textfiles/magazines/JOAUC/jauc01.txt

  THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN UNDERGROUND COMPUTING / Published Quarterly

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  ISSN 1074-3111           Volume One, Issue One       March 19, 1994

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      Editor-in-Chief:         Scott Davis

      NetSurfer:               John Logan

      It's A Conspiracy!:      Gordon Fagan



      E-Mail - editors@fennec.com

      ** ftp site: etext.archive.umich.edu    /pub/Zines/JAUC



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      The Journal Of American Underground Computing 

      10111 N. Lamar #25

      Austin, Texas 78753



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 "The underground press serves as the only effective counter to a growing

 power, and more sophisticated techniques used by establishment mass media

 to falsify, misrepresent, misquote, rule out of consideration as a priori

 ridiculous, or simply ignore and blot out of existence: data, books,

 discoveries that they consider prejudicial to establishment interest..."



 (William S. Burroughs and Daniel Odier, "The Job", Viking, New York, 1989)

 

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  Contents Copyright (C) 1994 The Journal Of American Underground Computing

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  Nothing may be reproduced in whole or in part without written permission 

  of the Editor-In-Chief and/or the author of the article. This publication

  is made available quarterly to the amateur computer hobbyist free of charge.

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     THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN UNDERGROUND COMPUTING - Volume 1, Issue 1



                          TABLE OF CONTENTS



 1) Introduction To TJOAUC                               Editors    

 2) Control Of Information In The Mass Media             Gordon Fagan

 3) Some Thoughts On Clipper, NSA, ...                   Jim Bidzos

 4) CIA Corrupt, Stupid, Should Be Abolished             Mark Lane

 5) Legion Of Doom T-Shirts...get 'em!!                  Chris Goggans



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      Introduction To The Journal Of American Underground Computing



 By The Editors (editors@fennec.com)



        First of all, I want to personally thank you for taking the time

 to read this electronic publication. The editors of this publication had a

 large hand in The World View Magazine, a publication that became defunct as

 of January 1, 1993. We had become stagnant with that publication, so we

 jointly agreed to ditch it. Since then, we have received hundreds of

 subscription requests for the magazine. After consulting with each other

 for several months, we have decided to do a "new-and-improved" version of

 that popular magazine...but under a different name. And in a more official

 capacity I might add. So here it is...Issue one, Volume one. The format for

 this magazine is totally undefined. The decision to do it this way is better

 than focusing on a certain area in the sense that we can cover anything and

 everything...and people will not be suprised when they see an article that

 is "out of character". Also, I hope that it will inspire people to write

 about whatever they feel intimate with...be it politics, computer networking,

 hacking, etc...or any remote aspect of such topics. So please read on, and

 keep in mind that we encourage you to comment on anything you agree with,

 disagree with, like, dislike, etc...we will print comments like that.

 Your input is necessary. Thanks for reading, and enjoy. A special thanks

 goes to "The Spotlight", a weekly publication in our nation's capital for

 permission to reprint, etc...Thanks to Don Markey!

 

  Editors



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                 CONTROL OF INFORMATION IN THE MASS MEDIA



 By Gordon Fagan (fagang@ccmail.us.dell.com)





 The Public's right to know is not always what the Public ends up

 getting. The Public frequently gets one-sided, biased information

 and not just from the mass media. It's easy to have a long arm that

 protects the special interest groups: this kind of a "one world

 family" of insiders that is capable of affecting federal judges,

 U.S. attorneys, to slant or obstruct justice, to hide or cover up

 crucial information, and to interfere with our liberties.



 There has been a major campaign on the part of the Central

 Intelligence Agency to place Central Intelligence Agency agents, in

 various news media posts.  Documents have been found on this.  It was

 called "Operation Mocking Bird".  They placed operatives in places

 like TIME Magazine and LIFE Magazine, the New York Times, inside CBS

 and ABC News.  The National Student Association and other student

 groups were also targeted.



 Originally, the intent of "Operation Mocking Bird" was to make

 certain that these major media outlets and student organizations

 reflected an adequately anti-communist perspective. And then, of

 course, as they became entrenched and in-place, any time the Central

 Intelligence Agency wanted a story killed or distorted they would

 contact their agents inside.  They have bragged openly in private

 memos back and forth inside the Agency about how proud they are of

 having very important "assets" inside virtually every major news

 media in the United States.



 For example, the Chief National Security Correspondent for TIME

 Magazine, Bruce Van Voorst, is a regular Central Intelligence

 Agency officer.  It turns out that Ben Bradlee from the Washington

 Post was a regular Central Intelligence Agency officer prior to

 coming to his post at the Washington Post.  Bob Woodward at the

 Washington Post was the Point-Briefer for U.S. Naval Intelligence

 of the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff before he went over to the Washington

 Post.  What we're told in the media (and what we're told officially

 from Government sources) and what is the truth are frequently at

 varying degrees against each other.



 We find these people constantly in the news media.  When the New

 York Times was refusing to print any information about Oliver North,

 Richard Secord, Albert Hakim and Rob Owen, and all of the other men

 who, throughout 1985 and 1986, were engaged in a massive criminal

 conspiracy to violate the Boland Amendment prohibiting any weapons

 shipments to the Contras, and who were involved in smuggling TOW

 missiles to Iran.  Keith Schneider, who was one of the reporters

 assigned to look into the issue, said that the Times was refusing to

 print any of it because their high-level sources inside the Central

 Intelligence Agency refused to confirm the stories.



 This kind of relationship between self-conscious "assets" of the

 Covert Operations Director of the Central Intelligence Agency is a

 political police force on an international level to protect the

 ostensible economic interests of United States industries by placing

 these people inside a news media which, under the First Amendment,

 ostensibly has the responsibility to critique and investigate

 potential injustices on the part of the State, inside the Government

 is an extraordinarily dangerous development here in the United States.



  %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%



  Article printed with permission of the author, Jim Bidzos

  Jim Bidzos is the President and CEO of RSA Data Security, and is a 

  well respected authority in the area of security and encryption.



      SOME THOUGHTS ON CLIPPER, NSA, AND ONE KEY ESCROW ALTERNATIVE



 By Jim Bidzos (bidzos@rsa.com)



 In a recent editorial, Dr. Dorothy Denning of Georgtown University

 argued in support of the U.S. government's proposed Clipper Chip, a

 security device that would allow law enforcement to decipher the

 communications of users of such devices.



 Dr. Denning attempts to argue that Clipper is necessary for law

 enforcement agencies to be able to do their job.  I'm not going to

 argue that one; there are plenty of people who can argue that

 compromising privacy for all citizens in order  to aid law enforcement

 is a bad idea more effectively than I, particularly in the Clipper

 case, where the arguments from law enforcement are dubious at best.

 (The current justification is inadequate; there may be better reasons,

 from a law enforcement perspective, but we haven't heard them yet.)



 Without doubt, law enforcement and intelligence are huge stakeholders

 in the debate over encryption. But every individual and corporation in

 the U.S. must be included as well. Are NSA's actions really in the

 best interests of all the stakeholders? Are there alternatives to the

 current key escrow program?



 If one steps back and looks at what has happened over the last few

 years, one might well question the government's approach with Clipper,

 if not its motivation, for dealing with this problem.  (I believe it

 may even be possible to conclude that Clipper is the visible portion

 of a large-scale covert operation on U.S. soil by NSA, the National

 Security Agency.) Over a number of years, through their subversion of

 the Commerce Department (who should be championing the causes of U.S.

 industry, not the intelligence agencies), NSA has managed to put many

 U.S. government resources normally beyond their control, both legally

 and practically, to work on their program of making U.S. and

 international communications accessible.



 The first step was the MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) between the

 Commerce Department's National Institute of Standards and Technology

 (NIST) and the Defense Department's NSA.  This document appears to

 contravene the provisions of the Computer Security Act of 1987, the

 intent of which was to give NIST control over crypto standards-making

 for the unclassified government and commercial sectors.  The MOU

 essentially gave NSA a veto over any proposals for crypto standards by

 NIST.



 By using the standards making authority of NIST, NSA is attempting to

 force the entire U.S.  government to purchase Clipper equipment since

 only NIST-standard equipment may be purchased by government agencies.

 This purchasing power can then be used to force U.S. manufacturers to

 build Clipper products or risk losing government business.  (GSA is 

 currently questioning NSA's authority to control government-wide

 procurement, and should continue to do so.)  This of course not only

 subsidizes Clipper products, but could make Clipper a de facto

 standard if the costs associated with alternatives are too high.

 These costs to industry, of ignoring Clipper, come in the form of lost

 government market share, costly support for multiple versions of

 incompatible products, and non-exportability of non-Clipper products. 



 It also appears that NSA is desperately seeking a digital signature

 standard that would force users to take that signature capability

 wrapped up with a Clipper chip.  If this is the case, as it appears to

 be, then NSA has is trying to use what is probably the most powerful

 business tool of the information age as a means to deny us its

 benefits unless we subsidize and accept Clipper in the process.  This

 would, if true, be an unprecedented abuse of government power to

 influence U.S.  industry and control individual privacy.  (Clipper is

 part of a chip called Capstone, which is where their proposed digital

 signature standard would be used.)



 The overall cost of these policies is unknown.  We only know that NSA

 has spent a considerable amount of money on the program directly.

 Other costs are not so obvious. They are:  



 - A burdened U.S. industry, which will have to build multiple products

 or more expensive products that support multiple techniques;



 - A low-intensity "trade war" with the rest of the world over

 encryption;



 - Lost sales to U.S. companies, since international buyers will surely

 go to non-U.S. suppliers for non- Clipper encryption, as may buyers in

 the U.S.;



 - Potential abuses by government and loss of privacy for all citizens.



 Does NSA truly believe they can displace other methods with Clipper?

 With over three million licensed, documented RSA products, the

 technology they feel threatened by, in use in the U.S. today? Not

 likely; therefore, they have already decided that these costs are

 acceptable even if they only delay the inevitable, and that U.S.

 industry and U.S. taxpayers should bear these costs, whatever they

 are.  This policy was apparently developed by unelected people who

 operate without oversight or accountability.  Does the White House

 really support this policy? 



 It has been reported that NSA is attempting to gain support from

 foreign governments for escrow technology, especially if "local

 control" is provided.  Even if NSA can convince their sister

 organizations around the world to support key escrow (by offering

 Clipper technology with a do-your-own-escrow option), will these other

 organizations succeed in selling it to their government, industry and

 citizens?  Most countries around the world have much stronger privacy

 laws and a longer history of individual privacy than the U.S.



 WHY AGAIN WHEN IT DIDN'T WORK THE FIRST TIME?



 Many seem to have forgotten or are not aware that the Clipper program

 is not new, and it's also not the first time NSA has attempted to

 force communications security on U.S. industry that it could

 compromise.  In the mid-80's, NSA introduced a program called the

 Commercial COMSEC Endorsement Program, or CCEP. CCEP was essentially

 Clipper in a black box, since the technology was not sufficiently

 advanced to build lower-cost chips.  Vendors would join CCEP (with the

 proper security clearances) and be authorized to incorporate

 classified algorithms into communications systems.  NSA had proposed

 that they themselves would actually provide the keys to end-users of

 such systems.  The new twist is access by key escrow. 



 To see how little things have changed, consider this quote: "...RSA

 Data Security, Inc.  asserts that since CCEP-2 is not published and

 therefore cannot be inspected by third parties, the NSA could put a

 'trap door' in the algorithm that would enable the agency to inspect

 information transmitted by the private sector.  When contacted, NSA

 representative Cynthia Beck said that it was the agency's policy not

 to comment on such matters."  That was in 1987. ("The Federal Snags in

 Encryption Technology," Computer and Communications Decisions, July

 1987, pp.  58-60.)



 To understand NSA's thinking, and the danger of their policies,

 consider the reply of a senior NSA official when he was asked by a

 reporter for the Wall Street Journal if NSA, through the CCEP program,

 could read anyone's communications: "Technically, if someone bought

 our device and we made the keys and made a copy, sure we could listen

 in. But we have better things to do with our time." (The Wall Street

 Journal, March 28, 1988, page 1, column 1, "A Supersecret Agency Finds

 Selling Secrecy to Others Isn't Easy," by Bob Davis.) Another NSA

 official, in the same Journal story, said "The American Public has no

 problem with relying on us to provide the technology that prevents the

 unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons. If you trust us to protect

 against that, you can trust us to protect private records."  Remember

 that the Cold War was still on at that time.  



 Law enforcement and intelligence gathering are certainly impeded by

 the use of cryptography.  There are certainly legitimate concerns that

 these interests have.  But is the current approach really the way to

 gain support from industry and the public?  People with a strong

 military and intelligence bias are making all the decisions. There

 seem to be better ways to strike a balance. 



 AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL



 One approach would be to have NIST develop a standard with three

 levels.  The first level could specify the use of public-key for key

 management and signatures without any key escrow.  There could be a

 "Level II" compliance that adds government key escrow to message

 preparation.  "Level III" could be key escrow controlled by the user,

 typically a corporation.  Would this work? The first level, meeting

 the standard by itself, would back up the government's claim that key

 escrow is voluntary; if I want privacy and authentication without key

 escrow, then I can have it, as the government has claimed I can.

 Actions speak louder than words.



 Why would any vendors support Level II?  There would be several

 reasons. They would find a market in the government, since the

 government should purchase only Level II products. (I would certainly

 like our public servants to use key escrow, just as I want work

 product paid for by my corporation to be accessible. Of course, anyone

 can buy Level I products for home and personal use.)  So the

 government can still influence the private sector by buying only

 products that include Level II compliance. Also, Level II products

 would be decontrolled for export. This way the market can decide;

 vendors will do what their customers tell them to.  This satisifies

 the obvious desire on the part of the government to influence what

 happens with their purchasing power.



 Level III would allow any user to insert escrow keys they control into

 the process.  (Level II would not be a prerequisite to Level III.) My

 company may want key escrow; I, as an individual, may want to escrow

 my keys with my attorney or family members; a standard supporting

 these funtions would be useful.  I don't necessarily want or need the

 government involved.   



 NIST already knows how to write a FIPS that describes software and

 hardware implementations, and to certify that implementations are

 correct. 



 This approach cetainly isn't perfect, but if the administration really

 believes what it says and means it, then I submit that this is an

 improvement over a single key escrow FIPS foisted on everyone by NSA,

 and would stand a much better chance of striking a workable balance

 between the needs of the government and the right of individuals to

 privacy.  Therefore, it RISKS much less than the current plan.



 The real problem with the way NSA works is that we don't find out what

 they're really doing and planning for decades, even when they're

 wrong.  What if they are?  



 In the 60's and 70's, the CIA was out of control, and the Congress,

 after extensive hearings that detailed some of the abuses of power by

 the CIA, finally moved to force more accountability and oversight.  In

 the 80's and 90's, NSA's activities should be equally scrutinized by a

 concerned Congress.



 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%



 SYSOPS: CAN YOU GO TO JAIL ?



 By Jeff A. Heyens

 Additional Comments By chris@eastern.eastern.com

 

     We have a new problem.  Everyone knows that lately there has 

 been a crackdown on Bulletin Boards which carry pornography, 

 pirated software, etc.  There is, however, a new and much more 

 powerful threat which is threatening to stop all privately run 

 BBS's. 

 

     The Canadian Radio and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) 

 is currently in the process of setting itself up to regulate 

 Public bulletin boards.  They want to make it an offense to run a 

 BBS without a CRTC license.  If licensing comes into effect, the 

 BBS scene will quite literally shrivel up and die. 

 

     Consider the example of radio in the 40's and 50's.  Before 

 the CRTC was formed, anyone could broadcast radio signals legally 

 from their home on any bandwidth.  Fearing obscenity and extreme 

 access to information, the CRTC was formed to sell licenses to 

 broadcasters.  Without such a license, you could be prosecuted 

 for broadcasting.  The result of this action can be seen today:  

 the only radio stations we see are totally mainstream and are 

 hell-bent on making profit, not pleasing listeners or informing 

 the public. 

 

     We all know that the bulletin board systems are a great way 

 to get alternative information.  We can get information on the 

 Paul Teele / Karla Homolka trials.  We can get new insights as to 

 what is really happening in the former Yugoslavia through the 

 giant Internet.  We currently have access to multitudes of 

 information that isn't available through the mainstream media. 

  

     If licensing comes into affect, we will LOSE this access.  

 Not only will the pirate boards be hunted down and exterminated, 

 but all currently LEGAL PUBLIC DOMAIN BBS's will also be made 

 illegal unless they can afford a license.  And who do you think 

 will get licenses?  Only those willing to follow the CRTC 

 guidelines for radio and television.  Corporations and rich 

 executives.  The BBS world, our underground paradise (if you 

 will) is in great danger of becoming a commercial hell like the 

 rest of today's media. 

 

     We don't yet know what the proposed licensing fee will be, 

 but it could anywhere in the area of $300-$5,000.  This could 

 also depend on the size of the BBS.  However, most BBS's will 

 simply close up shop if the government wants a license.  The 

 government will simply weed out all the little guys and support 

 the big guys.  

 

     This WILL HAPPEN, and sooner than you think!  The U.S. 

 Government has already started doing this, with the new 

 Information SuperHighway being the flag-ship of government 

 regulated systems.  The Canadian government is going farther, and 

 must be stopped now. 

  

     Before I go into my plan of action, I want to tell you that 

 if licensing comes into effect, if will be basically impossible 

 to beat the system.  All pirate radio stations in North America 

 have been crushed by the government in a matter of months.  

 Imagine how easy it will be to crush pirate bulletin board 

 systems (and by that I simply mean BBS's without a license) with 

 traceable phone numbers.  Bell Canada would be sure to help the 

 CRTC bust those boards.  And the RCMP would have a real easy time 

 busting any boards with illegal software, because those boards 

 would not have licenses.  The CRTC finds the board through Bell, 

 arrests the sysop for running a board without a license, then 

 informs the RCMP that this sysop was allowing copyrighted 

 material to be transferred through his/her bbs.  That sysop, for 

 the first time in his/her life, is suddenly looking at a possible 

 jail term.





     COULD YOU IMAGINE GOING TO JAIL FOR RUNNING A BBS???????? 

 

 That, I admit, is the extreme case, but it is looking more and 

 more likely as time goes on.  If you're as pissed off about this 

 as I am, then keep reading, because I have a plan of 

 action/protest to stop this from happening. 

 

     WE are the only people out there who can stop this from 

 transpiring.  Only the extremely computer literate, those of us 

 who know the ins and outs of the BBS scene and computers 

 generally, will be able to generate an argument strong enough to 

 counter the argument of the government and the CRTC.   

 

     I've been a user in different parts of Ontario for about six 

 years.  I currently go to York University for Computer Science 

 and my plan is to organize a campaign of users who will be 

 willing to petition the government to stop this craziness.  My 

 sister is a lawyer and also an occasional user of the boards.  

 She would be willing to confront the CRTC on legal grounds if we 

 have enough support from YOU.  I have to hear from you.  In order 

 to force the CRTC to at least seriously listen to our argument, 

 we need a lot of names, and a lot of letters to your local MP and 

 to the CRTC.   

  

     If I have enough support, I will set up a BBS which is 

 dedicated to keeping you informed.  I will keep up to date as to 

 what the CRTC is doing and open up discussion concerning what we 

 should do about it.  I would also print out all the messages on 

 the board and send them off to the prime minister, the CRTC and 

 our local MP's.  At the same time, my sister and I will prepare a 

 legal argument to present to the government and the CRTC.  IF we 

 have the support of your names and your letters behind us, the 

 CRTC will be forced to stop. 

  

 OUR GOAL:  To stop the CRTC from requiring the licensing of 

 bulletin board systems and get it written into the law books that 

 private, home run bbs's are totally legal and should never be 

 regulated, in the interests of free information. 

  

 

     PLEASE send me E-mail or letter mail with your thoughts.  I 

 WILL set up the bbs and get this ball rolling if we have enough 

 support!  Please send this file to other BBS's and get this 

 information out.  Contact me if you want to be involved.  We need 

 all your support! 

  

       Support USERS AGAINST THE LICENSING OF BBS's (UALBBS). 

 

                    KEEP PRIVATE BBS's LEGAL! 

 

 *** Begin Additional Comments: ***

 

 Reading the preceding document has brought a few thoughts to

 my mind.  First of all, there has been much apprehension about

 what the computerization of society holds for the freedom of the

 common citizen.  It seems that the more powerful a thing is, the

 more potential it has for both good and bad; and there is no doubt

 that the computerization of information is powerful indeed.

 

 On one side, the computerization of society holds the potential

 for a centralized authoritarian regime that could not have been

 dreamed of previously.  In the near future, there will be no further

 need for cash money and there will be no economic activity beyond

 the reach central intelligence and control.  And there will be no

 personal information that will be kept secret from the authorities.

 Even the USSR, with the model of central authority we feared most,

 could could not have been capable of realizing the degree of control,

 the dawn of which, we now witness.



 But the evil that we feared in Communism infects our own society.

 Abstract concepts such as truth and justice are minimum requirements

 for spiritual beings, yet we deny the spiritual and cling to the

 material.  If we assert that we are but material beings, how real

 can the spiritual necessities really be?  And yet, in order for

 us to have any hope of happiness, these must be acknowledged in

 any formula for a culture and society we might propose.  Even So,

 we increasingly embrace a purely materialist interpretation of

 existence in which such things as truth and justice, if not

 outright delusional, are relative.

  

 If we continue to embrace the same cosmology as drove the Soviet

 repression, and the tools of a police state become available,

 what of government's temptation to become the definer of truth and

 justice and all the things which are the very breath of life

 for the human soul?  Even one who is completely seduced by

 materialism would have to be blind indeed not to perceive what

 an enormous poison this is.

  

 On the other side, the proliferation of information technology has the

 same sort of potential as the cheap portable video camera.  The

 particular aspect of this potential I'm addressing has been made most

 obvious by the effect the video camera has had in totalitarian

 countries, namely, that it is increasingly difficult for these

 governments to suppress the truth of events by simple denial and

 propaganda.  The proliferation of information technology can

 have a parallel with the advent of the Guttenberg press, which made

 it more difficult for the Inquisition to suppress the works of 

 heretics-- but only if it is allowed.  If the Church had tried

 to regulate the press, it would have been possible to operate them

 underground.  This is not the case with BBSs because the telephone

 network can be programmed to log all modem communications.

  

 From the positive aspect of information technology, there comes the

 potential for a democratic process that has not been practical

 until now.  As information technology becomes more accessible,

 there could come a world in which an average Joe might write an

 article about picking his nose, and it would have no less

 distribution than if it had been published in MacLean's or Newsweek.

 

 Although the suppression of pornography and other abuses has its

 attractiveness, the complete and unregulated liberation of

 information is our only defense against its dark side.  The

 scope of the suffering that information enslavement can inflict

 upon us is so great that "preventing misuse" can only be an

 excuse of those who would enslave us.

  

 Any move that leaves the dark potential of the new technology

 in place, while invalidating its positive aspects, leaves the

 potential for authoritarian abuse in place, while invalidating

 our only true defense.  Any such move is quite obviously

 a move toward enslaving us.  If any cause is worthy of struggle,

 the preservation of information liberty is indeed such a cause.

  

 Three other thoughts:  

 

 1) If the traditional media loses its preeminence to the "new"

 media, it shows a flaw in the traditional media.  Then, the 

 success of the alternative media will be the excuse for imposing

 the same regulation on the alternative media as on the traditional.

 But this will have the effect of imposing the same mediocrity into

 the alternative media as made the traditional media less

 attractive.  Such are the politics of information enslavement.

 

 2) Radio and television are vulnerable to interference from

 the incompetent and abusive.  But private BBSs must be explicitly

 dialled into.  Can the regulators seriously contend that they

 might protect us from information that we must access in

 such a deliberate and specific manner?

 

 3) If private BBSs are regulated, uucp and FidoNet, which amount

 to networks of BBSs for machines, will also be.



 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

 The following article reprinted from "The Spotlight" in Washington D.C

 with permission from Asst. Editor Don Markey.

 

                CIA CORRUPT, STUPID, SHOULD BE ABOLISHED



        We're spending untold billions on any international spying

        operation that can't figure out what it's own people are

        doing.  It's time for a change.



 By Mark Lane



 The arrest of Aldrich Hazen Ames, former head of the CIA's Soviet

 counterintelligence branch, as a Soviet spy, raises some seminal questions

 about the value of the CIA.  With the fox and his wife, Maria del Rosario

 Casas Ames, also charged as a Soviet spy, in charge of the henhouse, it is

 time to wonder about the fate of the chickens.  



 During September, 1985, Vitaly Yurchenko, a senior KGB official, defected.

 Ames was assigned to debrief him.  Yurchenko, after that debriefing,

 escaped from his CIA controllers while having dinner with them in a

 restaurant in Georgetown and then returned to the Soviet Union. 



 Edward Lee Howard, a CIA officer, was under secret FBI surveillance during

 the same period.  He too fled to the Soviet Union after he learned that he

 was about to be arrested.  Until now the CIA and FBI have been unable to

 figure out how Howard learned of his imminent incarceration. 



 There is a simple rule employed by police departments throughout the

 United States to spot a possibly corrupt cop.  Is he living beyond his

 means?  Even unsophisticated local police organizations which do not

 regularly spy on their own colleagues or subject them to lie detector

 tests, as does the CIA, have established a relatively sound and simple

 method to locate potentially corrupt officers.  Did he buy a Cadillac

 instead of a Ford?  How can he afford to build a garage or construct an

 addition to his house? 



 During his highest paid year with the CIA, Ames earned under $70,000.  His

 wife was a student.  Last year he bought a new Jaguar -- which cost about

 his annual income after taxes, unless it was loaded with extras.  He also

 bought a house in Arlington, Virginia (a Washington suburb) worth well

 over half-a-million dollars, a large farm and a number of condominiums in

 Columbia, his wife's country of birth.  He paid for the Virginia house --

 $540,000 -- in cash. 



 Apparently he was paid approximately $1.5 million by the Soviet Union

 during the last several years and spent it all on a luxurious life style. 

 And now, we are informed by the CIA that no one at the agency noticed the

 improved Ames lifestyle during the past decade.  



 The Ames case is reminiscent of the case of CIA officer Edwin P. Wilson

 who engaged in a similar grand life, while earning a relatively meager

 salary at the CIA.  He was subsequently charged and convicted of illegally

 shipping explosives to Libya.  For years Wilson lived on a huge baronial

 estate in Virginia, kept horses and permitted other CIA officers,

 including his superiors, to send their children over to his mansion and

 stables to ride the horses. 



 The CIA later claimed to be astonished that Wilson had some other income. 

 He claimed the agency knew it all along and that he was the victim of a

 change in policy toward Libya in the smoke-filled rooms in Langley,

 Virginia (headquarters of the CIA) where the resident scholars engage in

 thinking too convoluted and too secret thoughts for ordinary Americans to

 comprehend.  Wilson is now in prison and the CIA is newly astonished by

 Ames. 



 Most Americans have not yet decided to forgive the CIA for murdering

 President John F. Kennedy and the leaders of other states.  The only

 justification for its existence, immoral though it may be, is that at

 least it is effective.  That excuse has now expired.  So should the CIA. 



 The American people deserve an intelligence agency created in the

 post-Communist world, one designed not to plot, overthrow and kill, but to

 inquire and determine.  An organization which can predict, based on work

 on the ground and contacts, trouble spots such as in Bosnia before they

 erupt, a financial crisis in Japan secured through evaluation and study of

 trends by competent scientists, the uprising of Mexican indigenous people

 before we enter into a NAFTA which makes us partners of their oppressors

 -- all of these would be of great value to America. 



 Above all, a democratic society deserves an intelligence agency designed

 to meet the needs of such a country, not designed for a totalitarian

 state. 



 This portion of the story ends on a light note.  The "Washington Times"

 reported in front page headlines that the Russians may lose billions of

 dollars in U.S. aid due to their perfidy of spying on us.  Just recently

 Philip Heyman, a Justice Department high official, over the objection of

 Janet Reno, the attorney general and his superior, demanded that Jonathan

 Pollard, the American who spied for Israel, be freed.  Pollard was paid in

 dollars which the United States had sent to Israel as part of its enormous

 contribution to that state. 



 I am still looking for the headline that suggests that Israel may lose

 billions of dollars in U.S. aid.  



*** An internationally known attorney and recognized authority on the

*** assassination of John F. Kennedy, Mark Lane is the author of "Rush to

*** Judgment", the definitive critique of the Warren Commission, and

*** "Plausible Denial", which links the CIA to the JFK assassination.  Both

*** books are available from Liberty Lobby, 300 Independence Avenue SE,

*** Washington, D.C. 

 

 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%



                 LEGION OF DOOM T-SHIRTS!! Get 'em



 By Chris Goggans <phrack@well.sf.ca.us>



After a complete sellout at HoHo Con 1993 in Austin, TX this past

December, the official Legion of Doom t-shirts are available

once again.  Join the net luminaries world-wide in owning one of

these amazing shirts.  Impress members of the opposite sex, increase

your IQ, annoy system administrators, get raided by the government and

lose your wardrobe!

 

Can a t-shirt really do all this?  Of course it can!

 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

"THE HACKER WAR  --  LOD vs MOD"

 

This t-shirt chronicles the infamous "Hacker War" between rival

groups The Legion of Doom and  The Masters of Destruction.  The front

of the shirt displays a flight map of the various battle-sites

hit by MOD and tracked by LOD.  The back of the shirt

has a detailed timeline of the key dates in the conflict, and

a rather ironic quote from an MOD member.

 

(For a limited time, the original is back!)

 

"LEGION OF DOOM  --  INTERNET WORLD TOUR"

 

The front of this classic shirt displays "Legion of Doom Internet World

Tour" as well as a sword and telephone intersecting the planet

earth, skull-and-crossbones style.  The back displays the

words "Hacking for Jesus" as well as a substantial list of "tour-stops"

(internet sites) and a quote from Aleister Crowley.

 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

All t-shirts are sized XL, and are 100% cotton.

 

Cost is $15.00 (US) per shirt.  International orders add $5.00 per shirt for

postage.

 

Send checks or money orders.  Please, no credit cards, even if

it's really your card.

 

 

Name:       __________________________________________________

 

Address:    __________________________________________________

 

City, State, Zip:   __________________________________________

 

 

I want ____ "Hacker War" shirt(s)

 

I want ____ "Internet World Tour" shirt(s)

 

Enclosed is $______ for the total cost.

 

 

Mail to:   Chris Goggans

           603 W. 13th #1A-278

           Austin, TX 78701

 

 

These T-shirts are sold only as a novelty items, and are in no way

attempting to glorify computer crime.



 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%



        In the super-state, it really does not matter at all what

        actually happened.  Truth is what the government chooses 

        to tell you.  Justice is what it wants to happen. 

                    --Jim Garrison, New Orleans District Attorney



 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

 

.