324 lines
16 KiB
Plaintext
324 lines
16 KiB
Plaintext
The newsletter of the Society for the Freedom of Information (SFI)
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=======================================
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T H E N E W F O N E E X P R E S S
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=======================================
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Electronic Edition
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Central distribution site is Secret Society BBS
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(314) 831-9039, WWIVNet 3460, 24hrs
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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The publisher, SFI, distribution site(s), and authors contributing to the NFX
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are protected by the Bill of Rights in the U.S. Constitution, which specifically
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permits freedom of speech and freedom of the press.
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We accept article submissions of nearly any sort, about
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hack/phreak/anarchy/gov't/etc. Send mail to the publisher (The Cavalier) at any
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of these addresses:
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WWIVnet [120@3460]
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VMB (301) 771-1151. hit #, then 140.
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The Internet address is temporarily closed.
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The printed edition of the newsletter may be available soon. The info will
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appear here as soon as possible. To be quite honest, the printed version looks
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a hell of a lot better; but as of now, only the members of SFI receive it.
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Highlights for Issue #1/Jun 1991
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--------------------------------
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Signaling System 7 Special Issue
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* Dialup List
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(see ref on page 2 top)
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* Reference of Recent Telco Terms
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(see ref on page 2 middle)
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* Signaling System 7 Updates
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(see ref on page 3 middle)
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* SUPPLEMENT: Known areas with Signaling System 7
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* Caller ID .. What does it mean to you?
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(see ref on page 4 top)
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* The State of Surveillance
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(see ref on page 4 middle)
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* Trend Watcher
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(see ref on page 5)
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* Editorial
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(see ref on page 5 middle)
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National Dialup Table (updated 05/18/91)
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Phone Number Owned by Status Descript
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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(800) 369-3100 MCI Dangerous 6N/7N
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(800) 753-9900 ? ? (new) 7N
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(800) 657-9600 Access Billing 7N
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(800) 635-1167 ? (SDN?) ? (new) 6N
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(800) 327-9488 ITT/Metro Safe/? 13I
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(800) 950-0070 ? ? 6N
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(800) 433-4778 ? (SDN) ? 10N
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(800) 225-5946 ? (SDN) ? 10N
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(800) 833-2808 ? (SDN) ? 10N
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(800) 321-0264 ? (SDN) ? 10N
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(800) 426-6565 ? (SDN) ? 10N
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(800) 882-4913 ? (SDN) ? 10N
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(800) 553-7149 ? (SDN) ? 10N
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(800) 284-8277 ? ? 7N
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(800) 228-4512 ? ? 7I
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(800) 476-3636 ? (Sprint?) Uncer., watch it 6N
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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* Notes on the above table:
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Description format is this standard: <Code Length><Code Format>, i.e. 7I is
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a dialup that is ACN+7 digits. 6N is 6 digits+ACN.
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SDN is a type of system. It is suspected AT&T, however some of these
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dialups may be owned by other LD companies.
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The regional 950-XXXX dialups have been left out; they differ from LATA to
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LATA (roughly an area code), and often the codes on them are regional. However,
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a few of them are 950-1407, 950-0511, 950-1011, etc. 1407 seems to be reliable
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in CA. I don't really recommend the use of 950s in particular - I will probably
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have a table of 950s coming out in the future.
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Several people have had good results with 800-635-1167.
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By the way, any changes/additions/alerts are accepted. Contact me or call
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the SFI VMB. PLEASE do not post any codes/etc on this box, just vague updates.
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Thanks.
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Telco Term Reference
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I strongly recommend you review this list before reading the article on
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Signaling System 7. These are by far not all of them, just essential ones
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needed to deal with the article below.
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SS7 - Signaling System 7. See article. Note: You need the DMS switch to run
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SS7.
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CCS - Common Channel Signaling. Basically, sending call information across the
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same line as voice. A major part of SS7.
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CO - Central Office. The building(s) in your city that house the local
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switching equipment. Your telephone line is connected to one.
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RBOC - Regional Bell Operating Company. The seven companies that AT&T was split
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up in the early '80s. Also known as RHCs, or Regional Holding Companies.
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ONA - Open Network Architecture. A plan to open the telephone network up to
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ESPs, who will provide services beyond basic switching. Such services might be
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cable TV, fast computer data channels, etc. See ISDN, ESP, SS7.
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ESP - Enhanced Service Provider. See ONA definition. The ESPs, who will
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provide services such as computer linkups and cable TV when ONA is implemented,
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are frustrated at the limitations of the RBOCs' ONA plans. Some ESPs are the
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major long-distance companies.
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PSC - Public Service Commission. The bureaucrats who set tariffs and decide on
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exactly what your local Telco can do.
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CLASS - Custom Local Area Signaling Services. Part of the RBOC's SS7 plans,
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these services, for example, include Caller ID, automatic call return and call
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blocking.
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LATA - Local Access Transport Area. Roughly synonymous with area codes. Your
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LATA is defined by where you can call locally without having to call
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long-distance. In certain areas, like the Northeast, this may comprise three to
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four area codes.
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Call Control Options - Services such as call trace and call blocking that do not
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need to be run using SS7. They can be utilized on 5ESS switches.
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DMS - Digital Multiplex Switch. One of the most advanced phone company switches
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on the market, this switch is necessary for SS7. It is produced by Northern
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Telecom.
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ISDN - Integrated Services Digital Network. A critical part of ONA, this is
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basically a plan to provide optical fiber interconnects to households. It will
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allow much more than just a telephone conversation; it will also allow (among
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other things) cable TV signals and SS7 communications. ><
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Signaling System Seven Update
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Once again, your intrepid editor is back with the current compilation of
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information regarding Signaling System Seven, or SS7. If you haven't heard
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about SS7 recently, or at all, here's your chance to catch up. First, the
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technical notes:
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SS7 is an international high-speed telecommunications network signaling
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standard publicly announced in 1988. It is a protocol for digital communication
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between COs, ESPs and telephone subscribers. It is made up of four basic
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levels: the bottom three (Signaling Data Link Functions, Signaling Link
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Functions, and Signaling Network Functions) control the message transfer part,
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and the top layer (Signaling Connection Control) controls additional services.
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The message transfer part controls the network itself, which is
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packet-switched. It handles all call control functions, and enables COs and
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ESPs to transparently switch the call internally. For example, if AT&T's SS7
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software had been working properly, the network crash on 15 Jan 1990 would
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probably have had negligible effects. The network would have been able to route
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the call around the malfunctioning switch while it reset.
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The signaling connection control part supports other services that may be
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provided; such as call forwarding, caller ID, call trace, etc. This layer is
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the one that will be utilized by the ESPs when ONA is implemented; the message
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transfer part is controlled by the RBOCs.
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The architecture of SS7 will bring the telecommunications network into
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tomorrow, and coupled with broadband ISDN and ONA, is the network of the future.
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However, this will also insure that the RBOCs have a major part in this future.
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Not to mention the fact that this will put the RBOCs in control of everything
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that comes down the cable.
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Now, what SS7 really means:
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Signaling System Seven will basically allow the phone company to route your
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call information from point to point until your final destination. In other
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words, in 1991 (in most regions), if you wanted to make sure a system didn't
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trace you back, you could call through a few diverters, PABXs, etc. However,
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when SS7 is installed throughout the nation, your call information will be
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routed from diverter to PABX to system instead of stopping at the first
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diverter. Us common people can buy this feature too -- see "Caller ID - What
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does it mean to me?" below.
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><
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Areas with SS7 as of 04/17/91
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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All of New Jersey United & NJ Bell
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Las Vegas, Nevada Centel
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Northeast Virginia Bell Atlantic?
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Washington, D.C. Bell Atlantic?
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Austin, Texas Southwestern Bell
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Kentucky (unknown where) GTE
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Olathe, Kansas Southwestern Bell
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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As with all our tables, any additions/corrections? Let us know.
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Caller ID ... what does it mean to me?
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Caller ID is probably the most anticipated and feared part of Signaling
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System 7. This service, only available in SS7 areas (see above table), keeps
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track of the last 10 numbers that called and the time and date they did so.
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Example: Let's say you are in an SS7 area. You call a friend with a Caller ID
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device (generally costing about $40). Between the first and second ring, they
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have your number. It's as easy as that. The problem is, when SS7 goes
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nationwide, ANY system you hack/phreak/phuck/whatever pegs you within 5 seconds
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of your call. I can hear you say, "What about diverters, and stuff like that?"
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Well, for one thing, there won't BE too many diverters left after this goes
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worldwide. The second thing is that if the system is serious enough about
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getting your number, it can pick the call information straight up off layer 4 of
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the call -- in other words, your call information, instead of stopping stone
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cold at the diverter, was passed from node to node up to your intended system.
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Cute, eh? .. but only if you're BEHIND the trigger. So, what can be done about
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it? Well, I am told that PSCs around the nation have been requiring that your
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local RBOC provide per-call blocking of Caller ID whenever they decide to go
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install SS7. This is good: You dial something like *67 and then the number, and
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the information is blocked. However, the Telco still gets the call info (but
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then again, they always have..). Also, you hardware people out there, I suggest
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you work on finding out more about Caller ID - and figure out where in the
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bandwidth this info is... sigh.. ><
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The State of Surveillance
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(part one of a series)
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I figured it was about time for an update on government and private
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surveillance techniques and what you can do about them. First, we'll start off
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with ways to spy, if you will. The all-time favorite technique seems to be
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tapping the telephone in some way - whether it be from wiring your phone for an
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infinity transmitter, wiring your junction box, induction tapping your wires, or
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taps at the local CO, the phone line is one of the most commonly tapped items.
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An infinity transmitter, aka a harmonica bug, has to be installed inside your
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phone. It works by intercepting all calls into the house and looking for a tone
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around the first ring. It then uses the microphone on the handset to pick up
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what's going on inside the house, while the phone is on the hook. What the
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person would do is call your house, and while the phone is ringing, he would
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send a tone down through the line. You wouldn't hear that first ring because
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the bug traps it, and he could listen to anything going on in the house. The
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way to check for one of these is to either open up your phone or to call a tone
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sweep, available in most areas. At a certain frequency, the bug would kick in
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and your phone would start either ringing or making strange noises.
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Another popular technique is wiring junction boxes, aka pedestals or cans.
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This is the large, 6 foot green box with the Bell logo on it with 1000
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connections inside, or the small, 3 or 4 foot green box with the Bell logo on it
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with 7 through 60 connections. These boxes contain rows of wire pairs. Your
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adversary could open one of these up, find your wire pair with an ANI, and hook
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up some sort of recording device or jumper cable to it. In effect, it is like
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picking up an extension outside the building. The way to detect it is to either
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look for a marked impedance drop on your phone, notice that people sound softer,
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or go outside and find your pedestal and examine it.
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The perennial inductance tap is a relatively secure tap - unless you catch
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your 'bugger' outside near your phone wires doing strange things, it's
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undetectable. Basically, a coil of wire and an amplifier are hooked together
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and brought near your telephone wires somewhere -- he doesn't have to splice
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them. Through the principles of electric induction, he can hear everything said
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on that line. As I said, this bug is very hard to detect.
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And finally, perhaps the hardest bug to detect at all: the telephone CO bug.
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If the Feds are really serious about tapping you, they won't hook up
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crude-as-hell wiretaps -- they'll go to your local central office and monitor
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your line from there. It is virtually undetectable if done right; if done
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wrong, you have no way of proving they did it...
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The next installment will cover non-telephone audio bugs. ><
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Trend Watcher
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This column will cover small interesting bits of information and trends that
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either I or any of you notice. Have any? Let me know.
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AT&T makes money selling 5ESS switches to other countries.
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MCI 800 ANI network pegs your number in under one minute in xESS areas.
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18-Gigahertz transmission is now economically feasible; radio waves at that
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frequency act like light.
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In a vote of 5-0, the FCC approves an independently-developed stage of ONA to
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the dismay of the Baby Bells, opening up the fiber network to ESPs of all kinds.
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Las Vegas telephone network is the most advanced in the nation.
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In 1989, the FCC busted 144 pirate radio station operators, both medium-wave and
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shortwave, and charged a total of $347,000 in fines. ><
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Editorial
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"Too much to say, and not enough space to say it in"
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Well, you're almost at the end of our first issue. Do you like it? Can you
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write better articles? (Which won't be hard, considering I wrote all of them in
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this issue..) By all means, send them to me. An article on IBM Phonemail? Or
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maybe a doc on how the gov't is really putting one over on us this time? I'll
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take it. You know how to get in touch with me... A slower way to do so is to
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use the VMB, at 301-771-1151 box #140. You might have to press the pound key
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first, I don't remember. But in any case, don't put anything illegal on the SFI
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box, like codes, etc - just news and messages to me. By the way, if you stumble
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upon a small bit of news that's important, call it and leave it there..
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The reason that our first issue is on Signaling System Seven is because this
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will be one of the most important phone company developments since the invention
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of the ESS switch. Read the set of articles that are on it and maybe you will
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understand why. Loss of privacy and profiteering of the phone networks just so
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Domino's Pizza can route a call from a WATS number to the closest Domino's
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location nearest you so you don't have to go through the mental and physical
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anguish of looking it up in the telephone book. Brighten up, men, this is
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progress at work!
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In any case, what I can leave you with are these thoughts: support the
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Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Free Software Foundation, the League for
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Programming Freedom, and any organization that supports open thought. Fight the
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secret policies and projects of a dishonest government that perpetuates
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hypocrisy, and keep looking over your shoulder for Big Brother. ><
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