3817 lines
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3817 lines
182 KiB
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+=============================================##==============================+
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| [ The Journal of Priveleged Information ] |
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+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| Volume I, Issue 001 By: 'Above the Law' |
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+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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|Informatik--Bringing you all the information you should know... |
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| and a lot you shouldn't... |
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+=============================================================================+
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/* Introduction */
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By the Informatik staff
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Welcome to the inaugural issue of Informatik, an electronic periodical
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devoted to the distribution of information not readily available to the public,
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with a particular emphasis on technology and the computing world. First and
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foremost, this publication is dedicated to the freedom of information.
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This journal is made possible by The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
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which states:
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Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
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or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; OR ABRIDGING THE FREEDOM
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OF SPEECH OR OF THE PRESS; or the right of the people peaceably to
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assemble, and to petition the Government for redress of grievances.
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In this and coming issues, we plan to exercise our First Amendment rights to
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the best of our ability. We will print feature articles on hacking, phreaking,
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and various other illicit activities. We also plan on bringing you recent news
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and gossip from the underground, anything news of interest to hackers,
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phreakers, grifters, cyber-punks, and the like. Informatik will also provide a
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plethora of information on the inner workings of corporate America and the U.S.
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Government.
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DO distribute this freely! Remember this is not illegal, this is information.
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Enjoy,
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Mack Hammer & Sterling
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[Editors]
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Please note that the information provided by this newsletter is strictly to
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interest and inform. We can not condone nor recommend the actual application
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of this knowledge with malicious intent. Thank you.
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///////////////* CONTENTS: *\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\
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Volume I, Issue 001
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Release date October 4, 1991
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===========================================
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01) An Ounce of Prevention: Making the Telcos Hacker-Proof
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By: Mack Hammer
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02) Introduction to Radio Telecommunications Interception
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By: Sterling
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03) Loops Explained
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By: Anonymous
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04) T-File Classic #1: A Novice's Guide to Hacking
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By: The Mentor
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05) Summary of FBI Computer Systems
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By: Ralph Harvey
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06) Dictionary of Phreaker's Terms
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By: Various Sources
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07) Tid-Bytes
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By: Informatik Staff
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08) Hot Flashes--The Underground News Report
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By: Various Sources
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[/]/[/]/[/]/[/]/[/]/[/]/[/]/[/]/[/]/[/]/[/]/[/]/[/]/[/]
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/[/]/[/] [/]/[/]/
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[/]/ /[/]
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/[/] ===== An Ounce of Prevention ===== [/]/
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[/]/ == Making the Telcos Hacker-Proof == /[/]
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/[/] [/]/
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[/]/ ------- by: ------- /[/]
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/[/] --- Mack Hammer --- [/]/
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[/]/ /[/]
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/[/]/[/] [/]/[/]/
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[/]/[/]/[/]/[/]/[/]/[/]/[/]/[/]/[/]/[/]/[/]/[/]/[/]/[/]
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Know thine enemy.
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Good advice for any battle. For the hacker or phreaker, one's primary
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opponents are computer security professionals. Since the greatest feather
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for any cyberpunk's cap is exploitation of a Telco, the behavior of Telco
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employees is of particular importance. Telco's spend a lot of time studying
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what hackers do, what information they have, and then trying to apply this
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information to thwarting the attempts of would be intruders in their
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systems.
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Therefore, it seems like hackers and phreakers should be aware of what
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the Telcos are doing to stop them. Most hackers know about ANI Feature
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Group D and the other electronic countermeasures used by the Telcos to track
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down hackers, but how are Telco employees trained to detect and thwart
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attempts at social engineering, and how do the Telcos respond to break-ins
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that are detected? This article will discuss basic electronic
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countermeasures, the training and advice given to employees, and the
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response of the Telcos to known threats to their systems.
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/* Hardware */
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Before one commits toll fraud (discouraged by this publication), or
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before they dial up a known carrier, questions race through their mind. The
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first and foremost is, "Are they tracing this call?" It makes you wonder,
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how many calls are actually traced?
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Unfortunately, which telcos trace and which don't varies from company to
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company. Needless to say, the Big Three long distance carriers (AT&T, U.S.
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Sprint, and MCI) record both the originator and reciever of every long
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distance phone call made on their system. For verification of this, call
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U.S. Sprint and ask for a billing report several months old. Rather than
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the spiffy little invoice you usually get, you'll recieve a crappy screen
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dump from a computer with "best possible quality" or something similar
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stamped on it. It lists, among other things, each call, along with the
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numbers of both parties. As you can see, this renders toll fraud using any
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of said systems practically impossible.
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Many local long distance systems, on the other hand, don't have the
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facilities necessary for tracing telephone calls. Use your own best
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judgement. As far as the regional telephone companies are concerned (Bell
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South, Pacific Bell, etc.), I have heard that newer ESS systems record ALL
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numbers dialed, including mistakes. I find it hard to believe that this is
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true, or if it is, that these records are easily retrieved and sifted
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through.
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In any case, tracing is quite possible, and in some cases, is quite
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probable. Use your better judgement, and remember, the bigger the company,
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the bigger the risk.
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/* Prevention through employee awareness */
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Among telcos today, much attention is given to employee awareness.
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Nearly all telco employees are trained to recognize and prevent social
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engineering and hacking. Unfortunately for the telcos employee laziness and
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complacence often leads employees to replace caution with sloth. For
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example, much attention has been given to "trashing" or "dumpster diving,"
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and employees are encouraged to shred sensitive documents. In all my
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trashing experience, however, I have NEVER found shredded paper.
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The same holds true for social engineering, explicit instructions are
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given to telco employees to lessen the threat of information leaks through
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clever social engineering. Employees are encouraged to get the caller's
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phone number and call them back, but this does not often occur.
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This advice for beefing up security was given in an article in
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"Enterprise," a magazine printed by Southwestern Bell.
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* Get rid of trivial passwords.
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* Routinely change passwords.
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* Review password files.
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* Restrict access to "read only."
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* Know to whom you're talking.
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* Shred as many documents as possible.
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* Post a warning which will be displayed whenever one logs into a
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computer.
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* Lock up terminals, personal computers, and floppy disks when they are
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not in use.
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* Eliminate unnecessary access lines.
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* Disconnect modems when they are not in use.
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* Avoid public domain software.
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* Report suspicious activity.
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As you can see, computer security personnel have gotten smart. They
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are well aware of most hacker tricks, and are doing their best to explain
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them to all of the other employees. Hackers now rely on the forgetfulness
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and laziness of normal employees for success, not the ignorance of system
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managers.
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Telco security personnel are much more apt to check audit trails than
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they once were. Suspicious activities such as late-night logins, the use of
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test and demo accounts, and the like are carefully monitored. One should
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use the telco computers during peak hours so that strange activity won't be
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noticed by already busy system managers.
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Security professionals also carefully monitor activities in the hacker
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world. They keep a watchful eye on hacker BBSes and publications. Each
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finding, either a breach in security or increased knowledge amongst hackers
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is recorded, prioritized and then published in various security documents.
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One should be especially cautious of any "beginner" who asks a lot of strange
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questions, because the telcos must have at least some people on the inside.
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One can also assume that if one telco or corporation has a particularly
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effective strategy for stopping hackers, or a successful awareness campaign,
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it will spread like wildfire to all telcos. Despite the fact that telcos
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are competitors, and are especially secretive since their business depends
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on a technological edge, they are happy to share all security information,
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since the ruination of the computer underground is one of their primary
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goals. This leads us to the final section of this article. . .
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/* Responses to security breaches */
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What do the telcos do when they detect a security breach? This may be
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the most important question the hacker can ask. Of course, one's goal is
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to explore the system in question without being detected, but if the worst
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happens and your intrusion is discovered, it's good to know what steps the
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telco will take to prevent your future intrusion.
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The first thing to remember when hacking into a telco's computer is, if
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you're caught, you will be prosecuted. . . If there's any way they can get
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you in court, you can bet your bottom dollar you'll be there. Unlike other
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businesses, which may ignore the occasional security breach because they
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don't feel like it's a major problem, the telcos live in fear of hackers,
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and do their utmost to prevent entry into their systems.
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Telcos make it a point to document every security risk, whether it's a
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break-in on their system, a bug in an operating system, or some new
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information found on a BBS. These detections are often published in telco
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literature in an attempt to educate all of the employees of the telephone
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company.
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/* Summing it up */
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Overall, the telcos finally seem to have gotten wise to most of the
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scams run by today's hacker. Despite the fact that telcos are often the
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victims of hacking and phreaking (thank goodness), they are much less
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susceptible to infiltration through hacking, trashing, and social engin-
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eering than they once were. The moral of the story is, today's security
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measures are breeding a harder working hacker, one who must constantly
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watch his back and look before he leaps.
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/+++++++++++++++++++++++++++\
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++ ++
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+++ Introduction To Radio +++
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+++ Telecommunication +++
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+++ Interception. +++
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++ ++
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\+++++++++++++++++++++++++++/
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[By *Sterling*]
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The purpose of this article is to explain how to use a scanner and radio
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receiver to eavesdrop on private calls from homes, offices, cars, ships,
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aircraft, and trains. I will discusses the best methods of monitoring, the
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equipment needed, and list the necessary frequencies.
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Why scan?
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---------
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It is quite a simple, and in most cases LEGAL, to listen-in on cellular,
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cordless, ship/shore, air/ground, pagers, etc. The benefits of such
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monitoring, aside from entertainment, can be quite high to the discerning
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listener. Callers quite often route to their favorite LD carrier to place long
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distance calls. They call their voice mail systems, private company
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lines and diverters. If you are have a specific interest in an individual or
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company you may peek in on their "private" conversations, learn who they are
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calling and what they are up to. Apart from radio-telephone communication
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scanner hobbyists are entertained by whatever they overhear on their radios.
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Police cars, fire engines, ambulances, armored cars, trains, taxis, airplanes,
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and buses are all equipped with radios and you can listen in on them. You can
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monitor the local police and fire departments to hear about events before the
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news reporters screw them up. Hostage dramas, bank robberies, car crashes,
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chemical spills, tornado sightings are all there.You can hear a high speed
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police chase, Secret Service agents on a sting operation, and undercover FBI
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agents as they stake out a suspect. How about listening to a presidential
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candidate discuss strategy with his adviser from a 415 MHz radiophone in Air
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Force 1, or a team of G-men protect him while transmitting in the 167 MHz
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range? Listen to your neighbors deal drugs over their cordless telephone, or
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as their conversations are picked up and transmitted over the airwaves by their
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sensitive baby monitor intercom. It's all there in the 46 and 49 MHz ranges.
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What Equipment is needed?
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Scanners are available in two varieties: crystal controlled and
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programmable. The crystal controlled models are cheaper, but require the user
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purchase and install a $5 crystal for EACH frequency of interest. Programmable
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(synthesized) units don't require crystals and usually have a keypad that
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permits you to store frequencies into channels. Programmables are now so cheap
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it doesn't make sense to buy a crystal unit as your main scanner unless you get
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it for under $45 or so. You can get a battery operated hand held scanner, a
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bigger "base" scanner which is powered from an AC outlet, or a mobile scanner
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which connects to your auto's electrical system.
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Make sure your first scanner:
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1. Has a "search" feature, which allows it to search all the frequencies
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between two frequency limits of your choosing. The lowest cost
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programmables can't search.
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2. covers the 800 MHz band, which is where cellular-telephone is broadcast.
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3. Has an AC-adaptor available, as scanners eat batteries.
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4. Has an earphone jack as you may want to record your findings.
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If you're not sure whether you'll like scanning, don't want to spend much
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money, a 16 channel radio will do. In general, the more channels and banks,
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the better. Deluxe scanners can be controlled by a personal computer, although
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this feature isn't important to most scanner owners.
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Currently, the more popular scanners include the Uniden/Bearcat 760XLT
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(a/k/a 950XLT) and Radio Shack PRO-2022 and PRO-2006 base/mobiles, and the
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Uniden/Bearcat 200XLT (a/k/a 205XLT) and Radio Shack PRO-37 portables.
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All scanners come with a built in antenna, permitting reception up to
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about 20 miles or so. Outdoor antennas can extend reliable reception to 100
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miles or more.
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A breakdown of exactly what there is to listen to out there:
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Cordless phones:
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It seems like everyone has a cordless phone now days. Cordless phones are
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quite easy to monitor. Cordless phones are duplex, they transmit sound from
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the handset to the base, and the base transmits both callers voices back to the
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handset. Obviously this is the frequency you want to listen in on. Cordless
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phones are broken into ten channels. They are as follows:
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Channel Frequency (in MHz)
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1 46.610
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2 46.630
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3 46.670
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4 46.710
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5 46.730
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6 46.770
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7 46.830
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8 46.870
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9 46.930
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10 46.970
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Most cordless phones have the channel number stuck on the back of the handset,
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and some have multiple channels. The easiest thing to do is simply scan the
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whole list of ten. The main problem with cordless phones is the range. They
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are seldom able to broadcast further than a block or so away. If you want to
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monitor a users phone calls, the best method is to hook up a Voice-Actuated
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Cassette recorder to a handheld scanner, wrap the whole combo in a ziplock bag
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and lay it in their shrubs. Come back the next day and you have a complete
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record of all calls made and received on their cordless. With the use of a
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touch-tone decoder you can even determine who they have been calling!
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Cellular Telephone:
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Cellular telephones are quite useful sources of information. Doctors,
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lawyers, the phone company and business officials all regularly use celluar
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phones. LD cellular calls can be quite expensive to say the least, so most
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users prefer to use Sprint, AT&T, etc. as their long distance carrier. Thus
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you can quite often hear them giving out their calling card number to the
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operator.
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Here is a method of determining which frequencies are used in a cellular
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system, and which ones are in what cells. If the system uses OMNICELLS, as
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most do, you can readily find all the channels in a cell if you know just one
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of them, using tables constructed with the instructions below.
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Cellular frequencies are assigned by channel number, and for all channel
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numbers, in both wireline and non-wireline systems, the formula is:
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Transmit Frequency = (channel number x .030 MHz) + 870 MHz
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Receive Frequency = (channel number x .030 Mhz) + 825 Mhz
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"Band A" (one of the two blocks) uses channels 1 - 333. To construct a
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table showing frequency by cells, use channel 333 as the top left corner of a
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table. The next entry to the right of channel 333 is 332, the next is 331,
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etc., down to channel 313. Enter channel 312 underneath 333, 311 under 332,
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etc. Each channel across the top row is the first channel in each CELL of the
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system; each channel DOWN from the column from the the first channel is the
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next frequency assigned to that cell. You may have noted that each channel
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down is 21 channels lower in number. Usually the data channel used is the
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highest numbered channel in a cell.
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"Band B" uses channels from 334 to 666. Construct your table in a similar
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way, with channel 334 in the upper left corner, 335 the next entry to the
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right. The data channel should be the lowest numbered channel in each cell
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this time.
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You want to tune-in on the non-data, RECEIVE channels. The transmit
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channel is a low power signal from the mobile source to the microwave tower,
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which rebroadcasts both caller's voices. The Data channel is used to send such
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things as the callers serial number, and connecting cell information, this
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information is not audible, though I hope to discuss this in depth with a later
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article.
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Scan from around 870 MHz to 894 MHz and note any signals you receive.
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Once you find a frequency listed in the following chart, you know that your
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area also uses all other channels in that cell for that particular band.
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Cellular Phone Band A (Channel 1 is Data)
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Cell # 1
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--------------------------------------------------
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Channel 1 (333) Tx 879.990 Rx 834.990
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Channel 2 (312) Tx 879.360 Rx 834.360
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Channel 3 (291) Tx 878.730 Rx 833.730
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Channel 4 (270) Tx 878.100 Rx 833.100
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Channel 5 (249) Tx 877.470 Rx 832.470
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Channel 6 (228) Tx 876.840 Rx 831.840
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Channel 7 (207) Tx 876.210 Rx 831.210
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Channel 8 (186) Tx 875.580 Rx 830.580
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Channel 9 (165) Tx 874.950 Rx 829.950
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Channel 10 (144) Tx 874.320 Rx 829.320
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Channel 11 (123) Tx 873.690 Rx 828.690
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Channel 12 (102) Tx 873.060 Rx 828.060
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Channel 13 (81) Tx 872.430 Rx 827.430
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Channel 14 (60) Tx 871.800 Rx 826.800
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Channel 15 (39) Tx 871.170 Rx 826.170
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Channel 16 (18) Tx 870.540 Rx 825.540
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Cell # 2
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--------------------------------------------------
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Channel 1 (332) Tx 879.960 Rx 834.960
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Channel 2 (311) Tx 879.330 Rx 834.330
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Channel 3 (290) Tx 878.700 Rx 833.700
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Channel 4 (269) Tx 878.070 Rx 833.070
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Channel 5 (248) Tx 877.440 Rx 832.440
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Channel 6 (227) Tx 876.810 Rx 831.810
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Channel 7 (206) Tx 876.180 Rx 831.180
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Channel 8 (185) Tx 875.550 Rx 830.550
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Channel 9 (164) Tx 874.920 Rx 829.920
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Channel 10 (143) Tx 874.290 Rx 829.290
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Channel 11 (122) Tx 873.660 Rx 828.660
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Channel 12 (101) Tx 873.030 Rx 828.030
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Channel 13 (80) Tx 872.400 Rx 827.400
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Channel 14 (59) Tx 871.770 Rx 826.770
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Channel 15 (38) Tx 871.140 Rx 826.140
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Channel 16 (17) Tx 870.510 Rx 825.510
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Cell # 3
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--------------------------------------------------
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Channel 1 (331) Tx 879.930 Rx 834.930
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Channel 2 (310) Tx 879.300 Rx 834.300
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Channel 3 (289) Tx 878.670 Rx 833.670
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Channel 4 (268) Tx 878.040 Rx 833.040
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Channel 5 (247) Tx 877.410 Rx 832.410
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Channel 6 (226) Tx 876.780 Rx 831.780
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Channel 7 (205) Tx 876.150 Rx 831.150
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Channel 8 (184) Tx 875.520 Rx 830.520
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Channel 9 (163) Tx 874.890 Rx 829.890
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Channel 10 (142) Tx 874.260 Rx 829.260
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Channel 11 (121) Tx 873.630 Rx 828.630
|
|
Channel 12 (100) Tx 873.000 Rx 828.000
|
|
Channel 13 (79) Tx 872.370 Rx 827.370
|
|
Channel 14 (58) Tx 871.740 Rx 826.740
|
|
Channel 15 (37) Tx 871.110 Rx 826.110
|
|
Channel 16 (16) Tx 870.480 Rx 825.480
|
|
|
|
Cell # 4
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (330) Tx 879.900 Rx 834.900
|
|
Channel 2 (309) Tx 879.270 Rx 834.270
|
|
Channel 3 (288) Tx 878.640 Rx 833.640
|
|
Channel 4 (267) Tx 878.010 Rx 833.010
|
|
Channel 5 (246) Tx 877.380 Rx 832.380
|
|
Channel 6 (225) Tx 876.750 Rx 831.750
|
|
Channel 7 (204) Tx 876.120 Rx 831.120
|
|
Channel 8 (183) Tx 875.490 Rx 830.490
|
|
Channel 9 (162) Tx 874.860 Rx 829.860
|
|
Channel 10 (141) Tx 874.230 Rx 829.230
|
|
Channel 11 (120) Tx 873.600 Rx 828.600
|
|
Channel 12 (99) Tx 872.970 Rx 827.970
|
|
Channel 13 (78) Tx 872.340 Rx 827.340
|
|
Channel 14 (57) Tx 871.710 Rx 826.710
|
|
Channel 15 (36) Tx 871.080 Rx 826.080
|
|
Channel 16 (15) Tx 870.450 Rx 825.450
|
|
|
|
Cell # 5
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (329) Tx 879.870 Rx 834.870
|
|
Channel 2 (308) Tx 879.240 Rx 834.240
|
|
Channel 3 (287) Tx 878.610 Rx 833.610
|
|
Channel 4 (266) Tx 877.980 Rx 832.980
|
|
Channel 5 (245) Tx 877.350 Rx 832.350
|
|
Channel 6 (224) Tx 876.720 Rx 831.720
|
|
Channel 7 (203) Tx 876.090 Rx 831.090
|
|
Channel 8 (182) Tx 875.460 Rx 830.460
|
|
Channel 9 (161) Tx 874.830 Rx 829.830
|
|
Channel 10 (140) Tx 874.200 Rx 829.200
|
|
Channel 11 (119) Tx 873.570 Rx 828.570
|
|
Channel 12 (98) Tx 872.940 Rx 827.940
|
|
Channel 13 (77) Tx 872.310 Rx 827.310
|
|
Channel 14 (56) Tx 871.680 Rx 826.680
|
|
Channel 15 (35) Tx 871.050 Rx 826.050
|
|
Channel 16 (14) Tx 870.420 Rx 825.420
|
|
|
|
Cell # 6
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (328) Tx 879.840 Rx 834.840
|
|
Channel 2 (307) Tx 879.210 Rx 834.210
|
|
Channel 3 (286) Tx 878.580 Rx 833.580
|
|
Channel 4 (265) Tx 877.950 Rx 832.950
|
|
Channel 5 (244) Tx 877.320 Rx 832.320
|
|
Channel 6 (223) Tx 876.690 Rx 831.690
|
|
Channel 7 (202) Tx 876.060 Rx 831.060
|
|
Channel 8 (181) Tx 875.430 Rx 830.430
|
|
Channel 9 (160) Tx 874.800 Rx 829.800
|
|
Channel 10 (139) Tx 874.170 Rx 829.170
|
|
Channel 11 (118) Tx 873.540 Rx 828.540
|
|
Channel 12 (97) Tx 872.910 Rx 827.910
|
|
Channel 13 (76) Tx 872.280 Rx 827.280
|
|
Channel 14 (55) Tx 871.650 Rx 826.650
|
|
Channel 15 (34) Tx 871.020 Rx 826.020
|
|
Channel 16 (13) Tx 870.390 Rx 825.390
|
|
|
|
Cell # 7
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (327) Tx 879.810 Rx 834.810
|
|
Channel 2 (306) Tx 879.180 Rx 834.180
|
|
Channel 3 (285) Tx 878.550 Rx 833.550
|
|
Channel 4 (264) Tx 877.920 Rx 832.920
|
|
Channel 5 (243) Tx 877.290 Rx 832.290
|
|
Channel 6 (222) Tx 876.660 Rx 831.660
|
|
Channel 7 (201) Tx 876.030 Rx 831.030
|
|
Channel 8 (180) Tx 875.400 Rx 830.400
|
|
Channel 9 (159) Tx 874.770 Rx 829.770
|
|
Channel 10 (138) Tx 874.140 Rx 829.140
|
|
Channel 11 (117) Tx 873.510 Rx 828.510
|
|
Channel 12 (96) Tx 872.880 Rx 827.880
|
|
Channel 13 (75) Tx 872.250 Rx 827.250
|
|
Channel 14 (54) Tx 871.620 Rx 826.620
|
|
Channel 15 (33) Tx 870.990 Rx 825.990
|
|
Channel 16 (12) Tx 870.360 Rx 825.360
|
|
|
|
Cell # 8
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (326) Tx 879.780 Rx 834.780
|
|
Channel 2 (305) Tx 879.150 Rx 834.150
|
|
Channel 3 (284) Tx 878.520 Rx 833.520
|
|
Channel 4 (263) Tx 877.890 Rx 832.890
|
|
Channel 5 (242) Tx 877.260 Rx 832.260
|
|
Channel 6 (221) Tx 876.630 Rx 831.630
|
|
Channel 7 (200) Tx 876.000 Rx 831.000
|
|
Channel 8 (179) Tx 875.370 Rx 830.370
|
|
Channel 9 (158) Tx 874.740 Rx 829.740
|
|
Channel 10 (137) Tx 874.110 Rx 829.110
|
|
Channel 11 (116) Tx 873.480 Rx 828.480
|
|
Channel 12 (95) Tx 872.850 Rx 827.850
|
|
Channel 13 (74) Tx 872.220 Rx 827.220
|
|
Channel 14 (53) Tx 871.590 Rx 826.590
|
|
Channel 15 (32) Tx 870.960 Rx 825.960
|
|
Channel 16 (11) Tx 870.330 Rx 825.330
|
|
|
|
Cell # 9
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (325) Tx 879.750 Rx 834.750
|
|
Channel 2 (304) Tx 879.120 Rx 834.120
|
|
Channel 3 (283) Tx 878.490 Rx 833.490
|
|
Channel 4 (262) Tx 877.860 Rx 832.860
|
|
Channel 5 (241) Tx 877.230 Rx 832.230
|
|
Channel 6 (220) Tx 876.600 Rx 831.600
|
|
Channel 7 (199) Tx 875.970 Rx 830.970
|
|
Channel 8 (178) Tx 875.340 Rx 830.340
|
|
Channel 9 (157) Tx 874.710 Rx 829.710
|
|
Channel 10 (136) Tx 874.080 Rx 829.080
|
|
Channel 11 (115) Tx 873.450 Rx 828.450
|
|
Channel 12 (94) Tx 872.820 Rx 827.820
|
|
Channel 13 (73) Tx 872.190 Rx 827.190
|
|
Channel 14 (52) Tx 871.560 Rx 826.560
|
|
Channel 15 (31) Tx 870.930 Rx 825.930
|
|
Channel 16 (10) Tx 870.300 Rx 825.300
|
|
|
|
Cell # 10
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (324) Tx 879.720 Rx 834.720
|
|
Channel 2 (303) Tx 879.090 Rx 834.090
|
|
Channel 3 (282) Tx 878.460 Rx 833.460
|
|
Channel 4 (261) Tx 877.830 Rx 832.830
|
|
Channel 5 (240) Tx 877.200 Rx 832.200
|
|
Channel 6 (219) Tx 876.570 Rx 831.570
|
|
Channel 7 (198) Tx 875.940 Rx 830.940
|
|
Channel 8 (177) Tx 875.310 Rx 830.310
|
|
Channel 9 (156) Tx 874.680 Rx 829.680
|
|
Channel 10 (135) Tx 874.050 Rx 829.050
|
|
Channel 11 (114) Tx 873.420 Rx 828.420
|
|
Channel 12 (93) Tx 872.790 Rx 827.790
|
|
Channel 13 (72) Tx 872.160 Rx 827.160
|
|
Channel 14 (51) Tx 871.530 Rx 826.530
|
|
Channel 15 (30) Tx 870.900 Rx 825.900
|
|
Channel 16 (9) Tx 870.270 Rx 825.270
|
|
|
|
Cell # 11
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (323) Tx 879.690 Rx 834.690
|
|
Channel 2 (302) Tx 879.060 Rx 834.060
|
|
Channel 3 (281) Tx 878.430 Rx 833.430
|
|
Channel 4 (260) Tx 877.800 Rx 832.800
|
|
Channel 5 (239) Tx 877.170 Rx 832.170
|
|
Channel 6 (218) Tx 876.540 Rx 831.540
|
|
Channel 7 (197) Tx 875.910 Rx 830.910
|
|
Channel 8 (176) Tx 875.280 Rx 830.280
|
|
Channel 9 (155) Tx 874.650 Rx 829.650
|
|
Channel 10 (134) Tx 874.020 Rx 829.020
|
|
Channel 11 (113) Tx 873.390 Rx 828.390
|
|
Channel 12 (92) Tx 872.760 Rx 827.760
|
|
Channel 13 (71) Tx 872.130 Rx 827.130
|
|
Channel 14 (50) Tx 871.500 Rx 826.500
|
|
Channel 15 (29) Tx 870.870 Rx 825.870
|
|
Channel 16 (8) Tx 870.240 Rx 825.240
|
|
|
|
Cell # 12
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (322) Tx 879.660 Rx 834.660
|
|
Channel 2 (301) Tx 879.030 Rx 834.030
|
|
Channel 3 (280) Tx 878.400 Rx 833.400
|
|
Channel 4 (259) Tx 877.770 Rx 832.770
|
|
Channel 5 (238) Tx 877.140 Rx 832.140
|
|
Channel 6 (217) Tx 876.510 Rx 831.510
|
|
Channel 7 (196) Tx 875.880 Rx 830.880
|
|
Channel 8 (175) Tx 875.250 Rx 830.250
|
|
Channel 9 (154) Tx 874.620 Rx 829.620
|
|
Channel 10 (133) Tx 873.990 Rx 828.990
|
|
Channel 11 (112) Tx 873.360 Rx 828.360
|
|
Channel 12 (91) Tx 872.730 Rx 827.730
|
|
Channel 13 (70) Tx 872.100 Rx 827.100
|
|
Channel 14 (49) Tx 871.470 Rx 826.470
|
|
Channel 15 (28) Tx 870.840 Rx 825.840
|
|
Channel 16 (7) Tx 870.210 Rx 825.210
|
|
|
|
Cell # 13
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (321) Tx 879.630 Rx 834.630
|
|
Channel 2 (300) Tx 879.000 Rx 834.000
|
|
Channel 3 (279) Tx 878.370 Rx 833.370
|
|
Channel 4 (258) Tx 877.740 Rx 832.740
|
|
Channel 5 (237) Tx 877.110 Rx 832.110
|
|
Channel 6 (216) Tx 876.480 Rx 831.480
|
|
Channel 7 (195) Tx 875.850 Rx 830.850
|
|
Channel 8 (174) Tx 875.220 Rx 830.220
|
|
Channel 9 (153) Tx 874.590 Rx 829.590
|
|
Channel 10 (132) Tx 873.960 Rx 828.960
|
|
Channel 11 (111) Tx 873.330 Rx 828.330
|
|
Channel 12 (90) Tx 872.700 Rx 827.700
|
|
Channel 13 (69) Tx 872.070 Rx 827.070
|
|
Channel 14 (48) Tx 871.440 Rx 826.440
|
|
Channel 15 (27) Tx 870.810 Rx 825.810
|
|
Channel 16 (6) Tx 870.180 Rx 825.180
|
|
|
|
Cell # 14
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (320) Tx 879.600 Rx 834.600
|
|
Channel 2 (299) Tx 878.970 Rx 833.970
|
|
Channel 3 (278) Tx 878.340 Rx 833.340
|
|
Channel 4 (257) Tx 877.710 Rx 832.710
|
|
Channel 5 (236) Tx 877.080 Rx 832.080
|
|
Channel 6 (215) Tx 876.450 Rx 831.450
|
|
Channel 7 (194) Tx 875.820 Rx 830.820
|
|
Channel 8 (173) Tx 875.190 Rx 830.190
|
|
Channel 9 (152) Tx 874.560 Rx 829.560
|
|
Channel 10 (131) Tx 873.930 Rx 828.930
|
|
Channel 11 (110) Tx 873.300 Rx 828.300
|
|
Channel 12 (89) Tx 872.670 Rx 827.670
|
|
Channel 13 (68) Tx 872.040 Rx 827.040
|
|
Channel 14 (47) Tx 871.410 Rx 826.410
|
|
Channel 15 (26) Tx 870.780 Rx 825.780
|
|
Channel 16 (5) Tx 870.150 Rx 825.150
|
|
|
|
Cell # 15
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (319) Tx 879.570 Rx 834.570
|
|
Channel 2 (298) Tx 878.940 Rx 833.940
|
|
Channel 3 (277) Tx 878.310 Rx 833.310
|
|
Channel 4 (256) Tx 877.680 Rx 832.680
|
|
Channel 5 (235) Tx 877.050 Rx 832.050
|
|
Channel 6 (214) Tx 876.420 Rx 831.420
|
|
Channel 7 (193) Tx 875.790 Rx 830.790
|
|
Channel 8 (172) Tx 875.160 Rx 830.160
|
|
Channel 9 (151) Tx 874.530 Rx 829.530
|
|
Channel 10 (130) Tx 873.900 Rx 828.900
|
|
Channel 11 (109) Tx 873.270 Rx 828.270
|
|
Channel 12 (88) Tx 872.640 Rx 827.640
|
|
Channel 13 (67) Tx 872.010 Rx 827.010
|
|
Channel 14 (46) Tx 871.380 Rx 826.380
|
|
Channel 15 (25) Tx 870.750 Rx 825.750
|
|
Channel 16 (4) Tx 870.120 Rx 825.120
|
|
|
|
Cell # 16
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (318) Tx 879.540 Rx 834.540
|
|
Channel 2 (297) Tx 878.910 Rx 833.910
|
|
Channel 3 (276) Tx 878.280 Rx 833.280
|
|
Channel 4 (255) Tx 877.650 Rx 832.650
|
|
Channel 5 (234) Tx 877.020 Rx 832.020
|
|
Channel 6 (213) Tx 876.390 Rx 831.390
|
|
Channel 7 (192) Tx 875.760 Rx 830.760
|
|
Channel 8 (171) Tx 875.130 Rx 830.130
|
|
Channel 9 (150) Tx 874.500 Rx 829.500
|
|
Channel 10 (129) Tx 873.870 Rx 828.870
|
|
Channel 11 (108) Tx 873.240 Rx 828.240
|
|
Channel 12 (87) Tx 872.610 Rx 827.610
|
|
Channel 13 (66) Tx 871.980 Rx 826.980
|
|
Channel 14 (45) Tx 871.350 Rx 826.350
|
|
Channel 15 (24) Tx 870.720 Rx 825.720
|
|
Channel 16 (3) Tx 870.090 Rx 825.090
|
|
|
|
Cell # 17
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (317) Tx 879.510 Rx 834.510
|
|
Channel 2 (296) Tx 878.880 Rx 833.880
|
|
Channel 3 (275) Tx 878.250 Rx 833.250
|
|
Channel 4 (254) Tx 877.620 Rx 832.620
|
|
Channel 5 (233) Tx 876.990 Rx 831.990
|
|
Channel 6 (212) Tx 876.360 Rx 831.360
|
|
Channel 7 (191) Tx 875.730 Rx 830.730
|
|
Channel 8 (170) Tx 875.100 Rx 830.100
|
|
Channel 9 (149) Tx 874.470 Rx 829.470
|
|
Channel 10 (128) Tx 873.840 Rx 828.840
|
|
Channel 11 (107) Tx 873.210 Rx 828.210
|
|
Channel 12 (86) Tx 872.580 Rx 827.580
|
|
Channel 13 (65) Tx 871.950 Rx 826.950
|
|
Channel 14 (44) Tx 871.320 Rx 826.320
|
|
Channel 15 (23) Tx 870.690 Rx 825.690
|
|
Channel 16 (2) Tx 870.060 Rx 825.060
|
|
|
|
Cell # 18
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (316) Tx 879.480 Rx 834.480
|
|
Channel 2 (295) Tx 878.850 Rx 833.850
|
|
Channel 3 (274) Tx 878.220 Rx 833.220
|
|
Channel 4 (253) Tx 877.590 Rx 832.590
|
|
Channel 5 (232) Tx 876.960 Rx 831.960
|
|
Channel 6 (211) Tx 876.330 Rx 831.330
|
|
Channel 7 (190) Tx 875.700 Rx 830.700
|
|
Channel 8 (169) Tx 875.070 Rx 830.070
|
|
Channel 9 (148) Tx 874.440 Rx 829.440
|
|
Channel 10 (127) Tx 873.810 Rx 828.810
|
|
Channel 11 (106) Tx 873.180 Rx 828.180
|
|
Channel 12 (85) Tx 872.550 Rx 827.550
|
|
Channel 13 (64) Tx 871.920 Rx 826.920
|
|
Channel 14 (43) Tx 871.290 Rx 826.290
|
|
Channel 15 (22) Tx 870.660 Rx 825.660
|
|
Channel 16 (1) Tx 870.030 Rx 825.030
|
|
|
|
Cell # 19
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (315) Tx 879.450 Rx 834.450
|
|
Channel 2 (294) Tx 878.820 Rx 833.820
|
|
Channel 3 (273) Tx 878.190 Rx 833.190
|
|
Channel 4 (252) Tx 877.560 Rx 832.560
|
|
Channel 5 (231) Tx 876.930 Rx 831.930
|
|
Channel 6 (210) Tx 876.300 Rx 831.300
|
|
Channel 7 (189) Tx 875.670 Rx 830.670
|
|
Channel 8 (168) Tx 875.040 Rx 830.040
|
|
Channel 9 (147) Tx 874.410 Rx 829.410
|
|
Channel 10 (126) Tx 873.780 Rx 828.780
|
|
Channel 11 (105) Tx 873.150 Rx 828.150
|
|
Channel 12 (84) Tx 872.520 Rx 827.520
|
|
Channel 13 (63) Tx 871.890 Rx 826.890
|
|
Channel 14 (42) Tx 871.260 Rx 826.260
|
|
Channel 15 (21) Tx 870.630 Rx 825.630
|
|
|
|
Cell # 20
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (314) Tx 879.420 Rx 834.420
|
|
Channel 2 (293) Tx 878.790 Rx 833.790
|
|
Channel 3 (272) Tx 878.160 Rx 833.160
|
|
Channel 4 (251) Tx 877.530 Rx 832.530
|
|
Channel 5 (230) Tx 876.900 Rx 831.900
|
|
Channel 6 (209) Tx 876.270 Rx 831.270
|
|
Channel 7 (188) Tx 875.640 Rx 830.640
|
|
Channel 8 (167) Tx 875.010 Rx 830.010
|
|
Channel 9 (146) Tx 874.380 Rx 829.380
|
|
Channel 10 (125) Tx 873.750 Rx 828.750
|
|
Channel 11 (104) Tx 873.120 Rx 828.120
|
|
Channel 12 (83) Tx 872.490 Rx 827.490
|
|
Channel 13 (62) Tx 871.860 Rx 826.860
|
|
Channel 14 (41) Tx 871.230 Rx 826.230
|
|
Channel 15 (20) Tx 870.600 Rx 825.600
|
|
|
|
Cell # 21
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (313) Tx 879.390 Rx 834.390
|
|
Channel 2 (292) Tx 878.760 Rx 833.760
|
|
Channel 3 (271) Tx 878.130 Rx 833.130
|
|
Channel 4 (250) Tx 877.500 Rx 832.500
|
|
Channel 5 (229) Tx 876.870 Rx 831.870
|
|
Channel 6 (208) Tx 876.240 Rx 831.240
|
|
Channel 7 (187) Tx 875.610 Rx 830.610
|
|
Channel 8 (166) Tx 874.980 Rx 829.980
|
|
Channel 9 (145) Tx 874.350 Rx 829.350
|
|
Channel 10 (124) Tx 873.720 Rx 828.720
|
|
Channel 11 (103) Tx 873.090 Rx 828.090
|
|
Channel 12 (82) Tx 872.460 Rx 827.460
|
|
Channel 13 (61) Tx 871.830 Rx 826.830
|
|
Channel 14 (40) Tx 871.200 Rx 826.200
|
|
Channel 15 (19) Tx 870.570 Rx 825.570
|
|
|
|
**************************************************
|
|
|
|
Cellular Phone Band B (Channel 1 is Data)
|
|
|
|
Cell # 1
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (334) Tx 880.020 Rx 835.020
|
|
Channel 2 (355) Tx 880.650 Rx 835.650
|
|
Channel 3 (376) Tx 881.280 Rx 836.280
|
|
Channel 4 (397) Tx 881.910 Rx 836.910
|
|
Channel 5 (418) Tx 882.540 Rx 837.540
|
|
Channel 6 (439) Tx 883.170 Rx 838.170
|
|
Channel 7 (460) Tx 883.800 Rx 838.800
|
|
Channel 8 (481) Tx 884.430 Rx 839.430
|
|
Channel 9 (502) Tx 885.060 Rx 840.060
|
|
Channel 10 (523) Tx 885.690 Rx 840.690
|
|
Channel 11 (544) Tx 886.320 Rx 841.320
|
|
Channel 12 (565) Tx 886.950 Rx 841.950
|
|
Channel 13 (586) Tx 887.580 Rx 842.580
|
|
Channel 14 (607) Tx 888.210 Rx 843.210
|
|
Channel 15 (628) Tx 888.840 Rx 843.840
|
|
Channel 16 (649) Tx 889.470 Rx 844.470
|
|
|
|
Cell # 2
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (335) Tx 880.050 Rx 835.050
|
|
Channel 2 (356) Tx 880.680 Rx 835.680
|
|
Channel 3 (377) Tx 881.310 Rx 836.310
|
|
Channel 4 (398) Tx 881.940 Rx 836.940
|
|
Channel 5 (419) Tx 882.570 Rx 837.570
|
|
Channel 6 (440) Tx 883.200 Rx 838.200
|
|
Channel 7 (461) Tx 883.830 Rx 838.830
|
|
Channel 8 (482) Tx 884.460 Rx 839.460
|
|
Channel 9 (503) Tx 885.090 Rx 840.090
|
|
Channel 10 (524) Tx 885.720 Rx 840.720
|
|
Channel 11 (545) Tx 886.350 Rx 841.350
|
|
Channel 12 (566) Tx 886.980 Rx 841.980
|
|
Channel 13 (587) Tx 887.610 Rx 842.610
|
|
Channel 14 (608) Tx 888.240 Rx 843.240
|
|
Channel 15 (629) Tx 888.870 Rx 843.870
|
|
Channel 16 (650) Tx 889.500 Rx 844.500
|
|
|
|
Cell # 3
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (336) Tx 880.080 Rx 835.080
|
|
Channel 2 (357) Tx 880.710 Rx 835.710
|
|
Channel 3 (378) Tx 881.340 Rx 836.340
|
|
Channel 4 (399) Tx 881.970 Rx 836.970
|
|
Channel 5 (420) Tx 882.600 Rx 837.600
|
|
Channel 6 (441) Tx 883.230 Rx 838.230
|
|
Channel 7 (462) Tx 883.860 Rx 838.860
|
|
Channel 8 (483) Tx 884.490 Rx 839.490
|
|
Channel 9 (504) Tx 885.120 Rx 840.120
|
|
Channel 10 (525) Tx 885.750 Rx 840.750
|
|
Channel 11 (546) Tx 886.380 Rx 841.380
|
|
Channel 12 (567) Tx 887.010 Rx 842.010
|
|
Channel 13 (588) Tx 887.640 Rx 842.640
|
|
Channel 14 (609) Tx 888.270 Rx 843.270
|
|
Channel 15 (630) Tx 888.900 Rx 843.900
|
|
Channel 16 (651) Tx 889.530 Rx 844.530
|
|
|
|
Cell # 4
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (337) Tx 880.110 Rx 835.110
|
|
Channel 2 (358) Tx 880.740 Rx 835.740
|
|
Channel 3 (379) Tx 881.370 Rx 836.370
|
|
Channel 4 (400) Tx 882.000 Rx 837.000
|
|
Channel 5 (421) Tx 882.630 Rx 837.630
|
|
Channel 6 (442) Tx 883.260 Rx 838.260
|
|
Channel 7 (463) Tx 883.890 Rx 838.890
|
|
Channel 8 (484) Tx 884.520 Rx 839.520
|
|
Channel 9 (505) Tx 885.150 Rx 840.150
|
|
Channel 10 (526) Tx 885.780 Rx 840.780
|
|
Channel 11 (547) Tx 886.410 Rx 841.410
|
|
Channel 12 (568) Tx 887.040 Rx 842.040
|
|
Channel 13 (589) Tx 887.670 Rx 842.670
|
|
Channel 14 (610) Tx 888.300 Rx 843.300
|
|
Channel 15 (631) Tx 888.930 Rx 843.930
|
|
Channel 16 (652) Tx 889.560 Rx 844.560
|
|
|
|
Cell # 5
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (338) Tx 880.140 Rx 835.140
|
|
Channel 2 (359) Tx 880.770 Rx 835.770
|
|
Channel 3 (380) Tx 881.400 Rx 836.400
|
|
Channel 4 (401) Tx 882.030 Rx 837.030
|
|
Channel 5 (422) Tx 882.660 Rx 837.660
|
|
Channel 6 (443) Tx 883.290 Rx 838.290
|
|
Channel 7 (464) Tx 883.920 Rx 838.920
|
|
Channel 8 (485) Tx 884.550 Rx 839.550
|
|
Channel 9 (506) Tx 885.180 Rx 840.180
|
|
Channel 10 (527) Tx 885.810 Rx 840.810
|
|
Channel 11 (548) Tx 886.440 Rx 841.440
|
|
Channel 12 (569) Tx 887.070 Rx 842.070
|
|
Channel 13 (590) Tx 887.700 Rx 842.700
|
|
Channel 14 (611) Tx 888.330 Rx 843.330
|
|
Channel 15 (632) Tx 888.960 Rx 843.960
|
|
Channel 16 (653) Tx 889.590 Rx 844.590
|
|
|
|
Cell # 6
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (339) Tx 880.170 Rx 835.170
|
|
Channel 2 (360) Tx 880.800 Rx 835.800
|
|
Channel 3 (381) Tx 881.430 Rx 836.430
|
|
Channel 4 (402) Tx 882.060 Rx 837.060
|
|
Channel 5 (423) Tx 882.690 Rx 837.690
|
|
Channel 6 (444) Tx 883.320 Rx 838.320
|
|
Channel 7 (465) Tx 883.950 Rx 838.950
|
|
Channel 8 (486) Tx 884.580 Rx 839.580
|
|
Channel 9 (507) Tx 885.210 Rx 840.210
|
|
Channel 10 (528) Tx 885.840 Rx 840.840
|
|
Channel 11 (549) Tx 886.470 Rx 841.470
|
|
Channel 12 (570) Tx 887.100 Rx 842.100
|
|
Channel 13 (591) Tx 887.730 Rx 842.730
|
|
Channel 14 (612) Tx 888.360 Rx 843.360
|
|
Channel 15 (633) Tx 888.990 Rx 843.990
|
|
Channel 16 (654) Tx 889.620 Rx 844.620
|
|
|
|
Cell # 7
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (340) Tx 880.200 Rx 835.200
|
|
Channel 2 (361) Tx 880.830 Rx 835.830
|
|
Channel 3 (382) Tx 881.460 Rx 836.460
|
|
Channel 4 (403) Tx 882.090 Rx 837.090
|
|
Channel 5 (424) Tx 882.720 Rx 837.720
|
|
Channel 6 (445) Tx 883.350 Rx 838.350
|
|
Channel 7 (466) Tx 883.980 Rx 838.980
|
|
Channel 8 (487) Tx 884.610 Rx 839.610
|
|
Channel 9 (508) Tx 885.240 Rx 840.240
|
|
Channel 10 (529) Tx 885.870 Rx 840.870
|
|
Channel 11 (550) Tx 886.500 Rx 841.500
|
|
Channel 12 (571) Tx 887.130 Rx 842.130
|
|
Channel 13 (592) Tx 887.760 Rx 842.760
|
|
Channel 14 (613) Tx 888.390 Rx 843.390
|
|
Channel 15 (634) Tx 889.020 Rx 844.020
|
|
Channel 16 (655) Tx 889.650 Rx 844.650
|
|
|
|
Cell # 8
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (341) Tx 880.230 Rx 835.230
|
|
Channel 2 (362) Tx 880.860 Rx 835.860
|
|
Channel 3 (383) Tx 881.490 Rx 836.490
|
|
Channel 4 (404) Tx 882.120 Rx 837.120
|
|
Channel 5 (425) Tx 882.750 Rx 837.750
|
|
Channel 6 (446) Tx 883.380 Rx 838.380
|
|
Channel 7 (467) Tx 884.010 Rx 839.010
|
|
Channel 8 (488) Tx 884.640 Rx 839.640
|
|
Channel 9 (509) Tx 885.270 Rx 840.270
|
|
Channel 10 (530) Tx 885.900 Rx 840.900
|
|
Channel 11 (551) Tx 886.530 Rx 841.530
|
|
Channel 12 (572) Tx 887.160 Rx 842.160
|
|
Channel 13 (593) Tx 887.790 Rx 842.790
|
|
Channel 14 (614) Tx 888.420 Rx 843.420
|
|
Channel 15 (635) Tx 889.050 Rx 844.050
|
|
Channel 16 (656) Tx 889.680 Rx 844.680
|
|
|
|
Cell # 9
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (342) Tx 880.260 Rx 835.260
|
|
Channel 2 (363) Tx 880.890 Rx 835.890
|
|
Channel 3 (384) Tx 881.520 Rx 836.520
|
|
Channel 4 (405) Tx 882.150 Rx 837.150
|
|
Channel 5 (426) Tx 882.780 Rx 837.780
|
|
Channel 6 (447) Tx 883.410 Rx 838.410
|
|
Channel 7 (468) Tx 884.040 Rx 839.040
|
|
Channel 8 (489) Tx 884.670 Rx 839.670
|
|
Channel 9 (510) Tx 885.300 Rx 840.300
|
|
Channel 10 (531) Tx 885.930 Rx 840.930
|
|
Channel 11 (552) Tx 886.560 Rx 841.560
|
|
Channel 12 (573) Tx 887.190 Rx 842.190
|
|
Channel 13 (594) Tx 887.820 Rx 842.820
|
|
Channel 14 (615) Tx 888.450 Rx 843.450
|
|
Channel 15 (636) Tx 889.080 Rx 844.080
|
|
Channel 16 (657) Tx 889.710 Rx 844.710
|
|
|
|
Cell # 10
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (343) Tx 880.290 Rx 835.290
|
|
Channel 2 (364) Tx 880.920 Rx 835.920
|
|
Channel 3 (385) Tx 881.550 Rx 836.550
|
|
Channel 4 (406) Tx 882.180 Rx 837.180
|
|
Channel 5 (427) Tx 882.810 Rx 837.810
|
|
Channel 6 (448) Tx 883.440 Rx 838.440
|
|
Channel 7 (469) Tx 884.070 Rx 839.070
|
|
Channel 8 (490) Tx 884.700 Rx 839.700
|
|
Channel 9 (511) Tx 885.330 Rx 840.330
|
|
Channel 10 (532) Tx 885.960 Rx 840.960
|
|
Channel 11 (553) Tx 886.590 Rx 841.590
|
|
Channel 12 (574) Tx 887.220 Rx 842.220
|
|
Channel 13 (595) Tx 887.850 Rx 842.850
|
|
Channel 14 (616) Tx 888.480 Rx 843.480
|
|
Channel 15 (637) Tx 889.110 Rx 844.110
|
|
Channel 16 (658) Tx 889.740 Rx 844.740
|
|
|
|
Cell # 11
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (344) Tx 880.320 Rx 835.320
|
|
Channel 2 (365) Tx 880.950 Rx 835.950
|
|
Channel 3 (386) Tx 881.580 Rx 836.580
|
|
Channel 4 (407) Tx 882.210 Rx 837.210
|
|
Channel 5 (428) Tx 882.840 Rx 837.840
|
|
Channel 6 (449) Tx 883.470 Rx 838.470
|
|
Channel 7 (470) Tx 884.100 Rx 839.100
|
|
Channel 8 (491) Tx 884.730 Rx 839.730
|
|
Channel 9 (512) Tx 885.360 Rx 840.360
|
|
Channel 10 (533) Tx 885.990 Rx 840.990
|
|
Channel 11 (554) Tx 886.620 Rx 841.620
|
|
Channel 12 (575) Tx 887.250 Rx 842.250
|
|
Channel 13 (596) Tx 887.880 Rx 842.880
|
|
Channel 14 (617) Tx 888.510 Rx 843.510
|
|
Channel 15 (638) Tx 889.140 Rx 844.140
|
|
Channel 16 (659) Tx 889.770 Rx 844.770
|
|
|
|
Cell # 12
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (345) Tx 880.350 Rx 835.350
|
|
Channel 2 (366) Tx 880.980 Rx 835.980
|
|
Channel 3 (387) Tx 881.610 Rx 836.610
|
|
Channel 4 (408) Tx 882.240 Rx 837.240
|
|
Channel 5 (429) Tx 882.870 Rx 837.870
|
|
Channel 6 (450) Tx 883.500 Rx 838.500
|
|
Channel 7 (471) Tx 884.130 Rx 839.130
|
|
Channel 8 (492) Tx 884.760 Rx 839.760
|
|
Channel 9 (513) Tx 885.390 Rx 840.390
|
|
Channel 10 (534) Tx 886.020 Rx 841.020
|
|
Channel 11 (555) Tx 886.650 Rx 841.650
|
|
Channel 12 (576) Tx 887.280 Rx 842.280
|
|
Channel 13 (597) Tx 887.910 Rx 842.910
|
|
Channel 14 (618) Tx 888.540 Rx 843.540
|
|
Channel 15 (639) Tx 889.170 Rx 844.170
|
|
Channel 16 (660) Tx 889.800 Rx 844.800
|
|
|
|
Cell # 13
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (346) Tx 880.380 Rx 835.380
|
|
Channel 2 (367) Tx 881.010 Rx 836.010
|
|
Channel 3 (388) Tx 881.640 Rx 836.640
|
|
Channel 4 (409) Tx 882.270 Rx 837.270
|
|
Channel 5 (430) Tx 882.900 Rx 837.900
|
|
Channel 6 (451) Tx 883.530 Rx 838.530
|
|
Channel 7 (472) Tx 884.160 Rx 839.160
|
|
Channel 8 (493) Tx 884.790 Rx 839.790
|
|
Channel 9 (514) Tx 885.420 Rx 840.420
|
|
Channel 10 (535) Tx 886.050 Rx 841.050
|
|
Channel 11 (556) Tx 886.680 Rx 841.680
|
|
Channel 12 (577) Tx 887.310 Rx 842.310
|
|
Channel 13 (598) Tx 887.940 Rx 842.940
|
|
Channel 14 (619) Tx 888.570 Rx 843.570
|
|
Channel 15 (640) Tx 889.200 Rx 844.200
|
|
Channel 16 (661) Tx 889.830 Rx 844.830
|
|
|
|
Cell # 14
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (347) Tx 880.410 Rx 835.410
|
|
Channel 2 (368) Tx 881.040 Rx 836.040
|
|
Channel 3 (389) Tx 881.670 Rx 836.670
|
|
Channel 4 (410) Tx 882.300 Rx 837.300
|
|
Channel 5 (431) Tx 882.930 Rx 837.930
|
|
Channel 6 (452) Tx 883.560 Rx 838.560
|
|
Channel 7 (473) Tx 884.190 Rx 839.190
|
|
Channel 8 (494) Tx 884.820 Rx 839.820
|
|
Channel 9 (515) Tx 885.450 Rx 840.450
|
|
Channel 10 (536) Tx 886.080 Rx 841.080
|
|
Channel 11 (557) Tx 886.710 Rx 841.710
|
|
Channel 12 (578) Tx 887.340 Rx 842.340
|
|
Channel 13 (599) Tx 887.970 Rx 842.970
|
|
Channel 14 (620) Tx 888.600 Rx 843.600
|
|
Channel 15 (641) Tx 889.230 Rx 844.230
|
|
Channel 16 (662) Tx 889.860 Rx 844.860
|
|
|
|
Cell # 15
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (348) Tx 880.440 Rx 835.440
|
|
Channel 2 (369) Tx 881.070 Rx 836.070
|
|
Channel 3 (390) Tx 881.700 Rx 836.700
|
|
Channel 4 (411) Tx 882.330 Rx 837.330
|
|
Channel 5 (432) Tx 882.960 Rx 837.960
|
|
Channel 6 (453) Tx 883.590 Rx 838.590
|
|
Channel 7 (474) Tx 884.220 Rx 839.220
|
|
Channel 8 (495) Tx 884.850 Rx 839.850
|
|
Channel 9 (516) Tx 885.480 Rx 840.480
|
|
Channel 10 (537) Tx 886.110 Rx 841.110
|
|
Channel 11 (558) Tx 886.740 Rx 841.740
|
|
Channel 12 (579) Tx 887.370 Rx 842.370
|
|
Channel 13 (600) Tx 888.000 Rx 843.000
|
|
Channel 14 (621) Tx 888.630 Rx 843.630
|
|
Channel 15 (642) Tx 889.260 Rx 844.260
|
|
Channel 16 (663) Tx 889.890 Rx 844.890
|
|
|
|
Cell # 16
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (349) Tx 880.470 Rx 835.470
|
|
Channel 2 (370) Tx 881.100 Rx 836.100
|
|
Channel 3 (391) Tx 881.730 Rx 836.730
|
|
Channel 4 (412) Tx 882.360 Rx 837.360
|
|
Channel 5 (433) Tx 882.990 Rx 837.990
|
|
Channel 6 (454) Tx 883.620 Rx 838.620
|
|
Channel 7 (475) Tx 884.250 Rx 839.250
|
|
Channel 8 (496) Tx 884.880 Rx 839.880
|
|
Channel 9 (517) Tx 885.510 Rx 840.510
|
|
Channel 10 (538) Tx 886.140 Rx 841.140
|
|
Channel 11 (559) Tx 886.770 Rx 841.770
|
|
Channel 12 (580) Tx 887.400 Rx 842.400
|
|
Channel 13 (601) Tx 888.030 Rx 843.030
|
|
Channel 14 (622) Tx 888.660 Rx 843.660
|
|
Channel 15 (643) Tx 889.290 Rx 844.290
|
|
Channel 16 (664) Tx 889.920 Rx 844.920
|
|
|
|
Cell # 17
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (350) Tx 880.500 Rx 835.500
|
|
Channel 2 (371) Tx 881.130 Rx 836.130
|
|
Channel 3 (392) Tx 881.760 Rx 836.760
|
|
Channel 4 (413) Tx 882.390 Rx 837.390
|
|
Channel 5 (434) Tx 883.020 Rx 838.020
|
|
Channel 6 (455) Tx 883.650 Rx 838.650
|
|
Channel 7 (476) Tx 884.280 Rx 839.280
|
|
Channel 8 (497) Tx 884.910 Rx 839.910
|
|
Channel 9 (518) Tx 885.540 Rx 840.540
|
|
Channel 10 (539) Tx 886.170 Rx 841.170
|
|
Channel 11 (560) Tx 886.800 Rx 841.800
|
|
Channel 12 (581) Tx 887.430 Rx 842.430
|
|
Channel 13 (602) Tx 888.060 Rx 843.060
|
|
Channel 14 (623) Tx 888.690 Rx 843.690
|
|
Channel 15 (644) Tx 889.320 Rx 844.320
|
|
Channel 16 (665) Tx 889.950 Rx 844.950
|
|
|
|
Cell # 18
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (351) Tx 880.530 Rx 835.530
|
|
Channel 2 (372) Tx 881.160 Rx 836.160
|
|
Channel 3 (393) Tx 881.790 Rx 836.790
|
|
Channel 4 (414) Tx 882.420 Rx 837.420
|
|
Channel 5 (435) Tx 883.050 Rx 838.050
|
|
Channel 6 (456) Tx 883.680 Rx 838.680
|
|
Channel 7 (477) Tx 884.310 Rx 839.310
|
|
Channel 8 (498) Tx 884.940 Rx 839.940
|
|
Channel 9 (519) Tx 885.570 Rx 840.570
|
|
Channel 10 (540) Tx 886.200 Rx 841.200
|
|
Channel 11 (561) Tx 886.830 Rx 841.830
|
|
Channel 12 (582) Tx 887.460 Rx 842.460
|
|
Channel 13 (603) Tx 888.090 Rx 843.090
|
|
Channel 14 (624) Tx 888.720 Rx 843.720
|
|
Channel 15 (645) Tx 889.350 Rx 844.350
|
|
Channel 16 (666) Tx 889.980 Rx 844.980
|
|
|
|
Cell # 19
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (352) Tx 880.560 Rx 835.560
|
|
Channel 2 (373) Tx 881.190 Rx 836.190
|
|
Channel 3 (394) Tx 881.820 Rx 836.820
|
|
Channel 4 (415) Tx 882.450 Rx 837.450
|
|
Channel 5 (436) Tx 883.080 Rx 838.080
|
|
Channel 6 (457) Tx 883.710 Rx 838.710
|
|
Channel 7 (478) Tx 884.340 Rx 839.340
|
|
Channel 8 (499) Tx 884.970 Rx 839.970
|
|
Channel 9 (520) Tx 885.600 Rx 840.600
|
|
Channel 10 (541) Tx 886.230 Rx 841.230
|
|
Channel 11 (562) Tx 886.860 Rx 841.860
|
|
Channel 12 (583) Tx 887.490 Rx 842.490
|
|
Channel 13 (604) Tx 888.120 Rx 843.120
|
|
Channel 14 (625) Tx 888.750 Rx 843.750
|
|
Channel 15 (646) Tx 889.380 Rx 844.380
|
|
|
|
Cell # 20
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (353) Tx 880.590 Rx 835.590
|
|
Channel 2 (374) Tx 881.220 Rx 836.220
|
|
Channel 3 (395) Tx 881.850 Rx 836.850
|
|
Channel 4 (416) Tx 882.480 Rx 837.480
|
|
Channel 5 (437) Tx 883.110 Rx 838.110
|
|
Channel 6 (458) Tx 883.740 Rx 838.740
|
|
Channel 7 (479) Tx 884.370 Rx 839.370
|
|
Channel 8 (500) Tx 885.000 Rx 840.000
|
|
Channel 9 (521) Tx 885.630 Rx 840.630
|
|
Channel 10 (542) Tx 886.260 Rx 841.260
|
|
Channel 11 (563) Tx 886.890 Rx 841.890
|
|
Channel 12 (584) Tx 887.520 Rx 842.520
|
|
Channel 13 (605) Tx 888.150 Rx 843.150
|
|
Channel 14 (626) Tx 888.780 Rx 843.780
|
|
Channel 15 (647) Tx 889.410 Rx 844.410
|
|
|
|
Cell # 21
|
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
|
Channel 1 (354) Tx 880.620 Rx 835.620
|
|
Channel 2 (375) Tx 881.250 Rx 836.250
|
|
Channel 3 (396) Tx 881.880 Rx 836.880
|
|
Channel 4 (417) Tx 882.510 Rx 837.510
|
|
Channel 5 (438) Tx 883.140 Rx 838.140
|
|
Channel 6 (459) Tx 883.770 Rx 838.770
|
|
Channel 7 (480) Tx 884.400 Rx 839.400
|
|
Channel 8 (501) Tx 885.030 Rx 840.030
|
|
Channel 9 (522) Tx 885.660 Rx 840.660
|
|
Channel 10 (543) Tx 886.290 Rx 841.290
|
|
Channel 11 (564) Tx 886.920 Rx 841.920
|
|
Channel 12 (585) Tx 887.550 Rx 842.550
|
|
Channel 13 (606) Tx 888.180 Rx 843.180
|
|
Channel 14 (627) Tx 888.810 Rx 843.810
|
|
Channel 15 (648) Tx 889.440 Rx 844.440
|
|
|
|
|
|
Restoring cellular reception.
|
|
Some scanners have been blocked from receiving the cellular band. This
|
|
can be corrected. It started out with the Realistic PRO-2004 and the PRO-34,
|
|
and went to the PRO-2005. To restore cellular for the 2004, open the radio
|
|
and turn it upside down. Carefully remove the cover. Clip one leg of D-513 to
|
|
restore cellular frequencies. For the PRO-2005, the procedure is the same,
|
|
except you clip one leg of D-502 to restore cellular reception. On the PRO-34
|
|
and PRO-37, Cut D11 to add 824-851 and 869-896 MHz bands with 30 kHz spacing
|
|
|
|
All these are described in great detail in the "Scanner Modification
|
|
Handbook" volumes I. and II. by Bill Cheek, both available from Communications
|
|
Electronics Inc. (313) 996-8888. They run about $18 apiece.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Pagers:
|
|
-------
|
|
Pocket pagers and the like operate in the area of 150-160 MHz.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Phone-Patches:
|
|
--------------
|
|
A phone patch is a way to use a telephone via two-way radio. Basically how
|
|
it works is the patch is connected to a repeater and a phone. The patch will
|
|
interpret signals from a transceiver to activate itself and call out to the
|
|
desired party. This then allows the person with the transceiver to call anyone
|
|
from his handheld radio unit. Phone-Patches are usually located on most bands,
|
|
as they are simply an attachment to the repeater.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Police, Fire, Ambulance and the like:
|
|
-------------------------------------
|
|
The easiest way to find these frequencies is to go to Radio Shack and buy
|
|
their listing, it runs around $8, and is set up for groups of neighboring
|
|
states. Hell, photocopy the pages you want and then return it! But generally
|
|
these are located in 450-460 MHz.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Typical Band Usage:
|
|
-------------------
|
|
|
|
The FCC dictates who uses what bands for radio broadcast. Following is a
|
|
breakdown of the general distribution of FCC licensing. These are by NO means
|
|
set in stone, there are always exceptions.
|
|
|
|
Abbreviations:
|
|
|
|
BA Remote Broadcast (Radio & TV)
|
|
CA General Mobile (Radio)
|
|
CAP Civil Air Patrol
|
|
IB Business
|
|
IF Forest Products
|
|
IM Motion Picture Industry
|
|
IP Petroleum Industry
|
|
IS Special Industry (Construction, farming, etc.)
|
|
IT Telephone Maintenance
|
|
IW Power and Water Utilities
|
|
IX Manufacturers
|
|
IY Relay Press (Newspaper Reporters)
|
|
LA Automotive Emergency ( Tow Trucks)
|
|
LJ Motor Carriers, Trucks
|
|
LR Railroad
|
|
LU Motor Carrier, Buses
|
|
LX Taxi
|
|
MC Maritime Limited Coast (private stations)
|
|
MG Maritime Government (Coast Guard)
|
|
MP Maritime Public Coast (marine telephone)
|
|
MS Maritime Shipboard
|
|
PF Fire
|
|
PH Highway Maintenance
|
|
PL Local Government
|
|
PM Medical Services
|
|
PO Forestry Conservation
|
|
PP Police
|
|
PS Special Emergency
|
|
RA Mobile Telephone (aircraft)
|
|
RC Mobile Telephone (radio common carrier)
|
|
RT Mobile Telephone (landline companies)
|
|
BIFC Boise Interagency Fire Cache
|
|
|
|
Govt:
|
|
UAF Air Force
|
|
UAR Army
|
|
UBW Boundary and Water Commission
|
|
UCE Evironmental Research Labs
|
|
UCF Maritime Fisheries Service
|
|
UCG Coast Guard
|
|
UCM Maritime Administration
|
|
UCO Ocean Survey
|
|
UCP National Capitol Police
|
|
UCW National Weather Service
|
|
UCX Department of Commerce
|
|
UEP Environmental Protection Agency
|
|
UER Department of Energy
|
|
UFA Federal Aviation Administration
|
|
UFC Federal Communications Commision
|
|
UGC Soil Conservation Service
|
|
UGF Forest Service
|
|
UGS General Services Administration
|
|
UGX Department of Agriculture
|
|
UHW Dept. of Health and Human Services
|
|
UIB Bonneville Power Administration
|
|
UIF Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife
|
|
UIG Geological Survey
|
|
UII Bureau of Indian Affairs
|
|
UIL Bureau of Land Management
|
|
UIM Bureau of Mines
|
|
UIP National Park Service
|
|
UIR Bureau of Rclamation
|
|
UIS Southwestern Power Administration
|
|
UIX Department of the Interior
|
|
UNO United Nations
|
|
UNS Nasa
|
|
UPO Postal Service
|
|
USA Misc. Federal Government
|
|
USD State Department
|
|
USN Navy
|
|
UTC Bureau of Customs
|
|
UTM Bureau of the Mint
|
|
UTR Department of Transportation
|
|
UTV Tennessee Valley Authority
|
|
UTX Treasury Department
|
|
UVA Veterans Administration
|
|
UXX Classified
|
|
|
|
Band Usage:
|
|
|
|
30-50 MHz:
|
|
|
|
30.00 - 30.55 USA,UAR,USN,UCG,UAF
|
|
30.58 - 31.98 IS,IP,IB,LU,PO
|
|
32.00 - 32.99 USA,UAR,USN,UCG,UGX,UAF,UIR
|
|
33.02 - 33.98 PS,PH,IS,IB,IP,PF
|
|
34.01 - 34.99 UCG,UER,USA,UAR,UAF,USN,UGX,UIP,UIF
|
|
35.02 - 35.98 IB,IT,RC,RT,IS,PS
|
|
36.01 - 36.99 UIX,UER,USA,UAR,USN,UTR,UCO,IP,UHW,UGF,UGX,UAF
|
|
37.02 - 37.98 PP,PL,IW,PH,PS
|
|
38.27 - 38.99 USA,USN,UGX,UGF,UAR,UAF,UIX,UTV,UVA
|
|
39.02 - 39.98 PP,PL
|
|
40.01 - 41.99 UIA,UAR,UIP,UAF,USA,UVA,UER,USN,UIF,UIR,UTV,UIM,IP
|
|
UIX,UEP,UCG,UIL,BIFC,UHW,UTX
|
|
42.02 - 42.94 PP
|
|
42.96 - 43.68 IB,IS,IT,RC,RT,PS
|
|
43.70 - 44.60 LU,LJ
|
|
44.62 - 46.58 PP,PO,PL,PH,PF,PS
|
|
46.61 - 46.99 USA,UIL,BIFC,UAF,UAR,UGX,UGF
|
|
47.02 - 49.58 PH,PS,IS,IW,IF,IP
|
|
49.61 - 49.99 UIL,UAR,UGC,UAF,UAR,UGX,UGF,USA
|
|
|
|
150-173 MHz:
|
|
|
|
150.775 - 151.985 PM,LA,IF,PH,PO,IS,IB
|
|
152.075 - 152.840 PM,RC,LX,IF,IB,RT
|
|
152.870 - 153.725 IM,IS,IP,IX,IF,IW
|
|
153.740 - 156.240 PL,PF,IS,IB,PP,PM,PH
|
|
156.255 - 157.450 IP,MC,MS,MG,MP,PM
|
|
157.470 - 158.700 LA,LX,IF,IS,IB,RT,IW,IP,IX,IT,RC
|
|
158.730 - 159.480 PP,PL,PH,PO,IP
|
|
159.495 - 161.565 LR,LJ
|
|
161.580 - 162.000 IP,MC,BA,MP
|
|
162.025 - 173.987 MISC GOVT AGENCIES
|
|
|
|
406-512 MHz:
|
|
|
|
406.125 - 419.975 MISC GOVT AGENCIES
|
|
450.050 - 450.925 BA
|
|
451.000 - 451.700 IW,IF,IP,IT,IX
|
|
451.725 - 452.175 IS,IF,IP,LX
|
|
452.200 - 452.950 LX,LJ,LR,LA
|
|
452.975 - 453.975 IY,PL,PH,PF,PO,PP
|
|
454.000 - 457.600 IPI,RC,RT,RA,BA,IB
|
|
458.025 - 467.925 PM,PP,IB,IX,IF,IP,IT,IW,GM
|
|
482.000 - 508.987 MISC PUBLIC SAFETY
|
|
|
|
800 MHz:
|
|
|
|
Unlike lower bands, the 800 MHz band is allocated on a first-come first-serve
|
|
basis. There are two categories for licensing: Public Safety and Industrial.
|
|
Sytemsusing one to five channels are conventional. Five channel systems might
|
|
use trunking, but all systems with more than five channels must use trunking.
|
|
|
|
851.0125 - 855.9875 Conventional Systems
|
|
856.0125 - 860.9875 Conventional or Trunked
|
|
861.0125 - 865.9875 Trunked Systems
|
|
866.0000 - 869.9999 Reserved-Satelite
|
|
870.0000 - 896.0000 Cellular Telephone
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
|
|
- -
|
|
- -
|
|
= Loops Explained =
|
|
- -
|
|
anonymous
|
|
- -
|
|
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
|
|
|
|
|
|
Loops occur in all area codes and consist of two phone numbers. These
|
|
numbers are in the same exchange and the last four digits are usually similar.
|
|
a typical loop pair might look like 212-555-9990 and 555-9993. There are
|
|
usually at least twenty loops in an area code and often all of the loops in an
|
|
area code will have identical suffix pairs.
|
|
|
|
The basic thing about any loop is that the two numbers are connected
|
|
together. If I were to call one number and you were to call the other we'd be
|
|
connected. It's all a bit eerie at first because most loops do not ring; if
|
|
you dial a loop and there is someone on the other end you will be instantly
|
|
connected. What will you hear if you dial a loop number and there's no one on
|
|
the other end? That depends upon which of the numbers you dial. If you dial
|
|
the higher number of the pair you will hear only silence; if you dial the
|
|
lower you will hear a 1000 Hz tone. On most loops you can talk to one caller
|
|
after another on the other end, very much like any other phone connection. You
|
|
may be asking so what? The answer to your question is that loops offer
|
|
anonymity. People use this anonymity for many reasons.
|
|
|
|
We are now to the point of wondering what telco uses loops for. There
|
|
have been a number of theories advanced on this topic over the years but few
|
|
people have bothered to ask telco. One common theory has been akin to the idea
|
|
that the loops are somehow used to "tie up" unused phone lines at the central
|
|
office to "keep them out of trouble." (I have always enjoyed the image of two
|
|
lonely phone lines tied together to keep them company.)
|
|
|
|
Loops are used to save time and manpower in testing long distance trunks;
|
|
we're not talking about the phone line that connects your phone to the
|
|
central office but the trunks that connect central offices and run in length
|
|
from a few thousand feet to many miles. When you talk on the phone, your voice
|
|
and the caller's voice go in different directions. Once the line gets to
|
|
telco premises the signal is divided up into two circuits. One circuit
|
|
carries your voice and the other carries your caller's voice. If the signals
|
|
were kept on one circuit there would be problems with feedback and echoes.
|
|
Trunks may consist of two pairs of two wire circuits or may be radio
|
|
frequency carriers on a cable. Trunks have repeaters along the way which
|
|
amplify the signal remove echoes and equalize frequencies. Repeaters occur
|
|
about every two miles on an "old style" wire trunk line and about every 2000
|
|
feet on carrier trunks. Very short trunks may not have a repeater. Repeaters
|
|
need to be tested and adjusted occasionally. In the old days a tech would
|
|
test a trunk by arranging for someone to be at The other end. He would then
|
|
send a 1000 Hz test tone to the other person who would read the volume on a
|
|
meter. To complete the test the other tech sends a signal back on the other
|
|
leg to the first tech as the phone system grew telco decided to cut down on
|
|
manpower by tying two lines together. Thus the loop was born. Trunks are
|
|
tied together via a thing called a "zero loss terminator" which connects lines
|
|
so there is no change in volume. By the mid fifties, the entire phone system
|
|
had been equipped with loops, so a tech at one end could test a trunk alone
|
|
by dialing a loop. he dials the other half of the loop with a known good
|
|
trunk. Then he reverses the signal path to complete the test.
|
|
|
|
It wasn't long before some ordinary citizens discovered that loops could
|
|
also pass voices, not just tones. Since the lines be longed to telco they
|
|
weren't billed for the call. So a few people made free calls to friends but
|
|
there was so little of this that its effect on the phone company's income was
|
|
negligible. It wasn't until years later in the early seventies that bell was
|
|
to put billing circuitry on loop numbers. To avoid giving away their location
|
|
most bookies used a cheesebox a device that connects two phone lines together.
|
|
Cheeseboxes were installed in a small business, often a small butcher shop or a
|
|
grocery. The bookie arranged with the proprietor to have two phones installed
|
|
in the shop and would pay a small monthly fee. He then tied the lines together
|
|
with his cheesebox and gave one of the numbers to his clientel. Some bookies
|
|
Either couldn't afford a cheesebox or couldn't locate one at any price, so they
|
|
hit upon using loops.
|
|
|
|
It was good while it lasted. Gradually however, more and more shady
|
|
characters started using loops. The authorities weren't blind to this and
|
|
started approaching the telco to do traces on these loops. Eventually the
|
|
phone company was spending a lot of time and money on criminal traces and
|
|
decided to do something about these loops.
|
|
|
|
In the late 50's, the phone company started inserting a bandpass filter
|
|
that passed only 1000 Hz in the terminator end of its' loops. With this change
|
|
it successfully blocked voices.
|
|
|
|
We're going to see that the solution was only temporary though. The old
|
|
style four wire trunks could only handle one call at a time taking up a lot
|
|
of wire and space. There had to be a way to cram calls into a smaller space.
|
|
By the early 1960's bell had started switching to carrier trunks which put
|
|
many calls on a cable. Each signal modulated an AM carrier on a different
|
|
frequency. Because AM carriers use radio frequency transmitters and recievers,
|
|
they could no longer pass a 1000 Hz tone through the bandpass filter. So a
|
|
switch was added to switch it on and off. Normally the filter would be left on.
|
|
When a tech wished to test a trunk he would turn the switch on, bypassing the
|
|
filter. When he was done he was expected to turn off the switch. If he
|
|
forgets a loop will continue to pass voice frequencies until it is switched
|
|
off.
|
|
|
|
Let's look at how loops are used nowadays. If a tech dials up the lower
|
|
number he will immediately ge a 1000 Hz tone coming back to him which is
|
|
injected at a specific volume known as "Zero db" level. Using his meter he
|
|
can gauge if there are any problems on the line. If he needs to do a
|
|
complete test at various frequencies he then turns the filter bypass switch
|
|
on. Most of this work is done at night when repair people are free from
|
|
normal chores.
|
|
|
|
It turns out there are people using loops for more things than I had
|
|
imagined. I have always wondered if spies use loops but i haven't encountered
|
|
any yet. When i started looking into loops I was aware that some radio
|
|
pirates use loops. Especially in the New York City area you'll often run
|
|
into AM and FM pirates on loops late at night.
|
|
|
|
Some local loop numbers are pretty well known and are passed around high
|
|
schools and colleges. When students get bored at night or want to find a
|
|
party they call a loop and wait there till someone else calls. It may be
|
|
someone they know or a complete stranger, but it's someone to talk to. Then
|
|
there are the loop habituates. They regulary meet with their circle of friends
|
|
and aquaintances on loops and tend to resent strangers on THEIR loops.
|
|
|
|
Representatives are quick to point out that loops belong to the phone
|
|
company. Anyone else using them is a transgressor. Since Bell is the
|
|
aggrieved party it needn't have any qualms about listening to loops nor about
|
|
tracing callers. Bell wishes to discourage people from using them and
|
|
periodically programs its billing computer to look for loop numbers. Any
|
|
customer thus found is sent a card pointing out that these numbers belong to
|
|
the telco. With the exception of those stealing services, Bell becomes aware
|
|
that some one is calling a loop using a faked credit card number; or Sprint or
|
|
MCI will ask for help tracing someone illegally stealing their services to
|
|
call a loop. Then it's a matter of waiting for the person to try again and
|
|
tracing the call. In these affairs the phone company is very aggressive and
|
|
effective in tracking down offenders. Bell has some very well trained people
|
|
who are most adept at keeping the offender on the line until a trace is
|
|
complete.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
==========================
|
|
This article is the first of Informatik's T-File classics series,
|
|
a group of text files which deserve special notice in the annals
|
|
of the computer underground. These articles are among the most
|
|
famous text files ever written on hacking, and it is our pleasure
|
|
to reprint them for you now.
|
|
==========================
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
|
| The LOD/H Presents |
|
|
++++++++++++++++ ++++++++++++++++
|
|
\ A Novice's Guide to Hacking- 1989 edition /
|
|
\ ========================================= /
|
|
\ by /
|
|
\ The Mentor /
|
|
\ Legion of Doom/Legion of Hackers /
|
|
\ /
|
|
\ December, 1988 /
|
|
\ Merry Christmas Everyone! /
|
|
\+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++/
|
|
|
|
**********************************************************************
|
|
| The author hereby grants permission to reproduce, redistribute, |
|
|
| or include this file in your g-file section, electronic or print |
|
|
| newletter, or any other form of transmission that you choose, as |
|
|
| long as it is kept intact and whole, with no ommissions, delet- |
|
|
| ions, or changes. (C) The Mentor- Phoenix Project Productions |
|
|
| 1988,1989 512/441-3088 |
|
|
**********************************************************************
|
|
|
|
Introduction: The State of the Hack
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
After surveying a rather large g-file collection, my attention was drawn to
|
|
the fact that there hasn't been a good introductory file written for absolute
|
|
beginners since back when Mark Tabas was cranking them out (and almost
|
|
*everyone* was a beginner!) The Arts of Hacking and Phreaking have changed
|
|
radically since that time, and as the 90's approach, the hack/phreak community
|
|
has recovered from the Summer '87 busts (just like it recovered from the Fall
|
|
'85 busts, and like it will always recover from attempts to shut it down), and
|
|
the progressive media (from Reality Hackers magazine to William Gibson and
|
|
Bruce Sterling's cyberpunk fables of hackerdom) is starting to take notice
|
|
of us for the first time in recent years in a positive light.
|
|
|
|
Unfortunately, it has also gotten more dangerous since the early 80's.
|
|
Phone cops have more resources, more awareness, and more intelligence that they
|
|
exhibited in the past. It is becoming more and more difficult to survive as
|
|
a hacker long enough to become skilled in the art. To this end this file
|
|
is dedicated. If it can help someone get started, and help them survive
|
|
to discover new systems and new information, it will have served it's purpose,
|
|
and served as a partial repayment to all the people who helped me out when I
|
|
was a beginner.
|
|
|
|
Contents
|
|
~~~~~~~
|
|
This file will be divided into four parts:
|
|
Part 1: What is Hacking, A Hacker's Code of Ethics, Basic Hacking Safety
|
|
Part 2: Packet Switching Networks: Telenet- How it Works, How to Use it,
|
|
Outdials, Network Servers, Private PADs
|
|
Part 3: Identifying a Computer, How to Hack In, Operating System
|
|
Defaults
|
|
Part 4: Conclusion- Final Thoughts, Books to Read, Boards to Call,
|
|
Acknowledgements
|
|
|
|
Part One: The Basics
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
As long as there have been computers, there have been hackers. In the 50's
|
|
at the Massachusets Institute of Technology (MIT), students devoted much time
|
|
and energy to ingenious exploration of the computers. Rules and the law were
|
|
disregarded in their pursuit for the 'hack'. Just as they were enthralled with
|
|
their pursuit of information, so are we. The thrill of the hack is not in
|
|
breaking the law, it's in the pursuit and capture of knowledge.
|
|
|
|
To this end, let me contribute my suggestions for guidelines to follow to
|
|
ensure that not only you stay out of trouble, but you pursue your craft without
|
|
damaging the computers you hack into or the companies who own them.
|
|
|
|
I. Do not intentionally damage *any* system.
|
|
II. Do not alter any system files other than ones needed to ensure your
|
|
escape from detection and your future access (Trojan Horses, Altering
|
|
Logs, and the like are all necessary to your survival for as long as
|
|
possible.)
|
|
III. Do not leave your (or anyone else's) real name, real handle, or real
|
|
phone number on any system that you access illegally. They *can* and
|
|
will track you down from your handle!
|
|
IV. Be careful who you share information with. Feds are getting trickier.
|
|
Generally, if you don't know their voice phone number, name, and
|
|
occupation or haven't spoken with them voice on non-info trading
|
|
conversations, be wary.
|
|
V. Do not leave your real phone number to anyone you don't know. This
|
|
includes logging on boards, no matter how k-rad they seem. If you
|
|
don't know the sysop, leave a note telling some trustworthy people
|
|
that will validate you.
|
|
VI. Do not hack government computers. Yes, there are government systems
|
|
that are safe to hack, but they are few and far between. And the
|
|
government has inifitely more time and resources to track you down than
|
|
a company who has to make a profit and justify expenses.
|
|
VII. Don't use codes unless there is *NO* way around it (you don't have a
|
|
local telenet or tymnet outdial and can't connect to anything 800...)
|
|
You use codes long enough, you will get caught. Period.
|
|
VIII. Don't be afraid to be paranoid. Remember, you *are* breaking the law.
|
|
It doesn't hurt to store everything encrypted on your hard disk, or
|
|
keep your notes buried in the backyard or in the trunk of your car.
|
|
You may feel a little funny, but you'll feel a lot funnier when you
|
|
when you meet Bruno, your transvestite cellmate who axed his family to
|
|
death.
|
|
IX. Watch what you post on boards. Most of the really great hackers in the
|
|
country post *nothing* about the system they're currently working
|
|
except in the broadest sense (I'm working on a UNIX, or a COSMOS, or
|
|
something generic. Not "I'm hacking into General Electric's Voice Mail
|
|
System" or something inane and revealing like that.)
|
|
X. Don't be afraid to ask questions. That's what more experienced hackers
|
|
are for. Don't expect *everything* you ask to be answered, though.
|
|
There are some things (LMOS, for instance) that a begining hacker
|
|
shouldn't mess with. You'll either get caught, or screw it up for
|
|
others, or both.
|
|
XI. Finally, you have to actually hack. You can hang out on boards all you
|
|
want, and you can read all the text files in the world, but until you
|
|
actually start doing it, you'll never know what it's all about. There's
|
|
no thrill quite the same as getting into your first system (well, ok,
|
|
I can think of a couple of bigger thrills, but you get the picture.)
|
|
|
|
One of the safest places to start your hacking career is on a computer
|
|
system belonging to a college. University computers have notoriously lax
|
|
security, and are more used to hackers, as every college computer depart-
|
|
ment has one or two, so are less likely to press charges if you should
|
|
be detected. But the odds of them detecting you and having the personel to
|
|
committ to tracking you down are slim as long as you aren't destructive.
|
|
|
|
If you are already a college student, this is ideal, as you can legally
|
|
explore your computer system to your heart's desire, then go out and look
|
|
for similar systems that you can penetrate with confidence, as you're already
|
|
familar with them.
|
|
|
|
So if you just want to get your feet wet, call your local college. Many of
|
|
them will provide accounts for local residents at a nominal (under $20) charge.
|
|
|
|
Finally, if you get caught, stay quiet until you get a lawyer. Don't vol-
|
|
unteer any information, no matter what kind of 'deals' they offer you.
|
|
Nothing is binding unless you make the deal through your lawyer, so you might
|
|
as well shut up and wait.
|
|
|
|
Part Two: Networks
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
The best place to begin hacking (other than a college) is on one of the
|
|
bigger networks such as Telenet. Why? First, there is a wide variety of
|
|
computers to choose from, from small Micro-Vaxen to huge Crays. Second, the
|
|
networks are fairly well documented. It's easier to find someone who can help
|
|
you with a problem off of Telenet than it is to find assistance concerning your
|
|
local college computer or high school machine. Third, the networks are safer.
|
|
Because of the enormous number of calls that are fielded every day by the big
|
|
networks, it is not financially practical to keep track of where every call and
|
|
connection are made from. It is also very easy to disguise your location using
|
|
the network, which makes your hobby much more secure.
|
|
|
|
Telenet has more computers hooked to it than any other system in the world
|
|
once you consider that from Telenet you have access to Tymnet, ItaPAC, JANET,
|
|
DATAPAC, SBDN, PandaNet, THEnet, and a whole host of other networks, all of
|
|
which you can connect to from your terminal.
|
|
|
|
The first step that you need to take is to identify your local dialup port.
|
|
This is done by dialing 1-800-424-9494 (1200 7E1) and connecting. It will
|
|
spout some garbage at you and then you'll get a prompt saying 'TERMINAL='.
|
|
This is your terminal type. If you have vt100 emulation, type it in now. Or
|
|
just hit return and it will default to dumb terminal mode.
|
|
|
|
You'll now get a prompt that looks like a @. From here, type @c mail <cr>
|
|
and then it will ask for a Username. Enter 'phones' for the username. When it
|
|
asks for a password, enter 'phones' again. From this point, it is menu
|
|
driven. Use this to locate your local dialup, and call it back locally. If
|
|
you don't have a local dialup, then use whatever means you wish to connect to
|
|
one long distance (more on this later.)
|
|
|
|
When you call your local dialup, you will once again go through the
|
|
TERMINAL= stuff, and once again you'll be presented with a @. This prompt lets
|
|
you know you are connected to a Telenet PAD. PAD stands for either Packet
|
|
Assembler/Disassembler (if you talk to an engineer), or Public Access Device
|
|
(if you talk to Telenet's marketing people.) The first description is more
|
|
correct.
|
|
|
|
Telenet works by taking the data you enter in on the PAD you dialed into,
|
|
bundling it into a 128 byte chunk (normally... this can be changed), and then
|
|
transmitting it at speeds ranging from 9600 to 19,200 baud to another PAD, who
|
|
then takes the data and hands it down to whatever computer or system it's
|
|
connected to. Basically, the PAD allows two computers that have different baud
|
|
rates or communication protocols to communicate with each other over a long
|
|
distance. Sometimes you'll notice a time lag in the remote machines response.
|
|
This is called PAD Delay, and is to be expected when you're sending data
|
|
through several different links.
|
|
|
|
What do you do with this PAD? You use it to connect to remote computer
|
|
systems by typing 'C' for connect and then the Network User Address (NUA) of
|
|
the system you want to go to.
|
|
|
|
An NUA takes the form of 031103130002520
|
|
\___/\___/\___/
|
|
| | |
|
|
| | |____ network address
|
|
| |_________ area prefix
|
|
|______________ DNIC
|
|
|
|
|
|
This is a summary of DNIC's (taken from Blade Runner's file on ItaPAC)
|
|
according to their country and network name.
|
|
|
|
|
|
DNIC Network Name Country DNIC Network Name Country
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
|
02041 Datanet 1 Netherlands | 03110 Telenet USA
|
|
02062 DCS Belgium | 03340 Telepac Mexico
|
|
02080 Transpac France | 03400 UDTS-Curacau Curacau
|
|
02284 Telepac Switzerland | 04251 Isranet Israel
|
|
02322 Datex-P Austria | 04401 DDX-P Japan
|
|
02329 Radaus Austria | 04408 Venus-P Japan
|
|
02342 PSS UK | 04501 Dacom-Net South Korea
|
|
02382 Datapak Denmark | 04542 Intelpak Singapore
|
|
02402 Datapak Sweden | 05052 Austpac Australia
|
|
02405 Telepak Sweden | 05053 Midas Australia
|
|
02442 Finpak Finland | 05252 Telepac Hong Kong
|
|
02624 Datex-P West Germany | 05301 Pacnet New Zealand
|
|
02704 Luxpac Luxembourg | 06550 Saponet South Africa
|
|
02724 Eirpak Ireland | 07240 Interdata Brazil
|
|
03020 Datapac Canada | 07241 Renpac Brazil
|
|
03028 Infogram Canada | 09000 Dialnet USA
|
|
03103 ITT/UDTS USA | 07421 Dompac French Guiana
|
|
03106 Tymnet USA |
|
|
|
|
There are two ways to find interesting addresses to connect to. The first
|
|
and easiest way is to obtain a copy of the LOD/H Telenet Directory from the
|
|
LOD/H Technical Journal #4 or 2600 Magazine. Jester Sluggo also put out a good
|
|
list of non-US addresses in Phrack Inc. Newsletter Issue 21. These files will
|
|
tell you the NUA, whether it will accept collect calls or not, what type of
|
|
computer system it is (if known) and who it belongs to (also if known.)
|
|
|
|
The second method of locating interesting addresses is to scan for them
|
|
manually. On Telenet, you do not have to enter the 03110 DNIC to connect to a
|
|
Telenet host. So if you saw that 031104120006140 had a VAX on it you wanted to
|
|
look at, you could type @c 412 614 (0's can be ignored most of the time.)
|
|
|
|
If this node allows collect billed connections, it will say 412 614
|
|
CONNECTED and then you'll possibly get an identifying header or just a
|
|
Username: prompt. If it doesn't allow collect connections, it will give you a
|
|
message such as 412 614 REFUSED COLLECT CONNECTION with some error codes out to
|
|
the right, and return you to the @ prompt.
|
|
|
|
There are two primary ways to get around the REFUSED COLLECT message. The
|
|
first is to use a Network User Id (NUI) to connect. An NUI is a username/pw
|
|
combination that acts like a charge account on Telenet. To collect to node
|
|
412 614 with NUI junk4248, password 525332, I'd type the following:
|
|
@c 412 614,junk4248,525332 <---- the 525332 will *not* be echoed to the
|
|
screen. The problem with NUI's is that they're hard to come by unless you're
|
|
a good social engineer with a thorough knowledge of Telenet (in which case
|
|
you probably aren't reading this section), or you have someone who can
|
|
provide you with them.
|
|
|
|
The second way to connect is to use a private PAD, either through an X.25
|
|
PAD or through something like Netlink off of a Prime computer (more on these
|
|
two below.)
|
|
|
|
The prefix in a Telenet NUA oftentimes (not always) refers to the phone Area
|
|
Code that the computer is located in (i.e. 713 xxx would be a computer in
|
|
Houston, Texas.) If there's a particular area you're interested in, (say,
|
|
New York City 914), you could begin by typing @c 914 001 <cr>. If it connects,
|
|
you make a note of it and go on to 914 002. You do this until you've found
|
|
some interesting systems to play with.
|
|
|
|
Not all systems are on a simple xxx yyy address. Some go out to four or
|
|
five digits (914 2354), and some have decimal or numeric extensions
|
|
(422 121A = 422 121.01). You have to play with them, and you never know what
|
|
you're going to find. To fully scan out a prefix would take ten million
|
|
attempts per prefix. For example, if I want to scan 512 completely, I'd have
|
|
to start with 512 00000.00 and go through 512 00000.99, then increment the
|
|
address by 1 and try 512 00001.00 through 512 00001.99. A lot of scanning.
|
|
There are plenty of neat computers to play with in a 3-digit scan, however,
|
|
so don't go berserk with the extensions.
|
|
Sometimes you'll attempt to connect and it will just be sitting there after
|
|
one or two minutes. In this case, you want to abort the connect attempt by
|
|
sending a hard break (this varies with different term programs, on Procomm,
|
|
it's ALT-B), and then when you get the @ prompt back, type 'D' for disconnect.
|
|
|
|
If you connect to a computer and wish to disconnect, you can type <cr> @
|
|
<cr> and you it should say TELENET and then give you the @ prompt. From there,
|
|
type D to disconnect or CONT to re-connect and continue your session
|
|
uninterrupted.
|
|
|
|
Outdials, Network Servers, and PADs
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
In addition to computers, an NUA may connect you to several other things.
|
|
One of the most useful is the outdial. An outdial is nothing more than a modem
|
|
you can get to over telenet- similar to the PC Pursuit concept, except that
|
|
these don't have passwords on them most of the time.
|
|
|
|
When you connect, you will get a message like 'Hayes 1200 baud outdial,
|
|
Detroit, MI', or 'VEN-TEL 212 Modem', or possibly 'Session 1234 established
|
|
on Modem 5588'. The best way to figure out the commands on these is to
|
|
type ? or H or HELP- this will get you all the information that you need to
|
|
use one.
|
|
|
|
Safety tip here- when you are hacking *any* system through a phone dialup,
|
|
always use an outdial or a diverter, especially if it is a local phone number
|
|
to you. More people get popped hacking on local computers than you can
|
|
imagine, Intra-LATA calls are the easiest things in the world to trace inexp-
|
|
ensively.
|
|
|
|
Another nice trick you can do with an outdial is use the redial or macro
|
|
function that many of them have. First thing you do when you connect is to
|
|
invoke the 'Redial Last Number' facility. This will dial the last number used,
|
|
which will be the one the person using it before you typed. Write down the
|
|
number, as no one would be calling a number without a computer on it. This
|
|
is a good way to find new systems to hack. Also, on a VENTEL modem, type 'D'
|
|
for Display and it will display the five numbers stored as macros in the
|
|
modem's memory.
|
|
|
|
There are also different types of servers for remote Local Area Networks
|
|
(LAN) that have many machine all over the office or the nation connected to
|
|
them. I'll discuss identifying these later in the computer ID section.
|
|
|
|
And finally, you may connect to something that says 'X.25 Communication
|
|
PAD' and then some more stuff, followed by a new @ prompt. This is a PAD
|
|
just like the one you are on, except that all attempted connections are billed
|
|
to the PAD, allowing you to connect to those nodes who earlier refused collect
|
|
connections.
|
|
|
|
This also has the added bonus of confusing where you are connecting from.
|
|
When a packet is transmitted from PAD to PAD, it contains a header that has
|
|
the location you're calling from. For instance, when you first connected
|
|
to Telenet, it might have said 212 44A CONNECTED if you called from the 212
|
|
area code. This means you were calling PAD number 44A in the 212 area.
|
|
That 21244A will be sent out in the header of all packets leaving the PAD.
|
|
Once you connect to a private PAD, however, all the packets going out
|
|
from *it* will have it's address on them, not yours. This can be a valuable
|
|
buffer between yourself and detection.
|
|
|
|
Phone Scanning
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Finally, there's the time-honored method of computer hunting that was made
|
|
famous among the non-hacker crowd by that Oh-So-Technically-Accurate movie
|
|
Wargames. You pick a three digit phone prefix in your area and dial every
|
|
number from 0000 --> 9999 in that prefix, making a note of all the carriers
|
|
you find. There is software available to do this for nearly every computer
|
|
in the world, so you don't have to do it by hand.
|
|
|
|
Part Three: I've Found a Computer, Now What?
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
This next section is applicable universally. It doesn't matter how you
|
|
found this computer, it could be through a network, or it could be from
|
|
carrier scanning your High School's phone prefix, you've got this prompt
|
|
this prompt, what the hell is it?
|
|
|
|
I'm *NOT* going to attempt to tell you what to do once you're inside of
|
|
any of these operating systems. Each one is worth several G-files in its
|
|
own right. I'm going to tell you how to identify and recognize certain
|
|
OpSystems, how to approach hacking into them, and how to deal with something
|
|
that you've never seen before and have know idea what it is.
|
|
|
|
|
|
VMS- The VAX computer is made by Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC),
|
|
and runs the VMS (Virtual Memory System) operating system.
|
|
VMS is characterized by the 'Username:' prompt. It will not tell
|
|
you if you've entered a valid username or not, and will disconnect
|
|
you after three bad login attempts. It also keeps track of all
|
|
failed login attempts and informs the owner of the account next time
|
|
s/he logs in how many bad login attempts were made on the account.
|
|
It is one of the most secure operating systems around from the
|
|
outside, but once you're in there are many things that you can do
|
|
to circumvent system security. The VAX also has the best set of
|
|
help files in the world. Just type HELP and read to your heart's
|
|
content.
|
|
Common Accounts/Defaults: [username: password [[,password]] ]
|
|
SYSTEM: OPERATOR or MANAGER or SYSTEM or SYSLIB
|
|
OPERATOR: OPERATOR
|
|
SYSTEST: UETP
|
|
SYSMAINT: SYSMAINT or SERVICE or DIGITAL
|
|
FIELD: FIELD or SERVICE
|
|
GUEST: GUEST or unpassworded
|
|
DEMO: DEMO or unpassworded
|
|
DECNET: DECNET
|
|
|
|
|
|
DEC-10- An earlier line of DEC computer equipment, running the TOPS-10
|
|
operating system. These machines are recognized by their
|
|
'.' prompt. The DEC-10/20 series are remarkably hacker-friendly,
|
|
allowing you to enter several important commands without ever
|
|
logging into the system. Accounts are in the format [xxx,yyy] where
|
|
xxx and yyy are integers. You can get a listing of the accounts and
|
|
the process names of everyone on the system before logging in with
|
|
the command .systat (for SYstem STATus). If you seen an account
|
|
that reads [234,1001] BOB JONES, it might be wise to try BOB or
|
|
JONES or both for a password on this account. To login, you type
|
|
.login xxx,yyy and then type the password when prompted for it.
|
|
The system will allow you unlimited tries at an account, and does
|
|
not keep records of bad login attempts. It will also inform you
|
|
if the UIC you're trying (UIC = User Identification Code, 1,2 for
|
|
example) is bad.
|
|
Common Accounts/Defaults:
|
|
1,2: SYSLIB or OPERATOR or MANAGER
|
|
2,7: MAINTAIN
|
|
5,30: GAMES
|
|
|
|
UNIX- There are dozens of different machines out there that run UNIX.
|
|
While some might argue it isn't the best operating system in the
|
|
world, it is certainly the most widely used. A UNIX system will
|
|
usually have a prompt like 'login:' in lower case. UNIX also
|
|
will give you unlimited shots at logging in (in most cases), and
|
|
there is usually no log kept of bad attempts.
|
|
Common Accounts/Defaults: (note that some systems are case
|
|
sensitive, so use lower case as a general rule. Also, many times
|
|
the accounts will be unpassworded, you'll just drop right in!)
|
|
root: root
|
|
admin: admin
|
|
sysadmin: sysadmin or admin
|
|
unix: unix
|
|
uucp: uucp
|
|
rje: rje
|
|
guest: guest
|
|
demo: demo
|
|
daemon: daemon
|
|
sysbin: sysbin
|
|
|
|
Prime- Prime computer company's mainframe running the Primos operating
|
|
system. The are easy to spot, as the greet you with
|
|
'Primecon 18.23.05' or the like, depending on the version of the
|
|
operating system you run into. There will usually be no prompt
|
|
offered, it will just look like it's sitting there. At this point,
|
|
type 'login <username>'. If it is a pre-18.00.00 version of Primos,
|
|
you can hit a bunch of ^C's for the password and you'll drop in.
|
|
Unfortunately, most people are running versions 19+. Primos also
|
|
comes with a good set of help files. One of the most useful
|
|
features of a Prime on Telenet is a facility called NETLINK. Once
|
|
you're inside, type NETLINK and follow the help files. This allows
|
|
you to connect to NUA's all over the world using the 'nc' command.
|
|
For example, to connect to NUA 026245890040004, you would type
|
|
@nc :26245890040004 at the netlink prompt.
|
|
Common Accounts/Defaults:
|
|
PRIME PRIME or PRIMOS
|
|
PRIMOS_CS PRIME or PRIMOS
|
|
PRIMENET PRIMENET
|
|
SYSTEM SYSTEM or PRIME
|
|
NETLINK NETLINK
|
|
TEST TEST
|
|
GUEST GUEST
|
|
GUEST1 GUEST
|
|
|
|
HP-x000- This system is made by Hewlett-Packard. It is characterized by the
|
|
':' prompt. The HP has one of the more complicated login sequences
|
|
around- you type 'HELLO SESSION NAME,USERNAME,ACCOUNTNAME,GROUP'.
|
|
Fortunately, some of these fields can be left blank in many cases.
|
|
Since any and all of these fields can be passworded, this is not
|
|
the easiest system to get into, except for the fact that there are
|
|
usually some unpassworded accounts around. In general, if the
|
|
defaults don't work, you'll have to brute force it using the
|
|
common password list (see below.) The HP-x000 runs the MPE operat-
|
|
ing system, the prompt for it will be a ':', just like the logon
|
|
prompt.
|
|
Common Accounts/Defaults:
|
|
MGR.TELESUP,PUB User: MGR Acct: HPONLY Grp: PUB
|
|
MGR.HPOFFICE,PUB unpassworded
|
|
MANAGER.ITF3000,PUB unpassworded
|
|
FIELD.SUPPORT,PUB user: FLD, others unpassworded
|
|
MAIL.TELESUP,PUB user: MAIL, others unpassworded
|
|
MGR.RJE unpassworded
|
|
FIELD.HPPl89 ,HPPl87,HPPl89,HPPl96 unpassworded
|
|
MGR.TELESUP,PUB,HPONLY,HP3 unpassworded
|
|
|
|
|
|
IRIS- IRIS stands for Interactive Real Time Information System. It orig-
|
|
inally ran on PDP-11's, but now runs on many other minis. You can
|
|
spot an IRIS by the 'Welcome to "IRIS" R9.1.4 Timesharing' banner,
|
|
and the ACCOUNT ID? prompt. IRIS allows unlimited tries at hacking
|
|
in, and keeps no logs of bad attempts. I don't know any default
|
|
passwords, so just try the common ones from the password database
|
|
below.
|
|
Common Accounts:
|
|
MANAGER
|
|
BOSS
|
|
SOFTWARE
|
|
DEMO
|
|
PDP8
|
|
PDP11
|
|
ACCOUNTING
|
|
|
|
VM/CMS- The VM/CMS operating system runs in International Business Machines
|
|
(IBM) mainframes. When you connect to one of these, you will get
|
|
message similar to 'VM/370 ONLINE', and then give you a '.' prompt,
|
|
just like TOPS-10 does. To login, you type 'LOGON <username>'.
|
|
Common Accounts/Defaults are:
|
|
AUTOLOG1: AUTOLOG or AUTOLOG1
|
|
CMS: CMS
|
|
CMSBATCH: CMS or CMSBATCH
|
|
EREP: EREP
|
|
MAINT: MAINT or MAINTAIN
|
|
OPERATNS: OPERATNS or OPERATOR
|
|
OPERATOR: OPERATOR
|
|
RSCS: RSCS
|
|
SMART: SMART
|
|
SNA: SNA
|
|
VMTEST: VMTEST
|
|
VMUTIL: VMUTIL
|
|
VTAM: VTAM
|
|
|
|
NOS- NOS stands for Networking Operating System, and runs on the Cyber
|
|
computer made by Control Data Corporation. NOS identifies itself
|
|
quite readily, with a banner of 'WELCOME TO THE NOS SOFTWARE
|
|
SYSTEM. COPYRIGHT CONTROL DATA 1978,1987'. The first prompt you
|
|
will get will be FAMILY:. Just hit return here. Then you'll get
|
|
a USER NAME: prompt. Usernames are typically 7 alpha-numerics
|
|
characters long, and are *extremely* site dependent. Operator
|
|
accounts begin with a digit, such as 7ETPDOC.
|
|
Common Accounts/Defaults:
|
|
$SYSTEM unknown
|
|
SYSTEMV unknown
|
|
|
|
Decserver- This is not truly a computer system, but is a network server that
|
|
has many different machines available from it. A Decserver will
|
|
say 'Enter Username>' when you first connect. This can be anything,
|
|
it doesn't matter, it's just an identifier. Type 'c', as this is
|
|
the least conspicuous thing to enter. It will then present you
|
|
with a 'Local>' prompt. From here, you type 'c <systemname>' to
|
|
connect to a system. To get a list of system names, type
|
|
'sh services' or 'sh nodes'. If you have any problems, online
|
|
help is available with the 'help' command. Be sure and look for
|
|
services named 'MODEM' or 'DIAL' or something similar, these are
|
|
often outdial modems and can be useful!
|
|
|
|
GS/1- Another type of network server. Unlike a Decserver, you can't
|
|
predict what prompt a GS/1 gateway is going to give you. The
|
|
default prompt it 'GS/1>', but this is redifinable by the
|
|
system administrator. To test for a GS/1, do a 'sh d'. If that
|
|
prints out a large list of defaults (terminal speed, prompt,
|
|
parity, etc...), you are on a GS/1. You connect in the same manner
|
|
as a Decserver, typing 'c <systemname>'. To find out what systems
|
|
are available, do a 'sh n' or a 'sh c'. Another trick is to do a
|
|
'sh m', which will sometimes show you a list of macros for logging
|
|
onto a system. If there is a macro named VAX, for instance, type
|
|
'do VAX'.
|
|
|
|
The above are the main system types in use today. There are
|
|
hundreds of minor variants on the above, but this should be
|
|
enough to get you started.
|
|
|
|
Unresponsive Systems
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Occasionally you will connect to a system that will do nothing but sit
|
|
there. This is a frustrating feeling, but a methodical approach to the system
|
|
will yield a response if you take your time. The following list will usually
|
|
make *something* happen.
|
|
|
|
1) Change your parity, data length, and stop bits. A system that won't re-
|
|
spond at 8N1 may react at 7E1 or 8E2 or 7S2. If you don't have a term
|
|
program that will let you set parity to EVEN, ODD, SPACE, MARK, and NONE,
|
|
with data length of 7 or 8, and 1 or 2 stop bits, go out and buy one.
|
|
While having a good term program isn't absolutely necessary, it sure is
|
|
helpful.
|
|
2) Change baud rates. Again, if your term program will let you choose odd
|
|
baud rates such as 600 or 1100, you will occasionally be able to penetrate
|
|
some very interesting systems, as most systems that depend on a strange
|
|
baud rate seem to think that this is all the security they need...
|
|
3) Send a series of <cr>'s.
|
|
4) Send a hard break followed by a <cr>.
|
|
5) Type a series of .'s (periods). The Canadian network Datapac responds
|
|
to this.
|
|
6) If you're getting garbage, hit an 'i'. Tymnet responds to this, as does
|
|
a MultiLink II.
|
|
7) Begin sending control characters, starting with ^A --> ^Z.
|
|
8) Change terminal emulations. What your vt100 emulation thinks is garbage
|
|
may all of a sudden become crystal clear using ADM-5 emulation. This also
|
|
relates to how good your term program is.
|
|
9) Type LOGIN, HELLO, LOG, ATTACH, CONNECT, START, RUN, BEGIN, LOGON, GO,
|
|
JOIN, HELP, and anything else you can think of.
|
|
10) If it's a dialin, call the numbers around it and see if a company
|
|
answers. If they do, try some social engineering.
|
|
|
|
Brute Force Hacking
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
There will also be many occasions when the default passwords will not work
|
|
on an account. At this point, you can either go onto the next system on your
|
|
list, or you can try to 'brute-force' your way in by trying a large database
|
|
of passwords on that one account. Be careful, though! This works fine on
|
|
systems that don't keep track of invalid logins, but on a system like a VMS,
|
|
someone is going to have a heart attack if they come back and see '600 Bad
|
|
Login Attempts Since Last Session' on their account. There are also some
|
|
operating systems that disconnect after 'x' number of invalid login attempts
|
|
and refuse to allow any more attempts for one hour, or ten minutes, or some-
|
|
times until the next day.
|
|
|
|
The following list is taken from my own password database plus the data-
|
|
base of passwords that was used in the Internet UNIX Worm that was running
|
|
around in November of 1988. For a shorter group, try first names, computer
|
|
terms, and obvious things like 'secret', 'password', 'open', and the name
|
|
of the account. Also try the name of the company that owns the computer
|
|
system (if known), the company initials, and things relating to the products
|
|
the company makes or deals with.
|
|
|
|
Password List
|
|
=============
|
|
|
|
aaa daniel jester rascal
|
|
academia danny johnny really
|
|
ada dave joseph rebecca
|
|
adrian deb joshua remote
|
|
aerobics debbie judith rick
|
|
airplane deborah juggle reagan
|
|
albany december julia robot
|
|
albatross desperate kathleen robotics
|
|
albert develop kermit rolex
|
|
alex diet kernel ronald
|
|
alexander digital knight rosebud
|
|
algebra discovery lambda rosemary
|
|
alias disney larry roses
|
|
alpha dog lazarus ruben
|
|
alphabet drought lee rules
|
|
ama duncan leroy ruth
|
|
amy easy lewis sal
|
|
analog eatme light saxon
|
|
anchor edges lisa scheme
|
|
andy edwin louis scott
|
|
andrea egghead lynne scotty
|
|
animal eileen mac secret
|
|
answer einstein macintosh sensor
|
|
anything elephant mack serenity
|
|
arrow elizabeth maggot sex
|
|
arthur ellen magic shark
|
|
asshole emerald malcolm sharon
|
|
athena engine mark shit
|
|
atmosphere engineer markus shiva
|
|
bacchus enterprise marty shuttle
|
|
badass enzyme marvin simon
|
|
bailey euclid master simple
|
|
banana evelyn maurice singer
|
|
bandit extension merlin single
|
|
banks fairway mets smile
|
|
bass felicia michael smiles
|
|
batman fender michelle smooch
|
|
beauty fermat mike smother
|
|
beaver finite minimum snatch
|
|
beethoven flower minsky snoopy
|
|
beloved foolproof mogul soap
|
|
benz football moose socrates
|
|
beowulf format mozart spit
|
|
berkeley forsythe nancy spring
|
|
berlin fourier napoleon subway
|
|
beta fred network success
|
|
beverly friend newton summer
|
|
bob frighten next super
|
|
brenda fun olivia support
|
|
brian gabriel oracle surfer
|
|
bridget garfield orca suzanne
|
|
broadway gauss orwell tangerine
|
|
bumbling george osiris tape
|
|
cardinal gertrude outlaw target
|
|
carmen gibson oxford taylor
|
|
carolina ginger pacific telephone
|
|
caroline gnu painless temptation
|
|
castle golf pam tiger
|
|
cat golfer paper toggle
|
|
celtics gorgeous password tomato
|
|
change graham pat toyota
|
|
charles gryphon patricia trivial
|
|
charming guest penguin unhappy
|
|
charon guitar pete unicorn
|
|
chester hacker peter unknown
|
|
cigar harmony philip urchin
|
|
classic harold phoenix utility
|
|
coffee harvey pierre vicky
|
|
coke heinlein pizza virginia
|
|
collins hello plover warren
|
|
comrade help polynomial water
|
|
computer herbert praise weenie
|
|
condo honey prelude whatnot
|
|
condom horse prince whitney
|
|
cookie imperial protect will
|
|
cooper include pumpkin william
|
|
create ingres puppet willie
|
|
creation innocuous rabbit winston
|
|
creator irishman rachmaninoff wizard
|
|
cretin isis rainbow wombat
|
|
daemon japan raindrop yosemite
|
|
dancer jessica random zap
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
///////////////////////////////////////
|
|
/ /
|
|
/ * Summary of FBI Computer Systems * /
|
|
/ By Ralph Harvey /
|
|
/ /
|
|
///////////////////////////////////////
|
|
|
|
|
|
This article is reprinted from Full Disclosure. Capitol Information
|
|
Association. All rights reserved. Permission is hereby granted to reprint
|
|
this article providing this message is included in its entirety. Full
|
|
Disclosure, Box 8275, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48107. $15/yr.
|
|
|
|
The FBI maintains several computer systems. The most common of which is
|
|
call NCIC (National Crime Information Computer). NCIC maintains a database of
|
|
information about such things as stolen cars, stolen boats, missing persons,
|
|
wanted persons, arrest records. It provides quick access to these records by
|
|
State, Local and Federal law enforcement agencies. NCIC is directly linked
|
|
with the Treasury Department's TECS computer and many State computer systems.
|
|
According to William H. Webster, Director of the FBI:
|
|
|
|
When a police officer stops a car and is uncertain about who he's going to
|
|
meet when he gets out, he can plug into this system [NCIC] and in a matter of
|
|
a few seconds he can find out whether that person is a fugitive or the
|
|
automobile is stolen. Incidentally, we receive almost 400,000 inquires of
|
|
this nature each day in the NCIC system.
|
|
|
|
When an agency determines that a subject is a fugitive, it supplies the FBI
|
|
computer with as much of the following information as possible: 1) Name and
|
|
case number; 2) Alias; 3) Race; 4) Sex; 5) Height; 6) Weight; 7) Color of
|
|
hair; 8) Color of eyes; 9) Description of any identifying scars, marks and
|
|
tattoos; 10) Date of birth; 11) Place of birth; 12) Social Security Number;
|
|
13) Passport Number; 14) Last known address; 15) Nationality; 16) If a
|
|
naturalized U.S. Citizen, date, place, and certificate number; 17)
|
|
Occupation; 18) The criminal violation with which subject is charged; 19)
|
|
Date of warrant; 21) Type of warrant -- Bench, Magistrate, etc.; 22) Agency
|
|
holding warrant; 23) Any information as to whether the subject is considered
|
|
dangerous, is known to own or currently possess firearms, has suicidal
|
|
tendencies, or has previously escaped custody; 24) Driver's license number,
|
|
year of expiration and State issued; 25) License number of vehicle, aircraft
|
|
or vessel subject owns or is known to use, include the year and State; 26)
|
|
Description of vehicle, aircraft or vessel subject owns or is known to use;
|
|
27) Associates of the subject*1; 28) FBI number; 29) Name and telephone of
|
|
the person to contact when subject is apprehended.
|
|
|
|
One of the major problems with the system is that the agency that submits an
|
|
entry is responsible for keeping it up to date. Once an entry has been made,
|
|
there is little motivation for the originating agency to "waste" its time
|
|
keeping it up to date, so many entries become incorrect with the passage of
|
|
time.
|
|
|
|
Another FBI computer system is their Investigative Support Information
|
|
System (ISIS). This system is only used to provide support for major
|
|
investigations that require the handling of a large volume of complex
|
|
information. It is limited to handling a maximum of 20 cases at a time.
|
|
|
|
The ISIS system was used during the investigation of the murder of Federal
|
|
Judge John Wood in San Antonio, Texas. In this case, the FBI entered 300,000
|
|
pieces of information, including 6,000 interviews, hotel registration
|
|
information from every hotel in the area, etc. The accused, while on trial,
|
|
claimed he was several hundred miles away. The FBI cross referenced his name
|
|
& known alias with the hotel registration database and got a match. Contact
|
|
with the hotel employees resulted in a positive identification and conviction
|
|
of the subject.
|
|
|
|
The FBI has a system called the Organized Crime Information Systems (OCIS)
|
|
of which director William Webster is "particularly proud." The system was
|
|
started in 1980 in Detroit, Michigan and is one of their most sophisticated
|
|
computers. The system is now functions in over 40 locations.
|
|
|
|
The OCIS system allows agents in different field offices to share and
|
|
analyze information collected in each other's areas. This system was used to
|
|
identify some of the United States citizens who were released from Cuban
|
|
prisons in 1984 that had criminal histories in the United States. An OCIS
|
|
link was recently opened in Rome, where it's used to support drug
|
|
investigations.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:
|
|
:$:/ / \ \:$:
|
|
:$:/ Dictionary of Phreaker's Terms \:$:
|
|
:$: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :$:
|
|
:$: :$:
|
|
:$: Taken from Various Sources :$:
|
|
:$:\ with Special Thanks to Phortune 500 /:$:
|
|
:$:\ \ / /:$:
|
|
:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:$:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1XB - No.1 Crossbar system. See XBAR for more information.
|
|
|
|
2600 - A hack/phreak oriented newsletter that periodically was
|
|
released and still is being released. See Phile 1.6 for more information on
|
|
the magazine and ordering.
|
|
|
|
4XB - No.4 Crossbar system. See XBAR for more information.
|
|
|
|
5XB - No.5 Crossbar system. The primary end office switch of Bell
|
|
since the 60's and still in limited use. See XBAR for more detail.
|
|
|
|
700 Services - These services are reserved as an advanced forwarding
|
|
system, where the forwarding is advanced to a user-programed location which
|
|
could be changed by the user.
|
|
|
|
800 Exceptional Calling Report - System set up by ESS that will log
|
|
any caller that excessively dials 800 numbers or directory assistance. See
|
|
ESS for more information.
|
|
|
|
800 Services - Also known as WATS. These services often contain WATS
|
|
extenders which, when used with a code, may be used to call LD. Many LD
|
|
companies use these services because they are toll-free to customers. Most
|
|
800 extenders are considered dangerous because most have the ability to
|
|
trace.
|
|
|
|
900 Services - Numbers in the 900 SAC usually are used as special
|
|
services, such as TV polls and such. These usually are $.50 for the first
|
|
minute and $.35 for each additional minute. Dial (900)555-1212 to find out
|
|
what the 900 services currently have to offer.
|
|
|
|
950 - A nationwide access exchange in most areas. Many LD companies
|
|
have extenders located somewhere on this exchange; however, all services on
|
|
this exchange are considered dangerous due to the fact that they ALL have
|
|
the ability to trace. Most 950 services have crystal clear connections.
|
|
|
|
ACCS - Automated Calling Card Service. The typical 0+NPA+Nxx+xxxx
|
|
method of inputting calling cards and then you input the calling card via
|
|
touch tones. This would not be possible without ACTS.
|
|
|
|
ACD - Automatic Call Distributor.
|
|
|
|
ACD Testing Mode - Automatic Call Distributor Test Mode. This level of
|
|
phreaking can be obtained by pressing the "D" key down after calling DA.
|
|
This can only be done in areas that have the ACD. The ACD Testing Mode is
|
|
characterized by a pulsing dial tone. From here, you can get one side of a
|
|
loop by dialing 6, the other side is 7. You may also be able to REMOB a
|
|
line. All possibilities of the ACD Test have not been experimented with.
|
|
See silver box for more details.
|
|
|
|
ACTS - Automated Coin Toll Service. This is a computer system that
|
|
automates phortress fone service by listening for red box tones and takes
|
|
appropriate action. It is this service that is commonly heard saying, "Two
|
|
dollars please. Please deposit two dollars for the next three minutes."
|
|
Also, if you talk for more than three minutes and then hang up, ACTS will
|
|
call back and demand your money. ACTS is also responsible for ACCS.
|
|
|
|
Alliance - A teleconferencing system that is apart from AT&T which
|
|
allows the general public to access and use its conferencing equipment. The
|
|
equipment allows group conversations with members participating from
|
|
throughout the United States. The fone number to Alliance generally follows
|
|
the format of 0-700-456-x00x depending on the location the call originates
|
|
from and is not accessible direct by all cities/states.
|
|
|
|
AMA - Automated Message Accounting. Similar to the CAMA system; see
|
|
CAMA for more info.
|
|
|
|
analog - As used for a word or data transmission, a continuously
|
|
varying electrical signal in the shape of a wave.
|
|
|
|
ANI - Automatic Number Identification - This is the system you can
|
|
call, usually a three digit number or one in the 99xx's of your exchange,
|
|
and have the originating number you are calling from read to you by a
|
|
computer. This is useful if you don't know the number you are calling from,
|
|
for finding diverters, and when you are playing around with other fone
|
|
equipment like cans or beige boxes. The ANI system is often incorporated
|
|
into other fone companies such as Sprint and MCI in order to trace those
|
|
big bad phreaks that abuze codez.
|
|
|
|
ANIF - Automatic Number Identification Failure. When the ANI system of
|
|
a particular office fails.
|
|
|
|
APF - All PINs Fail. This is a security measure which is designed to
|
|
frustrate attempts at discovering valid PINs by a hacking method.
|
|
|
|
aqua box - A box designed to drain the voltage of the FBI lock-in-
|
|
trace/trap-trace so you can hang up your fone in an emergency and
|
|
phrustrate the Pheds some more. The apparatus is simple, just connect the
|
|
two middle wires of a phone wire and plug, which would be the red and green
|
|
wires if in the jack, to the cord of some electrical appliance; ie, light
|
|
bulb or radio. KEEP THE APPLIANCE OFF. Then, get one of those line
|
|
splitters that will let you hook two phone plugs into one jack. Plug the
|
|
end of the modified cord into one jack and your fone into the other. THE
|
|
APPLIANCE MUST BE OFF! Then, when the Pheds turn their lame tracer on and
|
|
you find that you can't hang up, remove your fone from the jack and turn
|
|
the appliance ON and keep it ON until you feel safe; it may be awhile. Then
|
|
turn it off, plug your fone back in, and start phreaking again. Invented
|
|
by: Captain Xerox and The Traveler.
|
|
|
|
BAUDOT - 45.5 baud. Also known as the Apple Cat Can.
|
|
|
|
BEF - Band Elimination Filter. A muting system that will mute the 2600
|
|
Hz tone which signals hang-up when you hang up.
|
|
|
|
beige box - An apparatus that is a home-made lineman's handset. It is
|
|
a regular fone that has clips where the red and green wires normally
|
|
connect to in a fone jack. These clips will attach to the rings and tips
|
|
found in many of MA's output devices. These are highly portable and VERY
|
|
useful when messing around with cans and other output devices the fone
|
|
company has around. Invented by: The Exterminator and The Terminal Man.
|
|
|
|
BITNET - Nationwide system for colleges and schools which accesses a
|
|
large base of education-oriented information. Access ports are always via
|
|
mainframe.
|
|
|
|
bit stream - Refers to a continuous series of bits, binary digits,
|
|
being transmitted on a transmission line.
|
|
|
|
black box - The infamous box that allows the calling party to not be
|
|
billed for the call placed. We won't go in depth right now, most plans can
|
|
be found on many phreak oriented BBS's. The telco can detect black boxes if
|
|
they suspect one on the line. Also, these will not work under ESS.
|
|
|
|
bleeper boxes - The United Kingdom's own version of the blue box,
|
|
modified to work with the UK's fone system. Based on the same principles.
|
|
However, they use two sets of frequencies, foreword and backwards.
|
|
|
|
Blotto box - This box supposedly shorts every fone out in the
|
|
immediate area, and I don't doubt it. It should kill every fone in the
|
|
immediate area, until the voltage reaches the fone company, and the fone
|
|
company filters it. I won't cover this one in this issue, cuz it is
|
|
dangerous, and phreaks shouldn't destroy MA's equipment, just phuck it up.
|
|
Look for this on your phavorite BBS or ask your phavorite phreak for info
|
|
if you really are serious about seriously phucking some fones in some area.
|
|
|
|
blue box - An old piece of equipment that emulated a true operator
|
|
placing calls, and operators get calls for free. The blue box seizes an
|
|
open trunk by blasting a 2600 Hz tone through the line after dialing a
|
|
party that is local or in the 800 NPA so calls will be local or free for
|
|
the blue boxer. Then, when the blue boxer has seized a trunk, the boxer may
|
|
then, within the next 10-15 seconds, dial another fone number via MF tones.
|
|
These MF tones must be preceded by a KP tone and followed with a ST tone.
|
|
All of these tones are standardized by Bell. The tones as well as the inter-
|
|
digit intervals are around 75ms. It may vary with the equipment used since
|
|
ESS can handle higher speeds and doesn't need inter-digit intervals. There
|
|
are many uses to a blue box, and we will not cover any more here. See your
|
|
local phreak or phreak oriented BBS for in depth info concerning blue boxes
|
|
and blue boxing. Incidentally, blue boxes are not considered safe anymore
|
|
because ESS detects "foreign" tones, such as the 2600 Hz tone, but this
|
|
detection may be delayed by mixing pink noise of above 3000 Hz with the
|
|
2600 Hz tone. To hang up, the 2600 Hz tone is played again. Also, all blue
|
|
boxes are green boxes because MF "2" corresponds to the Coin Collect tone
|
|
on the green box, and the "KP" tone corresponds to the Coin Return tone on
|
|
the green box. See green box for more information. Blue boxing is
|
|
IMPOSSIBLE under the new CCIS system slowly being integrated into the Bell
|
|
system.
|
|
|
|
blue box tones - The MF tones generated by the blue box in order to
|
|
place calls, emulating a true operator. These dual tones must be entered
|
|
during the 10-15 second period after you have seized a trunk with the 2600
|
|
Hz tone.
|
|
700: 1 : 2 : 4 : 7 : 11 : KP= Key Pulse
|
|
Parallel Frequencies 900: ** : 3 : 5 : 8 : 12 : ST= STop
|
|
2= Coin Collect 1100: ** : ** : 6 : 9 : KP : KP2= Key Pulse 2
|
|
KP= Coin Return 1300: ** : ** : ** : 10 :KP2 : **= None
|
|
(green box tones) 1500: ** : ** : ** : ** : ST :
|
|
: 900:1100:1300:1500:1700: 75ms pulse/pause
|
|
|
|
BLV - Busy Line Verification. Allows a TSPS operator to process a
|
|
customer's request for a confirmation of a repeatedly busy line. This
|
|
service is used in conjunction with emergency break-ins.
|
|
|
|
BNS - Billed Number Screening.
|
|
|
|
break period - Time when the circuit during pulse dialing is left
|
|
open. In the US, this period is 40ms; foreign nations may use 33ms break
|
|
periods.
|
|
|
|
break ratio - The interval pulse dialing breaks and makes the loop
|
|
when dialing. The US standard is 10 pulses per second. When the circuit is
|
|
opened, it is called the break interval. When the circuit is closed, it is
|
|
called the make interval. In the US, there is a 60ms make period and a 40ms
|
|
break period. This is often referred to as a 60% make interval. Many
|
|
foreign nations have a 67% make interval.
|
|
|
|
bridge - I don't really understand this one, but these are important
|
|
phreak toys. I'll cover them more in the next issue of TPH.
|
|
|
|
British Post Office - The United Kingdom's equivalent to Ma Bell.
|
|
|
|
busy box - Box that will cause the fone to be busy, without taking it
|
|
OFF-HOOK. Just get a piece of fone wire with a plug on the end, cut it off
|
|
so there is a plug and about two inches of fone line. Then, strip the wire
|
|
so the two middle wires, the tip and the ring, are exposed. Then, wrap the
|
|
ring and the tip together, tape with electrical tape, and plug into the
|
|
fone jack. The fone will be busy until the box is removed.
|
|
|
|
cans - Cans are those big silver boxes on top of or around the
|
|
telephone poles. When opened, the lines can be manipulated with a beige box
|
|
or whatever phun you have in mind.
|
|
|
|
calling card - Another form of the LD service used by many major LD
|
|
companies that composes of the customers fone number and a PIN number. The
|
|
most important thing to know when questioned about calling cards are the
|
|
area code and the city where the calling card customer originated from.
|
|
|
|
CAMA - Centralized Automatic Message Accounting. System that records
|
|
the numbers called by fones and other LD systems. The recording can be used
|
|
as evidence in court.
|
|
|
|
CC - Calling Card.
|
|
|
|
CC - Credit Card.
|
|
|
|
CCIS - Common Channel Inter-office Signaling. New method being
|
|
incorporated under Bell that will send all the signaling information over
|
|
separate data lines. Blue boxing is IMPOSSIBLE under this system.
|
|
|
|
CCITT - The initials of the name in French of the International
|
|
Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee. At CCITT representatives of
|
|
telecommunications authorities, operators of public networks and other
|
|
interested bodies meet to agree on standards needed for international
|
|
intermarrying of telecommunications services.
|
|
|
|
CCS - Calling Card Service.
|
|
|
|
CCSS - Common Channel Signalling System. A system whereby all
|
|
signalling for a number of voice paths are carried over one common channel,
|
|
instead of within each individual channel.
|
|
|
|
CDA - Coin Detection and Announcement.
|
|
|
|
CF - Coin First. A type of fortress fone that wants your money before
|
|
you receive a dial tone.
|
|
|
|
Channel - A means of one-way transmission or a UCA path for electrical
|
|
transmission between two or more points without common carrier, provided
|
|
terminal equipment. Also called a circuit, line, link, path, or facility.
|
|
|
|
cheese box - Another type of box which, when coupled with call
|
|
forwarding services, will allow one to place free fone calls. The safety of
|
|
this box is unknown. See references for information concerning text philes
|
|
on this box.
|
|
|
|
clear box - Piece of equipment that compromises of a telephone pickup
|
|
coil and a small amp. This works on the principal that all receivers are
|
|
also weak transmitters. So, you amplify your signal on PP fortress fones
|
|
and spare yourself some change.
|
|
|
|
CN/A - Customer Name And Address. Systems where authorized Bell
|
|
employees can find out the name and address of any customer in the Bell
|
|
System. All fone numbers are listed on file, including unlisted numbers.
|
|
Some CN/A services ask for ID#'s when you make a request. To use, call the
|
|
CN/A office during normal business hours, and say that you are so and so
|
|
from a certain business or office, related to customers or something like
|
|
that, and you need the customer's name and address at (NPA)Nxx-xxxx. That
|
|
should work. The operators to these services usually know more than DA
|
|
operators do and are also susceptible to "social engineering." It is
|
|
possible to bullshit a CN/A operator for the NON PUB DA number and policy
|
|
changes in the CN/A system.
|
|
|
|
CO Code - Central Office code which is also the Nxx code. See Nxx for
|
|
more details. Sometimes known as the local end office.
|
|
|
|
conference calls - To have multiple lines inter-connected in order to
|
|
have many people talking in the same conversation on the fone at once. See
|
|
Alliance and switch crashing for more information.
|
|
|
|
credit operator - Same as TSPS operator. The operator you get when you
|
|
dial "0" on your fone and phortress fones. See TSPS for more information.
|
|
|
|
CSDC - Circuit Switched Digital Capability. Another USDN service that
|
|
has no ISDN counterpart.
|
|
|
|
DA - Directory Assistance. See directory assistance.
|
|
|
|
DAO - Directory Assistance Operator. See directory assistance.
|
|
|
|
data communications - In telefone company terminology, data
|
|
communications refers to an end-to-end transmission of any kind of
|
|
information other than sound, including voice, or video. Data sources may
|
|
be either digital or analog.
|
|
|
|
data rate - The rate at which a channel carries data, measured in bits
|
|
per second, bit/s, also known as "data signalling rate."
|
|
|
|
data signalling rate - Same as "data rate." See data rate.
|
|
|
|
DCO-CS - Digital Central Office-Carrier Switch.
|
|
|
|
DDD - Direct Distance Dialed.
|
|
|
|
Dial-It Services - See 900 Services.
|
|
|
|
digital - A method to represent information to be discrete or
|
|
individually distinct signals, such as bits, as opposed to a continuously
|
|
variable analog signal.
|
|
|
|
digital transmission - A mode of transmission in which all information
|
|
to be transmitted is first converted to digital form and then transmitted
|
|
as a serial stream of pulses. Any signal, voice, data, television, can be
|
|
converted to digital form.
|
|
|
|
Dimension 2000 - Another LD service located at (800)848-9000.
|
|
|
|
directory assistance - Operator that you get when you call 411 or
|
|
NPA-555-1212. This call will cost $.50 per call. These won't know where you
|
|
are calling from, unless you annoy them, and do not have access to unlisted
|
|
numbers. There are also directory assistance operators for the deaf that
|
|
transfer BAUDOT. You can call these and have interesting conversations. The
|
|
fone number is 800-855-1155, are free, and use standard Telex abbreviations
|
|
such as GA for Go Ahead. These are nicer than normal operators, and are
|
|
often subject to "social engineering" skills (bullshitting). Other
|
|
operators also have access to their own directory assistance at
|
|
KP+NPA+131+ST.
|
|
|
|
diverter - This is a nice phreak tool. What a diverter is is a type of
|
|
call forwarding system done externally, apart from the fone company, which
|
|
is a piece of hardware that will foreword the call to somewhere else. These
|
|
can be found on many 24 hour plumbers, doctors, etc. When you call, you
|
|
will often hear a click and then ringing, or a ring, then a click, then
|
|
another ring, the second ring often sounds different from the first. Then,
|
|
the other side picks the fone up and you ask about their company or
|
|
something stupid, but DO NOT ANNOY them. Then eventually, let them hang up,
|
|
DO NOT HANG UP YOURSELF. Wait for the dial tone, then dial ANI. If the
|
|
number ANI reads is different from the one you are calling from, then you
|
|
have a diverter. Call anywhere you want, for all calls will be billed to
|
|
the diverter. Also, if someone uses a tracer on you, then they trace the
|
|
diverter and you are safe. Diverters can, however, hang up on you after a
|
|
period of time; some companies make diverters that can be set to clear the
|
|
line after a set period of time, or click every once in a while, which is
|
|
super annoying, but it will still work. Diverters are usually safer than LD
|
|
extenders, but there are no guarantees. Diverters can also be accessed via
|
|
phortress fones. Dial the credit operator and ask for the AT&T CREDIT
|
|
OPERATOR. They will put on some lame recording that is pretty long. Don't
|
|
say anything and the recording will hang up. LET IT HANG UP, DO NOT HANG
|
|
UP. Then the line will clear and you will get a dial tone. Place any call
|
|
you want with the following format: 9+1+NPA+Nxx+xxxx, or for local calls,
|
|
just 9+Nxx+xxxx. I'd advise that you call ANI first as a local call to make
|
|
sure you have a diverter.
|
|
|
|
DLS - Dial Line Service.
|
|
|
|
DNR - Also known as pen register. See pen register.
|
|
|
|
DOV - Data-Over-Voice.
|
|
|
|
DSI - Data Subscriber Interface. Unit in the LADT system that will
|
|
concentrate data from 123 subscribers to a 56k or a 9.6k bit-per-second
|
|
trunk to a packet network.
|
|
|
|
DT - Dial tone.
|
|
|
|
DTF - Dial Tone First. This is a type of fortress fone that gives you
|
|
a dial tone first.
|
|
|
|
DTI - Digital Trunk Interface.
|
|
|
|
DTMF - Dual-Tone-Multi-Frequency, the generic term for the touch tone.
|
|
These include 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 as well as A,B,C,D. See silver box for
|
|
more details.
|
|
|
|
DVM - Data Voice Multiplexor. A system that squeezes more out of a
|
|
transmission medium and allows a customer to transmit voice and data
|
|
simultaneously to more than one receiver over the existing telefone line.
|
|
|
|
emergency break-in - Name given to the art of "breaking" into a busy
|
|
number which will usually result in becoming a third party in the call
|
|
taking place.
|
|
|
|
end office - Any class 5 switching office in North America.
|
|
|
|
end-to-end signalling - A mode of network operation in which the
|
|
originating central office, or station, retains control and signals
|
|
directly to each successive central office, or PBX, as trunks are added to
|
|
the connection.
|
|
|
|
ESS - Electronic Switching System. "The phreak's nightmare come true."
|
|
With ESS, EVERY SINGLE digit you dial is recorded, even mistakes. The
|
|
system records who you call, when you call, how long you talked, and, in
|
|
some cases, what you talked about. ESS is programed to make a list of
|
|
people who make excessive 800 calls or directory assistance. This is called
|
|
the "800 Exceptional Calling Report." ESS can be programed to print out
|
|
logs of who called certain numbers, such as a bookie, a known communist, a
|
|
BBS, etc. ESS is a series of programs working together; these programs can
|
|
be very easily changed to do whatever the fone company wants ESS to do.
|
|
With ESS, tracing is done in MILLISECONDS and will pick up any "foreign"
|
|
tones on the line, such as 2600 Hz. Bell predicts the whole country will be
|
|
on ESS by 1990! You can identify an ESS office by the functions, such as
|
|
dialing 911 for help, fortress fones with DT first, special services such
|
|
as call forwarding, speed dialing, call waiting, etc., and ANI on LD calls.
|
|
Also, black boxes and Infinity transmitters will NOT work under ESS.
|
|
|
|
extender - A fone line that serves as a middleman for a fone call,
|
|
such as the 800 or 950 extenders. These systems usually require a multi-
|
|
digit code and have some sort of ANI to trace suspicious calls with.
|
|
|
|
facsimile - A system for the transmission of images. The image is
|
|
scanned at the transmitter, reconstructed at the receiving station, and
|
|
duplicated on some form of paper. Also known as a FAX.
|
|
|
|
FAX - See facsimile for details.
|
|
|
|
FiRM - A large cracking group who is slowly taking the place of PTL and
|
|
the endangered cracking groups at the time of this writing.
|
|
|
|
fortress phone - Today's modern, armor plated, pay fone. These may be
|
|
the older, 3 coin/coin first fones or the newer, 1 coin/DT first fones.
|
|
There are also others, see CF, DTF, and PP. Most phortresses can be found
|
|
in the 9xxx or 98xx series of your local Nxx.
|
|
|
|
gateway city - See ISC.
|
|
|
|
Gestapo - The telefone company's security force. These nasties are the
|
|
ones that stake out misused phortresses as well as go after those bad
|
|
phreaks that might be phucking with the fone system.
|
|
|
|
green base - A type of output device used by the fone company. Usually
|
|
light green in color and stick up a few feet from the ground. See output
|
|
device for more information.
|
|
|
|
green box - Equipment that will emulate the Coin Collect, Coin Return,
|
|
and Ringback tones. This means that if you call someone with a fortress
|
|
fone and they have a green box, by activating it, your money will be
|
|
returned. The tones are, in hertz, Coin Collect=700+1100, Coin
|
|
Return=1100+1700, and Ringback=700+1700. However, before these tones are
|
|
sent, the MF detectors at the CO must be alerted, this can be done by
|
|
sending a 900+1500 Hz or single 2600 Hz wink of 90ms followed by a 60ms
|
|
gap, and then the appropriate signal for at least 900ms.
|
|
|
|
gold box - This box will trace calls, tell if the call is being
|
|
traced, and can change a trace.
|
|
|
|
grey box - Also known as a silver box. See silver box.
|
|
|
|
group chief - The name of the highest ranking official in any fone
|
|
office. Ask to speak to these if an operator is giving you trouble.
|
|
|
|
high-speed data - A rate of data transfer ranging upward from 10,000
|
|
bits per second.
|
|
|
|
H/M - Hotel/Motel.
|
|
|
|
ICH - International Call Handling. Used for overseas calls.
|
|
|
|
ICVT - InComing Verification Trunk.
|
|
|
|
IDA - Integrated Digital Access. The United Kingdom's equivalent of
|
|
ISDN.
|
|
|
|
IDDD - International Direct Distance Dialing - The ability to place
|
|
international calls direct without processing through a station. Usually,
|
|
one would have to place the call through a 011, station, or a 01, operator
|
|
assisted, type of setup.
|
|
|
|
IDN - Integrated Digital Networks. Networks which provide digital
|
|
access and transmission, in both circuit switched and packet modes.
|
|
|
|
in-band - The method of sending signaling information along with the
|
|
conversion using tones to represent digits.
|
|
|
|
INS - Information Network System. Japan's equivalent of ISDN.
|
|
|
|
Intercept - The intercept operator is the one you get connected to
|
|
when there are not enough recordings available to tell you that the number
|
|
has been disconnected or changed. These usually ask what number you are
|
|
calling and are the lowest form of the operator.
|
|
|
|
intermediate point - Any class 4X switching office in North America.
|
|
Also known as an RSU.
|
|
|
|
international dialing - In order to call across country borders, one
|
|
must use the format PREFIX + COUNTRY CODE + NATION #. The prefix in North
|
|
America is usually 011 for station-to-station calls or 01 for operator-
|
|
assisted calls. If you have IDDD, you don't need to place this prefix in.
|
|
|
|
INTT - Incoming No Test Trunks.
|
|
|
|
INWARD - An operator that assists your local TSPS '0' operator in
|
|
connecting calls. These won't question you as long as the call is within
|
|
their service area. The operator can ONLY be reached by other operators or
|
|
a blue box. The blue box number is KP+NPA+121+ST for the INWARD operator
|
|
that will help you connect to any calls in that area ONLY.
|
|
|
|
INWATS - Inward Wide Area Telecommunications Service. These are the
|
|
800 numbers we are all familiar with. These are set up in bands; 6 total.
|
|
Band 6 is the largest, and you can call band 6 INWATS from anywhere in the
|
|
US except the state where the call is terminated. This is also why some
|
|
companies have a separate 800 number for their state. Band 5 includes the
|
|
48 contiguous states. All the way down to band 1, which only includes the
|
|
states contiguous to that one. Understand? That means more people can reach
|
|
a band 6 INWATS as compared to the people that can access a band 1 INWATS.
|
|
|
|
IOCC - International Overseas Completion Centre. A system which must
|
|
be dialed in order to re-route fone calls to countries inaccessible via
|
|
dialing direct. To route a call via IOCC with a blue box, pad the country
|
|
code to the RIGHT with zeroes until it is 3 digits. Then KP+160 is dialed,
|
|
plus the padded country code, plus ST.
|
|
|
|
IPM - Interruptions Per Minute. The number of times a certain tone
|
|
sounds during a minute.
|
|
|
|
ISC - Inter-Nation Switching Centers. Most outgoing calls from a
|
|
certain numbering system will be routed through these "gateway cities" in
|
|
order to reach a foreign country.
|
|
|
|
ISDN - Integrated Services Digital Network. ISDN is a planned
|
|
hierarchy of digital switching and transmission systems. Synchronized so
|
|
that all digital elements speak the same "language" at the same speed, the
|
|
ISDN would provide voice, data, and video in a unified manner.
|
|
|
|
ITT - This is another large LD service. The extenders owned by this
|
|
company are usually considered dangerous. The format is
|
|
ACC-ESS#,(NPA)Nxx-xxxx,1234567.
|
|
|
|
KP - Key Pulse. Tone that must be generated before inputting a fone
|
|
number using a blue box. This tone is, in hertz, 1100+1700.
|
|
|
|
KP2 - Key Pulse 2. Tone that is used by the CCITT SYSTEM 5 for special
|
|
international calling. This tone is, in hertz, 1300+1700.
|
|
|
|
LADT - Local Area Data Transport. LADT is a method by which customers
|
|
will send and receive digital data over existing customer loop wiring. Dial-
|
|
Up LADT will let customers use their lines for occasional data services;
|
|
direct access LADT will transmit simultaneous voice and data traffic on the
|
|
same line.
|
|
|
|
LAN - Local Area Network.
|
|
|
|
LAPB - Link Access Protocol Balanced.
|
|
|
|
LD - Long Distance
|
|
|
|
Leave Word And Call Back - Another new type of operator.
|
|
|
|
local loop - When a loop is connected between you and your CO. This
|
|
occurs when you pick the fone up or have a fone OFF-HOOK.
|
|
|
|
loop - A pair or group of fone lines. When people call these lines,
|
|
they can talk to each other. Loops consist of two or more numbers, they
|
|
usually are grouped close together somewhere in the Nxx-99xx portions of
|
|
your exchange. The lower number in a loop is the tone side of the loop, or
|
|
the singing switch. The higher number is always silent. The tone disappears
|
|
on the lower # when someone dials the other side of the loop. If you are
|
|
the higher #, you will have to listen to the clicks to see if someone
|
|
dialed into the loop. There also are such things as Non-Supervised loops,
|
|
where the call is toll-free to the caller. Most loops will be muted or have
|
|
annoying clicks at connection, but otherwise, you might find these useful
|
|
goodies scanning the 99xx's in your exchange. Some loops allow multi-user
|
|
capability; thus, many people can talk to each other at the same time, a
|
|
conference of sorts. Since loops are genuine test functions for the telco
|
|
during the day, most phreaks scan and use them at night.
|
|
|
|
MA - Ma Bell, the Bell Telesys Company. Telco, etc. See Ma Bell for
|
|
more information.
|
|
|
|
Ma Bell - The telephone company. The Bell Telesys Phone Company. The
|
|
company you phreak and hack with. The company that doesn't like you too
|
|
much. The company you often phuck with, and sometimes phuck up. The company
|
|
that can phuck u up if u aren't careful.
|
|
|
|
make period - The time when, during pulse dialing, the circuit is
|
|
closed. In the US, this period is 60ms; however, foreign nations may use a
|
|
67ms make period. Make periods are also referred to in percentages, so a
|
|
60ms make period would be 60%, a 67ms as 67%.
|
|
|
|
marine verify - Another type of operator.
|
|
|
|
MCI - Yet another LD service that owns many dial-ups in most areas.
|
|
However, the codes from various areas may not be interchangeable. Not much
|
|
is known about MCI; however, MCI probably has some sophisticated anti-
|
|
phreak equipment. The format is ACC-ESS#,12345,(NPA)Nxx-xxxx.
|
|
|
|
MCI Execunet - The calling card equivalent of the regular MCI LD
|
|
service, but the codes are longer and interchangeable. For the local access
|
|
port near you, call (800)555-1212. The format for the port will be
|
|
ACC-ESS#,1234567,(NPA)Nxx-xxxx.
|
|
|
|
Metrofone - Owned by Western Union. A very popular system among fone
|
|
phreaks. Call Metrofone's operator and ask for the local access number at
|
|
(800)325-1403. The format is ACC-ESS#,CODE,(NPA)Nxx-xxxx. Metrofone is
|
|
alleged to place trap codes on phreak BBS's.
|
|
|
|
MF - Multi-Frequency. These are the operator and blue box tones. An MF
|
|
tone consists of two tones from a set of six master tones which are
|
|
combined to produce 12 separate tones. These are NOT the same as touch
|
|
tones. See blue box tones for frequencies.
|
|
|
|
mobile - A type of operator.
|
|
|
|
NAP/PA - North American Pirate/Phreak Association. A large group of bbs
|
|
boards which include a lot of pirates/phreakers. I'm not quite sure where the
|
|
group will go from here.
|
|
|
|
NON PUB DA - A reverse type of CN/A bureau. You tell the service the
|
|
name and the locality, they will supply the fone number. However, they will
|
|
ask for you name, supervisor's name, etc. Use your social engineering
|
|
skills here (aka, bullshitting skills). You also can get detailed billing
|
|
information from these bureaus.
|
|
|
|
NPA - Numbering Plan Area. The area code of a certain city/state. For
|
|
example, on the number (111)222-3333, the NPA would be 111. Area codes
|
|
never cross state boundaries sans the 800, 700, 900, and special exchanges.
|
|
|
|
Nxx - The exchange or prefix of the area to be dialed. For example of
|
|
the number (111)222-3333, the Nxx would be 222.
|
|
|
|
OGVT - OutGoing Verification Trunk.
|
|
|
|
OFF-HOOK - To be on-line, to have the switchhook down. To have a
|
|
closed connection. At this point, you also have a local loop.
|
|
|
|
ON-HOOK - To be off-line, to have the switchhook up. To have an open
|
|
connection.
|
|
|
|
ONI - Operator Number Identification. Identifies calling numbers when
|
|
an office is not equipped with CAMA, the calling number is not
|
|
automatically recorded by CAMA, or has equipment failures, such as ANIF.
|
|
|
|
OPCR - Operator Actions Program. Standard TBOC or equivalent "0"
|
|
operator.
|
|
|
|
OPEN - Northern Telecom's Open Protocol Enhanced Networks World
|
|
Program.
|
|
|
|
OSI - Open System Interconnection. Form of telecommunication
|
|
architechture which will probobly fail to SNA.
|
|
|
|
OST - Originating Station Treatment.
|
|
|
|
OTC - Operating Telefone Company.
|
|
|
|
out-of-band - Type of signaling which sends all of the signaling and
|
|
supervisory informations, such as ON and OFF HOOK, over separate data
|
|
links.
|
|
|
|
output device - Any type of interface such as cans, terminal sets,
|
|
remote switching centers, bridging heads, etc., where the fone lines of the
|
|
immediate area are relayed to before going to the fone company. These often
|
|
are those cases painted light green and stand up from the ground. Most of
|
|
these can be opened with a 7/16 hex driver, turning the security bolt(s)
|
|
1/8 of an inch counter-clockwise, and opening. Terminals on the inside
|
|
might be labeled "T" for tip and "R" for ring. Otherwise, the ring side is
|
|
usually on the right and the tip side is on the left.
|
|
|
|
OUTWATS - Outward Wide Area Telecommunications Service. These are WATS
|
|
that are used to make outgoing calls ONLY.
|
|
|
|
Paper Clip Method - This method of phreaking was illustrated in the
|
|
movie War Games. What a phortress fone does to make sure money is in a fone
|
|
is send an electrical pulse to notify the fone that a coin has been
|
|
deposited, for the first coin only. However, by simply grounding the
|
|
positive end of the microphone, enough current and voltage is deferred to
|
|
the ground to simulate the first quarter in the coin box. An easy way to
|
|
accomplish this is to connect the center of the mouthpiece to the coin box,
|
|
touch tone pad, or anything that looks like metal with a piece of wire. A
|
|
most convenient piece of wire is a bend out of a paper clip. Then you can
|
|
send red box tones through the line and get free fone calls! Also, telco
|
|
modified fones may require you to push the clip harder against the
|
|
mouthpiece, or connect the mouthpiece to the earpiece. If pressing harder
|
|
against the mouthpiece becomes a problem, pins may be an easier solution.
|
|
|
|
PBX - Private Branch eXchange. A private switchboard used by some big
|
|
companies that allow access to the OUTWATS line by dialing a 8 or a 9
|
|
after inputting a code.
|
|
|
|
PCM - Pulse Code-Modulated trunks.
|
|
|
|
PC Pursuit - A computer oriented LD system, comparable to Telenet,
|
|
which offers low access rates to 2400 baud users. Hacking on this system is
|
|
virtually impossible due to the new password format.
|
|
|
|
pen register - A device that the fone company puts on your line if
|
|
they suspect you are fraudulently using your fone. This will record EVERY
|
|
SINGLE digit/rotary pulse you enter into the fone as well as other
|
|
pertinent information, which may include a bit of tapping. Also known as
|
|
DNR.
|
|
|
|
Phortune 500 - An elite group of users currently paving the way for
|
|
better quality in their trade.
|
|
|
|
PHRACK - Another phreak/hack oriented newsletter. See reference
|
|
section, phile 1.6 for more information.
|
|
|
|
PHUN - Phreakers and Hackers Underground Network. They also release a
|
|
newsletter that is up to #4 at the time of this writing. See phile 1.6 for
|
|
more information on finding this phile.
|
|
|
|
PIN - Personal Identification Number - The last four digits on a
|
|
calling card that adds to the security of calling cards.
|
|
|
|
plant tests - test numbers which include ANI, ringback, touch tone
|
|
tests, and other tests the telco uses.
|
|
|
|
Post Office Engineers - The United Kingdom's fone workers.
|
|
|
|
PP - Dial Post-Pay Service. On phortress fones, you are prompted to
|
|
pay for the call after the called party answers. You can use a clear box to
|
|
get around this.
|
|
|
|
PPS - Pulses Per Second.
|
|
|
|
printmeter - The United Kingdom's equivalent of a pen register. See
|
|
pen register for more info.
|
|
|
|
PTE - Packet Transport Equipment.
|
|
|
|
PTL - One of the bigger cracking groups of all time. However, the group
|
|
has been dying off and only has a few nodes as of this writing.
|
|
|
|
PTS - Position and Trunk Scanner.
|
|
|
|
PTT - Postal Telephone Telegraph.
|
|
|
|
pulse - See rotary phones.
|
|
|
|
purple box - This one would be nice. Free calls to anywhere via blue
|
|
boxing, become an operator via blue box, conference calling, disconnect
|
|
fone line(s), tap fones, detect traces, intercept directory assistance
|
|
calls. Has all red box tones. This one may not be available under ESS.
|
|
|
|
rainbow box - An ultimate box. You can become an operator. You get
|
|
free calls, blue box. You can set up conference calls. You can forcefully
|
|
disconnect lines. You can tap lines. You can detect traces, change traces,
|
|
and trace as well. All incoming calls are free. You can intercept directory
|
|
assistance. You have a generator for all MF tones. You can mute and redial.
|
|
You have all the red-box tones. This is an awesome box. However, it does
|
|
not exist under ESS.
|
|
|
|
RAO - Revenue Accounting Office. The three digit code that sometimes
|
|
replaces the NPA of some calling cards.
|
|
|
|
RBOC - Regional Bell Operating Company.
|
|
|
|
red box - Equipment that will emulate the red box tone generated for
|
|
coin recognition in all phortress fones.
|
|
|
|
red box tones - Tones that tell the phortress fone how much money was
|
|
inserted in the fone to make the required call. In one slot fones, these
|
|
are beeps in pulses; the pulse is a 2200+1700 Hz tone. For quarters, 5 beep
|
|
tones at 12-17 PPS, for dimes it is 2 beep tones at 5-8.5 PPS, and a nickel
|
|
causes 1 beep tone at 5-8.5 PPS. For three slot fones, the tones are
|
|
different. Instead of beeps, they are straight dual tones. For a nickel, it
|
|
is one bell at 1050-1100 Hz, two bells for a dime, and one gong at 800 Hz
|
|
for a quarter. When using red box tones, you must insert at least one
|
|
nickel before playing the tones, cuz a ground test takes place to make sure
|
|
some money has been inserted. The ground test may be fooled by the Paper
|
|
Clip Method. Also, it has been known that TSPS can detect certain red box
|
|
tones, and will record all data on AMA or CAMA of fraudulent activity.
|
|
|
|
regional center - Any class 1 switching office in North America.
|
|
|
|
REMOB - Method of tapping into lines by entering a code and the 7
|
|
digit number you want to monitor, from ACD Test Mode. A possibility of this
|
|
may be mass conferencing.
|
|
|
|
ring - The red wire found in fone jacks and most fone equipment. The
|
|
ring also is less positive than the tip. When looking at a fone plug on the
|
|
end of typical 4 wire fone line from the top, let's say the top is the side
|
|
with the hook, the ring will be the middle-right wire. Remember, the ring
|
|
is red, and to the right. The three "R's" revived!
|
|
|
|
ring-around-the-rosy - 9 connections in tandem which would cause an
|
|
endless loop connection and has never occurred in fone history.
|
|
|
|
ringback - A testing number that the fone company uses to have your
|
|
fone ring back after you hang up. You usually input the three digit
|
|
ringback number and then the last four digits to the fone number you are
|
|
calling from.
|
|
|
|
ring trip - The CO process involved with stopping the AC ringing
|
|
signal when a fone goes OFF-HOOK.
|
|
|
|
rotary phone - The dial or pulse phone that works by hooking and un-
|
|
hooking the fone rapidly in secession that is directly related to the
|
|
number you dialed. These will not work if another phone with the same
|
|
number is off-hook at the time of dialing.
|
|
|
|
Rout & Rate - Yet another type of operator; assists your TSPS operator
|
|
with rates and routings. This once can be reached at KP+800+141+1212+ST.
|
|
|
|
RPE - Remote Peripheral Equipment.
|
|
|
|
RQS - The Rate Quote System. This is the TSPS operator's rate/quote
|
|
system. This is a method your '0' operator gets info without dialing the
|
|
rate and route operator. The number is KP+009+ST.
|
|
|
|
RSU - Remote Switching Unit. The class 4X office that can have an
|
|
unattended exchange attached to it.
|
|
|
|
RTA - Remote Trunk Arrangement.
|
|
|
|
SAC - Special Area Code. Separate listing of area codes, usually for
|
|
special services such as TWX's, WATS, or DIAL-IT services.
|
|
|
|
SCC - Specialized Common Carriers. Common Nxx numbers that are
|
|
specialized for a certain purpose. An example is the 950 exchange.
|
|
|
|
sectional center - Any class 2 switching office in North America.
|
|
|
|
service monitoring - This is the technical name of phone tapping.
|
|
|
|
SF - Supervision Control Frequency. The 2600 Hz tone which seizes any
|
|
open trunk, which can be blue boxed off of.
|
|
|
|
short-haul - Also known as a local call.
|
|
|
|
signalling - The process by which a caller or equipment on the
|
|
transmitting end of a line in: forms a particular party or equipment at the
|
|
receiving end that a message is to be communicated. Signalling is also the
|
|
supervisory information which lets the caller know the called know the
|
|
called party is ready to talk, the line is busy, or the called party has
|
|
hung up.
|
|
|
|
silver box - Equipment that will allow you to emulate the DTMF tones
|
|
A,B,C,D. The MF tones are, in hertz, A=697+1633, B=770+1633, C=852+1633,
|
|
D=941+1633. These allow special functions from regular fones, such as ACD
|
|
Testing Mode.
|
|
|
|
Skyline - Service owned by IBM, Comsat, and AEtna. It has a local
|
|
access number in the 950 exchange. The fone number is 950-1088. The code is
|
|
either a 6 or 8 digit number. This company is alleged to be VERY dangerous.
|
|
|
|
SNA - System Network Architechture, by IBM. A possible future standard
|
|
of architechture only competed by OSI.
|
|
|
|
SOST - Special Operator Service Treatment. These include calls which
|
|
must be transferred to a SOST switchboard before they can be processed;
|
|
services such as conferences, appointments, mobile, etc.
|
|
|
|
SPC - Stored Program Control. Form of switching the US has heavily
|
|
invested in.
|
|
|
|
Sprint - One of the first LD services, also known as SPC. Sprint owns
|
|
many extender services and is not considered safe. It is common knowledge
|
|
that Sprint has declared war on fone phreakers.
|
|
|
|
SSAS - Station Signaling and Announcement System. System on most
|
|
fortress fones that will prompt caller for money after the number, usually
|
|
LD numbers, has been dialed, or the balance due before the call will be
|
|
allowed to connect.
|
|
|
|
stacking tandems - The art of busying out all trunks between two
|
|
points. This one is very amusing.
|
|
|
|
STart - Pulse that is transmitted after the KP+NPA+Nxx+xxxx through
|
|
operator or blue boxed calls. This pulse is, in hertz, 1500+1700.
|
|
|
|
station # - The last four digits in any seven digit fone number.
|
|
|
|
STD - Subscriber Trunk Dialing. Mechanism in the United Kingdom which
|
|
takes a call from the local lines and legimately elevates it to a trunk or
|
|
international level.
|
|
|
|
step crashing - Method of using a rotary fone to break into a busy
|
|
line. Example, you use a rotary fone to dial Nxx-xxx8 and you get a busy
|
|
signal. Hang up and dial Nxx-xxx7 and in between the last pulse of your
|
|
rotary dial and before the fone would begin to ring, you can flash your
|
|
switchhook extremely fast. If you do it right, you will hear an enormous
|
|
"CLICK" and all of a sudden, you will cut into your party's conversation.
|
|
|
|
STPS - Signal Transfer PointS. Associated with various switching
|
|
machines and the new CCIS system.
|
|
|
|
switchhook - The button on your fone that, when depressed, hangs the
|
|
fone up. These can be used to emulate rotary dial fones if used correctly.
|
|
|
|
SxS - Step-By-Step. Also known as the Strowger Switch or the two-
|
|
motion switch. This is the switching equipment Bell began using in 1918.
|
|
However, because of its limitations, such as no direct use of DTMF and
|
|
maintenance problems, the fone company has been upgrading since. You can
|
|
identify SxS switching offices by lack of DTMF or pulsing digits after
|
|
dialing DTMF, if you go near the CO it will sound like a typewriter testing
|
|
factory, lack of speed calling, lack of special services like call
|
|
forwarding and call waiting, and fortress fones want your money first,
|
|
before the dial tone.
|
|
|
|
TAP - The "official" phone phreak's newsletter. Previously YIPL.
|
|
|
|
T&C - Time and Charge.
|
|
|
|
tapping - To listen in to a phone call taking place. The fone company
|
|
calls this "service monitoring."
|
|
|
|
TASI - Time Assignment Speech Interpolation. This is used on satellite
|
|
trunks, and basically allows more than one person to use a trunk by putting
|
|
them on while the other person isn't talking.
|
|
|
|
Telenet - A computer-oriented system of relay stations which relay
|
|
computer calls to LD numbers. Telenet has a vast array of access ports
|
|
accessible at certain baud rates.
|
|
|
|
Tel-Tec - Another LD company that usually give out a weak connection.
|
|
The format is (800)323-3026,123456,(NPA)Nxx-xxxx.
|
|
|
|
Tel-Tex - A subsidiary of Tel-Tec, but is only used in Texas. The
|
|
number is *800)432-2071 and the format is the same as above.
|
|
|
|
terminal - A point where information may enter or leave a
|
|
communication network. Also, any device that is capable of sending and/or
|
|
receiving data over a communication channel.
|
|
|
|
tip - The green wire found in fone jacks and most fone equipment. The
|
|
tip is the more positive wire compared to the ring. When looking at a fone
|
|
plug from the top, lets say the hook side is the top, the tip will be the
|
|
middle wire on the left.
|
|
|
|
toll center - Any class 4 switching office located in North America.
|
|
|
|
toll point - Any class 4P switching office in North America.
|
|
|
|
Toll LIB - Reverse CN/A bureau. See NON PUB DA for more info.
|
|
|
|
touch tone phone - A phone that uses the DTMF system to place calls.
|
|
|
|
touch tone test - This is another test number the fone company uses.
|
|
You dial the ringback number and have the fone ring back. Then, when you
|
|
pick it up, you will hear a tone. Press your touch-tone digits 1-0. If they
|
|
are correct, the fone will beep twice.
|
|
|
|
trace - Something you don't want any fone company to do to you. This
|
|
is when the fone company you are phucking with flips a switch and they find
|
|
the number you are calling from. Sometimes the fone company will use ANI or
|
|
trap and trace methods to locate you. Then the local Gestapo home in and
|
|
terminate the caller if discovered.
|
|
|
|
trap and trace - A method used by the FBI and some step offices that
|
|
forces a voltage through the line and traces simultaneously, which mean
|
|
that you can't hang up unless the Pheds do, and pray you aren't calling
|
|
from your own house. Trap and trace is also known as the lock-in-trace.
|
|
|
|
trap codes - Working codes owned by the LD company, not a customer,
|
|
that, when used, will send a "trouble card" to Ma Bell, no matter what
|
|
company the card is coming from, and ESS will immediately trace the call.
|
|
Trap codes have been in use for some time now, and it is considered safer
|
|
to self-hack codes opposed to leeching them off of BBS's, since some LD
|
|
companies post these codes on phreak oriented BBS's.
|
|
|
|
Travelnet - Service owned by GM that uses WATS as well as local access
|
|
numbers. Travelnet also accepts voice validation for its LD codes.
|
|
|
|
TSPS - Traffic Service Position System. Operator that usually is the
|
|
one that obtains billing information for Calling Card or 3rd number calls,
|
|
identifies called customer on person-to-person calls, obtains acceptance of
|
|
charges on collect calls, or identifies calling numbers. These operators
|
|
have an ANI board and are the most dangerous type of operator.
|
|
|
|
TWX - Telex II consisting of 5 teletypewriter area codes. These are
|
|
owned by Western Union. These may be reached via another TWX machine
|
|
running at 110 baud. You can send TWX messages via Easylink (800)325-4122.
|
|
|
|
USDN - United States Digital Network. The US's version of the ISDN
|
|
network.
|
|
|
|
videotext - Generic term for a class of two-way, interactive data
|
|
distribution systems with output typically handled as in teletext systems
|
|
and input typically accepted through the telephone or public data network.
|
|
|
|
WATS - Wide Area Telecommunications Service. These can be IN or OUT,
|
|
see the appropriate sections.
|
|
|
|
WATS Extender - These are the LD companies everyone hacks and phreaks
|
|
off of in the 800 NPA. Remember, INWATS + OUTWATS = WATS Extender.
|
|
|
|
white box - This is a portable DTMF keypad.
|
|
|
|
XBAR - Crossbar. Crossbar is another type of switching equipment the
|
|
fone company uses in some areas. There are three major types of Crossbar
|
|
systems called No.1 Crossbar (1XB), No.4 Crossbar (4XB), and No.5 Crossbar
|
|
(5XB). 5XB has been the primary end office switch of MA since the 60's and
|
|
is still in wide use. There is also Crossbar Tandem (XBT) used for toll-
|
|
switching.
|
|
|
|
XBT - Crossbar Tandem. Used for toll-switching. See XBAR.
|
|
|
|
YIPL - The classic "official" phreak's magazine. Now TAP.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/
|
|
-/- -/-
|
|
/-/ *> TID-BYTES <* /-/
|
|
-/- -/-
|
|
/-/ by the Informatik Staff /-/
|
|
-/- -/-
|
|
/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Unix Fake Mail */
|
|
|
|
Most good Unix hackers should already know this, but to the up and coming,
|
|
we feel it important to include this simple, but powerful trick.
|
|
|
|
Telnet to port 25 of the receiving site by 'telnet host.com 25'
|
|
|
|
Once connected, it may or may not require you to type 'helo' [sic]
|
|
If it doesn't don't.
|
|
|
|
type 'mail from: ' and then your imaginary sender:
|
|
ex. 'mail from: satan@hell.org' or 'mail from: root@white.house.gob', or some
|
|
sort, depending of course on your purpose.
|
|
|
|
after you get a sender OK, specify the user to receive the mail:
|
|
type 'rcpt to: ' and then the appropriate username.
|
|
|
|
next, type 'data' and hit enter. This will start entering the data field of
|
|
your letter. Enter as follows:
|
|
|
|
From: satan@hell.org (Lord of the Underworld)
|
|
To: schmuck@anywhere.edu
|
|
Subject: Your sinning
|
|
Status: R
|
|
|
|
Your terrible sinning has sparked my interests, we are currently accepting
|
|
applications for head daemon, 5th level of hell. Please include a photo.
|
|
|
|
Thanks...
|
|
Satan
|
|
.
|
|
|
|
The '.' on a line by itself ends the input. Note, that the From, To, Subject,
|
|
and Status lines should be included for the mail headers to make sense of it.
|
|
Of course there is the obvious message of:
|
|
|
|
From: root
|
|
To: loser
|
|
Subject: your account
|
|
Status: R
|
|
|
|
Your password is too old, please change it to 'hackme1'. Thanks
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Walgreen's Store Pricing Code */
|
|
|
|
Ever curious how much stores mark up their goods on you? Well it is quite easy
|
|
to tell at Walgreen's. On each price tag, you will see a group of letters, in
|
|
this example say, "ARB". These letters are the key to the stores purchase
|
|
price. The letters correspond to the positions in the code "BRUSH CLEAN".
|
|
Here is how it works: BRUSH CLEAN
|
|
12345 67890
|
|
Simply replace the letters with their appropriate digit, in our example (ARB)
|
|
it would be 9-2-1, in other words, $9.21 Now if they want you to pay $60.00
|
|
for the item, you know you are getting ripped!
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Bar Swindles */
|
|
|
|
Here are a of fast-one that you can pull in a bar environment:
|
|
|
|
Challenge someone to "Do as I do" wager.
|
|
Each of you takes a drink.
|
|
You make a gesture with the glass, as "toasting."
|
|
Your opponent toasts also.
|
|
You drink your drink. Your opponent drinks his drink.
|
|
You salute with the glass again. Your opponent does likewise.
|
|
You spit a mouthful back in your drink. Chances are your opponent has already
|
|
swallowed. Take the money and run!
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Interesting Catalogs */
|
|
|
|
Send for these way-cool publications:
|
|
|
|
Paladin Press
|
|
PO Box 1307
|
|
Boulder, CO 80306
|
|
|
|
"Publishers of the Action Library." Books on lockpicking, wiretapping,
|
|
smuggling, assassintaion, guerrilla warfare, and related subjects. Send $2.00
|
|
|
|
|
|
Loompanics
|
|
PO Box 1197
|
|
Port Townsend, WA 98368
|
|
|
|
"The Greatest Book Catalog In the World"-outlaw publishers who also sell outlaw
|
|
books... including some by our military. "No more secrets, no more excuses, no
|
|
more limits." A few of their catagories: Underground economy. Tax avoidance.
|
|
Fake IDs. Police science. Con games. Self defense. Revenge. Guns. Bombs.
|
|
Guerrilla warfare. Self-sufficiency. Alternate Energy. Life extension.
|
|
Drugs. Heresey. Forbidden philosophis. Human pleasure. Send $2 for a HUGE
|
|
catalog that is a reading experience unto itself!!
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(%)%(%)%(%)%(%)%(%)%(%)%(%)%(%)%(%)%(%)%(%)%(%)
|
|
)%( )%(
|
|
(%) > Hot Flashes < (%)
|
|
)%( )%(
|
|
(%) The Underground News Report (%)
|
|
)%( )%(
|
|
(%) Edited by: the Informatik Staff (%)
|
|
)%( )%(
|
|
(%) October 1991 (%)
|
|
)%( )%(
|
|
(%)%(%)%(%)%(%)%(%)%(%)%(%)%(%)%(%)%(%)%(%)%(%)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Teenage Hacker Emulates Hess
|
|
----------------------------
|
|
[Summary from Computer Weekly, 8th August 1991.]
|
|
|
|
A 16 year old schoolboy named Jamie Moulding has been cautioned by plainclothed
|
|
police after hacking into a military computer and trying to sell secrets to the
|
|
USSR. He claims to have read the Ministry of Defense personnel and payroll
|
|
files. One computer he entered held details of a British Army tank control
|
|
system. Moulding first incorporated details of the system into his own
|
|
simulation package, and then phoned the Soviet Union's London embassy to try to
|
|
sell the information. Next day two policemen turned up at his home and spoke
|
|
to his parents. Moulding's telephone bills were unwittingly paid by his
|
|
school. He wrote an autodialer program and an automatic hack program which
|
|
"planted a command which led to a display of passwords". DEC denied that its
|
|
systems had been hacked. The police officers were unavailable for comment.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Phone Card Scam Cheats Beaumont Residents
|
|
-----------------------------------------
|
|
[Houston Chronicle, Sept. 28, 1991]
|
|
|
|
Several residents have been cheated out of hundreds of dollars by con
|
|
artists who call, posing as police or phone company employees, and ask for the
|
|
residents' telephone credit card numbers. Most of the victims are elderly and
|
|
are eager to cooperate, since they are promised that they will be reimbursed
|
|
for any long-distance calls.
|
|
About eight Beaumont residents received extremely high phone bills last
|
|
month, including one that totaled $1,395, after giving their calling card
|
|
numbers to the California based con artists, Southwestern Bell spokesman Frank
|
|
Merriman said. Merriman said the caller identifies himself as a law
|
|
enforcement officer or a telephone company employee who needs the resident's
|
|
calling card number to catch a credit card theif or an employee suspected of
|
|
misconduct.
|
|
A Beaumont physician, who was not identified, told authorities he gave his
|
|
number to a man who posed as an FBI agent. The physician later received
|
|
long-distance bills totaling $1,395 that included calls to Iran, Puerto Rico,
|
|
Hong Kong, Belgium, and China.
|
|
The doctor said the man who called him said they had arrested a man in
|
|
Atlanta who had 19 cards, including his. "He said he has to really arrest this
|
|
guy, because he's ripping off the public, and that he needs my help." the
|
|
doctor said.
|
|
The calls have been traced to a pay phone in Los Angeles, he said.
|
|
Customers should never give their calling card numbers to anyone over the
|
|
phone, Merriman said. Southwestern Bell will adjust the charges if the company
|
|
can prove the customer did not make the calls, he said, but such scams end up
|
|
costing customers. "It's like shoplifting," he said. "It's a cost, and
|
|
sombody has to incur it."
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Security Comes To The Free Software Foundation
|
|
----------------------------------------------
|
|
[Summary from an article in the Boston Globe, Aug 6, 1991.]
|
|
|
|
The Free Software Foundation (FSF) has been forced to institute security
|
|
(password) control because "vandals who were able to enter the foundation's
|
|
system anonymously were not only deleting and trashing files there, but were
|
|
also entering Internet ... and doing damage in other systems as well."...
|
|
Michael Bushnell, a programmer at the Free Software Foundation, said the
|
|
changes are making systems more inconvenient to use and creating an
|
|
international network that cannot be used without an operator putting himself
|
|
under surveillance.
|
|
"There's not a big sharp impact because, over time, so many networks
|
|
already created security barriers," Bushnell said. Extension of these
|
|
restrictions..." is kind of like when the last critical-of-the-government
|
|
newspaper is shut down. After it's gone a while, people notice a difference.
|
|
An estimated 1,000 to 2,00 persons gained access ... and staff members say they
|
|
will try to preserve this somehow." "I feel ashamed not having an open
|
|
system," says [Richard] Stallman, "I feel ashamed having a system that treats
|
|
everyone as vandals when in fact very few were... Every time I think about this
|
|
I want to cry."
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Miser Held in Record Social Security Fraud
|
|
------------------------------------------
|
|
[Extracted from the article in from the ClariNet news service.]
|
|
|
|
Robert L. Chesney is facing trial in the single biggest Social Security
|
|
fraud case in U.S. history. He is accused of receiving retirement and
|
|
disability checks under at least 29 names. Federal agents found 15 boxes and
|
|
three steamer trunks full of birth certificates, bank statements, Social
|
|
Security cards and over 200 CA DMV id cards, each with Chesney's picture and a
|
|
different name. Chesney allegedly gleaned biographical date about public
|
|
personalities from the library. Pretending to be those people, Chesney would
|
|
write to their home counties, give their birth dates and other information and
|
|
ask for copies of their birth certificates. He then took the documents to the
|
|
DMV and obtained the ID cards with which he applied for the Social Security
|
|
benefits.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SWBT's Responds to the Supreme Court's White Pages Ruling
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------
|
|
[By SWBT Media Relations staff]
|
|
|
|
The following article discusses Southwestern Bell's response to the
|
|
recent Supreme Court ruling that White Pages Directory Listings generally are
|
|
not protected by Federal copyright law.
|
|
|
|
Media Relations Report
|
|
----------------------
|
|
Subject: White Pages Listings Generally Not Protected By Copyright Law, Supreme
|
|
Court Rules
|
|
Contact: George Stenitzer
|
|
|
|
White pages directory listings generally are not protected by federal
|
|
copyright law, the Supreme Court ruled today. The court said that white pages
|
|
listings are facts that lack the originality required to have copyright
|
|
protection, although directories as compilations may be copyrighted.
|
|
The Supreme Court ruled in the case of Feist Publications Inc. versus
|
|
Rural Telephone Service Co. Feist publishes wide area directories in parts of
|
|
Kansas, Oklahoma and Texas. When Rural, a small Kansas telephone cooperative
|
|
refused to license its white pages directory to Feist, Feist extracted listings
|
|
from Rural's directory without permission. The Supreme Court held that Rural's
|
|
listings were not entitled to copyright protection, and that Feist did not
|
|
violate copyright laws by using the listings. This ruling reversed earlier
|
|
decisions by the District Court and Court of Appeals, and expressly rejected
|
|
earlier cases holding that directory listings could be copyrighted.
|
|
Today's ruling means that other firms may use published white pages
|
|
listings without violating copyright laws. Southwestern Bell Telephone has
|
|
licensed the use of its white pages listings to directory publishers in both
|
|
paper and magnetic formats. SWBT's policy is not to license listings to direct
|
|
marketing firms but today's ruling suggests that direct marketing companies may
|
|
use published listings without a license. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages does
|
|
not license its yellow pages listings.
|
|
SWBT's licensing of published white pages listings in a paper format
|
|
represents about $250,000 in annual revenues; these revenues may be affected by
|
|
the ruling. However, today's ruling does not give other firms free access to
|
|
SWBT's yet-to-be-published listings, to listings in magnetic form, or to the
|
|
white pages database itself.
|
|
If queried, Southwestern Bell will respond as follows:
|
|
|
|
"Of course, we don't think it's fair that other firms can copy our published
|
|
listings without paying for them."
|
|
|
|
"Most of our white pages listing customers, however, are seeking updated
|
|
listings in magnetic tape form, not the right to copy listings from directories
|
|
that have already been published. Our white pages databases are updated
|
|
continuously, and the Supreme Court did not deal with the unpublished data
|
|
contained in telephone company databases"
|
|
|
|
Queries will be handled by SWBT's Sherry Smith.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Returns for Senders: (US Postal Service handling of forwardings)
|
|
----------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
[From the July/August issue of the Common Cause Magazine]
|
|
|
|
The U.S. Postal Service - the butt of so many complaints about inefficient
|
|
service -- is on its toes in one way the average mail recipient might not
|
|
appreciate. The same system that enables the Postal Service to forward your
|
|
mail to a new address also alerts scads of direct marketers -- from the folks
|
|
at your favorite mail-order company to those pesky tricksters who say they have
|
|
a special gift waiting if only you'll call to your new whereabouts. The system
|
|
seems to work for better and for worse. For better: You get the mail you want
|
|
and the Postal Service saves time and money by not delivering mail to the wrong
|
|
address. For worse: Junk mailers you never wanted to hear from discover your
|
|
new address and waste no time making use of it.
|
|
Postal officials insist that they share change-of-address information only
|
|
with those who already have your old address. Thanks to the large-scale
|
|
selling and renting of customer lists among direct mail marketers, some
|
|
companies that never knew you existed will have your particulars. The Postal
|
|
Service forwards about 2.3 billion pieces of mail a year for the 40 million
|
|
Americans who move annually, at a cost of some $1 billion, says Bob Krause,
|
|
director of the Postal Service's National Change of Address (NCOA) system.
|
|
Meanwhile 19 companies, including some of the largest direct-marketing
|
|
list management firms, pay the Postal Service an annual fee of roughly $48,000
|
|
to receive computerized NCOA updates every two weeks. These "licensees" then
|
|
provide the updated information to their customers, who pay for address changes
|
|
for consumers already on their mailing lists.
|
|
The Post Office places great importance on keeping address-correction
|
|
information secure, Krause says, and the licensees must follow strict
|
|
guidelines on what they can do with it. They may not use the information to
|
|
develop mailing lists. But direct marketers who properly obtain the
|
|
information from the Post Office or its licensees can make it available to
|
|
others with impunity. Ann Zeller, vice president for information and special
|
|
projects of the Direct Marketing Association, concedes that firms can buy
|
|
names from a direct mailer who has a consumer's new address.
|
|
Evan Hendricks, editor of the Washington-based Privacy Times newsletter,
|
|
is "very suspicious" of the system. Without realizing it, individuals who
|
|
complete change-of-address cards are permanently giving away their addresses to
|
|
anyone who asks for them," he says, and that should be clearly explained on the
|
|
card.
|
|
Of course a change-of-address card is only one of many methods direct
|
|
mailers have for learning a person's new address. Those who would sell you
|
|
their wares also mine motor vehicle records, voter rolls, magazine subscription
|
|
bases, home purchase records and other sources.
|
|
There is a way out. Individuals who want their names removed from various
|
|
mailing lists can contact the New York-based Direct Marketing Association,
|
|
which runs a name and address "suppression" service. But, Krause notes, "If
|
|
you buy something at your new address from any direct marketer, your name will
|
|
be on a number of lists within weeks."
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Inmate, working for TWA, steals credit card numbers
|
|
---------------------------------------------------
|
|
[From September 8, 1991 `Los Angeles Times']
|
|
|
|
Carl Simmons, a 20-year-old California Youth Authority inmate, working as
|
|
a TWA telephone reservation agent, stole dozens of customer credit card numbers
|
|
and used them for thousands of dollars of personal charges. He is now serving
|
|
two years in state prison for the thefts.
|
|
TWA has used CYA inmates in a special program since 1986. The story says
|
|
the program "has been touted as a way to help young criminals learn a trade and
|
|
repay their debt to society. It has raised more than $500,000 for victims'
|
|
restitution and the cost of incarceration. And the program's 213 graduates,
|
|
many of whom now work at airlines and travel agencies, are one-tenth as likely
|
|
to commit new crimes as nongraduates, CYA officials said."
|
|
CYA has tightened security, including more frequent searching of rooms and
|
|
occasional strip-searches. Inmates have always been forbidden from taking pen
|
|
and paper into the computer room, and now not even instruction manuals can be
|
|
taken out. But Simmons and another inmate said that won't stop inmates from
|
|
stealing card numbers or illegally charging airline tickets.
|
|
Fred Mills of the CYA says, "There's always going to be an exception, but
|
|
99.9 times out of a hundred in a program you're not going to get that. For
|
|
every person we can keep out of the institution for a year, that's saving the
|
|
state about $31,000. That's the thing we have to look at and balance."
|
|
One victim, New Hampshire businessman Phillip Parker, said, "I don't want
|
|
to begrudge someone a chance to make it back into a productive life, but giving
|
|
them a chance where there's a significant amount of potential for financial
|
|
fraud or risk -- maybe there's other things that would make more sense."
|
|
TWA says it will now re-evaluate the program.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Network Security Lacking at Major Stock Exchanges
|
|
-------------------------------------------------
|
|
[From Network World, Sep. 16, 1991]
|
|
|
|
"The General Accounting Office (GAO) found a total of 68 computer and
|
|
network security and control problems at five of the nation's six major
|
|
exchanges during reviews it conducted this past year for the Securities and
|
|
Exchange Commissions. The lack of adequate controls at the five stock markets
|
|
could impair their ability to maintain continuous service, protect critical
|
|
computer equipment and operations, and process correct information." The worst
|
|
three in terms of numbers of problems were the Midwest (24), Pacific (18), and
|
|
Philadelphia (18) exchanges, which were all faulted for their inadequate risk
|
|
analysis. The biggest problems were in the areas of contingency planning and
|
|
disaster recovery. The NY and American stock exchanges came off relatively
|
|
well.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Computer Security Breach at Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
[Associated Press, 9/16/91]
|
|
|
|
Security lapses at the Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant included the
|
|
storage of top-secret bomb designs for a week on a VAX accessible from the
|
|
public phone network. In other instances, workers transferred classified
|
|
working materials from secure computers to lower security ones, including PCs,
|
|
because they were tired of constant changes in the secure systems and wanted to
|
|
work on familiar systems.
|
|
Head of DOE operations at Rocky Flats Bob Nelson said that the agency
|
|
started last year a $37M program to correct security problems, following the
|
|
recommendations of outside security experts.
|
|
Nelson also said that the unclassified VAX was used by employees working
|
|
from home, but that if someone tries to break in "bells and whistles go off"
|
|
According to other documents obtained by the AP, other DOE computers had been
|
|
found to be vulnerable to break-ins.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Virus Halted Government Computers in South China
|
|
------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
HONG KONG, Sept 16 (AFP) - A spate of computer virus attacks put computers
|
|
in more than 90 Chinese governmental departments out of order, prompting the
|
|
authorities to have all software checked by police, a official Chinese news
|
|
agency reported here Monday. More than 20 kinds of the rogue disruptive
|
|
programs hit more than 75 percent of the offices' computers in southern China's
|
|
Guangdong province, the Hong Kong China News Service said. The provincial
|
|
public security bureau had ordered all government units not to use software
|
|
from unknown origin or software which had not been inspected by the bureau. In
|
|
addition, units or individuals were banned from engaging in the study of
|
|
computer viruses, or to hold training courses on them. The new regulations
|
|
forbid the sale of software capable of neutralizing the viruses. The report
|
|
said the public security bureau had set up a testing department for all
|
|
software against the computer viruses.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
AT&T Phone Failure Downs Three New York Airports For Four Hours
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
[N.Y. Times, Sep 18, 1991.]
|
|
|
|
Operations at all three New York airports ground to a standstill from 5pm
|
|
until 9pm yesterday [Sep 17, 1991] when an AT&T internal power failure at a
|
|
Manhattan 4-ESS switching center knocked out long distance calls in and out of
|
|
the city. Neighboring commercial power was unaffected. The 4-ESS system is
|
|
used to route calls between AT&T's long-distance network and the local
|
|
companies. The air traffic control centers use a network of radio towers
|
|
linked by phone lines.
|
|
Although the precise origin of Tuesday's problems remained unclear, the
|
|
extent of the difficulties provided yet another example of how dependent
|
|
today's telephone networks are on a few pieces of equipment. In recent years,
|
|
AT&T and other companies have gone to great lengths to emphasize the back-up
|
|
capacity and redundancy of their systems. Yet the long-distance carrier was
|
|
unable to reroute all traffic to other gateways for several hours after the
|
|
problems first became apparent. Calls were redirected to the two remaining
|
|
gateways, but those could not handle that much increased traffic.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Midwest Stock Exchange Reaps Millions Due to Accounting Glitch
|
|
--------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
[Summary from Chicago Tribune Business Section, 9-20-91]
|
|
|
|
The Chicago Tribune reports that leaders of the Midwest Stock Exchange had
|
|
discovered a 13-year-old accounting glitch which enabled a subsidiary to
|
|
wrongfully reap millions of dollars in interest payments which should have gone
|
|
to broker-dealers. While the exact amount of money received by the subsidiary
|
|
due to the error was not disclosed, the chairman of the exchange said that he
|
|
estimated that over the last twelve months, the firm received around 1.8
|
|
million dollars.
|
|
The accounting error, due partly to human error and partly the fault of
|
|
computers, apparently dates back to about 1978. At that time, the exchange and
|
|
two of its subsidiaries, Midwest Clearing Corp. and Midwest Securities Trust
|
|
Co., altered the way certain broker-dealer transactions were handled. Clearing
|
|
Corp. instituted a change, largely computerized, ordering broker-dealers to
|
|
wire money to it for the sale of securities before the securities were received
|
|
by Securities Trust Company.
|
|
By depositing these funds in short-term, government-backed securities,
|
|
sometimes overnight but also for longer periods, Clearing Corp. generated for
|
|
itself interest payments which should have gone to the broker-dealers. This is
|
|
referred to as "playing the float." When the clearing system is working
|
|
properly, the securities and proceeds are transmitted through the system
|
|
simultaneously, thus eliminating such a float.
|
|
The Midwest Stock Exchange insists that they are taking the situation very
|
|
seriously, and plan to pay the money back. Some exchange members are concerned
|
|
that the money used for the refund will come in the form of higher exchange
|
|
rates, putting the exchange at a serious competitive disadvantage.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SWBT sends off first 'cross-country' ISDN call
|
|
----------------------------------------------
|
|
[This Week, by Southwestern Bell Telephone]
|
|
|
|
The nation's first "cross-country" public network ISDN was placed last
|
|
week, courtesy of SWBT. The historic first call was the result of a two-year
|
|
joint effort among SWBT, BellSouth Corp., US Sprint and Bellcore. SWBT's
|
|
Advanced Technology Lab originated the call, which used US Sprint's digital
|
|
facilities in Burlingame, Calif. The call terminated at a BellSouth switch in
|
|
Atlanta, Ga.
|
|
Using an ISDN video application, SWBT's trial director Ken Goodgold
|
|
was able to see and talk to BellSouth's David Collins. "With this test,
|
|
the geographic limits of ISDN-based services were stretched from a few
|
|
miles to cross-country," Goodgold says. "We began with protocol testing
|
|
and service verification, two key parts of the process," Goodgold says.
|
|
"That required an extremely complex series of technical tests. The
|
|
Advanced Technology Lab staff worked for months performing the tests
|
|
leading up to the first successful call."
|
|
Last week's test call was significant from a marketing perspective as
|
|
well as a technical one. That's because it demonstrated the economic
|
|
benifits of using ISDN for video information. "The cost of a long distance
|
|
call is approximately the same, whether it's a voice transmission using a
|
|
regular phone line or a video transmission using ISDN," Goodgold says.
|
|
"That means a big reduction in cost to arrange a videoconference."
|
|
US Sprint joined the test because ISDN has evolved beyond the local
|
|
stage, says Terry Kero, the carrier's director of InfoCom Systems
|
|
Development Labs. "After today, it will be technically possible to make an
|
|
ISDN call across the country just as it is possible today to make a regular
|
|
long distance call," Kero says.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Computer Hacker Cited
|
|
---------------------
|
|
[Houston Chronicle Sept. 25, 1991]
|
|
|
|
WASHINGTON--A Colorado computer hacker has been charged with breaking into
|
|
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's computer system seven times
|
|
last year, the Justice Department said.
|
|
Richard Wittman, 24, of Aurora, Colo., allegedly "altered, damaged and
|
|
destroyed information" in the space agency's computer system twice, the
|
|
department said.
|
|
He was charged with illegally gaining access to the NASA computer system
|
|
and to its computers at the Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Ala.,
|
|
and the Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Md. If convicted on all
|
|
charges, he faces a maximum penalty of 15 years in prison and a $1 million
|
|
fine.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* End; Volume I, Issue 001 */
|
|
|