopes that DSA will be used for verifying the
|
|
identity of everyone from welfare recipients to military contractors, its
|
|
flexibility is a boon. Meanwhile, however, more and more companies are
|
|
choosing a public-key cryptography system for communicating confidentially --
|
|
often RSA, sometimes something different. Someday, probably soon, governments
|
|
will want to choose, too. Watch out for fireworks when they do.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
SWBT Sends Off First "Cross-Country" ISDN Call
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
>From Southwestern Bell Telephone
|
|
|
|
The nation's first "cross-country" public network ISDN was placed last
|
|
week, courtesy of SWBT. The historic first call was the result of a two-year
|
|
joint effort among SWBT, BellSouth Corp., US Sprint and Bellcore. SWBT's
|
|
Advanced Technology Lab originated the call, which used US Sprint's digital
|
|
facilities in Burlingame, Calif. The call terminated at a BellSouth switch
|
|
in Atlanta, Ga.
|
|
|
|
Using an ISDN video application, SWBT's trial director Ken Goodgold was
|
|
able to see and talk to BellSouth's David Collins. "With this test, the
|
|
geographic limits of ISDN-based services were stretched from a few miles to
|
|
cross-country," Goodgold says. "We began with protocol testing and service
|
|
verification, two key parts of the process," Goodgold says. "That required an
|
|
extremely complex series of technical tests. The Advanced Technology Lab staff
|
|
worked for months performing the tests leading up to the first successful
|
|
call."
|
|
|
|
Last week's test call was significant from a marketing perspective as well
|
|
as a technical one. That's because it demonstrated the economic benifits of
|
|
using ISDN for video information. "The cost of a long distance call is
|
|
approximately the same, whether it's a voice transmission using a regular phone
|
|
line or a video transmission using ISDN," Goodgold says. "That means a big
|
|
reduction in cost to arrange a videoconference." US Sprint joined the test
|
|
because ISDN has evolved beyond the local stage, says Terry Kero, the carrier's
|
|
director of InfoCom Systems Development Labs. "After today, it will be
|
|
technically possible to make an ISDN call across the country just as it is
|
|
possible today to make a regular long distance call," Kero says.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
|
|
== Phrack Inc. ==
|
|
|
|
Volume Three, Issue Thirty-five, File 13 of 13
|
|
|
|
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Phrack World News PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Issue XXXV / Part Four PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Compiled by Dispater PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Media Monopoly
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
by Dispater
|
|
|
|
As we all know, more technology means more and more legal questions. It
|
|
is important not only to understand the economic but social impacts of the
|
|
recent "Telco-TV" issue. I think technologically the idea of transmitting
|
|
audio/video signals through phiber optic line is fascinating and a great
|
|
technological triumph. However, how will society benefit by having an even
|
|
smaller number of owners controlling the media? There is already a media
|
|
dynasty due to policies established in Ronald Reagan's presidency.
|
|
|
|
Today almost all of the media is controlled by 18 global corporations.
|
|
That is down from 23 in 1990 and down from 50 corporations in 1983. The trend
|
|
is very scary. In the United States there are around 25,000 different media
|
|
voices. This includes newspapers, book publishers, television stations, radio
|
|
stations, movie studios, and magazines. However we should not kid ourselves
|
|
into thinking that there are 25,000 different owners. Is it fair to that 23
|
|
companies have so much power over our lives? It is incredibly dangerous to
|
|
allow this trend to continue. We must stop this trend and "bust up" the media
|
|
as it was done in the pre-Reagan era.
|
|
|
|
If you are concerned about this issue I strongly urge you to read "The
|
|
Media Monopoly" by Ben Bagdickian. It is published by Beacon Press and runs
|
|
around 300 pages in length.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Phone Companies Could Transmit TV Under FCC Plan October 25, 1991
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
by Edmund L. Andrews (The New York Times)
|
|
|
|
In a surprising and controversial move to promote cable television
|
|
competition, the Federal Communications Commission proposed today that local
|
|
telephone companies be allowed to package and transmit television programming.
|
|
|
|
The proposed rules, which were unanimously endorsed and are likely to be
|
|
adopted within a year, would expose cable companies to the most threatening
|
|
competition yet. But they could benefit cable television consumers, many of
|
|
whom have seen their bills double and triple in recent years.
|
|
|
|
The cable industry vowed to fight the proposals and threatened to
|
|
challenge the rules in court if they are adopted. Telephone companies, eager
|
|
to enter a lucrative new business, applauded.
|
|
|
|
"Today's action will create competition and offer consumers more choices,"
|
|
said James R. Young, vice-president of regulatory and industry relations at the
|
|
Bell Atlantic Corporation. "Let's hope it's a beginning to the end of turf
|
|
wars."
|
|
|
|
In essence, the commission recommended that telephone companies be allowed
|
|
to offer "video dial tone" over telephone lines that would carry programming
|
|
produced by outside companies. Consumers could view whatever programs they
|
|
pleased and would be charged accordingly.
|
|
|
|
Initially, telephone companies would serve primarily as a pipeline, not
|
|
producing the programs. But the commission said telephone companies should
|
|
also be allowed to organize and package video services, as long as they make
|
|
their networks available to all programmers. The commission also opened an
|
|
inquiry on whether to let telephone companies produce programs.
|
|
|
|
The idea of allowing so-called video dial tone service has long been a
|
|
favorite of the FCC's chairman, Alfred C. Sikes. Congress, which is weighing
|
|
regulatory legislation to rein in cable process has shied away from the issue.
|
|
Today's action makes it more likely that lawmakers will have to reconsider the
|
|
role of telephone companies in television.
|
|
|
|
Before cable companies would feel much impact from today's FCC proposal,
|
|
however, most telephone companies would have to spend billions of dollars to
|
|
install new fiber-optic transmission lines and switching equipment that could
|
|
carry large volumes of television material. Analysts have estimated that the
|
|
cost of converting every home in the country to a fiber-optic line would be
|
|
$100 billion to $200 billion and that it would take at least five years.
|
|
|
|
Most large telephone companies, including all of the regional Bell
|
|
companies, already plan to replace their copper wires with fiber over the next
|
|
two decades. The immense business opportunity posed by the $18 billion cable
|
|
television market is likely to accelerate those plans.
|
|
|
|
High-capacity communications lines that reach every home in America could
|
|
radically alter the distribution of entertainment and enable people on home
|
|
computers to tap distant libraries and obtain information in seconds.
|
|
|
|
"Both program providers and consumers would have chances they don't have
|
|
today, without the bottlenecks provided by cable companies and without the
|
|
bottlenecks of broadcasting," said Richard Firestone, chief of the FCC's common
|
|
carrier bureau.
|
|
|
|
The move was immediately attacked by the National Cable Television
|
|
Association, which threatened to challenge any new rules in court.
|
|
|
|
"Until and unless the telco's monopoly in voice telephone is ended, no
|
|
level of Government safeguards against cross-subsidies will be effective," said
|
|
James P. Mahoney, president of the cable association.
|
|
|
|
The most controversial issue, which the FCC raised for discussion without
|
|
recommendation, is whether telephone companies should be allowed to produce
|
|
programming, a much bigger business than transmission. Many Bush
|
|
Administration officials favor such a move, but television broadcasters and
|
|
producers bitterly oppose it. Officials noted that such a shift would require
|
|
changes in the Cable Television Act of 1984.
|
|
|
|
"Among the top two or three concerns of ever cable operator has always
|
|
been head-to-head competition against local telephone companies," said John
|
|
Mansell, a senior analyst at Paul Kagan Associates, a marketing-research firm
|
|
that monitors the cable industry.
|
|
|
|
For telephone companies, the move could be a windfall. Steven R. Sieck,
|
|
vice president of Link Resources Inc., a market-research firm in New York,
|
|
said, "It's by far the largest market opportunity among the whole collection of
|
|
information services" for telephone companies.
|
|
|
|
It remains unclear, however, whether the new rules will survive in court.
|
|
The Cable Television Act of 1984 bars a telephone company from owning a cable
|
|
television franchise in the same market. The FCC ruled today, however, that
|
|
the law does not prevent a local telephone company from transmitting programs
|
|
produced by other companies and that it does not bar long-distance carriers in
|
|
any way.
|
|
|
|
The Bell companies have lobbied strongly for legislation that would allow
|
|
them to enter the cable business, and several companies have invested in
|
|
European cable franchises. In addition, Pacific Telesis Group, which provides
|
|
local phone service in California, already holds an option to buy a controlling
|
|
interest in a Chicago cable franchise, which could be [sic] permissible since
|
|
it is outside the company's telephone area.
|
|
|
|
The commission also handed down a ruling that could give telephone
|
|
companies an important price advantage in future competition with cable
|
|
operators and could prompt protests from local governments, ruling that neither
|
|
a telephone company nor a video programmer needs to pay franchise fees to local
|
|
governments.
|
|
|
|
Under the cable act, by contrast, local governments can charge cable
|
|
operators a franchise fee as high as five per cent of revenues.
|
|
|
|
Explaining today's ruling, Mr. Sikes said, "We have segregation laws, and
|
|
these segregation laws should be ended." He added that some cable companies
|
|
were already installing optical fibers in their own networks, and that some
|
|
were exploring the option of using their networks to offer telephone service.
|
|
|
|
The proposals mark the second major change in longstanding restrictions on
|
|
the telephone companies' ability to move into new services. Less than three
|
|
weeks ago, a Federal appeals court cleared the way for the regional Bell
|
|
companies to begin providing information services, like news, stock and sports
|
|
tables, immediately.
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
Phiber Optic or Twisted Pair?
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
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by John J. Keller (Wall Street Journal) October 28, 1991
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Expanding the nation's telephone network into a vast television broadcast
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system is going to cost tens of billions of dollars and won't be finished
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before the end of the decade, say executives at some of the largest phone
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companies.
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But the scale of the project isn't stopping the phone giants, such as GTE
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Corp., Ameritech, Bell Atlantic Corp., and Pacific Telesis Group, from
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methodically exploring how to implement such a system.
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The Baby Bells and GTE have spent several million dollars testing new
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systems that carry cable TV shows into homes via the phone network. The phone
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companies will spend many million of dollars more before they are satisfied
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that they have a service that matches the current voice phone system and tops
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today's entrenched cable TV monopolies.
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Last week the phone companies were buoyed by a Federal Communications
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Commission plan to support a new technology called video dial tone, that would
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put the big phone companies into direct competition with local cable-television
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monopolies.
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Phone subscribers could use such a system to dial up and order video
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programs from an entertainment company through the same wire that connects a
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typical phone call. More important, allowing the phone companies could
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generate enough traffic to fund "broadband" upper-capacity information highways
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that could someday carry TV, medical information, and even FM stereo channels
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into a home through a single wire, say the executives.
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However, big hurdles remain. The FCC hasn't decided whether to let the
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phone companies participate in the programming end of the cable TV business.
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The phone companies argue that's a financial necessity, because cable TV
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companies would be reluctant to share the programs they now support and run
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them over a rival's network. In addition, the 1984 Cable TV Act, which
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prohibits phone company participation in the cable business, would have to be
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rewritten.
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"We're encouraged by the FCC action, but it's not as complete a step as
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there needs to be made," said Larry J. Sparrow, vice president of regulatory
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and governmental affairs at GTE Telephone Operations, Irvine, Texas. Adds
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Kathleen Ahren, Nynex Corp.'s director of federal regulatory policy: "For us to
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build facilities without anyone to use them would be irresponsible...
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programming is essential."
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There are also technical issues such as whether TV service to the home
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should be provided through a cable-TV-like coaxial cable or advanced fiber-
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optic line. Either would require pulling out existing "twisted pair" wiring
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that now binds the phones in homes and most small businesses to the local phone
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network. Moreover, the phone industry must still hammer out technical
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standards for melding video transmission, which requires tremendous
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transmission capacity, with voice traffic, which uses far less.
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The system that is finally built will require mountains of capital to
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transform the existing phone network into a high-capacity phone network of
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systems that pump signals digitally through fiber-optic transmission lines,
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which are glass wires. "We've seen figures that it would cost about $250
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billion nationwide," says James R. Young, vice president of regulatory and
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industry relations at Bell Atlantic. Adds Ms. Ahern, "I don't think our plans
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would have us doing this in less than 20 years and if we do you're talking
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billions of dollars."
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Pacific Bell, which spends about $1 billion a year on new network
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equipment, would see that annual tab jump by two to three times in the first
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several years of constructing a broadband network, says Michael Bloom, customer
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premise, broadband applications at the San Francisco-based unit of Pacific
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Telesis Group. But he notices that as equipment purchases grow and the
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technology is perfected the annual cost should drop down to current levels
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after about four years.
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PacBell, like most other phone companies, already has installed fiber-
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optic "trunking" lines to carry bulk traffic between its switching centers.
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It has also begun replacing copper facilities in some neighborhoods, running
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optical fibers to the pedestal at the curb and then connecting to the regular
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phone home wires. Someday these lines will carry cable TV, but for now
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regulation restricts the phone company to voice and data transmission, says Mr.
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Bloom.
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Someday this will change, says the FCC, which envisions a service where
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phone customers would turn on their TVs and find a listing of TV shows, movies,
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news and other programs, supplied by the phone company and other programmers
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and accessible via remote control.
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Several phone companies are already testing such services. In Cerritos,
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Calif., GTE has built an elaborate network of fiber-optic and coaxial cables
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lines and advanced switching systems to deliver TV services to several thousand
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customers. One service, called "Main Street," allows a customer with a remote
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control to shop via TV, check a bank account and even seek information on
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colleges in the US. Another service, dubbed "Center Screen," lets 3,900
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residential customers call for a movie or a TV show by dialling a special
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number. A third service lets some customers talk to one another through a
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videophone in the house.
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"We've found [from the Cerritos tests] that our customers like full-motion
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video and not still pictures," which is all that's possible over today's
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regular phone lines, Mr. Sparrow says.
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That's because regular conversation travels over phone lines at the rate
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of 64,000 bits a second. By contract, "reasonable quality" video, such as the
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kind that appears from a VCR tape, requires transmission capacity of at least
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1.3 megabits to 1.5 megabits a second. High quality video will take capacity
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of 45 megabits to 90 megabits a second, he says. A megabit equals 1 million
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bits.
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To save money and get as much capacity out of the existing copper-based
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systems, Bell Communications Research, the Baby Bell's research arm, has
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developed "video compression" technology which uses existing copper wire to
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deliver TV to the home. With video compression, a microprocessor squashes
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video signals so they can be sent through a regular phone line at the rate of
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1.5 megabits a second. The little chip, which is in an electronic box attached
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to the phone line, looks at an incoming video signal, and filters out the parts
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of the moving image that are redundant. The chip codes and sends the parts of
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the signal that are different through the phone line to a receiving box, which
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decodes and reconstructs the image before projecting it onto the TV screen.
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The cable companies hope to retaliate by providing phone service through
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their cable networks. They are funding research to develop switching systems
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that can pass phone calls from one cable subscriber to another and out to
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customers using the regular phone system.
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But the blood between the industries isn't all bad. Ameritech's Indiana
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Bell subsidiary and Cardinal Communications, an Indiana cable TV operator, are
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testing a fiber distribution system made by Broadband Technologies Inc, of
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Raleigh, NC. The system is being used to route video and phone signals over
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backbone fiber-optic lines and finally through coaxial and twisted pair lines
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attached to homes in Tipton Lake, a Columbus, Ind. residential development.
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Bell Atlantic is negotiating with Loudon Cablevision, a cable TV company in
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Loudon County, Va., to test the transmission of TV signals through phone
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company lines to 5,000-6,000 homes in The Cascades, a local housing
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development.
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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Baby Bells as Big Brother November 2, 1991
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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>From The New York Times
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Two official decisions in October, one liberating and the other
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frightening, may shape telecommunications -- and America -- for decades. The
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liberating decision, by the Federal Communications Commission, proposes to
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allow the seven regional telephone companies to transmit TV programs.
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If implemented, that proposal for video-by-phone would free families to
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tell cable operators, if they misbehave, to get lost.
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The frightening decision, by a federal appeals court, unblocked the same
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seven "Baby Bell" companies from owning electronic yellow pages, video shopping
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and other information services.
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Unless Congress intervenes, this decision will allow the Baby Bells to
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exploit their monopolistic stranglehold over residential phone lines and
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dictate what information reaches nearly every home. The same principle ought
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to govern in both situations: democracy needs diversity.
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Technological advances have brought the nation to a regulatory crossroad.
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A single information pipeline -- perhaps fiber-optic cable, perhaps enhanced
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coaxial or copper wire -- may soon pour an unimaginable array of phone, video
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and data communications into homes. Whoever controls the pipeline controls
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access to American minds.
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The best protection against Big Brother is to separate control of the
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pipeline from the information. That could be easily enforced by requiring that
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pipeline owners, like the Baby Bells, serve only as common carriers and lease
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pipeline space to information providers on a non-discriminatory basis.
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Common carrier status is what the FCC proposal would achieve for video
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services but what the appeals court decision would foreclose for information
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services.
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Congress seems unwilling to impose common carrier status. But Rep. Jim
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Cooper, D-Tenn., offers a second-best remedy. As long as the Baby Bells retain
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monopoly control over local phone service, he would allow each to sell
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information only outside its own region. His bill also offers stringent
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safeguards against anti-competitive behavior.
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Yet the bill's provisions aren't as safe as common carrier status. The
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Baby Bells have frequently violated regulations; rules alone are unlikely to
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stop them from subsidizing forays into information services with funds
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extracted from captive rate-payers.
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Contrary to their claims, the Baby Bells have no special abilities to
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provide electronic services. If they could sell video shopping for a profit,
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so could hundreds of other companies -- not one of which has the power to
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intimidate ratepayers because not one has privileged access to their homes.
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Nor, as the Baby Bells claim, do they need to produce their own
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information services in order to fill capacity on fiber-optic cables they might
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lay.
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The strongest argument the Baby Bells offer is technological. Only a
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single company, they contend, will be able to marry pipeline and information.
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But there's no proof of this speculation and besides, there are better ways to
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manage the problem.
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The Cooper bill provides plausible protection against monopolistic Baby
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Bells, giving them ample room to compete but limited room to exploit.
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Newspapers, including The New York Times Co., support the bill for
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competitive commercial reasons. But there is a much more important reason for
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the public to favor, and Congress to adopt, the Cooper bill: to protect the
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free, diverse flow of information on which democracy depends.
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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Don't Baby the Bells November 10, 1991
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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>From The New York Times
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Although the Bell companies are opposed by numerous groups, including the
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Consumer Federation of America, the cable television industry and existing
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providers of electronic information services, it is the newspapers that are its
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biggest opponents.
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The publishers argue that the telephone companies can compete unfairly by
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subsidizing their services with money from their regulated telephone businesses
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and by imposing technical obstacles to competing information suppliers.
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But one of their biggest fears is simply that the telephone companies
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could attract a large proportion of the classified advertising, a mainstay for
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newspapers, by offering cheap and easy-to-use electronic bulletin boards.
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The newspapers are pushing Congress to adopt a bill introduced by
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Representative Jim Cooper, Democrat of Tennessee, which would not allow a Bell
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company to offer information services unless those services are already
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available to at least 50 percent of the people in the area over an alternative
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network.
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As a practical matter, the bill would reinstate the information-service
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ban for all Bell companies for years, because of the difficulty in building an
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alternative network that reaches most customers.
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To defend their position as more than a simple bid to keep out
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competition, the newspaper association has crafted a blunt advertising campaign
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around the slogan "Don't Baby the Bells."
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In one ad, the association warns that the telephone companies could amass
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as much private information on customers as the Internal Revenue Service.
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But while many members of Congress are worried about giving new powers to
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the Bell companies, the Cooper bill has thus far attracted only 24 sponsors,
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and most experts doubt the bill can muster enough support to pass even the
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House.
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Meanwhile, the Bush administration strongly favors lifting the prohibition
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on information services and would probably move to veto a bill that kept it in
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place. The upshot is that newspaper publishers are in a difficult position.
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A stalemate in Congress amounts to a complete victory for the Bell
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companies, because court decisions have already given them precisely what they
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want.
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In Congress, however, aides to leading lawmakers say they are waiting in
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part to see how much popular and political strength each side can muster. "We
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want them to show us what they can bring," one staff member said about the
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publishers.
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One lobbyist allied with the publishers said opponents of the Bell
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companies were essentially trying to build up a bargaining position. "You could
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see this as the beginning of a minuet," he said. "The question is whether they
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will ever get into the middle of the floor and dance."
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_______________________________________________________________________________
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