textfiles/magazines/JAUC/juac11.txt

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From: Malik Al-Rashim <dfox@fc.net>
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To: mikecap@wpi.edu
Subject: JAUC-File11
Status: O

 
              MY LIFE AS AN INTERNATIONAL ARMS COURIER

 By Matt Blaze (mab@research.att.com)

 Under an obscure provision of US law, devices and computer programs
 that use encryption techniques to hide information from prying eyes
 and ears are considered ``munitions'' and subject to the same rules
 that govern the international arms trade.  In particular, taking such
 items out of this country requires the approval of the State
 Department, which decides whether exporting something might endanger
 national security.  In the past, these restrictions were of little
 concern to the average citizen; encryption found most of its
 application in military and diplomatic communications equipment.
 Today, however, growing concern over electronic fraud and privacy
 means that encryption techniques are starting to find their way into
 more conventional commercial products like laptop computers and
 portable phones.

 Mostly to find out what the process was like, I recently applied for a
 temporary export license for a portable telephone encryption product
 that I wanted to take with me on a business trip to England and
 Belgium.

 The item in question is more properly called a ``telephone security
 device.''  This is a little box that scrambles telephone conversations
 to protect them against eavesdroppers; this sort of protection is
 sometimes important when discussing confidential business matters from
 faraway places.  The particular model I bought was already approved
 for export; it employs a cipher algorithm that the government has
 already decided is not a threat to national security even should it
 fall into the hands of some rogue government.  This model is aimed
 primarily, I presume, at international business travelers who want to
 communicate in a reasonably secure manner with their home offices in
 the states.  In other words, a typical user buys two of them, leaving
 one at the home office and carrying the other when traveling abroad.
 The options that came with my device included a James Bond-ish looking
 acoustic coupler and handset to facilitate its connection to the
 hardwired phones that are still common in European hotel rooms.

 It turns out that there was recently some discussion in the government
 about exempting products like my secure phone from the licensing
 paperwork requirements.  Unfortunately, however, this exemption never
 actually took effect.  So even though the device I had was already
 approved for sale abroad, I still needed to get a temporary export
 license before I could take it with me.  But I was assured that ``this
 is an easy, routine process''.  Well, sure enough, about two weeks
 before I was to leave I got back my official US State Department
 ``license for the temporary export of unclassified defense articles''.
 So far, so good.

 From what I was able to figure out by reading the license (and having
 a few conversations with an export lawyer), I'm required to leave from
 an international airport with a Customs agent present (no problem
 there, although Customs is geared to arriving, rather than departing,
 travelers).  At the airport, I'm supposed to fill out a form called a
 ``shipper's export declaration'' (SED) on which I have to declare that
 ``these commodities are authorized by the US government for export
 only to Belgium and the United Kingdom.  They may not be resold,
 transshipped, or otherwise disposed of in any country, either in their
 original form or incorporated into other end-items without the prior
 written approval of the US Department of State''.  Then I'm to present
 the SED and export license to a Customs official at the airport before
 I leave.  The Customs officer is supposed to take my SED and endorse
 my license to show what I'm actually taking out of the country.

 On the way back in, I'm supposed to ``declare'' my item at Customs
 (even though it was manufactured in the US) and show them my license,
 and they're supposed to endorse the license again as proof that I
 have, in fact, returned the ``defense article'' to the safety of the
 United States.

 The first hitch I ran into was that no one could actually tell me
 where I could get an SED form.  But when I called Customs they assured
 me that this was no big deal.  ``Just come by when you get to the
 airport and we stamp the license.  I guess you can just fill out the
 SED there,'' they said.

 I made sure to get to the airport early anyway.

 Although there was moderately heavy traffic near the airport, I made
 it to JFK two and a half hours before my 10pm flight.  I was flying
 United, which has their own terminal at JFK, so Customs has an office
 right there in the same building from which I was to depart (JFK is
 awful to get around, so I was glad for this).  I checked in for my
 flight (and got upgraded to first class, which bolstered my
 expectation that everything was going to be really easy from here on).
 Then, luggage, license and phone in hand, I made my way downstairs to
 Customs, expecting to fill out the SED form and ``just have my license
 stamped'' as they had assured me earlier on the telephone.  I
 explained my situation to the security guard who controls entry to the
 Customs area, and he led me to ``the back office'' without much
 argument or delay.  The head uniformed Customs guy in the back office
 (which I think is same office where they take the people suspected of
 being ``drug mules'' with cocaine-filled condoms in their stomaches)
 looked approachable enough.  He had a sort of kindly, grandfatherly
 manner, and he was playing a video game on a laptop computer.  I got
 the impression that most of the people he encounters are suspected
 drug smugglers, and he seemed pleased enough to be dealing with
 something a little different from the norm.  When I explained what I
 was doing he looked at me as if I had just announced that I was a
 citizen of Mars who hadn't even bothered to obtain a visa.

 He explained, carefully, that a) I really do need the SED form; b) not
 only that, I should have already filled it out, in duplicate; c) he
 doesn't have blank SED forms; d) he, like everyone else in the entire
 US government that I had spoken to, has no idea where one gets them
 from, but people must get them from somewhere; and e) it doesn't
 really matter, because I'm in the wrong place anyway.

 I asked him where the right place is.  ``The cargo building, of
 course,'' he told me, patiently.  I remembered the cargo building
 because I passed it in the taxi just as the traffic jam began, about
 half an hour before I got to the United terminal.  The airport shuttle
 bus doesn't stop there.  I'd have to call a taxi.  ``But I think
 they're closed now, and even if they were open you'd never make it
 before your flight'' he helpfully added, saving me the trip.  He also
 complemented me for going to the trouble to get the license.

 I must have looked hurt and confused.  Eventually he called in some
 fellow in a suit who I presume to have been his boss.

 ``Are you the guy who wants to export the fancy gun?'' the fellow in
 the suit asked me.

 ``It's not a gun, it's a telephone,'' I responded, with a straight
 face.

 ``Why do you have a license to export a telephone?''  Good question, I
 thought.  I explained about the export law and showed him the thing.
 He agreed that it looked pretty harmless.

 The fellow in the suit reiterated points a through e almost verbatim
 (do they rehearse for these things?) and explained that this isn't
 really their department, since my license was issued by the State
 Department, not Customs, and my situation doesn't come up very often
 because exports usually go via the cargo building.  He'd love to help
 me, but the computer in which these things get entered is over in
 Cargo.  ``That's how the records get made.  But you do have a valid
 license, which is nice.''  He also suggested that I would have had an
 easier time had I shipped the device instead of carrying it with me.

 I asked what I should do, given that my plane was scheduled to leave
 in less than an hour.  Neither was sure, but the fellow in the suit
 seemed willing leave it to the discretion of the uniformed guy.  ``How
 does this thing work, anyway?'' he asked.  I explained as best as I
 could, trying to make it sound as harmless as it is.  ``You mean like
 that Clipper chip?'' he asked.

 At this point, given that he has a computer and knows something about
 the Clipper chip, I figured that maybe there was some hope of making
 my flight.  Or maybe I was about to spend the night in jail.  In my
 mind, I put it at about a 90:10 hope:jail ratio.

 Then he asked, ``Do you know about this stuff?''

 So we chatted about computers and cryptography for a while.  Finally,
 the two of them decided that it wouldn't really hurt for them to just
 sign the form as long as I promised to call my lawyer and get the SED
 situation straightened out ASAP.  They assured me that I won't be
 arrested or have any other trouble upon my return.

 I made my flight, validated license in hand.

 An aside: Throughout my trip, I discovered an interesting thing about
 the phone and the various options I was carrying with it.  Under X-ray
 examination, it looks just like some kind of bomb.  (I suspect it was
 the coiled handset cords).  Every time I went through a security
 checkpoint, I had to dig the thing out of my luggage and show it to
 the guard.  I almost missed the new ``Eurostar'' chunnel train (3hrs
 15mins nonstop from London to Brussels, airport-style check-in and
 security) as the guards were trying to figure out whether my telephone
 was likely to explode.

 Coming back to the US was less eventful, though it did take me an
 extra hour or so to get through Customs.  Expecting a bit of a hassle
 I didn't check any luggage and made sure to be the first person from
 my flight to reach the Customs line.  The inspector was ready to
 wordlessly accept my declaration form and send me on my way when I
 opened my mouth and explained that I needed to get an export license
 stamped.  That was obviously a new one for him.  He finally decided
 that this had to be handled by something called the ``Ships Office''.
 I was sent to an unoccupied back room (a different back room from
 before) and told to wait.  I thought about the recent Customs
 experiences of Phil Zimmermann.  (Zimmermann, the author of a popular
 computer encryption program, was recently detained, questioned and
 searched by Customs officials investigating whether he violated the
 same regulations I was trying so hard to follow.)  After about half an
 hour, an officer came in and asked me what I needed.  I explained
 about my export license that had to be endorsed.  She just shrugged
 and told me that she had to ``process the flight'' first.  As best as
 I could tell, her job was to clear the airplane itself through
 Customs, that being, technically speaking, a very expensive import.
 It would take a little while.  She was pleasant enough, though, and at
 least didn't look at me as if she intended to send me to jail or have
 me strip searched.

 Finally, she finished with the plane and asked me for my form.  She
 studied it carefully, obviously never having seen one before, and
 eventually asked me what, exactly, she was supposed to do.  I
 explained that I had never actually gone through this process before
 but I understood that she's supposed to record the fact that I was
 re-importing the device and stamp my license somewhere.  She told me
 that she didn't know of any place for her to record this.  After some
 discussion, we agreed that the best thing to do was to make a Xerox
 copy of my license and arrange for it to go wherever it had to go
 later.  She stamped the back of the license and sent me on my way.  It
 was a little over an hour after I first reached the Customs desk.

 My conclusion from all this is that it just isn't possible for an
 individual traveler to follow all the rules.  Even having gone through
 the process now, I still have no idea how to obtain, let alone file,
 the proper forms, even for a device that's already been determined to
 be exportable.  The export of export-controlled items is ordinarily
 handled by cargo shipment, not by hand carrying by travelers, and the
 system is simply not geared to deal with exceptions.  Technically
 speaking, everyone with a laptop disk encryption program who travels
 abroad is in violation of the law, but since no one actually knows or
 checks, no mechanism exists to deal with those who want to follow the
 rules.  While (fortunately) everyone I dealt with was sympathetic, no
 one in the government who I spoke with was able to actually help me
 follow the rules.  I was permitted to leave and come back only because
 everyone involved eventually recognized that my telephone was pretty
 harmless, that my intentions were good, and that the best thing to do
 was be flexible.  If anyone had taken a hard line and tried to enforce
 the letter of the law, I simply wouldn't have been able to take the
 thing with me, even with my license.  Had I just put my telephone in
 my suitcase without telling anyone instead of calling attention to
 myself by trying to follow the rules, chances are no one would have
 noticed or cared.

 Unfortunately, however, these absurd rules carry the full force of
 law, and one ignores them only at the risk of being prosecuted for
 international arms trafficking.  While it may seem far-fetched to
 imagine US citizens prosecuted as arms smugglers simply for carrying
 ordinary business products in their luggage, the law as written allows
 the government to do just that.  At the same time, anyone who is aware
 of and who tries to follow the regulations is made to jump through
 pointless hoops that are so obscure that even the people charged with
 enforcing them don't know quite what to make of them.

 Copyright 1995 by Matt Blaze. All rights reserved.

 Electronic redistribution permitted provided this article is reproduced
 in its entirety.

 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

                    OPEN LETTER TO WIRED MAGAZINE

 By Chris Goggans (phrack@well.sf.ca.us)

 To Whom It May Concern:

 I am writing this under the assumption that the editorial staff at
 Wired will "forget" to print it in the upcoming issue, so I am
 also posting it on every relevant newsgroup and online discussion forum
 that I can think of.

 When I first read your piece "Gang War In Cyberspace" I nearly choked on
 my own stomach bile.  The whole tone of this piece was so far removed
 from reality that I found myself questioning what color the sky must be
 in Wired's universe.  Not that I've come to expect any better from Wired.
 Your magazine, which could have had the potential to actually do
 something, has become a parody...a politically correct art-school project
 that consistently falls short of telling the whole story or making a solid
 point.  (Just another example of Kapor-Kash that ends up letting everyone
 down.)

 I did however expect more from Josh Quittner.

 I find it interesting that so much emphasis can be placed on an issue of
 supposed racial slurs as the focus of an imaginary "gang war," especially
 so many years after the fact.

 It's also interesting to me that people keep overlooking the fact that
 one of the first few members of our own little Legion of Doom was black
 (Paul Muad'dib.)  Maybe if he had not died a few years back that wouldn't
 be so quickly forgotten.  (Not that it makes a BIT of difference what color
 a hacker is as long as he or she has a brain and a modem, or these days
 at least a modem.)

 I also find it interesting that a magazine can so easily implicate someone
 as the originator of the so-called "fighting words" that allegedly sparked
 this online-battle, without even giving a second thought as to the damage
 that this may do to the person so named.  One would think that a magazine
 would have more journalistic integrity than that (but then again, this IS
 Wired, and political correctness sells magazines and satisfies
 advertisers.)  Thankfully, I'll only have to endure one month of the
 "Gee Chris, did you know you were a racist redneck?" phone calls.

 It's further odd that someone characterized as so sensitive to insults
 allegedly uttered on a party-line could have kept the company he did.
 Strangely enough, Quittner left out all mention of the MOD member who
 called himself "SuperNigger."  Surely, John Lee must have taken umbrage to
 an upper-middle class man of Hebrew descent so shamefully mocking him and
 his entire race, wouldn't he?   Certainly he wouldn't associate in any way
 with someone like that...especially be in the same group with, hang out
 with, and work on hacking projects with, would he?

 Please, of course he would, and he did.  (And perhaps he still does...)

 The whole "racial issue" was a NON-ISSUE.  However, such things make
 exciting copy and garner many column inches so keep being rehashed.  In
 fact, several years back when the issue first came up, the statement was
 cited as being either "Hang up, you nigger," or "Hey, SuperNigger," but
 no one was sure which was actually said.  Funny how the wording changes
 to fit the slant of the "journalist" over time, isn't it?

 I wish I could say for certain which was actually spoken, but alas, I was
 not privy to such things.  Despite the hobby I supposedly so enjoyed
 according to Quittner, "doing conference bridges," I abhorred the things.
 We used to refer to them as "Multi-Loser Youps" (multi-user loops) and
 called their denizens "Bridge Bunnies."  The bridge referred to in the
 story was popularized by the callers of the 5A BBS in Houston, Texas.
 (A bulletin board, that I never even got the chance to call, as I had
 recently been raided by the Secret Service and had no computer.)  Many
 people from Texas did call the BBS, however, and subsequently used the
 bridge, but so did people from Florida, Arizona, Michigan, New York and
 Louisiana.  And as numbers do in the underground, word of a new place to
 hang out caused it to propagate rapidly.

 To make any implications that such things were strictly a New York versus
 Texas issue is ludicrous, and again simply goes to show that a "journalist"
 was looking for more points to add to his (or her) particular angle.

 This is not to say that I did not have problems with any of the people
 who were in MOD.  At the time I still harbored strong feelings towards
 Phiber Optik for the NYNEX-Infopath swindle, but that was about it.
 And that was YEARS ago.  (Even I don't harbor a grudge that long.)
 Even the dozen or so annoying phone calls I received in late 1990 and
 early 1991 did little to evoke "a declaration of war."  Like many people,
 I know how to forward my calls, or unplug the phone.  Amazing how
 technology works, isn't it?

 Those prank calls also had about as much to do with the formation of
 Comsec as bubble-gum had to do with the discovery of nuclear fission.
 (I'm sure if you really put some brain power to it, and consulted Robert
 Anton Wilson, you could find some relationships.)  At the risk of sounding
 glib, we could have cared less about hackers at Comsec.  If there were no
 hackers, or computer criminals, there would be no need for computer
 security consultants.  Besides, hackers account for so little in the real
 picture of computer crime, that their existence is more annoyance than
 something to actually fear.

 However, when those same hackers crossed the line and began tapping our
 phone lines, we were more than glad to go after them.  This is one of my
 only rules of action:  do whatever you want to anyone else, but mess with
 me and my livelihood and I will devote every ounce of my being to paying
 you back.  That is exactly what we did.

 This is not to say that we were the only people from the computer
 underground who went to various law enforcement agencies with information
 about MOD and their antics.  In fact, the number of hackers who did was
 staggering, especially when you consider the usual anarchy of the
 underground.  None of these other people ever get mentioned and those of
 us at Comsec always take the lead role as the "narks," but we were far
 from alone.  MOD managed to alienate the vast majority of the computer
 underground, and people reacted.

 All in all, both in this piece, and in the book itself, "MOD, The Gang That
 Ruled Cyberspace," Quittner has managed to paint a far too apologetic piece
 about a group of people who cared so very little about the networks they
 played in and the people who live there.  In the last 15 years that I've
 been skulking around online, people in the community have always tended
 to treat each other and the computers systems they voyeured with a great
 deal of care and respect.  MOD was one of the first true examples of a
 groupthink exercise in hacker sociopathy.  Selling long distance codes,
 selling credit card numbers, destroying systems and harassing innocent
 people is not acceptable behavior among ANY group, even the computer
 underground.

 There have always been ego flares and group rivalries in the underground,
 and there always will be.  The Legion of Doom itself was FOUNDED because of
 a spat between its founder (Lex Luthor) and members of a group called The
 Knights of Shadow.  These rivalries keep things interesting, and keep the
 community moving forward, always seeking the newest bit of information in
 a series of healthy one-upsmanship.  MOD was different.  They took things
 too far against everyone, not just against two people in Texas.

 I certainly don't condemn everyone in the group.  I don't even know
 a number of them (electronically or otherwise.)  I honestly believe
 that Mark Abene (Phiber) and Paul Stira (Scorpion) got royally screwed
 while the group's two biggest criminals, Julio Fernandez (Outlaw) and
 Allen Wilson (Wing), rolled over on everyone else and walked away free
 and clear.  This is repulsive when you find out that Wing in particular
 has gone on to be implicated in more damage to the Internet (as Posse and
 ILF) than anyone in the history of the computing.  This I find truly
 disgusting, and hope that the Secret Service are proud of themselves.

 Imagine if I wrote a piece about the terrible treatment of a poor prisoner
 in Wisconsin who was bludgeoned to death by other inmates while guards
 looked away.  Imagine if I tried to explain the fact that poor Jeff Dahmer
 was provoked to murder and cannibalism by the mocking of adolescent boys
 who teased and called him a faggot.  How would you feel if I tried to
 convince you that we should look upon him with pity and think of him as a
 misunderstood political prisoner?  You would probably feel about how I do
 about Quittner's story.

 'Hacker' can just as easily be applied to "journalists" too, and with this
 piece Quittner has joined the Hack Journalist Hall of Fame, taking his
 place right next to Richard Sandza.

 Quittner did get a few things right.  I do have a big cat named Spud, I do
 work at a computer company and I do sell fantastic t-shirts.  Buy some.

 With Love,

 Chris Goggans
 aka Erik Bloodaxe

 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

                      WHEN BIGOTRY OUTPACES TECHNOLOGY

 By Douglas Welch dewelch@pop.com

 Previously published in the Los Angeles Times, Monday, December 19, 1994.
 Page B15

 Note: Electronic re-posting is ALLOWED but NO PAPER REPRINTS or inclusion
 in online digests without written permission from the author. All postings
 must retain this notice.

 Copyright (c) 1994 Douglas E. Welch
 dewelch@pop.com
 76625,3301

 * Communications: We need to attack the message, not the modem, to ensure
 on-line services are free from censorship.

 As each new technology marches onto the scene, there are some who instantly
 blame all the ills of society on it. Groups calling for the censorship of
 computer networks are forgetting that it is not the technology that is
 causing the problem, but the people using the technology. Instead of
 targeting the authors of hate speech on the computer networks, they are
 targeting the networks themselves. This only reinforces the immediate need
 for on-line computer services to be protected by the federal government
 as "common carriers," like telephone utilities.

 Hatemongers and bigots have always been a part of human society. Through
 ignorance and bullying, they gather their flock, but it is through open
 debate, education and reasoned discourse that they are best confronted.
 Instead, professed anti-hate groups are attacking the providers of on-line
 services in an effort to force them to remove offensive messages or prevent
 their posting. Rather than using the technology to fight back and denounce
 hate speech, they are seeking to remove the freedom of speech altogether.
 Were the situation reversed, I am sure you would hear them decrying the
 evils of censorship as loudly as they call for it now.

 Telephone companies cannot be sued when offensive or illegal calls are
 placed through their systems. On-line services deserve the same kind of
 "common carrier" status. There is no reason on-line services should have to
 be both provider and policeman. This places them in danger of being a
 censor.

 On-line users have several simpler options. They can merely ignore the
 message with the press of a key or set their "kill file" to ignore
 messages of certain content or from a certain user. Ultimately, on-line
 services provide users the chance to engage these hatemongers in a forum
 free of physical threat with hopes of liberating their narrow focus. The
 immediacy of posting a response can only be found in the on-line world.

 On-line services are no passing fad. they are rapidly gaining popularity
 on par with telephone and fax service. We need to stop treating on-line
 services like something new and ensure that they are free from censorship
 pressures.

 Censorship has always been defined as a "slipperly slope" that can easily
 lead to a repression of ideas and a lower quality of life. Whether we
 communicate via paper, phone lines or on-line computer services, our
 freedom of speech should be protected. Hate groups should be targeted for
 their messages, not how they send them.

 Douglas E. Welch is a computer consultant. He can be reached at
 dewelch@pop.com.

 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

             LETTER FROM STEVE CASE; RE: CHILD PORN ON AOL

 By Steve Case

 Ever since we first launched America Online we've remained committed to
 fostering an electronic community that provides a fun, enjoyable and
 enriching experience for all members.  We've asked our members to honor
 the privilege of interactivity, and we've strictly enforced our Terms of
 Service to help foster the kind of community of which we can all be proud.
 Recently, however, some material has been brought to our attention by some
 of our members which involves illegal activity -- the trading of images in
 electronic mail which appear to be child pornography.  Upon receiving the
 material, and verifying that it was a violation of our Terms of Service,
 and in all likelihood illegal, we immediately contacted the FBI and
 terminated the accounts of the senders.

 While we recognize that any community around the United States with more
 than 1.5 million citizens will have its share of illegal activity, we were
 nonetheless disheartened to find that some members are abusing the
 communications features of AOL in this way.  We simply will not tolerate
 such illegal activity on America Online.  To anyone who may be using
 America Online for illegal purposes, be advised that we will terminate the
 accounts of those participating and we will notify the proper authorities
 of any illegal activity that is brought to our attention.

 Our policy is that all private communications -- including e-mail, instant
 messages, and private chat rooms -- are strictly private.  We do not, will
 not, and legally cannot monitor any private communications.   But if we
 are alerted to a potential offense and we are sent evidence, as we were
 recently, we will vigorously pursue the matter.   In this case, electronic
 mail was forwarded to our attention by our members, and as recipients of
 the mail we were able to turn the material over to the authorities.

 We have over 250 people who help us provide assistance in the public areas
 of the service and give guidance to members who are new or who have
 questions. Of late, we've had a growing problem with member-created rooms
 whose title and discussion violate our Terms of Service.  Member-created
 rooms have always been a unique and much-valued aspect of America Online.
 Often, these rooms provide the seeds for new special interest forums that
 later emerge. But as more members abuse the privilege and establish rooms
 that suggest illegal activity, or detract from the enjoyment of others
 with offensive titles, we are faced with looking at a higher level of
 safeguards as it relates to member-created rooms.  We simply cannot keep
 up with the sheer volume of rooms created, and as a result, from time to
 time rooms that violate TOS remain open for some period of time.  We're
 looking at several alternatives to improve the situation.  We don't want
 to see our members denied the privilege of this fun and creative
 interactive environment due to the abuses of a few, but at the same time
 we do feel some action is warranted to safeguard this popular
 "neighborhood" in our community.

 Unfortunately, this is not the first time we have encountered this
 problem, nor is it unique to AOL.  In 1991, we were faced with a similar
 situation. At that time, we went to our members -- as we're doing now --
 advised them of the situation and asked for their help.  And recently,
 recognizing the potential for abuses in this emerging medium, online
 service providers banded together to sponsor a "child safety" brochure
 that gives parents tips and guidelines to foster a productive and safe
 environment for children online. A copy of this brochure can be found in
 the Parents Information Center, keyword:  Parents.  We encourage parents
 to take the time to review it.  In addition we strongly encourage parents
 to monitor their children's use of this medium, much as they would any
 other medium such as television, magazines, etc.  We've also implemented
 "parental controls" which allow parents to restrict their children's
 online access.

 Each one of us needs to respect and honor the privileges of this
 electronic community.  If you haven't reviewed our Terms of Service, take
 a few minutes now and do so.  If you observe what you believe may be
 illegal activity on AOL, bring it to our attention.  The problem is not
 widespread -- we believe only a mere fraction of this community is
 involved.  Let's work together to insure that America Online remains the
 kind of community that you want your friends and family to enjoy.

 Thanks for your continued support.

 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%